JOGEE - PARITY AND CLARITY?

jonerees

CDLS Lecture, 27th October 2016

Jogee [2016] 1 Cr App R 31

Parity and Clarity?

Introduction

On 18 February 2016, the Supreme Court gave its eagerly awaited judgment in

the case of Jogee on the law of joint enterprise and a particular feature thereof -

parasitic accessory liability.

Parasitic Accessory Liability

That term was coined by Professor Sir John Smith to describe the doctrine laid

down by the Privy Council in the first instance, then subsequently developed by

the House of Lords, in the following two cases:

• Chan Wing-Siu v R (1985) 80 Cr App R 117

• R v Powell; R v English [1998] 1 Cr App R 261

The doctrine held that:

If two people set out to commit an offence (crime A), and in the course of that

joint enterprise one of them (D1) commits another offence (crime B), the second

person (D2) is guilty as an accessory to crime B if he had foreseen the possibility

that D1 might act as he did.

D2’s foresight of that possibility plus his continuation in the enterprise to

commit crime A were held sufficient in law to bring crime B within the scope of

the conduct for which he is criminally liable, whether or not he intended it AND

whether or not he encouraged or assisted it.

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The Appellants argued that that doctrine – of parasitic accessory liability – did

not reflect the common law.

The point of general public importance that had been certified by the Court of

Appeal in refusing the appeal of Jogee chimed with a general and increasing

unease with the doctrine (although, I add, the Court of Appeal did not go so far as

to grant permission to appeal):

“(2) The current state of the law on joint enterprise over-criminalises secondary

parties”.

The formulation of the law in Chan Wing-Siu had initially been welcomed by

some as an important weapon in deterring gang violence, but when applied to

the law of murder, produced results that were widely seen as oppressive – for

two reasons in particular.

First, the mens rea for murder includes an intention to cause really serious harm.

In many cases of gang violemce it will not be difficult to conclude that the

participants will have foreseen the possibility that one or more of their number,

even if not they themselves, would at some stage of the proceedings act with

intent to cause really serious harm; and once that step is taken, a fatal outcome

must be seen as at least a possibility.

Secondly, murder is subject to a mandatory life sentence, with the draconian

rules as to the minimum period to serve introduced by Schedule 21 of the

Criminal Justice Act 2003. It was established in Sanchez (2009) 2 Cr App R (S) 41

that those rules apply also to accessories.

Public campaigns were launched to reform the law, seeking to place the liability

of an accessory onto the same basis as a principal. Two of those campaigns, ‘Just

for Kids’ and ‘Joint Enterprise Not Guilty By Association’ were given permission

to intervene in the appeal itself.

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Jogee

Lords Hughes and Toulson (with whom Lord Neuberger, Lady Hale and Lord

Thomas agreed) gave the single judgment of the Supreme Court.

That general unease with the current state of the law was referred to by the

Supreme Court:

“It cannot be said that the law is now well established and working satisfactorily.

It remains highly controversial and a continuing source of difficulty for trial

judges. It has also led to large numbers of appeals.”

(paragraph 81)

The Supreme Court also criticised the:

“… striking anomaly of requiring a lower mental threshold for guilt in the case of

an accessory than in the case of the principal (paragraph 84).”

So it proved that the law had taken a wrong turn, with the Supreme Court

stating:

“…there is no doubt that the Privy Council laid down a new principle in Chan

Wing-Siu”, which was now to be abandoned (paragraph 62).

Authorisation of crime B cannot automatically be inferred from continued

participation in crime A with foresight of crime B (paragraph 66).

If D2 continues to participate in crime A with foresight that D1 may commit

crime B, that is evidence, and sometimes powerful evidence, of an intent to assist

D1 in crime B. But it is evidence of such intent, not conclusive of it (paragraph

66).

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Let us measure then the judgment in Jogee against the two criticisms of the

previous law identified by the Supreme Court above, that is, the anomaly of

different mental thresholds for guilt and the lack of clarity, to see the extent to

which those matters have been corrected.

In other words, is there now parity of intention between principal and accessory

and clarity of the law. Hence the title of this presentation.

Principles ‘Re-Stated’

Turning away from the doctrine of parasitic accessory liability, the Court instead

‘restated’ the following principles (as far as tghey can be readily identified):

• Accessory liability requires proof of a conduct element accompanied by

the necessary mental element (paragraph 7).

