The Intelligence Review | volume 4 | issue 7 |

CJNG: The most powerful drug cartel in Mexico
Tracking female leadership in the Islamic State
Is the war against maritime piracy being won?
Pakistani Taliban: Current state and projections
The state of relations between Russia and China
The National Liberation Army (ELN) of Colombia
Marijuana legalization and US national security
0 EDITED BY Dr. JOSEPH FITSANAKIS
FOREWORD BY Dr. JOHN NOMIKOS

CJNG: The most powerful drug cartel in Mexico
Tracking female leadership in the Islamic State
Is the war against maritime piracy being won?
Pakistani Taliban: Current state and projections
The state of relations between Russia and China
The National Liberation Army (ELN) of Colombia
Marijuana legalization and US national security
PUBLISHED BY THE
EUROPEAN INTELLIGENCE ACADEMY
IN ASSOCIATION WITH THE
CHANTICLEER INTELLIGENCE BRIEF
EDITED BY Dr. JOSEPH FITSANAKIS
FOREWORD BY Dr. JOHN NOMIKOS

European Intelligence Academy www.euintelligenceacademy.eu
The European Intelligence Academy (EIA) was established in 2013 as an
international network of intelligence studies scholars, specialists and students,
who are dedicated to promoting research and scholarship across the European
Union (EU), as well as between the EU and other parts of the world,
particularly the United States. One of the primary aims of the EIA network
is to highlight the work of emerging graduate and undergraduate scholars
in the intelligence studies field, while encouraging cooperation in research
and scholarship between students of intelligence. The EIA is an initiative
of the Research Institute for European and American Studies (RIEAS).
Chanticleer Intelligence Brief www.cibrief.org
The Chanticleer Intelligence Brief (CIB) was established in 2015 as a studentled
initiative supported by the Department of Politics at Coastal Carolina
University (CCU) in Conway, South Carolina, United States. It operates as
an ancillary practicum for students in the National Security and Intelligence
Studies program who wish to cultivate and refine their ability to gather, analyze
and present information in accordance with techniques used in the analytical
profession. The goal of the CIB is to train aspiring intelligence professionals in
the art of producing well-researched, impartial and factual analytical products.
The European Intelligence Academy
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and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer of this volume.
2

Table of Contents
Foreword page 7
Dr. John Nomikos
Introduction page 11
Dr. Joseph Fitsanakis
CJNG: The Most Powerful Drug Cartel in Mexico page 15
Ryan Lawrence
Tracking Female Leadership in the Islamic State page 23
Tyra Bjorlo
Is the War Against Maritime Piracy Being Won? page 31
Kyle Brossard
The Pakistani Taliban: Current State and Projections page 37
Morgan Clasgens
The Current and Projected Status of Sino-Russian Relations page 45
Audrey Oien
The National Liberation Army (ELN) of Colombia page 55
Joseph Cain
Marijuana Legalization and US National Security page 63
Madison Scholar
Biographical Notes on Contributors page 69
5

6

Foreword
In 2006, during the peak of the conflict in Iraq, and amidst the
carnage of the Israel-Hezbollah war, we created the Research
Institute for European and American Studies (RIEAS). Our
goal was to promote cross-Atlantic research in international
affairs and security issues. From the beginning of our effort, we
devoted particular attention to issues such as the relationship
between the United States and its transatlantic partners,
intelligence and security studies, the integration of the European
Union on matters of security, and several pressing aspects of
global security. We have also worked systematically on Balkan and
Mediterranean studies, Turkish and Russian security policy, as
well as policy- and decision-making on national and international
markets.
To further-promote these goals, 2018, RIEAS launched a new
international scholarly publication, The Journal of European and
American Intelligence Studies (JEAIS). JEAIS is an academic-led
journal that focuses on the field of intelligence, but also touches
on several related areas of study and practice. Our emphasis is
on intelligence theory and practice, terrorism and counterterrorism,
homeland security, international security, international
relations, and geopolitics. The JEAIS has already published
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three issues and has acquired a reputation as an all-inclusive
academic platform that enables established and emerging scholars
and practitioners of intelligence to share their perspectives. These
authors, who come from both the public and private sectors,
converge in JEAIS in order to share their knowledge, ideas and
—often innovative— approaches to intelligence studies.
The European Intelligence Academy is another project of RIEAS.
It was launched in 2013 with the goal of assisting and promoting the
growth of the field of intelligence studies in European academic
institutions, in cooperation with our American partners. The
EIA aims to advance the intelligence profession and intelligence
scholarship by helping set standards, build resources and share
knowledge within the intelligence field. It also aims to promote a
strong intelligence culture in the academic institutions of European
Union member-states. Furthermore, the EIA promotes crossborder
research and scholarship cooperation between intelligence
academics in the European Union and their colleagues in other
parts of the world, particularly the United States.
Another major aspect of the EIA’s effort is to highlight the work
of emerging postgraduate and undergraduate scholars in the
intelligence studies field, and to provide them with a forum to
pursue relevant research and exchange ideas. The ultimate goal of
this effort is to connect young scholars who focus their undergraduate
and post-graduate studies on intelligence in Europe
and the United States. We are therefore extremely pleased to
mark the publication of this issue of The Intelligence Review, Vol.4,
No.7, December 2019, edited by Professor Joseph Fitsanakis of
Coastal Carolina University’s Intelligence and National Security
Studies program, and published by the EIA in association with
the Chanticleer Intelligence Brief.
Indeed, the deep connections between RIEAS and Coastal Carolina
University’s Intelligence and National Security Studies program
epitomize the EIA’s efforts to promote transatlantic cooperation
among students and emerging scholars of intelligence. In the
8

summer of 2018, RIEAS hosted over 20 members of Coastal
Carolina University’s Intelligence and National Security Studies
program in Athens, Greece, where they attended the EIAsponsored
workshop entitled “Illicit Antiquities Smuggling and
Organized Crime”. The workshop was led by government officials
and leading experts from the police and security services. We
hope to have an opportunity to repeat this fruitful exchange in
the future.
The work of the young scholars at Coastal Carolina University’s
intelligence program is at the heart of RIEAS’ efforts, and
reflects the goals and mission of the EIA. We are therefore
honored to support the superb effort that has led to this latest
volume of The Intelligence Review.
Dr. John Nomikos
Director, European Intelligence Academy
9

10

Introduction
Dr. Joseph Fitsanakis
Associate Professor, Intelligence and National Security Studies program,
Coastal Carolina University
Deputy Director, European Intelligence Academy
The Chanticleer Intelligence Brief (CIB) reached out to the European
Intelligence Academy (EIA) in 2016 to explore possible paths
of collaboration. At that time, the CIB had been in operation
for just over a year, having been founded in January of 2015 as
a student-led extracurricular project of the Intelligence and
National Security Studies program at Coastal Carolina University.
The project drew its human capital, and its inspiration, from
some of the most determined and ambitious undergraduate
students in our growing intelligence program at Coastal Carolina
University. These students had received hundreds of hours on
in-class instruction on the fundamentals of intelligence collection
and analysis. They were eager to put those skills to the test
focusing on domestic and international problems developing in
real time. The CIB quickly became the platform that allowed
these ambitious students to put their knowledge to the test.
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By the end of the first semester of the CIB’s operation, two
things were becoming clear: first that, in the process of applying
their intelligence-related skills to real-life problems, CIB analysts
were producing a significant amount of research output; and
second, that this output was both timely and worth distributing
to the outside world. We began to do just that, initially by
publicizing the CIB’s output through our website, www.cibrief.org.
February of 2016 saw the first three analytical products appear
on the CIB website. There was an update on the of extradition
of the Sinaloa leader Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán to the United
States, as well as a time-sensitive analysis of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization’s military buildup in Eastern Europe.
Additionally, our domestic affairs desk evaluated the internal
rivalries between the volatile milieu of far-right-wing groups and
militias in the United States.
It was at that critical moment that the EIA contacted us to
propose the creation of a new publication that would share the
work of the CIB with the world. The first product of this
collaborative effort was published in July of 2016. It contained
reports from 11 CIB analysts on topics such as the Islamic State,
the Afghan Taliban, and the intricacies of North Korea’s
domestic political landscape. Other reports touched on the
political stability of Venezuela, the future of the European
Union, and the global oil market. Today, six issues of the journal
later, we can say that we have published over 50 examples of
intelligence products by CIB analysts, spanning just about every
major pressing security-related issue under the sun since 2016.
The process of selecting analytical products for publication has
remained the same since our first issue. All of the CIB’s output
is submitted for review by an expert panel of current intelligence
practitioners. The panel judges these submissions in accordance
with standard editorial procedures that follow the double-blind
standard. The selection process focuses heavily on effective
writing and precise argumentation from the point of view of the
intelligence practitioner. The final selection that makes it to
publication represents the very best that the CIB’s written output
12

has to offer. In addition to the impressive acumen of their authors,
these analyses showcase one of the unique attributes of the
Intelligence and National Security Studies program at Coastal
Carolina University.
As always, the contents of our present volume are both timely and
insightful. CIB analyst Ryan Lawrence examines a series of recent
developments surrounding the Jalisco New Generation Cartel,
which is arguably Mexico’s most powerful. Tyra Bjorlo discusses
the highly overlooked issue of the rising importance of women
in Salafi-jihadist groups, with particular reference to the Islamic
State. Kyle Brossard focuses on the ongoing war against maritime
piracy in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Guinea. Morgan
Clasgens brings us up to speed on the current state of the
Pakistani Taliban, and considers their future prospects. Audrey
Oien evaluates the current and projected status of relations
between Russia and China. Joseph Cain focuses on the National
Liberation Army, a Colombia-based armed militant group with an
increasing presence in Venezuela. And Madison Scholar considers
the national-security implications of marijuana legalization in the
United States.
This is undoubtedly one of the most impressive array of analysts
that the CIB has ever been able to showcase in The Intelligence
Review. In addition to the persistence and talent of our CIB
analysts, the quality of this publication continues to improve
thanks to the support of Coastal Carolina University faculty and
staff, the invaluable sponsorship of the EIA, and the continuous
input and encouragement we receive from current and former
members of the United States Intelligence Community. Their
support inspires us to continue our work in the future.
13

14

CJNG: The Most Powerful Drug Cartel
in Mexico
Ryan Lawrence
Contemporary cartel power structures are remarkably fluid, and
it is well established that the cartel landscape is today more
fragmented and competitive than ever before (Beittel 2018:24).
The sentencing of former Sinaloa cartel boss Joaquín “El
Chapo” Guzmán Loera to life in a United States (US) prison, in
tandem with impending changes to law enforcement protocol,
may indicate yet another significant shift in Mexico’s cartel
landscape. Consequently, it can be stated with moderate confidence
that the Sinaloa cartel remains Mexico’s most powerful drug
cartel, with respect to cohesion of the leadership and personnel
apparatus, territorial control and overall operational capability.
However, the cartel has entered a state of decline. Therefore, it
can also be stated with moderate confidence that the Jalisco
New Generation Cartel (CJNG) is poised to become Mexico’s
most powerful drug cartel over the course of current Mexican
President Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s term.
15

