atw - International Journal for Nuclear Power | 03.2021
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Ever since its first issue in 1956, the atw – International Journal for Nuclear Power has been a publisher of specialist articles, background reports, interviews and news about developments and trends from all important sectors of nuclear energy, nuclear technology and the energy industry. Internationally current and competent, the professional journal atw is a valuable source of information.
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2021
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Small Modular Reactor
Safety-in-Design
and Perspectives
Nuclear Power is Dead,
Long Live Nuclear Energy!
BREST-OD-300 –
Demonstration of Natural
Safety Technologies
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atw Vol. 66 (2021) | Issue 3 ı May
Towards New Reactors and
Reactor Concepts
Nuclear energy is often referred to as “dinosaur technology” in discussions in order to characterize it in advance,
beyond a fair discussion. But even this is wrong, because the peaceful use of nuclear energy began about 70 years ago,
in the early 1950s, and it is thus virtually as young as, for example, renewable photovoltaics.
The first electricity from nuclear energy was generated in
1948 in an experimental facility. At the Oak Ridge National
Laboratory in the state of Tennessee in the USA, the X-10
reactor was commissioned in 1943 as the world's second
nuclear reactor after the Chicago Pile 1. From 1945, it
served research purposes and was also the first reactor in
the world to supply radioisotopes for medical use. The
air-cooled, graphite-moderated reactor offered a wide
range of possibilities for research but also technical
applications. In 1948, a small steam generator was
installed, the steam from which provided the drive for a
model generator that lit a light bulb for the first time in the
same year.
For the first time, electricity from a power plant
turbogenerator was supplied by the EBR-I fast reactor on
20 December 1951; four light bulbs marked the way to
further nuclear power generation.
Because of the many technical options and combinations
offered by nuclear fission, a wide variety of plant
concepts were pursued in the 1960s and 1970s, including a
broad range of applications. At an early stage, those
involved and developers were thinking not only of direct
power generation but also of district heating or the
provision of high-temperature process heat, seawater
desalination and chemical processes and energy storage –
all highly topical subjects today, for which experience
and historical documents from nuclear energy development
can provide valuable references, foundations and
elaborations.
As is well known, the developments around the
light water reactor technology have been commercially
successful until today, also because they could fall back on
manifold experiences of conventional power and energy
generation and provided a realizable potential with regard
to the further increasing plant capacities demanded at that
time.
However, in these successful decades since the 1960s –
nuclear energy continues to be one of the most important
low-emission energy sources alongside hydropower, with
a share of around 11 % – other reactor concepts have never
completely lost their importance in research and development.
Comprehensive concept studies, such as the work of
the Generation IV International Forum (GIF) in the context
of "Generation IV," were essential in this regard. In 2002,
GIF published the so-called Technology Roadmap, which
describes six reactor types that are considered suitable for
achieving or meeting the development goals of safety,
sustainability and economic efficiency. But the work on
high-temperature reactor concepts or fast reactors in
China, India and Russia also underlines the continuity, up
to the construction and operation of real pilot plants.
When it comes to concepts for the future, a broad
spectrum of developments is on the agenda today. The
change in overall power generation, i.e. initially essentially
characterized by more renewable capacities with unsteady
and unpredictable power feed-in, also requires other
solutions for the indispensable “conventional” generation.
Ultimately, power plants or storage solutions must ensure
grid stability and security of supply.
Nuclear energy can advantageously cover a broad
power spectrum, if only because of its scalability. What is
new is how the U.S. Department of Energy classifies future
nuclear power plants according to their output into:
p Microreactors from 1 to 20 MWe(lectric)
p Small Modular Reactors – SMR from 20 to 300 MWe
and
p High-power reactors from 300 to 1,000 MWe.
These reactors would cover the currently foreseeable
demand for new and additional generation capacities in
the best possible way. The “microreactors” are newly
classified. Thus, their small footprint and an expected
construction time of no more than 24 months – DOE
expects 54 months for SMRs – make them appear suitable
for combination with high-capacity renewable generation
parks, where a source as close to site as possible is needed
to balance volatility.
However, new nuclear power plant developments also
require an appropriate regulatory environment and
infrastructure. Historical experience shows that quasisimultaneous
development of rules and regulations for
large-scale projects can lead to noticeable delays with their
planning, design, and construction. A coordinated and
systematic approach is needed here. The fact that a suitable
regulatory environment and a safe infrastructure for new
nuclear power plant projects can be set up and implemented
in a targeted and speedy manner is impressively
demonstrated by the four new nuclear power plants built
in the United Arab Emirates. Within just a decade from the
final construction decision until now, the commercial
commissioning of the first of four 1,400 MW nuclear power
plant units at the Barakah site, the necessary reliable
environment has been established. Also, worldwide, the
IAEA – International Atomic Energy Agency – today
supports 30 countries in building infrastructure for the
desired entry into peaceful use of nuclear energy – as a
sustainable, low-emission energy source with economic
and consumer-oriented generation.
Christopher Weßelmann
– Editor in Chief –
3
EDITORIAL
Editorial
Towards New Reactors and Reactor Concepts
atw Vol. 66 (2021) | Issue 3 ı May
Contents
4
CONTENTS
Issue 3
2021
May
Editorial
Towards New Reactors and Reactor Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Inside Nuclear with NucNet
Lessons Learned
From the March 2011 Fukushima-Daiichi Nuclear Accident . . . . . 6
Calendar 8
Feature | Research and Innovation
Small Modular Reactor Safety-in-Design and Perspectives . . . . . . .9
Akira Tokuhiro, Chireuding Zeliang and Yi Mi
Cover:
Site layout for the SMR nuclear site complex
by MOLTEX Energy. A feasibility report for Canada
with the MOLTEX concept under review has just been
published.
Contents:
2020-year-in review –
The NuScale Energy Exploration Center,
Copyright NuScale
Did you know? 17
Q&A with the Ministry of Natural Resources Canada
The Nuclear Innovation Policy of Canada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Interview with John Gorman
“I am Personally Very Excited About Canadas’s Positioning
as a Tier One Nuclear Power and also as a First Mover
in Small Modular Reactors“ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Serial | Major Trends in Energy Policy and Nuclear Power
Nuclear Power is Dead, Long Live Nuclear Energy! . . . . . . . . . . 25
Simon Wakter
Energy Policy, Economy and Law
Europe on the Road to a Major Disaster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Herbert Saurugg
A Role for Nuclear in the Future Dutch Energy Mix . . . . . . . . . 35
Bojan Tomic and Mario van der Borst
Operation and New Build
BREST-OD-300 – Demonstration of Natural Safety Technologies . 41
Vadim Lemehov and Valeriy Rachkov
At a Glance
Nuclear Innovation Alliance (NIA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Environment and Safety
Safety-related Residual Heat Removal Chains of German
Technology Pressure Water Reactors (Light and Heavy Water) . . 48
Franz Stuhlmüller and Rafael Macián-Juan
IAEA Approach to Review the Applicability of the Safety
Standards to Small Modular Reactors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Paula Calle Vives, Kristine Madden and Vesselina Ranguelova
Research and Innovation
A Zero-power Facility as a Multi-fold Opportunity to Support
Quick Progress in Innovative Reactor Development . . . . . . . . . 59
Bruno Merk, Dzianis Litskevich, Anna Detkina, Greg Cartland-Glover, Seddon Atknison and Mark Bankhead
The Thorium Network – An Introduction to Blockchain for SMRs . 65
Dian Kemp, Hulmo Christiaansen, Yvette Kemp and Jeremiah E. Josey
Kazatomprom’s Digital Transformation Projects . . . . . . . . . . . 68
Aliya Akzholova
Studies on Performance and Degradation Stability
of Chemically Degraded Nuclear Graded Ion Exchange
Materials by Application of Radio Analytical Technique . . . . . . 71
Pravin Singare
News 78
Nuclear Today
As Reactor Technologies Advance,
Nuclear Will Still Need its Environmental Champions . . . . . . . . 82
Imprint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Contents
atw Vol. 66 (2021) | Issue 3 ı May
5
Feature
Research and Innovation
9 Small Modular Reactor Safety-in-Design
and Perspectives
CONTENTS
Akira Tokuhiro, Chireuding Zeliang and Yi Mi
Interview with John Gorman
21 “I am Personally Very Excited About Canadas’s Positioning
as a Tier One Nuclear Power and also as a First Mover
in Small Modular Reactors“
Serial | Major Trends in Energy Policy and Nuclear Power
25 Nuclear Power is Dead, Long Live Nuclear Energy!
Simon Wakter
Energy Policy, Economy and Law
29 Europe on the Road to a Major Disaster
Herbert Saurugg
Operation and New Build
41 BREST-OD-300 – Demonstration of Natural Safety Technologies
Vadim Lemehov and Valeriy Rachkov
Environment and Safety
56 IAEA Approach to Review the Applicability of the Safety Standards
to Small Modular Reactors
Paula Calle Vives, Kristine Madden and Vesselina Ranguelova
Contents
atw Vol. 66 (2021) | Issue 3 ı May
6
INSIDE NUCLEAR WITH NUCNET
Lessons Learned From the March 2011
Fukushima-Daiichi Nuclear Accident
The official Japanese report into the accident 10 years ago pointed to ‘a multitude of errors and
willful negligence’, but what steps have been taken to prevent a repeat?
Although triggered by a cataclysmic earthquake and
tsunami, the subsequent accident at the Fukushima-Daiichi
nuclear power station 10 years ago cannot be regarded as a
natural disaster.
It was, the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent
Investigation Commission concluded in its official report, 1 a
profoundly manmade disaster – one that could and should
have been foreseen and prevented. And its effects could
have been mitigated by a more effective human response.
Kiyoshi Kurokawa, chairman of the commission, was
blunt in his assessment of the root causes, pointing to a
multitude of errors and willful negligence that left the
Fukushima-Daiichi facility unprepared for the events of
11 March 2011. There were “serious deficiencies” in the
response to the accident by plant owner and operator Tokyo
Electric Power Company, regulators and the government.
Mr Kurokawa said what the commission’s report could
not fully convey – especially to a global audience – was the
mindset that supported the negligence behind this disaster.
“What must be admitted – very painfully – is that this
was a disaster ‘Made in Japan’, he said. “Its fundamental
causes were to be found in the ingrained conventions of
Japanese culture: our reflexive obedience; our reluctance
to question authority; our devotion to ‘sticking with the
programme’; our groupism; and our insularity.”
The report pointed to organisational problems within
Tepco. Had there been a higher level of knowledge,
training, and equipment inspection related to severe
accidents, and had there been specific instructions given to
the onsite workers concerning the state of emergency, a
more effective accident response would have been possible.
“Neither [Tepco or the regulators] had taken steps to
put preventive measures in place,” the report concluded.
“It was this lack of preparation that led to the severity of
this accident.”
The direct causes of the accident were all foreseeable.
The power station was incapable of withstanding the earthquake
and tsunami that hit on that day. The operator, Tokyo
Electric Power Company (Tepco), the regulatory bodies (the
Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency and the Nuclear Safety
Commission) and the government body promoting the
nuclear power industry (the ministry of economy, trade and
industry, or METI), all failed to correctly develop the most
basic safety requirements – such as assessing the probability
of damage, preparing for containing collateral damage from
such a disaster, and developing evacuation plans for the
public in the case of a serious radiation release.
As early as 1981, NISA had required that nuclear
operators assess the anti-seismic safety of their sites
according to new guidelines – the so-called “anti-seismic
backcheck.”
In March 2008, Tepco submitted an interim anti- seismic
backcheck report on Unit 5 of Fukushima-Daiichi, saying
the unit was safe.
In 2009, NISA accepted the contents of the interim
report, even though the scope of the assessment included
the reactor building and only seven of many other
important safety installations and equipment.
In June 2009, similar reports for Units 1 to 4 and 6 were
submitted, but these were similarly limited.
The official deadline for the backchecks was June 2009,
but according to the commission, Tepco made the decision
“internally and unilaterally” to reschedule the deadline to
January 2016.
Since 2006, the regulators and Tepco had also been
aware of the risk that a total outage of electricity at the
Fukushima Daiichi plant might occur if a tsunami were to
reach the level of the site. They were also aware of the risk
of reactor core damage from the loss of seawater pumps in
the case of a tsunami larger than assumed in the Japan
Society of Civil Engineers estimation. NISA knew that
Tepco had not prepared any measures to lessen or eliminate
the risk, but failed to provide specific instructions to
remedy the situation.
The report’s verdict on Tepco and the regulators was
damning. “They either intentionally postponed putting
safety measures in place, or made decisions based on their
organisation’s self-interest – not in the interest of public
safety.”
An IAEA report 2 echoed these findings. It said a major
factor that contributed to the accident was the widespread
assumption in Japan that its nuclear power plants
were so safe that an accident of this magnitude was
simply unthinkable. This assumption was accepted by
nuclear plant operators and was not challenged by
regulators or by the government. As a result, Japan was not
sufficiently prepared for a severe nuclear accident in
March 2011.
“The Fukushima-Daiichi accident exposed certain
weaknesses in Japan’s regulatory framework,” the IAEA
said. “Responsibilities were divided among a number of
bodies, and it was not always clear where authority lay.”
The Response In Japan
Japan moved quickly to resolve serious problems around
nuclear regulation, safety and accident readiness.
The Nuclear Regulatory Authority was formed on
19 September 2012 from the Nuclear Safety Commission
(NSC), which came under the authority of the cabinet, and
the Nuclear and Industry Safety Agency (NISA), which was
under METI. The problem lay in the fact that METI was
also responsible for the promotion of nuclear power,
leading to accusations of a serous conflict of interest. The
NRA was established as an independent entity under the
environment ministry.
According to legislation establishing the NRA, new
nuclear safety rules were to be completed within
10 months. The NRA’s first chairman, Shunichi Tanaka,
1 https://www.nirs.org/wp-content/uploads/fukushima/naiic_report.pdf
2 https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/fr-brochure.pdf
Inside Nuclear with NucNet
Lessons Learned From the March 2011 Fukushima-Daiichi Nuclear Accident
atw Vol. 66 (2021) | Issue 3 ı May
said that the authority would undertake a radical review of
existing safety standards.
In January 2013 the NRA presented a draft outline of
new safety standards 3 for nuclear power plants, including
countermeasures against severe accidents and criteria for
evacuating areas around plants during an emergency.
The standards were approved in June 2013 4 and became
effective on 8 July 2013. The NRA began accepting
applications for reactor restarts. At this point only two of
Japan’s 42 commercial reactors, Ohi-3 and Ohi-4, had
restarted since the accident.
The standards consisted of severe accident measures
based on the accident at Fukushima-Daiichi, together with
design standards and requirements in each area of nuclear
plant safety.
Measures included a requirement to outfit plants with
backup control rooms away from reactor buildings, install
new pressure vents capable of filtering out radioactive
gasses, and reinforce protective structures.
Operators deployed movable alternative equipment
such as power supply vehicles so that plants could be
operated safely for at least seven days without outside help.
One of the severe accident measures was a requirement
to build a so-called “specific safety facility” on nuclear
plant sites, on the assumption of core damage in a reactor,
with terrorism a possible cause. Terrorism would include
an intentional aircraft strike.
The safety facility had to be situated 100 metres or more
from the reactor building, so it would not be destroyed in
the same event. A secondary control room was required
within the safety facility.
Mr Tanaka said the new rules represented “the
beginning of real [nuclear] regulation in Japan”.
The IAEA said Japan has reformed its regulatory system
to better meet international standards. Regulators have
clearer responsibilities and greater authority. The new
regulatory framework has been reviewed by an IAEA peer
review mission. Emergency preparedness and response arrangements
have also been strengthened, the agency said.
Japan’s Nuclear Status
Japan has 62 nuclear power units, but shut down all 42
that were operating at the time after Fukushima-Daiichi.
Thirty-three units have a licence to operate, although
before units return to service they need to meet the NRA’s
new safety standards.
Nine units have been returned to service, but five of
those are offline again for regular maintenance or
upgrades. The four reactors that are online are Sendai-1,
Sendai-2, Genkai-3 and Ohi-4.
Before the Fukushima-Daiichi accident Japan’s nuclear
fleet generated about 30 % of the country’s electricity.
According to the International Atomic Energy Agency that
figure was about 7.5 % in 2019.
Governments with established nuclear-energy
programmes responded in part by conducting safety
checks, including comprehensive “stress tests” that
scrutinised a facility’s ability to withstand everything from
an earthquake and tsunami to a terrorist assault.
Additional backup sources of electrical power and
supplies of water have been installed, and protection
against extreme external events strengthened. In some
cases, organisational and regulatory systems have been
reformed.
Safety reassessments concluded that facilities examined
offer a safety level that is sufficient, and no immediate
shutdown was required.
The IAEA emphasises that nuclear safety remains the
responsibility of an individual country, but says nuclear
accidents can transcend borders and the Fukushima-
Daiichi accident “underlined the importance of international
cooperation”.
In Europe, all nuclear power plants in the EU underwent
stress tests and peer reviews in 2011 and 2012. Many
other countries and territories also conducted comprehensive
nuclear risk and safety assessments, based on
the EU stress-test model. These include Switzerland and
Ukraine (both of which fully participated in the EU stress
tests), Armenia, Turkey, Russia, Taiwan, Japan, South
Korea, South Africa and Brazil.
In China, which had aspirations to build up to 100 new
nuclear units by 2030, plans were put on hold. Premier
Wen Jiabao announced the suspension of the approval of
new nuclear power projects and called for a com prehensive
safety assessment of Chinese nuclear power facilities.
Beijing ultimately decided to lift the moratorium on
construction of new nuclear power plants in October 2012.
The state council said safety investigations had shown that
“nuclear security is guaranteed in China.”
In the US, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ordered
in March 2012 that nuclear power plants meet specific
deadlines for safety checks and upgrades. 7
The checks
included maintaining key safety functions even if installed
electricity sources fail; installing additional equipment to
monitor spent fuel pool water levels; and installing or
improving systems to safely vent pressure during an
accident. The NRC also asked all US plants for information
on comprehensive earthquake and flooding hazard
analyses.
Author
David Dalton
NucNet –
The Independent Global Nuclear News Agency
Bruxelles, Belgium
www.nucnet.org
INSIDE NUCLEAR WITH NUCNET 7
The International Response
Three months after the accident, the International Atomic
Energy Agency hosted a ministerial conference on nuclear
safety. This paved the way for the unanimous endorsement
of an IAEA action plan 5
that has led to international
collaboration toward strengthening global nuclear safety. 6
3 https://www.nucnet.org/news/japan-s-regulator-unveils-proposed-new-safety-measures
4 https://www.nucnet.org/news/japan-s-regulator-approves-new-safety-guidelines
5 https://www.iaea.org/topics/nuclear-safety-action-plan
6 https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/four-years-of-progress-action-plan-on-nuclear-safety
7 https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/japan-events.html
Inside Nuclear with NucNet
Lessons Learned From the March 2011 Fukushima-Daiichi Nuclear Accident
atw Vol. 66 (2021) | Issue 3 ı May
8
CALENDAR
Calendar
2021
Online Conference 04.05.2021
2021 KTG Annual Meeting. Berlin, Germany, KTG,
www.ktg.org
Online Conference 10.05. – 15.05.2021
FEC 2020 – 28 th IAEA Fusion Energy Conference.
Nice, France, IAEA, www.iaea.org
18.05. – 20.05.2021
Power Uzbekistan 2021 – 15 th Anniversary
International Exhibition on Energy.
Tashkent, Uzbekistan, Iteca Exhibitions,
www.power-uzbekistan.uz
Online Conference 04.08. – 06.08.2021
ICONE 28 – 28 th International Conference on
Nuclear Engineering. Nuclear Energy the Future
Zero Carbon Power. ASME, https://event.asme.org
25.08. – 27.08.2021
KONTEC 2021 – 15 th International Symposium
“Conditioning of Radioactive Operational &
Decommissioning Wastes”. Dresden, Germany,
atm, www.kontec-symposium.de
25.08. – 03.09.2021
The Frédéric Joliot/Otto Hahn Summer School
on Nuclear Reactors “Physics, Fuels and Systems”.
Aix-en-Provence, France, CEA & KIT, www.fjohss.eu
29.08. - 03.09.2021
PSA 2021 – International Topical Meeting on
Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Analysis.
ANS, Columbus, OH, USA, www.psa.ans.org
Postponed to 24.10. – 28.10.2021
TopFuel 2021. Santander, Spain, ENS,
https://www.euronuclear.org/topfuel2021
26.10. – 28.10.2021
VGB Conference Chemistry. Ulm, Germany, VGB
PowerTech, www.vgb.org
01.11. – 12.11.2021
COP26 – UN Climate Change Conference.
Glascow, Scotland, www.ukcop26.org
Postponed to 30.11. – 02.12.2021
Enlit (former European Utility Week and
POWERGEN Europe). Milano, Italy,
www.enlit-europe.com
30.11. – 02.12.2021
WNE2021 – World Nuclear Exhibition. Paris,
France, Gifen, www.world-nuclear-exhibition.com
Postponed to 30.08. – 03.09.2021
International Conference on Operational Safety
of Nuclear Power Plants. Beijing, China, IAEA,
www.iaea.org
2022
Online Conference 19.05. – 20.05.2021
Small Modular Reactors (SMR). Prospero,
www.prosperoevents.com
Cancelled due to COVID 30.05. – 05.06.2021
BEPU2020 – Best Estimate Plus Uncertainty
International Conference, Giardini Naxos.
Sicily, Italy, NINE, www.nineeng.com
Online Conference 07.09. – 09.09.2021
Management systems for a sustainable nuclear
supply chain. Helsinki, Finland, Foratom,
https://events.foratom.org/mstf2021
Hybrid Conference 08.09. – 10.09.2021
3 rd International Conference on Concrete
Sustainability. Prague, Czech Republic, fib,
www.fibiccs.org
08.09. – 10.09.2021
World Nuclear Association Symposium 2021.
London, UK, WNA, www.wna-symposium.org
Postponed to 28.02. – 04.03.2022
20 th WCNDT – World Conference on
Non-Destructive Testing. Incheon, Korea,
The Korean Society of Nondestructive Testing,
www.wcndt2020.com
06.03. – 11.03.2022
NURETH19 – 19 th International Topical Meeting
on Nuclear Reactor Thermal Hydraulics. SCK·CEN,
Brussels, Belgium, www.events.sckcen.be
22.09. – 23.09.2021
VGB Congress 100 PLUS. Essen, Germany, VGB
PowerTech, www.vgb.org
Online Conference 01.06. – 02.06.2021
Nuclear Power Plants IV. Expo & VIII. Summit
(NPPES). Istanbul, Turkey, INPPES Expo,
www.nuclearpowerplantsexpo.com
Online Conference 02.06. – 05.06.2021
HTR2021 – 10 th International Conference
on High Temperature Reactor Technology.
Yogyakarta, Indonesia, Indonesian Nuclear Society,
www.htr2020.org
Online Conference 07.06. – 09.06.2021
Nuclear Energy Assembly. NEI,
www.nei.org
Online Conference 14.06. – 16.06.2021
2021 ANS Annual Meeting. ANS, www.ans.org
26.09. – 30.09.2021
RRFM 2021 – European Research Reactor
Conference. ENS, Helsinki, Finland,
www.euronuclear.org
27.09. – 30.09.2021
European Nuclear Young Generation Forum
(ENYGF). Tarragona, Spain, ENYGF, www.enygf.org
27.09. – 01.10.2021
NPC 2021 International Conference on Nuclear
Plant Chemistry. Antibes, France, SFEN Société
Française d’Energie Nucléaire,
www.sfen-npc2021.org
04.10. – 05.10.2021
AtomExpo 2021. Sochi, Russia, Rosatom,
http://2021.atomexpo.ru/en
29.03. – 30.03.2022
KERNTECHNIK 2022.
Leipzig, Germany, KernD and KTG,
www.kerntechnik.com
04.04. – 08.04.2022
International Conference on Geological
Repositories. Helsinki, Finland, EURAD,
www.ejp-eurad.eu
Postponed to Spring 2022
4 th CORDEL Regional Workshop – Harmonization
to support the operation and new build of NPPs
including SMR. Lyon, France, World Nuclear
Association, https://events.foratom.org
Online Conference 23.06. – 24.06.2021
Maintenance in Power Plants 2021.
VGB PowerTech e.V., www.vgb.org
Online Conference 20.07. – 22.07.2021
POWER 2021. ASME, www.event.asme.org
Online Conference 03.08.-04.08.
and 10.08.-11.08.2021
International Uranium Digital Conference 2021.
AusIMM, www.ausimm.com
Postponed – final date and location
to be determined
ICEM 2021 – International Conference on
Environmental Remediation and Radioactive
Waste Management. ANS, www.asme.org
16.10. – 20.10.2021
ICAPP 2021 – International Conference on
Advances in Nuclear Power Plants. Khalifa
University, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates,
www.icapp2020.org
Postponed to 04.05. – 06.05.2022
NUWCEM 2022 – International Symposium on
Cement-Based Materials for Nuclear Wastes.
Avignon, France, SFEN, www.sfen-nuwcem2021.org
This is not a full list and may be subject to change.
Calendar
atw Vol. 66 (2021) | Issue 3 ı May
Small Modular Reactor
Safety-in-Design and Perspectives
Akira Tokuhiro, Chireuding Zeliang and Yi Mi
Across the public, nuclear power and global energy sectors, there are various degrees of interest in next and
near-generation micro- to small, modular reactors (MMR, SMR) 1 . The ongoing interests, here defined in terms of
commercial and national technology developments, policy documents (roadmaps, action plans, etc.), various levels
and means of “investments”, are intended to support and facilitate development of select advanced reactor concepts
and demonstration units. The current portfolio of SMRs and MMRs is relative to the current, global fleet; mostly larger
scale nuclear plants (Generation III and III+ designs) currently under construction and/or operating. These legacy
designs largely meet the electricity demand in nations with robust socio-economic development rates. Both the
operating plants and those in various stages of development are included in a “pan-global, nuclear portfolio”, touted (in
the “24/7/365” social media) to address and mitigate the negative impacts of climate change. While there are reasons
to “worry” about the lack of foresight, preventative preparedness and response to address the cliff-edge impacts of climate
change, the goal here is not to argue climate change nor policies/developments in national commitments to a
lower or net-zero carbon economies of scale. If anything, climate change can be construed as human society’s inability
to exercise a paradigm shift – in effect, a linear extrapolation from 150+ years of industrialization based on fossil fuels
and release of effluents without consequences. Along the way, we forgot to ask what can happen and how can it happen.
The consequences are here and imminent (“urgent”), as expressed by climate change leaders, Greta Thunberg, and
others. Nature is suffering in our age of our Anthropocene.
With this in mind, the article here will review a number of
ongoing micro- to small, modular reactors concepts, but
from the perspective of engineering and design development
so that the design is completed. While engineered
and designed features hold much interest to those with
engineering and R&D backgrounds, one might argue that
if nuclear energy is to serve in transition and/or as a
solution to aspirational economies of scale that mitigate
and reduce the negative impacts of climate change, nuclear
reactor designs need to be complete, prudently financed
and “constructable”, because ultimately they serve to
generate electricity that the public expects and demands.
Some 70 years ago in nuclear history, then U.S. President
Dwight Eisenhower appeared at the United Nations (1953)
and spoke on, “Atoms for Peace”. Subsequently, in the then
short list of post-WWII developed and developing nations,
there was rapid development, and selection process of
Generation I and II nuclear concepts. Many of these are
part of the 440 or so nuclear power plants operating today.
1 Designs, Legacy and Processes
A few words about the design and engineering process of
new/advanced reactor concepts is in order. Perhaps owing
to the lead author’s educational legacy, it is not something
that I remember explicitly learning during my nuclear
engineering education. That said, there are established
processes within nuclear vendors (manufacturers) that
remain proprietary. These practices do not necessarily
make it into university classrooms. My observation has
been that seasoned professionals from the nuclear sector
do not transition late in their career, to university nuclear
engineering programs/classrooms. There can thus be a
knowledge transfer gap, from the reactor vendor to the
classroom.
The article here on advanced reactor concepts and
SMRs/MMRs, is based on the assumption that completing
the design is of utmost importance, and that the design
process takes time and requires sufficient and sustained
funding because the key high-level task is, iterative
system design. That is, engineering system design, wherein
systems and subsystems are coupled, require iterative
design optimization. This is certainly the case in nuclear
reactor design.
So, we note that SMRs, like many nuclear reactors are
generally designed from the reactor core, outward in terms
of various essential and supporting systems; that is, the
primary, secondary systems and beyond. In fact, one could
say for SMRs, the design regions of interest extend all the
way to the emergency planning zone (EPZ), since in
principle, a SMR’s EPZ should be related to, “very
small probability (keep reading) but a high consequence”,
hypothetical accidents. One can say that increasingly
Generation IV (or advanced) reactor concepts are expected
to have very small hypothetical probability with respect to
design basis and beyond design basis accidents (DBA,
BDBA), and features that substantiate means to address
Fukushima (Daichi) type situations. In fact, the design
itself is expected to have a number of safety-in-design
features so that the commonly cited metrics such as, “core
damage frequency” (CDF) and/or “early release frequency”
(ERF), are typically, smaller than 1E-06 2 , if not 1E-08. (We
note here that probabilities – less than say, 1E-09, 1E-10 or
smaller may not hold regulatory meaning or significance.)
Further, other than these small probabilities, observance
or adherence to safety-in-design philosophies/principles
as described in INSAG-10 [14], and “goodness” in design
such that no human intervention is required for durations
of time beyond “event” initiation (i.e. first 24, 48, 72 hours,
etc.), detailed information on accident progression/
evolution, may appear as aspirational or embedded in the
design features and functions, without open access to the
technical details. Open access of detailed technical
information may not be possible; thus, it is not current
practice.
With the above design engineering process and metrics
in mind, let us look at the micro- to small modular reactor
9
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1 The term, SMR, is used to be inclusive of Small and Micro Modular Reactor concepts and designs.
2 This notation is used instead of a superscript that may appear visibly small (1 x 10 -6 ).
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FEATURE | RESEARCH AND INNOVATION 10
concepts currently under various states of development.
We note that since a number of overview articles on SMR/
MMR reactor concepts exist, this article is not intended to
be such. Instead we thought to reveal some of the not so
obvious aspects of safety-in-design, that various advanced
reactor designers may adopt to varying degrees. First for
brevity and utility, we cite some of the key documents
below as a starting point into the various aspects
surrounding SMRs as follows:
p On safety-in-design, references [1, 7, 14, 17(US only),
23, 24, 30]
p On licensing and regulatory aspects of SMRs, reference
[3, 15, 19, 22]
p Overview and advances of SMR, reference [2, 6, 9, 16,
31, 33, 36, 40]
p Specifically passive safety systems within safety-indesign,
references [8, 20, 32]
p Nuscale, SMART, IRIS, CAREM, ESBWR, AP1000
specific starting documents, reference [10, 11, 12, 13,
21 (NuScale EPZ), 28, 29]. Note that the ESBWR and
AP1000 are Generation III/III+, large-scale plant
designs from which lessons learned are realized in SMR
designs.
p General principles in nuclear design and economics,
references [4 (economics),18, 25, 26]
2 Back to the future with nuclear energy?
In a manner similar to many early nuclear reactor
concepts in the late 1950s, early 1960s, there are many
micro- to small, modular reactor concepts. However, with
approximately 60 years of complete design experience,
operational experience, lessons learned from three major
severe accidents, (along with other recorded events),
unrestrained cost increases, regulatory compliance burdens,
anti-nuclear sentiments and advances in computer- based
engineering, recent advanced reactor designs hold consensus
expectations in safety, non- proliferation and
economics. It goes without much declaration that nuclear
energy is often questioned and compared to other forms of
energy (including renewable energy sources) and as a
matter of regional to national energy policy. In recent years,
public acceptance of any risk-inherent technology, processes,
production and consumption – a composite portfolio
of social license, advocacy and questionable objectivity
issues, are fiercely fought with fervent banter in social
media domains. Everyone has an opinion.
Nuclear energy and new micro- to small, modular
reactor concepts are not benign from socio-technical
scrutiny, most recently in the global debate on whether
nuclear energy is a partial to full solution to counter the
increasingly emerging evidence on the negative impacts of
climate change.
2.1 The micro- to small, modular reactor
concepts
Nuclear reactors are traditionally classified in terms of the
following technical features. These features are high-level
decisions made by its originators. They are: 1) neutron
spectrum, 2) related type of neutron moderation, 3) type
of coolant, 4) fuel type and core configuration. We will use
the same approach for consistency. We note Hussein [40]
review that used an expanded classification based on
200+ cited references.
We limit our coverage below to SMR design concepts
of thermal power (output) magnitude that feature conventional
or unique energy conversion system design, utilizing
a liquid-based energy transport system from a defined core
configuration. The core and energy transport system
should fulfill the basic functions as follows: startup (to
criticality), (transition to) steady-state operation at a
targeted power, transition up or down from a given power
setting to another, intended shutdown, emergency shutdown
and post-shutdown decay heat energy removal (to
cold shutdown state).
In this regard, micro-modular reactor concepts (MMR)
are even simpler in design than many SMR concepts
because the thermal power output is approximately an
order of magnitude smaller than SMR (i.e. ~O (5 MWth)
per reactor core vs. ~O (50 MWth)) per reactor core] and
as such, the corresponding means of reactivity control are
reduced accordingly. With respect to MMR safety-indesign,
post-shutdown energy removal mechanisms are
predominantly passive such that air or a large volume of
water, serves as the ultimate heat sink for decay heat.
Energy conversion systems are correspondingly modular
in design and may feature reduced coupling to reactor core
control (and thus operations) such that the sole output is
electricity and/or thermal energy. With such simple design
and limited functions, the thermal-hydraulic “parameter
space” is correspondingly small, such that conventional
means of control (analog and/or digital) can be used for
monitoring, prognostics and diagnostics. The 2020 release
of the IAEA “book” on SMRs/MMRs contains 6 MMR concepts.
A concise, descriptive summary of the announced
MMR concepts is given below.
1) Energy Well (Rez, Czech Republic) – is a high
temperature (core inlet, 650 °C; outlet, 700 °C) molten
salt FLiBe cooled and moderated, with targeted thermal
and electrical power output, 20MWt/8 MWe. The once
through core design features 15 % enriched TRISO fuel
and operational reactivity control via Y-shaped control
rods. Energy conversion is a 3-loop (FLiBe, NaBF 4 ,
supercritical CO 2 ) design so as to avail pro duction of
electricity, hydrogen and energy storage, juxtaposed
against the Czech national energy portfolio. Common
to many national nuclear conceptual design engineering
studies (here at nuclear R&D centre, Rez), while
development details may be ongoing, a path toward
commercialized deployment is unknown.
2) MoveLuX (Toshiba, Japan) – is a sodium heat-pipe
cooled and calcium hydride moderated, natural
convection (air-based primary circuit) driven MMR
with thermal/electrical power output, targeted at
10 MWt/3-4 MWe. The core design uses uranium
silicide (U 3 Si 2 ) fuel housed in hexagonal “cans” with
lithium expansion system reactivity control. With a
sodium heat pipe based higher temperature conversion
system coupled to helium gas, electricity and hydrogen
production are possible, as well as a fuel cycle adapted
to the national fuel cycle practice. This MMR concept is
a Toshiba internal conceptual design study.
3) U-Battery (Urenco, UK) – is a high-temperature, helium
gas-cooled, graphite-moderated MMR with targeted
thermal/electrical output, 10 MWt/4 MWe. The core
design uses TRISO fuel, enriched up to 20 %, in
hexagonal blocks with control rods, fixed burnable
poisons and shut-down absorber spheres. A 5-year full
power year and 30-year design life are targeted. Energy
conversion is via indirect secondary nitrogen circuit
with applications both for heat applications or closed
gas-turbine technology (no combustion stage).
Regulatory approval of its detailed design and
commercialization partners have been announced by
its developer, URENCO – UK.
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4) AURORA – (Oklo, USA) – with a targeted thermal/
electric power output, 4 MWt/1.5 MWe, this compact,
liquid-metal cooled fast reactor MMR using metal fuel,
a 20-year refueling cyle, Oklo has applied for a USNRC
combined license application. The plant features low
power output, low power density and low decay heat
output, and correspondingly has low fuel burnup, small
fuel inventory, simplicity in energy removal by inherent
and passive means, and overall takes advantage of
thermal capacity via use of higher con ductivity material
selection. Oklo has an existing agreement to access
the Idaho National Lab site and some aspects of their
technology know-how under a partnership agreement.