• The requisite conduct element is that D2 has encouraged or assisted in

the commission of the offence by D1 (paragraph 8).

• Secondary liability does not require the existence of an agreement

between D1 and D2. Where, however, it exists, such agreement is by its

nature a form of encouragement and in most cases will also involve acts

of assistance (paragraph 78).

• Once encouragement or assistance is proved to have been given, the

prosecution does not have to go so far as to prove that it had a positive

effect on D1’s conduct or on the outcome (paragraph 12), unless anything

said or done by D2 has faded to the point of mere background such that it

can be regarded as spent or has become spent by some overwhelming

intervening occurrence (paragraphs 13 97). In that case, the defendant

will bear no criminal responsibility for the principal’s actions (paragraph

97).

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• It is a question of fact and degree whether D2’s conduct was so distanced

in time, place or circumstances from the conduct of D1 that it would not

be realistic to regard D1’s offence as encouraged or assisted by it

(paragraph 12).

• The mental element in assisting or encouraging is an intention to assist or

encourage the commission of the crime (paragraph 9).

• This requires knowledge of any existing facts necessary for it to be

criminal (paragraph 9).

• Where the offence charged does not require mens rea, the only mens rea

required of the secondary party is that he intended to encourage or assist

the perpretrator to do the prohibited act, with knowledge of any facts and

circumstances necessary for it to be a prohibited act (paragraph 99).

• If the crime requires a particular intent, D2 must intend to assist or

encourage D1 to act with such intent (paragraphs 10 & 90).

• There may often be no practical distinction to draw between an intention

by D2 to assist D1 to act with the relevant intention and D2 having the

relevant intention himself. For example, in cases of concerted physical

attack there may often be no practical distinction to draw between an

intention by D2 to assist D1 to act with the intention of causing grievous

bodily harm at least and DS having the intention himself that such harm

be caused. In such cases it may be simpler, and will generally be perfectly

safe, to direct the jury that the Crown must prove that D2 intended that

the victim should suffer grievous bodily harm at least. However, as a

matter of law, it is enough that D2 intended to assist D1 to act with the

requisite intent (paragraph 90).

• The intention to assist, and indeed the intention that the crime should be

committed, may be conditional (paragraph 92).

It is sufficient, for

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example, that D2 intends to assist or encourage D1 to act with intent to do

grievous bodily harm at least, in the event that they are met with

resistance (paragraph 92).

• D2 need not encourage or assist a particular way of committing the

offence, although he may sometimes do so. In particular, his intention to

assist in a crime of violence is not determined only by whether he knows

what kind of weapon D1 has in his possession. The tendency to focus on

what D2 knew of what weapon D1 was carrying can and should give way

to an examination of whether D2 intended to assist in the crime charged.

Knowledge or ignorance that weapons generally, or a particular weapon,

is carried by D1 will be evidence going to what the intention of D2 was,

and may be irresistible evidence one way or the other, but it is evidence

and no more (paragraph 98).

Did Jogee succeed?

Did Jogee succeed then in:

(1) removing the anomaly of requiring a lower mental threshold for guilt in

the case of an accessory than in the case of the principal?

And

(2) in bringing clarity to the law on accessories?

You may have guessed that my answer to both is No, although there are different

views as (1) above, as we will see.

To give credit where it is undoubtedly due, there is absolutely no doubt that

post-Jogee it is not sufficient that D2, in the scenario where two defendants set

out to commit crime A, merely foresaw that D1 might commit crime B. The classic

Chan Wing-Siu formulation has gone for good.

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It may be, however, that that is the sole extent to which clarity has been

provided; and other questions are now begged, some of which we will consider.

David Ormerod QC & Karl Laird [2016] Crim LR 539, amongst others, are not

convinced:

“What is doubtful…is the extent to which the Supreme Court has conclusively

resolved the problems that bedeviled this area of the law.”

David Ormerod QC & Karl Laird [2016] Crim LR 539

Indeed, for reasons we will come on to, Ormerod & Laird conclude:

“Close analysis of the decision in Jogee suggests that the law might not have

changed as significantly as many have assumed. Therefore despite the fact [that

the] Supreme Court has corrected the “wrong turn” taken by the Privy Council in

Chan Wing-Siu, as a matter of substance, not much may have changed.”