Background
In 2006, then-President Felipe Calderón deployed the Mexican
military into the streets to combat rising cartel violence and
militarization. The strategy employed by Calderón, and his
eventual successor, Enrique Peña Nieto, called for the removal
of “kingpins” and prominent leaders within the cartels. Its
aftermath saw increased cartel balkanization due to ensuing
power struggles (Lee et al. 2019). Fractures within several
prominent cartels and the resulting clashes among splinter
groups led to significantly higher levels of violence all across
Mexico. One of these fractures was responsible for the creation
of the CJNG, a splinter group of the now defunct Milenio cartel,
which at the time operated under the Sinaloa cartel. The CJNG
retained a working relationship with the Sinaloa cartel until the
summer of 2013, after which the organizations separated
(Beittel 2018:22). Notably, this dissociation occurred around the
same time Guzmán was a wanted fugitive and consequently
arrested for the second time. After his second escape, Guzmán
was rearrested for a third and final time on January 8, 2016,
following a shootout with Mexican marines. He was extradited
to the United States a year later, on January 19, 2017, to stand
trial (Beittel 2018:10).
All the while, the CJNG has focused its efforts on taking advantage
of a regional power vacuum, capitalizing on the disorder and
uncertainty within the Sinaloa and other rival cartels and rapidly
expanding its operations to a global scale. It is estimated that the
CJNG now boasts a presence in 23 of the 31 Mexican states
while also carrying out operations in the Americas, Asia and
Europe (Beittel 2018:23-24; Drug Enforcement Administration
2018:97). As recently as 2018, the CJNG was described as one of
the most territorially aggressive cartels in Mexico, as illustrated
by its efforts to seize control of key ports on the Pacific and
Gulf Coasts, which grant the group even greater control of the
narcotics supply chain (Beittel 2018:23). The CJNG’s aggressive
expansion efforts have contributed in large part to the epidemic
levels of violence that presently afflict contested cities such as
16

Tijuana, Juarez, Guanajuato and Mexico City (Stewart 2019).
Indeed, this aggression has caught the attention of both Mexican
and US authorities, and the cartel’s surging notoriety recently
prompted the US Department of Justice to rank it among the
five most dangerous transnational criminal organizations in the
world (Drug Enforcement Administration 2018).
Conviction of Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán Loera
Guzmán’s trial took place in Brooklyn, New York, and lasted
11 weeks, with a guilty verdict delivered on February 12, 2019.
The drug kingpin was convicted on several counts, including
distribution of cocaine and heroin, illegal firearms possession
and money laundering (Drug Enforcement Administration
2019). Guzmán’s removal prompted internal conflict and
speculation about the future of the Sinaloa cartel, though it is
widely believed that his longtime associate, Ismael “El Mayo”
Zambada García, has assumed leadership of the cartel (Beittel
2018:14). However, his leadership is not without contention;
Zambada is in poor health, and Guzmán’s two sons, Ivan
Archivaldo and Jesús Alfredo, have thus far struggled to tame
internal power struggles in their father’s absence (Anon. 2018;
Agren 2017). Despite Zambada’s deteriorating health and his
lieutenants’ inability to quench dissent within the cartel’s ranks,
the Sinaloa retains international dominance and may still have
influence in the highest levels of the Mexican government
(Beittel 2018:14).
Possibility of Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) Designation
In an interview on March 12, 2019, US President Donald Trump
stated that his administration was seriously considering labeling
violent Mexican drug cartels, or factions of specific cartels, as
Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) following a February
20, 2019 letter sent to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo by US
Representatives Chip Roy and Mark Green (Phillips 2019). In
their letter, the Congressmen requested that the administration
classify the CJNG and other particularly violent cartels as FTOs
so as to introduce sanctions on cartel members and their assets
17

and further-stigmatize the groups domestically and abroad (Roy
2019). Roy and Green argue that an FTO designation would
make entry into the US unlawful for cartel members and those
providing material support or resources, and would allow the
US Department of the Treasury to block cartel assets (Roy 2019).
President Andrés Manuel Lopéz Obrador’s New Strategy
The election of current Mexican President Andrés Manuel Lopéz
Obrador spurred optimism in Mexico, as he pledged to make
significant changes to the country’s counter-cartel operations.
Citing the epidemic levels of violence and his predecessors’
failure with military intervention, López Obrador began his
reforms by declaring an end to the Mexican Drug War on
January 30, 2019 (Quackenbush 2019). In an attempt to reduce
cartel balkanization, the administration also pledged efforts to
cease the targeting of cartel kingpins, remove the military from
ongoing counter-narcotics operations, and prioritize the
development of a National Guard. These measures are planned
to accompany the possible decriminalization of marijuana and
amnesty for low-level criminals (Agren 2018). Despite these
repeated claims, López Obrador has continued to rely on the
military through the beginning months of his term, and violence
levels remain on pace to reach record highs in 2019, drawing
criticism from many observers about the efficacy of López
Obrador’s enforcement efforts (Agren 2018; Anon. 2019).
Moreover, despite López Obrador’s legislative success with the
creation of the National Guard, efforts to find new recruits have
been hampered in part by public protests by officers of the
Mexican federal police as recently as the beginning of July 2019
(Anon. 2019).
Analysis
Despite the apparent instability and relative decline of the Sinaloa
cartel as a result of Guzmán’s removal, it should be noted that
the cartel continues to control numerous territories and critical
drug trafficking routes in Mexico. Moreover, it maintains the
18

most expansive influence of any cartel, both in Mexico and
internationally (Drug Enforcement Administration 2018:97; Knierim
2018:6). However, since the CJNG’s rise to prominence between
2013 and 2015, the group has extended its geographic reach
while maintaining high levels of internal cohesion, exploiting the
splintering of the Sinaloa cartel (Beittel 2018:23-24). Notably,
2018 and the first half of 2019 have proven to be a time of
relative stasis among the cartel conflict zones, with no cartel
gaining any significant territory (Stewart 2019). This may
indicate the slow decline of the Sinaloa cartel, allowing it to still
retain a tentative grasp on its status as Mexico’s most powerful
drug cartel in the near term.
Furthermore, FTO designations by President Trump’s administration
could signal a significant shift in the methods employed by US
law enforcement to pursue powerful cartels like the CJNG
(Phillips 2019). Worth noting, however, is that the CJNG has
been resistant to numerous enforcement efforts thus far,
including financial sanctions by the US Department of the
Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (Beittel 2018:24).
Meanwhile, López Obrador’s decision to declare an end to the
Mexican Drug War and cease the targeting of cartel leaders is
likely an attempt to curb epidemic levels of violence in Mexico,
including a record 33,341 intentional homicides in 2018 (Romo
2019). This indicates what is likely to be a decrease in instances
of confrontation between the military and the cartels, but could
also have the unintended result of solidifying the leadership
apparatuses of existing cartels, possibly enabling these groups
to further consolidate their power. Moreover, despite claims
from López Obrador that violence in Mexico had not risen, it
was recently reported that 8,493 people were murdered from
January 1 to March 31 of this year, amounting to a 9.6 percent
increase over the same period in 2018 (Anon. 2019). This signals
a probable continuation of the cartel-fueled violence that has
gripped Mexico for over a decade.
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Conclusion
The Sinaloa cartel has been confirmed to be in a state of
deterioration, in light of Joaquín Guzmán’s conviction and the
splintering due to competition for leadership. Despite these
factors, the cartel retains significant influence and presence in
the international drug trade. However, as 2018 and the first half
of 2019 were marked by stagnations in cartel expansion, it can
be surmised that the Sinaloa’s decay will continue to be gradual.
Therefore, it can be stated with moderate confidence that the
Sinaloa cartel remains Mexico’s most powerful drug cartel, but
is in a state of decline. Additionally, taking into account the
CJNG’s meteoric rise to power and its ongoing stability despite
heightened enforcement efforts by US and Mexican authorities,
it can also be stated with moderate confidence that the CJNG
will definitively become Mexico’s most powerful drug cartel
during President López Obrador’s term.
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Bibliography of References Cited
Agren, D. (2017) “Mexico After El Chapo: New Generation Fights for Control
of the Cartel”, The Guardian, 5 May <https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2017/may/05/el-chapo-sinaloa-drug-cartel-mexico>, accessed on
23 April 2019.
Agren, D. (2018) “Mexican President-elect’s New Plan to Fight Crime
Looks Like the Old Plan”, The Guardian, 21 November <https://www.
theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/21/president-elect-amlo-pledges-newmilitary-force-fight-crime-mexico>,
accessed on 23 April 2019.
Anonymous (2018) “As El Chapo’s Day in Court Begins, El Mayo Fights
to Control the Sinaloa Cartel” Mexico News Daily, 5 November <https://
mexiconewsdaily.com/news/el-chapos-day-in-court-begins/>, accessed
on 23 April 2019.
Anonymous (2019) “Mexican Police Protest Against Joining New National
Guard”, Reuters, 3 July <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mexicosecurity/mexican-police-protest-against-joining-new-national-guard-idUS
KCN1TZ07W?il=0>, accessed on 8 July 2019.
Anonymous (2019) “Mexico Murder Rate Rises in First Three Months of
2019”, BBC, 22 April <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-
48012923>, accessed on 23 April 2019.
Beittel, J.S. (2018) Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations,
Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC, United States.
Knierim, P.E. (2018) Narcos: Transnational Cartels and Border Security, United
States Drug Enforcement Administration, Springfield, VA, United States.
Lee, B., Renwick, D., and Labrador, R.C. (2019) “Mexico’s Drug War”.
Council on Foreign Relations, New York, New York, United States <
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/mexicos-drug-war>, accessed on 22
April 2019.
Phillips, B.J. (2019) “Would Trump Label Mexican Cartels Terrorist
Organizations?”, The Washington Post, 26 March <https://www.washington
post.com/politics/2019/03/26/would-trump-label-mexican-cartelsterrorist-organizations/?utm_term=.6bbe272abd5c>,
accessed on 23
April 2019.
Quackenbush, C. (2019) “‘There Is Officially No More War.’ Mexico’s
President Declares an End to the Drug War Amid Skepticism”, Time, 31
January <http://time.com/5517391/mexico-president-ends-drug-war/>,
accessed on 23 April 2019.
Romo, V. (2019) “Mexico Reports Highest Ever Homicide Rate In 2018,
Tops 33,000 Investigations”, National Public Radio, 23 January <https://
www.npr.org/2019/01/23/687579971/mexico-reports-highest-everhomicide-rate-in-2018-tops-33-000-investigations>,
accessed on 23 April
2019.
Roy, C. (2019) “Rep. Chip Roy Releases Bill Asking Sec. Pompeo To
Designate Cartels Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs)”, Congressman
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Chip Roy, 12 March <https://roy.house.gov/media/press-releases/repchip-roy-releases-bill-asking-sec-pompeo-designate-cartels-foreign>,
accessed on 23 April 2019.
Stewart, S. (2019) “Tracking Mexico’s Cartels in 2019”, Stratfor World
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accessed on 23 April 2019.
US Drug Enforcement Administration (2018) “Justice, Treasury, and
State Departments Announce Coordinated Enforcement Efforts Against
Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generacion”, United States Drug Enforcement
Administration, Springfield, VA, United States <https://www.dea.gov/
press-releases/2018/10/16/justice-treasury-and-state-departmentsannounce-coordinated-enforcement>,
accessed on 23 April 2019.
US Drug Enforcement Administration (2018) “National Drug Threat
Assessment”, United States Drug Enforcement Administration, Springfield,
VA, United States.
US Drug Enforcement Administration (2019) “Joaquin “El Chapo”
Guzman, Sinaloa Cartel Leader, Convicted of Running a Continuing
Criminal Enterprise and Other Drug Related Charges”, United States
Drug Enforcement Administration, Springfield, VA, United States
<https://www.dea.gov/press-releases/2019/02/12/joaquin-el-chapoguzman-sinaloa-cartel-leader-convicted-running>,
accessed on 23 April 2019.
22