5) eVinci Micro Reactor (Westinghouse, USA) – this
conceptual design MMR with a targeted thermal/
electrical power output, 7-12 MWt/2-3.5 MWe, uses
(sodium) heat pipes and metal hydride moderator in a
stand-alone, transportable reactor and energy conversion
system unit. Instrumentation and controls are
provided via a separate, integrated (second) unit. The
core is based on TRISO or similarly encapsulated fuel,
in a monolithic core with reactivity control realized via
ex-core (moving) control drums. Onsite refueling or
whole reactor replacement are envisioned. Energy
conversion is via open-air Brayton and single shaft gas
turbomachinery. The core is designed with negative
reactivity, and decay heat removal is via intended
conduction and natural convective heat dissipation to
air. The design integrates many elements and simplifications
based on lessons learned by Westinghouse in
overall plant “island” design. The design concept is
under Vendor Design Review, Canadian Nuclear Safety
Commission (CNSC), and preliminary discussions with
the USNRC.
6) MMR (Ultra Safe Nuclear, USA) – this MMR with a
( Canadian) national laboratory site partnership
permit, has a targeted thermal/electrical power ouput,
15 MWt/greater than 5MWe. This MMR is a hightemperature,
(helium) gas-cooled, graphite- moderated,
solar salt energy stored integral design. The core will
use TRISO for fully ceramic micro-encapsulated (FCM)
fuel pellets, HALEU enriched to just under 20 %, in
hexagonal blocks with control rods. Its inherent core
negative temperature feedback and low power density,
dissipates heat radiatively and via natural convection.
Energy conversion is via a 3-loop system with a molten
salt intermediate (heat exchanger) loop that also stores
thermal energy. This loop connected to a steam
generator unit. The concept, under Global First Power,
has submitted a license to prepare site initial application
at CNL Chalk River site, and with the CNSC.
various designs are most clearly revealed in the thermalhydraulic
design that minimize and/or eliminate potential
initiating events may be linked to DBA and certainly BDBA
scenarios. In the latter case, the DBA/BDBA can then be
claimed as impossible. Reflection of this approach then
begs the question of prudent integration of the following
practices: probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), system
analysis ( RELAP and similar), accident analysis (MELCOR
and similar) and dispersion analysis. The work by Williams
et al. [34] describes the safety-in-design, including foremost,
defense-in-depth and putting into (design) practice,
the INSAG-10 explicit levels.
2.3 Gas-cooled, graphite-moderated
Large scale gas-cooled, often graphite-moderated reactors
have a history as long as water-cooled, thermal spectrum
reactors. As such, there have been generational reactor
concepts paralleling that of LWRs. Much of the
generational development can be traced to the 1950s to
1970s, and is associated with the prismatic (block) type
Magnox and AGR in the UK [41, 42]. The pre-commercial,
experimental Dragon reactor introduced the TRISO
(tristructral- isotropic) fuel type. Soon thereafter, the
German constructed and operated the AVR (Arbeitsgemeinschaft
Versuchsreaktor), with a pebble bed fuel and
moderator (spheres) core configuration, demonstrated
high- termperature operation using gas as coolant. This
reactor concept is often attributed to Daniels and Schulten,
and following the AVR saw incremental developments via
the following: German THTR-300, the Japanese High
| Figure 1
U-Battery Design (Source: www.u-battery.com/design-and-technology).
FEATURE | RESEARCH AND INNOVATION 11
2.2 Water-cooled, moderated, thermal spectrum
designs
Due to the large number of light water-cooled, thermal
spectrum reactor designs in the history of nuclear energy,
SMRs based on the similar light water moderation,
reflection and cooling concepts comprise the largest
grouping of SMR concepts and designs at present. In fact,
one of the most complete, if not the only completed design
is that by NuScale Power. Not surprisingly, many aspects of
the design, engineering, system design and overall, design
methodology are proprietary. That said, based on a survey
of various SMR designs of integral Pressurized Water
Reactor type (iPWR) by Zeliang, Mi and co-workers [32], if
the selected core design is conventional (primarily to
reduce overall cost), but smaller, then differences in
| Figure 2
The Micro Modular Reactor (MMR) system (Source: www.usnc.com/mmr-energy-system/).
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| Figure 3
Westinghouse eVinci Micro Reactor
(Source: www.westinghousenuclear.com/new-plants/evinci-micro-reactor).
Temperature Test Reactor (HTTR) and Chinese High
Temperature Reactor, HTR-10. X-Energy’s Xe-100 is the
current pebble-bed, high temperature, gas-cooled nuclear
reactor (SMR) design, using TRISO fuel and with targeted
output at 200 MWth/76 MWe. Consistent with many light
water based SMR designs, the current day gas-cooled,
graphite based concepts feature active or passive safety
features.
2.4 Unique Reactor Designs
There are and can be other unique types of SMRs and
MMRs designs and concepts, differing in selection of fuel
type, fuel form (solid vs. liquid), neutron energy spectrum,
the combination of coolant, moderator and reflector,
thermal/electrical output, safety-in-design and deployment
strategies, including aspects of modularity, manufactureability,
cost savings per advance manu facturing
methods, and “add-on” benefits such as medical isotope,
hydrogen and district heating production. It may be
reasonable to say that, assuming that there is ( sovereign)
regulatory review with inclusion of public consultation of
any particular SMR design, aspects of technical innovation
and interest, has to prevail against public sentiment and
skepticism. Thus, innovative concepts rarely have a chance,
even in demonstration, and in today’s social media driven,
multi-national climate, consensus acceptance may be
needed for certain. In other words, new technology
solutions have to overcome a daily battle of disinformation
and misinformation to garner and secure sustainable
investments and developments. In other words, “the odds
are not very good, even if the technology (the goods) are
very innovative (not odd)”.
2.5 Molten salt-fueled and cooled,
and fast spectrum, liquid metal designs
As noted, finishing the SMR design and submitting this for
regulatory review and approval, as well as commitment to
construction via sufficient and satisfactory investments,
are the most important in current SMR efforts. These
linked objectives also apply to novel SMR/MMR concepts
based on molten-salt fueled and cooled concepts as well as
fast spectrum concepts. Historically and technically, fast
spectrum concepts are often associated with liquid metal
(sodium, lead, eutectic alloys, etc.) thermal-hydraulic
system designs. Most notably, large thermal diffusivity
(and conductivity, relative to water) and selection of
materials with small neutron cross section, provide design
advantages in fast spectrum concepts. A succinct summary
of the sodium-cooled fast reactor is contained in [43]. The
IAEA “2020 booklet” provides technical specification of
the Terrestrial Energy’s [39] and Kairos Power’s (fluoride
salt-cooled, high temperature, pebble bed), [40] designs,
as well as the fast spectrum designs of the ARC-
100 (sodium- cooled) and Oklo (MMR, HALEU fuel,
supercritical CO 2 with heat pipe) concepts. Additional
information of technical interest can be found via ongoing
regulatory review processes (examples: US, Canada) and
open access publications and news releases. Of importance,
relative to and in contrast to thermal spectrum SMR/
MMRs with safety-in-design, is the inherently passive
safety system feature (including reactivity control) corresponding
to a defense-in-depth approach, that provides
competitive, if not advantageous benefit, in the eyes of the
stakeholders. Because these reactor concepts are or can be
significantly different than thermal spectrum, water-based
SMR/MMR designs (example, flowing in-solution liquid
fuel and coolant), they provide important regulatory
opportunity to confirm technology “neutrality” when that
objective is sought.
There are 11 fast spectrum SMR concepts noted in the
IAEA – 2020 book. Of these, the Siberian Chemical
Combine’s, BREST-OD-300, with declared thermal and
electrical power output, 700 MWt/300 MWe, recently
received license (from Rostechnadzor) to be constructed
in Seversk. This, a lead (Pb-cooled and moderated, pool
type fast reactor, is both a test and demonstration plant. It
is thus an evolutionary design similar in design to French
and Japanese one-off SFR designs (Super Phenix, Joyo,
Monju), but incorporating lessons learned using lead and
lead-bismuth within the Russian Federation. The core
consists of mixed uranium-plutonium nitride fuel,
enriched up to 14.5 %, in hexagonal configuration with
chromium ferritic-martensitic steel cladding and capability
for fuel breeding. Reactivity control is via shim and automatic
control roads, while the 2-loop energy conversion
system features a lead to water steam generator system.
The emergency core cooling system is passive, and consists
of pipes immersed directly into the primary system, thus
serving as a natural circulation driven lead-to-air heat
exchanger. Completion of construction is scheduled to be
as early as 2026.
It is worth noting that in terms of safety-in-design of
liquid-metal cooled fast reactors, the key safety feature is a
prompt, negative temperature feedback from Doppler
broadening of the cross section. In simple terms, because
of the combination of higher fuel enrichment (relative to
water-cooled reactors), liquid metal as coolant and
subsequent compactness of the overall core design, the
power density of a fast reactor is larger than water-cooled
reactors. Thus, the probability of an initiating event
developing into an energetic event has to be considered.
The safety-in-design of the EBR-II test/demonstration
plant considered many of these aspects and demonstrated
its inherent safety. In brief, historically documented
( accident) phenomena specifically for sodium-cooled
designs include the following: transient overpower, lossof-flow,
fuel- vapor explosion, sodium vapor explosion,
containment response under short and sustained loads.
For specific liquid metal cooled, SMR-scale fast spectrum
designs, these specific issues have to be addressed.
It remains to be seen how the ARC-100 SFR will develop
as a scaled-down, updated version of EBR-II [44], with
some of the original EBR-II lead principals. The ARC-100 is
a forced circulation SFR, thermally projected to be
286 MWt/100 MWe, and featuring U-Zr metallic fuel,
enriched on average to 13.1 %, such that it has a 20-year
refueling service life. Beyond the primary circuit, it
features a 2-loop IHX to SG design, supported by four
submersed EM pumps. The SG is a vertically oriented,
helical coil, single-walled, counter-flow sodium-to-water,
shell-in-tube design. Reactivity control is via a redundant
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system of 6 control rods (3 x 2). Besides the core, many of
the major energy conversion system components are
integrated into the reactor vessel and defining building.
The ARC-100 is undergoing CNSC Vendor Design Review
and has Provincial support from New Brunswick ( Canada).
Generational knowledge preservation and transfer, as well
as workforce capability to understand the SFR remains to
be seen.
Finally, we would be remiss if the long-standing promise
of fast reactors as part of national energy self-sufficiency
strategy via closing of the nuclear fuel cycle, is not noted.
Unfortunately, no nuclear nation today completely
practices a fully closed (commercial) nuclear fuel cycle
and thus, with fast reactors of a SMR “kind”, we have to
again maintain a sensible view to technology readiness of
fuel reprocessing aspects for those fast SMR concepts that
use existing supplies of spent fuel. Except possibly in China
and the Russian Federation, openly competitive global
markets have eroded the promise of fast reactors and
closed fuel cycle.
3 Lesson learned, evolution of
safety-in-design, getting to the end
One can look at the 70+-year history of nuclear power
generation of electricity, and relative to other public use/
acceptance of other risk-inherent technologies such
as the automobile and travel via commercial airlines
(approximately 100 years), begin to understand the
development of social license/public acceptance of
technologies. Once could state that unfortunately, nuclear
power developed alongside environmental consciousness
and a spectrum of “anti” movements that continue to this
day. This paper is not intended to argue rightful acceptance
of nuclear power. However, not preserving the options
presented by nuclear generated electricity would be
testimony to lack of foresight in the world we live in today,
with the issues and challenges that we have.
The ongoing “nuclear renaissance” of recent years can
be summarized in terms of the following trends: 1)
conceptual designs followed by various states of
engineering design development of many types of SMRs
and MMRs, 2) a broad discussion of the socio- technological
importance of addressing (the emerging, negative impacts
of) climate change, and thus, transitioning away from a
carbon-based (fossil fueled) to low carbon or net zero
carbon economies of scale using nuclear energy, and 3) unbeknownst
to many but integration of lessons learned,
evolution in safety-in-design thinking, and advancements
in modeling and simulation (using high performance
computing) for advanced reactor designs. Recent
advancements in accident tolerant fuels, and advanced
manufacturing are noted but perhaps years away from
being inherent in SMR/MMR design.
4 Emerging drivers in SMR and
advanced reactor concept design
The ongoing global interest and enthusiasm for SMR/
MMR has generated many concepts but equally revealed
uncoordinated global gaps, including regulatory review of
the safety-in-design of various concepts. This is to be
expected, given that regulatory mandate is at the national
level. That said, there are a few bi-/tri-lateral collaboration
agreements to share regulatory practices. It remains to
be seen whether such collaborations will facilitate review
and thus reduce the overall time to realizing any
particular SMR/MMR concept. We further note that global
institutions, such as the IAEA, WNA, OECD-NEA, WANO
| Figure 4
Conceptual sketch of weighting factor assignment.
and related promote common understanding – here with
respect to safety-in-design of SMRs/MMRs and other
advanced reactor concepts. The authors herein describe
emerging drivers or influences, based on many lessons
learned in reactor concepts and designs. We offer this
account since, design methods and approaches often
remain proprietary and as such, not openly discussed. We
thus offer for contemplation and discussion, high-level
aspects of safety-in-design of SMRs.
Figure 4 first shows a qualitative “high, medium or
low” weighting in importance versus the INSAG-10 levels
(1 to 5), meant to reflect historial perspective on defencein-
depth. The figure compares conventional reactors
( larger plants) versus SMRs currently proposed. We note
that the weigthing for convential reactors may sensibly
decrease incremental manner if level “1, 4, 5”, for example,
loosely correspond to AOOs, DBA an BDBA respectively.
That is, convential reactors have largely been designed so
that safety systems can respond to and counter consequences
of the postulated DBA. However, history has
taught us that human operational error can generate
BDBA-type situations; that is, leading to core meltdown
(degradation) and (unintended) release of radioactivity
beyond the plant boundary. Thus, for older generation
reactor designs (Generation II), one could imagine a
higher weighting for levels 1-to-3, relative to levels 4-to-5
event. Since, the authors anticipate arguments under such
qualitative perspectives, an uniform, medium weighting
across levels, 1-to-5, is also shown. It is conceivable that a
particular, recent design (Generation III, III+) could
feature uniform weighting as depicted.
In contrast, the designs of current SMRs are generally
expected to reflect generational improvements in safety- indesign,
overall. Thus, at minimum, the SMR may feature
inherent, passive safety system/s in its design, and thus
reflect a safety-in-design philosophy, that may emphasize
at least “M” weighting for unlikely, level “4 or 5” scenarios.
In so doing, the design eliminates the need for immediate
(human) emergency response. This latter philosophy may
not always be apparent by studying the design itself, but
depicted through an integration of a number of safety- indesign
aspects. In reality and with operational excellence
taken into consideration, the relationship may be
something similar to the (non-linear) dotted trend with
high imporance placed on both low and higher level
scenarios. Any difference in magnitude or slope comparing
conventional reactors to SMRs, thus reflects historical
FEATURE | RESEARCH AND INNOVATION 13
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DiD
Level
SMR target
frequency (/yr)*
No. Generic eliminated scenarios Contributing innovative features
1. Large Break Loss of Coolant Accidents (LB-LOCAs) Integrated Reactor Cooling System
2. Elimination of control rod ejection/injection accidents Integrated Control Rod Drive Mechanisms (CRDMs)
3. Exclusion of inadvertent reactivity insertion as a result of boron dilution Eliminated liquid boron reactivity control system
4. Elimination of loss of flow accidents and failures/scenarios related to
reactor coolant pumps
Naturally circulated primary system
5. Elimination of the need for external power under accident conditions Fail-safe passive safety features on loss of power
| Table 2
SMR design features that challenge conventional safety analysis.
Design characteristics
Integral reactor coolant system (RCS)-
design-reduced accident initiators
Attributes
Level 1 < 10 -2 Initiating event frequency
Level 2 < 10 -5 Failure detection capability and control action
(automatic or manual)
Level 3 < 10 -8 Core damage frequency (CDF)
Facilitating factors in (SMR) passive safety systems (PSSs) start-up/operation
Minimizes accident initiators, thus consider use of PSS.
Results in a simplified design
Lower core power capacity Less (magnitude) decay heat to be removed 30)
PRA
Levels
Level 1
Level 4 < 10 -10 Conditional containment failure probability Level 2
Level 5 < 10 -12 Large early release frequency (LERF) Level 3
| Table 1
Relationship among DiD, PRA, existing requirements and expectations. *small values can be argued, conservatively
Current regulatory
requirements (/yr)
< 1 x 10 -5 and < 1 x 10 -4
(depending on regulator)
< 0.1
(depending on regulator)
< 1 x 10 -6
(depending on regulator)
Larger surface to volume ratio
Larger primary coolant inventory
per MW(th)
Smaller reactor core power density
Large secondary coolant inventory,
e.g., NuScale reactor pool
Taller and broader reactor pressure
vessel or vessel containing core
Facilitates decay heat removal due to large surface area,
particularly for single phase flow
Larger heat sink for natural circulation; larger buoyancy-driven
flows/regioins; reduces requirements for heat removal systems 31)
Larger thermal-hydraulics margins; favourable in long term decay
heat removal, in particular via PSSs
Facilitates passive decay heat removal and
containment cooling 10)
Facilitates decay heat removal via natural circulation,
i.e., higher elevation difference between heat source and sink 30)
| Table 3
SMR design features that challenge conventional safety analysis.
lessons learned and competing philosophies in safety- indesign
of nuclear reactors.
Continuing, Table1 below provides a semi-quantitative
equivalent to Figure 4 but compares INSAG-10 levels,
against the possible SMR target frequencies (a design
merit), short descriptors of the corresponding attributes of
an event or accident, the commonly noted PRA levels, and
the currently known regulatory values for existing plants.
This table is qualitative and simply contrasts different
perspectives that may be used by a SMR designer. We
recognize that small frequency values, say less than 1E-08,
may not hold regulatory meaning and as such, higher
frequencies for levels 1-5 may apply, depending on the
practicality of such values in regulatory review of
submitted SMR/MMR designs and concepts. Finally, as a
measure of confidence in its design, a vendor may assume
a probability 3 orders of magnitude smaller at each level,
except at level 4-and-5.
Table 2 provides five representative, generic events
for which design features and/or design concepts of
recent SMRs (also MMRs), have either greately reduced or
eliminated all together the likelihood of such vulnerabilities,
most often associated with conventional reactor
designs. Here again, through gradual advancements in
conventional reactor safety-in-design, further facilated by
ongoing development in SMRs, safety-in-design and
defence- in-depth have both been embodied in various
SMR designs. The rightmost column gives an example of
the SMR design feature that eliminated the generic
scenarios.
Finally, Table 3 representative design characteristics
or features observed in recent iPWR-type SMRs (left
column), relative to their phenomenolgical impact in
assuring energy removal under many severe accident
scenarios and design vulnerabilties associated with
conventionl reactor designs. Further, for a given SMR design
encompassing a mulitple number of design characteristics
as above, operator intervention is greatly reduced or eliminated
for substantial durations of time, starting from the
initiating event and possibly linked to an additional
sequence of unlikely events. In other words, current SMR
designs anticipate BDBA and catastrophic, external events.
Feature
Small Modular Reactor Safety-in-Design and Perspectives ı Akira Tokuhiro, Chireuding Zeliang and Yi Mi
atw Vol. 66 (2021) | Issue 3 ı May
5 Uphill costs and getting to the end
It is no secret there are major milestones on the path to
realizing any new commercial nuclear power plant. Some
major milestones that come to mind are first criticality and
connection to the electricity grid. New conventional builds
have however become too expensive, relative to other
large infrastructure projects and public spending that
address regional to national priorities. As ramification of
the Fukushima Daiichi earthquake-tsunami-nuclear plant
accident, and examples of cost overruns and delays associated
with large nuclear plant projects persist, “opportunist”
have taken sides – to either support or not support
nuclear energy as a valued energy source option. It is well
known that the merits of nuclear power (as zero to low
carbon) in addressing the negative impacts of climate
change, continue to be argued in public and social media
spaces. Pragmatism regarding public infrastructure need
can become easily mired and disconnected to those elected
and engaged in media. If the authors may inject opinion,
nuclear energy is an energy technology that we have today
and it provides, at minimum, the time needed for society to
reach consensus via change in mindsets, values and beliefs.
This lead author is of the opinion that addressing climate
change is just as much a matter of change needed in how
we live and consume. Energy consumption and its sources
are very much part of the anthropocene.
While various perspective on developments in SMRs/
MMRs can be taken, the authors’ position here is that
getting to the “end” may be the most important.
6 Conclusion
Development of various Small- and Micro-Modular
Reactor concepts, regardless of its point of origin depends
on alignment of both timely and prudent engineering and
design efforts, sustained financial backing during this
effort and, public and/or private stakeholder investments
so that a first-of-a-kind reactor (FOAK) is constructed on
time and at cost, post timely regulatory safety-in-design
approval. Beyond the FOAK plant, expectations are such
that sustained investments and commitments, parallel
reduction in cost with each additional unit constructed in
modular manner.
Here the authors have elaborated on a holistic safety- indesign
perspectives wherein technical features make
design and beyond design basis accidents nearly impossible
(or eliminated), and even under improbable initiating
events, decay heat removal is passive such that it does not
require operator intervention for a defined length of time.
The article also emphasized that completion of the design
and (time) efficient regulatory review of the submitted
design, are of tantamount importance with respect to the
sustained investments, and can determine the fate of any
given SMR/MMR design. It is clear that regional to national
support of nuclear energy, an existing history of reactor
design development, a skilled nuclear and energy sector
workforce, and an existing supply chain are increasingly
expected conditions when considering new nuclear plants.
Finally, early public engagement and confirmation of
gradual public acceptance and social license (nominal
acceptance of nuclear energy) must exist, as identified via
fleeting social media platforms. This is the reality of the
world that we live in today. Let us brave the future of
nuclear energy.
Acknowledgments
The lead author thanks Ontario Tech University and its
Faculty of Energy Systems and Nuclear Science. He also
thanks contributions to recent research on SMRs from
Chireuding Zeliang and Yi Mi. The lead author would
like to thank partial support by the National Science,
Engineering Research Council (of Canada), CREATE
528176-2019, awarded to McMaster University with
Ontario Tech University as partnering institution.
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FEATURE | RESEARCH AND INNOVATION 15
Feature
Small Modular Reactor Safety-in-Design and Perspectives ı Akira Tokuhiro, Chireuding Zeliang and Yi Mi
atw Vol. 66 (2021) | Issue 3 ı May
FEATURE | RESEARCH AND INNOVATION 16
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Authors
Prof. Akira Tokuhiro
Dean and Professor at the Faculty
of Energy Systems and Nuclear Science
Ontario Tech University, Ontario, Canada
Akira.Tokuhiro@ontariotechu.ca
Akira Tokuhiro is Dean and Professor at the Faculty of Energy Systems and Nuclear
Science at Ontario Tech University in Oshawa, Ontario, Canada. His primary R&D
interests are in development of advanced reactor concepts, including small modular
reactors. He joined Ontario Tech University from NuScale Power. He has nuclear and
energy R&D experiences in Switzerland, Japan, USA and Canada.
Yi Mi
Master of Applied Science in Nuclear Engineering
yi.mi@uoit.net
Yi Mi is a young nuclear engineering professional with research experience in
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) and Small Modular Reactor (SMR) Technology
Development. He completed his Master of Applied Science degree in January 2020,
in Nuclear Engineering, at Ontario Tech University His research was on SMRs,
especially integral Pressurized Water Reactors (iPWRs). His focus was on safetyin-design
methodology of small modular reactors (SMR). Specifically, he was
integrating a number of tools and methods such as, system analysis and
probabilistic risk analysis codes (LabVIEW and CAFTA), but including in the
methodology, scaling analysis of iPWR type SMR with passive safety systems.
Also, he studied the similarity and differences among different types of SMRs
including iPWR, Steam Cycle-High Temperature Gas-Cooler Reactor (SC-HTGR),
Fluoride-salt-cooled High Temperature reactor (FHR) and CO2-cooled micro modular
reactor (MMR). Before OntarioTech, hec ompleted a Bachelor of Engineering in
Chemical Engineering in Sichuan University.
Chireuding Zeliang
Junior Engineer/Analyst
Kinectrics Inc., Toronto, Canada
Chireuding Zeliang is a young nuclear engineering professional with research and
work experience in Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) and Small Modular Reactor
(SMR) Technology Development. He currently works with Kinectrics Inc. as a Junior
Engineer/Analyst in the areas of PRA as well as Design Modification of Safety and
Supporting systems in CANDU nuclear plants. Prior to joining Kinectrics, Chireuding
pursued his research career in PRA and SMR Technology Development from University
of Ontario Institute of Technology under a 15 countries collaborative IAEA Coordinated
Research Project on ‘Design and Performance Assessment of Passive Engineered
Safety Features in Advanced SMRs’. He holds two (2) Master’s degree from
University of Ontario Institute of Technology and Indian Institute of Technology
Kanpur, and a Bachelor’s degree from North Eastern Regional Institute of Science
and Technology, India.
Feature
Small Modular Reactor Safety-in-Design and Perspectives ı Akira Tokuhiro, Chireuding Zeliang and Yi Mi
atw Vol. 66 (2021) | Issue 3 ı May
Did you know?
Nuclear Power as Part of Sustainable Energy Policy –
UNECE Working Group Report
In the 2021 report “Application of the United Nations Framework
Classification for Resources and the United Nations Resource
Management System: Use of Nuclear Fuel Resources for Sustainable
Development Entry Pathways” prepared by the Expert
Group on Resource Management (EGRM) of the United Nations
Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) the role of nuclear
energy is explored in the framework of the UN‘s 2030 Agenda
for Sustainable Development. Key insights of this work among
other are:
p “Nuclear energy is an indispensable tool for achieving the
global sustainable development agenda. It has a crucial role
in decarbonizing the energy sector, as well as eliminating
poverty, achieving zero hunger, providing clean water,
affordable energy, economic growth, and industry innovation.
...”
p “Nuclear energy entry pathways for newcomer countries align
with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Nuclear
energy programmes, based on the IAEA‘s Milestones
Approach, support national energy needs, socio-economic,
and environmental goals, and can help countries meet international
climate commitments”
p “Currently available nuclear reactor designs are based on
mature and proven technologies that in some instances have
been licensed to operate for 80 years. ... They provide reliable,
affordable and low-carbon electricity that will support a
country in meeting its sustainable development goals.”
The report states to meet “a need expressed by global decision
makers to better understand the role nuclear energy may play in
the energy transition”. It gives advice on how to foster and embed
the entry into nuclear energy in a larger framework of policies
and recommendations on how to facilitate the implementation of
a nuclear energy programme. The “embedding” policies include
policies for sustainable development and a low-carbon energy
transition, energy market reforms that support long term strategic
investment, policies to improve energy security and resilience
and an industrial development strategy. Typical policies aiming
for a low carbon energy system that foster nuclear power are
deep decarbonization or a net-zero carbon target, technologyneutral
low-carbon energy portfolio standards, coal/fossil fuel
phase- outs, increasing electrification of heat and transport,
decarbonization and modernization of energy-intensive industries.
Regarding the electricity market design the report calls
among other to value energy reliability, resilience and the need
for technologies providing secure, reliable and dispatchable
generation to support the integration of variable renewables. It
proposes as well to include non-power (socio-economic) benefits.
The report makes mention of the assessment in a recent OECD-
NEA report that for a generalized country the most cost-effective
option to achieve a decarbonization target of 50 g CO 2 /kWh is a
mix relying primarily on nuclear energy. Even in cases with ultralow-cost
wind and solar PV an aggressive decarbonization target
would require a share of 40 – 60 percent dispatchable low-carbon
technologies such as nuclear.
When eventually a decision in favour of nuclear power has been
reached, supporting measures for implementation according to
the report are international cooperation, regulatory harmonization,
the development of indigenous capabilities, the delivery of
projects on time and on budget, the proactive engagement of
stakeholders and diversity in the nuclear sector with regard to
gender balance. The report also assesses the issues of sustainable
resource management, socioeconomic and environmental
factors, the nuclear fuel cycle, nuclear waste management
and disposal as well as nuclear technologies and innovation
perspectives among other.
DID YOU EDITORIAL KNOW?
17
200
150
100
Projected Costs of Energy Technologies by
Country (2020) in USD/MWh (Median LCOE)
(Data: IEA)
External Costs of Health effects for
14 Technologies as of 2025,
NEEDS study 2009
Lignite
Lignite post-comb CCS
Lignite oxy-fuel CCS
Coal
Coal post-comb CCS
Coal oxy-fuel CCS
CCGT
in Euro cent/kWh
Source:
Application of the United
Nations Framework
Classification for
Resources and the
United Nations Resource
Management System:
Use of Nuclear Fuel
Resources for Sustainable
Development – Entry
Pathways, Expert
Group on Resource
Management (EGRM),
United Nations Economic
Commission for Europe
(UNECE), Geneva 2021
CCGT CCS
50
0
India United States China Europe Japan
Coal Gas
(CCGT)
Nuclear Onshore
wind
(> = 1MW)
Offshore
wind
Solar PV
(utility scale)
Wind
PV
Solar Thermal
Biomass
Ocean
Nuclear
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6
For further details
please contact:
Nicolas Wendler
KernD
Robert-Koch-Platz 4
10115 Berlin
Germany
E-mail: presse@
KernD.de
www.KernD.de
Did you know?
atw Vol. 66 (2021) | Issue 3 ı May
18
The Nuclear Innovation Policy of Canada
INTERVIEW
Q&A with the Ministry of Natural Resources Canada
Canada pursues an ambitious climate policy and is strongly committed to nuclear innovation. Today Canada is a
front runner in the development, design review and licensing of micro, small modular and advanced modular reactors.
Natural Resources Canada (NRCan) supported this development with Canada’s SMR Roadmap process in 2018 and the
SMR Action Plan which is expected to yield concrete results within this decade. Canadian nuclear innovation policy
aims beyond decarbonization in Canada and the fulfillment of specific Canadian local energy needs. Part of the policy
is to establish new nuclear technologies globally as part of climate solutions and become a prime supplier of such
technologies. The Q&A below with the Ministry of Natural Resources Canada (NRCan) gives you insights on the
Canadian nuclear policy, its consensual making, its goals and the current state of progress.
About the SMR Action Plan
Canada's Small Modular Reactor (SMR) Action Plan is
Canada's plan for the development, demonstration and
deployment of SMRs for multiple applications at home and
abroad.
SMRs are a promising new technology that could unlock a
range of benefits: economic, geopolitical, social, and
environmental. Canada’s SMR Action Plan brings together
essential enabling partners, leveraging their strengths to
lock-in these benefits and lead the world on SMRs.
The Action Plan is the result of a pan-Canadian effort
bringing together key enablers from across Canada, which
are called “Team Canada” – the federal government,
provinces and territories, Indigenous Peoples and communities,
power utilities, industry, innovators, laboratories,
academia, and civil society.
Each of these key enablers has contributed a chapter to the
Action Plan, describing a concrete set of actions they
are taking to seize the SMR opportunity for Canada.
Collectively, these chapters demonstrate the breadth of
engagement on SMRs across the country and outline the
depth of progress and ongoing efforts.
Canada has a long and impressive tradition in the
use of nuclear energy and nuclear technologies.
The CANDU reactors have been successfully
developed and introduced; the only commercial
non-LWR technology with worldwide recognition.
From your point of view, what are the Canadian´s
Government expectations for the nuclear sector?
Small modular reactors (SMRs) are a potential gamechanging
technology that can help Canada meet and
exceed its emissions targets while creating economic
opportunities in a post-pandemic world.
Nuclear energy plays an important role in Canada’s
current energy mix, accounting for 15 percent of our
electricity supply, including approximately 60 percent of
our supply in Ontario and approximately 40 percent in
New Brunswick. The sector also contributes approximately
$17 billion a year to Canada’s gross domestic product, and
accounts for approximately 76,000 jobs across the country,
including over 200 small- and medium-sized enterprises.
SMRs are an opportunity for Canada to produce nonemitting
power where it’s needed. The Government of
Canada recognizes that it has a role to play in supporting
this emerging innovative sub-sector, and in enabling
Canada to seize these benefits.
With the “SMR Road Map” and the recent “SMR
Action Plan” from December 2020 Canada places
itself on the forefront of this technology. What are
the primary objectives of this SMR policy?
SMRs have the potential to support Canada in its
goals to reach net-zero by 2050 by accelerating electricity
decarbonization, moving Canadians off coal and diesel,
and driving deep indus trial decarbonization, all while
creating jobs for Canadians.
Over 100 organizations have submitted chapters to
the Action Plan. For more information on our SMR
Roadmap and Action Plan, see the ‘About’ section here:
https://smractionplan.ca/
What are the main advantages and prospective
applications of this technology?
SMRs are nuclear reactors that are:
p smaller, with a lower up-front capital investment than
traditional nuclear power plants;
p simpler, involving modular designs and a fleet-based
approach to control cost and shorten project schedules;
and
p cheaper to compete with alternatives, enabling new
applications such as hybrid nuclear-renewable energy
systems.
Many SMR designs also offer enhancements to improve
safety, performance, and prevention of accidents.
In Canada, SMRs have three major areas of application:
p on-grid power generation, especially in provinces
phasing out coal in the near future. Utilities want to
replace end-of-life coal plants with non-emitting baseload
plants of similar size;
p on- and off-grid combined heat and power for heavy
industry, such as cement producers; and
p off-grid power, district heating, and desalination in
remote communities. These currently rely almost
exclusively on diesel fuel, which has various limi tations.
Interview
The Nuclear Innovation Policy of Canada ı Ministry of Natural Resources Canada
atw Vol. 66 (2021) | Issue 3 ı May
The “SMR Action Plan” assembles an impressively
broad coalition of stakeholders from many
segments of society. How was it possible to gain
so much and diverse support for the Canadian
SMR endeavor?
Natural Resources Canada ( NRCan) recognizes the
potential for this emerging area of nuclear innovation and
understands the importance of diverse, strategic partnerships.
That’s why, in 2018, NRCan convened Canada’s SMR
Roadmap, a ten-month cross- country conversation on
Canada’s SMR opportunity that brought together
provincial and territorial governments, power utilities,
industry and other interested stakeholders to chart a path
forward for this technology in Canada. The report made
over 50 recommendations, which Canada’s SMR Action
Plan responds to and builds on.
The SMR Action Plan is the result of a pan-Canadian
effort bringing together key enablers from across Canada,
including the federal government, provinces and territories,
Indigenous Peoples and communities, power utilities,
industry, innovators, laboratories, academia, and civil
society. Each of these key enablers contributed a chapter to
the Action Plan, describing a concrete set of actions they
are taking to seize the SMR opportunity for Canada.
Collectively, these chapters demonstrate the breadth of
engagement on SMRs across the country and outline the
depth of progress and ongoing efforts.
INTERVIEW 19
Decarbonization is a global challenge, not a
challenge for single countries or regions. Is the
export and the sharing of know-how of Canadian
nuclear technology to other countries part of the
“SMR Action Plan”?
The SMR Action Plan is Canada’s plan for the development,
demonstration and deployment of SMRs for multiple
applications at home and abroad. Over the past six
decades, the Government of Canada has successfully
established and maintained strategic bilateral and multilateral
partnerships around the globe to advance shared
nuclear energy priorities. With our own power reactor
technology and full-spectrum nuclear capabilities, Canada
belongs to an elite group of Tier 1 nuclear nations.
With demonstrated leadership and expertise in nuclear
science and technology, Canada is in a position to lead
and contribute to international partnerships to support
the development and deployment of SMRs across the
globe.
What is the timeline of SMR projects in Canada and
which are the closest to realization?
The Government of Canada understands the important
role it has to play in advancing SMR technology in time for
Canada to be a world leader and to provide a non-emitting
alternative for jurisdictions that must phase out conventional
coal-fired power plants by 2030. The Government of
Canada also recognizes the leadership of provincial and
territorial governments and power utilities in SMR deployment,
and plans to continue working together to make
Canada a world leader in SMR technology.
Several provinces that must phase out conventional
coal-fired power plants are at a critical decision point for
new electricity sources, and the commercialization of
SMRs could allow these provinces to achieve and lock in a
decarbonized energy mix.
