22.03.2021 Views

An evaluation of the role of fire extinguishers

A report considering the role of a fire extinguisher in human terms identifying the gap between policy assumptions and the evidence from real fires. It considers the implications arising from this and makes a number of recommendations to create an evidence base and enhance current fire safety policies/advice.

A report considering the role of a fire extinguisher in human terms identifying the gap between policy assumptions and the evidence from real fires. It considers the implications arising from this and makes a number of recommendations to create an evidence base and enhance current fire safety policies/advice.

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133. A 2003 UK survey found that private houses accounted for only 3.3% <strong>of</strong> extinguisher use. However,<br />

across all categories <strong>of</strong> location, <strong>extinguishers</strong> were successful in extinguishing 79.9% <strong>of</strong> <strong>fire</strong>s, which<br />

seems to correlate with <strong>the</strong> dwelling <strong>fire</strong> data. It reported that 58.6% were operated by trained<br />

staff, 36.4% were operated by untrained staff and in 5% <strong>of</strong> incidents, this was unknown. Data from<br />

<strong>the</strong> National Association <strong>of</strong> Fire Equipment Distributors (NAFED) provides even more robust<br />

validation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> influence <strong>of</strong> <strong>fire</strong> <strong>extinguishers</strong> as used by ‘ordinary civilians’.<br />

‘The combined results <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 34 years <strong>of</strong> data are based on <strong>the</strong> performance <strong>of</strong> 32,756 <strong>fire</strong><br />

<strong>extinguishers</strong> used on 13,453 incidents. Of <strong>the</strong> 13,221 <strong>fire</strong> incidents reported, portable <strong>fire</strong><br />

<strong>extinguishers</strong> successfully extinguished 12,505 <strong>fire</strong>s (95%).’ (NAFED 2010: 2)<br />

134. As previously identified, <strong>the</strong> government/FRS policy is to actively deter attempts at <strong>fire</strong>fighting by<br />

<strong>the</strong> public, in favour <strong>of</strong> a default to <strong>the</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>essional response model. This has wide ranging<br />

consequences including for those who call 999. Even where someone is determined to do so, <strong>the</strong><br />

FRS will not give <strong>the</strong>m any advice on how to tackle a <strong>fire</strong>. Instead, it will repeat its advice to get out<br />

and wait for <strong>the</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>essionals, unless it deems <strong>the</strong>re is an immediate risk to life, in which case, it<br />

provides advice on how to avoid <strong>the</strong> effects <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>fire</strong> (<strong>fire</strong> survival guidance). But in ei<strong>the</strong>r case,<br />

<strong>the</strong> FRS will not share its expertise to help <strong>the</strong> public to tackle a <strong>fire</strong> more safely or effectively.<br />

135. Once <strong>the</strong> FRS has <strong>the</strong> information it requires, <strong>the</strong>y will end <strong>the</strong> call. This <strong>the</strong>n leaves <strong>the</strong> caller and<br />

those present unsupported until <strong>the</strong> physical arrival <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> FRS. From a risk management<br />

perspective, this seems an unusual and obvious gap. Despite being aware <strong>of</strong> a high-risk event<br />

(accounting for most recorded <strong>fire</strong> injuries), and which is still in a dynamic stage, <strong>the</strong> FRS has no risk<br />

mitigation interventions for this period, o<strong>the</strong>r than rushing to <strong>the</strong> scene. From a service design<br />

perspective, this means <strong>the</strong>re is a neglected, and yet critical, risk period averaging nearly eight<br />

minutes. During this period, <strong>the</strong> incident is left to develop without pr<strong>of</strong>essional influence. This<br />

omission is hard to understand ei<strong>the</strong>r from a risk management approach or in recognition <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />

increasing capability <strong>of</strong> technology to bridge <strong>the</strong> gap between remote operations.<br />

136. Studies also identify that <strong>the</strong> public experience time differently depending on what <strong>the</strong>y are doing.<br />

They underestimate how long <strong>the</strong>y spent when active with tasks and overestimate how long passes<br />

when <strong>the</strong>y are in a passive state, e.g. waiting for help. Again, from a risk management and guidance<br />

perspective this is important because it will influence <strong>the</strong>ir decisions and behaviours.<br />

137. Historically, FRS policies did include <strong>the</strong> provision <strong>of</strong> advice to <strong>the</strong> public in terms <strong>of</strong> how to tackle a<br />

<strong>fire</strong>, whe<strong>the</strong>r as a free service or for some as a commercial proposition. <strong>An</strong>ecdotally, <strong>the</strong> current<br />

policy <strong>of</strong> withholding advice seems to be primarily due to a concern that <strong>the</strong> FRS could be sued if<br />

<strong>the</strong> person following <strong>the</strong>ir advice incurs an injury. By not providing advice <strong>the</strong> FRS believe it avoids<br />

that organisational risk, even though it may leave <strong>the</strong> public exposed to o<strong>the</strong>rwise avoidable<br />

injuries. If true, this is a perverse logic for a service aimed at enhancing public safety. Given <strong>the</strong><br />

established and beneficial nature <strong>of</strong> public interventions to tackle <strong>fire</strong>s, <strong>the</strong> default <strong>of</strong> repeating ‘get<br />

out’ to avoid injuries ignores <strong>the</strong> reality <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> evidence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public’s motivations and behaviours.<br />

The health sector may well <strong>of</strong>fer ready-made solutions for progressing this issue given its<br />

experience in providing critical life and health advice by remote means, e.g. phone.<br />

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