Tracking Female Leadership in the
Islamic State
Tyra Bjorlo
It can be stated with moderate confidence that a female is likely to
openly lead a Salafi-jihadist group within the decade. Leadership
roles can be defined as leading a unit, such as propaganda or
domestic policing, or serving as an inspiring figurehead, or an
operational leader. The current wave of religious terrorism,
specifically Salafi-jihadism, has been present since approximately
1979. However, since 2014, there has been an unprecedented
gender evolution in Islamic fundamentalist groups. These have
historically been predominantly male, but are now encouraging
and even praising female participation in operational roles. This
transition from traditional to non-traditional gender roles has
encouraged women to join Salafi-jihadist groups, serving in
unacknowledged leadership positions, as well as on the frontline.
Discussion
The year 2019 has marked a historic paradigm shift for Salafijihadist
groups with regard to the utilization of women. Women
23

are becoming increasingly involved in combat operations and
these groups are displaying mounting indicators of female
recruitment (Shipman 2019). It is important to note it is not just
Muslim women from local societies in the Middle East and
Southeast Asia that are joining Salafi-jihadist groups. Much of
these groups’ recruitment propaganda is communicated in
English, French, German, and other European languages,
indicating that Westerners are the primary target audience.
Foreign women are arguably the primary target of Salafi-jihadist
propaganda aimed at females. A primary example is the Islamic
State newspaper known as Dabiq. In 2017, women were pictured
in the pages of the magazine posing with AK-47s and headlines
called for women to “prepare for battle” (Mironova 2019).
The phenomenon of the combat roles that IS women are
partaking in has not been witnessed before in Salafi-jihadist
groups. There is a history of female fighters in secular groups;
however, with the exception of a small number of female suicide
bombers in the early 2000s, women in Islamist groups have
been exclusively used for spousal support, specifically the
provision of sexual favors (as sexual slaves) and as caretakers.
The main reason for the strict gender hierarchy that Salafijihadist
groups have historically practiced has to do with
traditions associated with silencing women, preventing them
from being educated, and considering them the property of men
in conservative Middle Eastern societies. Yet, existing Salafijihadist
groups are not just recruiting Muslim women, but also
large numbers of foreign women – particularly from the West.
The irony is that Salafi-jihadist groups, which originate from the
Middle East, are now recruiting from Muslim communities in
non-traditional Muslim regions, such as North America.
These women have nothing in common except for the way they
were recruited. Moreover, studies show women become
radicalized and join Salafi-jihadist groups for several reasons:
political grievances, feelings of social alienation, need for
acceptance, youthful rebellion, liberation from oppressive social
environments, and self-empowerment through leadership roles.
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The uses of 21 st -century digital media innovations have
contributed to a shift in communication and recruitment
strategies (Nacos 2016). They also provide women and men
with an anonymous approach to joining Salafi-jihadist groups.
Digital media eliminates the risk of receiving criticism from
larger communities. For example, cultural courtesies, such as
looking into the eyes of one another or shaking hands, might
interfere with a foreign woman’s ability to communicate faceto-face
with a male militant. It also allows women to bypass the
need to travel to foreign countries, which was the only way to
connect with Salafi-jihadist groups prior to the dawn of digital
media, and increases the risk of being caught by authorities.
Women are indirectly lured into Salafi-jihadist groups through
the Internet via chat rooms and dating websites, as well as on
social media platforms like YouTube, Twitter, Facebook, and
WhatsApp. The data on this topic is inconclusive, but case
studies show that an increasing number of women who marry
male militants subsequently become directly involved in the
groups. Many of these women serve as the brains behind
organized attacks, head propaganda units, and partake in
combat operations (Mironova 2019).
Recent Developments
Many female jihadists were defiant when leaving the last Islamic
State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) stronghold in the city of Baghouz
in northeastern Syria. The women were evacuated to a refugee
camp run by Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces. When
interviewed by journalists, the women are typically angry and
persistent, vowing to continue fighting for Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi (their self-proclaimed caliph prior to his death), in
hopes of re-establishing the Islamic caliphate. More specifically,
a BBC journalist, Jewan Abdi, was attacked with stones and
trash while some women shouted, “Go film the brothers, don’t
come here. Go. Leave. Go film them, we’re the women of the
Islamic State, Allahu Akbar, Allahu Akbar (God is greatest)”
(Abdi 2019). This indicates radicalization beyond defeat. IS
25

women engaged in support and operational roles are more radical
than believed.
One interesting case is that of Shamima Begum, an ISIS bride
hoping to return home to the United Kingdom (UK). She is
currently fighting for her citizenship to be reinstated after it was
revoked by the UK government in February 2019. Begum left
the UK in 2015 to join IS (Ensor and Mendick 2019). Amidst
the legal battle, several contradicting news reports were released,
which revealed Begum’s roles while she was affiliated with ISIS.
Recently, it was reported that Begum was not just a bride, but a
“cruel enforcer” of the all-female morality police squad within
ISIS, al-Hisba (Ensor and Mendick 2019). The mission of al-
Hisba is to enforce sharia, or religious law, in the areas that ISIS
controls. The local population that has been subjugated to ISIS
considers Al-Hisba as the group’s most notorious and feared
unit (Ensor and Mendick 2019). In fact, women receive an
elevated status for volunteering to be part of the force.
Another important case study involves Samantha Lewthwaite,
deemed the world’s most wanted female jihadist. She is a
member of al-Shabaab, a branch of IS located in Somalia (West
2019). She is also known as the “White Widow” and referred to
as the “intelligence mastermind” behind many attacks planned
and executed in Somalia, Kenya, and even Europe (West 2019).
She is a known senior female figure for al-Shabaab’s intelligence
wing, the Amniyat – the reason that IS in Somalia survives – and
has indirectly recruited more young women to the group
through her media campaign (Harper 2019). The Amniyat is
considered the heart of al-Shabaab because of its widespread
power and stealthiness. Success in enemy territories, such as
government-held areas, can be attributed to the Amniyat and its
intelligence operations – including the utilization of spies and
women to track down targets and attract recruits (Harper 2019).
Currently, Lewthwaite is on the run and suspected to be
planning more attacks in Europe. To evade capture from state
security forces, she is believed to have undergone a series of
plastic surgeries (West 2019).
26

Analysis
Some Salafi-jihadist groups are coming to the conclusion that
they need women in order to survive. Women present
significant security concerns for governments and should be
viewed as militant assets rather than victims by counterterrorism
forces. Likewise, state security forces need to reevaluate their
own gender stereotypes if they want to preempt the activities of
Salafi-jihadist groups. Many state security forces, such as the
Iraqi Special Operations Forces, have adopted the same strict
gender hierarchy that is employed in conservative Middle
Eastern societies. Ironically, ISIS is arguably more inclusive of
women than state security forces combatting terrorism. State
security forces lack female soldiers and are, therefore, illprepared
to address this shift in terrorism strategies.
Male fighters can be physically protected from police if women
perform tasks that are usually carried out by their male
counterparts (Mironova 2019). Women can also evade scrutiny
at security checkpoints because they can disguise suicide vests
under their long black headdresses, store supplies on their back
where a child would typically be nestling, and use their niqabs to
cover additional materials – such as monetary funds – and
weaponry. The three aforementioned cases embody this rapidly
evolving paradigm shift. Women are valuable assets to groups
that need to prioritize stealth for survival. Territorial losses and
the inability to defeat state security forces has threated the selfproclaimed
ISIS caliphate and prevented IS from expanding in
the region. Their voluntary and willing participation in
operational roles indicates that women are persistent and eager
to help achieve the group’s objectives.
There is a dynamic of change from within Salafi-jihadist groups
and it is very likely that women will continue to pose significant
security threats. Although women are not formally recognized
as leaders within Salafi-jihadist groups, many already hold such
a status. Vera Mironova, a visiting fellow at Harvard University,
states, “[a]ccording to a survey a colleague and I conducted in
Mosul [Iraq] in December [2018], 85 percent of 400 responders
27

said that in the past, Islamic State women were as radical as men
and 80 percent agreed or strongly agreed that they played an
important role in the group; 82 percent said they agreed or
strongly agreed that [IS] women will be dangerous for Mosul in
the future” (Mironova 2019). Not only should counterterrorism
forces be cautious of women, but even the children of
radicalized parents are likely to adopt IS ideology and become a
future threat as well (Sputnik International2018).
Conclusion
It can be stated with moderate confidence that a female will
likely openly lead a Salafi-jihadist group within the decade. This
revolution in gender roles began with the establishment of ISIS,
but the conclusions of this article can be applied to cases
involving Boko Haram in Nigeria, al-Shabaab in Somalia, and
most recently, the National Thowheed Jamath in Sri Lanka.
Women are seen as critical to the survival of Salafi-jihadist
groups and are just as ideologically driven as males, which makes
women more of a threat than previously believed. The West has
completely misinterpreted these groups. Now, countering Salafijihadist
groups involves the need for gender-informed threat
assessments and counterterrorism strategies (Shipman 2019).
28

Bibliography of References Cited
Abdi, J. (2019) “Islamic State Women Defiant in Face of Lost Caliphate”,
BBC News, 13 March <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middleeast-47553726>,
accessed on 15 March 2019.
Ensor, J., and Mendick, R. (2019) “UK Teen Shamima Begum was in
ISIS’s ‘All-Female Police Squad”, Stuff, 14 April <https://www.stuff.
co.nz/world/middle-east/112024668/uk-teen-shamima-begum-was-inisiss-allfemale-police-squad>,
accessed on 17 April 2019.
Harper, M. (2019) “Somalia’s Frightening Network of Islamist Spies”, BBC
News, 27 May <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-48390166>,
accessed on 26 June 2019.
Manisera, S. (2017) “‘I Came for the Jihad’: Women Tell of Life in the
Islamic State”, Syria Deeply, 29 September < https://www.newsdeeply.
com/syria/articles/2017/09/29/i-came-for-the-jihad-women-tell-oflife-in-the-islamic-state>,
accessed on 4 April 2019.
Mironova, V. (2019) “Is the Future of ISIS Female?”, The New York Times,
20 February <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/20/opinion/islamicstate-female-fighters.html>,
accessed on 4 April 2019.
Nacos, B.L. (2016) Mass-Mediated Terrorism: Mainstream and Digital Media in
Terrorism and Counterterrorism, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, New York,
United States.
Shipman, M. (2019) “Study Highlights How Little We Know About
Women Terrorists”, NC State University News, 29 April <https://news.
ncsu.edu/2019/04/study-highlights-how-little-we-know-about-womenterrorists/>,
accessed on 29 April 2019.
Sputnik International (2018) “Threat by Jihadist ‘Wives and Children’ and
How France, Britain Deal With It”, Sputnik News, 24 October, accessed
on 10 July 2019.
West, S. (2019) “Asset or Victims: A Portrait of Women Within Al-
Shabaab”, Jamestown Foundation, 25 March <https://jamestown.org/program/
asset-or-victims-a-portrait-of-women-within-al-shabaab>, accessed on 4
April 2019.
Williams, Z. (2014) “The Radicalisation of Samantha Lewthwaite, the
Aylesbury Schoolgirl Who Became ‘The White Widow”, The Guardian, 27
June <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/jun/27/what-radi
calised-samantha-lewthwaite-77-london-bombings>, accessed on 8 April
2019.
29