The ongoing projects in Ontario to extend the life of the
Darlington and Bruce nuclear plants have led to a rampedup
nuclear supply chain, creating thousands of new jobs.
| This map shows that all uranium comes from mines in Saskatchewan, but uranium processing,
refining, conversion, fuel fabrication, research and waste management happens across Canada. Nuclear
power stations are located in Ontario and New Brunswick. (Source: Natural Resources Canada)
As these projects end in the late 2020s and early 2030s,
SMR projects could present an opportunity to sustain this
capacity into the long term, as found through Canada’s
SMR Roadmap. In other regions throughout the country,
including Atlantic, Western and Northern Canada, SMRs
are an opportunity to develop a new economic driver
supporting good, middle-class jobs, and the Government
of Canada supports efforts to enable all regions to benefit
from Canada’s SMR oppor tunity.
Through Canada’s SMR Action Plan, SaskPower identified
that they are evaluating several potential low
emissions pathways, including the deployment of nuclear
power from SMRs in the 2032 – 2042 timeframe, with a
view to limiting the deployment of new natural gas
generation in the 2025 – 2040 timeframe.
We are putting significant effort into building a strong
foundation so that we are ready to unleash the full
potential of SMRs, and projects in Canada are currently
proceeding through three streams:
p Stream 1 refers to near-term, grid-scale SMRs. Ontario
Power Generation has announced that it is working
towards a new grid-size SMR at its Darlington Nuclear
Station by about 2028.
p Stream 2 refers to the development of two advanced
Generation IV SMR designs. This is being led by New
Brunswick, and NB Power envisions technology
demonstration at the Point Lepreau site in the early to
mid-2030s.
p Stream 3 refers to a new class of micro SMRs, with
potential to replace the use of diesel for remote communities
and mines. Canadian Nuclear Laboratories (CNL)
launched an Invitation for Demonstration in 2018, to
invite SMR vendors to propose demonstration projects
for siting at an AECL-owned, CNL-managed site.
Interview
The Nuclear Innovation Policy of Canada ı Ministry of Natural Resources Canada
atw Vol. 66 (2021) | Issue 3 ı May
INTERVIEW 20
| Figure 1
Electricity generation by source, Canada 1990-2019. (Source: www.iea.org/countries/canada)
| Figure 2
Nuclear electricity generation, Canada 1990-2019. (Source: www.iea.org/countries/canada)
At least, an adopted regulatory framework is
necessary for SMRs. Until now, which milestones
have been achieved and is there any international
cooperation between governments and institutions
on the subject?
Canada has a world-renowned regulator committed to
safety and open to innovation, as well as a comprehensive
plan to manage nuclear waste in the long-term. This
combination of enabling elements, coupled with our
commitment to nuclear excellence, means Canada is
poised to lead the world.
The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC)
offers optional pre- licensing engagement with potential
applicants, as well as a pre-licensing vendor design review
service, to help identify any significant barriers to licensing
SMR technologies in Canada and thereby minimize potential
impediments during the licensing process. 12 SMR
design vendors are currently engaged with the CNSC in
the vendor design process and are at various stages of
review.
On international collaboration:
In 2019, the CNSC signed a memorandum of cooperation
with the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
that could support more efficient reviews of SMRs.
The CNSC and the United Kingdom (UK) Office for
Nuclear Regulation (ONR) recently (Oct 2020) signed two
agreements to explore further collaboration and to more
effectively regulate an ever-changing nuclear sector.
A cornerstone of SMR technology to reach broad
distribution as energy technology is serialization
and the expected cost degression by number of
installations. Are there already specific plans to
realize this?
Canada’s SMR Roadmap recognizes that as the technology
matures, the cost of individual units will decrease. The
Roadmap identifies several factors that will determine
how quickly these costs decline, such as:
p how many SMRs are built;
p construction experience; and
p the degree of standardization within SMR fleets.
A major topic in discussions about nuclear power is
waste management. What is the state of affairs in
Canada particularly with regard to final disposal?
The health, safety, and security of Canadians and the
environment is the government’s top priority when it
comes to regulating nuclear energy and materials. The
Government of Canada is committed to ensuring that safe
solutions are in place for managing radioactive waste now
and into the future.
Currently, all radioactive waste in Canada is safely
managed in facilities licensed by the Canadian Nuclear
Safety Commission (CNSC) – Canada’s independent
nuclear regulator.
The Nuclear Waste Management Organization
( NWMO) is responsible for implementing Canada’s plan
for the safe, long-term management of used nuclear fuel –
including that created using new or emerging technologies.
The Government of Canada is committed to continuous
improvement with respect to ensuring that safe solutions
are in place for managing radioactive waste. For this
reason, Canada launched an open and transparent engagement
process to modernize Canada’s radioactive waste
policy. Between now and fall 2021, the Government of
Canada is conducting a review of Canada’s Radioactive
Waste Policy. As part of this process, officials are engaging
with stakeholders and talking to Canadians, including
Indigenous peoples, to ensure all voices are heard.
What are the differences for waste management
between existing nuclear power plants and the
smaller scaled SMR based nuclear power plants?
Will the SMR path require changes to the waste
management strategy or will it be part of existing
concepts?
All radioactive waste in Canada is being safely managed
according to international standards at facilities that are
licensed and monitored by the CNSC. Depending on the
waste type and other characteristics, owners of waste from
SMR technologies may be able to use existing concepts or
may need to implement new solutions for their radioactive
waste.
Author
Nicolas Wendler
Head of Media Relations and Political Affairs
KernD (Kerntechnik Deutschland e.V.)
nicolas.wendler@kernd.de
Interview
The Nuclear Innovation Policy of Canada ı Ministry of Natural Resources Canada
atw Vol. 66 (2021) | Issue 3 ı May
“I am Personally Very Excited About
Canadas’s Positioning as a Tier One
Nuclear Power and also as a First Mover
in Small Modular Reactors“
Interview with John Gorman ı President & CEO of Canadian Nuclear Association
INTERVIEW 21
The Canadian Nuclear Association represents an
established nuclear industry which has decades of
experience with nuclear technology. Can you give
us a short overview of the nuclear sector in Canada?
Let me start by saying that Canada is in a quite unique
situation in terms of having both a vibrant nuclear ecosystem
that is being fueled by the refurbishments of
existing plants in our largest province of Ontario and in
turn that is being used as a platform to do all sorts of
innovation in Small Modular Reactors but also in other
areas like medical isotopes. So, the combination of these
two things, the healthy nuclear ecosystem and the
innovation that we have going on in Small Modular
Reactors is positioning Canada to provide climate change
Small Modular
Reactors will help us
continue that track
record and help others.
solutions, the decarbonization
of very important
sectors of our economy
here in Canada and by
extension the ability to be
a first mover in helping
other nations around the
world lower their GHGs. So, I am personally very excited
about Canadas’s positioning as a tier one nuclear power
and also as a first mover in Small Modular Reactors.
In terms of actual statistics, we are a tier one nation
being in this business for more than sixty years, with a very
respected regulator and a highly respected track record in
terms of the efficient and safe operation
of nuclear plants. We currently
have 12 different SMR technologies
being evaluated and going through
the review and licensing process in
Canada making us a world leader in
terms of the number of technologies
and the speed with which we are developing them. CANDU
technology is deployed in seven countries around the
world and is still very actively involved in existing markets
and developing markets. A great example of that is
Romania, where they are very likely going to refurbish
John Gorman
Retiring coal in Ontario
became and still is north
Americas single largest
carbon reduction initiative.
President & CEO of Canadian Nuclear Association
John Gorman is President & CEO of Canadian Nuclear Association, past President
& CEO of the Canadian Solar Industries Association (CanSIA) and a Director on the
board of the Energy Council of Canada (ECC). John served as Canada’s Designate
to the International Energy Agency’s Executive Committee (PVPS) and was a
Founder of the Canadian Council on Renewable Electricity (CanCORE). He’s using
this experience to secure a leading role for nuclear energy at the heart of Canada’s
energy transition. Before joining CanSIA, he was the Senior Vice President of
Empower Energies, an innovative, global integrator of energy systems. He has
served as a director on the boards of numerous community and corporate
organizations, including one of the nation’s largest electric utilities. John has been
recognized as one of Canada’s CLEAN50 and is the recipient of the “40 Under 40”
business award for excellence in business practices. He was awarded the
designation of Climate Project Ambassador by Nobel Laureate Al Gore in 2008.
their two existing CANDU units and complete the
construction of two additional units. So, Canada while
being a smaller nation is a world leader in nuclear and we
have accomplished some amazing things here from a
climate perspective which I am eager to talk to you about
and Small Modular Reactors will help us continue that
track record and help others.
You already mentioned the refurbishment programs.
As I know of this is a quite unique feature,
partially after long term shut downs. To understand
this process, what determined the decisions about
the refurbishment in both cases, i.e., the shut
downs earlier and then the refurbishments and
long-term operation later?
This is an amazing story, that I hardly ever get asked about,
so I am pleased to talk about it. Let me start with the punch
line. Ontario, the largest province in Canada decided in the
early 2000s to phase out all of our coal fired electricity.
When we did that, coal fired electricity was providing
about 25 % of Ontarios electricity, it was creating smog
days and health problems and obviously
emitting a lot of emissions. We replaced
89 % of that coal fired electricity by
bringing back online two units that had
been shut down. So, in the process we
were able to retire coal very quickly and
retiring coal in Ontario became and still is
north Americas single largest carbon reduction initiative.
That’s the punch line. More specifically in 1997 Ontario
Hydro, the utility, and the government made the decision
to shut down two of our units because there was no
demand for this electricity, there was a surplus. But by the
Interview
“I am Personally Very Excited About Canadas’s Positioning as a Tier One Nuclear Power and also as a First Mover in Small Modular Reactors“ ı John Gorman
atw Vol. 66 (2021) | Issue 3 ı May
INTERVIEW 22
early 2000s supply had become tight, we needed more
electricity and at the same time we made the decision to
phase out coal fired electricity. We addressed both of those
issues by restarting four units and subsequently made the
decision to refurbish a number of our units. We are likely
going to close down two of them in the mid-2020s but we
will continue to operate the majority of the 18 units in
Ontario. So, this is the story: surplus of generation in 1997
made the decision for shut downs, then as more generation
was needed and the phase out of coal was decided we
brought them back on and we undertook this refurbishment.
At this moment the refurbishment is the single
largest infrastructure project in Canada. It is a 26-billiondollar
refurbishment that is taking place over ten years
and it is employing a lot of people and driving a lot of
innovation.
This brings me to a follow-up question: when I
remember the discussions, we had in Germany
about longer operation of nuclear power plants in
2009 and 2010 there was a fierce opposition of the
green party and of environmental organizations.
Were there discussions of that kind and organizations
parties or movements opposed to the
refurbishment of nuclear power plants in Canada?
There are certainly detractors of nuclear power in Canada.
We continue as an industry globally and in Canada to be
exposed to that sort of stigma and misinformation and not
fact-based attitudes towards nuclear. But at the end of the
day Canada has an outstanding record in terms of the safe
operation and managements of its fleet. Canadians
recognize that we are a world leader
in nuclear power and clearly in the
end the arguments and support in
favor of refurbishment outweighed
the detractors. Our country is very
large, there are ten different provinces
which are responsible for their own electricity supply so it
becomes a very regional discussion rather than a national
discussion. This might be a key difference between Canada
and Germany. There is one thing that we know for certain:
the more people know about nuclear the more supportive
they are. In the provinces where we do have nuclear power
like New Brunswick or Ontario or in Saskatchewan where
there are uranium operations, these regions are very comfortable
with nuclear or at least much more supportive
than other provinces.
Nuclear technology is not just about nuclear power
plants, there are also very important other sectors.
One of them is isotope production for many
purposes including medical ones. In 2018 a major
production facility in Canada that was important
globally, the NRU reactor, was taken out of production
and important capacity was lost. How was
it compensated for or was it compensated for?
It has been compensated for in a very interesting way.
Firstly, the NRU had to be taken down because it served its
lifespan. But we continue to have radioisotope production
in our existing conventional power reactors and in other
research reactors as well as particle accelerators such as
TRIUMF and Canadian Light Source
in western Canada. Despite the end of
operation of NRU, we still have other
research reactors and particle accelerators
that are fulfilling that need.
However, it has also spurred real
The more people know
about nuclear the more
supportive they are.
innovation here in Canada using our existing CANDU
reactors. So, what we are seeing is that our two largest
operators, Bruce Power and Ontario Power Generation
have partnered with companies in the private sectors such
as BWXT and isoGEN to produce isotopes from conventional
reactors. This is really fascinating. There is no need
to interrupt the operation of the units in any way. Ontario
Power Generation and BWXT are beginning to produce
Molybdeneum-99 at the Darlington Nuclear Association
and Bruce Power, BWXT and Isogen similarly are beginning
to produce Lutetium-177 for cancer therapy. At the
same time, we continue to produce a large portion of the
worlds supply of isotopes through our other assets. This
includes more than 70 per cent of the global supply of
Cobalt-60 and about 60 per cent of the world market for
Iodine-129 is produced here as well. We have adapted and
used innovation to replace the isotope production that was
shut down.
Let’s get back to power, the major question for
many countries nowadays given all the climate
discussions and climate targets. What is the longterm
perspective for nuclear power in Canada and
how is it included in Canadian or provincial energy
and climate strategies?
The long-term perspective for nuclear power in Canada is
extremely bright for the reasons we have already spoken
about. The refurbishment of our CANDU power plants in
Ontario is the largest infrastructure program in Canada. It
is going to keep those plants operating well into the 2060s
and they are providing 15 per cent of Canadas clean
electricity and a healthy nuclear ecosystem
that is the foundation for other work that we
are doing in Small Modular Reactors and
isotopes. With this very strong foundation of
the refurbishments going on with a large work
force and innovation we have become a first
mover in Small Modular Reactors. The government has
started funding a number of the SMR-technologies that are
under review and licensing and we expect to see more
funding announcements in a short number of weeks
coming. We also have an extraordinary level of coordination
between government and industry and the provinces
in the development and deployment of Small Modular
Reactors. And this is quite exceptional and exciting: four of
our provinces have signed a Memorandum of Understanding
on the development and deployment of SMR. The
federal government has come out and identified nuclear as
being needed and essential for net zero in 2050, our
national goal. So, we have both the federal government
identifying nuclear as being essential to reaching net zero
2050 and four provinces and their utilities who have
agreed on a business plan for the development and deployment
of SMR in their regions. When you combine this with
our very progressive regulator, the Canadian Nuclear
Safety Commission, which is very well suited to evaluate
and work with innovative technologies much more so than
some of the very prescriptive regulators we see in other
places, it really becomes a competitive advantage for us.
In fact, when you look at Canadas commitment around
climate change which is very aggressive with the objective
The federal government has come
out and identified nuclear as being
needed and essential for net zero
in 2050, our national goal.
of net zero in 2050 where
nuclear is acknowledged as a
key element of that energy
plan and we have both a long
term set of operating assets
producing 15 per cent of our
Interview
“I am Personally Very Excited About Canadas’s Positioning as a Tier One Nuclear Power and also as a First Mover in Small Modular Reactors“ ı John Gorman
atw Vol. 66 (2021) | Issue 3 ı May
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INTERVIEW 23
electricity and a world leading advantage on the development
of SMR, so the long-term perspectives of nuclear in
Canada are assured.
To realize the opportunities that exist with SMRs
regulatory issues are quite important. They need
certain adaptations compared to larger units and
apparently this is working well in Canada as I can
conclude from what you said. But is there also work
going on to achieve some standardized regulations
on SMR designs that are in the pipeline, are you
cooperating with the US and the UK and maybe at
some point with the European Union too because
there probably soon will be an international market
for this type of plants.
You identified one of the most important issues here.
Globally, to realize the benefits of SMR will need some
standardization in terms of regulation. As you know this is
a departure from a long history of nuclear power being a
very nationally driven sector. Each country focused on a
particular type of technology and set up a regulatory
framework for this technology. Canada is a good example
for this with its CANDU- technology. Of course, SMR
depend on being mass produced and manufactured
in manufacturing settings, making it more of a product
and commodity. And because of their smaller size these
units cannot afford the regulatory expense of needing to
be certified in every country that they enter into. So,
finding regulatory harmonization is key to SMR success
going forward. What we have done here in Canada as the
Canadian Nuclear Association is to begin working with our
sister organization in the US, the NEI, and we have set up a
US-Canada regulatory task force that is looking at these
issues. But more importantly our regulators, the CNSC
here in Canada and the NRC in the United States have
signed a Memorandum of Cooperation and they are
working on regulatory harmonization. So, we recognized
the need here in north America for this standardization. At
the same time, we have reached out to the Nuclear Industry
Association in the UK and we are working with them as do
our governments on these same issues. We have now
signed a Memorandum of Understanding with our
counter part in Europe, Foratom, and we will be talking
about similar issues. But right now, the most developed
push on this front is between Canada and the United States
and has started with the UK and we hope to expand this to
Europe as well.
Is this the major aspect of the MoU with Foratom or
are there other objectives too?
There are other objectives as well. Firstly, the nuclear
cooperation between Canada and Europe goes back for
decades and specifically Canadian CANDU reactors have
been in service in Romania for nearly thirty years. So, this
MoU at the highest level addresses the need for greater
dialogue and the exploration of the role of nuclear in
effective environmental stewardship and a subtext to that
would be this work that we have to do in rationalizing
regulation around SMR. But the MoU has essentially three
components to it: one is around advocacy and trying to
advocate for more explicit inclusion for nuclear energy in
Canada and the EU and that includes the idea of sustainable
finance, taxonomy which I know that the European Union
is grappling with right now. The second point is that we
Interview
“I am Personally Very Excited About Canadas’s Positioning as a Tier One Nuclear Power and also as a First Mover in Small Modular Reactors“ ı John Gorman
atw Vol. 66 (2021) | Issue 3 ı May
INTERVIEW 24
want to support innovation, particularly in SMR and
advanced reactors which is something we flagged in the
MoU and the regulatory work also falls into that. And we
also want to find initiatives where we can work together to
promote nuclear as a clean source of electricity that is
needed for climate goals.
But what I wanted to say about this idea of taxonomy
and that nuclear is clean and the importance of that: the
nuclear industry in Canada
The nuclear industry in Canada like in
other nations has had to work very
hard with stake holders and policy
makers to explicitly acknowledge
nuclear power as clean energy and
we have succeeded in that in Canada.
like in other nations has had to
work very hard with stake
holders and policy makers to
explicitly acknowledge nuclear
power as clean energy and
we have succeeded in that
in Canada. So, recently just
before Christmas the federal
government explicitly identified
nuclear as clean and essential to net zero 2050. And
for us this has been important as we see in this increasingly
carbon constrained world all of the policies and
funding programs are increasingly directed toward clean
technologies. We worked very hard for that and I am
hoping that we can share some of the experiences and
lessons that we learned here in Canada around this issue
with Europe through our collaboration with Foratom.
A last time back to the SMR projects: How far advanced
are the projects trying to demonstrate the
feasibility of new kinds of reactor designs?
SMR are going to enter the market in Canada much sooner
than people expect. Our largest utility, Ontario Power
Generation, has announced that it will be net zero by 2040.
But as part of that it will connect its first SMR at its Darlington
Facility in 2028. SaskPower, Saskatchewan Power, is
working in partnership with them to roll out multiple units
in Saskatchewan with the same technology right on the
heels with OPG. And we have other technologies, including
very small reactor technologies, that are projecting that
they will be in the market even sooner, by 2026. There is an
amazing story here about the application of very small reactors
in a number of Canadas most important sectors. The
market demand in Canada for very small reactors is about
5.3 billion Dollars between 2030 and 2040. And much of
that market demand is in the mining industry using SMRs
for their high temperature heat, to generate electricity but
also to produce hydrogen. Many of these SMRs are going to
be used in heavy industry like cement and steel, fertilizer
production, in the oil sands, which is such an important
part of our economy. These SMRs are going to be used to
generate high temperature steam to clean up the extraction
process for oil and gas.
So, Canada is not only a first mover in SMRs but it has a
set of industries that are able to take advantage of the
unique capabilities of SMRs while decarbonizing those
sectors and ensuring that Canadas natural resource sector
and the materials that we produce are going to be
competitive in this increasingly carbon constrained world.
It is really a beautiful dynamic that we have here in Canada
of being able to develop a handful of SMR technologies
that are going to be tailor made to address the particular
GHG reduction issues in our industries. And our hope of
course is that we will be able to use those technologies to
help other nations decarbonize their heavy industries and
natural resource sectors so that we can contribute to the
world moving to a low carbon economy.
And finally, I want to come to nuclear waste
management. What are Canadas plans for waste
management?
Readers of atw surely will know that the nuclear industry
is a very responsible manager of nuclear waste and that the
facts on spent fuel are actually quite a positive story. We
are the only energy generating sector that is entirely
responsible for the all of the byproducts that it produces
and we prepay for its safe management
and storage. We don’t emit
pollution to the environment and
we produce so little spent fuel
because uranium is so power dense.
We have been operating for
60 years providing 15 per cent of
the nations electricity and we
barely fill up a few hockey rings to
the floor boards with spent fuel. It
is exceptionally well managed, no one has ever been
harmed, let alone killed by spent fuel. If you look at our
entire life cycle from uranium mining to storing the spent
fuel and all of our byproducts, we have the lowest carbon
footprint of any electricity generating source, only wind is
comparable. We have an amazing story to tell on that front
that people don’t understand.
But we also recognize that we need a permanent
solution for storing the waste. We have been managing the
waste exceptionally well to this point but especially in
Canada where we are extending the life of our nuclear
plants for another 40 years and because of the advent of
SMR we need a permanent storage for the waste. So, there
are currently two communities, two land-locked areas that
have been short listed for a deep geological repository,
South Bruce in southern Ontario and Ignace in northwestern
Ontario and we have a nuclear waste management
organization that is overseeing the site selection for
this area. We are going to follow the example of Finland
here which is on track to have their DGR by 2023 and we
are going to continue managing our spent fuel until that
deep geological repository is completed. Another thing
that we are excited about is that a number of the technologies
that are reviewed and hopefully licensed here in
Canada will also be reusing the spent fuel from the CANDU
reactors as their fuel which adds some additional avenues
for properly storing or using the spent fuel.
Interviewer
Nicolas Wendler
Head of Media Relations and Political Affairs
KernD (Kerntechnik Deutschland e.V.)
nicolas.wendler@kernd.de
Interview
“I am Personally Very Excited About Canadas’s Positioning as a Tier One Nuclear Power and also as a First Mover in Small Modular Reactors“ ı John Gorman
atw Vol. 66 (2021) | Issue 3 ı May
Nuclear Power is Dead,
Long Live Nuclear Energy!
Simon Wakter
The supposed demise of nuclear power has long been asserted by those opposed to the technology. But as the world
struggles to meet the Paris Agreement climate goals of limiting global temperature increase by 1.5 °C to 2 °C compared
to pre-industrial levels, neither the historic contribution nor the important future role of nuclear energy should be
ignored. Nuclear is an indispensable tool to meet the dual challenge of meeting an increasing energy demand while
phasing out fossil fuels. To paraphrase the speech of Robert Cecil at the final meeting of the League of Nations – nuclear
power is dead, long live nuclear energy!
Many countries have made pledges to decrease emissions
or set net zero goals by the year 2050. This leaves just
under 30 years to dramatically reduce emissions, while
global energy use is expected to continue rising. As pledges
are often phrased in terms of reductions in relation to 1990
emission levels, it also means that just over 30 years have
passed since the ‘benchmark’ year. In those 30 years, the
share of fossil fuels in both electricity and total energy
consumption has remained virtually unchanged, at around
65 percent and 85 percent respectively. The share of
nuclear energy in electricity production today is around
ten percent, a drop from a high of 17.5 percent in 1996. The
drop in nuclear production is only in terms of the share of
total production – nuclear electricity production has
actually increased in absolute terms, but world electricity
demand has roughly doubled in the same period. Total
energy demand has increased by about 60 percent.
Higher energy and electricity consumption is correlated
with higher development and human welfare indicators.
The increased access to and use of electricity has contributed
greatly to the improved standards of living for
hundreds of millions of people. But many people still lack
access to electricity and much of the worlds electricity and
energy consumption is still fossil fuelled. As has become
abundantly clear, energy production must increase but
must also be clean.
Globally, the combined share of low carbon technologies
amounts to approximately 35 percent of total
electricity production. Nuclear accounts for 30 percent of
this low carbon electricity, second only to hydro power’s
46 percent. In advanced economies, nuclear energy
supplies 40 percent of low carbon electricity. 1,2 Within the
EU, just over half of electricity is produced from low carbon
technologies and nuclear supplies almost half of this clean
electricity. 3
The world now faces the enormous, twofold challenge
of transitioning to clean energy while meeting the increase
in energy and electricity demand.
| Figure 1
Low carbon electricity generation in advanced economies in 2018. 1,2
added on top of the daily trials of coronavirus lockdown.
The lack of electricity, frequent blackouts and interruptions
to internet and running water made working or
studying from home virtually impossible.
In Japan, a cold spell coupled with an already tight LNG
market in Asia brought power prices to record highs.
Intraday power prices reached over ¥250/kWh, or roughly
€2/kWh, with spot prices topping out at around
¥155/kWh, or €1,20/kWh.
In Texas, arctic temperatures brought electricity
demand surging toward all-time highs and prices topped
out at over $9,000/MWh, or €7,700/MWh. When power
plants (primarily gas power plants) dropped from the grid
due to the cold, grid operators initiated rotating outages
which then turned into lasting blackouts for millions of
peoples.
Both in Texas and in Japan, utilities as well as consumers
have been hit by the record breaking prices leading to
extraordinary corporate and personal financial difficulties.
25
SERIAL | MAJOR TRENDS IN ENERGY POLICY AND NUCLEAR POWER
Energy enables modern lives
Access to affordable energy is the foundation of modern,
civilised societies. The ability to use energy when and
where it is needed enables almost every other human
activity. This has been illustrated and reinforced by events
during the past year. In Libya, already strenuous conditions
have worsened through prolonged power outages
Electricity is key
The key to solving a large part of the decarbonisation challenge
is electricity. Dramatic cost reductions in wind and
solar production has redrawn the map and enabled a large
scale roll out of clean electricity only ever before seen in
the nuclear energy programmes of countries such as Sweden
and France.
1 Nuclear Power in a Clean Energy System, International Energy Agency (IEA), May 2019
2 European Commission Joint Research Centre, Technical assessment of nuclear energy with respect to the ‘do no significant harm’ criteria of Regulation (EU) 2020/852
(‘Taxonomy Regulation’), Petten, 2021, JRC124193
3 Eurostat, Electricity production by source, EU-27, 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Electricity_generation_statistics_–_first_results
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Electrification also brings with it great potential for
improvements in efficiency. For example, the electrification
of transportation through electric vehicles offers
significant efficiency improvements compared to fossil
fuelled cars.
Large scale production of hydrogen through electrolysis
enables the decarbonisation of several industry processes,
such as iron production. Direct electrification through
Electric Arc Furnaces, EAF, enables fossil free steel
production.
It’s a power grid, not an energy grid
Electrification is a versatile tool for decarbonisation, but
places high demands on the power grid. Analysing and
designing systems based on the required energy on a yearly
basis is not sufficient.
Before transmission of power through alternating
current was discovered by Nikola Tesla at the end of the
19 th century, so called flatrod systems (German: Kunstgestänge
or Stangenwerk) were used to transfer power.
Flatrod systems, made up of timbers which were tied or
joined together, made it possible to transfer power both
horizontally and vertically over distances up to a few
kilometres.
Similarly to the flat rod system swinging back and forth,
alternating current is based on the current constantly
changing direction. Just like the flatrods, it is the oscillations
that transmit the power. In Europe, the oscillation
takes place 50 times per second and must always stay at
this constant frequency. A multitude of instrumentation
and control systems are in place to make sure the system is
always balanced – the production and load must always be
equal.
The economic market for trading, called the power
market, is not really a market for power but rather for
energy. Energy becomes a commodity to be produced,
distributed and consumed. This step away from the
physical concept of energy enables competition but also
brings difficulties.
In order to function properly, and in turn enable the
market, the power grid also requires balancing and
ancillary services. Such services may consist of inertia,
reactive power or short circuit power, all of which have so
far been provided largely for free by large generators such
as nuclear power plants. While markets exist for some
services, e.g. for frequency reserve measures, it is likely
that new markets for such services will be necessary in the
future to ensure the functioning of the power system. 4
Nuclear can already provide many of these services
today and with the right incentives it is possible to expand
the services, e.g. through integrating thermal storage with
molten salt in advanced reactors.
It’s not all electricity
Electrification is key to decarbonisation, but does not
paint the full picture. Some sectors, e.g. energy-intensive
industry and heavy-duty transportation (such as long-haul
aviation, maritime shipping and some road freight), are
| Figure 2
Global greenhouse gas emissions by sector. 4 This is shown for the year 2016 – global greenhouse gas emissions were 49.4 billion tonnes CO 2 eq.
4 Ritchie, H.; Our World in Data – Sector by sector: where do global greenhouse gas emissions come from? https://ourworldindata.org/ghg-emissions-by-sector
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more challenging to decarbonise and will require greater
effort and novel approaches. These sectors, heavy industry
and heavy-duty transports, make up almost one-third of
global carbon emission.
Iron and steel production makes up seven percent of
greenhouse gas emissions. The emissions stem from two
sources – from the fossil fuels used to heat and power the
process, and from the coking coal used as raw material in
the reduction process itself. Low carbon energy can replace
the fossil fuels used to power the process, and clean
hydrogen can replace the coking coal used for the reduction
of oxygen in the iron oxide. Hydrogen is also an important
feedstock in ammonia and fertilizer production as well as
for refining fossil fuels, biofuels or plastics. This hydrogen
demand, today around 70 million tons per year, is currently
met almost exclusively by production from fossil fuels.
The production of cement produces around three
percent of global greenhouse gas emissions. Again, the
emissions stem from two sources. In this case roughly
60 percent of emissions are inherent to the calcining
process itself, while the remaining 40 percent arise from
the use of fossil fuels for heating the production process.
Electrification and fossil free fuels can replace the fossil
fuels, but emissions inherent to the calcining process will
require carbon capture technologies.
A large part of transportation can most likely be solved
through electrification, but heavy-duty transportation will
require higher density energy storage or fuels. This could
be in the form of hydrogen, ammonia or other electrofuels
such as synthetic hydrocarbons which can be made
through the Fischer-Tropsch process, combining carbon
monoxide (from carbon capture) and hydrogen into liquid
hydrocarbons.
Energy use in buildings is another major sector, behind
almost one-fifth of emissions. Although electrification is a
major part of the solution, a large share of the property
stock relies on fossil gas for heating. Replacing gas boilers
with ground source or air source heat pumps could prove
prohibitively expensive – especially for those in energy
poverty, already struggling with a “heat or eat”-dilemma.
Existing grids, built for gas heated buildings, would
struggle to serve the increased power demand during cold
or hot spells. Hydrogen, either replacing or mixed into existing
gas pipelines, and district heating have both been
proposed as solutions.
The scale of energy use in buildings is often overlooked.
For example, final energy consumption for heating in
German residential buildings is roughly equal to the total
German electricity production, approximately 560 TWh
per year. Since 95 % of this heating demand is met with
fossil fuels, heating the country’s 40 million homes
produces almost ten percent of Germany’s greenhouse gas
emissions. Even partially meeting this energy demand
with clean hydrogen would require an extraordinary
amount of electricity for electrolysis – hydrogen from fossil
methane is not carbon neutral, especially when accounting
for flaring and fugitive emissions – meaning electrification
and district heating may prove to be more sensible
solutions. Nuclear CHP plants could provide cities with
both electricity and district heating, which is already done
at several locations today. District heating reactors, that
produce only heat and not power, are also being developed
and constructed.
All in all, industry and transport together with energy
use in buildings make up almost 60 percent of global
emissions. Nuclear is an important tool in these “hard-toabate”
sectors.
Small solutions to big problems
A new wave of modern small and advanced modular
reactors are currently being designed, licensed and built
all over the world. These reactors have increased passive
safety features, reduced or no emergency planning zone
and significant potential for cost savings.
To compensate for lack of economies of scale, otherwise
associated with larger reactors, smaller reactors take
advantage of simpler construction principles, modularity
and standardisation to decrease cost. The smaller size also
decreases initial capital expenditure, construction time
and overall risk. This creates a feedback loop which works
to decrease the overall cost of capital, which for traditional
large scale reactors can account for up to 70 percent of
total costs.
More is more when it comes to heat output
Many advanced reactors work at significantly higher
temperatures than conventional reactors. Where today’s
boiling and pressurised water reactors work at temperatures
around 300 °C, advanced reactors cooled with
molten lead, sodium or gas work at temperatures between
500 and 700 °C. This means higher efficiencies and opens
up a range of new applications.
Advanced nuclear reactors, providing high temperature
heat and electricity now become an attractive option for
hydrogen production, process heat, district heating,
desalination and carbon capture through direct air capture
(DAC). Nuclear energy can be integrated across the
manufacturing process in many applications, e.g. for
production of iron and steel where high temperature
electrolysis, electricity production and large amounts of
high temperature heat can dramatically reduce emissions
and improve efficiencies.
Coal power remains largely unthreatened as the world’s
main source of electricity production, with global output
increasing to over 4,630 TWh in 2020 5 . One solution, as
explored in an article by Qvist et al. 6 , is “retrofit decarbonisation”
– a term which includes repowering of coal
units with low-carbon energy technology. The prospect of
| Figure 3
Steam temperature comparison, nuclear and coal power plants. 6
SERIAL | MAJOR TRENDS IN ENERGY POLICY AND NUCLEAR POWER 27
5 Ember, Global Electricity Review 2021, https://ember-climate.org/project/global-electricity-review-2021/
6 Qvist, S.; Gładysz, P.; Bartela, Ł.; Sowiżdżał, A. Retrofit Decarbonization of Coal Power Plants—A Case Study for Poland. Energies 2021, 14, 120.
https://doi.org/10.3390/en14010120
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SERIAL | MAJOR TRENDS IN ENERGY POLICY AND NUCLEAR POWER 28
advanced reactors capable of high temperature output,
suitable for existing coal powered steam turbines, and the
fact that more than half of the world’s 2,000 GWe coal fleet
is less than 14 years old combine to create a compelling
argument.
Integrating and reusing the existing site, equipment
(cooling water systems and steam cycle) and grid connection
could lower upfront capital costs by 28 – 35 percent
and levelized cost of electricity by 9 – 28 percent compared
to a greenfield installation.
Standardisation, harmonisation, cooperation
To realise the potential of small and advanced modular
reactors it is essential to avoid unnecessary, countryspecific
design modifications or changes to documentation.
Policymakers and regulators must work to ensure
stability and predictability in the licensing process as well
as to increase international harmonisation of licensing
requirements.
Redesigning SMRs for each country would quickly
become prohibitively expensive, which means licensing
regimes need to be performance-based rather than
prescriptive. Licensing should also be risk-informed and
technology-inclusive. In the cases where that is difficult or
not possible it is important that regulators agree on
terminology and definitions, possibly through a taxonomy
of licensing requirements. One example is the definition of
active and passive systems, which has varying definitions
between different countries and different organisations.
Increasing standardisation and harmonisation through
international cooperation is a low cost, no-regrets option
for countries wishing to expand the use of nuclear energy.
Enabling nuclear energy
Nuclear energy is a flexible solution which can help solve
many challenges – providing electricity and heat for
several applications ranging from industrial process heat,
through hydrogen production to carbon capture and
production of electrofuels. Nuclear also provides firm
power and grid stability, aiding in the integration of
variable renewable energy sources.
In addition to contributing to the historic and future
decarbonisation of energy use in the west, expansion of
nuclear energy is a promising solution for economies in
transition and developing economies seeking to improve
living standards while reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
Over 30 “nuclear new-comers” have concrete plans to
develop nuclear energy projects in the coming decade.
Recent research by Kenton de Kirby and Jessica Lovering
offer important insights and lessons on how to enable the
success of nuclear energy in emerging markets.
In their report 7 , de Kirby and Lovering find that local
opposition to projects in emerging markets differs from the
anti-nuclear movement of the 1970’s which, in highincome
countries, has protested nuclear on ideological and
absolutist grounds. The authors warn against projecting
fundamental anti-nuclear sentiments onto activists in
newcomer countries. Instead, local opposition is largely
based in a worry about livelihoods, lack of local economic
benefit and government corruption as well as the government’s
inability to respond effectively in the event of an
accident.