(See also Dr Matthew Dyson [2016] Crim LR 638: “What needs careful unpacking

is what the law was changed from, what it has been changed to, and whether the

change will be significant.”)

With those notes of caution ringing in the ears, let me begin with the first of our

two yardsticks:

‘Striking anomaly of a lower mental threshold’

Has the Supreme Court removed that anomaly?

Well, foresight is no longer good enough for a secondary party. That is clear.

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Intention is required for both the principal and secondary party. That is also

clear.

Is there a parity of intention, however, between the principal and the

aider/abettor?

Sir Richard Buxton [2016] Crim LR 324 poses the question in this way:

when the court adopts the formula of intent to assist in the commission of the

principal crime, does it assume also that the accomplice must intend the

commission of that crime?

The President of the Queen’s Bench Division thinks so.

In Anwar [2016] 2 Cr App R 23 (one of the few cases so far in which the Court of

Appeal has cited Jogee), Sir Brian Leveson, expressed the obiter view that Jogee

now requires that D2 intended that D1 cause grievous bodily harm or kill if the

circumstances arise.

Set aside the issue of conditional intent for the moment – which applies equally

to the principal and accessory.

What is being suggested therein is that the mental element for principal and

accessory is the same – both must intend that the victim is killed or caused

grievous bodily harm.

(see also Damian Warburton, [2016] J Crim L 160 at 163: “It is no longer enough

to find only that in the course of their joint crime A, D foresaw that his principal

might commit crime B; D must now, as he must have done prior to the error in

Chan Wing-Siu, intend for this principal to commit crime B in order for D to also

be convicted of it”)

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That view is certainly consistent with the passage in Jogee at paragraph 94 in

which the Supreme Court talks about D2 having “a necessary conditional intent

that crime B should be committed”.

David Ormerod QC and Karl Laird in their article also suggest that Jogee requires:

“…that the defendant…intended that the principal will intentionally cause really

serious harm or kill if the circumstances arose.”

[2016] Crim LR 539

In doing so, they draw on the Crown Court Compendium section 7-4 on

Accessory/Secondary Liability (which of course Ormerod had a hand in

drafting).

Yet, that section puts forward the following under the heading Legal Summary:

• There is no requirement that D and P shared a common intent (7-4.3)

• D’s mens rea is satisfied by proof that D intended to assist or encourage P

(7-4.8(1))

• Where P’s offence requires proof that P acted with intent D must intend to

assist/encourage P to act with that intent (7-4.8(5))

I do not see the proposition therein that D2 must intend that at least really

serious harm will be caused – that would amount to requiring a common intent

with D1.

Indeed, save for the passing reference in paragraph 94 that I referred to earlier,

the Supreme Court never explicitly stated that D2 must intend D1 to commit the

crime (that is, complete the actus reus with the required mens rea).

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On the contrary, in paragraph 90 (quoted on PowerPoint display), the fact that

the Supreme Court recognises that there will be cases where there is no practical

distinction to draw between an intention by D2 to assist D1 to act with the

intention of causing grievous bodily harm at least and D2 having the intention

himself that such harm be caused, suggests that there is a legal distinction

between the two, which is confirmed by the next sentence, where the Court

stated that::

“…As a matter of law, it is enough that D2 intended to assist D1 to act with the

requisite intent.”

Sir Richard Buxton, having posed the question I mentioned earlier, goes on to

suggest that the Supreme Court may have recognised that the logic of its

rejection of the anomaly of a lower mental threshold for an aider/abettor was

driving towards a single mens rea for both principal and secondary - in the case

of murder, an intention to kill or cause grievous bodily harm; yet recoiled from it

at the last moment.

Why? A single mens rea for both principal and aider/abettor would not cater for

those who lend assistance but are indifferent to whether or not the crime is

actually completed.

A requirement that D2 intended that D1 cause grievous bodily harm or kill is

different to a requirement that D2 intended to assist or encourage D1 to act with

intent to do grievous bodily harm or kill.

The first intention is to cause at least grievous bodily harm – the second

intention may be indifferent as to whether at least grievous bodily harm is

actually caused by D1.

So, it looks to me like that there may well remain a lower mental threshold for

guilt in the case of an accessory than in the case of the principal, albeit not as low

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as pre-Jogee (and I am not alone in that view – see Dr Matthew Dyson [2016]

Crim LR 638).