30

Is the War Against Maritime Piracy
Being Won?
Kyle Brossard
Maritime piracy has been a threat to seafarers for millennia.
Today, pirates target both private and commercial vessels, with
the goal of either hijacking the ship, stealing its cargo, or
kidnapping its crewmembers. The contemporary war against
piracy began in the mid-2000s and quickly became an
international issue of concern. Piracy has been highly
concentrated in two main areas: the Indian Ocean, including the
Gulf of Aden, and West Africa, specifically in the Gulf of
Guinea. Currently, it can be stated with moderate confidence
that the war against maritime piracy is being won in the Indian
Ocean. It can also be stated with high confidence that the war
is not being won in West Africa.
Background
In the early to late 2000s, piracy was primarily a phenomenon
that concentrated in the Indian Ocean. Pirates came from a
variety of countries, with the majority hailing from Somalia.
31

Pirate attacks increased by 200 percent in the region between
2007 and 2008 (International Chamber of Commerce 2019).
These pirates focused on attempting to hijack ships and either
steal their goods or hold crewmembers for ransom. In 2008, the
Gulf of Aden became a high-risk area for ships to travel
through, since over 400 vessels were attacked within two years
(ICC International Maritime Bureau 2018:4). Because of the
growing number of violent attacks on cargo ships worldwide,
the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL)
became involved. Interpol focused on three areas to combat
piracy in the region, first by improving evidence collection on
piracy incidents and networks. Secondly, it began increasing
information exchange between the governments of countries
battling the pirates. And lastly, it encouraged countries to build
up their regional capabilities in order to combat the proliferation
of the pirates’ home bases (International Criminal Police
Organization n.d.). In 2009, the United States (US) launched an
international campaign in order to combat the pirates,
specifically in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. The force
included ships from over 20 countries, including the United
Kingdom and Canada. The campaign targeted pirate groups and
conducted routine patrols in the region. China conducted an
anti-piracy operation of its own in the area for six years. They
deployed a variety of navy ships and provided escorts for over
2,000 ships traveling through the region (Erickson and Strange
2015:ch3). Both operations concluded after piracy declined in
the region and was no longer a major threat for ships.
Piracy was relatively minimal from 2014 to 2016, with few
attacks happening in the Indian Ocean. However, in 2017
attacks in West Africa grew rapidly and have been increasing
ever since. It quickly became known as a high-risk area in the
Gulf of Guinea, with a new wave of pirates. Pirates mainly came
from Nigeria, and usually traveled over 170 nautical miles out
to sea to carry out attacks, which is a significantly longer journey
than that of previous pirates (Oladipo 2017). They are also more
violent and take extreme risks compared to pirates from
Somalia. They have been reported to have larger weapons and
32

faster boats. A detailed report from an attack in May, showed
that pirates were able to hijack a tug boat, which they equipped
with lager weapons on deck and used it to attack tanker ships.
(ICC International Maritime Bureau 2019). Their goal when
attacking a ship, is to take as many hostages as possible and then
hold them for ransom (Oladipo 2017).
Recent Developments
The Indian Ocean has seen a decrease in piracy in 2018 with no
successful hijacking of ships by pirates since 2013 (BIMCO et
al. 2018:3). In April 2019 there were a few reported attacks, but
they were low-level with no casualties or hostages taken. There
has only been one successful hijacking where pirates were able
to board and steal a medium-size fishing vessel off the central
coast of Somalia. They then used the vessel as a “mothership”
to get further out to sea, where they attacked two larger fishing
vessels. The pirates fled the vessels after armed guards shot at
them. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces in
the region were able to intercept the pirate ship and detain the
pirates (Maritime Executive 2019). Other than the one
successful attack, piracy incidents are limited and remain small.
Currently, the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden still remain
high-risk areas for piracy. But, according to the International
Maritime Bureau (IMB), the designated geographic area will be
cut in half in May 2019 given the decrease in incidents in the
region (International Chamber of Commerce 2019). Ships
traveling in the region are encouraged to take anti-piracy
measures, but they are now able to travel through the region
without escorts.
So far, piracy in West Africa in 2019 is on track to surpass the
200 incidents in 2018. In 2018, 130 of the 141 crewmembers
taken hostage were from the Gulf of Guinea (ICC International
Maritime Bureau 2018:5). This year there have been 45 attacks
in the region, with an estimated 75 people taken hostage (ICC
International Maritime Bureau 2019). In one particular incident,
pirates used two small vessels to attack a cargo vessel off the
coast of Nigeria. The cargo vessel had four armed Nigerian
33

Naval guards aboard, who engaged in combat with the pirates.
Two of the guards were shot and one was killed by the pirates,
as the latter eventually boarded the ship. After boarding the
ship, the pirates took five crew members hostage and have kept
them ever since. It has also been reported that around 90
percent of pirate attacks in Nigeria had some insider help from
the ship’s crew. The latter either provided information on the
ship’s whereabouts or even participated in the attack (Maritime
Executive 2019).
Currently, the main regional actor combating the pirates is the
Nigerian Navy. It is conducting patrols in the region and assigns
guards to some ships when sailing in the area. In March of this
year, the US conducted a multinational maritime security exercise
called OBANGAME Express 2019, based in Lagos, Nigeria
(Maritime Executive 2019). Its purpose was to provide training
to the Nigerian Navy on ship boardings and anti-piracy tactics.
The US also provided training on new combat ships and
weapons, in order to help the Nigerian Navy combat pirates. It
lasted five days and incorporated over 80 ships from 33 countries.
At the end of the operation, the Nigerian Navy expressed its
gratitude but emphasized the need for more operations and
assistance in combating pirates in the region (Maritime Executive
2019). Five days after the exercise, Nigerian pirates hijacked three
ships, took nine crewmembers hostage and killed one in the
process. Interpol is currently helping train the Nigerian
authorities on how to build a case and prosecute the pirates
(International Criminal Police Organization n.d.).
Analysis
Even with the recent attack on two ships in the Indian Ocean,
pirates in the region are not a large threat. Their capabilities are
limited and they lack sufficient equipment in order to conduct
large-scale attacks. Rear Admiral Antonio Martorell (Spanish
Navy) said that “piracy in the region is by no means eradicated;
it is only suppressed” (Maritime Executive 2019). Even though
piracy groups remain, their operational capabilities are limited
34

by the efforts of actors in the region. The region is continuing
to be patrolled by NATO forces and private security
contractors. It is likely that these operations will continue to
combat pirates in the region and prevent groups from growing
to a large scale. That is why it can be stated with moderate
confidence that the war is being won in the Indian Ocean.
Piracy in West Africa is continuing to be on the rise. The pirate’s
operational capabilities have increased, and they are able to
target larger ships farther out at sea. Reported attacks have
shown they will conduct violent attacks on ships and
crewmembers. They are also gaining useful intelligence and help
prior to attacking the ships. The Nigerian Navy is the primary
actor in the region and has yet to be effective in combating the
pirates, even though they have received training on anti-piracy
practices. There are currently no large-scale international
operations tasked with combating pirates in the region. It is
likely that the pirates will continue to heavily attack ships
travelling in the region. Attacks are being reported weekly, with
many of them involving violent tactics made use of by the
pirates. That is why it can be stated with high confidence that
the war is not being won in West Africa.
Conclusion
Piracy hot spots are continually changing, with some areas
seeing a decrease in attacks and some showing sharp increases.
The Indian Ocean still has some incidents, but they remain low
level with no causalities. Actors in the region will likely suppress
any piracy groups that could possibly pose a threat. West Africa
has become the new high-risk area with violent attacks. Ships
are warned to stay out of the region due to the large number of
pirates equipped with large weapons. Given the evidence, it is
likely that piracy in the region will continue. The Nigerian Navy
is making strides to be able to respond to incidents quicker and
increase its patrol zones, but has not mitigated the threat. For
these reasons, it can be stated with high confidence that the war
against piracy in West Africa is not being won.
35

Bibliography of References Cited
BIMCO, ICS, IGP&I Clubs, INTERTANKO, and OCIMF (2018)
BMP5: Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy and Enhance Maritime Security
in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea, Witherby
Publishing Group, Livingston, Scotland, United Kingdom.
Erickson, A.S., and Strange, A.M. (2015) Six Years at Sea…and Counting:
Gulf of Aden Anti-Piracy and China’s Maritime Commons Presence, The
Jamestown Foundation, Washington, DC, United States.
ICC International Maritime Bureau (2018) “Piracy and Armed Robbery
Against Ships 2018”, International Chamber of Commerce International
Maritime Bureau, London, United Kingdom.
International Chamber of Commerce (n.d.) “International Maritime
Bureau”, International Chamber of Commerce, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
<https://www.icc-ccs.org>, accessed on 29 April 2019.
International Criminal Police Organization (n.d.) “Maritime Piracy”,
International Criminal Police Organization, Lyon, France <https://www.
interpol.int/Crime-areas/Maritime-piracy/Maritime-piracy>, accessed on
29 April 2019.
International Maritime Organization (n.d.) “Maritime Security and
Piracy”, International Maritime Organization, <http://www.imo.org/en
/OurWork/Security/Pages/Maritime Security.aspx>, accessed on 28
April 2019.
Maritime Executive (2019) “Pirates Attack Two Fishing Boats off
Somalia”, Maritime Executive, 23 April <https://www.maritimeexecutive.com/article/pirates-attack-two-fishing-boats-off-somalia>,
accessed on 29 April 2019.
Maritime Executive (2019) “Pirates Kidnap Four Boxship Crewmembers
in Gulf of Guinea”, Maritime Executive, 2 April <https://www.
maritime-executive.com/article/pirates-kidnap-four-boxship-crewmembers
-in-gulf-of-guinea>, accessed on 29 April 2019.
Oladipo, T. (2017) “Is Africa Facing a New Wave of Piracy?”, BBC, 15
May <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-39849352>, accessed
on 29 April 2019.
.
36

The Pakistani Taliban: Current State
and Projections
Morgan Clasgens
It can be stated with moderate confidence that the Pakistani
Taliban will regain some control in the Federally Administered
Tribal Areas of Pakistan in the near term. In recent years, the
Pakistani Taliban lost control of all areas in Pakistan due to the
internal divisions and state-led counterinsurgency operations
against them. The new leader of the Pakistani Taliban, Noor
Wali Mehsud, has brought the power back to the organization’s
originating tribe and all previously split factions swore allegiance
to him.
Background
The Pakistani Taliban has a history of committing terrorist acts
that threaten the United States and its allies. After the US
invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, many of the Taliban fighters
fled over the border into the Federally Administered Tribal
Areas of Pakistan. In 2002, Pakistan’s security forces began
counterinsurgency operations in the Federally Administered
37

