theRealist | International Relations - Issue 1

the|Realist

the | Realist 1

The new

crisis in the

Mediterranean

On a collission course?

The rise of nationalism | p. 4

Vienna as a bridge builder | p. 18

Friendship between UK & Turkey | p. 21

Armenia‘s security dilemma | p. 32

the | Realist

2

Relations

& Security

p. 4 Russia and China:

An uncertain relationship of convenience

p. 6 The rise of nationalism: A fear of losing identity

p. 8 Otto von Bismarck:

The conservative mastermind of Realpolitik

p. 11 The Middle East: The legacy of

World War I in the sights of the Great Powers

p. 14 Understanding Lebanon:

A society on the way to collapse

p. 16 The risky game in the Mediterranean:

Ankara‘s gamble in Libya

p. 18 NATO and the EU:

An uneasy relationship of obstacles

Editor: Konstantin Ghazaryan

Guest commentators: Mari Avalyan, Nikolina Martinović

the | Realist 3

Appeasement

& Diplomacy

p. 20 The international arena of diplomacy:

Vienna as a bridge builder

p. 23 MI 6: New friendship between UK and Turkey?

p. 25 Appeasement towards

neo-Ottoman and pan-Turkic tendencies

p. 28 Grey Wolves: How Turkish ultra-nationalism

reaches the social centre of Europe

p. 30 Henry Kissinger: The symbol of Realpolitik -

loved, hated, disputed

p. 32 The frozen conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh:

The limits of diplomacy

p. 34 Armenia‘s dilemma of security and foreign policy

Website: the-realist.eu

the | Realist

4

Russia and China

An uncertain partnership of convenience

The geopolitical situation of the last

years and decades has changed fundamentally.

The once stable bipolar

world order of the Cold War is now

being followed by a multipolar period

in which the cards are being reshuffled

and the major players have to

find themselves anew. It is a regular

occurrence that new great powers

replace old ones, hegemons emerge

and the cycles repeat themselves

again and again. Former opponents

can become allies and vice versa.

Nevertheless, the constant in world

politics is that states, especially great

powers, try to expand their power

base independently of time in order

to ensure their own survival. Changes

in geopolitics and the emergence of

new important actors are inevitable.

Once the Roman Empire and Carthage

dominated global politics, later

for a time it was the Spanish or Portuguese

– or the French and British.

Post-Cold-War Period: The confrontation

between new political

centres

After the collapse of the Soviet Union

and the de facto end of the Cold

War, a period of American hegemonic

politics followed, followed by a

multipolar world order in which we

find ourselves today. Whereas there

used to be two great powers that clearly

dominated the others technologically,

economically, politically and

militarily, this has changed today.

There are more political centres but

less or even no hegemonic power.

Once it was the United States and the

Soviet Union, it can be said that today

it is a bundle of potentially emerging

regional powers: The United States,

China, Russia, India, Brazil, the EU

and individual powers in the Middle

East. Yet this list of powers is de facto

dominated by the United States and

China. Russia is still a major military

player, but its economic power is not

sufficient to compete seriously with

China, the US or the EU. At 1.6 trillion,

Russia ranks 11th, far behind Brazil,

India, Canada, Japan and several

European countries, compared with

some 21 trillion in the US, 18 trillion

in the EU and 14 trillion in China.

the | Realist 5

A global political confrontation between

Russia and the USA such as during

the Cold War is not given today.

Rather, there are individual proxy

wars in which Russia wants to dominate

its own post-Soviet sphere of influence

and the United States wants

to weaken it (and vice versa in Latin

America). The core concerns of the

United States lie elsewhere, namely

in China. The rivalry between China

and the United States is developing

into a new Cold War in which two

economic giants are facing each other.

China, the rising empire in the East,

is trying to replace the United States

in parts of the world and to take over

the rank. The once rather

ramshackle country, torn

apart by civil war and wars,

now has a weighty voice on

the international stage.

The Russian role in the Sino-American

confrontation

But what is much more exciting in

this political confrontation, is the role

of other states – above all Russia. Although

Russia is not the main driving

force in global politics, it will play a

decisive role in the Chinese-American

confrontation. There are two

main points of view here: A somewhat

more widespread media portrayal

is that of a Russian-Chinese alliance

against the West. The other depiction

assumes a Russian-American alliance

against China in the long term.

It is particularly worthwhile to take a

closer look at the latter representation.

There are several reasons for this:

For one thing, since Peter the Great,

Russia has been a major player in the

European concert and was considered

part of the West. Until the October

Revolution, Russia was de facto

an integral, albeit hegemonic, part

of the West. This becomes clear at

the latest with the Napoleonic wars.

Almost symbolic of Russia’s Western

affiliation is, among other things,

the Boxer Rebellion and the international

intervention in China – led

by Western countries, with Russia at

the forefront. The main dangers that

Russia has faced throughout history

have come not only from mainland

Europe, but also and above all from

the East and South – from the Chinese,

the Japanese, the Golden Horde,

the Tatars and the Ottomans.

Another factor is the historical – now

often forgotten – tension between

Russia and China. The 20th century

is a good example of this. Although

influenced by communism, both

countries were considered arch rivals

in the 1970s. This was one of the

reasons why the United States wanted

to strengthen the relationship

„There are more political centres but

less or even no hegemonic power.“

between the USA and Russia on the

one hand and the USA and China

on the other during the Nixon era.

The Soviets and the Chinese were

faced with an indirect confrontation

in which both sides wanted to draw

other actors, such as the USA, to their

side. Nevertheless, this did not bother

the Communists in supporting

North Vietnam in its struggle against

the South. The revival of Sino-Russian

relations is young, but should be viewed

without ideological blindness.

The broad presentation of a Russian-Chinese

friendship is at least somewhat

selective. But if it is, then it

can only be described as a temporary

partnership of convenience. A partnership

of convenience with some

overlaps and common interests, but

above all many lines of conflict and

grey areas. The partnership of convenience

consists in the fact that both

great powers have concerns regarding

the West. But behind the facade

of friendship there are a number of

questions: Russia is trying to appease

the Chinese counterpart – this is due

to several factors. On the one hand

China’s economic superiority, on the

other hand Russia’s sparsely populated

eastern regions and China’s population

strength. Partly for this reason,

several border issues between

China and Russia were resolved in

the 1990s and 2000s through Russian

concessions to China (such as the

2004 treaty). In addition, China is pushing

more strongly into the post-Soviet

region in terms of foreign policy,

and this is particularly noticeable in

Central Asia. While Russia is trying

to maintain this sphere of influence,

there is a growing Chinese influence

in this region – indeed, against Russia’s

interests.

Breaking the picture down to Russia,

China and the United States is far

too simplistic. Asian countries

such as India, but also

Vietnam and a number of

Southeast Asian countries

are performing a balancing

act with China. Communist Vietnam

is therefore not afraid to knock on the

door of the United States. India and

China are considered geopolitical

rivals and opponents in the region.

China’s difficult relations with a number

of Asian countries puts Russian-Chinese

relations in particular on

a critical test. That is because Russia

maintains historically good relations

with India. It is unlikely that Russia

would take sides in favour of China in

the Indo-Chinese power struggle. In

addition, Russia has a more open relationship

with other Asian countries

with which China maintains complicated

relations. This is particularly noticeable

in the Korean conflict. Russia

maintains a pragmatic relationship

with both Korean states, especially

with South Korea. One could even argue

that the anti-Chinese sentiments

in Asia and the American presence

in East Asia play into Russia’s hands

to some extent. After all, a Chinese

hegemon without a counterweight

would crush Russia politically. For this

reason, a balancing act between the

United States and China is important.

the | Realist

6

„The main dangers that Russia has faced throughout history have come not

only from mainland Europe, but also and above all from the East and South…“

A new relationship of trust between

the West and Russia could be an opportunity

The current political situation could

be described as an exception in the

light of history: The conflicts of interest

with the West are forcing Russia

to turn its attention politically – sometimes

against its own will – to the

East. In the short term, the Russian

political elite still has serious concerns

regarding the Americans. The

relationship of trust between the

West and Russia has been shattered

and put to the test. A partnership

of convenience with the Chinese is

a beneficial alternative. In the long

term, however, the dangers of a hegemonic

China are well known to

certain circles of the Russian political

elite. Through an alliance with China,

Russia would play second fiddle in

the long term and act as a supplier

of raw materials to China. The Russian

East, which borders on China, is

far too sparsely populated for this,

and has no economic or technological

prospects. The restoration of the

Russian-Western relationship of trust

would make Russia once again one of

the leading players in the European

or Western orchestra. This will require

concessions on both sides and a certain

amount of self-reflection.

The rise of nationalism

A fear of losing identity

Guest commentary: Nikolina Martinović

After many wars, countless taken lives, sacrifices,

and greed, the world today functions as

a puzzle game. Namely, from one idea to the

realization and establishment of the European

Union as the founders of common values,

goods, countries are trying to incorporate, join

this unique model, in order to become an integral

part of this great puzzle.

Nevertheless, the growth of nationalism and

its power is more than evident. It appeared

around the 17th/18th century and apparently

left deep roots. In order to better understand:

“Nationalism is a theory that explains how people

around the world are organized socially

and politically. It holds that the human population

is divided into many different nations

composed of people with a strong sense of

group loyalty. Members of a nation are deeply

committed to maximizing their nation’s autonomy,

which means they prefer to have their

own state.” (Mearsheimer)

Nationalism due to EU identity

Despite the desire of developing countries to

be part of the family of the European Union

and feel the security, but also the benefits of

their membership, there is a fear of losing identity,

integrity, and eventually hard-won sovereignty.

The same problem is with the member

states. In other words, the more we move towards

a unique identity, the more we face a

nationalism.

Specifically, this problem also exists outside

the European Union and we can face it in

everyday life. Former Yugoslav states or

Post-Soviet states, each of which strives primarily

for separated borders, then for its own

identity, language, history, as well as the religion.

We can search for examples related to the

languages in Former Yugoslavia, namely, there

were three official languages: Serbo-Croatian,

Macedonian, and Slovene. Now, each country

uses the same language but with a different

name: Montenegro – Montenegrin, Serbia

– Serbian, Bosnia and Herzegovina – Bosnian,

etc. When it comes to history, it can often

be based on myths and misunderstandings

among these countries. This is to say, every

country wants something special, different in

order to highlight its diversity. Consequently,

after a long time of pressure, each of them

wants to have freedom and supremacy over its

territory and is ready to defend with all the forces

at its disposal. Regarding the psychological

side, nationalism gives people a sense of oneness,

superiority, sovereignty over others.

the | Realist 7

On the other side, the European Union

allows a new start. To be a part of

it, one must invest and put a lot of

effort. Through the path to the goal,

the state develops and acquires greater

competence to solve existing problems.

Further, the European Union

offers a healthier way of thinking – a

sense of unity and an incentive

to improve, which

certainly meets the needs

of one population and its

country. With independent

institutions, the selfless

sharing of goods significantly

enhances peace and

good cooperation with the

member states and those

on their way to becoming so.

Previous experience with European

Union significantly shows that there

is no space for fear, because it

guarantees stability. This has been

proven by the range of support and

assistance that the European Union

provides to developing countries

on a daily basis, not to mention crisis

situations. Additionally, this is

provided through numerous assistance

grants, and planning projects

for each country individually, according

to its needs and current achievements.

A much more serious and

difficult type of assistance offered

by the European Union to stabilize

the situation and peacefully resolve

relations is its active participation in

resolving them and finding the best

possible solution. All these facts shatter

the prejudices and perceptions

that a state can carry with it, due to

a previous bad experience. Indeed,

the European Union has proved to be

successful in its intentions so far.

„Further, the European Union offers

a healthier way of thinking – a sense

of unity and an incentive to improve,

which certainly meets the needs of one

population and its country. “

GAP between nationalism and religion

Yet, nationalism is also mostly understood

from a negative perception

and many international relations

theories see nationalism as a big enemy.

Nationalism can take a negative

form only if it crosses the line and

becomes extremist or chauvinistic.