The anomaly of a lower mental threshold quite possibly remains, even if it is less

striking.

Greater clarity?

What about the pursuit of greater clarity in the law on accessories.

The law would have been clearer and better if the Supreme Court had explicitly

said that D2 must intend D1 to commit the crime.

Procuring

It would also have been better if the Supreme Court had considered the form of

complicity known as procuring, at the same time as dealing with

assisting/encouraging. There can be no doubt that ‘procuring’ requires D2 to

intend D1 to commit the crime (procuring means ‘to produce by endeavour’ –

Attorney-General v Able [1984] QB 795 at 812).

An aider/abettor faces a lower mental threshold than not only the principal but

also the procurer.

Threshold of foresight as evidence of intention?

I addressed the issue earlier as to whether or not there is a parity of intention

required of both the principal and the aider/abettor. What about parity as to the

level of foresight required of the principal and the aider/abettor, before the

requisite intention in either can be found?

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The issue is complicated because two different questions are being asked. In

relation to the principal, the issue relates to a consequence, whereas for the

accessory, the issue is partly at least about someone else’s state of mind.

It is clear that foresight is no longer to be equated with intent, but is rather

evidence of intent. Is there, however, a minimum degree of foresight that must

be required before the jury can find that the aider/abettor has the required

intention?

The common law, in the context of murder at least, imposes a high threshold on

the types of foresight from which a jury will be entitled to infer intent. After a

period of 25 years or so of incremental narrowing (i.e. from Hyam v DPP [1975]

AC 55 to Woollin [1999] 1 AC 82), the House of Lords finally agreed in Woollin

that:

• a jury is not entitled to ‘find’ that the defendant intended to kill or cause

really serious harm unless they conclude that death or really serious

harm was a virtually certain consequence, barring some unforeseen

intervention, and the defendant appreciated that this was the case

There is a threshold on foresight – anything less than foresight of virtual

certainty will not be sufficient to entitle the jury to find intention

In Jogee, the Supreme Court was silent as to any threshold of foresight that a

secondary party must possess before the jury will be entitled to infer the

requisite intent. Will the defendant’s foresight of even the slightest possibility of

the principal intentionally acting in the proscribed way be sufficient for a jury to

be entitled to infer that he possessed the requisite intention? Alternatively, does

there have to be a high level of foresight before the jury will be entitled to infer

from this foresight that he possessed the requisite intention?

I return back to the controversy as to whether or not there is a difference any

longer between the requisite intention in a principal and in an aider/abettor.

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If the requisite intention is now the same for both principal and secondary party

– e.g. an intention that at least really serious injury be caused to the victim –

presumably, the courts will simply apply the Woollin approach to both principal

and aider/abettor alike.

But if an intention to assist or encourage D1 to act with the intent to cause at

least really serious injury is different to an intention that at least really serious

injury is caused to the victim, how might the Woollin approach be adapted?

One possibility is that such a direction nevertheless concentrates on foresight of

the consequences of D1’s actions on the victim. The other possibility is that such

a direction focuses on foresight of the consequences of D2’s actions on D1:

“A jury is not entitled to find that D2 intended to assist or encourage D1 to act

with the intent to kill or cause really serious injury….

…unless they conclude that it was a virtually certain consequence of D2’s

assistance or encouragement, barring some unforeseen intervention, that D1

would act with the intent to kill or cause really serious injury, and D2

appreciated that this was the case.”

Consider the following:

D1 and D2 are on a bridge with V. D1 throws V into the river after being

encouraged by D2 to do so, calling out ‘Chuck him in’. V drowns.

In light of Woollin, the judge will direct the jury that in relation to D1 they can

only convict him of murder, if when he threw V into the river, he appreciated

that death or really serious injury was a virtually certain consequence barring

some unforeseen intervention. What about D2? The jury can be directed that as a

matter of law, it is enough that D2 intended to encourage D1 to act with the

intent to kill or cause really serious injury. If D2 denies having such intention,

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however, are the jury to be directed that they can infer that intention if D2

foresaw that D1 would act with the requisite intention, so long as D2’s foresight

of that was more than de minimis?

Alternatively, should the jury be directed that they are only entitled to infer the

requisite intent if D2 foresaw that D1 would act with intent to kill or cause really

serious injury as a virtually certain consequence of D2’s act of encouragement,

even if D2 did not appreciate that death or really serious injury was a virtually

certain consequence of the act of D1 that he encouraged?