To gain public trust and consent, stakeholders must
establish strategies and take concrete action to improve
transparency, involve the local community and work to
understand activist’s concerns – all while addressing
perceived risks and building trust in regulators and
relevant institutions. The report goes on to offer concrete
ideas and best practices for effective engagement with
local communities.
Nuclear power is dead,
long live nuclear energy!
From harmonisation and standardisation of licensing
requirements in established nuclear energy countries to
stakeholder engagement in emerging economies, nuclear
energy (like other clean energy technologies) must be
enabled through proactive work from politicians, policymakers
and international institutions.
75 years ago, in the spring of 1946, Robert Cecil
participated in the final meeting of the League of Nations
in Geneva. Lord Cecil was one of the architects of the
League and participated during the creation of the United
Nations. He ended his final speech at the meeting with the
words: “The League is dead, long live the United Nations.”
Whether the world successfully eradicates global
poverty while managing climate change will be largely
determined by the events in emerging markets. Nuclear
energy is an indispensable tool to meet the dual challenge
of increasing energy consumption while phasing out fossil
fuels. Just as the League was succeeded by the United
Nations, formed to meet new challenges, so our view of
nuclear must grow to meet the challenges that lay ahead.
To paraphrase the speech of Robert Cecil – Nuclear power
is dead, long live nuclear energy!
Author
Simon Wakter
Expert Advisor, Energy
Simon Wakter is a nuclear energy engineer working as Expert Advisor in energy
systems at the consultancy firm AFRY, with experience from technical consultancy in
nuclear safety and licensing as well as from advising on different projects ranging
from SMRs to hydrogen. Mr. Wakter is also a board member of the Swedish Nuclear
Society and one of the founders of the Swedish Ecomodernists.
7 de Kirby, K; Lovering, J. A Socially Sustainable Future for Nuclear Energy in Emerging Markets, 2021
https://thebreakthrough.org/issues/energy/socially-sustainable-nuclear-in-emerging-markets
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Europe on the Road to a Major Disaster
When Physics and the Laws of Nature Are Disregarded,
a Rude Awakening Looms
Herbert Saurugg
Introduction The European electricity supply system is undergoing a radical upheaval. What is essential in terms
of climate protection policy is leading to the interconnected system becoming increasingly fragile, because the approach
which is being adopted is non-systemic. Instead of sound basic knowledge, it is wishful thinking and knee-jerk reactions
which are determining the approach, and this could end in the greatest catastrophe since World War II.
We can still turn away from this disastrous
route. This would require rapid
and decisive political action, but there
is no evidence of this at present. A
systemic conversion of the European
electricity supply system into robust
energy cells would have to be initiated
immediately to reduce the looming
susceptibility to failure. From a
technical point of view, this would not
be a problem, since the necessary
knowledge is available and this
conversion could be undertaken while
the system is in operation.
The greatest obstacle here is the
fact that we have so far successfully
thought in terms of large-scale
technology, and this would have to be
supplemented by complementary
complexity and networked thinking,
and adopted as the maxim. This
requires appropriate framework conditions.
The current route is pointing
more in the opposite direction, however,
towards centralization, but this
makes it impossible to manage a system
which is becoming increasingly
complex.
The electricity supply is our most
important lifeline, without which our
modern society could be destroyed
within only a few days. We ought to
prevent this from happening.
On January 8, 2021 we experienced
the second most serious
major disruption so far in the
European power supply system
(ENTSO-E/RG CE – Regional Group
Central Europe). The consequences
were very minor compared to the
first one on November 4, 2006. On
that occasion, around 10 million
households in Western Europe had
to be disconnected from the grid
within 19 seconds to prevent a
pan-European blackout. This time,
those affected were “only” large
commercial customers in France
and Italy which had contractually
agreed to be disconnected should
such an incident occur. The precautionary
and communication
measures of the 43 European transmission
system operators, which
have continually been improving
the situation since 2006, meant the
disruption could be rectified after
about one hour. Hardly anybody
had expected yet another major
disruption. Despite everything,
nobody knows whether the security
mechanisms which have been
designed will also be effective when
the next incident takes place.
The worst case would be a pan-
European electricity, infrastructure
and supply outage, a so-called
blackout, as is expected by the
Austrian Armed Forces or the
author, within the next five years.
In the European interconnected
system, the expenditures needed to be
able to maintain grid stability have
been increasing for many years. The
Austrian bottleneck management
costs, i. e., the expenditures to avert
an imminent blackout, have ballooned
from 2 million euro in 2011 to
346 million euro. Instead of 2 interventions,
interventions were necessary
on 301 days within a few years.
Although these expenditures fell
slightly in 2019 and 2020, they are
still far too high. This is primarily
down to the fact that the system does
not adjust to the framework conditions,
which have changed considerably
in the meantime, and also
the necessary transition to renewable
energy.
| Figure 1
ENTSO-E/RG CE – Regional Group Central Europe.
Lack of storage systems
and buffers
Wind and sun are not always available,
and there are sometimes significant
deviations between forecast and
actual production. In a system where
the balance between generation and
consumption has to be maintained for
31,536,000 seconds per year, this is
an enormous challenge, particularly
since there is a lack of systemsupporting
storage systems and
buffers. This situation can only be
remedied by large-scale power station
interventions, but this does not represent
a permanent solution and incurs
high costs. In addition, the susceptibility
to failure of the whole system is
increasing because it is permanently
under stress.
Whereas in Austria around
3,300 GWh of pumped storage capacity
is theoretically available, the
whole of Germany can muster only
around 40 GWh. And there are no
plans for expansion which are worth
mentioning. With electricity consumption
currently at 60 to 80 GW,
Germany would not be able to cover
even one hour of its own electricity
consumption. Quite apart from the
fact that this would not be technically
feasible, because only around 11 GW
of bottleneck power is available. In the
whole of Europe, storage systems with
a turbine capacity of around 47 GW
are currently available, two thirds of
this with a pumping option to refill the
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ENERGY POLICY, ECONOMY AND LAW 30
storage reservoirs when surplus
electricity is available. This can cover
or temporarily store only a fraction of
European consumption.
The issue of storage ranges from
inherent to seasonal, which requires
different technologies. The transition
to renewable energy so far has disregarded
the fact that conventional
power stations have the storage
integrated in the primary energy
( nuclear fuel rods, gas, coal, oil), thus
making it possible to balance the
continual changes in consumption.
But now we have increasing, and
increasingly more difficult to forecast
consumption, and volatile electricity
generation at the same time. Two
things which cannot be reconciled
without appropriate storage systems
and buffers.
Power-to-X
Power-to-X, especially the use of
hydrogen, is deemed to be very
promising for seasonal storage. In
principle, it sounds very tempting,
since an existing infrastructure would
already be available - the gas grid. The
fact that a number of big challenges
remain to be solved is usually not
mentioned. Least of all the costs. The
announcement of a large wave of
financial support triggered a goldrush
mood and an avalanche of further
announcements. It is to be expected
that a gold nugget or two will indeed
be found. But people should not really
expect that a great breakthrough and
widespread implementation will be
possible within the next few years.
What we do need are solutions that
can be implemented rapidly, not only
in 10 to 20 years’ time. On the other
hand, we still know relatively little
about the potential side effects of the
water vapor which is released in huge
amounts as the hydrogen is being
reconverted to produce electricity.
And even more attention needs to be
paid to this aspect with the planned
methanation, since we already know
the effects here, because methane is
significantly more harmful to the environment
than CO 2 .
Inconsistency
The general principle is that there is
no form of energy which would not
have any side effects. Enormous
resources are required for wind and
PV systems as well, but people usually
have a distorted perception of this,
unfortunately. The individual system
is small and manageable. But if one
considers the actual performance and
extends these considerations to cover
| Figure 2
Turbo-generator set of a thermal power plant. (Source: Foro de la Industria Nuclear Española)
a period of one year, a very different
picture emerges. The wrong way of
thinking often leads to apples being
compared with oranges, or to average
values being used. But all that is
relevant for the operation is the
contribution that one specific type of
energy generation can guarantee in
order to maintain the necessary
permanent balance. This means not
calculated as a statistical average over
the year, but plannable, reliable and
constant. If that were to be done, one
would very quickly recognize that it
requires much more than simply a
production plant.
This is precisely the way of thinking
that is necessary to be able to ensure
the systemic restructuring of our most
important lifeline. Our either/or
thinking will not get us anywhere
here. We need both/and thinking to
master the challenges we are facing.
CO 2 emissions can be significantly
reduced with renewable energies, but
at the same time we also need other
elements in the system to be able to
continue to guarantee the very high
security of supply to which we have
hitherto been accustomed.
Instantaneous reserve
Another technical detail which is
hardly ever considered concerns
the instantaneous reserve, i.e., the
rotating masses of conventional power
stations. When nuclear and coal-fired
power plants are shutdown, these
reserves are also disconnected from
the grid on a grand scale. The gyrating
masses of the synchronous generators
play a key role for the frequency
generation and maintenance, since
mechanical energy is thereby continuously
converted into electrical
energy and vice versa without the
need for controlling interventions. A
purely physical process. They can also
be thought of as large shock absorbers
for load shocks, which have so far
ensured that the operation of the
European interconnected system has
been so stable. These shock absorbers
are now being removed and not really
replaced, which makes the whole
system more susceptible to failure.
The instantaneous reserve is at the
same time also an inherently available
energy storage system, which can
temporarily buffer any short-term
energy surplus. The generated frequency
of the alternating current
therefore also always indicates
whether there is a lack of power or
a surplus of power in the system overall.
IT-independent control interventions
can therefore be specifically
performed via the frequency, and the
system overall kept stable.
Implementation speed
Approaches which utilize large
system-supporting storage batteries
and corresponding power electronics
already exist, and are already being
used in Southern Australia, Great
Britain and now also in Texas, for
example, to reproduce and compensate
the instantaneous reserve. It
is supplementary, however, and will
never be able to replace the complete
instantaneous reserve. Here again, a
both/and mindset is crucial. In the
ENTSO-E RG CE grid, these systems
first need to be implemented on a
grand scale, however. As is often the
case, the sticking point is not the
knowledge or the technology, but the
implementation. This would have to
take place at the same speed as the
other measures are being taken.
Germany is going it alone
The biggest problem is that Germany
in particular is taking the second step
before the first: Conventional power
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stations are being shut down in
large numbers without an equivalent
replacement being available. The
emphasis so far has been placed on
the rapid expansion of wind and PV
power stations or providing massive
financial support for them. But what is
missing here is the indispensable
system adjustment, starting with the
lack of storage systems and buffers,
and continuing with the lack of
trans mission possibilities, i.e., lines.
In addition, the electricity no longer
has to be distributed in a one-way
system only, because those who
were pre viously consumers have now
increasingly become producers as
well, i.e., so-called prosumers, and
therefore there are also load flows in
the opposite direction, for which the
system and the protective devices
were never designed.
In Germany, it is also assumed, at
least in the current planning documents,
that in the future, electricity
can simply be imported from its neighbors
when needed. But somebody else
might just have a thing or two to say
about that. Because: Where is the
electricity going to come from when
these countries have already been
importing electricity from Germany
when they have had shortfalls? In
addition, conventional power stations
are being shutdown everywhere. And
the idea that the wind will always be
blowing somewhere is a myth which
does not withstand scrutiny. Quite
apart from the fact that the transmission
infrastructure would still be
needed, and this was never built for
large-scale electricity exchange. The
desire for Europe to be a single
conductive sheet of copper is understandable,
but bears no resemblance
to reality and ignores physical framework
conditions.
Decentralized functional units
Moreover, millions of tiny power
stations and new actors can no longer
be controlled using the centralized
structure and logic which has previously
been successful. What is
required instead is an “orchestration”
of this multitude of components and
actors which, with the self-organization
of a “swarm”, will then automatically
play their part in ensuring the
security of supply by having a view of
the situation in the overall system
which is accessible to all. This requires
it be restructured into so-called robust
energy cells, however, since the increasing
complexity will not be
manageable otherwise. For complex
systems cannot be centrally controlled,
they require decentralized autonomous
units, where demand, storage
and generation are balanced locally or
regionally if possible, and not as at
present, where problems are shifted
around across a wide area. Crosssystem
synergies (electricity, heat,
mobility) must be used as well. The
issue is therefore a holistic energy
supply in cellular structures, which
first requires a rethink in many places.
Such an approach is not inconsistent
with the previous large-scale
system, which will still be required as
before, since it will not be possible to
supply large consumers such as large
industrial enterprises or cities in other
ways for some time yet. But these
decentralized structures and functional
units do enable us to enhance
the robustness of the overall system
bottom-up and while it is in operation,
without interruptions. Cellular structures
are not as efficient as the largescale
system we have had to date, but
this holds true only as long as there is
no major disruption in the form of a
blackout. In such a case, all previous
gains in efficiency would be destroyed
in a single blow and incredible societal
damage would be caused. Resilience
and robustness require redundancies
and reserves, and are therefore generally
in conflict with the efficiency
mindset, which is driven mainly by
economic considerations.
No such thing as one-hundred
percent security
Moreover, there is simply no such
thing as a failure-proof system, as the
European transmission system operators
stated clearly and unequivocally
in their investigative report on the
blackout in Turkey: “A large electric
power system is the most complex
existing man-made machine.
Although the common expectation of
the public in the economically
advanced countries is that the electric
supply should never be interrupted,
there is, unfortunately, no collapsefree
power system.”
Increasing complexity
We should therefore learn from
nature, where all living things are
organized in cellular structures. This
has obviously been tried and tested
and has survived through time. For
what is being celebrated as a decentralized
transition to renewable energy is
currently anything but decentralized.
The whole transition to renewable
energy to date only works because of
the existing centralized system with
the requisite storage systems and
buffers. The proposed smart grid and
flexibilization measures also depend
on a comprehensive, cen tralized IT
network and thus on an increasing
degree of complexity. Thus, in addition
to the risk of cyber attacks, the
result is additional, hardly noticed
side effects.
Complex systems
Complex systems exhibit a number
of unpleasant characteristics which
cannot be managed with our linear
way of thinking and machine logic
which has succeeded so far. As the
number of actors and the networking
increases, so does the complexity and
thus the dynamics, which we can
observe on an ongoing basis, of
course. We can hardly keep up. At the
same time, the forecastability of the
system behavior worsens because
self-amplifying feedback processes
are possible, as can currently be seen
with the phasing out of coal power: An
increasing number of power plant
operators want to abandon coal early,
because their operation is no longer
profitable. At the same time, we have
more or less run down the overcapacities
which used to be available
during the past 10 years, which means
less and less scope for action remains.
Phase-out of coal and nuclear
power
At the beginning of January 2021,
those German coal-fired power plants
which had strictly speaking been
selected for early shutdown had
already to go onstream again, because
the demand could not be covered
sufficiently well. If Germany sticks to
its plans to phase out coal and nuclear
power, which is currently firmly
scheduled for the end of 2022, this
will already give rise to critical
windows in the coming months,
where regional shutdowns to protect
the system as a whole can no longer be
excluded. It is irrelevant here whether
it will nevertheless just work out
in 99.99 percent of the time. The
electricity supply system knows no
leeway here. The balance must be
safeguarded 100 percent of the time.
There is a risk the system will collapse
otherwise.
Lack of basic knowledge
It is unfortunately the case that in
many fields and among most of
the decision-makers, too, there is a
lack of the most basic knowledge
about the laws of nature, especially
the laws of physics, and also a lack
of technical know-how to understand
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ENERGY POLICY, ECONOMY AND LAW 32
the implications of often ill-considered
decisions. This situation is now
being compounded by the lack of
knowledge on how to deal with
complex systems, since this is not part
of our universal basic education.
Characteristics of complex
systems
One further characteristic of complex
systems is that small causes can have
massive effects, as we are currently
experiencing with the coronavirus
pandemic. A virus turns the whole
world upside down in a matter of
weeks. The consequences of decisions
are frequently irreversible. A power
plant which has been shut down,
deconstructed, and decommissioned
is lost forever. It is very expensive to
maintain and reactivate power plants
which have been mothballed.
Non-linearity means that many of
our previous methods of risk assessment
fail. The delayed consequences
are particularly deceptive since people
like to ignore them. They include, for
example, the 50.2 hertz problem,
which arises when a large number of
old installations with inverters disconnect
from the electricity grid at the
same time, leading to a yo-yo effect.
This problem is supposed to have been
solved, but we do not know whether
this is actually the case. What we do
know is that it was ignored for far too
long. Neither is the effect immediately
noticeable with the instantaneous
reserve, or when power plants are
being shutdown. Things mount up
and there comes a point when something
happens which is the last straw
and can no longer be controlled –
small cause, great effect. And there
are no easy cause-and-effect relationships
which can clearly be made to
take the blame. Things have simply
built up over a lengthy period of time.
The collapse of complex systems is, as
has been well investigated, not a fault
but a system design characteristic to
facilitate a renewal. Economic theory
uses the term “creative destruction”.
The new can often develop only when
the old is broken or has been
destroyed. If adopted with our most
important lifeline, our electricity
supply, it would equate to an intention
to commit suicide.
meanwhile between 40 and 50 years
old. Some are even older. This means
that far-reaching changes will have to
be introduced in the next few years.
But the currently purely economic
considerations and the uncertain
framework conditions mean this is not
worthwhile. Postponing investments
is thus a popular move, but one which
increases the susceptibility to failure.
And when investments are made only
when it is worthwhile, it is already too
late. This explains why the liberalized
electricity market is also contributing
to reducing the reserves and redundancies.
What may be acceptable in
other types of infrastructure could
come to a nasty end if used for the
vital electricity infrastructure, as is
illustrated by the turkey illusion: A
turkey which is fed every day by its
owner assumes on the basis of its daily
positive experience (being fed and
looked after) that the owner only has
its best interests at heart. It lacks the
most important information that this
care serves only one purpose: On the
day before Thanksgiving, traditionally
the day on which the turkeys are
slaughtered, it gets a fatal surprise.
This metaphor comes into its own
with very rare events which have
enormous consequences, so-called
extreme events (“X-Events”) or strategic
shocks. In such cases, we like to
mistake the absence of proof for the
proof of absence.
Extreme weather events
As if this were not enough, we must
also expect that extreme weather
events will become more common in
Europe just as they already are in
Australia, California or Texas. This
also means we have to expect serious
damage to infrastructures and infrastructure
outages. The droughts of the
last few years in particular have posed
an enormous challenge for conventional
power plants, which have to
draw their cooling water from lakes
and rivers. At the same time, falling
water levels reduce the capacity of
hydroelectric power plants. In the
other extreme case, floods or torrential
rainfall events cause problems
with electricity generation, as
happened in June 2020, for example,
when a torrential rainfall event
knocked out the biggest Polish coalfired
power station and other generating
plants at the same time, leading
to a critical gap in supply.
Energy cells are also affected in
these situations, but the risk of sudden
and widespread outages could be
significantly reduced here. Cells do
not have greater security of supply
per se. But they do help to reduce
the potential damage, and this is
gaining in importance as a result of
the problems illustrated. Moreover,
we are still creating many even worse
dependencies and hence vulnerabilities
by developing a structure
which increasingly lacks borders.
Lack of predetermined
breaking points
The lack of clearly defined, predetermined
breaking points makes it
much more difficult to re-establish a
network. And this is precisely the
aspect that is to be extended even
more in the next few years. An EU
directive requires at least 70 percent
of the capacity of the border interconnectors
to be open for the crossborder
electricity trade by 2025.
Something which can boost competition
and thus lower prices on the
daily level leads on the other hand to a
massive vulner ability of the whole
system, because it means that less and
less consideration is given to the
physical limits. A possible inter ruption
can spread much faster and much
further. These directives are thus
clearly at variance with a robust,
cellular approach.
Aging infrastructures
The transition to renewable energy is
not the only reason we are facing a
time of great upheaval. The bulk of
the infrastructure will reach the
end of its service life over the next
few years. Most power plants are
| Figure 3
Turkey Illusion.
Energy Policy, Economy and Law
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Dangerous trade in electricity
The role played by the electricity trade
is paid too little attention on the
general level as well in respect of the
risks to the European interconnected
system. In June 2019, German
electricity traders brought the system
to the verge of collapse after they
exploited a loophole in the regulations.
Despite receiving a formal
warning and the prospect of high
penalties which now loom, loopholes
still seem to exist. In the first quarter
of 2021, there have already been over
60 frequency anomalies, which are
probably caused by economically
optimized power plant operational
planning. In the whole of 2020 there
were around 140 anomalies. The
problem is: On the hour and regular as
clockwork, half to two-thirds of the
reserve which has been held back in
order to be able to react to unforeseen
power plant outages is “consumed”. If
one or more power plant outages do
actually occur during this time, which
is more likely with the timetable
change, this could rapidly lead to a
further escalation. Although people
have long been aware of the problem,
the regulators do not seem to see the
need to prevent this misuse. This can’t
go on forever.
January 8, 2021
There are also several indications that
the two factors, the reduced instantaneous
reserve and the excessive
electricity trade, could have played a
significant role in the major disruption
on January 8, 2021, even if this has so
far not been mentioned in any publicly
available investigation reports.
At 14:04 on January 8, a bus
coupling was overloaded in the
Ernestinovo (Croatia) transformer
substation, which had then correctly
shutdown for its own protection. This
led to 13 other units in Southeast
Europe being overloaded, causing the
European interconnected system to be
separated into two parts. The result
was a massive increase in frequency to
50.6 hertz in Southeast Europe caused
by the massive power imbalance, and
a drop in frequency to 49.74 hertz in
Northwest Europe. In the Southeast
there was excess power of 6.3 GW,
which was simultaneously not available
in the Northwest.
The very steep drop or increase in
frequency indicates that too little
instantaneous reserve was available,
which should have cushioned such a
significant change in power. On the
other hand, there was an enormous
electricity transmission of approx.
| Figure 4
Phases of a pan-European electricity, infrastructure and supply outage (“blackout”).
6.3 GW towards Spain and France at
the same time. There are hence some
indications that the transregional
electricity trade could also have
played a role here, and led to the overload.
Another interesting point is that
the bus coupling in the Ernestinovo
transformer substation had not been
classed as systemically important up
to that point, and had therefore not
been incorporated into the con tinuous
safety calculations. This begs the
question of how many such unnoticed
breaking points could still exist. The
incident on January 8, 2021 should
therefore be understood as a warning
to be taken very seriously, even
though politicians immediately maintained
that the electricity supply was
secure. Thirty-six countries are all
sitting in the same boat, and if it
capsizes, they will all go down with it.
After a blackout
Austria is probably one of the first
countries which will be in a position to
re-establish a working power grid,
although this could still take about
one day or longer. It will take at least a
week before electricity is flowing
everywhere again on the European
level. But that is not all.
In general, the consequences and
restart times after a widespread and
sudden outage of the power supply
are massively underestimated. Many
preparatory measures deal only with
the immediate provisions for the
power outage, which usually leads to
the procurement or extension of an
emergency power supply. Albeit it that
the outage phase is still the most
manageable one. The considerably
longer phases (phases 2 and 3) as
systems are being restarted will have
much more serious and catastrophic
consequences in the other infrastructure
sectors and during the
resynchronization of the supply
logistics, and this is something which
is completely underestimated in
this dimension because we have no
experience of it.
It is primarily the very high security
of supply in all areas of our life, especially
in Central Europe, which will
backfire on us: There is a general lack
of self-sufficiency measures or fallback
solutions. Far too many people
and organizations simply rely blindly
on the continuous availability. A
turkey illusion.
Protracted restart
It is thus to be expected, for example,
that after the electricity supply
resumes, it will be several more days
before telecommunication services,
i.e., cell phones, internet, and landlines,
are back in operation, because
serious hardware damage and overloads
must be expected. This takes us
to week 2 at least if we are lucky, until
wide-scale production and goods distribution
can start up again. This does
not take account of the international
intermeshing in the supply logistics.
And neither the people nor companies
nor countries are prepared for this.
There is thus the threat of an inconceivable
catastrophe, which could end
in the biggest catastrophe after the
Second World War.
What can we do?
In the short term, the only thing that
will help is to prepare for the event,
which means (in a general sense as
well): Prevention and security are
important, but not enough. There has
to be both/and thinking here as well:
We also have to be in a position to deal
with unexpected events and get a grip
on them. This applies at all levels. For
example, preventing cyber attacks is
enormously important, yet an IT
recovery plan is indispensable, even if
you always hope it will never be
needed. But hope on its own is not
enough. The same applies in relation
to blackouts. We are currently undertaking
the biggest infrastructure
transformation of all times – as openheart
surgery and without a safety
net. It could turn out to be a fatal
evolutionary mistake.
The most important step begins
within your own four walls: Be able to
be completely self-sufficient for at
least two weeks, looking after yourself
and your family from your own
pro visions and supplies. This means
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ENERGY POLICY, ECONOMY AND LAW 34
2 liters of water per person per day.
After the outage, you can cook again
but it is not possible to go shopping. So
have provisions such as pasta, rice,
and tinned food for two weeks. The
same applies to important medi cation,
and food for small children and pets.
Torches, a battery-powered radio,
rubbish bags and other important
articles that you might need. In other
words, things you would take with
you on a 2-week camping holiday.
Very low level
of preparedness
Several investigations have shown
that around a third of the population
could be self-sufficient for a maximum
of four days, and a further third for a
maximum of seven days. This is the
beginning of a vicious circle, because
when people can no longer provide for
themselves to a sufficient degree, they
do not come into work to power up the
systems again. A vicious spiral is set in
motion. This explains why broadbased
self-sufficiency in the population
is an essential prerequisite for
being able to cope with such a
scenario. This especially also relates to
those organizations and companies
which must be able to maintain an
emergency service in such an event,
including the energy business.
Stand-alone PV systems
And many PV owners are not aware
that their PV system will not supply
any electricity either during the
outage, because most systems are
line-commutated. Only stand-alone
PV systems, i.e., those supplemented
with system decoupling, hybrid
inverters, and storage devices, can
maintain an emergency supply in their
own four walls even in the event of an
outage. So power could continue to be
provided for lighting, heating, and
the refrigerator/freezer (provisions!).
This would noticeably lessen the
impact of the scenario. From society’s
point of view, it would be even more
effective and more efficient to construct
regional energy cells as rapidly
as possible, thus ensuring that at least
a basic emergency supply in respect
of water, wastewater, heat or healthcare
services could be maintained.
even during an outage. This will
not happen, however, because the
necessary awareness and the
requisite framework conditions are
lacking.
Organizational measures
The organizational measures which
are necessary can then build on these
personal precautionary measures.
This represents the first step towards
sensitizing a company’s own staff by
giving them a nudge to take their own
precautions. On the other hand, full
consideration is required as to how
the necessary communication can be
safeguarded in the event of a blackout.
In many cases, only offline plans,
i.e., prepared arrangements which
have to be available in the minds of
the staff, will work. Key staff have to
know what to do when nobody else
can be reached, and how the handover
and supply operates when an
emergency service has to be maintained.
Raising the alarm in the usual
way will generally not be possible
because most of the telecommunication
systems will go down within a
few minutes of the power outage. As
far as staff availability is concerned, it
is primarily their personal circumstances,
such as how far they have to
travel to their place of work, or other
obligations such as family members
who need to be looked after, offices
they hold in the local crisis management
group or emergency response
organizations, which need to be
considered. Moreover, an assessment
must be carried out as to how long the
available resources, for example the
fuel for emergency generators for
emergency operation, will last, since
there is little hope of external supplies
coming in if appropriate preparatory
measures are not taken. This continues
right through to restart plans,
where consideration must be given as
to the conditions which must prevail
before it is even possible for regular
operation to be resumed again.
Summary
The European electricity supply
system is currently going through a
time of radical upheaval, where the
crux is: “Too many cooks spoil the
broth.” This situation has arisen
because there is no systemic overall
coordination and approach. Each
member country is transitioning to
renewable energy in different directions,
and a coordinated approach is
difficult to discern. Furthermore,
fundamental physical and technical
framework conditions are being
ignored and replaced with wishful
thinking, and it is foreseeable that this
can only lead to disaster. After all, the
electricity supply system obeys only
the laws of physics. We can still turn
away from this disastrous route. This
would require quick and decisive
action, but there is no evidence of this
at present.
Author
Herbert Saurugg
President of the
Austrian Society for
Crisis Preparedness
(GfKV)
office@saurugg.net
Herbert Saurugg is an international blackout and crisis
preparedness expert, President of the Austrian Society
for Crisis Preparedness (GfKV), author of numerous
specialized publications and a requested keynote
speaker and interview partner on the topic of
“A Europe-wide power, infrastructure and supply
breakdown (‘blackout’)”. For the past 10 years, he
has been researching the increasing complexity and
vulnerability of vital infrastructures and possible
solutions for making the supply of vital goods more
robust again. At www.saurugg.net he runs an
extensive expert blog on these topics.
Energy Policy, Economy and Law
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A Role for Nuclear
in the Future Dutch Energy Mix
Findings of a Study for the Dutch Parliament
Bojan Tomic and Mario van der Borst
Introduction The EU is embarking on the European “Green Deal”, with the target to be “climate neutral” by 2050.
With majority of EU greenhouse gas emissions coming from production and use of energy, all possible energy sources
warrant a new look. Facing the need for a drastic reduction of CO 2 emissions over the next couple of decades, while
having limited back up options for VREs a potential role of nuclear energy for the Netherlands in 2050 has been raised
by the Dutch parliament. Among seven questions raised by the Dutch parliament (motion Yeşilgöz-Zegerius/Mulder
(2018/2019 35167NR15) of specific interest were prospects and costs of new NPPs including SMRs, comparison with
other sources of electricity also considering CO 2 costs as well as potential scenarios including nuclear that are possible
for the Netherlands. Consideration of the security of supply, reliability, and flexibility as well as new development
including hydrogen cycle were important. To respond to the parliamentary motion, the Ministry of Economic Affairs
and Climate Policy of the Netherlands launched a “meta- study” to critically assess and compile information from
numerous reports while placing those in the specific Dutch perspective. Furthermore, the Study was to examine the cost
of electricity from nuclear power plants and other low-carbon electricity sources specifically for the Netherlands.
In their reports, most international
organisations, from IPCC over US EIA,
OECD NEA, WEC etc. favour deployment
of nuclear to cope with climate
change. Moreover, many see little
chance of full decarbonisation without
a significant contribution of nuclear.
This is in particular so for the countries
like the Netherlands where there are
no other possibilities (except fossil) to
complement the VRE (vari able renewable
energy) sources. This highlights
the need for a cost com parison that
would not just be based on the headline
LCOE (levelized costs of electricity)
than rather consider all the cost
drives, from the cost of financing a
source of electricity over the operating
costs including the system costs to the
cost of decommissioning and waste. In
this, the Study corrected some of
previous cost comparisons that often
excluded realistic system costs and/or
other subsidies available to VREs such
as grid connection, etc. Furthermore,
the effects of the “priority access” to
the grid were investigated. In particular,
the notion of a “level playing
field” was investigated, including
sensitivity studies to account for uncertainties
in some of the parameters.
Upon its publication and presentation
of the result in the Dutch
Parliament a lively debate commenced,
in the Chambers (and its committees)
but also in the media and among the
public. As expected, some of the
particular strong reactions came from
entities and interest groups representing
the VREs, which claimed that ENCO
study reached “wrong conclusion”,
while falling to establish technically
sound/justified arguments as what was
wrong in ENCO Study’s conclusion.
New nuclear power –
where do we stand
As of May 2020, 441 nuclear reactors
are operating in 31 countries, with
389,994 MWe total installed capacity.
Further 54 nuclear power reactors are
under construction, with a total of
57,444 MWe total net installed capacity.
Developing nations with increasing
energy needs and those
heavily relying on coal (e.g. China and
India) are leading the way in ad vancing
nuclear construction, based on own
and foreign technologies. Per IAEA,
about 19 countries are starting or
planning construction, and even countries
that have never employed nuclear
as an energy source, are reviewing
their position (e.g. Australian Parliament’s
report). The world nuclear fleet
generated 2,563 terawatt- hours (TWh)
of electricity in 2018, a 2.4 percent
increase over the previous year, which
was essentially due to China’s nuclear
output increasing by 44 TWh (+19 %),
but still 4 percent below the historic
peak of 2006.
At the end of 2019, nuclear
electricity constituted about 26 % of
the EU’s electricity generation. There
are 126 nuclear power plants. There
are active constructions of new NPPs
in 3 EU Member states, and up to
6 MS are pursuing nuclear new built,
of which Hungary expected to issue
a construction licence for a new
NPP in 2021. Regardless of massive
investment in the VRE resources all
across the EU, nuclear energy
remains by far the largest (26.7 % in
2019) single source of low-carbon
energy in the EU, ahead of hydro
(12.3 %), wind (13.3 %), and solar
(4.4 %).
As a possible contributor to the
carbon-neutral future, small modular
reactors (SMR) are receiving increased
attention. This is due to the
technological capability of nuclear
to deliver on-demand electricity,
coupled with a promise for great
simplification and related cost reduction
while applying industrial manufacturing
and construction technologies
at a factory rather than on site.
The SMRs are expected to address the
biggest obstacle for large nuclear
power plants: long construction
periods causing high capital costs.
Active licensing activities with sites
elected are underway in USA and
Canada. Several EU countries expressed
interest and as per news
bulletins, some including Estonia and
Poland started the negotiations with
potential suppliers of SMRs.
One of the typical complaints
regarding nuclear power is that it is
unsafe. To the wider public, when
considering with wide media coverage
and public interest related with any
nuclear accidents, and in particular
Chernobyl and Fukushima, such a
perception is understandable. However,
the fact of the matter is that no
one died from the radioactivity
released during Fukushima accident
(and as per UNSECAR report released
on 21st March 2021 “Radiation-linked
increases in cancer rates not expected
to be seen”). As per multiple
studies undertaken on the Chernobyl
accident and its consequences,
apart from several dozens of first
re sponders who died shortly after the
accident, there was a very limited
number of deaths caused by the radioactive
release. To put safety in the
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ENERGY POLICY, ECONOMY AND LAW 36
| Figure 1
Fatalities per TW of electricity generated for various sources.
perspective it is useful to assess the
fatalities per unit of generated energy
from various sources of electricity.
The fatalities caused by the nuclear
industry in Figure 1 reflect the GEN II
nuclear plants. Integral to the GEN III
and SMR reactors is the fundamental
design requirement of a strict limit to
any radiological release in a case of
accident. GEN III nuclear plants as
well as most SMRs are designed to be
“inherently safe”, meaning minimisation
of probability of accidents and
exclusion of off-site consequences
even in cases where a hypothetical
accident is to occur. Deployment of
such reactors would enable the construction
also in highly populated
countries, without concerns of the
population in the vicinity of a plant.
This applies even more to future GEN
IV reactors, where innovative and/or
revolutionary concepts might be
expected to lead to fully inherently
safe designs.
With that consideration, the notion
of nuclear not being safe does not pass
the scientific scrutiny. The energy that
could have been produced in nuclear
plants in Germany and instead was
produced by burning coal, lignite and
gas, affected the population and even
much more the climate (in 2018
German CO 2 emission per capita was
almost double of that in France or the
UK) not just in Germany but also in
the neighbouring countries.
Another criticism of nuclear power
is that it generates radioactive waste
that will remain dangerous for
millions of years to come. While
notionally true, it is also well known
and often ignored that the amount
of waste that remain dangerous for
extended period of time is extremely
small. Every other source of energy,
even VREs generates waste that
is dangerous to people and the
environment and would need to be
safely isolated, in quantities that are
(much) larger than the radioactive
waste generated in nuclear plants.
Important advances have been
achieved in the management of longlived
high-level radioactive waste.
Disposal in special canisters in geologically
stable layers in the deep underground
is inter nationally regarded
as a safe solution. Pragmaticallygoverned
countries, in particular the
EU Member states in Scandinavia,
implemented solutions for long-lived
waste that guarantees no effect to the
public and environment for much
longer periods that the humankind
exist on the Earth. It is useful to put
that in the perspective of currently
non-recyclable PV panels, or ever
increasing needs for exotic material
including rare earth, cadmium or
lithium, mining and processing of
which leave enormous impact on
the environment and its residues
entering the water supply affecting
the world’s population today. Furthermore,
unlike any other sources of
electricity, nuclear has from the very
beginning been planned to require
plant operators to make a provision
for decommissioning and for disposing
of any waste, thus these costs
are ‘ internalised’ as part of operating
costs. No other source of electricity in
the use today fully operates on such a
principle.