Tribal Areas, in an attempt to drive out the militants that were
launching cross-border raids (National Counterterrorism
Center n.d). At this point, the main focus of the militants
switched from fighting with the Afghan Taliban against the
Western forces in Afghanistan to creating their own group and
fighting the Pakistani forces. At that time, the militants began
coordinating and building networks within Pakistan. In 2007,
the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) was created to unify the
different factions with an executive council, led by Baitullah
Mehsud (National Counterterrorism Center n.d). The Pakistani
Taliban claimed responsibility for a series of attacks against US
personnel and buildings, including the 2009 bombing at Camp
Chapman that killed seven Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
personnel, the 2010 attack at the US Consulate in Peshawar, and
the failed attempt by Faisal Shahzad to detonate a bomb in New
York City Times Square. Following this series of attacks, in
September 2010 the US officially designated the TTP as a
terrorist organization (US Department of State 2010). The
Pakistani Taliban were strongest from 2009 to 2013. In 2013, the
group began losing its power due to the counterinsurgency
efforts by the Pakistani government and tribal infighting (US
Department of State 2015:6-7). The group is mostly comprised
of Mehsud tribesmen and in 2013 its tribal leader, Hakimullah
Mehsud, was killed in a US airstrike. Mullah Fazlullah was
appointed as the group’s first central leader from outside the
Mehsud tribe. This caused infighting due to the large number of
Mehsud tribesmen. Many of them broke ties with the Pakistani
Taliban and operated on their own, causing the Pakistani Taliban
to lose power (US Department of State 2015:6-7).
Recent Developments
In June 2018, the leader, Mullah Fazlullah, was killed in a US
drone strike in Afghanistan. After his death, the central council
appointed Noor Wali Mehsud to replace him in an effort to bring
the organization back to its roots by selecting a commander
from the Mehsud tribe. A Pakistani Taliban spokesman stated
after Mehsud’s appointment that all factions of the Pakistani
38

Taliban that had previously split from the group swore
allegiance to Mehsud (Roggio 2018). In September 2018, two
months after his appointment, Mehsud released a Code of
Conduct. It was divided into 67 points and outlined the
Pakistani Taliban’s overall strategy, organizational design,
policies regarding target selection, and the management of
prisoners and defectors. It expressed efforts to reunite the
differing factions under one central leader, in a clear attempt to
reinforce the group’s internal structure and minimize sources of
dispute and future divisions. The document also identifies as
legitimate targets those belonging institutions of the state and
mandates that civilian targets are not to be attacked in the future.
The final theme in the Code of Conduct discusses how to deal
with prisoners, spies, and defectors, advises members against
cruelty and vigilante justice, and suggests that all punishments
be decided by the central council (Jadoon and Mahmood 2018).
The Pakistani Taliban have claimed responsibility for a number
of attacks since Mehsud’s appointment. Immediately following
his appointment, the group launched multiple attacks on the
political campaigns taking place in Pakistan. Its main target since
the new Code of Conduct was released has been the Pakistani
security forces, which were listed in the document as a hard
target (Jadoon and Mahmood 2018). The Pakistani Taliban has
carried out multiple attacks on the security forces, including an
attack on a security base (Mackenzie 2019), a police office where
800 candidates were present taking an entrance exam (Schuttler
and Osmond 2019), and a police vehicle (Mehsud 2019). The
group also targeted Taqi Usmani in an assassination attempt in
Karachi. Usmani is the head of one of the largest religious
seminaries in the country. This attack was unsuccessful but
killed the police officers that were guarding Usmani.
Although the Pakistani Taliban split from the Afghan Taliban
in 2002 to create their own group, the two continue to have
strong ties. The Pakistani Taliban have their own goals: namely
to remove the Pakistani government influence in the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas, implement strict sharia law, and
39

expel US forces from Afghanistan (Jadoon and Mahmood).
Similarly, the Afghan Taliban’s goals are to dismantle the
Afghan government and presumably to institute sharia law. The
Afghan Taliban are currently in negotiations with the US in an
attempt by Washington to strike a peace deal with the Afghan
Taliban. Terms of this peace deal have previously been
discussed between the two, with a main point of contention
being that the Taliban want the US has to remove all troops
from Afghanistan. However, the US refuses to do so until the
Taliban agree to not let any militant groups operate within
Afghanistan’s borders (Bacon 2019). The US has stated that this
peace treaty will need cooperation between all parties - the US,
Afghan Taliban, Pakistan, and the Afghan government. The
Afghan government has long accused the Pakistani government
of supporting the Taliban and believes Pakistan’s role in this
peace process has the most influence. At one point, the two
governments got in an argument on Twitter and Pakistan told
the US ambassador to Kabul that it would not be participating
in the peace talks that were scheduled for April 19-21, because
the Afghan government would be attending for the first time.
On April 19, the Afghan Taliban cancelled the peace talks due
to concerns of the parties attending and stating it had not agreed
to meet with the Afghan government (Nelson and Amiri 2019).
Following many attacks carried out by the Afghan Taliban, the
group agreed to stop attacks on places with large civilian activities.
This agreement came out of the Intra-Afghan Dialogue Conference
on Peace in Doha, Qatar, held on July 8, 2019. The Taliban
continues to refuse direct peace talks with Afghan government
officials until the US officially announces a timetable for the
withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan (Mashal 2019).
Analysis
As explained earlier, the appointment of Mehsud placed the
power of the Pakistani Taliban back into its originating tribe,
thus rekindling tribal ties. Following Mehsud’s appointment, all
previously split factions swore allegiance under the new leadership
40

(Roggio 2018). Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry spokesman stated,
“the killing of the terrorist Mullah Fazlullah, who has been
directing terrorism against Pakistan, is a significant development
in fighting terrorism” (Gul 2018). Since Mehsud’s appointment,
the Pakistani Taliban have been able to plan and carry out more
attacks than in previous years, which shows this was not truly a
positive development for the Pakistani government. The killing
of Fazlullah did not help the fight against the Pakistani Taliban
and instead gave it the opportunity to appoint a more powerful
leader that has allowed the Pakistani Taliban to reconnect and
become a stronger force in Pakistan. The new Code of Conduct
released by Mehsud is seen as an attempt to reorganize and
coordinate among the factions, while also establishing guidelines
for future attacks.
If the current peace negotiations between the US and the
Afghan Taliban result in a peace treaty and the Afghan Taliban
agree to not allow militants to operate within Afghanistan, it
could affect the Pakistani Taliban and its ability to operate
within Afghanistan. It has been stated that the Pakistani
government has been unsuccessful in combatting the Pakistani
Taliban recently because it is masterminding its attacks from
within Afghanistan (Rehman 2019). This peace treaty could
negatively impact the force of the Pakistani Taliban by affecting
its ability to operate from Afghanistan and organize attacks
there. However, the US and the Afghan Government have a
history of unsuccessful attempts at negotiating a peace treaty
with the Afghan Taliban in the past. Considering the complexity
of the current Afghan Taliban peace treaty process, the
likelihood of a deal being agreed upon in the near term is low.
Conclusion
The new leader of the Pakistani Taliban, Noor Wali Mehsud,
has brought the power back to its originating tribe and all
splintered factions pledged allegiance to him. This has allowed
the group to reorganize and coordinate plots and attacks.
41

Additionally, without the cooperation of the Pakistan government,
Afghan government, Afghan Taliban, and the US, it is unlikely
that a peace treaty will be agreed upon in the near term.
Therefore, it can be stated with moderate confidence that the
Pakistani Taliban will regain some control in the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas in the near term.
42

Bibliography of References Cited
Bacon, T. (2019) “Is the Taliban Making a Pledge It Cannot Keep?”,
Foreign Affairs, 21 February <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/
afghanistan/2019-02-21/taliban-making-pledge-it-cannot-keep>, accessed
on 21 February 2019.
Jadoon, A., and Mahmood, S. (2018) “Fixing the Cracks in the Pakistani
Taliban’s Foundation: TTP’s Leadership Returns to the Mehsud Tribe”,
CTC Sentinel, 11(11), pp22-24
Mehsud, S. (2019) “Four Police Killed in Pakistan Ambush Claimed by
Taliban Splinter Group”, U.S News and World Report, 12 February
<https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2019-02-12/four-policekilled-in-pakistan-ambush-claimed-by-taliban-splinter-group>
, accessed
on 19 April 2019.
Mackenzie, J. (2019) “Gunmen Attack Security Base in Pakistan’s
Balochistan Province”, Reuters, 1 January <https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-pakistan-security/gunmen-attack-security-base-in-pakistansbalochistan-province-idUSKCN1OV1ON>,
accessed on 27 April 2019.
Mashal, M. (2019) Stressing War’s Toll, Taliban and Afghan Representatives
Agree to Peace Road Map”, The New York Times, 8 July <https://www.
nytimes.com/2019/07/08/world/asia/afghanistan-taliban-peace-talks.html>,
accessed on 10 July 2019.
National Counterterrorism Center (n.d.) “Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP)”,
Director of National Intelligence, McLean, VA, United States <https://
www.dni.gov/nctc/groups/ttp.html>, accessed on 6 February 2019.
Nelson, C., and Amiri, E. (2019) “Talks Cancelled in Big Blow to Afghan
Peace Push”, The Wall Street Journal, April 18 <https://www.wsj.com/
articles/afghan-peace-talks-stall-after-taliban-objects-to-guest-list-11555572767>,
accessed on 29 April 2019.
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Pakistan Police Station”, Reuters, 29 January <https://www.reuters.com/
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43

44

The Current and Projected Status of
Sino-Russian Relations
Audrey Oien
It can be assessed with moderate to high confidence that current
Sino-Russian relations are at their highest level of cooperation
and will continue to improve. In this case, the term “improve”
can be defined as an expansion of cooperation and deepening
of ties between the two countries. Although Russia and China
are not allies, they formed a “strategic partnership” in 1996 (Bolt
2014:49). Through this ongoing partnership, Russia and China
intend to establish a multi-polar world order (Bolt 2014:50). In
theory, this is accomplished by filling global power gaps left by
the United States, allowing Russia and China to increase their
role in world affairs. Cooperation intended to fill these power
gaps draws the two nations closer together, deepening their ties.
The desire by Moscow and Beijing to establish a multi-polar
world order and counterbalance US global power is indeed a
foundational element of the Sino-Russian relationship (Bolt
2014:50).
45