That does not need to happen. Back

in history, people wanted to have

something to identify with and that

fact did not change still. People are

connected by common beliefs, values

ideologies, but also are raised to

love their country and to be attached

to it. Identity and origin are very important

segments in an individual’s

life. In the Balkans, religion is often

related to national identity. In Bosnia

and Herzegovina, the Bosnians

are more often related to Islam as a

religious group, while in Montenegro

Bosnians are more often identified as

a national identity, primarily as a part

of Montenegro.

Therefore, the gap between nationalism

and religion is a huge

problem, and a lot of people

have difficulties on which

side should they be. Nationalism

and religion meet

each other at one point,

each of which unifies people

with a strong sense of

loyalty towards their beliefs,

and both can easily cross

the line to extremism. Unfortunately,

both sides usually do not realize extremism

of their own, and the main

reason is that they think they protect

either their religion or country from

“enemies” and for everything they do

a justification “exists”. If these sides

recognize each other as a threat, one

country can have a lot of troubles. It

leads to internal disorder among the

citizens, protests, that often go along

with hate speech towards the other

side. The problem lies in the lack of

tolerance and the constant search

for guilt in others, as well as the unwillingness

to take the blame. At the

glance we have an open question:

Can we overcome nationalism?

the | Realist

8

the | Realist 9

Otto von Bismarck

The conservative mastermind of Realpolitik

When talking about the greates

German statesman, names such

as Konrad Adenauer, Willy Brandt

or Helmut Schmidt are often mentioned.

Well, it should be pointed

out that the foundation for a modern

and above all unified Germany,

which has only existed for about 150

years, was laid by the “Iron Chancellor”

Otto von Bismarck. Leaving aside

the merits of the individual important

statesmen, the wealth of foreign

and domestic policy reforms undertaken

by the Iron Chancellor

are unprecedented. In

one form or another, many

of his reforms are still valid

today. In this respect, it

should be noted that Otto

von Bismarck was ideologically

primarily on the one

hand a convinced monarchist,

on the other hand someone

who – whether deliberately

or for tactical reasons – was responsible

for the realization of important

liberal, conservative but also social

democratic initiatives.

Otto von Bismarck, who came from

a noble family, steered the fortunes

of Prussia at the beginning and later

of Germany for 28 years. His political

commitment until 1871 can be described

above all by Prussia’s exemplary

power politics. At the time Bismarck

took over the affairs of state,

there was de facto no Germany as we

know it today. Rather, the territory

of present-day Germany at that time

resembled a patchwork of many autonomous

small states, which together

formed a kind of confederation

within the German Confederation.

Apart from the small German states,

two players played a dominant role

in the German Confederation: Prussia

and Austria-Hungary.

„By skilful tactics, taking advantage

of military conflicts for his own benefit,

Otto von Bismarck actually managed

to establish the German Empire

through these ‚unification wars‘.“

Bismarck’s Realpolitik: The way to

German unification

One of the decisive factors for the

unity of a German nation state was

Otto von Bismarck’s Realpolitik. Not

only a shrewd power politician, but

a strategist who was always able to

derive political benefit from military

conflicts. Otto von Bismarck understood

like no other that German unity

and the security of Germany was possible

on the one hand through clever,

sometimes secret alliances and on

the other hand through military conflicts,

which in his view were merely

a matter of time. True to the motto

“today’s friend is tomorrow’s enemy”

and vice versa, Prussia was able

at that time to enter into alliances

of convenience with countries with

which it was at war just a few years

ago. Bismarck wanted to strengthen

Prussia’s supremacy in the German

Confederation in the first step and

unite the small German states behind

him in the second step. In this context,

three wars can be mentioned in

particular, which have been fateful

for Germany to this day: On the one

hand, the German-Danish War, the

German-Austrian War and the German-French

War. The German-Danish

War was about territorial conflicts

over Schleswig-Holstein, whereby

Prussia and its ally Austria were able

to win the war and extend the Prussian-Austrian

supremacy.

The Prussian-Austrian alliance of convenience

was mainly characterized

by power struggles in the German

Confederation. In the so-called German-Austrian

War between Prussia

and Austria, the aim was to secure

its own dominant position in Central

Europe. One could also say that until

1866 (the year of the German-Austrian

War) Austria was considered the

dominant player in Central Europe

and had to cede its supremacy to

Prussia in the course of the war. Although

the Prussian monarch demanded

not only the cession of power

but also territorial claims, Otto von

Bismarck was able to convince him

to abstain from territorial

claims, as he saw Austria as

an important ally in the later

course on. When Austria

abdicated power, Prussia

assumed a dominant position

in the German Confederation,

which led many

small German states to oppose

Prussian dominance.

Otto von Bismarck knew that only

an external threat would bring together

the German small states and the

North German Confederation under

Prussian leadership.

Through the dispute over a Spanish

throne succession, Otto von Bismarck

was able to trick France into declaring

war on the North German Confederation

under Prussian leadership.

After France declared war on Prussia,

the (southern) German small states

actually joined the Prussian-led alliance

to fight against France, contrary

to French expectations. By skilful

tactics, taking advantage of military

conflicts for his own benefit, Otto von

Bismarck actually managed to establish

the German Empire through

these “unification wars” (mentioned

above). In foreign policy, the pragmatist

attempted in the following years

to cement the new order, prevent

other powers becoming the allies of

France, above all through multiple

defensive alliances.

the | Realist

10

„By taking over the agendas of his opponents and implementing them in one

form or another, he tried to prevent these groups from growing stronger. “

A conservative at the forefront of

reforms

As Chancellor of the German Empire,

Otto von Bismarck devoted himself

to domestic policy in the following

years. It would be wrong to call Bismarck

a parliamentarist or pluralist.

On the contrary, he was a power politician.

But, in all his actions, methods

and convictions, one thing above all

must be borne in mind: his actions

must be seen in relation to the spirit

of the times. The second half of the

19th century was seething in several

respects: liberals fought against clerical

influences, the churches tried

to maintain their authority, and the

socialists invented themselves during

that period in the course of the

Industrial Revolution. What Otto von

Bismarck characterized in terms of

foreign policy can be applied to domestic

politics in one way or another:

Namely, forming alliances of convenience

with former opponents, the

pragmatic approach to ensure stability.

At first, the convinced monarchist

was regarded as a classical conservative

law-and-order statesman, but

then – partly for tactical reasons – he

opposed the church power, in order

to unite among others the liberals of

that time behind him.

By taking over the agendas of his

opponents and implementing them

in one form or another, he tried to

prevent these groups from growing

stronger. For this reason, among others,

he opposed the clerical power

(Kulturkampf) and later introduced

civil marriage, which still exists today.

In the context of the time, civil marriage

can be described as a kind of liberal

revolution. Gradually he turned

away from the liberals and turned

to some social policy measures. He

countered the rise of the socialists, in

whom he saw a clear danger to the

monarchy, with two measures: One

was the Socialist Law, a de facto ban

on socialists (but not on moderate

social democrats) and the parallel

introduction of social policy measures.

Similar to the Liberals, he implemented

decisive social reforms to

satisfy the working class on the one

hand and to reduce the support for

socialists on the other. In this way,

he introduced the social insurance

system, which to this day forms the

basis for the current social insurance

system in one way or another.

There is no doubt that Otto von Bismarck

was no fanatical ideologue.

Rather, he was a conservative reformer

who recognized the signs of the

times and was able to react quickly

through alliances of convenience.

Regardless of whether his reform

measures were tactically motivated

or corresponded to his actual convictions,

these reforms (civil marriage,

social insurance system) were revolutionary

for the time. Above all, one

thing can be said with certainty: his

talent for foreign policy, the compatibility

of a strategic genius, tactician

and realpolitician (Realpolitik), created

the nation state as we know it in

the first place. At the end of his political

life, however, he became a prisoner

of his own tactics: Because of the

permanent maneuvering between

the different groups, he ended up

bringing both parts of conservative,

liberal and socialist factions against

him. In doing so he was still reacting

to the trouble spots in the Reich and

was thus able to prevent revolutionary

movements and lay the foundations

for European conservatism.

However, his foreign and domestic

policy reforms were supported by

conservative fundamental principles.

The quotation “Conservative

means marching at the forefront of

progress” from the former Bavarian

Prime Minister Franz J. Strauss about

conservatism fits very well with the

political life of Otto von Bismarck.

The political life of the chancellor,

who became the symbol of conservative

reformism.

the | Realist 11

The Middle East

The legacy of World War I in the sights of the

Great Powers

The consequences of the policy of

division

No other region in the world has been

plagued by crises as the Middle East

in recent decades. The chessboard of

the great powers has not only been

hit by wars since the Arab Spring. The

Middle East is diverse – religiously,

politically and culturally. Although

the present appearance of the Middle

East is shaped by the last absolute

monarchies and one-party systems,

the region is considered the cradle

of civilization. The first advanced civilizations

(high cultures) settled in

the area between the Euphrates and

Tigris thousands of years ago. As the

starting point for Islamization and

the center of the later crusades, the

Middle East was always torn between

two worlds. Many conservative parts

of today’s Orient were once responsible

for the cultural boom in Europe

and elsewhere.

The history of the past hundred years

is particularly important for the current

hotspots. Important parts of the

Orient were under Ottoman rule for

a long time and already played a key

role in the First World War – because

the great powers also fought their

wars in the Middle East. Both sides,

the Germans as well as the English

and French have always appreciated

the importance of allies in the region.

Dissatisfied with the Ottoman rule,

Arab tribes sought political independence

especially before, during and

after the First World War. The promises

of individual European powers,

especially the English, that the Arab

tribes would be granted independence

in the event of an alliance,

were not fulfilled. Instead, the French

and English decided to reorganize

the Middle East. State borders, which

are responsible for many of today’s

conflicts, have been drawn. Instead

of a large Arab state, the area was divided

into several small states, which

were often heterogeneous within the

country.

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12

Cleavages between ethnical and religious

minorities

A look at Lebanon, Syria or Iraq illustrates

the situation. Lebanon in particular

appears to be a prime example

from the history book. Ethnic and

religious heterogeneity is held together

by a unique constitution that

predefines offices according to religion

and ethnicity. Religiously, half of

the population consists of Sunnis and

Shiites, the other half of Orthodox,

Catholic and Maronite Christians. In

addition, there is a Druze minority

that plays a role in the region – especially

in Lebanon, Syria and Israel. In a

weakened form, different ethnic and

religious minorities can also be defined

in Syria and Iraq, which belong

to the indigenous population

of the respective states.

The Kurds, for example,

play a formative role in Iraq

and have their own armed

forces and government

through autonomy.

Besides the Israel-Palestine conflict,

there are many other cleavages within

the Arab world. The former Iraqi

ruler Saddam Hussein, himself a

Sunni, ruled the mostly Shiite country.

The intra-confessional conflicts,

not only in Iraq, are the breeding

ground for numerous conflicts within

the Arab world. Saddam Hussein

not only tried to install a Sunni Arab

regime – he also acted against individual,

influential ethnic minorities

(such as the Kurds). The overthrow of

a regime – for whatever reason – is

one side of the problem, the loss of

control over the environment of the

overthrown regime is another point.

Especially in the Iraqi case, thousands

of high-ranking officers were driven

underground within one day. These

are the same officers who, many

years later, partially made up part of

the leadership of the Islamic State.

We can see a similar picture in

neighboring Syria, the country,

which is predominantly Sunni, has

been authoritarian-ruled by the Alawite

Al-Assad family for several decades.

Fearing that Islamist groups

could take power in the country, several

religious and ethnic minorities

were/are forming “alliances” with the

regime. In addition to Bashar al-Assad,

the civil war is not only shaped

by a democratic opposition, but also

by Islamist rebels, Kurds and Christian

minorities. Due to the complex

situation within Syria, it is important

in this debate not to relativize the actions

of the regime, but at the same

time to call radical rebel groups as

such.

„Instead of a large Arab state, the area

was divided into several small states,

which were often heterogeneous within

the country. “

Because great powers are involved

in these conflicts, conspiracy theories

are used to justify authoritarian

regimes and deny the right to resist.