Societal costs of nuclear
Every source of electricity (or indeed
practically any other human activity)
has external impact that are not fully
reflected in the price, but which
society as a whole must bear. The best
example is the cost of emissions,
which may (and in reality already is)
cause damage to those who are
not related nor benefitting from the
activities. In the case of electricity
generation, the external costs of
interest are those related with three
components: emissions of CO 2 and
resulting climate change; damage/
impact such as on health and crops
associated with air, water or environmental
pollutants and other nonenvironmental
social costs.
External costs to the society from
the operation of nuclear power could
assumed to be negligible as there are
no emissions from the operation, and
the cost of management of waste
and decommissioning are internalised,
meaning included in the price.
Nevertheless, one might argue that a
serious accident causing damage
which is beyond the insurance limit
might become the societal costs. However,
for modern nuclear plants the
probability of such an accident is
extremely low and societal costs might
be expected not to exist for the Gen III
or inherently safe SMRs.
Electricity generation from fossil
fuels is not regulated in the same way,
and therefore the operators of thermal
power plants do not to internalise the
costs of greenhouse gas emission or of
releases in the atmosphere. In some
countries this is being addressed
through the CO 2 pricing. For VREs the
impact of the decommissioning and
waste management are not even
known, effectively making the future
societal cost.
Externalities of electricity production
are not limited to environmental
and health related impact, but may be
related with macro-economic, policy
or strategic factors not reflected in
market prices, such as security of
supply, cost stability and broad economic
impacts including employment.
Although those externalities generally
have not been subjected to systematic
assessment and comparison, some
qualitative analysis established high
advantage for nuclear as compared
with any other sources of electricity
on the majority of the parameters of
interest.
One further aspect for consideration
is in relation to the social impact
is the land utilisation. For this aspect,
the extremely high energy density of
nuclear (up to about a 1000 times) is a
great benefit compared to VREs. Due
to its low energy density, VREs require
lots of space. This is particularly
relevant for solar PVs, where the
installations are competing with land
available for agriculture and/or
encroaching the preserved nature,
and for onshore wind, where increased
opposition due to noise (on
Energy Policy, Economy and Law
A Role for Nuclear in the Future Dutch Energy Mix ı Bojan Tomic and Mario van der Borst
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| Figure 2
The cost breakdown for Hinkley point C NPP.
shorter distance), drop shadow and
intrusions into natural settings is
becoming omnipresent.
Especially in densely populated
parts of Europe, such as the Netherlands,
enormous needs for space for
some of the technologies is becoming
increasingly a limiting factor in the
deployment. Further to this, the
disturbance of the landscape complains
are on the raise everywhere.
Although the “NIMBY” phenomena
affects any intervention, a much
higher energy density of nuclear
plants, the number of people affected
is only a fraction of those affected by
the low energy density VREs.
The cost of nuclear power
Often raised drawback for nuclear
power is that it is just “too expensive”.
Clearly, judging from the headline
numbers, e.g. the price of two large
GEN III nuclear units under construction
at Hinkley point in the UK is
above 24 billion Euros, or multiple
costs increases for similar units in
France (Flamanville 3) or Finland
(Olkilouto 3), the cost are very high.
Furthermore, many were astonished
with so called” strike price” for the
electricity from Hinkley point C being
94 GBP per MWhr when comparing
that with currently traded price of
about 50 to 60 GBP MWhr. However,
the comparison with the strike price of
about 140 GBP per MWhr for nondispatchable
offshore wind sources provides
a bit of perspective. To assess the
cost of nuclear it is important to understand
its background. The cost comparison
with other sources using the
“levelized cost of electricity” (LCOE)
provide interesting insights.
The construction of a nuclear plant
is a large and extremely complex
undertaking. While at the time of the
most intensive deployment of nuclear
plants in late seventies and eighties of
the last century, typical construction
period was in the order of 5 or so years.
| Figure 3
Cost of nuclear electricity in relation with WACC.
With fewer nuclear plants being
built nowadays, the construction duration
extended dramatically, beyond
15 years and counting for the EPR
reactors in Finland and France. Given
the high costs of a plant itself, just the
cost of deployed capital over such a
long period significantly contributes to
the overall cost. How ever, this is not
unique to nuclear plants. Other large
and complex infrastructure projects
experienced similar extension of the
construction periods and resulting
effects on the costs, e.g. an airport
(BER, a factor of 3 cost increase) or a
railway (Crossrail, factor of 3.5 cost
increase and counting). The difference
to those is in the financing costs.
The cost of capital
Where the nuclear plants are really
penalised, and which is the dominant
cause of their high price, is the costs
of the capital. While infrastructure
projects such as BER and Crossrail
attract the capital with very low costs,
due to a perceived risk related to
nuclear projects, the cost of capital
encompasses a risk premium. In
the costs profile of new nuclear the
majority is indeed the costs of capital,
i.e. interest and risk premium. For
Hinkley point C, about 65 % of the
total cost of the plant is associated
with interest payment.
It is obvious that with the cost of
capital as it is in the EU today (zero or
negative interest rates), an investment
model where two thirds of the cost is
to cover the interest is not sustainable.
With the weighted cost of the capital
(WACC) in the range of 4 %, simular
to what is used in VRE projects,
nuclear becomes fully cost com petitive
with other sources of carbon free
electricity.
The system cost
Apart from the costs of investment
(construction) and operating costs
(fuel, operation, maintenance) various
| Figure 4
The contributors to cost of electricity, comparison between
nuclear, solar and wind.
energy technologies would have
specific costs related to the integration
into the electricity supply system. The
system costs typically include the
balancing costs (deviations from the
planned production and extra cost for
investment in reserves), the profile
cost (technology dependant, i.e.
anti- cyclicals able to achieve higher
prices) and the grid cost (extra cost of
ENERGY POLICY, ECONOMY AND LAW 37
Energy Policy, Economy and Law
A Role for Nuclear in the Future Dutch Energy Mix ı Bojan Tomic and Mario van der Borst
atw Vol. 66 (2021) | Issue 3 ı May
ENERGY POLICY, ECONOMY AND LAW 38
expanding the grid). The system costs
are highly dependent on the configuration
of the electrical system – the
energy mix. The system costs is
what differentiate between reliably
dispatchable energy sources being
able to supply agreed electricity to the
grid and non-dispatchable ones, being
dependant on external influences like
weather and therefore requiring
backups. For the VREs, the system
costs are also dramatically increasing
with the penetration, while dispatchable
technologies might be credited
with system benefits due to being able
to vary their outputs to support system
stability.
The further point of attention is the
electric potential (in installed MW)
that is needed to guarantee the supply
of electricity in dispatched MWh. This
is best explained by comparing solar
and nuclear. Because of the capacity
factor of about 10 % for solar and
90 % for nuclear, the installed capacity
for solar to generate the same
amount of electricity needs to be
9 times larger. The LCOE cost calculation
takes this into the account only as
far as the expected production of
electricity from different sources is
concerned (i.e. capacity factor). However,
the grid costs and in particular
the balancing and profile costs to
assure reliable supply of electricity,
are (much) higher for VRE, and
dramatically increasing with the
higher penetration. The system costs
strongly depends on the geography
i.e. whether large hydro is available.
Typical studies addressing the system
costs always take into the account a
certain proportion of hydraulic plants,
which is not the case in countries such
as the Netherlands.
Another important consideration is
that the deployment of a large share of
variable-electricity generating sources
with (nearly) zero marginal cost has a
profound impact on the functioning of
electricity markets and on the operation
of the generating capacity. In the
short term, reduced load factors (the
compression effect) and lower prices
| Figure 5
The relation of system cost to the penetration of VREs.
affect the economics of all dispatchable
generators. Above certain level of
penetration of VRE and at specific
weather conditions, there would be
no other generators on the market,
leading to a necessity of shutting
down some of the VRE producers. At
that time the implicit promise (i.e. the
state guarantee) that all electricity
that would be generated by VREs will
be taken by the grid and delivered to
the consumers suddenly disappears,
further increasing system cost but
also the LCOE due to lower overall
utilisation.
The system costs for the dispatchable
sources such as nuclear or coal/
gas are very small, in the order of
2 Euro/MWh. With a low penetration
of VRE, the system costs remain small,
as there are enough reserves to
balance the grid when VREs are not
generating. With an increased penetration
of VRE, and in particular above
about 50 %, the system costs become a
dominant contributor, as documented
in the research of the IEA in the
Figure 5.
The decarbonation of electricity
supply with VRE only leads to the
situation of both very high costs (due
to electric potential, needs for grid
development, etc.) AND accepting
regular blackouts as there will be
periods when none of the VREs would
generate electricity. Availability of
VREs is internally closely related, i.e.
non redundant: doubling the amount
of PV panels will not add to overnight
supply; all windmills would stand still
when there is no wind.
The studies analysing VRE role in
the electric supply often significantly
underestimate system cost by projecting
upwards from the current situation
where there is 10-20 % penetration.
Sometimes the “low” system
costs are justified with the assumption
that electricity will be unavailable for
certain amount of time, which is very
likely not acceptable to today’s society.
Furthermore, typically advertised
“low cost of VRE” often exclude the
grid connection cost, which in a case
of offshore wind becoming a dominant
contributor. On the contrary,
nuclear is constantly dispatchable,
able to balance the grid and its investment
costs already include the grid
connection.
It should be highlighted that some
nuclear plants are now being approved
to operate for 80 years, while the wind
generators and solar panels have projected
lifetime up to a maximum of
25 years (with discernible degradation
over the lifetime for solar PV).
Typically, after about 25 years, the
investment in a nuclear plant is
already paid off. For VRE, this is
exactly the time when the new investment
cycle is needed.
The LCOE estimates for the
Netherlands for the year 2040
The key request by the Ministry of
Economic Affairs and Climate Policy
was to estimate the LCOE for several
electricity generation technologies
for the year 2040, on a comparable
basis specifically for the Netherlands.
The study considered the following
emission free sources of electricity:
p Large nuclear GEN-III plant
p Nuclear SMR
p Off-shore wind
p On-shore wind
p Large solar PV
p Hydrogen Power
To make this comparison meaningful
with expected higher (50 %) penetration
of VREs, the adjusted “LCOE*”
was calculated to include the system
effects, as defined by the OECD NEA.
A full utilisation was assumed for
all sources of electricity, meaning that
each source would be allowed to
deliver to the grid when it is capable to
deliver, independent of electricityexchange-market
or other prioritization
mechanisms. For the stability of
the electrical grid with the higher VRE
penetration rates, VRE units would
also be obliged to shut down or reduce
the output at certain moments, like
now is the case with the dispatchable
plants. This will result in the utilisation
rates being lower than 100 %. As
those are not driven only by economic
considerations, rather by political and
other issues, the Study did not elaborate
further on the expected utilisation
rate. The basis assumption for the
assessment is included in the list in
the following table.
The findings could be best illustrated
by the summary Figure 6.
The results are pretty obvious:
even limiting the VRE penetration rate
to 50 %, the system costs became so
dominant that the dispatchable sources
are visibly cheaper than the VREs.
Compared with the offshore wind,
onshore wind and solar PV, two
nuclear options remain cheaper when
realistic system costs are considered in
the LCOE*. The Hydrogen Round trip
is very costly. The expla nation is in the
low efficiency, between 25 % and
39 % for the electrolyser and the
turbine, meaning that 60 % to 75 % of
the energy is lost in the process. The
hydrogen storage is assumed to
be in the salt-caverns. When storage
Energy Policy, Economy and Law
A Role for Nuclear in the Future Dutch Energy Mix ı Bojan Tomic and Mario van der Borst
atw Vol. 66 (2021) | Issue 3 ı May
in high pressure casks is selected, the
LCOE* for this option could be 5-10
times higher.
As with any prediction for the
future in a dynamic and changing
environment, the point values might
be far off if the assumptions change.
All such estimations, and in particular
those that are addressing the more
distant future, could only be made on
the basis of a set of assumptions, covering
wide range of issues, from the
technology development to the cost of
financing and learning curves. While
the projections of the LCOE* are considered
the best estimate, it was highly
interesting to assess how those estimates
would be influenced by changes
in the assumptions and/or relevant
parameters. The Study undertook a
series of sensitivity analysis, covering
the following:
p Construction times (duration)
p Learning effects consideration
p Impact of the lifetime of a plant
p Utilisation rates of a plant
p Interest-rate (WACC) sensitivity
p System costs sensitivity
p Sensitivity cases for hydrogen
utilisation
The results are depicted in the
Figure 7, indicating the effects of
uncertainties.
The example sensitivity case for
the VRE penetration rate of 75 %
shows an interesting correlation. The
increased penetration of VREs from
about 50 % to about 75 % leads to
approximately doubling of the system
costs for every technology. However,
for the technologies with lower system
costs, this effect is barely visible while
for the non-dispatchable sources of
electricity it dominates, as in the
Figure 8.
ENCO report caused quite a
stir in the Dutch media and
politics
The prevailing public opinion in the
Netherlands is that nuclear indeed
contributes to lowering the emissions,
but that the costs would be many
times higher than solar and wind
energy. Reference is often made to the
cost overruns of the new construction
projects in Finland and France. As a
result, enthusiasm for nuclear energy
decreased even among the most
interested parties.
The ENCO report made it clear that
nuclear energy can compete with
solar and wind energy in the future, if
the system costs are allocated to the
energy source causing those. This
message did not please the renewable
energy interests and many articles
General assumptions
LCOE assessment Nuclear VRE
WACC 7 % 4,3 % 4,3 %
| Table 1
The relation of system cost to the penetration of VREs.
appeared in the media contradicting
the Study conclusions. Most of the
articles lacked factual arguments and
attempts were made to discredit the
authors of the ENCO report.
The consultancy firm Kalavasta,
which had previously published a
report on the “Costs of Nuclear
Energy”, wrote a negative assessment
report, mainly focusing on the fact
that” system costs are not that high”.
The conclusion and arguments used
have been thoroughly refuted by the
Dutch journal Kernvisie.
Reflecting Kalvasta criticism of the
ENCO report, questions were asked in
the Dutch parliament. The Parliamentary
committee organised a round
table discussion on December 2 nd
2020 attended by the members of
the Parliament and a variety of
experts from energy companies,
NGOs, consultancies and universities.
Unsurprisingly, this discussion ended
in a draw.
In the meantime, EPZ, the operator
of the nuclear power plant Borssele,
announced that it is preparing the
extension of its lifetime after 2033
and consideration for the expansion
of Borssele site with two new large
nuclear power plants. Several Dutch
provinces, such as Zeeland and
Brabant, do not rule out nuclear
energy as a solution for achieving a
100 % CO 2 neutral economy by 2050.
On March 17 th the elections for the
Dutch parliament took place. Nuclear
energy was one of the major discussion
topics during the campaign,
including the argument that there is
not sufficient space in the Netherlands
to rely on wind and solar energy
for decarbonisation. The opponents
claiming that nuclear energy is too
expensive. The political parties that
believe in a role for nuclear energy to
tackle the climate problem represent
the majority in the new Dutch
| Figure 6
LCOE* for the decarbonised generation for the Netherlands in 2040.
| Figure 7
The results of sensitivity analysis on the LCOE*.
Hydrogen
P2P
Technical Lifetime (years) 60 25 20, electrolysers limiting
Depreciation period technical lifetime technical lifetime technical lifetime
Utilisation factor 100 % 100 % 50 %
Decommissioning costs
Waste costs
15 % of capital costs,
discounted at 3 %
Spent fuel dis posal and
storage, decomm. waste
included in decomm. costs
and operational waste in
O&M costs
5% of capital costs,
discounted at 3 %
Decommissioning waste
included in decomm.
costs and operational
waste in O&M costs
5% of capital costs,
discounted at 3 %
Decommissioning. waste
included in decomm.
costs and operational
waste in O&M costs
Construction time (years) 7 0,5 – 1,5 3, CCGT limiting
| Figure 8
The results of sensitivity analysis on the LCOE*.
ENERGY POLICY, ECONOMY AND LAW 39
Energy Policy, Economy and Law
A Role for Nuclear in the Future Dutch Energy Mix ı Bojan Tomic and Mario van der Borst
atw Vol. 66 (2021) | Issue 3 ı May
ENERGY POLICY, ECONOMY AND LAW 40
parliament (80 out of 150 seats). It is
expected that the nuclear option will
be the topic for the Dutch political
discussions for the coming years.
From financial standpoint it is
recognized that system costs are
the discriminating factor between
nuclear and the VRE. Numerous
institutes, including PBL, TNO but
also Berenschot/Kalavasta, involved
in the development of the Dutch
energy scenario studies all consider
system costs in their analysis. However,
the system costs as projected for
VRE are (by far) too optimistic and
systema tically fail to consider obvious
uncertainties. The extrapolation from
the present situation to the one where
VREs predominate is obviously impossible,
because in the present world
the VRE caused system costs are
absorbed by the still-available margins
in the electrical system. Some studies
consider arrangements to moderate
system cost including smart grids,
load rejection, car-loading systems
and decentralised generation enable
short transport trajectories. All these
solutions have their limitations and
many are not established and their
technical merits and general acceptance
is uncertain. Furthermore, zero
curtailment (100 % utilisation) is
assumed for the VRE, and 50 % to
70 % curtailment for nuclear. With
higher VRE penetration this becomes
impossible and furthermore it obviously
does not establish a level playing
field, where all CO 2 free generators
should have the same priority to the
grid.
Conclusions
The outcome of the Study for the
Netherlands lead to some interesting
insights. When the system costs are
properly accounted for, two nuclear
options are markedly cheaper than
the offshore wind and significantly
cheaper than photovoltaic. This is
even before other (positive) externalities
are considered, e.g. the lifetime
of nuclear plants being 60 or
even 80 years, while the VREs at best
last for 25 years, the spatial impact of
nuclear is a minuscule fraction of that
for the VREs, or that the cost of
nuclear already include provisions for
decommissioning and safe disposals
of all of its waste.
The positive vision on future
developments is affecting all technologies,
though mainly the offshore
wind and nuclear SMR. For large
nuclear significant saving could be
achieved by reducing the duration
of the construction; it is however
uncertain whether nuclear industry
would be able to erect a NPP in Europe
in less than 7 years. A much more
dramatic impact is observed with the
reduction of the capital costs for a
nuclear plant. When the WACC is
reduced from 7 % to 4,3 %, the
resulting decrease of LCOE* is around
25 %. With some EU governments
being able to borrow at negative rates,
low WACC for nuclear by implementing
risk- sharing instruments becomes
a pretty logical con sideration.
When the design lifetime of nuclear
plant is being extended from 60 to
80 years, the impact of this change on
LCOE* appears low. This is because of
the devaluation of money, the impact
of the last 20 years on the LCOE* in
relation to the full lifetime is not that
significant (due to the constant value
calculation).
The LCOE* of all electricity generation
sources is driven by capital costs.
All sources have roughly the same
dependence on the utilisation, as all
need to operate to generate income.
The impact from 100 % to 60 % is
moderate. Below 60 %, the LCOE*
increases fast.
The LCOE* of Hydrogen Round
trip units is extremely high, especially
affected by lower utilisation factor of
electrolysers. At the UF of 20 %, a
typical utilisation factor of a “Peaker”
unit, the LCOE* will increase to above
700 €/MWh.
Nuclear power emits no greenhouse
gases. The complete nuclear
power supply chain, from uranium
mining to waste disposal, including
the construction and operation, is
estimated to emit only 2–6 grams of
CO 2 per kilowatt-hour generated. This
is less than even wind and solar, and
up to two orders of magnitude fossil
fuels. Nuclear should not be viewed as
being in competition with “renewable”
sources of energy, such as wind or
solar. As the reduction of carbon emissions
becoming a top priority, both
nuclear and renewable sources have
both roles to play.
Possibly the most relevant finding
from the Study is that with the
level playing field for all non-carbon
emitting sources for electricity,
nuclear is fully competitive and even
dominates other sources in several
areas. The current situation where
VREs are effectively subsidized by
having guaranteed income (i.e. all
VRE generation is taken by the grid
and paid for at a predetermined price,
regardless of the need for such
electricity) will became impossible
with higher penetration of VREs, as
some will have to periodically shut
down. This, together with system
costs, further undermines the competitiveness
of VREs. On the contrary,
nuclear with its guaranteed dispatchability
and reliability of supply, when
financed with capital costs that are
prevailing in the markets today,
becomes the most affordable non
carbon emitting source of electricity.
Authors
Bojan Tomic
Principal Consultant
ENCO, Vienna, Austria
b.tomic@enco.eu
Bojan Tomic has more than 35 years experience in the
nuclear sector internationally. He started his career as
the designer of nuclear plant safety systems at
Combustion engineering in USA. He was a First officer
at the IAEA’s Nuclear safety division, with responsibilities
for probabilistic safety assessments and operational
safety. He continued his career as a consultant
with ENCO, advising clients on various aspects of
utilisation of nuclear and radiological technologies
worldwide. He was engaged in numerous modelling
and analytical studies, including due diligence
assessment for new nuclear units. Bojan has been
involved with many nuclear safety initiatives at the EU
level, most notably in the EU Post Fukushima Stress
test activities, where he led the peer review team
assessing national stress tests in several countries
including Germany. More recently he was on the
Board of ENSREG’s Topical peer review on Ageing
management of NPPs. Mr Tomic is a member of the
Borssele Benchmark committee.
Mario van der Borst
Principal Consultant
2mario@zeelandnet.nl
Mario van der Borst started his career in R&D at TNO
in the Netherlands. In 1984 he entered the Nuclear
Industry. He specialized in Thermo-Hydraulics and
Probabilistic Safety Assessments. He was responsible
for major back-fitting and O&M projects at the NPP
Borssele. From 2003 till 2010 he was the Technical
Director of this plant. In 2010 he entered the RWE
New Build Team to be responsible for Technology,
Authorization and Regulation. At that time RWE was
involved in NNB projects in the UK, Netherlands,
Romania and Bulgaria. He is president of the Dutch
Nuclear society. At the moment he is principal
consultant.
Energy Policy, Economy and Law
A Role for Nuclear in the Future Dutch Energy Mix ı Bojan Tomic and Mario van der Borst
atw Vol. 66 (2021) | Issue 3 ı May
BREST-OD-300 – Demonstration
of Natural Safety Technologies
Vadim Lemehov and Valeriy Rachkov
Introduction The article discusses the need to update the strategy for the development of nuclear power, various
approaches to the development of large-scale nuclear power. The current state of fast reactor technologies development
is examined through the example of the BREST-OD-300 reactor plant and the closed nuclear fuel cycle (CNFC) in Russia
with highlighting the main problems. The problems of choosing solutions for fast reactors and organization of the
nuclear fuel cycle are discussed within the article as well.
Evaluation of prospects for the
development of the nuclear power
industry in Russia and other countries
shows the presence of two trends [1]:
1. Focusing on the development of
the nuclear power industry on the
basis of the existing and improved
types of thermal reactors with an
open nuclear fuel cycle that use
mainly U-235. This also includes
possibilities of using a limited additional
fuel resource in the form of
mixed oxide uranium-plutonium
fuel (MOX-fuel). It is obtained by
single recycling of spent nuclear
fuel (SNF) from these reactors,
separation of accumu lated plutonium,
and mixing it with depleted
uranium. Despite a long history,
the share of MOX fuel in the world’s
nuclear fuel pro duction for thermal
reactors has never exceeded
5 %, and its production at some
plants ( Belgium, UK) is ceasing.
2. Focusing on the development of the
closed nuclear fuel cycle (NFC)
with the introduction of reactors
ensuring simple nuclear fuel conversion
or nuclear fuel breeding
(BR ≥ 1). These could be conventional
fast neutron reactors (FNRs)
or the light water hard spectrum
reactors (LWRs) previously discussed
in the 1970s and newly
proposed in the United States and
Russia. Nuclear fuel breeding
provides full-scale involvement of
natural uranium (with 99.3 %
U-238) in the plutonium- uranium
breeder producing fissionable
plutonium from U-238 and fissionable
U-233 from natural Th-232 in
the breeder reactor.
The first approach involves evergrowing
quantities of natural uranium
that is used less than 1 % energy-wise,
and the amount of accumulated SNF
constantly in creases. In the conditions
of modern energy markets, this
approach is recognized as economically
justified. A concept of
further development of this approach
has spread in the Unites States, which
has the largest nuclear power industry
in the world, and has been promoted
by leading nuclear power plant (NPP)
designers in emerging countries,
where nuclear power engineering is in
progress. According to American
experts, the world‘s known uranium
resources make it possible to stay on
this track for a long time.
It is obvious that large-scale nuclear
power engineering can be implemented
only under the second
approach. But development strategies
under this approach are conceptually
different in different countries,
depending on the expected role of
fast-neutron reactor (FNR) in the
structure of the nuclear power industry.
There are three strategies for the
formation of large-scale nuclear power
engineering, which can be conditionally
distinguished: [1].
“AS USUAL” Strategy. The United
States in the foreseeable future will
rely on thermal light water reactors
(LWRs) with the open NFC, and
provision is made for the transition to
SNF reprocessing from LWR (being
accumulated in a tem porary storage
facility for 100 years) in order to
reduce the amount of high level waste
(HLW) subject to final disposal by
means of burning of minor actinides
(MA) from HLW in an FNR. At the
same time, FNRs themselves are
considered as noncompetitive energy
generators and possible “cleaners” for
the dominant LWRs. For such FNRs, a
breeding ratio (BR < 1) is adopted,
and their NFCs remain open, since it
requires a constant external (not from
the NFC) makeup by fissile nuclides. A
possibility of using FNRs with BR ~ 1
and BR > 1 is under consideration,
but their mission remains fundamentally
the same.
Closed NFC with thermal reactors
(TRs). France and Japan, which
do not have their own uranium deposits,
have traditionally built their development
strategies providing for the
transition from LWRs with the open
NFC to sodium-cooled FNRs with the
closed NFC and a BR much larger
than 1, ensuring LWR makeup fuel
supply. A similar strategy was considered
and has still been proposed bv a
team of specialists in Russia.
Closed NFC with FNR. The
Russian Strategy Guidelines formulated
in the “Strategy for the Development
of Russia’s Nuclear Power Industry
in the First Half of the 21 st Century”
[2] and worked out in detail in [3] is
based on the concept of large-scale
nuclear power engineering, which can
be used to solve its main tasks by
means of FNRs of moderate power
rate without surplus plutonium produc
tion remaining in the structure of
previously built NPPs with thermal
reactors. In this case, the complete
inner plutonium breeding (IBR » 1)
with dense nitride fuel of equilibrium
composition is important.
Scenarios for the formation of
FNRs with the closed NFC should be
based on the actually established
structure of the nuclear power industry.
In this regard, it is important to
understand the difference between
temporary two-component nuclear
power engineering ensuring a gradual
transition from thermal reactors to
FNRs, and basic two-component
nuclear power engineering, where
thermal reactors play a key role and
fast breeder reactors only feed them
with fuel and burn HLW.
The idea of the basic twocomponent
nuclear energetics was
developed in the second half of the
last century under the influence of the
following factors:
p Development of uranium enriched
thermal reactors for military
purposes and their further modernization
for the civilian power
engineering;
p Understanding of the necessity of
FNRs for the development of
nuclear power industry;
p Economic uncompetitiveness of
fast reactors reactors built in
dif ferent countries with their
specific features determined by the
41
OPERATION AND NEW BUILD
Operation and New Build
BREST-OD-300 – Demonstration of Natural Safety Technologies ı Vadim Lemehov and Valeriy Rachkov
atw Vol. 66 (2021) | Issue 3 ı May
OPERATION AND NEW BUILD 42
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ISSN 1431-5254
require ments of a large BR: high power density, use of a
sodium coolant, pro duction of weapon-grade plutonium
in the blanket.
With the development of the uranium enrichment technology,
thermal reactors became the basis of modern
nuclear power engineering, and, for more expensive FNRs
with a large BR, they could be used for thermal reactors’
makeup fuel supply (with plutonium produced by FNRs)
in case of cheap natural uranium depletion. In such a
two-component nuclear power industry, a large-scale SNF
and MOX fuel circulation is required between fast and
thermal reactors and centralized nuclear fuel recycling
plants.
The “Strategy for the Development of Russia’s Nuclear
Power Industry in the First Half of the 21 st Century” [1]
considers two-component nuclear power as a Stage of a
gradual tran sition from thermal to fast neutron reactors,
which forms the basis of the future large-scale power
industry.
The main large-scale development factors of the nuclear
power industry in Russia and the world remain safety and
economic competitiveness with other types of energy
generation. Russia’s nuclear power processing datum
surface on the basis water-water energetic reactors (VVER)
reactors is sufficient for the scale of NPP construction and
volume of exports forecasted by the ES-2030. [4] However,
its long- term strategic potential is limited by the inconsistency
of a safety level with requirements for large-scale
nuclear power engineering, limited natural uranium
resources, SNF accumulation, and falling competitiveness
due to increased safety measures.
The “Strategy for the Development of Russia’s Nuclear
Power Industry in the First Half of the 21 st Century” [2]
defined main conditions for natural safety of a large-scale
nuclear power industry:
p Elimination of accidents requiring evacuation, and
especially resettlement of the population and withdrawal
of significant areas from economic use;
p Effective use of energy potential of the extracted fuel
raw materials;
p Circulation of nuclear materials in the fuel cycle
without significant violation of the natural radiation
balance 1 ;
p Technological support of the nonproliferation of
nuclear weapons;
p Ensuring the competitiveness of nuclear power
engineering in comparison with other types of energy
generation.
The abandonment of the thermal reactor plutonium
makeup from the SNF solves the problem of choosing
between a large or small FNR BR in favor of the inner BR
(IBR) close to l. It should be noted again that the smallscale
nuclear energy system (NES) component is an
imperative associated with acceptable safety of the largescale
nuclear power engineer ing, while the choice between
the hybrid NFC (with the enriched uranium makeup) and
a closed NFC (with the plutonium makeup from the FNR
SNF) is a matter of economic feasibility.
Sometimes fears are expressed that in the case of a FNR
BR close to one, it is impossible to increase the power of the
nuclear power plant in a short time (if necessary). But,
firstly, today even the most optimistic forecasts do not
1 Preservation of the natural radiation balance assumes that, after a certain
historically short period of time, the total radioactivity and radiotoxicity of the
waste generated as a result of the NPP operation, reprocessing of irradiated fuel
and land-buried waste will not exceed the total radioactivity and radiotoxicity of
the uranium isotopes extracted from the earth’s crust to supply NPPs with fuel.
Operation and New Build
BREST-OD-300 – Demonstration of Natural Safety Technologies ı Vadim Lemehov and Valeriy Rachkov
atw Vol. 66 (2021) | Issue 3 ı May
discern such a scenario for
the development of nuclear power.
Secondly, if such a scenario turns out
to be in demand, then, without going
beyond the natural safety, it can be
implemented by quickly putting in any
rationally required amount of FNR
capacity with fuel from enriched
uranium or using a blanket, the
presence of which in the countries
of the “nuclear club” meets nonproliferation
requirements.
At present, it can be considered
theoretically proven and computationally
experimentally substantiated
that such three additional
requirements for FNR, as IBR close
to 1 [5], lead coolant [6] and dense
nitride uranium-plutonium fuel
(MNIT-fuel) [7], make it possible to
significantly increase the safety
level of FNR that meet these requirements,
in com parison with FNR
with IBR, significantly less than
one (larger only when using a
blanket), with sodium coolant and
MOX fuel mastered in Russia. Thus,
for a large-scale component of
nuclear power, an FNR with a IBR
close to unity, with lead coolant
and dense uranium- plutonium fuel
is required.
1. In connection...
with the requirement to increase the
level of safety, in relation to the reactor
installations of NPPs, six main
technical solutions can be distinguished
that ensure the satisfaction
of the natural safety requirements of
large-scale nuclear power, which are
demonstrated in the BREST-OD-300
reactor plant: The equilibrium active
zone of FNR
The equilibrium FNR core allows
minimizing the reactivity margin for
nuclear fuel burnout and virtually
eliminating instantaneous neutron
acceleration (Figure 1).
2. Dense fuel
Among the fundamental properties
of dense fuel, three play a significant
role in terms of influencing the basic
characteristics of the active zones and
safety: density, thermal conductivity,
and the specific amount of scattering
light elements (oxygen, carbon, and
nitrogen).
A higher fuel density and a smaller
number of light elements contributes
to an increase in the reproduction
coefficient in the reactor core (IBR)
and the integral BR for the reactor
plant (RP). Special unique properties
are acquired by active zones with the
so-called “equilibrium” fuel, in which
| Figure 1
Reactivity reserve for the campaign of the BREST-OD-300.
the burning of the fissile material is
completely compensated by its reproduction.
Dense fuel allows realizing an
equilibrium core (Figure 2) with a IBR
of about one (Table 1), that provide:
p complete reproduction of fissile
nuclides, which is a sufficient
con dition for the practical use of
the energy resource U-238;
p work without a uranium blanket,
which eliminates the production of
low-background radiation with a
quality close to weapons-grade;
p the absence of the need to separate
plutonium from SNF and the
possibility of using technologies
without separating uranium and
plutonium, which together with
the previous advantage provide
technological support for the nonproliferation
regime;
p minimization of the burnout
reactivity margin, which reduces
the maximum reactivity margin of
the reactor vessel and increases the
nuclear safety of the reactor vessel;
p unique stability of fuel rods and
fuel assemblies heat release during
their operation.
Currently, more than 1,500 fuel rods
have been tested in the BOR-60 and
BN-600 rector plants, including up to
a burn-up depth of 9.3 % t. a.
3. Wide core grid
The wide grid of the core allows
having a level of natural circulation
sufficient to remove the residual heat
and reduce the power consumption
for pumping the coolant.
4. Integrated layout of the
reactor plant
The integrated layout of the reactor
plant (Figure 3) allows excluding the
loss of core cooling.
All primary circuit equipment
required for organizing the circulation
circuit and transferring energy to the
heat conversion circuit is located in a
single reactor block.
5. Heavy liquid metal coolant
The choice of lead as a coolant for the
BREST-OD-300 reactor plant stems
from:
p the presence of a well-founded
lead coolant technology, i.e. a set
of measures and means to ensure
the required quality of the coolant
and the cleanliness of the primary
circuit during operation;
p low potential energy associated
with possible chemical reactions
involving lead;
p negligible moderating ability of
lead nuclei, which, on the one
hand, eliminates the problem of
the positive void effect of coolant
reactivity, and on the other hand,
| Figure 2
Cartogram a.z. reactor plant BREST-OD-300.
Number of fuel assemblies in the core 169
Core height, mm 1,100
MNIT fuel density, g/cm 3 12.3
Full load of MNIT fuel, t 20.8
Max. burn-up depth in the discharged fuel
(at the initial stage), % t. a.
Average ST temperature at the inlet/outlet
of the core, °C
Average energy intensity of a.z., MWth/m 3 140
Maximum linear power over the core, W/cm 420
| Table 1
Index a.z. reactor plant BREST-OD-300.
9.3 (6.0)
420/535
Reproduction rate (blanket is missing) 1.05
OPERATION AND NEW BUILD 43
Operation and New Build
BREST-OD-300 – Demonstration of Natural Safety Technologies ı Vadim Lemehov and Valeriy Rachkov
atw Vol. 66 (2021) | Issue 3 ı May
OPERATION AND NEW BUILD 44
| Figure 3
The view of BREST-OD-300 reactor plant.
allows the use of a wide lattice in
the core, thereby providing an
effective mode of natural circulation
of the coolant in the core with
a simultaneous decrease in coolant
velocity (almost twice as compared
with sodium coolants in a sodiumcooled
fast breeder reactor (BNreactor)
reactor) and hydraulic
resistance of the circulation loop
and, as a consequence, with a reduction
in the power consumption
for pumping the coolant;
p low availability of lead nuclei in
the neutron flux, which makes it
possible to switch from a vessel
structure to a pool structure,
charac terized by a high heat capacity,
and place the equipment in a
concrete shaft lined with steel
or cast iron compatible with lead,
with a decrease in the cost of a
reactor installation and an increase
in reactor safety in transient and
emergency processes due to the
thermal inertia of the circuit;
p high boiling point (~ 1745 °C) of
the lead coolant, which excludes
accidents associated with the crisis
of heat exchange (in the reactor,
due to the higher pressure in the
core, the boiling point of lead can
reach 2300 °C).