Background
Since the 1600s, Sino-Russian relations have been characterized
by periodic conflicts (Karlin 2014). Most Sino-Russian conflicts
were due to conflicting territorial claims in Siberia (Karlin 2014).
With the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in
1949, the Soviet Union officially recognized diplomatic relations
with China (Karlin 2014). Shortly after this, Russia and China
reverted back to strife (Bolt 2014:52). It was not until the fall of
the Soviet Union in 1991 that relations between the two nations
began to normalize (Karlin 2014). This ultimately led to the
creation of the Treaty of Good Neighborliness and Friendly
Cooperation in 2001. The treaty is a 20-year strategic plan
outlining the basis for peaceful relations, economic cooperation,
and diplomatic and political inter-reliance (Anon. 2001). Since
the signing of the treaty, Sino-Russian relations in these and
other areas have consistently expanded (Bolt 2014:49). In recent
years, the level of depth in the cooperation between Russia and
China has increased dramatically. Within the past year, Chinese
Foreign Minister Wang Yi described bilateral relations as being
at their “best level in history” (Westcott 2018). Since Yi’s
statement, cooperation between Russia and China and the
desire to deepen their relationship has further increased.
Diplomacy in Venezuela
Russia and China have increased efforts to expand diplomatic
cooperation. This can be seen through Russia and China’s
intervention in the Venezuelan crisis. Sino-Russian support for
the Venezuelan President, Nicolas Maduro, significantly
increased when opposition leader Juan Guaido declared himself
interim president on January 23, 2019. Shortly after, Russia and
China joined Maduro in opposing any military action facilitated
through US aid and even supplied the state’s military with
advanced weaponry (Anon. 2019a). China then stated that the
Venezuelan crisis is a result of internal affairs, echoing Russian
comments against outside military intervention (Anon. 2019b).
On February 28, Russia and China vetoed a US-proposed
46

resolution to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)
calling for a peaceful process leading to free elections in
Venezuela (Nichols 2019). Prior to voting against the resolution,
both nations made their views known that the Venezuelan crisis
would best be resolved via “constructive discussions” regarding
differences between the government and people (Anon. 2019c).
Increased Sino-Russian support for Maduro’s presidency is
consistent with the two nations’ goal of combatting US
hegemony to create a multi-polar world order. The joint
diplomatic efforts in Venezuela allowed Russia and China to
counter US influence and support for Guaido. The use of vetoes
at the UNSC is one way in which the two nations are able to
exert influence in world events and combat US hegemony.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov remarked that Russia
views China and itself as important stabilizers in world affairs
(Anon. 2019d). This was followed by agreement from China, as
Beijing stated that China-Russia relations have “injected positive
energy” into maintaining global strategic stability (Anon. 2019e).
The efforts to accomplish this goal have allowed Russia and
China to build stronger diplomatic ties and expand their joint
diplomatic efforts into new regions. The Venezuelan crisis is an
indicator that, in the foreseeable future, Russia and China will
likely continue their joint cooperation in diplomatic affairs, in
order to augment their world power and influence.
Trade and Energy
Recently, Sino-Russian trade cooperation reached new heights.
In 2018, China was Russia’s largest trading partner (Anon.
2019f). Trade between the two nations grew 24.5%, reaching an
all-time record of $108 billion in trade turnover (Anon. 2019f).
Most of these goods were traded in the energy sector, particularly
crude oil, refined copper, and petrochemicals (Anon. 2019f).
One example of this is the construction of the Power of Siberia
Pipeline. The pipeline is a 30 year agreement between Russian
and Chinese state companies to supply China with 38 billion
cubic meters of natural gas per year from Eastern Siberia,
47

beginning in 2025 (Yep 2019). China hopes to continue this and
other similar projects aimed at doubling bilateral trade turnover,
as China’s Premier Le Keqiang stated earlier this year (Jiangnan
2019). This will also be accomplished through increased trade
in internet commerce, the air and space industry, and general
exchanges between the two nations (Anon. 2019g). Since
Keqiang’s remarks, it was announced in early June that a
memorandum of understanding of trade promotion was signed
between Russia and China (Yinglun 2019). The memorandum
highlighted certain sectors needing development and improvement,
which will put the two countries on track to reach trade turnover
goals (Yinglun 2019).
The recent increase in trade activity between Russia and China
shows that the two nations are not only deepening their current
economic ties, but expanding economic cooperation into new
areas. This increase in economic cooperation signals the depth
of the relations, as both countries are willing to rely on one
another, potentially reducing trade in corresponding areas with
other countries. The pipeline would be a major supplier of
natural gas for China, causing China to become more dependent
on Russia for energy supplies. China’s willingness to become
reliant upon Siberia for natural gas reaffirms Chinese interest in
the region. This may suggest further cooperation between
Russia and China to continue developing mutually beneficial
projects in Siberia.
Russia and China also intend to boost economic cooperation by
relying on national currencies in bilateral trade. On June 5, 2019,
the two countries signed an intergovernmental agreement
allowing the currency of bilateral trade to shift from the US
dollar to the Russian ruble and Chinese yuan (Anon. 2019h).
The deal will also increase cross-currency settlements by up to
50 percent (Anon. 2019h.). It is believed that, in the next few
years, this deal will allow share settlements in the ruble and yuan
to increase from ten percent to 50 (Anon. 2019h). It was also
reported that new mechanisms of cross-border payment are
currently under development with the intention of completion
48

in 2020 (Anon. 2019h). Both countries have urged other nations
to follow in their footsteps and switch to trading with national
currencies, with Russian President Vladimir Putin stating that a
number of countries have already expressed interest in
abandoning the dollar (Anon. 2019i).
The decision to use national currencies in bilateral trade is one that
could draw Russia and China even closer together economically.
Reducing dependency on US currency by switching to national
currencies may cause Russia and China to become more
economically reliant and dependent on each other. Using the
ruble and yuan would help to reduce exchange rate fluctuations,
which creates even more of an incentive for Russia and China
to not only keep trading with each other, but to further increase
bilateral trade. While moving away from the dollar could
significantly benefit Russia and China, it will likely have negative
consequences for the US. If other countries follow suit in
abandoning the dollar, the currency may drop in value, and the
US may lose some of its power and position as a leader in global
trade. This result is consistent with Russia and China’s mutual
desire to draw power and global dominance away from the US.
Tensions in Siberia
As part of the recent deepening of Sino-Russian business
relations, China is increasing its number of projects in Siberia
(Anon. 2019l). One of these is a water bottling project
conducted by AkvaSib, a Russian firm owned by the Chinese
company Lake Baikal Water Industry (Gan 2019). AkvaSib’s
project, which began construction in January, allows for 190
million liters of water to be bottled from Lake Baikal each year,
beginning in 2021 (Anon. 2019k). Since the start of the project
in 2017, locals in the Siberian village of Kultuk, where the plant
is based, have been concerned that the project would harm the
lake’s environment (Antonova 2019). As a result, an online
petition against the project was launched and received over one
million signatures (Gan 2019). In response to local concerns, on
March 15, a court in the Siberian city of Irkutsk ordered
49

AkvaSib to halt the project in order to investigate the claims of
environmental violations (Antonova 2019). On March 27, the
court ruled that the project’s official permit of plant
construction was illegal (Anon. 2019l).
Protest against AkvaSib’s project comes during a time of
popular disapproval of Chinese projects in the region (Anon.
2019l). Locals have been wary of the increased Chinese presence
in Siberia, and the AkvaSib project is no exception. Negative
feelings this project festered have the potential to complicate
Russia and China’s relationship. Territorial disputes and border
demarcation in the Siberian region have sparked Sino-Russian
conflicts in the past (Gan 2019). Though it was reported that
the majority of the public and mass media are not in favor of
the recent projects, there has been no word from Moscow itself
on the matter (Gan 2019). If China continues to show interest
in Siberia through projects like AkvaSib’s, already present
tensions will likely grow between the two nations. This may
challenge Russia and China’s efforts to continue expanding
economic cooperation. Continued Chinese investment in
Siberia could grant China a large financial claim to the
infrastructure of the region, decreasing Russian influence. Since
locals are already concerned by Chinese encroachment in the
region, Russia may be less willing to continue economic
cooperation with China in Siberia. This could negatively impact
Sino-Russian business interactions and potentially reduce
annual bilateral trade turnover with China.
Conclusion
Sino-Russian efforts to establish a multipolar world order have
resulted in an increase in diplomatic and economic cooperation
between the two. This can be seen through the Sino-Russian
intervention in Venezuela, increases in bilateral trade, and the
recent agreement to use national currencies during trade.
However, there still remains an ever-present tension between
Russia and China over China’s latest projects in the Siberian
region. Though these tensions exist, the benefits of the Sino-
50

Russian relationship will likely facilitate continued cooperation
to fill global power gaps. Therefore, it can be assessed with
moderate to high confidence that Sino-Russian relations are at
their highest level of cooperation and will continue to improve.
51

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53

54

Will the Power of the ELN Continue to
Grow in 2019?
Joseph Cain
The Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), or National Liberation
Army, a Marxist-Leninist guerilla movement operating in
Colombia and Venezuela, has carried out numerous operations
against the Colombian government and continued to expand its
influence across the Andean region, signifying an increase in its
overall power. It has done so in the name of combating
disproportionate wealth created by what it sees as the
exploitation of Colombia’s natural resources. Since the signing
of the 2016 peace accords by the Colombian government and
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the
ELN has stepped in to fill the power vacuum and achieve its
stated goal of battling transnational corporations and the elite
of Colombian society from taking advantage of the extensive
natural resources Colombia has. The ELN has also taken
advantage of the volatile situation in Venezuela and set up illegal
enterprises across the country.
55

Meanwhile, the Colombian President Ivan Marquez Duque was
inaugurated in August of 2018. His government has made a
concerted effort to combat the ELN. However, the steady flow
of attacks carried out by the ELN against government
infrastructure and personnel shows that this effort has largely
been ineffective. Therefore, we assess with a high level of
confidence that the power of the ELN is likely to continue to
grow in 2019.
Background
The ELN was formed in 1964 in the department of Santander,
located in the northeastern sector of Colombia. Originally, the
organization was very ideologically driven, drawing on
influences such as the Cuban Revolution, Catholic Liberation
theology, and socialism. This meant that the ELN strictly
partook in subversive acts against the Colombian government
and stayed away from more ideologically nefarious activities that
it would adopt later on. This approach lasted primarily until
1973 when the Colombian government undertook a massive
military offensive against the ELN, decimating its membership
from 200 to 65 by the end of the campaign (Stanford 2015). The
ELN leadership was wiped out and new leaders emerged that
took the ELN in a new direction. This would include the
adoption of new means of survival through funds procured
from acts such as kidnapping, extortion, and narcotics
trafficking. This resulted in the ELN reaching new peaks in
terms of power. By the mid-1990s, it was estimated the group
had grown to 5,000 members (InSight Crime 2018). However,
the growth of the ELN was once again affected by a major
military push by the Alvaro Uribe government from in the mid-
2000s. It also faced conflict from rightwing-based paramilitary
organizations. This severely affected the ELN. But with the
2016 FARC Peace accords, the FARC demobilized and became
a legitimate political party relinquishing its control over large
swathes of areas in Colombia. This allowed the ELN to begin
expanding into territories it had not historically operated in —a
growth that has been evident up to the present day. The group
56