Both, an authoritarian regime and

several radical rebel groups financed

by regional or great powers are

part of the game. Major and regional

powers undoubtedly play an important

role in the region and try to advance

their own interests. It is in the

nature of geopolitics that domestic

tensions and civil wars are additionally

aggravated by foreign countries.

More than a battlefield for proxy

wars

Different interests thwart in Syria,

Iraq and Lebanon. Iran’s regional

power struggle with Saudi Arabia,

for example, is an important basis for

the conflict and is based on the Sunni

and Shiite cleavage. For Iran, Shiite

support in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon is

of national importance to broaden

the sphere of influence and build a

logistical bridge to the Hezbollah militia.

Bashar al-Assad is considered an

important partner, which is why Iranian

military units also operate on the

regime’s side in Syria. Saudi Arabia,

on the other hand, is trying to push

back Iranian influence in the Middle

East and expand its sphere of influence.

Not only in neighboring Qatar,

but above all in the region around

Iraq and Syria. It should be mentioned

that Saudi Arabia has established

a conservative version of Islam,

Wahhabism, as the state religion.

One of the last absolute monarchies,

which is known for brutal executions,

supports the spread of Wahhabism

worldwide. The Saudi Arabian rulers,

but also Qatar, are suspected

in directly or indirectly

financing (different) radical

groups in the Syrian conflict.

Another important regional

player is Turkey,

which is also suspected of financing

individual radical groups in Syria –

especially northern Syria. Turkey’s

primary interest lies in preventing a

strong Kurdish self-government in

northern Syria. Under the pretext of

fighting terrorists, Turkey not only

finances anti-Kurdish forces in the

region, but also takes an active part

in military operations, as in the case

of the intervention in northern Syria.

The country on the Bosporus maneuvers

between Washington and

Moscow, which has an impact on

the conflict in the Middle East. While

Russia supports/supported the

Syrian ruler, but at the same time

strengthened relations with strategically

important Turkey, Turkey has a

tense relationship with Bashar al-Assad.

The intervention in Northern Syria,

which is predominantly occupied

by Kurds, occasionally led/leads to

military clashes with the Syrian units.

the | Realist 13

When talking about Russia’s role in

the region, the United States must

be addressed in the same moment.

Similar to Saudi Arabia

and Iran, Russia and the

United States are also

trying to defend or expand

their spheres of

influence in the region.

The cradle of civilization

is seen as the battlefield

on which great powers wage wars at

the expense of the civilian population.

It’s not just about the Tartus military

port and strategically important

location, which the Russians don’t

want to lose. And it’s not just about

the oil reserves that Donald Trump

wants to defend according to himself.

„The cradle of civilization is seen as

the battlefield on which great powers

wage wars at the expense of the civilian

population. “

It is the total package of interests that

could not be more heterogeneous:

The religious conflict between the

Shiites and Sunnis and the conflict

between two theocracies. It is the

conflict between enlightened monarchies

like Jordan, even democratic

systems like in Lebanon or Israel, and

the conservative counterparts

of the Arabian Peninsula. Last

but not least, it is a conflict on

the Israel-Palestine question

that divides the Middle East.

Even today, and above all on

this point, the consequences

of the division policies of the former

colonial powers can still be seen. The

cradle of civilization is still considered

the chessboard of the great powers.

the | Realist

14

Understanding Lebanon

A society on the way to collapse

Slightly smaller in area than Tyrol,

this small Mediterranean state is not

only culturally rich, but is also characterised

by a field of domestic tension.

Few countries are as heterogeneous

in demographic terms and have such

a complex state system as Lebanon.

The political and demographic complexity

is primarily due to history and

still leaves its mark on everyday political

life today.

While other Arab states are also

ethnically diverse and exactly this

fact often led to internal conflicts, the

situation in Lebanon is even more

acute. Because in Lebanon there are

18 recognized religious

communities, whereby in

1950 54% of the Lebanese

were followers of Christianity

and 46% Muslims.

According to the current

status there was a shift

to 50% Muslims, 5% Druze

and 45% Christians. In addition,

the religious situation is also complicated

by the fact that the Muslims

and Christians do not form homogeneous

groups among

themselves, but consist of many

small denominations. The Shiites,

Sunnis, Christian Maronites, Greeks

and Armenians play a particularly

formative role. Lebanon, above all

the Maronites, who were exposed

to different rulers, have thereby a

historically strong connection to

the French. The former French mandated

territory was regarded as a

place of refuge for the Christians from

the Middle East and was supposed to

be first – according to the French initiative

– a Christian dominated country

in a Muslim shaped region.

Religion and foreign policy: Between

co-existence and civil war

After complete independence, a

unique system was established in

Lebanon. The country, often referred

to as the “Switzerland of the Orient”

because of its economic stability and

strong western orientation, estab-

„This leads to a strongly influenced

sectarianism in which individual cities

function as strongholds of individual

confessions. “

lished a system whereby certain government

offices were reserved for

certain religious groups. The aim was

to ensure peaceful coexistence in

Lebanon through a more careful occupation

of these offices. For example,

according to the constitution,

the president of the country must be

a Christian Maronite, while the prime

minister is a Sunni, the president of

parliament a Shiite. The democratic

and unique system makes Lebanon

and Israel the only free countries, the

only democracies in the Middle East.

Whether the system of parity has

saved Lebanon from large-scale conflicts

or whether it has caused them,

is disputed. However, one thing can

be said: stability in the country can

be better guaranteed by a demographic-ethnic

balance than by a

strong imbalance, namely when one

of the two major religious groups is

strongly in the minority. This leads to

a strongly influenced sectarianism

in which individual cities function

as strongholds of individual confessions.

Thus, for example, the north

with Tripoli is considered a stronghold

of the Sunnis, the

south a bastion of the Shiites,

including Hezbollah,

while in the east there are

mainly Christian groups

and the capital Beirut itself

is known as a more liberal

melting point. First and

foremost, Lebanon is a paradox: a

paradox in which, on the one hand,

people of different confessions can

coexist peacefully in some regions,

while at the same time there are permanent

competition and conditions

similar to civil war. Apart from the religious

question, there is also another

one that divides the country strongly:

namely the foreign policy orientation

towards Syria, mostly pan-Arab

and socialist or anti-Syrian, more civic

and pro-Western.

This conflict, which is also related to

the question of religious denomination

and ethnicity, even goes so

far that there are two major party

alliances in the country: On the one

hand, there is the Alliance of March 8,

a pro-Syrian movement, and on the

other hand the Alliance of March 14,

which are pro-Western. The day numbers

in the names have their origin in

the Lebanese civil war, which lasted

from 1975 to 1990.

The initially pro-Western Christian

confrontation with the more Muslim

and anti-Western/pro-Arab forces is

still rooted in parts of society today.

The civil war also led to a 30-year occupation

by the Syrian army, which

lasted from 1976 to 2005

and ended with a series of

assassinations on anti-Syrian

politicians, including

the then prime minister.

Political deadlock due to

confessionalism and corruption

The once stable and flourishing country

in the Levant has not yet found

political peace. Today the country is

marked by corruption, mismanagement,

clan crime, warlords and an

oligarchic division of the country. In

addition to the ethnic sensitivities

in the country, the government has

in fact no full control and no monopoly

on the use of force throughout

the country. Instead, the country is

controlled by individual family clans

or even groups accused of terrorism,

such as Hezbollah. After all, the conflict

with Israel and the de facto war of

2006 was not least caused by the presence

of the anti-Israeli Hezbollah in

the south of the country, which was

co-financed by Iran. A fifteen- year civil

war, a 30-year military occupation,

an indirect military conflict with the

neighbouring country and the loss of

control have made the former light of

the oriental paradise fade.

Many Lebanese are of the opinion

that, among other things, the – probably

well-meant – sectarian occupation

of offices has caused political

rigidity and corruption. Because

of the government’s mismanagement,

Lebanon ranks third among

the world’s most indebted countries

after Japan and Greece. The de facto

inclusion of individual ministers

associated with Hezbollah in the

government complicates relations

with individual countries, above all

with its Israeli neighbour. And Lebanon

– despite having a hard-hitting

army – is considered one of the

most important targets of the regional

powers. Before the civil war, but

above all from 1976-2005, Syrians

were regarded as Lebanon’s – partly

imposed – patron. Even today, France

is still held in high esteem by parts of

the population – not least because

of their shared history. This can be

„It is a disaster on a national level for

a highly indebted state with already

internal tensions. “

seen especially in the reactions of the

heads of state to the explosion in Beirut.

The French President Emmanuel

Macron not only promised immediate

support on several occasions,

but also announced that he himself

would visit the country because of

the tragedy. This is unprecedented.

Iran and Israel are engaged in a proxy

war in Lebanon, and in doing so they

are resorting to individual population

groups, given that about 27% of

the population are Shiites. Hezbollah

is considered an important agent on

the ground, especially for Iran, and at

the same time makes the country a

target for the Israeli side.

Apart from the great scale of the explosions

that occurred in Beirut on

4 August 2020, it is not only a tragedy

for Lebanon in which many people

lost their lives, several thousand

people were injured and 250,000 are

without housing. It is more. It is a disaster

on a national level for a highly

indebted state with already internal

tensions. The numerous refugees

that the country has taken in during

the Syrian war are an additional major

challenge for the small state. This

the | Realist 15

is an existential question for Lebanon.

It is about continuing the revolution

that was successfully managed

in 2019 (in the course of which the

Prime Minister resigned) in order to

discharge the conflicts through real

reforms, to dismantle corrupt systems

and to seek a more consequent

approach to Hezbollah. However, the

corruption problem and the issue

on the elites is not solved and new

protest movements will overwhelm

the streets. Otherwise, the already

charged country is in danger of imploding.

Switzerland of the Orient in the

need of international aid and political

reforms

The fate of a 75-year-old

Lebanese man of Armenian

descent reflects very well

the fatigue of the shaken

country. The man is sitting

in front of the ruins of his

existence, to be more precise,

of his photography shop. For the

third time. He had to rebuild the shop

already in 1975 and later in 1978 due

to the civil war. The formerly independent

businessman can no longer

manage a third reconstruction. The

costs are too high, the tiredness too

high. The tiredness in the face of

constant social instability. The explosion

in Beirut took many to the

limits of their possibilities. There is no

doubt that Lebanon will not survive

the crisis by its own efforts. The country

cannot cope with the destruction

of a large part of its capital, the total

destruction of the port, a major

artery of the country. It will need

international aid for this. Aid which,

above all, however, will require political

reforms. It is worth mentioning,

however, that Lebanon is of invaluable

value, especially to the West.

The melting pot of different ethnic

groups and the democratic glimmer

of hope of the Orient has always

been a reliable partner. Let us hope

that the “Paris of the Orient”, as Beirut

used to be called, will resurrect, just

like the whole country.

the | Realist

16

The risky game in the Mediterranean

Ankara’s gamble in Libya

Emmanuel Macron expressed the

escalation of the political situation

in the Mediterranean with the words

“Turkey is playing a dangerous game

in Libya”. Political disputes – even

among “partners” – are part of the

everyday business of geopolitics. On

the one hand, states try to preserve

their interests and sovereignty and,

on the other hand, to maximize their

own power and thus their sphere of

influence. In many cases, foreign policy

offensives are accompanied by

domestic instability. This is because

domestic political instability or unpopularity

can be overcome – or at

tions between supposed “NATO allies”

developed so openly. To overcome

political instability and dock with the

nationalists, modern Turkey under

Erdogan is playing a high-risk game

– approached by neo-Ottomanism

and Pan-Turanism. Turkey has

rarely acted so offensively and at the

same time so isolated as it does today.

tion to nationalistic ambitions, there

are two rational reasons for Turkey’s

expansion in the Mediterranean region.

On the one hand, it is a matter

of reasserting the sphere of influence

in the Mediterranean region and,

on the other, it is a matter of energy

or resource policy. Since Turkey itself

has to import the majority of its energy

resources from abroad at a more

or less expensive price, it is attempting

to drill for oil in Cypriot-Greek waters

in violation of international law.

In doing so, Turkey is claiming Cypriot

and Greek waters, but also individual

islands, and in doing so wants to

adapt the internationally recognised

borders in its own favour.

The power politics in the Mediterranean

leads to a further escalation,

namely the Turkish-Libyan alliance.