The above benefits are illustrated in
Figures 4 and 5.
The figures are given for the worst
conditions of heat removal from the
reactor core – complete blackout.
There is a shutdown of four reactor
coolant pumps (RCPs) and a cessation
of feed water supply during operation
at the initial nominal power. The
removal of the residual energy release
is carried out by two of the four
emergency core cooling systems
(ECCSs) loops (the failure of the other
two ECCS loops and the failure of the
ECCS is postulated).
Result: for all standardized
radionuclides, emissions into the
atmo sphere do not reach the control
level per day.
6. Using ambient air
as an aftercooler
Use of atmospheric air as a final cooler
without intermediate circuits in the
case of natural circulation removal of
residual heat in a high-power reactor
plant (Figure 6).
In addition to the safety requirements
for nuclear power plants, there
are a number of requirements for
closed NFC technologies, which
are implemented at the Industrial
pilot facility with a power complex
with the BREST OD-300 reactor, a
plant for the production of nuclear
fuel from the products of reprocessing
of spent nuclear fuel and a
plant for repro cessing spent nuclear
fuel:
p low-waste reprocessing spent
nuclear fuel from FNR;
p involvement of SNF reprocessing
products from thermal reactors
into the nuclear reactor fuel cycle;
p reduction of the duration the spent
nuclear fuel spends on the nuclear
reactor before its reprocessing to
1 – 2 years;
p ensuring the radiation balance
between the extracted fuel raw
materials and the buried radioactive
waste (RW);
p technological support for the
nonproliferation regime.
| Figure 4
Change in power (1) and flow through the reactor (2).
| Figure 5
Temperature change of fuel (1) and fuel element cladding (2).
Operation and New Build
BREST-OD-300 – Demonstration of Natural Safety Technologies ı Vadim Lemehov and Valeriy Rachkov
atw Vol. 66 (2021) | Issue 3 ı May
| Figure 6
ECCS plan.
In connection with the requirements
for the technologies of the closed
NFC, three technical solutions can
be distinguished:
p “dry” reprocessing of spent
nuclear fuel from FNR to reduce
the duration of spent nuclear fuel
holding before reprocessing and to
exclude the separation of pure
plutonium during reprocessing;
p transmutation of minor actinides
in FNR to ensure a balance
between the extracted fuel raw
material and the disposed radioactive
waste;
p abandonment of the blanket in
FNR to exclude the production of
weapon-grade plutonium (when
exporting technologies).
The question remaining is competitiveness
of NPPs in general and on the
basis of FNR in particular. Obviously,
without norms and standards corresponding
with the new technological
nuclear power platform the solution
of this question is difficult. The first
approach to the answer about the feasibility
of competitive CNFC power
engineering based on fast neutron reactors
will be given by conceptual projects
of industrial power facilities with
reactor plants BN-1200 and BR-1200.
balance between the extracted fuel
raw material and buried RAW) are
preferable for the large-scale
nuclear power engineering in
general.
3. To prove the advantages of reactors
with lead coolant, a pilot demonstration
power complex is being
created at the site of JSC Siberian
Chemical Combine (SKhK).
4. Answers to the questions related to
the industrial production and
application of MNIT fuel for the
IPF on the BN-1200 and BR-1200
basis can be given only in case of its
pilot application in the BREST-
OD-300 reactor plant of the industrial
pilot facility.
5. Answers to the questions related to
the industrial reprocessing of
MNIT-SNF for the isotope production
facilities (IPF) can be given
only in the operation of the
processing module on the pilot
demonstration facility.
6. Technological support of the nonproliferation
regime in the export
version of natural safety technologies
is not a complete solution to
the nonproliferation problem but
only an important addition to
institutional tools of its solution.
7. For a radical solution to the CO 2
problem, it is possible to develop a
large-scale nuclear power industry
by the end of this century, which
means a gradual transition to FNRs
with closed NFC in the nearest
future.
8. The main requirement for the
development of the nuclear power
industry is its competitiveness,
primarily with the generation
based on organic fuels and with
renewable energy sources in terms
of exports. Preliminary calculations
for industrial power complexes
with fast reactors operating
in a closed fuel cycle show the
possibility of achieving parity with
other types of generation.
RP
RW
SNF
TR
VVER
Reactor Plant
Radioactive Waste
Spent Nuclear Fuel
Thermal Reactor
Water-Water Energetic Reactor
Preferences
[1] New Technological Platform for the National Nuclear Energy
Strategy Development / Adamov E.O., Rachkov V.I. // Russian
Academy of Sciences Bulletin.
Energy. – 2017.– No. 2. – P. 3-12.
[2] Development Strategy of the Russian Nuclear Power Industry
for the First Half of the XXI Century. Main Provisions, Minatom
Rossii, Moscow, 2000. – 26 p.
[3] E. O. Adamov, A. V. Dzhalavyan, A. V. Lopatkin,
N. A. Molokanov, E. V. Murav’ev, V. V. Orlov, S. G. Kalyakin,
V. I. Rachkov, V. M. Troyanov, E. N. Avrorin, V. B. Ivanov, and
R. M. Aleksakhin, Conceptual Provisions of the Development
Strategy of the Russian Nuclear Power Industry in Prospect up
to 2100 - NIKIET, Moscow, 2012. – 61 p.
[4] Energy strategy of Russia for the period up to 2030
[approved. by order of the Government of the Russian
Federation of November 13, 2009 No. 1715-r].
[5] E. O. Adamov, et al., White Book of Nuclear Power
Engineering – NIKIET, Moscow, 2001. – 496 p.
[6] E. O. Adamov, V. I. Rachkov, et al., “Choice of coolant for
nuclear power plant with inherent safety,” Izv. Ross. Akad.
Nauk Energ., No. 6, 3 − 14, 2015
[7] E. O. Adamov, L. M. Zabud’ko, V. I. Matveev, V. I. Rachkov, V.
M. Troyanov, Yu. S. Khomyakov, and V. N. Leonov,
“ Comparative study of advantages and disadvantages of the
use of metal and mixed nitride uranium- plutonium fuel in fast
reactors,” Izv. Ross. Akad. Nauk., Energ., No. 2, 3 − 15, 2015.
Authors
Vadim Lemehov
Chief Designer and
Technical Committee
member of the Proryv
Project*
rvi@proryv2020.ru
Valeriy Rachkov
Research and Development
Chief Scientific
Officer of the Proryv
Project* as well as
Technical Committee
member
OPERATION AND NEW BUILD 45
Conclusions
1. A large-scale element of twocomponent
nuclear power engineering,
i.e. a closed nuclear fuel
cycle FNR, requires an FNR with
the inner breeding rate close to 1
with a lead coolant and dense
uranium- plutonium fuel to ensure
the necessary safety level.
2. Low-waste “dry” SNF reprocessing
(mainly to reduce a duration of the
SNF conditioning before its reprocessing)
and minor actinide transmutation
(to ensure a radiation
Abbreviations
BN Sodium-Cooled Fast Breeder Reactor
BR Breeding Ratio
CFC Closed fuel cycle
ECCS Emergency Core Cooling Systems
FNR Fast-Neutron Reactor
HLW High Level Waste
IBR Inner Breeding Ratio
IPF Isotope Production Facilities
LWR Light Water Reactor
MA Minor Actinides
MNIT Mixed Uranium-Plutonium Nitride Fuel
NES Nuclear energy system
NFC Nuclear Fuel Cycle
NPP Nuclear Power Plant
RCP Reactor Coolant Pump
* Proryv project
is implemented
by Rosatom
Operation and New Build
BREST-OD-300 – Demonstration of Natural Safety Technologies ı Vadim Lemehov and Valeriy Rachkov
atw Vol. 66 (2021) | Issue 3 ı May
46
AT A GLANCE
Nuclear Innovation Alliance (NIA)
The Nuclear Innovation Alliance (NIA) is focused on championing cuttingedge
solutions to the climate challenges of this century. NIA is a non- partisan,
non-profit, “think-and-do” tank working to ensure advanced nuclear energy
can be a part of the climate solution. By engaging with policymakers,
industry, and other stakeholders, NIA works on licensing modernization,
policy development, and industry commercialization to bring economicallycompetitive,
zero-carbon energy to U.S. and global markets. Advanced
nuclear energy technologies face economic, political, and social obstacles
to successful development, demonstration, and commercialization. NIA
believes these obstacles can be overcome by encouraging public and private
investment in advanced nuclear innovation at a scale adequate to drive
meaningful innovation, and by building strong public trust in emerging
technologies through collaboration among industry, government, labor, and
civil society.
NIA approaches its education and engagement efforts
thoughtfully, by producing technically-informed analysis
and policy recommendations for policymakers, investors,
and members of the public. It informs licensing
moder nization efforts at the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Com mission (NRC), educates policymakers in the
legislative and executive branches, and promotes
commercialization through collaboration with industry.
NIA also promotes entrepreneurialism through its annual
Nuclear Innovation Bootcamp.
“NIA’s highest objective is to help achieve the conditions
for advanced nuclear energy success. We believe
advanced nuclear energy is key to making substantial
and identifiable progress in climate protection. NIA is an
advocacy hub for advanced nuclear energy policy in the
United States, and is building a durable and sustainable
organization with an expanding base of support,” says
Judi Greenwald, NIA Executive Director.
Currently, NIA is primarily funded through charitable
grants and philanthropic donations from climateconcerned
individuals and foundations. With its strong
policy research base, NIA regularly works with policymakers
and fellow NGOs, including The Breakthrough
Institute, Clean Air Task Force, ClearPath, Good Energy
Collective, and Third Way. The organization also reaches
out into the broader nuclear energy ecosystem by
actively engaging with advanced nuclear developers
and investors, as well as universities, national laboratories,
and other technical research institutions. More
recently, NIA has also begun to work collaboratively with
stakeholders outside of the nuclear sector, including
environmentalists, other clean energy industries, labor,
and energy consumers.
History
NIA was created in 2015 after the Clean Air Task Force
spun off its advanced nuclear program under Dr. Ashley
Finan into a separate organization. Under Dr. Finan’s
leadership, NIA quickly emerged as a leader in analysis,
stakeholder convening, and advocacy for advanced
reactors. Through a mix of coordination, reports, and
Congressional testimony, NIA played a major role in the
development and passage of two major pieces of
legislation:
The Nuclear Ecosystem and the NIA’s Role in Innovation
P The Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization
Act (NEIMA), which required reforms at the NRC to
facilitate the licensing of advanced reactors, including
the development of a risk-informed, performancebased,
technology-inclusive pathway.
P The Nuclear Energy Innovation and Capabilities Act
(NEICA), to support U.S. Department of Energy
research activities and to ensure national research
assets facilitate private innovation.
At a Glance
Nuclear Innovation Alliance (NIA)
atw Vol. 66 (2021) | Issue 3 ı May
Beyond these two major successes, the NIA also worked
on nuclear export control reform, nuclear energy geopolitics,
and other priority areas for the industry.
In 2019, Dr. Finan departed NIA to head Idaho National
Laboratory’s newly formed Nuclear Reactor Innovation
Center, an institution created by NEICA. In 2020, Judi
Greenwald was selected to replace Dr. Finan, bringing an
extensive background in energy and environmental
policy leadership in Washington, DC. Recently, NIA has
grown its staff as the pace of licensing modernization
and commercialization for advanced reactors grows.
From one employee at its founding, NIA is set to reach
four employees in summer 2021, supported by fellows
and outside consultants.
Building on its success in helping pass NEIMA, NIA is
pursuing an ambitious research agenda to inform
licensing modernization at the NRC. NIA continues to
monitor and support NRC efforts to develop Part 53, a
performance-based licensing pathway for advanced
reactors. NIA is also conducting research on potential
NRC fee reforms to reduce barriers to reactor innovation,
identifying ways to shorten the duration of NRC reviews,
and evaluating how to make U.S. licensing compatible
with international approaches.
Beyond its regulatory work, NIA engages extensively
with policymakers as they endeavor to enact and
implement new laws to drive nuclear innovation.
47
AT A GLANCE
Organization
NIA is overseen by its Board of Directors, and consults
with its Industry Innovation Leadership Council and
Advisory Committee, to ensure its approach to achieving
conditions for success encompasses a broad range of
interests and perspectives, including investors, government
leadership, and the public.
NIA’s Industry Council is a forum for advanced reactor
developers to discuss innovation challenges and opportunities.
Reformed in early 2021, the Council informs the
NIA’s strategy and activities but does not set NIA policy.
The current members of the Council include leading
advanced reactor developers in the U.S.:
P BWX Technologies, Inc.
P Framatome,
P GE Hitachi
P General Atomics
P Holtec
P Kairos
P NuScale
P Oklo
P Terrapower
P Terrestrial Energy USA
P Ultra Safe Nuclear Corporation
P Westinghouse
P X-Energy
Ongoing Activities
Today, NIA is engaged in many activities to catalyze the
development of advanced nuclear energy. In February,
NIA and the Partnership for Global Security released a
joint strategy for U.S. leadership on commercialization of
advanced reactors. The report, titled “U.S. Advanced
Nuclear Energy Strategy for Domestic Prosperity, Climate
Protection, National Security, and Global Leadership,”
details a whole-of-society approach; with collaboration
between government, industry, civil society, and other
nations that can bring advanced reactors to market to
reduce global emissions, provide domestic jobs, and
support national security. The Strategy and other reports
by NIA are available on the NIA website.
Nuclear Innovation Bootcamp
NIA is a proud sponsor and organizing partner of the
Nuclear Innovation Bootcamp, an annual workshop that
introduces select students and early career professionals
to advanced nuclear energy and the 21st century energy
landscape. Over the span of two weeks, participants
engage in multi-disciplinary classes and workshops
delivered by a broad array of presenters, all while
developing group ventures that are ultimately pitched to
industry leaders. Past Bootcamps have incorporated a
diverse range of topics including technology, marketing,
policy, and public relations. Bootcamp alumni are active
across industry, academia, and the policy space.
In 2016, the first Nuclear Innovation Bootcamp was held.
The program convened twenty-five students from
around the world at UC Berkeley, where the students
developed and pitched nuclear start-up concepts to a
panel of judges. Using lessons learned from the inaugural
edition, the program format was enhanced and
remained at UC Berkeley for the following two years. In
2019, the Bootcamp, “Atoms in Action,” was hosted at
the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency in Paris, France.
Twenty- seven students and young professionals from
10 countries and 4 continents took part that year, the
Bootcamp’s first edition in Europe. While there, they
drew upon experience from the established French
nuclear industry and learned about exciting developments
taking place in the European advanced nuclear
sphere.
In light of the COVID-19 pandemic, the 2020 Bootcamp’s
programming was abbreviated, moved online, and
opened to past alumni. Due to ongoing public health
concerns and travel restrictions, the NIA and other
cooperating organizations are looking to build on the
success of the 2020 online experience and develop an
equally engaging program for 2021.
Contact
www.nuclearinnovationalliance.org
@theNIAorg
At a Glance
Nuclear Innovation Alliance (NIA)
atw Vol. 66 (2021) | Issue 3 ı May
48
ENVIRONMENT AND SAFETY
Safety-related Residual Heat Removal
Chains of German Technology Pressure
Water Reactors (Light and Heavy Water)
Franz Stuhlmüller and Rafael Macián-Juan
Introduction The Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) with Pressure Water Reactor for enriched fuel (PLWR, Pressurized
Light Water Reactor) and for natural uranium (PHWR, Pressurized Heavy Water Reactor), developed in Germany, are
largely identical in their basic design. However, there is a striking difference in the scope of the main reactor systems.
While in PLWR these only consist of Reactor and Reactor Coolant System including Pressurizer and Pressurizer Relief
Tank, in PHWR the Moderator System is added. In power operation of a PLWR, the entire thermal reactor power is
transferred to the water/steam cycle via the Steam Generators. In PHWR, on the other hand, part of the power has to be
removed - at a lower temperature level - from the moderator, which is spatially separated from the main reactor coolant
within the Reactor Pressure Vessel, but is kept at the same pressure via function-related compensating openings. This
portion of power is used to preheat the feed water before it enters the Steam Generators. The Moderator System
installed for this purpose can also be used in a second function as the inner link in the Residual Heat Removal Chain
(RHRC) for cooling the Reactor after it has been switched off. In PLWR the analog system is operated exclusively for the
removal of residual heat from the Reactor and, if necessary, the Fuel Pool. In the following, the development steps of the
RHRC of both NPP lines are shown and the main differences between both NPP-types in this regard are explained by
comparing the most recently erected plants, DWR 1300 MW (KONVOI) and Atucha 2.
*In the case of sump
operation after loss of
coolant, the extraction
does not take place
from the reactor system,
but from the floor
(sump) of the Reactor
Building Interior. With
the PLWR, this is
achieved by switching
to a separate suction
line in the intake to the
Residual Heat Removal
Pump. The PHWR uses
the Safety Injection
Pump for this – possibly
in parallel operation
with the Moderator
Pump – which thus
becomes part of the
RHRC. In the further
explanations and
figures these RHRC
special variants are not
considered.
Residual Heat Removal Chain,
Structure and Terms
Figure 1 shows the basic structure of
the RHRC using the example of a plant
with four cooling lines, as is the case
with DWR 1300 MW and Atucha 2
(CNA 2). The figure also illustrates the
terms “system” (or “RHR link”), “subsystem”,
“RHR line” (resp. “redundancy”)
and “RHR Chain”. While a
“system” contains the entirety of all
“subsystems” of an RHR link (horizontal
unit), each “RHR line” is made up
of three contiguous subsystems, from
heat source to heat sink (vertical unit).
All RHR lines together form the “RHR
Chain” (although in normal usage a
chain is understood to mean what is
referred to here as a line).
(Redundancy)
Line
Removal
Heat
Residual
Residual Heat
Removal
System/
Moderator-
System
Safety Component
Cooling System/
RHR Intermediate
Cooling System
Secured Service
Cooling Water
System
1
2
3 4
5
Subsystem
1
2
3 4
5
Reactor
Heat Sink
1
2
3 4
5
The RHRC thus consists of three
procedural systems, namely
p a circulation system for reactor
coolant or moderator, connected
to the reactor cooling loops or
directly to the Reactor Pressure
Vessel*,
p an intermediate cooling system,
which takes heat from it in heat
exchangers, and
p transfers it in other heat exchangers
via the Secured Service
Cooling Water System to the external
heat sink. “Secured” expresses
that the system – like the entire
RHRC – has a fail-safe design and
that its electrical units can be
operated via the NPPs Emergency
Power Supply, if necessary.
1
2
3 4
5
Residual Heat Removal Chain
1
2
3
4
5
Residual Heat Removal Pump/
Moderator Pump
Residual Heat Exchanger/
Moderator Cooler
Component Cooling Pump/
RHR Intermediate Cooling Pump
Component Cooling
Heat Exchanger/
RHR Intermediate Cooling
Heat Exchanger
Secured Service Cooling
Water Pump
| Figure 1
Residual Heat Removal from the Reactor; Definition of “System” (or “RHR link”), “Sub-System”,
“RHR Line” and “RHR Chain”.
Temporal Development
of the RHRC
The development steps up to the latest
versions of the RHRC for PLWR and
PHWR go hand in hand with the
chronological growth of the unit sizes
of both NPP variants from the second
half of the 1960s to the end of the
1980s (Figure 2).
Starting with MZFR (multi- purpose
research reactor Karlsruhe) as a prototype
NPP of a PHWR and KWO
(Obrigheim nuclear power plant) as a
PLWR demonstration plant, the unit
power outputs increased with almost
constant gradients,
p at the PLWR version via KKS ( Stade
nuclear power plant) to the KWB-A
plant (Biblis nuclear power plant,
Unit A). This was followed by a
consolidation phase with the
construction of several (1200 to)
1300 MWel class NPPs (before
the step towards an EPR size of
≥ 1600 MWel was taken),
p at the PHWR with a significantly
flatter course via Atucha 1 (CNA 1)
to CNA 2 plant as the last NPP of
this type to date.
Hereinafter, the RHRC concepts of all
of the above power plants (without
EPR) are shown in their original
version. Later retrofittings, e.g. as
adaptation measures to tightened
safety regulations are not considered.
In the first plants – both PLWR and
PHWR – the single-line concept or
multi-line in meshed construction was
common for the systems of the RHRC.
Here e. g. cross-connections between
individual subsystems of an RHR link
Environment and Safety
Safety-related Residual Heat Removal Chains of German Technology Pressure Water Reactors (Light and Heavy Water) ı Franz Stuhlmüller and Rafael Macián-Juan
atw Vol. 66 (2021) | Issue 3 ı May
| Figure 2
Temporal Development of unit net power of german-type PLWR and PHWR plants.
are established, via which, if necessary,
a standby pump can optionally be
connected to several circuits. However,
this design pre supposes that failure of
passive system parts, such as piping,
does not have to be assumed. The
extension of scenarios to be controlled,
in particular the postulate that in the
event of an accident, in addition to
the maintenance or repair of a component,
a single failure also occurs on
any system part, led to transition to
the completely line-separated concept
with three or four RHR-lines for the
RHRC, depending on the unit size. This
change took place step by step for both
types of NPP, with the line separation
developing from the inner to the outer
link of the cooling chain, i.e. starting
with the Moderator System (PHWR)
resp. the Residual Heat Removal
System (PLWR) up to the Secured
Service Cooling Water System.
The following descriptions are
exclusively in the present form, also
for the plants that have already been
decommissioned.
NPPs with Pressurized Light
Water Reactor
Immediately after switching off a
PLWR power plant, cooling of the
reactor system basically takes place
via the Steam Generators (exception:
loss of coolant accidents above certain
leak sizes). At the time, when cooling
is taken over by the RHRC, pressure
and temperature of the reactor cooling
circuit have already been reduced to
such an extent, that the design values
for the Residual Heat Removal System
can be kept significantly lower than
those of the reactor system. The heat
to be removed has sunk so far, that an
intermediate cooling system, designed
for low temperature and low pressure,
can be used on the secondary side of
the Residual Heat Exchanger. This
intermediate cooling system (called
“Component Cooling System”) supplies
further safety- related and operational
cooling points in parallel to the
Residual Heat Exchanger. If the RHRC
has a multi-line structure at least up to
and including the Component Cooling
System, then two component cooling
subsystems are designed so that –
alternating – they can supply cooling
water to all of the operational cooling
consumers (e.g. of Reactor Coolant
Pumps and nuclear auxiliary systems)
in addition to their line- associated
safety-related cooling points.
NPP Obrigheim (KWO),
283 MWel
The RHRC is formed from one line,
i. e. each RHR link from one circuit.
The Residual Heat Removal System
here includes two Residual Heat
SG
RCP
3
5
Reactor
4 7
6
1
2
8
SG
RCP
| Figure 3
KWO, Reactor Coolant System and RHR Chain.
Removal Pumps connected in parallel
and two Residual Heat Exchangers,
both of which are integrated on their
secondary side in the single component
cooling circuit [1].
Special features of KWO are:
p The additional use of the Residual
Heat Exchangers as low-pressure
coolers within the Volume Control
System (not shown in Figure 3),
p Two Emergency Secured Service
Cooling Water Pumps (in addition
to the regular two Secured Service
Cooling Water Pumps).
NPP Stade (KKS), 630 MWel
The Residual Heat Removal System as
the inner link of the RHRC is carried
out in two subsystems, but is still
mesh-designed with one Residual
Heat Exchanger und two Residual
Heat Removal Pumps each [2], [3],
[4]. The other two RHR links consist –
like at KWO – of only one circulation
system each, but with special features.
These are:
p Three Component Cooling Pumps,
p Three Component Cooling Heat
Exchangers connected in parallel
(which were probably activated as
required),
p Two additional Emergency Component
Cooling Pumps (not shown
in Figure 4),
p Three Service Cooling Water
Pumps.
NPP Biblis Unit A (KWB-A),
1150 MWel
With KWB-A, already in 1975 the
RHRC took the shape, which subsequently
– with a few safety-relevant
additions – became the standard and
Main Steam System
Reactor Coolant System
Residual Heat
Removal System
Component Cooling
System
Secured Service
Cooling Water System
SG Steam Generator
RCP Reactor Coolant Pump
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Residual Heat Removal Pumps
Residual Heat Exchangers
Component Cooling Pump(s)
Component Cooling
Heat Exchanger
Secured Service
Cooling Water Pumps
Emergency Secured
Service Cooling Water Pumps
Further Component Cooling
Water Consumers
Further Secured Service
Cooling Water Consumers
ENVIRONMENT AND SAFETY 49
Environment and Safety
Safety-related Residual Heat Removal Chains of German Technology Pressure Water Reactors (Light and Heavy Water) ı Franz Stuhlmüller and Rafael Macián-Juan
atw Vol. 66 (2021) | Issue 3 ı May
ENVIRONMENT AND SAFETY 50
SG
RCP
3
5
4
SG
2
4
Reactor
RCP
RCP
has since been used for all following
PLWR plants [5], [6]. The number of
RHR lines usually, but not necessarily,
corresponds to the number of reactor
cooling loops. For this size of units
(and also for the EPR concept
(≥ 1600 MWel) four Steam Generators
and thus four reactor cooling
loops are required for heat transfer to
the water/steam cycle in power operation.
Accordingly, the RHRC also
consists of four independent RHR
lines with a heat transfer capacity of
50 % each, based on the design case.
1
6
4
RCP
2
SG
| Figure 4
KKS, Reactor Coolant System and RHR Chain.
SG
Main Steam System
Reactor Coolant System
Residual Heat
Removal System
Component Cooling
System
Secured Service
Cooling Water System
SG Steam Generator
RCP Reactor Coolant Pump
1
2
3
4
5
6
Residual Heat Removal Pumps
Residual Heat Exchangers
Component Cooling Pumps
Component Cooling
Heat Exchangers
Secured Service
Cooling Water Pumps
Further Component Cooling
Water Consumers
(Note: Even for plants with only three
reactor cooling loops, this “one to
one” assignment of loop and line
number can be obtained without
violating the safety philo sophy (repair
and simultaneously single-failure)
when the heat transfer capacity of
each line is increased to 100 %.) In
Figure 5, the two inner component
cooling circuits are designed for the
alternating supply of operational
component points. For this purpose,
in addition to the regular Component
Cooling Pump, a second pump is
connected in parallel, operated in case
of a very high cooling water demand.
NPPs of DWR 1300 MW class
The increasing safety-related requirements,
set down e. g. in the “RSK
Guidelines for Pressurized Water
Reactors” [7] and in “Safety Regulations
of the KTA” [8], [9], in
particular
p elevated awareness of the fuel pool
inventory as a source of activity,
and
p the inclusion of “civilizationrelated
external impacts” (aircraft
crash, explosion pressure waves,
third part influences) as cases to be
managed,
led to important extensions for the
system technology of the steam
generator feed as well as for the RHRC
[10].
With the Emergency Feed Water
System, a possibility of short- and
medium-term heat removal from the
Reactor Coolant System via the Steam
Generators was created, independent
of the Feed Water Tank and the regular
Emergency Power Supply. For the
subsequent long-term cooling via the
so-called Emergency Cooling Chain
(ECC) in this two of the four RHR
lines, whose residual heat removal
circuits contain a Fuel Pool Cooling
Pump,
p an Emergency Component Cooling
Pump within the Safety Component
Cooling System*, and
p an Emergency Secured Service
Cooling Water Pump in the Secured
Service Cooling Water System.
Operational
Cooling points
Reactor Reactor
Building Building
Interior Annulus
Reactor
Auxiliary
Building
SG
Main Steam System
Reactor Coolant System
Residual Heat
Removal System
Component Cooling
System (safety-related part)
Component Cooling
System (operational part)
Secured Service
Cooling Water System
Steam Generator
RCP Reactor Coolant Pump
1
2
3
4
5
6
Residual Heat Removal Pumps
Residual Heat Exchangers
Component Cooling Pumps
Component Cooling
Heat Exchangers
Secured Service
Cooling Water Pumps
Further Component Cooling
Water Consumers
7 Further Secured Service
Cooling Water Consumers
| Figure 5
KWB-A, Reactor Coolant System and RHR Chain.
Environment and Safety
Safety-related Residual Heat Removal Chains of German Technology Pressure Water Reactors (Light and Heavy Water) ı Franz Stuhlmüller and Rafael Macián-Juan
atw Vol. 66 (2021) | Issue 3 ı May
Emergency Feed
Water System
1
8 9 10
G
11
SG
4
1a
2
RCP
5
SG
are installed in parallel to the existing
pumps.
The Fuel Pool Cooling Pumps
themselves act as “Emergency Residual
Heat Removal Pumps” as part of
the Residual Heat Removal System in
this case. If required, all this pumps
are supplied with power via the
Emergency Generators, which – after
the Emergency Feed Water Pumps
have been disconnected – are driven
by the Emergency Diesel Engines.
For the fuel pool cooling, in
addition to the two RHR lines that
include the Fuel Pool Cooling Pumps,
there is also another fuel pool cooling
circuit whose single cooler is supplied
by the Operation Component Cooling
System*.
NPPs with Pressurized Heavy
Water Reactor
The function of the Moderator System
in power operation of the plant
requires identical pressure and
temperature design values as for the
Reactor Coolant System itself. However,
this also opens up the possibility
– by switching over valves inside
the Moderator System and with an
appropriate design of the RHR Intermediate
Cooling System as the middle
link of the RHRC – to take over the
cooling of the reactor immediately
after shut down, even without additional
Steam Generator feed. This
option has not yet been implemented
for the MZFR as the first PHWR plant.
Only CNA 1 and CNA 2 are equipped
with a high pressure/high temperature
designed RHRC and are therefore
independent of the function of the
main heat sink (steam turbine condenser)
for cooling down the plant
1
2
RCP
5
Reactor
after all shut-down occasions to be
assumed.
Multi-purpose research reactor
Karlsruhe (MZFR), 50 MWel
The shutdown concept of the MZFR
basically corresponds to that of PLWR
plants, with priority on the Steam
Generators [11]. Only when this –
below a certain coolant temperature –
is no longer thermodynamically
possible, switch over to RHRC operation
has to be performed for further
cooling of the plant. Moderator temperature
and heat to be removed at
this time are already so low that the
SG
From
Condenser
Cooling
Tower
RCP
5
RCP
3
5
RCP
3. Fuel Pool
7 4 7 Cooler 7 4 7 4
SG
1
Reactor
4
SG
2 2
G
G
6 6 Reactor
6
Building
11
Annulus
11
3a 3
3
3 3
5a
Emergency Feed
Water System
8 9 10
Operational
Cooling points
Reactor Reactor
Building Auxiliary
Interior Building
| Figure 6
DWR 1300 MW, Reactor Coolant System and RHR Chain.
Emergency Feed
Water System
10 9 8
5
1a
6
3a
5a
SG
RCP
1
1
10
2
Feedwater
System
5 7
| Figure 7
MZFR, Reactor Coolant System and RHR Chain.
Emergency Feed
Water System
9 8
G
11
Moderator Cooler on its secondary
side can be operated with inlet
temperatures, which are accepted by
the other cooling points of the
Component Cooling System without
boiling at its outlet; even at the slight
overpressure with which the Component
cooling System is operated.
A special feature of the MZFR-
RHRC is that the operating pressure in
the Secured Service Cooling Water is
higher than in the system. In the event
of a heat tube leak in the Component
Cooling Heat Exchanger, transition
of possibly radioactive contaminated
water to the environment is thereby
6
Main Steam System
Reactor Coolant System
Residual Heat
Removal System
Safety Component
Cooling System
Secured Service
Cooling Water System
SG Steam Generator
RCP Reactor Coolant Pump
1 Residual Heat Removal Pumps
1a Fuel Pool Cooling Pumps
2 Residual Heat Exchangers
3 Component Cooling Pumps
3a Emergency Component
Cooling Pumps
4
Operation Component
Cooling System
Component Cooling
Heat Exchangers
SG
Main Steam System
Reactor Coolant System
Moderator System
Component Cooling
System
Secured Service
Cooling Water System
Steam Generator
RCP Reactor Coolant Pump
1 Moderator Pumps
2 Moderator Coolers
3 Component Cooling Pump(s)
4 Component Cooling
Heat Exchanger
5 Secured Service
Cooling Water Pumps
6 Further Component Cooling
Water Consumers
7 Further Secured Service
Cooling Water Consumers
5 Secured Service
Cooling Water Pumps
5a Emergency Secured Service
Cooling Water Pumps
6
Safety-related Cooling Points
7 Secured Intermediate Coolers
8 Emergency Feed Water Pumps
9 Emergency Generators
10 Emergency Diesel Engines
11 Demineralized
Water Pool
*With introduction of the
new “Power Plant
Labeling System (KKS)”
in 1976 the Component
Cooling System was,
without any technical
impact, split into “Safety
Component Cooling
System” and “Operation
Component Cooling
System”. The former
includes the Component
Cooling Pumps,
the Component Cooling
Heat Exchangers as
well as the supply of all
cooling points that are
relevant for operation
of the RHRC. The latter
only consists of the
connected pipe network,
which distributes
and collects the cooling
water flows to consumers
of nuclear
operating systems
inside Reactor- and
Reactor Auxiliary
Building.
ENVIRONMENT AND SAFETY 51
Environment and Safety
Safety-related Residual Heat Removal Chains of German Technology Pressure Water Reactors (Light and Heavy Water) ı Franz Stuhlmüller and Rafael Macián-Juan
atw Vol. 66 (2021) | Issue 3 ı May
ENVIRONMENT AND SAFETY 52
RCP
3
SG
Reactor
SG
RCP
2 1
1 2 Feed Water
System
3
4 4
5
| Figure 8
CNA 1, Reactor Coolant System and RHR Chain.
3
avoided, but pollution of the demineralized
water in the component
cooling circuit may happen instead. In
subsequent plants, the pressure gradation
was implemented consistently
from the heat source (high) to the
heat sink (low).
NPP Atucha 1 (CNA 1),
319 MWel
The Moderator System consists of two
completely separate loops, each of
which assigned to a circuit of the RHR
Intermediate Cooling System [12],
[13], [14]. Deviating from MZFR, the
task of this system is to be able to take
6
Main Steam System SG Steam Generator
Reactor Coolant System RCP Reactor Coolant Pump
1 Moderator Pumps
Moderator System
2 Moderator Coolers
RHR Intermediate
3 RHR Intermediate
Cooling System
Cooling Pumps
Component Cooling
4 RHR Intermediate
System
Cooling Heat Exchanger
Secured Service
Cooling Water System
8
7
9
5 Secured Service
Cooling Water Pumps
6 Component
Cooling Pumps
7 Component Cooling
Heat Exchanger
8
Component Cooling
Water Consumers
9 Fuel Pool Coolers
over the reactor cooling already
shortly after shut down of the Reactor.
The asso ciated temperature and
pressure values in the system preclude
the use of the Component Cooling
System for heat removal; this is
designed to only supply all other
safety- related and the operational
cooling points as a single circuit
without redundancy. It is fitted out
with two Component Cooling Heat
Exchangers and Component Cooling
Pumps of full capacity each. The
RHR Intermediate Cooling System is
equipped with a third RHR Intermediate
Cooling Pump. In the event of
failure of one of the two regular
pumps this additional pump takes
over the circulation in the affected
circuit. The return lines of the RHR
Intermediate Cooling Circuits cannot
be shut off to the area around the
Moderator Cooler flowed through by
the feed water during power operation,
so that the feed water pressure is
impressed on them in their standby
state. After the feed water lines at the
outlet of the Moderator Cooler have
been shut off and transition to the
RHRC cycle operation is completed,
the water balance in the RHR Intermediate
Cooling Circuits (absorption
of expansion water when heating up,
recovery of contraction water when
cooling down) can be carried out via
expansion tanks as well as discharges
to the Feed Water Tank on the one
hand, and feed from the tank or the
demineralized water pool by means of
system-associated pumps on the other
hand.
A line assignment has not yet
been made for the outer RHRC link,
the Secured Service Cooling Water
System. Three parallel Secured Service
Cooling Water Pumps can feed a
manifold, from which all inter coolers
as well as the Fuel Pool Coolers are
supplied.