is currently experiencing a resurgence, and it is now believed to
have between 2,500 and 3,000 members, a number that is
expected to rise.
Recent Developments
At the beginning of 2019, the ELN was partaking in peace
negotiations with the Colombian government in Cuba.
However, talks were immediately suspended indefinitely in the
aftermath of the January 17, 2019, ELN car-bombing on the
General Santander National Police Academy in Bogota, which
killed 22 people and injured 60 (Dayton 2019:17). This left the
members of the ELN delegation, including its leader, Nicolas
Rodriguez Bautista, alias Gabino, stranded in Cuba. President
Duque also reactivated International Criminal Police Organization
(INTERPOL) red notices on all members of the ELN delegation
stranded in Cuba. However, Cuba has refused to extradite any
of the members, citing the protocols for peace talks (Cobb 2019a).
Although this issue is affecting the leadership of the ELN, it has
not hampered the organization’s operations in Colombia and
Venezuela. The main reason being that the ELN is a highly
decentralized organization with multiple fronts across Colombia
that operate with high degrees of autonomy from the main
leadership organ of the ELN central command (COCE). Therefore,
attacks on oil infrastructure have continued unhampered. The
most prominent examples include attacks against the state-owned
energy corporation Ecopetrol. Two of the main pipelines that it
runs, the Cano-Limon pipeline in the northeast and Transandino
pipeline in the southwest, have experienced approximately 20
attacks this year, all of which are thought to have been carried out
by the ELN (Cobb 2019b). However, the Colombian government
managed to capture Arturo Ordóñez, alias El Elefante, who was
the ELN commander of the Urban Front that carried out the
attack on the General Santander Police Academy on March 1,
2019 (El Tiempo 2019).
The ELN has also begun to significantly expand its presence in
Venezuela. Reports indicate that the ELN is now present in at
57

least 12 of the 23 Venezuelan states, primarily for the purpose
of narcotics trafficking, fuel smuggling, and the illegal mining of
precious metals (Venezuela Investigative Unit 2019). In fact, it
is now estimated that several guerilla organizations, primarily
the ELN, run a criminal economy in Venezuela that employs
upwards of 15,000 Venezuelans. The ELN is performing
services for the Venezuelan people such as handing out food
rations, rebuilding schools, as well as passing out educational
guerilla material to consolidate its standing among the country’s
populace, as well as boost recruiting. The government of
Nicolas Maduro, through its actions and inactions, has shown a
willingness to allow the ELN to act as a de facto governing force
inside the country, specifically in the rural areas that have
become too expensive for the Venezuelan government to
maintain a large presence in. There have also been reports of a
minor armed skirmish between the ELN and Venezuelan
authorities in November of 2018, which resulted in the death of
three Venezuelan soldiers (Lozano 2018). However, the
relationship between the two entities has remained intact.
Colombia’s highest-ranking General, Luis Navarro, recently
stated that the Venezuelan military has been training ELN
personnel in advanced weapons training on the Russian IGLA
surface-to-air missile system (Bristow 2019).
Analysis
The Colombian government, under the leadership of President
Duque, has been able to do little to curb the growth of the ELN
in 2019, despite the intense focus on doing so. One explanation
is that the ELN benefits from the disunity between the
executive and legislative branches in Colombia. President
Duque’s popular support has been steadily dwindling as his
term has progressed, amid the emergence of a centrist alliance.
The latter intends to act as a voting bloc against President
Duque’s policies, between the Liberal Party (LP), Radical
Change (CR) and the U Party (U) (Alsema 2019). At this point
in the Duque Administration, it is too early to apply the label of
a ‘lame duck’, but the trajectory is pointing in that direction. This
58

will make it difficult for Duque to draw on political support to
combat the ELN, as the group continues to bomb government
infrastructure such as police buildings and state-owned oil
pipelines. The relative gains the Colombian government has
made in combating the ELN, such as the capture of El Elefante
are just that —relative. The ELN works in a highly decentralized
fashion, and whenever a member of its leadership is arrested, it
is unlikely to affect the fronts and cells of the organization.
The ELN’s continued expansion into Venezuela is very
significant due to the international attention being placed on the
country. The United States, specifically Admiral Craig Faller of
US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), has stated that the
ELN is a growing threat and that the US is strengthening its
focus on the organization. Washington has said it will provide
increased support to the Colombian government to combat the
ELN, and has accused the group of taking advantage of the
instability in Venezuela (Stewart 2019). The reason this
expansion is so pressing for the US, and for other Andean
countries that oppose the Maduro government in Venezuela, is
because, in the event of an attempt to overthrow Maduro, the
ELN would protect him. Considering that the ELN has been
participating in a constant guerilla warfare campaign against the
Colombian government for decades and has continued to
persist, the organization poses a serious threat to any entity that
attempts to combat it, especially as it continues to operate with
a high degree of freedom in Venezuela.
Conclusion
The ELN has steadily expanded its areas of operations and
carried out well planned and sophisticated attacks against the
Colombian government this far into 2019. In light of the current
relationship between the President and the Colombian
Congress, a unified strategy and effort to disrupt and minimize
the power of the ELN is unlikely to emerge. The ELN is also
taking advantage of the situation in Venezuela, which is close to
its historic stronghold and main operating region of north-
59

eastern Colombia, to further profit off enterprises and
recruitment in Venezuela. This holds a major significance to the
world, as the ELN is firmly entrenched in Venezuela and
presents a formidable adversary to any potential invading force.
Therefore, it can be stated with a high degree of confidence that
the ELN will continue to grow in power in 2019.
60