This alliance is leading to four major

conflicts: Firstly, Turkey bypasses the

international community’s arms embargo

and officially takes sides militarily.

Not only that, Turkey itself intervenes

militarily in the conflict and

attempts to consolidate its own position

in North Africa. The Turkish-Libyan

alliance, whereby only parts of Lib-

least distracted – by foreign-policy

exaggerations, nationalist calls.

In doing so, states always make a

cost-benefit calculation and try to act

fundamentally risk-averse in order

not to endanger their own security.

A look at the Mediterranean region

and the Caucasus currently shows a

completely different picture. Never

before in modern history has the situation

been so acute and so close to

a conflict as it is today. Never before

in modern history have confronta-

Turkey’s dangerous game in the

Mediterranean and Libya

One major conflict that has gained

in offensiveness, especially in recent

years, is the conflict between

Greece, Cyprus and Turkey. In addi-

ya are meant here, leads to a further

violation of the Cypriot and Greek territorial

waters. Turkey is drawing new

water borders in order to create a sea

corridor between Turkey and Libya.

The policy, which is contrary to international

law and directed against the

sovereignty of other states, is causing

concern for two other players: Egypt

is considered a regional military power

and sees itself pushed back in the

Mediterranean, but also, and above

all, in North Africa.

the | Realist 17

Ankara’s neo-Ottoman ambitions

lead to an open conflict of interests

with Turkey. It should be noted that

Egypt, which can be described per se

as a state with a strong military apparatus,

has not only reprimanded

Turkey through diplomatic channels

but also has not excluded the possibility

of military confrontation. In

the power game between Egypt and

Turkey, Ankara hopes that Egypt is

bluffing on this point. Egypt’s military

history and current developments

show that Egypt

would be prepared to use

the military – at least indirectly

– in an emergency. A

proxy war between Turkey

and Egypt in Libya is the

consequence. Espec- ially since parts

of the Libyan forces have already asked

Cairo for support, while the other

part is sticking with Ankara. Both

states are actively supporting each

side of the conflict – both politically

and militarily. Last but not least, power

politics in the Mediterranean is leading

to another confrontation with

the NATO partner France – a confrontation

that should be taken quite

seriously by Turkey. As a major European

power, France feels threatened

by Turkey and is backing Greece. For

Macron, driv-ing France out

of the Med- iterranean is

absolutely out of the question.

Whereas diplomatic

warning phras-es used to

be used in the past, today

there are more or less open threats

from Paris in the direction of Ankara.

France is prepared to give political

backing to its historically and traditionally

good ally, Greece. The four

more or less serious and direct confrontations

in the Med- iterranean

are, from a real-political point of view,

a dilemma into which Turkey has maneuvered

itself. Turkey has gambled

too highly and isolated itself in the

region in terms of foreign policy. Erdogan

cannot afford an open conflict

with Cyprus and Greece, supported

by France on the one hand and Egypt

on the other.

In addition, relations between Israel

and Turkey have cooled down again.

It should be noted that Greece and

Cyprus have excellent trilateral relations

with Egypt on the one side and

with Israel on the other. One could say

that Greece is looking for anti-Turkish

alliances in the Mediterranean. Although

Israel is trying to stabilize relations

with Turkic-speaking countries

– partly because of the traditionally

„A proxy war between Turkey and

Egypt in Libya is the consequence. “

rather difficult relations with Arab

states – two areas of conflict have developed

here: Ankara is increasingly

supporting the Palestinian side and

is helping individual groups, such as

Hamas. The Israelites do not like that.

In return, Israel bypasses Turkey via

Greece and Cyprus in the EastMed

gas pipeline issue. This in turn does

not please Turkey. One could also say

that the once more stable Israeli-Turkish

relations are at a low point. Although

Israel would probably refrain

from an open confrontation, it can be

„One could say that Greece is looking

for anti-Turkish alliances in the Mediterranean.

“

assumed that a Greek-Cypriot-Egyptian

alliance would be more beneficial

to Israel than Turkish expansion in

the region.

The clash of interests in the Caucasus:

Turkey, Iran and Russia

In addition to the Mediterranean, another

region has become a trouble

spot: the Caucasus. The frozen conflict

between Azerbaijan and Armenia

around Nagorno-Karabakh has

been reignited, this time not in Nagorno-Karabakh

but on the Armenian-Azerbaijani

border. Russia, which

traditionally maintains a reserved

and mediating role in this conflict –

despite its alliance status (towards

Armenia) – wants to keep its influence

in the Caucasus. The frozen conflict

and the dependence of both states

on Russia plays into the hands of

the Kremlin in a certain way. In other

words, the Kremlin wants to maintain

the status quo. However, the Turkish-Azerbaijani

military exercises in

Nakhichevan, an Azerbaijani exclave

enclosed between Armenia and Iran,

are indicative of the escalation

of the conflict. Although

Turkey is regarded

as a clear ally of Azerbaijan,

there have hardly been any

such overt and large-scale

military exercises in the Caucasus, in

which Turkey has participated. While

the status quo of the frozen conflict

is beneficial to the Kremlin, Moscow

cannot allow the war to be decided

militarily for the Azerbaijani-Turkish

side, and certainly not for Turkish

influence in the Caucasus. A similar

position is taken by Iran, which traditionally

maintains difficult relations

with Turkey and close relations with

Armenia.

Relations between Turkey and Russia,

which can basically be described

as very pragmatic,

could cool down again. On

the one hand because of

the Turkish presence in the

Caucasus and on the other

hand in Syria. However, it should be

mentioned here that both countries

have been able to intensify their relations

in recent years despite conflicts

of interest. For example, Russia is building

a nuclear power plant in Turkey

and is also selling modern weapon

systems to Turkey. The confrontation

between Ankara and Damascus is

a further obstacle between the two

states, but Russia and Turkey manage

to keep this conflict of interest to a

minimum, at least in the short term.

the | Realist

18

Ankara’s risky path between Moscow

and Washington could backfire

The Russian weapons systems and

Turkish demonstration of its political

independence in general by

the maneuvering between Moscow

and Washington may put Ankara

under pressure. The United States

are known to impose sanctions as a

means of exerting pressure on individual

countries. This happened not

least after an incident in Turkey in

which an American pastor was involved.

The latest developments, such

as the rapprochement with Russia,

but especially the purchase of weapons

from Russia, are displeasing to

the Americans. The Americans have

excluded Turkey from the Lockheed

Martin F-35 Lightning II program because

Turkey had purchased modern

S-400 air defence systems from Russia.

Renewed and, above all, tougher

American sanctions could result in

a disaster for the already weakened

Turkish economy.

The complexity of the individual alliances,

coalitions and interests

shows how complex, independent of

each other, but at the same time interconnected

the conflicts are. Either

way, it can be said that Turkey risks

further isolating itself in the region

in the long term. Turkey is unable

to cope with confrontations on that

level. The old man on the Bosporus

is not the once rising Ottoman Empire,

but an authoritarian country

with ethnic and economic problems.

However, Ankara is also in a dilemma.

How do you manage to row

back from the conflict without losing

face? Do they want to row back at all,

or is Turkey continuing to play high

stakes in a high-risk game? Although

large-scale military conflicts are rather

unlikely, in the long term the formation

of an anti-Turkish alliance

– with possible involvement of Israel

– by Greece, Cyprus, Egypt and

France is quite realistic.

NATO and the EU

An uneasy relationship of obstacles

43% of Europeans believe that decisions about

European security policy should be taken

by the EU. Although only 17% prefer NATO in

terms of European security policy, the EU security

policy is often linked to NATO in public.

While security policy was fundamentally determined

by the Warsaw Pact and NATO in the Cold

War, security organizations diversified after the

collapse of the Soviet Union. European security

policy is coordinated, by the Common Security

and Defence Policy founded in 1999, known

as CSDP. The European security structure is not

a mere formal act, but institutionally deeply

rooted, entails EU forces, European Union military

staff and carries out operations. But, it

should be also mentioned, that there are no

territorial and functional boundaries with

NATO. This has led – especially since the eastward

expansion of the EU and NATO – to overlaps

of functions. Certain inefficiencies between

both organization and suboptimal crisis

management can be attributed to the lack of

coordination and overlaps.

It is debatable whether coordination between

the two organizations is actually possible - because

the member states of both organizations

illustrate the common ground and different interests.

The main differences between the two

organizations can be attributed to three areas:

the strategic goals of the organizations themselves,

the different key players and conflicts

between the member states of both organizations.

European “regionality” meets NATO’s global

profile

Both organizations are geographically different

– while the European Union is limited to

the European continent, NATO is more global.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO

has participated in several out-of-area missions,

such as in the Yugoslavia conflict, in Afghanistan

or in Libya. This underlines the globalization

of NATO on the one hand and the

organization’s new task profile on the other.

Among other things, the security interests of

both organizations can be derived from this.

While the European Union is regionally limited

and stability in the neighboring region is

the main priority, NATO has been more global

since the collapse of the Warsaw Pact.

the | Realist 19

Nevertheless, both NATO and the EU

are actively involved in foreign and

security policy, but they differ in the

type of activity. While even the “military

missions” of the EU have compared

to NATO a civil character, NATO

frequently focuses on military-specific

help and missions.

However, this does not mean that

the European Union has no security

policy objective: on the contrary, the

example mentioned above rather

illustrates that the EU –

especially in its immediate

neighborhood and based

on security policy concerns

– is on average more militarily

defensive than NATO.

Furthermore, the European Union

also maintains better diplomatic relations

with Russia than NATO does.

Also in terms of rapprochement with

Georgia, EU-NATO-states are per se

more skeptical than non-EU-NATO

countries. Of course, this does not

mean that there is no rivalry between

individual EU countries and Russia.

The relationship between individual

Eastern European countries such as

Poland and the Baltic States with Russia

is strained. However, the weight

of the Baltic States within the EU is

not decisive. This is one of

the reasons why the Baltic

States in particular are

above-average involved in

military operations abroad.

The role of key-players and lines of

conflict

The diversity of the goals can be also

explained by the (partly) different

key players. In a realistic world, the

main objective of states should be

the survival. At the same time, key

players of both organizations are dominating

the agenda and direction

of their organization. Of course, Germany

and France play an important

role in both the EU and the NATO, but

there are two additional dominant

non-EU players within NATO: NATO’s

hegemon – the United States – and

Turkey, which has the second largest

army in NATO. In other words: The

two largest armies of NATO do not

belong to EU-member states.

„…NATO has been more global since

the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. “

On the other hand, there are open

lines of conflict and different views

between the EU countries on the

one hand, and Turkey and the United

States on the other. The common

alliance between Turkey and

many EU countries does not protect

Turkey from conflicts with the EU or

individual EU countries. The Netherlands,

France, partially Germany and

Greece as NATO EU countries have

serious tensions with Turkey. Individual

EU countries and Turkey not

„The two largest armies of NATO do

not belong to EU-member states. “

only carry out open conflicts, but

sometimes block each other – as in

the case of Cyprus. Turkey as a NATO

and non-EU country and Cyprus as

an EU but non-NATO country block

each other in their respective organ-

izations. In addition to the different

security policy objectives mentioned

above, this also leads to additional

obstacles in cooperation and coordination.

There is also another group of states

that advocates a suppression of NATO

influence on the European continent

and favors the expansion of the European

Defence Union (“turf battles”).

Nevertheless, the debate about a

stronger European defense community

has existed since 1999

with different intentions.

A world is changing: Quo

vadis, EU?

In addition to the generally

more global orientation of NATO,

the continentality of the EU and the

resulting objectives, there are also

some other key factors. The lines

of conflict between individual EU

countries and Turkey are therefore

an essential factor. Another factor

are the different key players of the EU

and NATO, which set the direction of

security policy. Finally, the intra-European

debate about a stronger European

defense community also plays

an increasingly important role. One

should also not forget that the UK –

one of the major European

states – could change the

balance of powers within

the NATO. Especially taking

account that the United

States has partially called

on the European part to make a

greater contribution and at the same

time has announced a partial withdrawal.