The issue becomes striking if the Crown cannot establish the identity of the

principal. Ormerod poses the question, in those circumstances is the judge

required to direct the jury - in relation to each defendant - that there are two

different routes to finding intention, depending upon whether they are principal

or accessory?

The Supreme Court failed to specify whether the jury is only entitled to infer the

necessary intention if they are sure that D2 possessed a high level of foresight. It

is unclear whether it is safe to conclude from this omission that the Supreme

Court did not intend for some version of the Woollin direction to apply.

Of course, in most cases, the prosecution will continue to allege that D2 intended

D1 to do the relevant acts and in fact intended D1 to commit the crime. The real

risk is that prosecutors if needed will argue that foresight of a possibility of what

D1 might do, however slim a possibility, is enough to show a conditional

intention to assist or encourage D1, or indeed, a conditional intention that D1

commit the crime.

Problem with Cogan & Leak?

Requiring an intention on the part of the aider/abettor which focuses, in turn, on

the state of mind of the principal may also prove a problem to the principle set

out in Cogan & Leak (1975) 61 Cr App R 217.

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In Cogan & Leak, the appellant Cogan was charged with rape of Leak’s wife, and

was convicted, but his conviction was quashed on appeal on the ground that he

believed that Leak’s wife was consenting. Leak was charged and convicted as an

aider and abettor, after he told Cogan, untruthfully, that his wife wanted to have

sexual intercourse with her. The Court of Appeal held that, “The fact that Cogan

was innocent of rape because he believed that she was consenting does not affect

the position that she was raped”. It was also said to be irrelevant to the liability

of Leak as an aider/abettor that C did not intend to have sexual intercourse with

her without her consent.

Yet, under the Jogee formulation of the requisite intent for an aider/abettor, D2

must intend to assist/encourage D2 to act with the necessary mens rea to

commit the offence. If Leak, because he intended Cogan to fall for his deception,

did not intend Cogan to act with requisite mens rea for rape, then Leak is not

guilty as an aider/abettor under Jogee.

Of course, that is only a problem if you think that Cogan & Leak was rightly

decided in the first place. It is, nevertheless, a case firmly established in the

canon of law relating to sexual offences and it may have warranted some

consideration by the Supreme Court as part of its review of accessorial liability.

Conditional intent – restricted to necessity test?

I said I would return to conditional intent and I do so, because another potential

issue arises out of Jogee which may need clarification.

At paragraph 95, the Supreme Court stated:

“…liability as an aider or abettor does not necessarily depend on there being

some form of agreement between the defendant; it depends on proof of

intentional assistance or encouragement, conditional or otherwise. If D2 joins

with a group which he realises is out to cause serious injury, the jury may well

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infer that he intended to encourage or assist the deliberate infliction of serious

bodily injury and/or intended that that should happen if necessary. In that case, if

D1 acts with intent to cause serious bodily injury and death results, D1 and D2

will each be guilty of murder.”

Ormerod and Laird ask whether the Supreme Court were suggesting that

“conditional intent applies in only a tightly restricted context: it arises where D

anticipates that P will conclude that it is ‘necessary’ intentionally to kill or cause

GBH”.

It may be more likely that the Court meant no more than that the jury can infer

that D2 had the requisite intention, albeit conditional, if he foresaw that D1

might decide in the circumstances to inflict GBH or death. If that is the correct

interpretation, this serves to illustrate the danger referred to previously arising

from an absence of an explicit threshold for foresight before intention can be

inferred in the accessory.

Whether or not, conditional intent is restricted only to circumstances of

necessity may be a matter which the Court of Appeal needs to clarify.

Actus reus of assisting/encouraging?

Finally, in our list of some of the post-Jogee issues, the Supreme Court

acknowledged in Jogee the difficulty of proving causation between

assistance/encouragement and commission of the crime itself (slide of re-stated

principle on actus reus).

Rather than attempt to identify with any precision the threshold of causation, the

Supreme Court instead opted to fudge the issue by leaving it entirely in the

hands of the jury to decide when it would be ‘realistic to regard [D1s] offence as

encouraged or assisted” by D2.