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Buildup at Colombian Border is to Combat Criminal Groups”, InSight
Crime, 11 April <https://www.insightcrime.org/news/brief/venezuelacolombia-border-military-criminal-groups/>,
accessed on 26 April 2019.
InSight Crime (2018) “Colombia: ELN”, InSight Crime, 16 October
<https://www.insightcrime.org/colombia-organized-crime-news/elnprofile/>,
accessed on 26 April 2019.
El Tiempo (2019) “Este es el Señalado Cerebro del Atentado en Escuela
General Santander”, El Tiempo, 2 March <https://www.eltiempo.com/
justicia/delitos/quien-es-arturo-ordonez-alias-elefante-capturado-poratentado-en-la-escuela-general-santander-333336>,
accessed on 26 April
2019.
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Marijuana Legalization and United
States National Security
Madison Scholar
It can be stated with moderate confidence that marijuana
legalization will not become a matter of US national security,
however it will negatively affect certain communities and will
not impede the illicit market in narcotics. National security can
be defined as efforts to ensure a homeland that is safe, secure,
and resilient against threats (Congressional Research Service
2013:8). Marijuana is currently a schedule one drug under the
Controlled Substance Act, and is deemed federally illegal. Lately,
Mexican cartels have responded to legalization by shifting their
focus to distributing more addictive drugs as the demand for
low-grade marijuana drops. Domestic criminal organizations
have taken control of the illicit marijuana market as they are
capitalizing on the illegal cultivation and transportation of
marijuana across US state lines.
It can also be stated with high confidence that confliction
between federal and state laws will continue, and that state
legalization will be an upward trend in 2019. Because the 10 th
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Amendment allows states to supersede federal law, states have
been legalizing marijuana regardless of the federal ban on the
drug. Within legalized states, dispensaries and retail stores that
sell both recreational and medical marijuana have created a new
industry. On average, over $40 billion is spent annually on both
legal and illegal marijuana in the US (Halperin 2018).
Background
In 1970, President Richard Nixon passed the Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act, also known as the Controlled
Substance Act (CSA), categorizing all known drugs into
schedules (Houser and Rosacker 2014:132). Marijuana was
classified as a schedule one drug, the highest schedule, and was
made illegal under federal law. The government defined it as
having, “no currently accepted medical use and a high potential
for abuse” (US Congress 1970:1247). Soon following the
enactment of the CSA, Nixon declared the War on Drugs and
directed federal authorities to target drug traffickers (Houser
and Rosacker 2014:132). President Nixon then created the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) as a central authority to
enforce federal drug laws. The War on Drugs has lasted over 50
years and continues to this day.
Since the 1970s, the federal government has strengthened its
enforcement on marijuana while states have done the exact
opposite. In 1996, California became the first state to legalize
medical marijuana (Houser and Rosacker 2014:134). This was
one of the first major instances of a state superseding federal
drug law. Washington and Colorado became the first states to
legalize recreational marijuana in 2012, and other states quickly
followed (Houser and Rosacker 2014:133). Movements towards
legalization sparked controversy between state and federal law,
and tensions began to rise. Currently, 11 states, including
Washington, DC, have legalized recreational marijuana
(National Conference of State Legislatures 2019). Marijuana is
also legal for medical use in 33 states and is decriminalized in 13
states (National Conference of State Legislatures 2019).
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Recent Developments
The DEA’s National Drug Threat Assessment for 2018 states
that Mexico continues to be the largest source of foreign
marijuana to the US (US Drug Enforcement Administration
2018:77). This is primarily because even though Mexicandistributed
marijuana is considered “low grade”, it is much
cheaper than legal marijuana sold in dispensaries (UN Office on
Drug and Crime 2018:40). There is indication of some cartels
enhancing the quality of their marijuana to compete with US
growers. We are also seeing a larger trend of cartels shifting their
cultivation to opium (UN Office on Drug and Crime 2018:40).
Apart from the cartels, domestic criminal organizations have
created networks of unlicensed grow houses in legalized states
that cultivate mass quantities of marijuana, which is later
transported out of state and sold on the illicit market (US Drug
Enforcement Administration 2018:82). The DEA explains that
criminals have been using medical marijuana as a front to
operate their networks without attracting the attention of
authorities (US Drug Enforcement Administration 2018:82). In
Colorado, local law enforcement reports that drug traffickers
have begun to move into the state from the East Coast with the
intention of opening up illegal grow sites in rental homes,
warehouses, on federal land, or even disguised as legitimate
dispensaries (Stewart 2018). Legitimate dispensaries are also
involving themselves in the illicit market. The federal
government does not test marijuana, leaving it up to the states
to enforce their own testing laws (Roberts 2017). Marijuana that
tests positive for pesticides, bacteria and mold is not thrown
away, but is instead resold to the illicit market (Roberts 2017).
Analysis
According to my research, the illicit drug market will not be
significantly affected by marijuana legalization. However, the
illicit marijuana market is shifting into the hands of domestic
criminal organizations, and away from the Mexican cartels.
There is still a demand for illegal marijuana, because legal
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marijuana sold at dispensaries is significantly more expensive
than the marijuana that can be bought on the street. Marijuana
can also be chemically changed to be more potent than state
laws allow. A law enforcement source adds that cartels are ahead
of the game, beginning to make the marijuana with potencies
far greater than legal limits in order to continue selling (Source
A 2019). Domestic criminal organizations are also profiting from
illegally transporting marijuana across state lines. Such organizations,
including street gangs and biker gangs, have created networks
within legalized-marijuana states to illegally grow marijuana without
a license (US Drug Enforcement Administration 2018:85).
Furthermore, communities will be negatively affected because,
as laws change in the US, cartels have begun to shift their focus
on producing more dangerous drugs, including heroine, methamphetamines,
and Fentanyl. Younger cartels with foundations
in harder drugs, rather than marijuana, have become increasingly
more violent (Agren 2018). US Customs and Border Patrol
(CBP) reported that marijuana seizures dropped by over 50
percent between 2012 and 2017 —a trend that directly
coincided with Mexico’s deadliest year in 2017, as a result of
drug violence (Agren 2018). Growers have slowly moved away
from marijuana to grow opium, the plant used to make heroine,
because of growing demand for heroine in the US. The US
opium epidemic is worsening as a result of an influx of opium
coming across the US-Mexico border (UN Office on Drug and
Crime 2018:47).
Secondly, relating to the complications between federal and
state laws, we have begun to see a strong trend in US states
pushing marijuana legalization agendas. Public support is rising
in recent polls and is not expected to decline (Mccarthy 2018).
Despite this trend, the federal government has shown no signs
of altering its standards on marijuana legalization. Marijuana is
still considered a schedule one drug under the CSA, and the
DEA has not shown any interest in changing its schedule. It is
apparent that marijuana legalization is not one of President
Donald Trump’s priorities (Napolitano 2018). Therefore, in
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order for the federal government to legalize marijuana, there
may have to be a political party swing in congress, or a
presidential candidate who is focused on legalization elected to
the White House. It is also clear that the legalization trend
among states will continue, therefore increasing the confliction
between federal and state law.
Conclusion
We can see that the illicit narcotics market in the US has not
been significantly affected by marijuana legalization. However,
the marijuana trade is shifting into the hands of domestic
criminal organizations away from the prior control of Mexican
cartels. Marijuana legalization is also contributing to the opium
epidemic occurring in the US, as cartels have begun to switch
their focus on more dangerous drugs in order to meet demand
in the US. Therefore, it can be stated with moderate confidence
that marijuana legalization will not become a matter of US
national security, however it will negatively affect certain
communities, while at the same time not impeding the illicit
market in narcotics.
Secondly, since the federal government has not shown signs of
lifting the federal ban on marijuana, law confliction will
continue to escalate as more states legalize it. The current
presidential administration has shown little interest in federal
legalization, and the CSA is not likely to be amended any time
soon. State elections in 2018 showed a strong public support for
marijuana legalization, which in turn will result in multiple states
potentially legalizing the substance in 2019. In addition to the
above conclusion, it can also be stated with high confidence that
conflictions between federal and state laws will continue, and
state legalization will be an upward trend in 2019.
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Bibliography of References Cited
Agren, D. (2018) “Mexican Cartels Pushing More Heroin After US Relax
Marijuana Laws”, USA Today, 20 February <https://www.usatoday.
com/story/news/world/2018/02/20/mexican-cartels-switch-gears-afteru-s-states-relax-u-s-states-legalize-marijuana-mexicos-cartels-sw/343389002>,
accessed on 18 April 2019.
Congressional Research Service (2013) “Defining Homeland Security:
Analysis and Congressional Considerations”, Congressional Research
Service, Washington, DC, United States.
Halperin, A. (2018) “Cannabis Capitalism: Who is Making Money in the
Marijuana Industry?”, The Guardian, 3 October <https://www.the
guardian.com/society/2018/oct/03/cannabis-industry-legalization-whois-making-money>,
accessed on 18 April 2019.
Houser, K.A. and Rosacker, R.E. (2014) “High Times: A History of
Marijuana Laws In the United States”, The International Journal of Business
and Public Administration, 11(2), pp131-141.
Mccarthy, J. (2018) “Two in Three Americans Now Supporting Legalizing
Marijuana”, Gallup, 22 October <https://news.gallup.com/poll/2439
08/two-three-americans-support-legalizing-marijuana.aspx>, accessed on
22 April 2019.
Napolitano, A. (2018) Interview on Fox Business News, New York,
United States, first broadcast on 22 June.
National Conference of State Legislatures (2019) “State Medical
Marijuana Laws”, National Conference of State Legislatures, Washington,
DC, United States <http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-medicalmarijuana-laws.aspx>,
accessed on 20 April 2019.
Roberts, C. (2017) “Leafly Investigation: California Has A Dirty Cannabis
Problem”, Leafly, 15 February <https://www.leafly.com/news/politics/
leafly-investigation-california-dirty-cannabis-problem>, accessed on 13
April 2019.
Source A. (2019) Telephone interview, Conway, South Carolina, United States.
Stewart, B. (2018) “Why Colorado’s Black Market For Marijuana Is Booming
4 Years After Legalization”, CBC News, 28 May <https://www.cbc.ca/
news/world/colorado-marijuana-black-market-1.4647198>, accessed on
13 April 2019.
UN Office on Drugs and Crime (2018) “World Drug Report”, United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Vienna, Austria.
US Congress (1970) Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of
1970, Senate Judiciary Committee and Interstate and Foreign Commerce
Committee, House of Representatives, United States Congress,
Washington, DC, United States.
US Drug Enforcement Administration (2018) “National Drug Threat
Assessment”, United States Drug Enforcement Administration, Springfield,
Virginia, United States.
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Biographical Notes on Contributors
TYRA BJORLO, from Exmore, Virginia, is a graduate of Coastal Carolina
University, where she majored in Intelligence and National Security Studies
and minored in Political Science. In the fall of 2019, Tyra interned for the
Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington
DC, focusing on al Qaeda’s global network. During her time at Coastal,
Tyra was elected to serve as an executive officer for the Chanticleer
Intelligence Brief, and served as the organization’s recruitment officer
while also heading the Transnational Issues and Africa Desks. Her research
focused on women in Salafi-jihadist groups with particular focus on the
Islamic State. In May 2019, Tyra received the Intelligence and National Security
Studies’ Student of the Year Award at Coastal Carolina University.
KYLE BROSSARD, from Lake Geneva, Wisconsin, graduated from Coastal
Carolina University in May 2019 with a Bachelor of Arts in Intelligence
and National Security Studies. He is now employed as an intelligence
analyst with the United States Government. In 2019, Kyle was a member
of the Chanticleer Law Enforcement Analysis and Research Group
(CLEAR) and provided crime and data analysis to the Myrtle Beach Police
Department. He also joined the invitation-only Order of the Sword and
Shield (the honor society for homeland security, intelligence and emergency
management). Kyle served in the Chanticleer Intelligence Brief as its
Communications Officer and head of the Special Topics Desk. He is also
the recipient of the Chanticleer Intelligence Brief’s Regional Expert Award.
JOSEPH CAIN, from Springfield, Kentucky, is a senior Intelligence and National
Security Studies major and a Spanish minor at Coastal Carolina University.
He has been a member of the Coastal Carolina University’s Honor
College for the duration of his undergraduate career. In 2018, Joseph
studied Eastern Mediterranean security and geopolitics during a monthlong
stay in the countries of Cyprus and Greece. Additionally, as a
member of the Chanticleer Law Enforcement Analysis and Research
Group (CLEAR), he has provided geographic information system (GIS)
capabilities and analysis to the Myrtle Beach Police Department. He
currently serves as the Reports Officer and head of the South America
Desk for the Chanticleer Intelligence Brief. Joseph is also the recipient
of the Chanticleer Intelligence Brief’s Intelligence Analysis Award and
Regional Expert Award. In the summer of 2019 he was awarded a place,
and subsequently attended, the Cambridge Security Initiative’s International
Security and Intelligence Program at Cambridge University in England.
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MORGAN CLASGENS, from Cincinnati, Ohio, majored in Intelligence and
National Security Studies. She graduated from Coastal Carolina University
in May 2019 and is now employed as an intelligence analyst. Her undergraduate
research focused on non-state terrorist organizations and counterterrorism
efforts in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Syria, and Lebanon. Morgan
joined the Asia Desk of the Chanticleer Intelligence Brief, where she
focused on research relating to the current and projected status of the
Pakistani Taliban. Her intelligence briefs on her analytical subject were
repeatedly published on the organization’s website.
RYAN LAWRENCE, from Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania, majored in Intelligence
and National Security Studies and minored in Political Science at Coastal
Carolina University. He graduated in May 2019 with cum laude honors
and as a member of the University’s Honors College. During his studies
at Coastal Carolina University, Ryan joined the Chanticleer Intelligence
Brief to hone both his briefing and analytical skills, and was able to
successfully contribute to the organization’s Latin America Desk. In the
Applied Intelligence Analysis course at Coastal Carolina University, Ryan
studied the power dynamics of Mexico’s most powerful drug cartels and
had two of his written briefs on his analytical topic published on the
organization’s website. In the Spring 2019 semester, Ryan was invited
to appear on The Intelligence Report, the Chanticleer Intelligence Brief’s
television broadcast. In the same semester, he and his fellow analysts in
the Latin America Section were presented with the Chanticleer Intelligence
Brief’s Intelligence Analysis Award for delivering the highest-quality oral
analytical product during the semester.
AUDREY OIEN, from Beaver Dam, Wisconsin, is a senior Intelligence and
National Security Studies and Language and Intercultural Studies doublemajor
at Coastal Carolina University. Her primary research interest is the
evolving relationship between Russia and China and its implications for
the United States, a topic that she has been researching since her
freshman year. During her participation in the Chanticleer Intelligence
Brief, Audrey has been awarded the organization’s Regional Expert
Award for the Russia Desk and the Best Intelligence Essay Award. She
was also featured as a panelist at the 6th Chanticleer Intelligence Brief
Symposium and on episode six of The Intelligence Report, the organization’s
television broadcast. More recently, Audrey was awarded the China
Government Scholarship, a fully funded scholarship to study in China,
and is currently studying Mandarin Chinese in Beijing during the Fall
2019 semester.
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MADISON SCHOLAR, from Marietta, Georgia, is a recent graduate of
Coastal Carolina University’s Intelligence and National Security Program.
Throughout her studies at Coastal Carolina University, she was an active
member of the Chanticleer Intelligence Brief, serving as Chief Operations
Officer for two semesters. During her senior year, she was awarded a
Policy Fellowship from the Dyer Institute for Leadership and Public
Policy. This gave her the opportunity to conduct in-depth research on
the topic of marijuana legalization and to discuss the topic in numerous
speaking opportunities. Upon graduation, Madison received the Department
of Politics Intelligence and National Security Student of the Year Award
for the graduating class of 2019. She is currently completing a Master’s
degree in Peace and Conflict Resolution at the University of Manchester
in England, which is generously funded through a $50,000 Ambassadorial
Scholarship awarded by the Rotary Global Grant.
JOSEPH FITSANAKIS, PhD, is Associate Professor of Politics in the
Intelligence and National Security Studies program at Coastal Carolina
University, where he teaches courses on intelligence operations,
intelligence communications, national security, intelligence analysis, and
intelligence in the Cold War, among other subjects. Before joining Coastal,
Dr. Fitsanakis founded the Security and Intelligence Studies program at
King University, where he also directed the King Institute for Security and
Intelligence Studies. He has written extensively on subjects such as
international espionage, intelligence tradecraft, counterintelligence,
wiretapping, cyber-espionage, transnational crime and intelligence reform.
He is a frequent media commentator, syndicated columnist, and senior
editor at intelNews.org, an ACI-indexed scholarly blog that is cataloged
through the United States Library of Congress.
JOHN NOMIKOS, PhD, is Director at the Research Institute for European
and American Studies (RIEAS), Chairman of the Mediterranean Council
for Intelligence Studies (MCIS), Chairman of the Greek Intelligence Studies
Association (GISA), Chairman of the European Intelligence Academy (EIA), and
Founding Editor of the Journal of Mediterranean and Balkan Intelligence
(JMBI) and the Journal of European and American Intelligence Studies. He
is Assistant Professor at Webster University (Athens Campus) and Visiting
Scholar at the John Naisbitt University in Serbia and the University of Rome
(Tre) in Italy. He was previously Adjunct Professor at the Department of
International Relations at the University of Indianapolis (Athens Campus).
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