So: Quo vadis, EU?

the | Realist

20

the | Realist 21

The international arena of diplomacy

Vienna as a bridge builder

Vienna was the home of several

heads of states, kings, diplomats

and delegations for more than six

months. During the Congress of

Vienna in 1815, the great powers restored

the European order. The capital

of the Habsburg monarchy was

once known as the playing field for

Europe’s greatest politicians and diplomats.

The then Austrian Foreign

Minister, later State Chancellor and

Henry Kissinger’s ideological idol Klemens

von Metternich – a realist and

Machiavellist – can be seen as one

of the forefathers of modern European

diplomacy. Nevertheless,

Vienna is more than

the congress, “which once

danced”. While the glory

of the Habsburg monarchy

has faded, Vienna’s role remains

undisputed to this day.

The stabilizing role in and the conservative

conscience of Europe: the

Habsburgs

The Habsburg monarchy played until

the collapse of the empire a stabilizing

role in a balanced Europe. Characterized

by its central location, economic

and geographical importance,

the Habsburg Empire connected the

West with the East, the South with

Central Europe. The comparatively

militarily passive empire has not only

become the leading power thanks to

marriage policy – but also thanks to

diplomacy and the important role in

the German Confederation. For centuries,

the Habsburgs influenced politics

throughout Central Europe – up

to 1866, when Austria had to cede

to the Prussian supremacy after the

Austro-Prussian War. Austria became

the centre of European politics, especially

in the Napoleonic era, when the

European reorganization was re-dictated

at the Congress of Vienna. Not

only because the Congress took

place in Vienna, but also due to the

brilliant role of Austrian diplomacy,

which has remained the symbol

of modern diplomacy to this day.

1814/1815 Austria became the centre

of the political and cultural world.

In addition to intrigue, a spy network

and a rich cultural program, alliances

were forged in Vienna, the borders

were redrawn and the basis laid for

decades of more or less successful

stability.

„The Habsburg monarchy, especially

Metternich, was the conservative conscience

of Europe.“

Although Europe was dominated

militarily by France, Great Britain,

Russia and now emerging Prussia,

Austria was a heavy-weight in terms

of economic and political power.

The Austrian presence was decisive

for a balanced Europe. In Central

Europe, the Habsburgs acted as

a counterweight to Prussia due to

their dominant presence in the German

Confederation until 1866. How

effective the Holy Alliance (formed

in 1815) was, can be seen from the

fact that, among other things, Russian

regiments intervened at Austria’s

request in 1848. On the other hand,

it must be mentioned that it was primarily

an alliance of convenience.

An alliance of conservatives against

nationalist and liberal tendencies

that simmered all over Europe. The

Habsburg monarchy, especially Metternich,

was the conservative conscience

of Europe. The conservative

conscience, that originally developed

as a counter-reaction to the French

Revolution, could not offer any solutions

to nationalist tendencies in the

nineteenth century. Especially in the

multi-ethnic state of the Habsburgs,

the nationalist efforts hardly calmed

down until the collapse – one could

even say that they were decisive and

jointly responsible for the collapse.

Austria as a negotiating platform

and bridge builder

After the Second World War, Austria

got into a symbol of bridge building

policy, not only between East and

West, despite or primarily because

of its central location and

diplomatic tradition. Vienna

returned to the international

arena after the

Second World War, where

it still plays a defining role.

The traditionally good relations,

historical ties with the Western

powers, but also with Russia, are not

the only factors. Above all, there is

one major difference between Austria

and other “neutral countries”:

cultural influences from Eastern and

South-eastern Europe due to the

Habsburg monarchy. Centuries of

coexistence with the West and South

Slavs allows Austria to be one of the

few “western” countries credibly fulfilling

the bridge-building function.

In other words: Austria maintains

good historical, cultural relations to

both Western and Eastern Europe

and demonstrated it several times

during the history.

During the Congress of Vienna Austria

orchestrated the so-called Viennese

Concert. But also during the

Cold War, when Austria assumed the

role of bridge builder as the centre of

several international organizations.

the | Realist

22

Austria did not only become the

platform of a propaganda battle

between the two worlds, the spying

hotspot of the two giants (USA and

USSR). No, it also became the symbol

of a negotiating platform – as at

the the summit between Kennedy

and Khrushchev in 1961. The country

also played an important – albeit

passive – role during the Prague

Spring and the Hungarian Uprising,

when it on the one hand

became the home of many

refugees, but also led an

active reporting policy on

the events. Austrian mediation

policy is almost unprecedented

in history, because the

foreign policy role was not only limited

to the European continent, but

also allowed Austria to participate in

the Middle East conflict.

The new self-confidence and an opportunity

for Europe

Even after joining the European

Union – a clear western orientation

of the country – Austria still enjoys

good relations with Washington,

Moscow, Jerusalem or Brussels. The

mediation function that once shaped

Austrian foreign policy has never disappeared

from the screen. But the

foreign policy is experiencing a reviv-

al. Austria is regaining importance in

a partly politically divided Europe.

Moreover, Austrian foreign policy has

gained more self-confidence in the

past ten years. The Ballhausplatz (government

district) develops its own

foreign policy positions, provides a

political counterweight and uses the

traditionally good relationships with

its neighbours.

„Vienna returned to the international

arena after the Second World War,

where it still plays a defining role.“

In today’s Europe, Austria increasingly

acts as an agenda setter, whether

in migration or fiscal policy. 200 years

after the Congress of Vienna and

75 years after the Second World War,

the constant of Austrian foreign policy

remains the same: Austria can

work with both the Scandinavian

northern countries and the Visegrad

countries. Nevertheless, Austria now

has a more active foreign policy role

– especially in the Balkans. Despite

the complicated relationship, many

Balkan countries – whether direct

or indirect – have a kind of trust, a

love-hate relationship with Austria.

This is not least reflected in the fact

that the ex-Yugoslav communities,

primarily Croatians, Bosnians, Serbs

and Montenegrins – mostly well integrated

– are an important group

of voters. This can be seen, among

other things, in how Austrian parties

are fighting for those votes through

foreign policy positions and identity

policy.

The ongoing influence in and understanding

of Eastern and

South Eastern Europe can

be very valuable for Europe.

Without falling into boundless

optimism, Austria’s special

position, the diplomatic

tradition, can be seen as an opportunity

for Europe. An opportunity not

to deepen the formation of blocks,

but to create a common basis. An

opportunity to strengthen relations

with the Balkans and not to leave

South Eastern Europe entirely to

Russian, Chinese, partly Turkish and

Saudi Arabian influence. 200 years after

the Congress, Vienna is one of the

headquarters of the United Nations,

the OSCE, the atomic organization

IAEA and the OPEC. Henry Kissinger

described Austria as the former symbol

of political Europe. The former

symbol is again on the international

stage of diplomacy.

the | Realist 23

MI 6

New friendship between UK

and Turkey?

Guest commentary: Mari Avalyan

Former British Ambassador to Turkey and friend

of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has

been appointed head of the British foreign intelligence

service MI6.

The government of the United Kingdom maintains

intelligence agencies within several different

government departments. The agencies

are responsible for collecting and producing

foreign and domestic intelligence, providing

military intelligence, performing espionage

and counter-espionage. Their intelligence assessments

contribute to the behaviour of the

foreign relations of the United Kingdom. One

of the main organisations are the Secret Intelligence

Services (SIS or MI6).

The 57-year-old Richard Moore was confirmed

as the head of MI6 on July 29. The service

will begin in the fall of 2020. Moore will serve

as head of British intelligence over the next five

years. He speaks fluently Turkish and is interested

in golf, hiking and Turkish rugs. He also

held positions in Vietnam, Turkey (2014-2017),

Pakistan and Malaysia. Moore is opposed to

China and Russia, which he considers to be the

main threats to Britain’s security. There is also

an opinion that Richard Moore is a friend of

Recep Tayyip Erdogan and a supporter of the

idea of the “Great Turan” as some kind of strong

element to counter Russia and China. Moore’s

active involvement in the North Caucasus region

and Turkey and his clearly defined

pro-Turkish stance cannot be overseen. He has

managed to visit Baku in order to meet the local

elite and is moreover actively interested in

Abkhazia. He is also opposed to the idea of an

independent Kurdistan. Does this assignment

mean that Turkey is in the hands of England as

an instrument of countering Russia? A kind of

counterbalance in a region of growing power?

When one side gets stronger, it is necessary to

balance the imbalance.

Interstate relations between Russia and

Great Britain

For further understanding, I propose to consider

in detail the Russian-British and Turkish-British

relations.

For most of the 20th century, the Soviet Union

was a key element shaping Britain’s foreign

pol-icy doctrine, and Moscow regarded London

as one of the main representatives of the

community of Western powers. The focus of

both countries on the United States has over

time surpassed mutual interest. However, before

the world plunged into the maelstrom

of the Cold War, England and Russia had managed

to be both the main geopolitical rivals

and allies over the centuries-old history of their

relations. During the Second World War, in the

face of a common threat, relations between

the two countries acquired an allied character,

but even then they were full of contradictions.

The victory over fascism brought the world

back to the realities of geopolitical confrontation,

dressed in ideological clothes. After World

War II, for several decades Britain claimed to

be a bridge, a link between Moscow and Washington,

as well as between Europe and the

United States. In the new conditions after the

end of the Cold War and the collapse of the

Soviet Union, Brit-ain restructured a number

of its foreign political priorities in order to

maintain itself as an interregional power and

to a large extent compensated for the loss of

the role of “bridge builder” between the West

and the USSR. British policy has intensified in

the Asia-Pacific region and in the countries of

Latin America. At the same time, London has

demonstrated the ability to adapt to changing

situations. Russia, with varying success, is a-

dopting the British experience in using the

concept of a “connecting link” between different

regions and parts of the world.

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24

Relations between Russia and Great Britain

were only aggravated by subsequent events,

such as the poisoning of Alexander Litvinenko,

Sergei and Yulia Skrepal, as well as the annexation

of Crimea.

1. Alexander Litvinenko was a lieutenant colonel

of the Soviet and Russian state security,

an employee of the then KGB and the FSB. He

criticized the policies of the Russian authorities

and personally of Vladimir Putin. In 2000

he received political asylum in the UK. On

November 1, 2006, Litvinenko was hospitalized

and died three weeks later. The cause of

death was poisoning with polonium-210, an

extremely rare and difficult to detect radioactive

substance. The poisoning of Litvinenko led

to a diplomatic scandal and to a significant deterioration

in bilateral relations between Russia

and the UK. According to Scotland Yard, the

Russian government was involved in the poisoning.

2. The poisoning of Sergei Skripal and his

daughter Yulia took place on March 4, 2018 in

Salisbury (Great Britain). Sergei Skripal, a former

Russian military officer who worked for

the British intelligence

services and

his daughter Yulia

were poisoned and

„Good relations with Ankara

will help London to realize

its interests in the region. “

hospitalized unconscious.

British

experts from a secret chemical laboratory have

determined that the poison used was agent

A-234 class “Novichok”. The British government

accused Russia of involvement in the attempted

murder of the Skripals and in violation of

the Chemical Weapons Convention. A diplomatic

conflict broke out. In response to the poisoning,

London expelled 23 Russian diplomats.

Most of the countries of the European Union,

as well as the USA, Canada, Australia and a

number of other countries – out of solidarity –

have taken similar steps.

I would like to summarize that the two countries

are partners in a number of positions, often

competitors, but almost never allies.

British-Turkish ties: Counterbalancing Russia

Turning to the events of the recent past can

be useful for predicting bilateral relations between

Turkey and Great Britain, their relations

with the EU, understanding their mutual interests

and foreign policy strategy. Britain’s efforts

were an important factor in setting the date at

the EU summit in Brussels for the start of EU accession

negotiations with Turkey – October 3,

2005.

Support for Turkey’s accession to the EU was

expressed by the UK at the same time as the

general idea of EU enlargement. The UK agreed

that Turkey’s admission process should be

based on the 1995 Copenhagen criteria for the

country’s compliance with EU requirements in

the fields of politics, human rights, economics

and social order. However, there are differences

that make it possible to attribute the position of

the UK to the strategy of being a “bridge-builder”

between the EU and important players in

international politics.