NPP Atucha 2 (CNA 2),
692 MWel
A clear line separation concept has
been implemented at CNA 2. Although
the plant only has two reactor cooling
circuits, the Moderator System and
the entire RHRC are constructed with
four lines, each of them having a
capacity of 50 % of the total power to
| Figure 9
CNA 2, Reactor Coolant System and RHR Chain.
RCP Reactor Coolant Pump
SG Steam Generator
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Moderator Pumps
Moderator Coolers
RHR Intermediate Cooling Pumps
RHR Intermediate Cooling Heat Exchangers
Secured Service Cooling Water Pumps
Component Cooling Pumps
Component Cooling Heat Exchangers
Component Cooling Water Consumers
Fuel Pool Coolers
Secured Intermediate Coolers
Environment and Safety
Safety-related Residual Heat Removal Chains of German Technology Pressure Water Reactors (Light and Heavy Water) ı Franz Stuhlmüller and Rafael Macián-Juan
atw Vol. 66 (2021) | Issue 3 ı May
be removed in the design case. Thus
the “repair + single-failure” criterion
for accidents is fulfilled. Not only the
RHR Intermediate Cooling System,
but also the Safety Component
Cooling System here consists of four
circuits, which supply the respective
associated consumers – i. e. pumps
and their motors – with cooling water.
The circuits of the two outer re dundancies
in Figure 9 can also be optionally
switched on to cooling points of
the fuel assembly transport devices
(not shown in Figure 9). One circuit
of the two inner redundancies serves
not only its safety-relevant consumers,
but also the Operation Component
Cooling System, the other one stands
by for that. The design of the RHR Intermediate
Cooling System enables –
if necessary – a takeover of heat transfer
from the Reactor Cooling System
after shut-down of the plant without
the aid of Steam Generator feed. To
achieve the maximum possible heat
removal capacity, the bypasses inside
the RHR Intermediate Cooling Circuit
around Moderator Cooler and RHR
Intermediate Cooling Heat Exchanger
must be closed. If it is necessary for
the RHRC to keep the Reactor Cooling
System at a desired temperature state
or to cool it down according to a
specified shutdown gradient, this is
done by opening/ closing the bypass
around the Moderator Cooler and
by controlling the flow rate through
the primary side of the RHR Intermediate
Cooling Heat Exchanger on
the one hand and the bypass around
the cooler on the other (Shutdown
control).
An important modification compared
to CNA 1 is the handling of the
water balance in the RHR Intermediate
Cooling Circuits. Facilities
for absorbing expansion water and
re-feeding it when the circuit cools
down as well as replacing operational
medium losses (in the event of failure
of operational demineralized water
supply) are set up for each circuit
self-sufficient and spatially separated
from each other in the Reactor
Building Annulus.
Each of the four subsystems of the
Secured Service Cooling Water
System with one Secured Service
Cooling Water Pump each, supplies all
of the assigned heat exchangers in
parallel, that are
p one RHR Intermediate Cooling
Heat Exchanger,
p one Component Cooling Heat
Exchanger,
p one Secured Intermediate Cooler,
(This heat exchanger removes the
Emergency Feed
Water System
1
SG
1a
2
RCP
5
heat loss from the line-assigned
Emergency Diesel Engine and the
Secured Chilled Water System,
which is absorbed in the so-called
Secured Closed Cooling Water
System.)
p One Fuel Pool Cooler (Each one of
the two coolers is connected to two
subsystems of the Secured Service
Cooling Water System; this is why
in Figure 9 and Figure 10 below –
only to illustrate the supplyability –
four pool coolers are drawn.)
1
5
Reactor
6 6
Reactor
Building 6
6
11
Annulus
11
3a 3
3
3 3 3a
3. Fuel Pool
4 7 4 7 Cooler
7 4 7 4
5a
Main Steam System
Reactor Coolant System
SG
2
RCP
Residual Heat Removal System
Safety Component Cooling System
RCP
5
SG
RCP
2 2
8 9 10 8 9 10
10 9 8
10 9 8
11
G
Emergency Feed
Water System
G
Operational
Cooling Points
Reactor Reactor
Building Auxiliary
Interior Building
Comparison DWR 1300 MW –
Atucha 2
By comparing the RHRC configurations
of the latest PLWR- and PHWR
plants in Figure 10 it is intended to
show at a glance their differences
in the type and scope of process
engineering equipment for the removal
of residual heat from the
reactor cooling system. Furthermore,
it is marked which resp. how many
subsystems/lines must be active
during power operation of the plant.
1
G
DWR 1300 MW
Emergency Feed
Water System
5
1a
5a
SG
Operation Component Cooling System
Secured Service Cooling Water System
| Figure 10
DWR 1300 MW – CNA 2, Comparison of RHR Chains regarding their necessary use during power operation of the plant;
Explanation of Numbers: see Figures 6 and 9.
1
Emergency Feed
Water System
G
11
CNA 2
ENVIRONMENT AND SAFETY 53
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Safety-related Residual Heat Removal Chains of German Technology Pressure Water Reactors (Light and Heavy Water) ı Franz Stuhlmüller and Rafael Macián-Juan
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ENVIRONMENT AND SAFETY 54
DWR 1300 MW
Reactor SG
CNA 2
Reactor
RCP
SG
RCP
6
3
HPT
FWT
HPT
4
M
S
RH
5
M S
LPT
LPT
G
Main Cooling
Water
G
G
SG
RCP
RH
Steam Systems
Reactor Coolant System
Moderator System
Feedwater System
Main Condensate System
Main Cooling Water System
Steam Generator
Reactor Coolant Pump
FWT Feed Water Tank
HPT
LPT
MS
1
2
3
Generator
Reheater
High Pressure Turbine
Low Pressure Turbine
Moisture Separator
Moderator Pump
Moderator Cooler
Main Feedwater Pump
1 2
FWT
4
3 5
Main Cooling
Water
4
5
6
Low-Pressure
Feedwater Heater
Main Condensate Pump
High-Pressure
Feedwater Heater
| Figure 11
DWR 1300 MW – CNA 2, Comparison of Water/Steam Cycles (simplified).
In order to complete the comparison,
the water/steam cycle must
also be included. By using the
Moderator Cooler for preheating the
feed water, the PHWR – in this
regard – is considerably simplified in
comparison to the PLWR (Figure 11).
In addition to the High Pressure
Preheaters themselves, the steam
extraction points on the high- pressure
section of the Steam Turbine and the
connecting steam pipes are eliminated
for the PHWR.
The second above item determines
the number of pumps within the
RHRC that are to be operated continuously,
and thus also the electrical
auxiliary power demand as well as the
net efficiency.
In Figure 10 mean:
p Thick drawn subsystems and
components:
Used in power operation
p Thin drawn subsystems and
components:
Operation readiness
p Thin drawn heat exchanger edging,
but with thick drawn flow symbol:
Flow through its secondary side,
but without heat input
For DWR 1300 MW, the upper part
of Figure 10 shows the minimum
amount of subsystems to be operated.
It is assumed that
p the fuel pool cooling circuit
connected to the Operating Component
Cooling System is sufficient
to maintain the fuel pool water
under the desired temperature.
Otherwise, one of the outer RHR
lines would have to be operated
with a Fuel Pool Cooling Pump,
addi tionally or exclusively.
p operation of only one of the four
Secured Chilled Water Systems
(which are redundantly supplied
by the Secured Closed Cooling
Water Systems) is necessary and
therefore just one of the Secured
Intermediate Coolers (No. 7 in
Figure 6 and Figure 10 above) has
to be flowed through. If this is not
the case, then additional subsystems
of the Secured Service
Cooling Water System must be
activated.
With CNA 2, the constantly running
Moderator Pumps mean that their
cooling points – line-separated –
always have to be supplied with cooling
water via the Safety Component
Cooling System. Therefore, all its
subsystems as well as the entire
Secured Service Cooling Water S ystem
must continuously be operated. With
regard to the heat removal capacity,
actually only the line which is connected
to the Operation Com ponent
Cooling System with its permanent
heat input is utilized, fully or only
partially.
The part of the RHR Intermediate
Cooling System not flowed by feed
water is separated and in stand-by
condition.
In contrast to the DWR 1300 MW,
the fuel pool cooling in CNA 2 is
completely independent from the heat
removal via the RHRC. Here, the fuel
pool cooling circuits transfer the heat
to be removed directly to the Secured
Service Cooling Water.
Summary
Development of the Residual Heat
Removal Chain (RHRC) in NPPs with
Pressurized Water Reactors of german
design, from the prototype plant
MZFR (heavy water) and the
demonstration power plant KWO
(light water) to the last plants erected,
was carried out on three mutually
independent areas:
p PLWR and PHWR:
Increasing requirements concerning
plant-internal damage
assumptions
The assumption of failing of passive
components and system parts
as well as the postulate of simultaneity
of “repair case and single
failure” led to the (step- by-step)
Environment and Safety
Safety-related Residual Heat Removal Chains of German Technology Pressure Water Reactors (Light and Heavy Water) ı Franz Stuhlmüller and Rafael Macián-Juan
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P transition from the single-line
to the multi-line RHRC-design
with several functionally independent
redundancies of the
same heat transfer capacity. In
plants with four RHR lines – as
is the case with the DWR
1300 MW class as well as with
Atucha 2 – each of the lines has
to be equipped with a heat
removal capacity of 50 %, based
on the thermodynamic design
case of the entire RHRC.
P This goes hand in hand with
abandoning meshing technology
in which, for example, if
a pump fails, a reserve unit
can be switched to various
subsystems of an RHR link.
p PLWR – specific:
Measures for emergencies “civilization-related
external impacts”
For the first time after the occurrence
of accidents, in which it is no
longer possible to feed the Steam
Generators from the Feed Water
Tank, the Emergency Feed Water
System was created to remove the
residual heat via Steam Generators,
for the long-term range via
the Emergency Cooling Chain
(ECC) Chain, both of them operated
by self-sufficient diesel engines/
generators. According to the safety
requirements two Emergency
Cooling Lines of a thermal capacity
of 100 % each, with respect to the
max. power to be removed, are
sufficient. For this ECC, sub systems
of the middle link (Safety Component
Cooling System) and the
outer link (Secured Service
Cooling Water System) of the
existing RHRC are equipped with
additional, less powerful pumps –
parallel to the main pumps. By
using this two lines as ECC which
contain a Fuel Pool Cooling Pump
in their inner link, this aggregates
are also deployed as “emergency
residual heat removal pumps”.
Both the Reactor and the Fuel Pool
can thus be cooled via these lines.
p PHWR – specific :
Transition to a high-pressure/
high-temperature RHRC
The residual heat removal concept
of the MZFR as the first plant of this
type of NPPs is largely identical
with that from PLWR. In the first
time after Reactor shut-down
cooling is performed exclusively
via the secondary side (Steam
Generator) before the RHRC takes
over with the Moderator System
as the inner link. Only in the
sub sequent plants Atucha 1 and
Atucha 2 the fact has been utilized,
that with the Moderator System a
“ Residual Heat Removal System” is
available, which is similar to the
Reactor Cooling System regarding
its pressure/temperature design
values. By also designing the
middle RHR link, the RHR Intermediate
Cooling System, as highpressure/high-temperature
circuits
it was possible to create a divers
residual heat removal option for
the Steam Generators, with which
reactor cooling is possible from the
beginning – without further Steam
Generator feeding.
Bibliography
[1] Lepie, G., Martin, A.
“Aufbau der Gesamtanlage KWO”
Atomwirtschaft, December 1968
P. 596 – 606
[2] Kernkraftwerk Stade
“Tabelle: Wichtige Daten des Kernkraftwerks Stade”
Atomwirtschaft, November 1971
P. 586 – 590
[3] Müller, H., Stahlschmidt, H.
“Die Gesamtanlage des Kernkraftwerks Stade”
Atomwirtschaft, November 1971
P. 579 – 580
[4] Bruhn, H.
“Reaktorhilfs- und Nebenanlagen des KKS”
Atomwirtschaft, November 1971
P. 610 – 612
[5] Huttach, A., Putschögl, G., Ritter, M.
“Die Nuklearanlage des Kernkraftwerks Biblis”
Atomwirtschaft, August/September 1974
P. 420 – 430
[6] Bald, A., Brix, O.
“Die Dampfkraftanlage des Kernkraftwerks Biblis”
Atomwirtschaft, August/September 1974
P. 431 – 438
[7] “RSK-Leitlinien für Druckwasserreaktoren”
Original version (3 rd edition of October 14, 1981)
with amendments of November 15, 1996
[8] Sicherheitstechnische Regel des KTA
“KTA 3301, Nachwärmeabfuhrsysteme
für Leichtwasserreaktoren”
Version 2015-11
[9] Sicherheitstechnische Regel des KTA
“KTA 3303, Wärmeabfuhrsysteme für Brennelementlagerbecken
von Kernkraftwerken mit Leichtwasserreaktoren”
Version 2015-11
[10] Rieser, R., Brosche, D., Faber, P.
“Planung, Errichtung und Inbetriebnahme
des Konvoi-Leitprojektes Isar-2”
Atomwirtschaft, June 1988
P. 276 – 284
[11] Bald, A., Schamburger, R.
“Die Dampfkraftanlage”, from “MZFR Kernkraftwerk
mit Mehrzweck-D2O-Druckkesselreaktor in Karlsruhe”
Atomwirtschaft, July/August 1965
P. 363 – 368
[12] Frewer, H., Keller, W.
“Das 340-MW-Kernkraftwerk Atucha
mit Siemens-Natururan-Druckwasserreaktor”
Atomwirtschaft, July 1968
P. 350 – 358
[13] Herzog, G., Sauerwald, K.-J.
“Das Kernkraftwerk Atucha”
Changed reprint from ATOM und STROM, 15 th Year,
issue 4, April 1969
P. 53 – 63
[14] Hirmer, G., Seifert, W.
“Das Kernkraftwerk Atucha”
Elektrotechnische Zeitschrift,
Ausgabe A (ETZ-A), Band 90, (1969)
P. 509 – 513
Authors
Franz Stuhlmüller
External Scientific
Associate at the Chair of
Nuclear Technology at
the Technical University
of Munich
f-stuhlmueller@
t-online.de
Franz Stuhlmüller studied Mechanical Engineering at
the Rudolf-Diesel-Polytechnikum in Augsburg as well
as Energy and Power Plant Technology at the Technical
University of Munich. He was employed at Kraftwerk
Union / Siemens AG in Erlangen in the field of nuclear
power plants as well as conventional power plant
technology. As a section manager he was responsible
for decay power calculation and design of nuclear
safety systems, conventionally for the development of
advanced coal-fired combined cycle power plants as
well as new emerging power generation technologies.
After he retired in 2007 he was a consultant during
completion of the Heavy Water Nuclear Power Plant
Atucha 2 in Argentina till 2015. Since 2016 Franz is an
External Scientific Associate at the Chair of Nuclear
Technology at the Technical University of Munich
(TUM).
Prof. Rafael
Macián-Juan, PhD
Head of the Chair
of Nuclear Technology
at the Technical
University of Munich
rafael.macian@
ntech.mw.tum.de
Prof. Rafael Macián-Juan has a Master of Science in
Energy Engineering from the Polytechnic University of
Valencia, Spain, as well as a Master of Science in
Nuclear Technology and holds an PhD in Nuclear
Technology by the Penn State University, USA. He is
the Head of the Chair of Nuclear Technology since
2007 at the Technical University of Munich (TUM).
Before joining TUM, he worked at the Paul Scherrer
Institute (PSI), Switzerland, where he carried out
research and development in reactor thermalhydraulics
and coupled neutronics, as well as safety
assessments of the Swiss nuclear power plants. His
current research interests include nuclear safety,
multi-physics and multiscale simulation codes,
uncertainty and sensitivity methods, experimental and
numerical thermal-hydraulics, and safety analysis and
development of future nuclear reactor designs. He is
currently also visiting professor at Harbin Engineering
University in China.
ENVIRONMENT AND SAFETY 55
Environment and Safety
Safety-related Residual Heat Removal Chains of German Technology Pressure Water Reactors (Light and Heavy Water) ı Franz Stuhlmüller and Rafael Macián-Juan
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ENVIRONMENT AND SAFETY 56
IAEA Approach to Review the
Applicability of the Safety Standards
to Small Modular Reactors
Paula Calle Vives, Kristine Madden and Vesselina Ranguelova
Introduction A continuously increasing interest in nuclear power, and particularly in small modular reactor (SMR)
technologies, has been expressed over the past several years by numerous IAEA Member States particularly in
contributing to the mitigation of climate change. Today there are over seventy (70) SMR designs under development
according to the IAEA booklet Advances in Small Modular Reactor Technology Developments, a Supplement to IAEA
Advanced Reactors Information System (ARIS) [5]. While SMRs are typically designed to generate electric power up to
300 MW, many new designs are also designed for other heat production applications, such as district heating,
desalination and hydrogen production or a combination of the former.
SMRs present novel features and
innovative technologies, including
different types of coolant, nuclear fuel
and neutron spectrums and inherent
safety features. As for all reactors,
SMRs shall meet the objective of
ensuring the protection of people and
the environment from the harmful
effects of ionizing radiation. A key
element of meeting this objective
is demonstrating compliance with
fundamental safety principles and
safety requirements.
The IAEA safety standards reflect a
widely accepted extensive approach
to ensure nuclear safety, establishing
safety principles, requirements and
associated guidance. The IAEA safety
standards are Member States consensus
based documents that have
been developed in an iterative fashion
and capture wider aspects of legal,
regulatory, siting, design, construction,
commissioning, operation, decommissioning,
and release from
regulatory control of nuclear facilities
and radioactive waste management,
including disposal. Although the IAEA
safety standards are considered to
be technology neutral, they are influenced
by specific issues pertaining to
water cooled large reactors technology
as most of the experience and
knowledge in the Member States
contributing to the development of
safety standards is based predominantly
the existing technology.
In recent years, the IAEA has
undertaken various initiatives to
review the applicability of certain
safety standards to particular types of
SMRs. Until now, however, the IAEA
has not systematically assessed the
applicability of the IAEA safety
standards to all types of SMRs
through out their entire lifecycle.
Therefore, the IAEA has developed
and is implementing an approach for
the identification of areas of nonapplicability
of the IAEA safety
standards, to suggest compensatory
measures to close any identified gaps,
in order to address the needs of the
Member States.
The Early Work
The current approach adopted by the
IAEA builds on the early work
performed for the preparation of the
IAEA in TecDoc-1936 [1] establishing
the engineering judgement necessary
to apply the design safety requirements
contained in SSR-2/1 (Rev. 1)
[2] to light water cooled and
high temperature gas cooled SMRs
(LW-SMRs and HTG-SMRs).
A team of international experts
between 2016 and 2018 (see
TecDoc-1936 [1], pg 144-145 ) was
asked by the IAEA to perform a pilot
study to assess, with comments, the
applicability of SSR-2/1 (Rev. 1) [2] to
the aforementioned SMR tech nologies
on the basis of the following criteria:
p Applicable as is
p Applicable with modification
p Applicable with interpretation
p Not applicable
The participants were also encouraged
to include any recommendations
for new criteria not covered in SSR-
2/1 (Rev. 1) [2] and to provide technical
rationale for their recommendations.
Applicable with modification
inferred the need for the text to be
updated for the requirement to be
applicable to the specific design,
whereas applicable with interpretation
inferred the need to modify
definitions of pre-existing terminology
to encompass the new technologies.
The Member States’ contributions
were merged and refined
into one comprehensive working
document to provide an overarching
list of recommendations. The creation
of this working document highlighted
the need for the two SMR designs
assessed to initially be discussed
independently in reference to their
applicability to SSR-2/1 (Rev. 1) [2].
The working document, in its final
form, evaluated the applicability of
each of the 82 design safety requirements
established in SSR-2/1 (Rev. 1)
[2] to LW-SMRs and HTG-SMRs. The
initial findings from the LW-SMR
working group were presented and
published at an international IAEA
conference in 2017 [4]. The working
material developed in this manner
was channelled into an evolving project
report that forms the basis of
Appendixes I and II and Annex I in
IAEA TecDoc-1936 [1]. The IAEA
officers responsible for the development
of this pilot study report were
Kristine M.. Madden and Ramsey
Arnold of the Division of Nuclear
Installation Safety IAEA. The results
of the study were subsequently extensively
used to prepare an IAEA official
publication. The work was completed
by a team of international experts (see
TecDoc-1936 [1], pg 143) with IAEA
responsible officer Palmiro Villalibre
Ares of the Division of Nuclear Installation
Safety in the form of
TecDoc-1936 [1].
Current applicability review
approach
The ongoing review of applicability of
the safety standards builds on previous
experiences and aims to consider
in a holistic manner whether the
current requirements and recommendations
for SMRs cover the safety
issues related to the new possibilities
opened by the novel designs or, on the
contrary, if there are gaps that need to
be addressed to ensure that the level
of safety established by the IAEA
fundamental safety principles will be
complied with.
The level of safety defined by the
Safety Objective and the Safety
Fundamentals [6] is considered as the
departing point for the study. The
review therefore focuses only on
the applicability of the requirements
and recommendations to meet the
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overall high level of safety defined in
the Fundamental Safety Principles:
Safety Fundamentals (SF-1) [6].
It is also expected that key elements
of the safety design approach remain
applicable to these technologies
although additional guidance in the
implementation may be necessary,
such as
p Defence in depth
p The elimination of high radiation
doses to workers
p The practical elimination of early
release
It is also important to clarify that the
scope of some SSGs may be wider than
the scope of the safety requirements.
These SSGs reflect the best practices in
Member States. The lack of linkage
with safety requirements may lead to
additional consideration on how to
define the design objectives in terms of
acceptability of the consequences of
novel accident scenarios.
To achieve this objective, the
review approach follows four steps
that are presented in detail in this
publication to identify:
p the relevant safety standards to be
considered in the review
p areas of novelty when compared to
operating land-based water-cooled
large reactors
p gaps in the applicability of the
safety standards to SMRs, based on
the areas of novelty identified.
p areas of where the safety standards
may not be applicable or could be
adapted for a better application
to novel design to some SMRs,
based on the areas of novelty
identified.
Identification of the relevant
safety areas to be considered
in the review
The safety areas and topics considered
in the applicability review are presented
in the table.
Identification of areas
of novelty
The first step of the applicability
review is the identification of areas of
novelty in the lifecycle of the SMR
when compared with land based
water- cooled large reactors.
The technologies considered as
part of the review include transportable
SMR, micro-sized reactors water
cooled SMRs, and non-water SMRs
(sodium fast reactors, lead fast reactors,
high temperature gas cooled reactors,
molten salt reactors).
The identification of areas of novelty
is based on a systematic comparison
of the characteristics of SMRs with a
Light-water Cooled Reactor Reference
defined as part of the project.
The characterization of these
technologies in terms of areas of
novelty is developed at the onset
based on expert knowledge, literature
review and detailed questionnaires
responses by technology developers,
reflecting designers’ current practices
and claims. This information is then
reviewed by regulatory authorities,
technical support organisations and
Safety Areas
Siting
Design and
Construction
Fuel Cycle
Waste
Management
Facilities and
Decommissioning
Safety
Assessment
Operation and
Commissioning
LMfS
Legal and
Regulation
Safety Topics
other organisations from member
states participating in the project.
Identification of gaps in the
applicability of the safety
standards to identified areas
of novelty
The areas of novelty identified are
compared to the contents of the
IAEA safety standards in terms of
Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installations
p Site survey and site selection
p Consideration of external events in site evaluation for NPPs
p Dispersion of radioactive material in site evaluation for NPPs
Safety in Design for NPPs
p Safety classification
p The design of key reactor safety systems: the reactor core, the containment and associated systems and
the reactor coolant system and associated systems
p The design of electrical power systems
p Instrumentation and control systems
p The design of fuel handling and storage systems for NPPs
p The application of the human factors engineering in the design
p External hazards in the design
p Internal hazards
p Radiation protection and radioactive waste management
p Construction for nuclear installations
Safety of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities
p Safety of conversion facilities and uranium enrichment facilities
p Safety of uranium fuel fabrication facilities
p Safety of uranium and plutonium mixed oxide fuel fabrication facilities
p Safety of nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities
p Safety of nuclear fuel cycle research and development facilities
p Criticality safety in the handling of fissile material
Predisposal Management of Radioactive Waste and Decommissioning
p Disposal of radioactive waste
p Classification of radioactive waste
p The safety case and safety assessment for the predisposal management of radioactive waste
p Leadership, management and culture for safety in radioactive waste management
p Predisposal management of radioactive waste from NPPs and research reactors
p Storage of radioactive waste
p The safety case and safety assessment for the disposal of radioactive waste.
p Geological disposal of radioactive waste
p Near surface disposal of radioactive waste
p Decommissioning of nuclear power plants, research reactors and other nuclear fuel cycle facilities
p Release of sites from regulatory control on termination of practices
p Storage of spent fuel pool
Safety Assessment for Activities and Facilities
p The structure and content of the safety analysis report
p The development and application to nuclear power plants of deterministic safety analysis and probabilistic
safety analysis
p The conduct of a periodic safety review (PSR) for an existing nuclear power plant
Commissioning and Operations
p Commissioning
p Conduct of operations at nuclear power plants
p Operational limits and conditions and operating procedures for nuclear power plants
p Fire safety in the operation of nuclear power plants
p Maintenance, surveillance and in-service
p Modifications to nuclear power plants
p Core management and fuel handling for nuclear power plants and criticality safety in the handling of
fissile material
p Operating experience feedback for nuclear installations
p Ageing management and development of a programme for long term operation of nuclear power plants
p Chemistry programme for water cooled nuclear power plants
p The evaluation of seismic safety for nuclear installations
p Accident management programme for a NPP
Leadership and Management for Safety (LMfS)
p The operating organization
p The recruitment, qualification and training
p The application of management systems to facilities
p The management system for nuclear installations
p Establishing the safety infrastructure for a nuclear power programme
Legal and Regulation
p Organisation etc. for regulatory body
p Functions and processes of the regulatory body
p Licensing process for nuclear installations regulatory control of radiactive discharges to the environment
ENVIRONMENT AND SAFETY 57
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ENVIRONMENT AND SAFETY 58
requirements and recommendations.
Gaps in the safety standards may be
associated to one or several of the following
areas of novelty:
p New barriers, new safety functions
or new provisions to deliver the
safety functions.
p New failure mechanisms, faults,
phenomena that could lead to the
failure of a barrier or a provision to
deliver a safety function.
p Eliminated failure modes, faults,
phenomena by design which
may imply the need for additional
design requirements and/or
recommendations.
p The use of new technologies,
including new fuels, new coolants,
novel safety provisions, novel
materials and construction/manufacturing
techniques that could
lead to the need for additional
requirements and/or recommendations
(e.g. recommendations for
fuel qualification, qualification of
materials to higher temperatures,
use of more corrosive coolants, etc.)
p New operating, maintenance,
testing, refuelling and/or wates
management strategies.
p New facilities and/or activities on
site and/or off site needed to support
the construction, ope ration
and/or post-operation management
of the nuclear power plant.
To ensure exhaustivity, for each of the
above areas, the potential gaps are
closely examined to judge if existing
requirements and recommendations
are sufficiently overarching to address
the specific differences. In some cases,
additional and more detailed review
may be necessary at a later stage to
characterise and confirm the identified
potential gaps.
Identification of areas where
the safety standards may not
be applicable to (some) areas
of novelty
The areas of novelty identified are
then compared to the requirements
and recommendation in the safety
standards. Areas of non-applicability
in the safety standards may be associated
to one or several of the following
novelties:
p Failure modes, faults, phenomena
typically considered in light-water
cooled reactor reference that are
not relevant to the design, which
may imply some requirements
and/or recommendations may not
be applicable
p Safety functions and provisions to
deliver these functions that are no
longer needed which may imply
some requirements and/or recommendations
may not be applicable
p New operating, maintenance,
testing, refuelling and/or postoperation
management strategies
which may imply some requirements
and/or recommendations
may not be applicable
When areas of non-applicability are
identified, the review also considers:
p If there are associated gaps (not
identified in the gap review)
p If there is sufficient experience to
confirm that the relevant areas
of the safety standards are not
applicable. In some cases, claims
may have not been confirmed by
sufficient operating experience or
there are still considerable uncertainties
related to the areas of
novelty. For these cases additional
features may be needed in the
design until sufficient experience is
available. The potential nonapplicability
and uncertainty will
be captured in the review.
Expected outcomes
The IAEA expects to publish this work
as a Safety Report providing a roadmap
for the applicability of the IAEA
safety standards to novel advanced
reactors and particularly SMRs
throughout their entire lifecycle. The
large team of IAEA experts and international
experts from member states
supporting the development and implementation
of the presented
approach will be acknowledged in the
Safety Report publication.
As a secondary outcome, it may be
possible to further analyse gaps and
areas of non-applicability to identify
potential pathways for resolution and
help to build a further programme
of work to address areas of nonapplicability
and potential gaps.
References
[1] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Applicability of
Design Safety Requirements to Small Modular Reactor
Technologies Intended for Near Term Deployment: Light Water
Reactors and High Temperature Gas Cooled Reactors, IAEA
Technical Document No. 1936, IAEA, Vienna (2021).
[2] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Safety of Nuclear
Power Plants: Design, IAEA Safety Standards Series No.
SSR-2/1 (Rev. 1), IAEA, Vienna (2016).
[3] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, IAEA Safety
Glossary: Terminology Used in Nuclear Safety and Radiation
Protection (2007 Edition), IAEA, Vienna (2007).
[4] K. Madden et al. “Applicability of IAEA Safety Standard SSR-
2/1 to Water Cooled Small Modular Reactors”. Proceedings of
an International Conference organized by the International
Atomic Energy Agency held in Vienna, 6 – 9 June 2017:
Topical Issues in Nuclear Installation Safety: Safety
Demonstration of Advanced Water Cooled Nuclear Power
Plants, V2. IAEA, Vienna (2018).
[5] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Advances in Small
Modular Reactor Technology Developments, a Supplement to
IAEA Advanced Reactors Information System (ARIS), IAEA
Booklet, 2020 Edition, IAEA, Vienna (2020).
[6] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Fundamental
Safety Principles, IAEA, Vienna (2006).
Authors
Paula Calle Vives
(Lead Author)
Senior Nuclear
Safety Officer
International Atomic
Energy Agency
P.Calle-Vives@iaea.org
Paula Calle Vives is a Senior Nuclear Safety Officer at the
IAEA and the Lead of SMRs and other cross cutting topics
at the Safety Assessment Section. She chairs the IAEA
Working Group on SMR Safety and leads the review of
applicability of the IAEA Safety Standards to novel
advanced reactors. Previously, she was the Delivery Lead
of Advanced Nuclear Technologies at the Office for
Nuclear Regulation (ONR), UK. As a Principal Inspector,
she also undertook roles on regulation of new build and
operating reactors. Before ONR, she was a Senior Safety
Engineer working in UK operating reactors, and
developed proba bilistic safety analysis research in France.
Paula holds a double nuclear engineering master’s degree
(Universidad Politécnica de Madrid and Ecole Centrale de
Nantes) as well as an international relations master’s
degree (University of Cambridge).
Kristine Madden
Associate Nuclear
Safety Officer
International Atomic
Energy Agency
K.Madden@iaea.org
Kristine Madden is a creative and results driven nuclear
industry leader with over ten years of progressive leadership
experience across a broad range of diverse industry
segments, including deterrence, non-proliferation, nuclear
safety, nuclear security and nuclear energy. Kristine is currently
a Nuclear Safeguards Inspector at the Inter national
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), where she also previously
worked on SMR and emergency response initiatives
within the Department for Nuclear Safety and Security.
Prior to joining the IAEA, she led licensing initiatives for
the Chernobyl ISF-2 project for Holtec International and
was a Senior Reactor Operator, INPO Engineering Coordinator
and Reactor Engineer at USA based nuclear power
plants. Kristine is completing her master’s degree in International
Relations at the University of Cambridge and
holds a bachelor’s degree in nuclear engineering and
radiological sciences from the University of Michigan.
Vesselina Rangelova
Safety Assessment
Section Head
International Atomic
Energy Agency
V.Ranguelova@iaea.org
Vesselina is the Head of the Safety Assessment Section, Department
of Safety and Security at the International Atomic
Energy Agency, managing the IAEA activities on design
safety and safety assessment of nuclear power plants.
Previously, she led the IAEA Operational Safety Review
Team (OSART) to assess operational safety of Nuclear
Power Plants in IAEA Member States. Before joi ning the
IAEA, she was coordinating the implementation of the
European Commission Joint Research Centre EURATOM
research and training programme on nuclear safety and
security. Vesselina holds a master of science degree in
nuclear engineering from Moscow Power Engineering University
and post graduate diploma in probabilistic safety
assessment techniques from Manchester University.
Environment and Safety
IAEA Approach to Review the Applicability of the Safety Standards to Small Modular Reactors ı Paula Calle Vives, Kristine Madden and Vesselina Ranguelova
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A Zero-power Facility as a Multi-fold
Opportunity to Support Quick Progress
in Innovative Reactor Development
Bruno Merk, Dzianis Litskevich, Anna Detkina, Greg Cartland-Glover, Seddon Atknison and Mark Bankhead
Introduction and history Nuclear has a very unique role to play in a sustainable energy future, since it is the
only currently available technology which can assure 24/7 availability and controllability while delivering massive
amounts of low carbon energy on demand for a net-zero future. However, in the recent decades there has not been any
significant progress in the development of viable innovative nuclear technologies in comparison with the golden age of
the nuclear development (1950’s-1970’s). Most new designs are iterative improvements of the nuclear technologies
developed at that time (e. g. EPR in France, BN in Russia), or are more radical designs with little substantiation with an
exception made for BREST-OD-300 [1], currently under development/construction [2]. Regardless of the different
nuclear technologies studied and developed, the majority of the NPPs built around the world are still light water
reactors. Unfortunately, light water reactor technologies have their limits due to their operational characteristics and
cannot address major challenges which nuclear industry faces at the moment. Core points are: reducing nuclear waste,
the availability of resources to manage assets over 100’s years and the complexity systems leading to elevated cost. To
be accepted by both, business and public, nuclear must deliver and be cost competitive compared to other flexible,
on-demand producing, power plants with similar financial risks applied. Thus, nuclear needs innovations to be more
sustainable, but even more importantly, we need to regrow the trust that nuclear can deliver these innovations. Finally,
we need innovative approaches to reduce the risks associated with nuclear power plant construction becoming complex
mega projects.
59
RESEARCH AND INNOVATION
Looking back to the most recent
western nuclear reactors put into
operation as well as the current new
build projects, the demand for risk
reduction should be evident. The time
since the last reactor being put into
operation in the west indicates that
we will have a problem when we
intend to rely on experience.
Looking into innovative reactor
development, the last building projects
fall into the 1980ies, followed by
very mixed levels of success on operation.
The German THTR project to
build an industrial demonstrator for
high temperature reactor technology
lasted from 1971 to 1985 with the
permanent shutdown in 1988. The
French SUPERPHENIX construction
took from 1976 to 1985 and the
reactor was permanently shutdown
1998 never delivering an Energy
Availability Factor above 33 % and
most of the time below 15 %. The
UK fast reactor project in Dounreay
indicates comparable dates and outcomes,
construction started in 1966,
Country
Western Reactors
under construction
first criticality in 1974 with a load
factor of below 30 % and the shutdown
in 1994 (all data from [3]).
Obviously, if we want to be successful
in delivering innovative reactors,
we need to learn again, and this
should happen in a smart way. The
key will be to receive timely feedback/
quick response on the decisions made
instead of the long lead times which
results typically in high costs when
late adaptions are required, see e. g.
the Olkiluoto or the Vogtle project,
where changes in the later construction
phase have not only led to higher
costs but also to massive time delays
which is maybe even more important.
To support the required learning,
we need an innovative and efficient
approach, start smart and small –
looking back to early reactor developments,
zero/low power reactors have
been used as a test bed for the next
steps [5, 6] which seems to be highly
promising. The main challenge will be
to make the best out of the money and
to use the time wisely.
Reactor
type
Construction
start year
USA Watts Bar-1 WH 4LP 1973 1996
USA River Bend GE BWR 1977 1985
France Chooz B N4 1984 1996
France Civaux N4 1988 1997
USA Watts Bar-2 WH 4LP 1973/2007 2016
| Table 1
The last constructed nuclear power plants and their grid connection [3].
Grid
connection
p How is starting small possible
in a highly complex multi-billion
industry?
p How did we do this in the 50ies and
60ies? Can we repeat this? What
do we need to do differently in the
21 st century?
p How important are collaborative
opportunities to support upskilling
and engineering development?