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This fudge reflects an overall failing of the judgment in Jogee to spell out in

principle why D2 should be liable for D1’s crime – it merely restates the fact of

assistance or encouragement and does not deal at all with any possible

justifications for criminal liability for the secondary party, in circumstances

where there remains a lower mental threshold than for the principal and a lower

causation threshold than for the principal.

The result appears to be that it is simply left for juries to decide when D2 has

done enough and been at fault enough to be liable. And that value judgment is a

strange creature in a criminal trial, and particularly in a criminal trial for the

most serious offence of all, murder.

Directions

So how does the Crown Court Compendium suggest the jury should be directed

in relation to accessory/secondary liability?

Under the heading “Directions” at the end of chapter 7-4 (a chapter which has a

warning in bold at the outset that ‘This is a complex area of the law”!) it is stated

that

“The jury must be directed as follows:

• D is guilty of a crime committed by another person (P) if D intentionally

assist/encourages/causes P to commit the crime

• If P’s crime requires a particular intention on P’s part, e.g. murder or a

section 18 offence: This means that D must intentionally

assist/encourage/cause P to (commit the actus reus) with (the required

intent)

Note:

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(1) the CCC rolls up assist/encouraging with procuring so that there is one mens

rea for either base of liability;

(2) in doing so, it does suggest that the jury should be directed that D2 must

intend D1 to commit the offence – both the actus reus and the mens rea, making it

difficult for Cogan & Leak to survive if right but leading to a parity of intention

between the principal and the accessory despite my misgivings;

(3) Query what is the actus reus for murder, which D2 must intend D1 to commit

– death or really serious injury only?

Under chapter 8-1 on ‘Intention’, the court is reminded that in some cases,

“usually where D claims his aim was to achieve a different purpose and he hoped

that the harm for which he is being prosecuted would not arise”, it may be

necessary to give the jury a direction that they are not entitled to find the

necessary intention unless they are sure that the consequence was a virtual

certainty (barring some unforeseen intervention) as a result of the defendant’s

actions and that the defendant appreciated that such was the case (the Woollin

direction). There is, you won’t be surprised, no attempt made to wrestle with

how such a direction may be adapted when the jury are considering the

intention of the accessory rather than the principal (although if the Crown Court

Compendium’s approach on intention is correct – that the intention required is

the same whether principal or accessory – there may not be any difficulty).

Conclusion

So, in conclusion:

(1) It is debatable at least as to whether parity of intention between the

principal and aider/abettor has been reached;

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(2) Clarity has been brought to the law on some matters, but there is plenty

of parts of the law on accessorial liability still waiting for the mud to

clear;

(3) Particular issues to be resolved include:

a. Whether the mens rea for procuring differs to that for

aiding/abetting;

b. Whether there is a threshold of foresight as evidence of intention,

and if so, at what level is it set;

c. The present status of Cogan & Leak;

d. Whether conditional intent is restricted only to circumstances

where D2 anticipates that D1 will conclude that it is ‘necessary’ to

act with the requisite intention;

e. If the aider/abettor is required to intend that the actus reus of the

offence is committed, in the case of murder does the aider/abettor

need to intend death or will grievous bodily harm suffice.

Finally, you will remember that part of the Supreme Court’s issue with the

doctrine of parasitic accessory liability was the burden it placed upon on the

courts.

In the same vein, the Supreme Court were clearly worried about the possible

burden placed upon the Court of Appeal by their own judgment. They dealt with

that issue by discouraging appeals based upon their finding that the law had

been consistently misapplied over 30 years.

Lords Hughes and Toulson were clear that an out-of-time appeal to the Court of

Appeal should not succeed only on the basis that ‘the law applied has now been

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declared to be mistaken’ (paragraph 100). Their approach is suggestive of a

‘floodgates’ concern and what emerges is the message to the Court of Appeal that

an appeal should not be allowed unless “a substantial injustice can be shown”.

The quandary, of course, is that surely any conviction, that would not today be

obtained, but was obtained previously on a basis that was wrong in law, is

unjust? What more is required to render that injustice substantial?

Jogee was the lucky one. According to Sir Richard Buxton, his case was selected

by the Supreme Court as the vehicle to address its concern about the doctrine of

parasitic accessory liability. Having ‘re-stated’ the principles for future

defendants, the impression given is of the Supreme Court trying to shut the door

to those who have suffered in the past.

Jogee, however, got his re-trial….

And the jury acquitted him of murder.

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