Support for Turkey’s accession to the EU was

consistently carried out after 2004, throughout

Tony Blair’s tenure as Prime Minister of

Great Britain; continued both under his successor

Gordon Brown (2007-2010) and under

the conservative David Cameron (2010-2016).

This course did not change even after the 2016

referendum on Britain’s exit from the EU. In

October 2016, Foreign Minister Boris Johnson

said: “We are leaving the EU, but not Europe,

and one way or another we will help Turkey (to

join the European Union)”. But the position of

the Turkish leadership has changed. President

Recep Tayyip Erdogan has seen the country’s

future outside the EU since

mid-2010. The coup attempt

undertaken by the Turkish

military in the summer of 2016

only reinforced his opinion. It

was Richard Moore who advocated

for London to immediately take a decisive

position against the military who undertook

a coup. He also organized the visit of Boris

Johnson, then the head of the Foreign Ministry,

to Ankara to demonstrate solidarity with Turkey.

The visit underlined the British support for

Turkey by the following expression: “London

will stand side by side with Ankara”. The gesture

paid off and increased Britain’s political capital

in Turkey, while other Western countries tried

to distance themselves from Ankara. With the

UK leaving the EU, strong ties with Ankara look

extremely important – London needs to secure

good trade deals with other external players to

prove the feasibility of Brexit. Moreover, Turkey

has become an influential player in the Middle

East: good relations with Ankara will help London

to realize its interests in the region.

It should be noted that Russia plays the leading

role of a mediator in the regulation of the Armenian-Azerbaijani

conflict. Since the beginning

of the 19th century, the South Caucasus

has been under the full geopolitical influence

of Russia. Will Turkey try to take Russia’s place

with the help of Great Britain? The time will tell.

the | Realist 25

Appeasement towards

neo-Ottoman and pan-Turkic tendencies

It has now become a matter of routine

among the leading superpowers

and European states to look away

when Turkey is about to cross the line

again. Nevertheless, the tactic of appeasement

policy is nothing new in

European foreign policy. Historically,

the term is symbolic of the period

before the Second World War, when

Britain and France tolerated the aggressive

expansionist policies of the

Germans - until they themselves

were finally affected by the German

military machinery.

Turkish foreign policy, once an integral

part of the Western alliance, has

divided the minds of Europe since the

reorientation of Turkish foreign policy.

Since Erdogan, the foreign policy

of the “sick man on the Bosporus”

has been supplemented by increased

nationalism and a retreat

into Islamist tendencies. While Turkey

was in the last century seen as one of

the modern Muslim countries – at

least in socio-political terms – today

it is choking in the renewed Neo-Ottomanism

and Pan-Turkism. Particularly

since the weakening economy

and domestic political instability,

Turkish rulers have increasingly used

foreign policy instruments to distract

from internal problems on the one

hand and to consolidate the society

behind them on the other.

Ethnic conflicts are once again becoming

more acute. At the same

time, modern Turkey is constructing

its own history out of a construction

kit. To get back to foreign policy:

Never before in the country’s modern

history Turkey has had such a

clear, symbolic and nationalistic

rhetoric. A symbolism that undermines

the mood in the region. Such

as the change of the Hagia Sophia

to a mosque. This symbolism sums

up the contemporary spirit of the

Turk-ish society well. The statements

of leading Turkish leaders resemble

a permanent election campaign for

the votes of the conservative AKP and

nationalist MHP voters. The leadership

has a broken relationship with

the liberal forces within the country,

so it must win the favour of the MHP,

an ultra-nationalist party. This leads

to a situation in which the years of extreme

right-wing agitation by the

Grey Wolves are increasingly reflected

in statements by leading politicians.

Neo-Expansionism: The combination

of Nationalism and Islamist

tendencies

The constant of Turkish security policy

has always been the Kurdish problem.

The establishment of Kurdish

dominance in the region was to be

prevented for Turkey in any case. We

know that Turkey is willing to do anything

when it comes to the Kurdish

problem. And Turkey has a rich history

of persecution and killing of ethnic

minorities. In modern politics, Turkey

does not shy away from taking

action against Kurds, Kurdish politicians,

mayors or exerting foreign policy

pressure. The arrest of the leader

of the pro-Kurdish HDP party is only

one aspect of this. Turkey

is not afraid to take action

against Kurds in foreign policy

either, and above all in

military terms. The importance

Turkey attributes to

this can be seen from the

fact that it even accepts

the invasion of Syria in violation

of international law,

or threatens its Iraqi neighbours with

military intervention.

But apart from the Kurdish constant,

a turnaround and a radicalisation has

become established, especially since

the end of the Cold War and above

all since Erdogan’s inauguration.

While Turkey was a clear member

of the Western alliance as a Soviet

border neighbour until the end of

the Cold War, its relationship with the

great powers has become much more

opportune today. Since the end of

the Cold War, two things in particular

have changed: Firstly, the removal of

the hegemony on Turkey’s borders,

which restricted Turkish expansionist

policies. Secondly, the disintegration

of the Soviet Union has given rise to

five independent Turkic-speaking

states – namely Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan,

Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and

Turkmenistan. This mainly fuels the

nationalist elements within Turkey,

which have become increasingly vocal

in recent years. Two Turkish-nationalist

concepts that appeal to different

regions of the world are partly

served in parallel by the nationalists

and also by the leading party: Namely,

Neo-Ottomanism, which is increas-

ingly focused on the Middle East and

partly the Balkans, and Pan-Turkism,

which is more oriented towards the

Caucasus and Central Asia.

The invasion of northern Syria, the

threatening gestures towards Iraq are

only a partial aspect of this. Turkey is

also increasingly turning against a

NATO partner, namely Greece. The

extremely tense situation between

Greece, Cyprus on the one hand and

Turkey on the other hand is being

skilfully exploited by Turkey due to

the silence of European partners, but

also Russia and the USA. The invasion

of northern Syria would not be possible

without a green light from both

„Nevertheless, the appeasement policy

towards Turkey is not a matter of

regularity, but a factor that is causing

disruption, especially within the EU

and the NATO pact. “

Russia and the USA. Among other

things, by violating Cypriot waters

in order to start drilling oil wells in

those waters. Or, for example, the

daily airspace violations against

Greece and the open and unconditional

claim to Greek territory. By

means of an ambiguous alliance policy,

Turkey is trying to gain a foothold

in Libya – and without any reaction

from the international community.

In the Caucasus, Turkey is pursuing

a goal that the Turkish ruler had publicly

declared only a few days earlier:

“The completion of the mission

of the grandfathers”. In other words,

not only in words, but also in actions,

Turkey is showing a consistently anti-Armenian

policy in the Caucasus.

Ankara not only openly declares

its support for Azerbaijan, but also

openly supports the autocracy on

the Caspian Sea with weapons. Turkish

foreign policy in the Caucasus is

geared towards weakening the Armenian

presence, and ideally eliminating

it. Of course Turkey cannot afford

to provoke open confrontation

– there are too many opponents in

the Caucasus for that.

the | Realist

The tightrope walk: Between appeasement

and confrontation

Moreover, Turkey does not have the

once clearly defined foreign policy

rival from which it had to protect

itself – namely the Soviet Union.

This also means that Turkey no longer

depends on NATO, especially

when Ankara is manoeuvring between

Moscow and Washington. Despite

considerable foreign policy and

military activity, many regional and

global players tolerate Turkish advances.

Both for Russia, on the one

hand, and for the USA and Eastern

and Northern European countries,

on the other, Turkey has become far

too important. While Turkey remains

geographically important

for NATO troops, Russian’s

are tolerating, even launching

Russian-Turkish patrols

in Syria. Turkey marks

the transition between

the Western and Russian

spheres of influence, but

also between the Orient

and Occident. From a geographical

point of view, Turkey is very

important and provides the second

largest army within NATO after the

USA.

The only reason Turkey can afford

to manoeuvre between Washington

and Moscow is because both sides

have an interest in the country. Nevertheless,

it is crucial for Turkey not

to overstep the mark in either direction.

It is a tightrope walk which

could backfire. States weigh up the

costs and benefits of a partnership.

Should Turkey, in the course of its

newly created Neo-Ottomanism and

Pan-Turkism, scratch too much at

Western or Russian interests, it could

become a dangerous act for the state

on the Bosporus. The neo-Ottoman

ambitions – above all in the Balkans

and in the European region in general

– are hardly met with goodwill. At

the same time, Russia observes Turkish

activity in Northern Syria, the

Caucasus and Central Asia with suspicion.

Central Asia, where, according

to Turkish nationalist intellectuals,

the great Turan is supposed to extend,

is especially important for both

the Chinese and Russian spheres of

influence.

26

the | Realist 27

The Turkish presence within the Arab

world is also not without controversy:

with its questionable alliance with

Libyan groups, Turkey has above all

incurred Egyptian anger. Egypt is a

regional power with a strong military

apparatus that counteracts Turkish

interests, especially in North Africa. In

addition, relations with Iraq, a number

of Arab states, but also with Iran

and Israel are very tense. However,

the states mentioned above have difficult

relations with each other, which

Turkey manages to use to its advantage.

Nevertheless, the appeasement policy

towards Turkey is not a matter

of regularity, but a factor that is causing

disruption, especially within the

EU and the NATO pact. While mostly

Eastern and Northern European

states as well as Great Britain consider

Turkey an irreplaceable partner,

some exer- cise restraint or openly

oppose Turk-ish influence. For many

European states Turkey is not only

important militarily towards Russia

and the Middle East, but also in terms

of migration policy. Thus, some states

prefer to accept neo-Ottoman activities

at their own doorstep rather than

let the fragile refugee deal collapse.

Within Europe, a bundle of Turkey-sceptical

states has also formed,

which are increasingly distancing

themselves from Turkey. The Netherlands

and Austria, along with

Greece and Cyprus, are among the

traditionally anti-Turkish countries

and are pursuing a correspondingly

consistent position. Indeed, Austria

occasionally even stings with the initiative

to formally end the accession

negotiations with Turkey. Germany,

too, which is known for its pragmatic

foreign policy, occasionally takes

a stance against Turkey, but tries

not to damage the relationship too

much, especially because of the refugee

deal and the German soldiers

based in Turkey. A growing rift develops

between France and Turkey.

The French, in particular, do not like

the Turkish expansion in the Mediterranean

area, such as in Libya.

While France feels increasingly

pushed back in its sphere of influence,

Turkey is trying to consolidate its

own sphere of influence.

Learning from the past: A warning

signal for Europe

Turkish activities are unprecedented

for the 21st century in their speed,

determination and aggressiveness.

The dangerous combination of Turkish-influenced

Islamism and nationalist

ideologies creates an unpredictable

and, above all, unreliable actor

in the Middle East who knows its own

worth and deliberately tries to blackmail

partner states in foreign policy.

Nevertheless, the Turkish balancing

act between East and West and the

fragile relations with almost all neighbouring

states could thwart Turkey’s

expansion plans in the medium and

long term and become a disaster. The

permanent election campaign mood

and the internal weakness among

the country’s leaders are leading to

an increasingly radical and above all

undiplomatic rhetoric. The history of

appeasement policy should be familiar

to all regional and global players

and a warning signal for the future.

After all, internal European state security

is not only to be found in Europe,

it begins in the Middle East.

Individual NATO and EU states would

do well to support Greece, a reliable

ally with close cultural and ideological

ties, instead of tolerating Turkish

power politics.

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28

Grey Wolves

How Turkish ultra-nationalism reaches the

social centre of Europe

Racial superiority, the dream of an

ethnically pure empire, a strongly developed

cult of leadership and their

own greeting formula. What is very

much reminiscent of the National Socialists

is also part of the profile of the

ultra-nationalist Grey Wolves and the

MHP party. They also call themselves

“idealists” and dream of the Turan, a

great empire that encompasses all

Turkic peoples from the Bosporus to

Central Asia. The targets of their hatred

are primarily Jews, Armenians,

Greeks or Kurds. What sounds like a

small fringe group unites over 10%

of the people behind them in Turkish

elections. Authoritarian leadership

and antipluralism are the foundation

of their thinking. Political opponents

are not only denounced as enemies

of the people, but also physically attacked.