The fundamental problem is, when
building an innovative reactor there is
no experience, no plan, so appropriate
cost management is almost impossible
because we don’t know all the steps,
the required technologies, and the
challenges (unknown unknowns).
Introducing a structured process to
the R&D will be a key requirement and
will help to define a structured
approach to the first of a kind (FOAK)
or the later serial build. Learning on a
small real project and going in steps
will allow us to achieve a more
efficient cost reduction than just
learning from experience which typically
takes place at a very later stage of
the project which leads to delays and
cost over runs. These multiple arguments
speak for starting a new, innovative
reactor programme on a small
scale using a zero-power reactor to
reduce the risk of the whole development
program.
Why do we need this program?
The last indigenous reactor in the UK
was constructed 1980 and put into
operation in 1988, while the design
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A Zero-power Facility as a Multi-fold Opportunity to Support Quick Progress in Innovative Reactor Development ı Bruno Merk, Dzianis Litskevich, Anna Detkina, Greg Cartland-Glover, Seddon Atknison and Mark Bankhead
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RESEARCH AND INNOVATION 60
The Dungeness disaster
Construction on the new AGR at Dungeness B started in
January 1966. A later historian of the privatization of the
British electricity industry described it as “the single most
disastrous engineering project undertaken in Britain”
[Henney (1994) p. 131]. Among a certain generation of
people, Dungeness B is still a byword for failure of
construction, design and project management on a heroic
scale. The project was beset by delays, strikes and cost
overruns.
Henney, A (1994). A Study of the Privatisation of the Electricity
Supply Industry in England & Wales,
London: Energy Economic Engineering
| Figure 1
Simon Taylor (2016) The Fall and Rise of Nuclear Power in Britain:
A history [8].
also occurred several decades earlier
and the knowledge was not passed
onto the next generation. This has led
to a significant reduction in the
number of the specialists in the
nuclear sector. Looking deeper, the
last indigenous development of a
reactor has been delivered in the late
1960ies, see Figure 1. This development
was pushed by an ambitious
construction programme aiming to
deliver five twin reactor stations and
was quickly rolled out to support
business since export orders were
eagerly anticipated. Thus, the situation
seems to be a bit like the todays
nuclear renaissance supported by
the BEIS (Department for Business,
Energy & Industrial Strategy) nuclear
innovation program (NIP) [7] with
the aim to produce business opportunities
for UK plc and to become a top
table nation in nuclear latest in 2050
to support the green recovery.
The lead station of the AGR program
was Dungeness B which could
be seen as industrial demonstrator
and a first of a kind and it was a direct
step into a large station without real
stepwise development. It was ordered
in 1965 with a targeted completion
date of 1970. The project did not
progress as expected, being several
times delayed after problems in many
aspects of the reactor design, a bit
comparable to today’s mega projects,
see Figure 1. Finally, electricity generation
began in 1983, 13 years late,
while full power was reached for the
first time in 2004, roughly 38 years
after construction began [8]. Another,
early example how costly and time
consuming it can be to learn on a full
power project. The last, more successful,
reactor of the AGR fleet was connected
to the grid in 1989, thus the
last classical UK thermal reactor project
finished construction more than
30 years ago. The last delivery in the
innovative reactor program was the
prototype fast reactor (PFR) which
was announced in 1966 to be built at
Dounreay. The PFR achieved first
criticality in 1974 and grid connection
1975.
Thus, the design of the reactor
system of the commercial fleet took
place in the early 1960ies and the
design of the innovative reactor
system just shortly after, leading to
the situation that the last experience
of construction, commissioning, and
connection to the grid took place in
the late 1980ies [3]. This is a UK view,
but only the dates will be slightly
different in other western countries,
while the introduction just shows that
the situation is comparable. Maybe
the length of time period will be
slightly smaller, but in all cases, it is
too far back in time to rely on the
experience gained at that time.
The key questions to answer are:
p What should we learn from this
history to avoid repetition of such a
very costly disasters – costly in
regards not only to money, but also
with regards to time?
p How can we re-gain experience
and quick response in the whole
process?
p How can we reduce the risk in the
project as mentioned at the end of
the introduction?
A key point will be to learn and to
re- educate experts for the nuclear
renaissance since the historic expertise
is obviously lost. In addition, we
can neither afford massive delays
which are predictable and costly when
problems appear at the very late stage
of a project, e.g. in the middle of
construction, nor do we have time to
waste if nuclear should make a
real contribution to a future net-zero
society. Luckily, the situation still
allows us to deliver on these tasks if
we start now and if we use time and
resources wisely. Moreover, in comparison
with the 1960ies we have
more robust and efficient simulation
tools which should speed up the R&D
activities. Digitalisation will help the
whole process via end to end support
and by adopted working practices
instead of simply sending more information
to key stakeholders creating a
decision-making bottleneck. To make
this possible some tools require
targeted validation for the innovative
reactor designs to leverage their
full potential and to reduce time of
development and costs significantly.
The learning has to be supported
by creating a structured programme
from feasibility through to construction,
see Figure 2, in combination
with following the recently proposed
4 step process [6] consisting of preliminary
studies, an experimental
phase starting with the zero power
reactor as the key steps towards
feasibility. This will support the smallscale
demonstrator providing information
for the preliminary design
with the first experience of nuclear
power production in a new kind of
reactor. However, in an innovative
reactor development, FOAK is going
all the way through this cycle in each
step. We need to build a complete
programme at sufficient detail encompassing
all of the R&D and skills
development required to effectively
project manage the delivery of each
step right-to-left (thus backwards)
engaging all of the stakeholders at
each level in the process.
| Figure 2
A structured program for the development of a nuclear reactor along the recommendations in a WNA white paper [9].
Research and Innovation
A Zero-power Facility as a Multi-fold Opportunity to Support Quick Progress in Innovative Reactor Development ı Bruno Merk, Dzianis Litskevich, Anna Detkina, Greg Cartland-Glover, Seddon Atknison and Mark Bankhead
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All mentioned points demonstrate
that we need a new strategy to speed
up learning by identifying strengths
and weaknesses of the capabilities
and the current capacities available to
be able to deliver the end-to-end
approach developed above. Key will
be to work on the known unknowns
and to identify early the unknown
unknowns – areas where the community
is weak, but where we are not
aware of the weakness or the lack of
knowledge. Testing procedures and
technologies early and on smaller
scale will be of high importance to
avoid costly late failures.
Opportunities of a zero- power
reactor as a first step
Developing and delivering an indigenous
zero-power facility should be the
most promising first step into any
innovative reactor program as a part
of an active risk limitation program
for the whole nuclear reactor development.
The zero-power facility has the
potential to be used as a multi-fold
opportunity, since it is more than a
system that can be used for the validation
of numerical models and their
inherent approximations. It is a FOAK
and the opportunity to go through the
whole process from design to operation
of an innovative reactor facility
testing the feasibility, but in contrast
to any larger reactor it is delivering a:
p low cost opportunity compared to
a power reactor due to limited size
and significantly reduced system
complexity
p low risk opportunity in time,
finance, and nuclear – it is not
rocket science, GUINEVERE [15]
has finally been successfully
delivered – here the reduced complexity
is key, it reduces the number
of critical tasks and the required
safety systems. However, all key
components for the nuclear island
and the fuel production have to be
designed, regulated, and delivered
p less complex project, no heat transfer
and no power conversion
system are needed, no extensive
multi-redundant and diverse safety
systems are required as well as no
expensive mitigation devices like a
containment
p quick response opportunity, since
such a project should not take
more than 3 to 5 years, a quick
turnaround and an accelerated
learning curve will be seen.
Knowledge and capacity gaps will
be identified in short time creating
less costly opportunities to close
gaps and even change/adapt the
final pro duct in a comparably late
project phase.
p High flexibility of the facility itself
which could be equipped with
a new core (as done in the
GUINEVERE project) if another
technology should be investigated
A zero-power facility for a new technology
is a comparably small project,
which still requires the whole production
chain for a nuclear reactor, while
it requests collaboration in an interdisciplinary
team. Thus, it will be a
perfect test case for the readiness for
future, larger projects, assuring an
accelerated learning curve in an innovative
reactor technology on:
p designing,
p licensing,
p constructing,
p commissioning, and
p operation
Where can these advantages
be delivered?
As previously mentioned, the zeropower
facility is a low cost, low risk,
quick response project which delivers
opportunities on different levels, see
Figure 3.
The opportunities of the facility are
in detail:
p Manufacturing
Manufacturing an innovative
reactor of a new technology will
help identifying weak points
( unknown unknowns), upskilling
demands, and already available
pockets of expertise. It will allow
developing and testing of new technological
approaches and advanced
manufacturing techno logies on a
small scale and support the creation
of a core team of experts with
real hands on experience for the
following small scale demonstrator
which would make the UK an
| Figure 3
The multiple opportunities which can be delivered in a zero-power facility.
attractive location to deploy these
designs. Testing of new components,
e. g. establishing a pre-industrial
fuel production. It will help
creating and educating the required
supply chain for the technologies.
All points will be essential for progressing
into the next step of the
development process – the smallscale
demonstrator.
p Experiment
On the one hand, the experiment
will help in the education and
the qualification of future reactor
physics experts, which are highly
demanded worldwide. On the other
hand, it will help to improve the
recognition of reactor physics and
new reactor technologies. Thus, it
will attract bright students of future
generations into nuclear. The
investment in an experiment will
showcase the innovation potential
in nuclear technologies and the
drive to innovate to the public.
p Leading Science
Taking the lead through an investment
into advanced reactor technologies
such as the proposed
molten salt reactor technology.
The investment into the zeropower
facility will create a sustainable
long term claim in an innovative
reactor technology. The facility
will create the opportunity to provide
safety demonstrations and
code validation and deliver an
accelerated learning curve for the
operating entity as well as the local
academic community. The demonstration
opportunity will help
creating new IP for the country.
The facility will attract top scientists
to the country either in collaborations
or through relocation
while giving UK plc an advantageous
position.
RESEARCH AND INNOVATION 61
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A Zero-power Facility as a Multi-fold Opportunity to Support Quick Progress in Innovative Reactor Development ı Bruno Merk, Dzianis Litskevich, Anna Detkina, Greg Cartland-Glover, Seddon Atknison and Mark Bankhead
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RESEARCH AND INNOVATION 62
An already successful example:
p Business Opportunity
Finally, besides the leading science,
the facility will allow experiments
for international partners and for
industrial developers who cannot
afford to build their own zeropower
system, as has been
delivered for decades through
the BFS at IPPE Obninsk for international
sodium fast reactor
development or through the new
opportunities of GUINEVERE at
SCK∙CEN at Mol for lead cooled
fast reactor technologies. The
facility will serve industry to
support the home-grown supply
chain and link them to reactor
developers while earning money
through paid experiments.
How can these advantages be
delivered?
The key for the success will be to make
the most out of the money invested, as
well as to use the time available
wisely. The zero-power reactor project
has to deliver much more than only
results for code validation or safety
demonstration, which would be the
outcome of doing paid experiments at
another facility. Possible opportunities
are given above.
A zero-power reactor project can
build on these first approaches
delivered in project FAITH (see text
box), but it can and has to go much
further. The accelerated learning curve
starts already with the design and
manufacturing of a facility to study
innovative reactor development and
operation, not with the experiment.
Creating, enabling, and edu cating the
supply chain on a very small scale and
reduced complexity system, as a basis
for the next level of the small-scale
A first demonstrator of this approach is Project FAITH (Fuel
Assembly Incorporating Thermal Hydraulics) a multi- purpose
project using new, highly innovative approaches to make
better use out of the invested money. Main side purposes are:
Educating new partners from outside of the nuclear industry
how to deliver on nuclear standards while using already
established innovations from other technologies, e. g. modular
manufacturing established in ship building or application of
tailored materials through additive manufacturing. “In FAITH
we intend to demonstrate modular manufacturing on small
scale with low cost and complexity to quickly evaluate a key
technology for small modular reactors, while creating an
opportunity for qualification and education of the strongly
demanded workforce. This is delivered by a stepwise approach
from easy to build and operate experiments into future
cutting- edge science and technology with a complex and
challenging fluid. All surrounded by digital design and
development technologies from cradle to grave as well as the
approach to deliver a project management integrated with the
technical delivery. This will allow to include product quality
management into the digital twin as well as thinking in terms
of the whole project lifecycle using a common modelling
environment.” [9]
power demonstrator. Key points will be
to develop and test new approaches
(modular manufacturing, advanced
fuel production, and applying digital
twin technology across the whole lifecycle
of the asset), accept failure and
be prepared for a quick for recovery to
support rapid developments, but in
all cases by using small steps. This
approach reduces risk and promotes
learning and solving problems at each
step. Learning has to be seen as a process
making progress based on UK
capabilities and capacities instead of
just buying a product. It is about
involving all main suppliers into the
development instead of having just
suppliers delivering their parts. This
also implies using the available nuclear
chemistry expertise of academic partners
to improve the available database
for the pre- experiments required for
the design, as well as upgrading of
existing facilities to be able to deliver
on the new challenges, e.g. salt based
uranium fuels production. A further
opportunity is refurbishing existing
facilities and retaining the highly
skilled employees at these facilities
thus serving as a social-economic development
to support a new facility as
in the case of the VENUS facility at
SCK. This will be complemented by
linking with leading groups from outside
nuclear energy to involve them in
the project and attract available expertise
from other areas, e. g. detector
development for particle physics delive
ring UK’s contribution to CERN experiments
or modular manufacturing.
It is about using the experiment
to deliver a hands on education to give
the future experts a tier-one experience
in building a new type of reactor as well
as to operate the facility instead of
completely relying on modelling & simulation
as it has often become tradition
in reactor physics. The facility will offer
very effective accelerated learning to
the next generation of engineers and
scientists that comes with de signing,
developing and constructing the facility
as well as running and ana lyzing the
experiments. The facility will be at the
centre of a user community and
attracting international experts while
growing an experimental program for
a new type of zero- power experiment
in collaboration with national and
international partners. In addition, the
facility will allow the testing of new
detector technologies in a challenging
environment and potentially invest
into developing some tailored, innovative
detector technology.
The development of zero-power
experiments will proceed from easy
to complex to support the learning
process, a further example of learning
from project FAITH. Most probably, the
experimental campaign will be started
with experiments based on a solid salt
block operating at room temperature
to learn how to apply experimental
procedures from the ground, to test
detector technologies and establish the
data acquisition systems, while providing
first code validation data, but
keeping the commissioning process at
a much lower risk than a full power
system. This will be followed by the
much more complex experiments
using a liquid molten salt core to
demonstrate the real operational
behaviour of a liquid core including
feedbacks, power distribution, and the
effects of density changes which are
typically hard to observe and demonstrate
to the required accuracy with
traditional modelling and simulation.
Besides the technical advantages,
the investment into the development
and delivery of a zero-power facility
will demonstrate leadership in science
in an innovative reactor technology.
This is essential since “the start of a
nuclear programme is often associated
for with the first significant
reactor experiment” [6], thus the
project will create a major claim in
innovative nuclear of the 21st century.
It will mark a clear step for preparing
to become a leading player in new
nuclear in 2050 as it is expected in the
BEIS nuclear innovation program [7].
The zero-power experiment marks
a key crossroads for a technology, since
this facility will allow the delivery of
experiments which are essential for the
progress of a new technology to accelerate
the development process. On the
one hand, it is the first time that codes
can be evaluated on the real reactor behaviour
of a critical system. On the
other hand, it is the first time that
safety demonstrations can be delivered
which involve the neutronic behaviour
of the system. If the zero-power facility
is designed in a smart way, it will even
allow to deliver first coupled safety
demonstrations of a liquid core considering
not only the neutronics but
also thermodynamic effects and thermal
feedback effects. Typical, essential
safety de monstrations for a new, innovative
technology, thus a broad range
of proposed innovative reactor designs,
are required to be delivered through
experimental confirmation for licensing
of a power operation system are:
p of core criticality;
p of neutron flux, energy, and power
distribution;
p of reactivity coefficients;
Research and Innovation
A Zero-power Facility as a Multi-fold Opportunity to Support Quick Progress in Innovative Reactor Development ı Bruno Merk, Dzianis Litskevich, Anna Detkina, Greg Cartland-Glover, Seddon Atknison and Mark Bankhead
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| Figure 4
Opportunities in the different steps given by a zero-power facility at one glance.
p of changes in reactivity and flux as
a function of salt density, temperature
and composition change
Applying a smart design of a zeropower
facility for molten salt technology
will allow these demonstrations
without the requirement for a
considerable nuclear power production,
which typically requires a
powerful cooling system and strong
radiation protection measures.
Delivering the zero-power facility
will create a focal point for a longerterm
game changer technology which
will support the formation of the
teams and educating the specialist for
the next step in the process. The
facility opens the opportunity for
spin-offs of the technology already at
a very early stage through paid
experiments before achieving the
industrial scale demonstrator, see
Figure 4. The zero power experiments
help accelerating the next steps and
avoid potential mistakes (which can
be really costly for a large-scale
demonstrators) due to the availability
of experience and expertise with a
real project. The opportunity of quick
studies in a safe setting to test technologies
and to optimize new
approaches will create very valuable
experience and data. A role which has
been described through the development
of the German HTR program
where the zero-power experiment
KATHER was set up very late for the
design phase of the industrial demonstrator
[11].
However, it is important to keep in
mind that the use of the facility will
not be finished when the demonstration
and validation experiments
are finished. As described in the THTR
program the facility will help to speed
up the design process and reduce risks
during the small scale and later the
industrial demonstrator projects for
the iMAGINE technology [6]. The
facility has a strong potential to
support the education of future
reactor physics specialists through the
access to real world experiments. In
addition, zero-power reactors are a
well-recognized tool to deliver experiments
for money for start-ups around
the globe (e. g. Seaborg, TerraPower,
Moltex, Terrestrial Energy, etc.) to
support their development and their
interaction with the regulator as it is
today delivered at the BfS facility
in Obninsk [12, 13] and in the
GUNIEVERE facility in Mol [14, 15].
Figure 4 gives a collection of the
opportunities delivered through the
life of a future zero power facility.
How would the next steps
look like?
As already discussed the zero power
experiment is the first real world step
in the process of the development of
an innovative reactor program [6]
which delivers technology specific
hardware – thus it is often seen as the
start in a new reactor program leading
to the small scale and the industrial
demonstrator, see Figure 5. The role
of the facility for risk reduction has
been recently described by a highlevel
expert, the general director of
JSC “NIKIET”, in the opening remarks
for the Russian MSR project in
Zheleznogorsk [6] in October 2019.
“We all have to solve an extremely
ambitious task – to create a research
reactor here. There is no similar real
facility anywhere in the world. I am
| Figure 5
The process to develop an innovative, new reactor system, required governmental
investment structure in a successful program and resulting skills development and growth.
convinced that we will succeed, we
will be the first. … we will go in stages.
First of all, the creation of a research
reactor for testing technologies. Let‘s
move on to a large reactor with more
powerful parameters, having completely
developed the underlying technology.
The path is not fast, but it is
new, and it is impossible to not take
risks. At the same time, it is logical to
build our work as parallel as possible
in order to save time.” Thus, reducing
the risk is the key point even for the
very experienced Russian specialists.
For a country which has not delivered
an indigenous reactor for decades, the
other key point is creating a project
tolerant for expected failure through
developing methods to quickly recover
with reasonably small risk in time and
cost. This will assure an effective,
accelerated learning opportunity
which has to be delivered alongside a
consequent stepwise learning process
from one step to the other. Thus, the
approach is to lead by applying as
much testing and learning as possible
in the smallest and least complex units
as possible while using the experience
of the last step to support the next
one. This will assure the parallel development
of capabilities and capacities
where the core group of one step
will form the seed for the much larger
team required for the next step.
| Figure 6
Possible spin-offs in the different development steps during the process to develop an innovative reactor system.
RESEARCH AND INNOVATION 63
Research and Innovation
A Zero-power Facility as a Multi-fold Opportunity to Support Quick Progress in Innovative Reactor Development ı Bruno Merk, Dzianis Litskevich, Anna Detkina, Greg Cartland-Glover, Seddon Atknison and Mark Bankhead
atw Vol. 66 (2021) | Issue 3 ı May
RESEARCH AND INNOVATION 64
Considering all focus on the zero
power reactor experiments, it must be
clear it is only the first of the steps
required on the way to delivering
an innovative nuclear system, see
Figure 5 and Figure 6. For any kind of
investment planning, the multi-fold
opportunities of the zero-power
facility are a perfect example of
creating early wins on the way
through the process by delivering
more than just a facility to do the
required experiments. These spin-offs
are essential, due to the long timescales
of nuclear programs, since they
allow the investors to create some
early revenues, even before the final
step is delivered. These revenues can
be financial like paid experiments, but
in nuclear with the strong demand
on highly qualified subject matter
experts and complex manufacturing
challenges the most valuable spin-offs
are provided by growing capabilities
and capacities. However, for investors
into a successful new build program
based on innovative reactors it seems
that the risk reduction in cost and
delivery schedules through the stepwise
approach forms a key part for a
successful program.
Conclusions
The last innovative reactor projects
have been delivered more than
40 years ago, thus it will be almost
impossible to rely on the experience
from these projects. In addition,
recent reactor projects have suffered
from massive cost overruns and time
delays due to changes in a very late
project stage. Learning from this, for
innovative projects we need much
quicker feedback since the number of
unknowns and thus the risk will be
much larger than in LWR technology.
Thus, a new, historically proven way
to develop this industry is required. At
the point entering into a new, innovative
nuclear reactor technology, it is
important to find a new way to reduce
the project risks of each of the process
steps as a first of a kind.
The first step is traditionally via
zero power experiments. However, we
have highlighted here that the experiments
are only a small part of the
opportunities given by a zero-power
facility. Developing a zero-power
facility will deliver on several levels
starting with manufacturing of the
facility and the components which
demand the development of capabilities
and capacities while delivering a
strong learning process which is
required after no innovative reactor
has been built in the west and no native
reactor has been designed and built
within the last few generations within
the UK. The next required opportunity
will be provided by the experiment itself
which will help to grow capabilities
and capacities in operating a reactor
and developing experiments which in
turn will provide the chance for quick
learning. Investing into a zero- power
facility will demonstrate the willingness
to lead and the operation will deliver
leading science, providing unique
results and the oppor tunity to deliver
the very valu able scientific data for
code validation, but also the chance to
provide the essential experiments
which will be demanded for the regulation
process of a future small-scale
demonstrator. Finally, after the most
promising cutting-edge science feat of
delivering the experiments for the
countries own program, the zeropower
facility will give a good business
opportunity to deliver experiments on
demand for national and international
scientific and industrial partners.
On the one hand a zero-power
facility requires the same steps as that
of any full-scale reactor development
which is required; designing, licensing,
constructing, commissioning, and
operating of a nuclear facility. On the
other hand, such a facility is a low-cost
opportunity with limited size and
significantly reduced system complexity,
being a low risk opportunity in time,
finance, and nuclear – here the reduced
complexity is very helpful since it
reduces the number of critical tasks,
while all key technologies for the
nuclear island are required, but the
consequences of potential accidents
and the related mitigation measures
are not needed. However, due to the
reduced complexity, neither requiring
heat transfer and no power conversion
nor extensive multi redundant and
diverse safety systems, the adventure is
easier to overview and it will lead a
quick response. Delivering such a
facility should not take more than 3 to
5 years assuring a quick turnaround
and a accelerated learning curve.
All points together demonstrate
that a zero-power facility is a great,
multi- fold opportunity which could
deliver a quick and very efficient start
into a new, innovative nuclear program.
References:
[1] Dragunov, Yu & Lemekhov, V. & Smirnov, V. & Chernetsov, N.
(2012). Technical solutions and development stages for the
BREST-OD-300 reactor unit. Atomic Energy. 113. 10.1007/
s10512-012-9597-3.
[2] Construction licence issued for Russia‘s BREST reactor,
available: https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/
Construction-licence-issued-for-Russias-BREST-reac, accessed
22/03/2021
[3] https://pris.iaea.org/PRIS, accessed 22/03/2021
[4] Barakah Nuclear Energy Plant, available: https://www.enec.
gov.ae/barakah-plant/ , accessed 22/03/2021
[5] Government and Industry Roles in the Research,
Development, Demonstration, and Deployment of Commercial
Nuclear Reactors: Historical Review and Analysis. EPRI
2017. 3002010478
[6] B. Merk et al: “iMAGINE - A disruptive change to nuclear or
how can we make more out of the existing spent nuclear fuel
and what has to be done to make it possible in the UK?”,
atw 6/7 2019
[7] B. Merk et al. The UK nuclear R&D programme on digital
nuclear reactor design - modelling, simulation, and virtual
engineering, ICAPP 2018 : Charlotte, NC, 8-11 April 2018
[8] Simon Taylor (2016) The Fall and Rise of Nuclear Power in
Britain: A history, UIT Cambridge (2 Mar. 2016),
UIT Cambridge Ltd., Cambridge, United Kingdom
[9] Lesson-learning in Nuclear Construction Projects, World
Nuclear Association, April 2018, Report No. 2018/002
[10] M. Bankhead, B. Merk: Project FAITH description, c
urrently submitted to IMGENIA
[11] V. Drüke & D. Filges (1987) The Critical HTGR Test Facility
KAHTER–An Experimental Program for Verification of Theoretical
Models, Codes, and Nuclear Data Bases, Nuclear Science
and Engineering, 97:1, 30-36, DOI: 10.13182/NSE87-A23493
[12] Profile SFR-64, BFS-2, RUSSIA, available: https://nucleus.iaea.
org/sites/lmfns/Facility%20Country%20Profiles1/Profile%20
SFR-64%20Russia%20-BFS-2.pdf, accessed 22/03/2021
[13] I.P. Matveenko et al. EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES of BREST-
OD-300 REACTOR CHARACTERISTICS ON BFS FACILITIES,
available: https://inis.iaea.org/collection/NCLCollectionStore/
_Public/32/021/32021979.pdf, accessed 22/03/2021
[14] GUINEVERE: Generator of Uninterrupted Intense Neutron at
the lead VEnus REactor, available: https://science.sckcen.be/
en/Projects/Project/GUINEVERE, accessed 25/11/2020
[15] H. Aït Abderrahim and P. Baeten, “The GUINEVERE-project at
VENUS, project status,” in ECATS Meeting, Cadarache, France,
January 2008.
[16] https://www.sibghk.ru/news/9068-na-gkhk-proshlorabochee-soveshchanie-po-voprosu-sozdaniyazhidkosolevogo-reaktora.html
Authors
Prof. Bruno Merk
(Lead Author)
School of Engineering,
University of Liverpool,
United Kingdom
B.Merk@liverpool.ac.uk
Prof Bruno Merk is currently holding a Royal Academy
of Engineering Chair in Emerging Technologies for
advanced nuclear technologies. From 2015 to 2020,
he was holding the NNL/RAEng Research Chair in
Computational Modelling for Nuclear Engineering and
was NNL Laboratory Fellow for Physics of Nuclear
Reactors. Prior to moving to the UK, he was in a
leading position in the Helmholtz nuclear research
program NUSAFE and was advising the German
Academy for Science and Technology in the topic
nuclear waste management, giving political
recommendations.
Dzianis Litskevich
Anna Detkina
Seddon Atknison
School of Engineering, University of Liverpool,
United Kingdom
Greg Cartland-Glover
Scientific Computing Department, Science and
Technology Facilities Council, Daresbury Laboratory,
SciTech Daresbury, United Kingdom
Mark Bankhead
National Nuclear Laboratory, United Kingdom
Research and Innovation
A Zero-power Facility as a Multi-fold Opportunity to Support Quick Progress in Innovative Reactor Development ı Bruno Merk, Dzianis Litskevich, Anna Detkina, Greg Cartland-Glover, Seddon Atknison and Mark Bankhead
atw Vol. 66 (2021) | Issue 3 ı May
The Thorium Network –
An Introduction to Blockchain for SMRs
Dian Kemp, Hulmo Christiaansen, Yvette Kemp and Jeremiah E. Josey
Worldwide interest in adopting SMRs is on the rise. “SMRs everywhere” necessarily are safe, reliable and secure,
and this requires tracking tools for all activities of energy production. These tools answer questions of: “Where are the
SMRs?”, “What stage of their life cycle are they?”, “Where is the fuel in transit?”, “Where is the spent nuclear fuel?”,
“Where are the intermediate and low-level waste materials?”.
All of these questions can be answered
with one word: Blockchain.
Uncrackable, unhackable, immutable,
distributed: blockchain is the
modern marvel of the 21 st century.
The best example is the safe, secure
management of over 1 Trillion USD in
assets by the Bitcoin Protocol – the
leader in the Blockchain establishment
and growing from zero in 2009
to where it is today in only about 10
short years. It is used by millions of
people to store and transfer value all
over the planet.
But what does this have to do with
Small Modular Reactors (SMRs)? or
“Burners” as we like to call them.
Well, a lot actually. The present world’s
energy production from nuclear
energy is a little more than 10 %. And
that comes from about 440 installations
worldwide. With small burners
everywhere in the range from micro
(5 MW) to small (200 MW) and predicting
an uplift to 30 % of nuclear
energy production (as project financiers
and environmentalists converge
on the idea that wind and solar just
can’t do it). The number of machines
worldwide would balloon from current
numbers to perhaps 20,000 installations
or more. It’s a scenario screaming
for digitization. Blockchain does it
very very nicely.
But don’t worry about being first.
There are thousands of blockchain
projects worldwide today. Food
producers, shipping, even governments
are looking to move their entire
operation onto blockchain (Estonia
and Dubai are two leading examples).
Here’s a list of industries and how
blockchain is being deployed:
p Secure sharing of medical data;
p Music royalties tracking;
p Cross-border payments;
p Real-time IoT operating systems;
p Personal identity security;
p Anti-money laundering tracking
systems;
p Supply chain and logistics monitoring;
p Voting mechanisms;
p Advertising insights;
p Original content creation;
p Cryptocurrency exchange;
p Real estate processing platform;
IBM alone has been involved in over
400 blockchain projects ranging
from supply train logistics, shipping,
food and payments. So it’s only a
matter of time until Blockchain goes
Nuclear.
In the typical nuclear energy
production process, materials require
safeguarding due to the danger
these materials pose for weapons
manu facture and uncontrolled radiation
exposure. Safeguarding requires
a significant amount of administrative
paperwork. Digitization of this adminis
tration reduces the environmental
and financial costs of safeguarding
material from nuclear energy production.
However, housing all that
information in a single digital
location makes it vulnerable to a
single point of failure, malicious
attack, mani pulation and falsification.
With the anticipated expansion of
SMRs worldwide, this system is
destined to fail. By using a blockchain,
this problem is circumvented
through the design and use of the
blockchain.
The Thorium Network’s Honey
Badger TM is the first commercially
available decentralized nuclear lifecycle
tool that derives its security from
Blockchain. It is designed to be used
to digitize the supply chain of nuclear
materials, such as radioactive isotopes
or nuclides, and the machines producing
energy from them – the
“Burners”. The blockchain shares the
information over multiple nodes, peerto-peer,
it is censorship-resistant, with
each node using encrypted channels,
and every authorized party having a
copy of the blockchain. This safeguards
the information by prohibiting
a single point failure removing the
chance of a malicious party changing
critical information such as enrichment,
plutonium and fission product
content.
| Thorium in a bottle.
| Estimated Return in Investment in Energy Sytems
(Source: http://www.ansto.gov.au).
The blockchain is monitored on a
trust-less basis whereby everybody on
the network verifies it for itself and
checks each change. The resulting
consensus derives from the rules
requiring you to be compliant in such
a system. This makes it impossible
to maliciously change information
on the blockchain without anyone
noticing, as any changes will immediately
be recognized and be evaluated
for truth by the network. For this
reason, the integrity of the information
can be maintained indefinitely
while digitizing the information
and making it easily available to all
involved/authorized participants. In
order to improve access to the right
documents, a database of hash and
documents will be included within the
RESEARCH AND INNOVATION 65
Research and Innovation
The Thorium Network – An Introduction to Blockchain for SMRs ı Dian Kemp, Hulmo Christiaansen, Yvette Kemp and Jeremiah E. Josey
atw Vol. 66 (2021) | Issue 3 ı May
RESEARCH AND INNOVATION 66
| Thorium molten salt equipment: Circulation-loop.
blockchain. This will allow the documents
to be easily referenced while
keeping the document details and
hash connection secure.
A brief intro for the thorium
network and our ethos
The Thorium Network TM (TTN) is a
Swiss-based nuclear firm with the
objective of delivering thorium to the
market using blockchain technology.
The security and transparency of the
blockchain will allow for a digital
revolution in the manner in which we
will monitor and protect nuclear
energy. Small Modular Reactor (SMR)
technology is anticipated to expand
rapidly in the next decade. Non-
Nuclear-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
countries will pursue this technology
and if ineffective monitoring of the
material is allowed to pass, then we
can see 3 rd parties use the material.
For malicious means.
Placing all orders for fuel and
SMRs onto the blockchain. By
making it secure and transparent, will
allow non-NPT countries to pursue
nuclear energy. The blockchain will
allow for effective oversight and
monitoring of all SMRs from all over
the world from the comfort of your
home.
The expansion of SMR technology
worldwide will require effective
oversight which is unhackable, unchangeable
and available for a very
long time. The same blockchain will
be effective in the implementation of
Smart contracts, fuel transfer, waste
management and recording of the
material over a long period of time.
The blockchain is currently being
implemented in the transport and
transparency of medical isotope
transport, including value recording,
shielding calculations, on-time delivery
and faster more reliable delivery
of the medical isotopes.
The blockchain
The development of a thorium supply
chain has given The Thorium Network
new opportunities. These include the
upgrade of current nuclear supply
chains, such as nuclear equipment,
nuclear fuel, nuclear waste, and
medical isotopes using The Thorium
Network’s blockchain called Honey
Badger TM .
The problem with medical isotopes
is that from the point of production
the material has a short half-life. In
order to transport this material from
the production facility, a coordinated
group effort must be implemented
with all paperwork in place and all
transport approved. All of this documentation
traditionally is placed in a
hard copy which increases labor and
slows down an already time-sensitive
process. The advantage of using
blockchain technology is that all of
this paperwork can be compiled digitally
and be sent along with the supply
chain/blockchain. This will speed up
the process, reducing lost product
due to time delays in delivery and
incorrect paperwork. By using a
digital system using similar supply
chains and blockchains has reduced
cost by up to 70 %.
Going digital also allows for the
development of Smart contracts and
the ability to conduct online radiation
shielding calculations. It also allowsfor
real-time monitoring of the
package, its location and the status
of the container which houses the
isotopes. All of this information,
placed on the blockchain, will be
transparent to all approved interested
parties. This way the airline can see in
real-time the location of the transport
truck, the condition of the container,
time to delivery, the criticality of
the material, and have all necessary
paperwork for the journey already
on hand. This allows for better
| Thorium molten salt equipment: Purification.
coordination in the aircraft regarding
the location of the container, and if
any delays occur the airline is notified
timeously. By connecting a number of
transport logistics firms, in the event
that due to circumstances beyond the
firm’s control, like weather hold or
a change of aircraft, alternative
arrange ments can be made timeously
such that a minimal disruption of
product quantity occurs.
By going with a blockchain and the
supply of thorium, we are introducing
a new cryptocurrency token which will
be equivalent to 0.232 g of thorium
atoms. This token will be tradable on
the Swiss crypto exchange, similar to
other crypto- currency and will be used
as payment on the blockchain for
medical isotopes, fuel, components
and utilization of the blockchain.
The development into these new
fields increases the number of specialists
required such that expertise is
available for every facet of the nuclear
supply chain. This led to the creation
of a nuclear consultancy group called
SAFE Fission Consult TM . This group
is an international multidisciplinary
group in all fields related to the
nuclear fuel cycle, from universities to
accident investigations, financing of
nuclear plants, legislation creation,
new international nuclear programs,
mining and production of raw
materials by chemical means.
The senior advisory group is small
and can thus work fast while our list of
consultants is growing day by day.
This team is unique in the world due
to the length and breadth of experience
it has and the fact that today,
with zoom and the internet, can consult
anywhere in the world. This
panel, more importantly, are experts
in all things nuclear and have been
game-changers in the nuclear field.
Bringing in the thoriu