The Grey Wolves and the MHP

Party are not a marginal phenomenon

– they have arrived in European

society today. Although observed

by the domestic security agencies

and classified as extreme right-wing,

the Grey Wolves are hardly considered

relevant in Europe, specifically

in Austria and Germany. Because

they have arrived in the middle of society

and because it is unpopular to

call right-wing extremist groups from

abroad as such.

integration advisories somewhere in

a large German city. It is unpopular to

ban cultural associations or restrict

the activity of religious institutions.

This is exactly what the Grey Wolves

make use of. Although they are

politically, ideologically and above

all rhetorically closer to right-wing

pop-ulist parties, Grey Wolves are

often members of more moderate

or left-wing parties. This is due to

reasons of opportunism, and partly

because these parties are more socially

accepted. Some cases of the

Social Democrats in Linz (Austrian

The (Grey) Wolf in sheep’s clothing:

Neo-fascism operation under the

cloak of associations

In Germany, the security agency assumes

about 20,000 members and

about the same number of supporters

of the Grey Wolves. In Austria

it is assumed that there are several

thousand members and supporters.

Measured against the approximately

three million citizens of Turkish origin

in Germany and about 400,000 to

500,000 in Austria, this is only a small

part. However, what makes these

groups dangerous, apart from their

ideology, is the active appearance

of these movements in the guise of

cultural associations, religious institutions

or representative organizations.

A (grey) wolf in sheep’s cloth.

ing’. The infiltration or control of

numerous associations or political

parties makes the organization a national,

if not European, problem. People

who openly admit to neo-fascist

ideas are also members of parties

represented in parliament or act as

city) on the Grey Wolves have become

known, but there are also members

within the German CDU and the

German Greens. Of course, it must be

mentioned that in all cases – sometimes

consistently, sometimes

half-heartedly – the parties have excluded

the respective members. To

this day, however, representatives of

the Grey Wolves are invited to anti-racist

discussions or integration forums.

When those people, who stand up

against xenophobia, play down MHP

or AKP-related associations as regular

youth organizations, it is either naive

or hypocritical. Usually both.

the | Realist 29

The Grey Wolves, the MHP and

Erdogan: A community of convenience

in foreign countries

Nevertheless, the Grey Wolves, who

play a politically active role, especially

among young people, serve as

a good vote attracter within the Turkish

community. They are recognized

far beyond the MHP borders. Moreover,

many of the European Grey

Wolves voted for Erdogan’s AKP party

during the election in 2018. Last but

not least, during Erdogan’s

election events in foreign

countries, three crescent

moons (the symbol of the

MHP party) or the wolves

salute were seen many

times. What the Hitler salute

is to neo-Nazis, the

wolf salute is to Turkish ultra-nationalists.

After the wolves salute was

banned in Austria, Vienna became

not only the target of Grey Wolf, but

also Turkish government.

It would be wrong to claim that within

Turkey the MHP and AKP maintain

friendly relations with each other

(nevertheless, they managed to create

an alliance during 2018 elections).

On the contrary, there are enough

differences between both parties.

However, something that unites both

parties – especially abroad – is their

common enemy: everything and

everyone that/who is non-Turkish.

That is why there are vague transitions

between Grey Wolves and AKP

supporters within the Austrian-Turkish

and German-Turkish communities.

Both supporters sympathize

with authoritarian systems, perceive

integration as a betrayal of Turkishness,

deny the Armenian Genocide,

and are anti-pluralist and anti-democratic.

The question between an MHP

and an AKP is a question of intensity,

an intensity in Pan-Turkism. Moreover,

according to court documents,

the Grey Wolves were partly funded

„For reasons of opportunism and image,

left-wing parties in particular should

not make themselves the accomplices of

Turkish nationalism.“

by the Turkish service intelligence in

order to take action against Armenian

and Kurdish groups. It is almost

absurd that foreign nationalist Turks

are greyer than the wolf in Turkey.

While the opposition tended to win

in Turkish cities, the AKP won over

70% of the vote in Austria, the Netherlands

and Belgium, and over 60%

in Germany (excluding the MHP).

They managed to reach the

mainstream through harmless,

youth-oriented offers ranging from

sports and folklore concerts to religious

events. Many organizations,

which for decades were considered

partners in the field of integration,

are accused of being close to the AKP,

MHP or the Grey Wolves. The spectrum

ranges from prominent associations

such as ATIB and DITIB, UID

(Union of International Democrats)

to the Turkish Federation, numerous

cultural associations and even some

mosques.

The political extreme does not belong

to the centre

Western and Central European politics

has inhibitions against foreign

right-wing extremism,

for fear of being accused

of xenophobia. The expulsions

of some imams,

the closure of some Turkish

nationalist mosques,

the condemnation of

some organizations, the

ban on wolf greetings and Erdogan

elections are important rays of hope.

Such associations harm the society as

a whole and those citizens of Turkish

origin who distance themselves from

Turkish ultra-nationalism. For reasons

of opportunism and image, left-wing

parties in particular should not make

themselves the accomplices of Turkish

nationalism. Anyone who neglects

the Grey Wolves, neglects rightwing

extremism and runs the risk of

rewarding fascism and segregation.

Turkish ultranationalist forces do not

belong in the middle of society, but

on the political fringes.

the | Realist

30

the | Realist 31

Henry Kissinger

The symbol of realpolitik – loved, hated, disputed

How unethical can foreign policy

be?

The political scientist and diplomat

from Germany with Jewish roots is

considered one of the most formative

representatives of offensive

realpolitik and pragmatism. As a

heavyweight among diplomats who

received the Nobel Peace Prize after

the end of the Vietnam War, the diplomatic

icon is equally loved and hated.

As Machiavellist of the first blow,

Kissinger understood like no other

the role and necessity of

power in international relations

– the prioritization of

state interests over values

and ethics. In his personal

career, he used various

means to reach positions of power.

Ideologically, Kissinger was strongly

influenced by politicians and philosophers

such as Metternich, Bismarck

or Machiavelli.

Henry Kissinger’s was shaped by the

policy of détente between the United

States and the Soviet Union, the

roadmap between Israel and Palestine

and the end of the Vietnam

War. Foreign policy, characterized by

pragmatism and realism, may seem

opportunistic and unethical to some,

but it has a clear foundation. As a realist

(realpolitiker), Kissinger was less

focused on values when it came to

allies, but primarily on national interests,

which were ultimately decisive

for the balance of the great powers.

He supported the bipolar system

with the United States and the Soviet

Union and was jointly responsible for

the détente policy. At the same time,

he recognized the danger posed by

China and formulated the foreign policy

vision as follows: The relationship

between the Soviet Union and China

must be worse on average than the

relationship between the Soviet Union

and China with the United States

in detail.

The former Secretary of State was

and is heavily criticized for the support

of individual authoritarian rulers

such as Pinochet, or the more or less

conscious acceptance of the victims

in the Vietnam War. He is also accused

of intrigue, unethical behaviour

and his offensive foreign policy.

Kissinger was characterized

by manoeuvring and playing off

individual parties against each

other. Is that morally reprehensible?

Quite possible. Nevertheless,

all of these are instruments that

„Is the Nobel Prize winner an architect

of peace or a cynical war criminal?“

diplomats – especially American (not

only) diplomats – have used before

and after him. The sole intensification

on Henry Kissinger has no argumentative

basis. Conversely, this does not

mean, that his actions and the actions

of many diplomats are morally

justified. One could argue that if you

want to prevent bigger evil, you have

to accept smaller evils. That would

probably be the argument by Henry

Kissinger.

The architect of peace?

It is certain that no other US Secretary

of State has ever been as polarizing

as Henry Kissinger. While some

openly described him as a war criminal,

others classified him as the best

Secretary of State of American history.

Opinions still differ widely today:

Is the Nobel Prize winner an architect

of peace or a cynical war criminal?

While negative criticism has increasingly

come to the fore in recent years,

one thing has to be said: Henry Kissinger

has carried out his foreign policy

functions, regardless of whether

as a consultant or foreign minister,

in a phase of the Cold War, arms race

and escalation in the Middle East . As

a proponent of the “balance of power”

theory and strategy, and thanks

to Henry Kissinger, the disarmament

policy between the USA and the Soviet

Union took place. He was also

largely responsible for the “shuttled

diplomacy” he shaped in the Middle

East – i.e. mediating between hostile

parties by constantly traveling

between the countries. Especially

in the Yom Kippur war, when the

Arab states did not recognize Israel,

he achieved a diplomatic masterpiece.

The more or less stable relations

between Jordan and Israel, as

well as between Egypt and Israel, can

be traced back to the mediation

of Henry Kissinger.

A genius of diplomacy,

who could unite opposites

Many years after Kissinger retired

from foreign policy, he is still considered

as a diplomatic compass and

one of the leading experts. Kissinger

often commented on the current

conflicts of our time – such as the

Ukraine crisis, where he advocated

a more balanced Ukrainian foreign

policy, as is the case of Finland. He

rejected the American interference

in the Yugoslav conflict as well as the

designation of the Serbs and Croats

as aggressors.

A genius of diplomacy and intrigue, a

controversial personality who could

unite opposites; on the one hand

known for the offensive foreign policy

of strength and at the same time

responsible for the disarmament and

détente policy. A power politician

who worked closely with Western

dictators and was a peace broker in

the Middle East. Regardless of whether

his accomplishments or “mistakes”

predominate, he is considered one

of the most influential people of the

20th century. The fascinating individual

Henry Kissinger, a German-Jewish

refugee child, not only managed

to climb the educational Olympus in

the United States, but also became a

symbol of realpolitik and an icon of

diplomacy.

the | Realist

32

The frozen conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh

The limits of diplomacy

The conflict over Artsakh/Nagorno-Karabakh

is a 30-year conflict

with roots going back to the first half

of the 20th century. The prospect of

long-term peace is hardly noticeable

from the current perspective. The

fronts have hardened and great powers

are practising a balancing act on

the one hand, while at the same time

trying to freeze the tense situation.

Some actors are thus able to keep the

region in dependence.

The region, which is mostly inhabited

by Armenians and historically belongs

to them, is fought over by Ar-

leave their respective countries. Although

the war did not end in a

peace treaty, it did end in a de facto

ceasefire between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Since 1991 or 1994 (end of

the conflicts) the Republic of Artsakh

(previously Nagorno-Karabakh) has

established itself as a de facto state

without international recognition.

The limits of diplomacy: An issue of

trust and security

Since the de facto independence,

however, there have been ongoing

smaller and larger clashes at the

border, with 2016 being the year in

which the greatest acts of violence

Photo: Prime Minister Office, Armenia

menia and Azerbaijan. Although the

region was not part of an independent

Azerbaijan, it was associated

as an autonomous republic with the

Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan during

the Soviet era. In the course of the disintegration

of the Soviet Union, a referendum

was held on the republic’s

independent status in accordance

with the Soviet constitution. Despite

a vote majority, the referendum was

not recognised by Azerbaijan, which

resulted in pogroms and mass expulsions

– such as the pogroms in Baku

or Sumgait. As a result, the Armenian

diaspora in Azerbaijan and the Azerbaijani

diaspora in Armenia had to

since 1994 took place. The difficulty

in resolving the conflict can be explained

by several factors. Although

diplomacy is considered a good instrument

in international politics, diplomacy

can only freeze the conflict

in this case. However, a diplomatic

solution can only be found under

certain conditions: Namely, if the war

target is “divisible”, both negotiating

parties have similar information, the

military balance of power is equal

and there is trust between both conflict

parties.

A look into the conflict shows above

all that the relationship of trust between

the two parties does not exist.

Even more: The populations in both

states, especially in Azerbaijan, as

they want to “reconquer” the territories

from their perspective, are very

emotionalized. This makes long-term

negotiations with a stable peace

as a goal impossible. Above all, this

makes the object of the negotiations,

the region, an indivisible “object”. The

proposal to return the seven territories

outside Nagorno-Karabakh,

which were also conquered during

the war, is a risk game. On the one

hand, nationalist forces within Azerbaijan,

which dominate the politics,

would not be satisfied with these territories.

The great goal of the Azerbaijani

side, which has been announced

several times by official representatives,

is the complete “reconquest” of

the entire region. But this is above

all an illusory approach, because ultimately

there would be no guarantees

for the Armenian side. By returning

the seven areas mentioned above,

which lie outside the Artsakh region,

Armenia would lose a security buffer

and above all the corridor between

Armenia and Artsakh. The disappearance

of the corridor would make

Nagorno-Karabakh an exclave and

endanger Armenian security policy

in the long term.

The conflict is made more difficult

above all by the fact that no international

observers are stationed in

the region. The media echo is often

limited to reporting that there have

been clashes. Both the media and

third-party states do not want or are

unable to locate the aggressor of the

attacks. It should be noted that the

Armenian side wants to maintain the

status quo and is therefore in a defensive

position, while the Azerbaijani

side wants to change the status

quo by “reconquering” and

is therefore in a more offensive

position. In general,

maintaining the de facto

status for a longer period of

time increases the probability

of the respective state

being recognized.

Negotiations between the two

sides are often inconclusive and predict-

able, and are much more likely

to serve to keep the conflict frozen.

Apart from the technical and numerical

superiority of the Azerbaijani side,

Armenia is surrounded on the western

side by Azerbaijan’s main ally,

Turkey. In addition, Baku can exert

more pressure on third-party states

because of its economic relevance.

The role of regional players and alliances

A look at the alliances and regional

players shows the complexity of the

conflict. Armenia is part of the Russian-led

CSTO alliance – consisting

of six states. Although Armenia is

part of this organisation, it should

be noted that two of the six member

states (Kazakhstan and Belarus) have

friendly relations with Azerbaijan and

Russia’s role is highly controversial.

Despite the existence of a strategic

partnership between Armenia and

Russia, Russia supplies both sides

with weapons. Moreover, trade relations

between Baku and Moscow

are at a high level. In addition, the

constantly changing and unstable

relationship between Moscow and

Ankara is a burden on the Armeni

an side. In any case, conflicts on the

Armenian-Azerbaijani border show

that the CSTO organisation is neither

actively nor passively supporting a

member state. The cost-benefit question

of Armenian membership of the

CSTO is something that will concern

Armenian politics in the future. How

meaningful is membership of a military

alliance that does not assist an

ally?

The unstable and semi-peaceful situation

creates a dependence of

both states on Russia. Russia, on the

other hand, wants to maintain its

sphere of influence in the Caucasus

and is relying on appeasement

„Russia, on the other hand, wants to

maintain its sphere of influence in the

Caucasus and is relying on appeasement

tactics. “

tactics. An appeasement policy that

mainly plays into the hands of the

financially stronger conflict partner.

A look at Iran shows that, on the one

hand, Armenian-Iranian relations

are fairly good, but at the same time

there is a large Azerbaijani ethnic

group living within Northern Iran.

On the one hand, this fact creates a

potential for danger and thus creates

conflicts of interest with Baku. In

addition, there are also conflicts of

interest and rivalry between Iran and

Turkey. Nevertheless, there are active

investment relations between Iran

and Azerbaijan. Georgia is engaged

in a balancing act in this conflict. On

the one hand, Georgia cooperates

mainly with Turkey and Azerbaijan –

somewhat in the area of pipeline or

train connection projects – and on

the other hand, within the GUAM

community between Georgia, Ukraine,

Azerbaijan and Moldova. At the

same time, there are also border

disputes between Azerbaijan and

Georgia – albeit on a smaller scale.

Furthermore, Georgia is an important

port location for Armenia due to its

geographical position. Georgia’s role

in this conflict can be described as

pragmatic.

New Approach: The role of peacekeepers,

Artsakh and diplomacy

The deadlocked conflict situation is

reminiscent of other hopeless conflicts,

but under certain conditions it

could lead to two different scenarios:

the | Realist 33

On the one hand, a large-scale military

conflict, on the other hand, a more

stable status quo situation. It should

be noted that diplomatic instruments

alone will not solve the situation. This

would require some preconditions: A

peacekeeping mission and a demilitarized

buffer zone could limit the

military conflict. Here, it is important

to learn from past mistakes: A neutral

mission of the peacekeeping forces

is important, since in the past unilateral

Russian observer missions were

rejected because both sides

opposed a too strong Russian

military presence. The

inclusion of the Republic

of Artsakh as a negotiating

partner in the talks is crucial

for the peace process. The

exclusion of the Republic

of Artsakh leads the negotiations ad

absurdum. For the Armenian side it is

also important to reconsider alliance

structures, especially with pro-Azerbaijani

states.

It must also be mentioned that the

threat of violence is an internal instrument

within Azerbaijani politics to

strengthen the position of President

Aliyev. The threatening of violence

and nationalist fantasies should nevertheless

be treated with caution:

While these fantasies will result in

minor confrontations, a large-scale

confrontation is unlikely. This is a too

risky game for the Azerbaijani side.

Above all the gas and oil companies,

as well as those who have invested

in them, are against a military solution.

Moreover, the president’s family

manages to stay in power by means

of a permanent external enemy and

counteract pluralistic processes. A

change of power, a process of democratization

could ease the situation

between the two countries to a large

extent and would lead more likely to

a peaceful solution.

Nevertheless, the following is true

in international politics: good diplomacy

is underpinned by a strong

military. Therefore, the military will

remain an important, even diplomatic,

instrument in the years to

come, regardless of the scenario.

the | Realist

34

Armenia’s dilemma

of security and foreign policy

The Eurasian country in the Caucasus Mountains

lies at the crossroads of different civilizations.

This is reflected particularly in the fact

that there were Roman, Greek, Russian, Persian,

Arabic or Ottoman traces in Armenia. The

battlefield of Eurasia was battled for centuries

by regional great powers. Today, the landlocked

state has no de facto connection with

two of its four neighbouring countries, namely

Turkey and Azerbaijan. Relations with the

internationally isolated Iran are positive, with

Georgia pragmatic. Its de facto isolation from

both sides and the constant danger of a frozen

conflict with Azerbaijan poses a security dilemma

for Armenia. In addition to the neighbouring

countries, there are a number of other

organizations and countries that play an important

role in the Caucasus – specifically Armenia

as well.

The post-Soviet country maintains a strategic

partnership with the regional hegemon Russia

and is also involved in NATO partnership

programs. While other post-Soviet states have

a foreign policy that is far more clearly Western

or pro-Russian in orientation, Armenia is

attempting to balance the situation in terms

of security policy. On the one hand, Armenia

is trying to maintain strategic relations with

Russia, but at the same time is not closing the

door on alternatives to the USA and above all

to European states.

Russia’s limited reliability as security guarantor

It should be noted that the relations between

Russia or the United States and Armenia are

not constant, but rather vary. The variation

depends on a number of factors, notably the

relationship with Turkey. Put simply, an improvement

in relations between Russia and Turkey

represents a permanent threat to Armenian

security policy. Armenia’s security guarantor,

which Russia has de facto declared itself to be,

has its own geopolitical interests. This ranges

from improving relations with Turkey – a NATO

country – to control over the South Caucasus.

The frozen conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh is

playing into the hands of Russian foreign policy.

The tense situation in the South Caucasus

means that Moscow keeps both sides in a certain

degree of dependence. The reliability of

Russia, Armenia’s security guarantor, is limited.

On the one hand, Russia maintains a military

base in Armenia, while at the same time flirting

with Armenia’s arch-rivals. Moscow is making

efforts to exploit the dispute between Turkey

and the USA to its own advantage. The Kremlin

acts pragmatically and is prepared to tolerate

Turkish great power ambitions – because without

the green light from Moscow and Washington

the Turkish invasion of northern Syria

would hardly have been sustainable. A further

problem is the double-track approach to Armenia

and Azerbaijan. Although Russia is officially

an ally (CSTO), Moscow is not reluctant to

sell arms to either side.

While Azerbaijan, which is financially stronger

and more independent in terms of energy policy,

enjoys a double advantage and can purchase

more modern and expensive weapon

systems in addition to Russian weapons, Armenia

is becoming increasingly dependent. It

is becoming doubly dependent, both in terms

of weapons systems and energy policy. Russia’s

monopoly position in energy policy does not

allow Armenia to obtain cheaper resources

from Iran.

The strategic partnership between Russia and

Armenia is rounded off by two organizations:

The security organization CSTO and the Economic

Community of the Eurasian Union. Organizations

can, but of course do not have to,

be used as instruments of hegemonic powers

to protect their own sphere of influence. What

one needs to know about both organizations

are the member states: There are six countries

in the CSTO, in addition to Armenia there are

Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and

Tajikistan. The Eurasian Union is made up of

the same countries with the exception of Tajikistan.

Armenia faces two main security policy

challenges in this respect: The first is that they

are all countries that do not share a common

identity – and Armenia is geographically distant

from all other countries.

the | Realist 35

The question of whether it would be

beneficial for Kyrgyzstan, for example,

to assist Armenia in a hypothetical

case of war with Azerbaijan is

open to question. Secondly, and this

is the more decisive reason, there are

in both organizations avowed supporters

of the Azerbaijani Government

– namely Kazakhstan and, to a

lesser extent, Belarus. In other words:

Half of the countries in

the alliance organizations

where Armenia is active

openly or indirectly support

Armenia’s arch-rivals.

Challenges of an clear pro-American

alignment: Balancing instead of

aligning

The strategic partnership with

pro-Russian ex-Soviet states is a permanent

risk scenario for Armenia. A

kind of Democles sword hovering

over Armenia.

Concluding from this that Armenia

would be better off in a pro-American

alliance is also problematic. Indeed,

the relationship between the

United States and Azerbaijan is much

colder than that between Russia and

Azerbaijan. Moreover, Washington

and Ankara are not experiencing

the peaks in their relationship. Nevertheless,

it is important to bear in

mind, first, that Turkish foreign policy

has been constantly maneuvering

between Moscow and Washington

for years and, second, that Turkey is

ultimately a NATO ally. Turkey is strategically

far too important for both

the United States and Russia. This forces

Armenia to maintain a constant

balance between the United States

and Russia. A hypothetical NATO

partnership for Armenia would have

two problems: On the one hand, accession

processes take too long – a

period of time that Armenia cannot

„Turkey is strategically far too important

for both the United States and

Russia. “

remain non-aligned. On the other

hand, the Turkish-Greek confrontation

suggests that a similar confrontation

would exist in the Armenian

case.

The security dilemma consists in the

fact that the pro-Russian allies offer

no real security guarantee, but at the

same time a possible affiliation with a

Western Alliance would not offer any

security guarantee either. Nevertheless,

there are alternative options in

comparison to a clear pro-American

or pro-Russian stance.

Political pragmatism: creating additional

guarantees with alternative

actors

While both Russia and the USA want

to bind Turkey to them in the long

term, there are no such ambitions

in the European Union. The EU in

general, as well as France, Germany,

the Netherlands, Austria, Greece

and Cyprus in particular, have had a

tense and consistently negative attitude

towards Turkey for years. Integration

of Turkey into the EU is de

facto rejected, while some states go

even further and demand a tougher

position towards Turkey. With the

exception of individual advocates of

Ankara – such as Hungary –

most European states are at

least more predictable and

reliable than Russia or the

United States when it comes

to Turkey and Armenia.

True to pragmatism and political realism,

Armenian foreign policy must

move closer to those countries that

have conflicts of interest with Turkey.

These include a number of European

states, but also Iran, certain Arab

states and China. The art of Armenian

foreign policy will remain the same:

on the one hand, to strengthen these

relations in order to create additional

guarantees, without noticeably damaging

relations with Washington

or Moscow. However, Armenia may

– without falling into overestimation

and excessive optimism – also raise

the cost-benefit question of certain

organizations of which it is a member.

In the long term, Armenia will

nevertheless need alternative economic

and, above all, energy policy

options to free itself from its dependencies.

the | Realist

36

“

International politics,

like all politics, is a

struggle for power.

Hans J. Morgenthau

Founding father of political realism

in International Relations

Impressum: Editor, publisher and responsible for the content: Konstantin Ghazaryan.

Photos: pixabay.com. Website: www.the-realist.eu

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