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SUnDAy, jAnUARy 16, 2022

4

Acting Editor & Publisher : Jobaer Alam

e-mail: editor@thebangladeshtoday.com

Sunday, January 16, 2022

Diversifying traditional

agriculture

Traditional agriculture- centering mainly on the

production of food grains-has served a purpose, no

doubt, in feeding the growing population of

Bangladesh. But this singular emphasis on food grain

production is also costing dear the country in different ways.

It has created the necessity or urgency of crop diversification.

Mono cropping or production of only food grains in the

same land round the year causes loss of soil fertility.

However, such fertility loss can be avoided if rotation of crops

or planting different crops at different times on the same land

is practiced. Besides, the singular pursuit of food grain

production leads to under production of non food grain crops

and increases the country's import dependence of their

products.

For example, from an exporter of spices, Bangladesh

turned into a net importer of the same in the last decade as

farmlands progressively were used less and less for spice

cultivation. Oilseeds are imported or in their crushed form to

meet the needs of cooking oil. But once upon a time,

Bangladesh was self sufficient in producing oilseeds to meet

its entire consumption requirements.

Besides, there are important crops-such as cotton and

rubber-the cultivation of which can substantially reduce

import dependence. Experiments established that cotton of

the finest quality can be produced in Bangladesh. The soil of

this country is well suited for high grade cotton cultivation.

The country's main export commodity at present is readymade

garments (RMG). But value-addition in the RMG

sector at present is only about 30 to 35 per cent. But the same

can climb to 70 per cent or above, fairly soon, if only cotton in

increased quantities is locally produced to be used for making

yarn and fabric. In that case, foreign exchange earnings from

the RMG sector will also rise substantially. Extension of

rubber cultivation to the same end is also possible.

Similarly, stepped up production of oilseeds and spices can

lead to a substantial saving of foreign currency by much

reducing the import needs of these commodities. The

cumulative effect of the wider and successful production of

these non food grain crops will translate into vital balance of

payments support for the country by reducing imports and

increasing export values. Furthermore, production of these

within the country will also aid crucially in their price

stabilsation when the higher import costs of these are

tormenting the consumers .

Understandably, the demand of the country's huge

population for basic food creates the compulsion for using

lands very extensively for food grain production. But this

problem can be circumvented considerably by going for

higher yields of food grains from limited lands to set free

considerable lands for the cultivation of non food grain and

new crops. This strategy might ensure continued high

production of food grains while also freeing up farmlands for

planting the non food grain crops.

One study has found that improved or high yielding seeds

for food grains are being sowed in only 20 per cent of the

cultivated areas. If only the rate of application of improved or

higher yielding seeds can be increased to 50 or 60 per cent,

then production of food grains can more than double. In that

case, more than self sufficiency in food grains production can

be achieved that would also create conditions for using a

sizeable part of the farm lands for producing non food grain

crops.

It might also be assessed whether expanding acreage under

non food grain crops and achieving import substitution

means a greater saving of resources even if import of food

grains increase somewhat as more lands are devoted to the

non food grain crops. It is very likely that even increasing

food imports to some extent to release lands for the

cultivation of non food grain crops might effect a greater

saving of resources at some stage than the present scenario of

near self reliance in food but growing import dependence of

other agricultural products.

Then, there are other products to be derived from lands

which have much prospects namely baby corn, gherkin, cut

flowers, orchids and condiments. All of these and more can

be grown in the country especially with an eye for export.

Thus, these soil derived commodities can open up a rich new

field of export. However, to successfully diversify into these

areas of production, it will be necessary to build capacities at

all levels in respect of technology, standardisation,

infrastructural and institutional facilities right from the start

of production stages to export.

Government declared diversification of agriculture and

export of new agriculture oriented products as its thrust

policy some years ago. Venture capital and other forms of

patronization to this end were also declared. But evidences of

vigorous implementation of the policy or its notable bearing

of fruit, is not visible. If the policy has been slow in

implementation, then it needs serious investigations why it

is not creating the desired impact. After such an assessment

and identification of the bottlenecks, it can be recast with

emphasis amended or increased in different areas, as

required, and also increases in support activities accordingly.

Diversification of agriculture in support of the above

objectives is a pressing need indeed for the national

economy.

Rich Western countries stand by as Afghans face starvation

On January 11, the United Nations

emergency relief coordinator, Martin

Griffiths, appealed to the

international community to help raise

US$4.4 billion for Afghanistan in

humanitarian aid, calling this effort "the

largest ever appeal for a single country for

humanitarian assistance."

This amount is required "in the hope of

shoring up collapsing basic services there,"

said the UN. If this appeal is not met,

Griffiths said, then "next year [2023] we'll be

asking for $10 billion."

The figure of $10 billion is significant. A

few days after the Taliban took power in

Afghanistan in mid-August 2021, the US

government announced the seizure of $9.5

billion in Afghan assets that were being held

in the US banking system.

Under pressure from the US government,

the International Monetary Fund also

denied Afghanistan access to $455 million of

its share of special drawing rights, the

international reserve asset that the IMF

provides to its member countries to

supplement their original reserves.

These two figures, which constitute

Afghanistan's monetary reserves, amount to

around $10 billion, the exact number

Griffiths said the country would need if the

United Nations did not immediately get an

emergency disbursement for providing

humanitarian relief to Afghanistan.

A recent analysis by development

economist William Byrd for the US Institute

of Peace titled "How to Mitigate

Afghanistan's Economic and Humanitarian

Crises" noted that the crises being faced by

the country are a direct result of the cutoff of

$8 billion in annual aid to Afghanistan and

the freezing of $9.5 billion of the country's

"foreign-exchange reserves" by the United

States.

The analysis further noted that the

sanctions relief given by the US Treasury

Department and the United Nations

Security Council on December 22 to provide

humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan

should also be extended to "private business

and commercial transactions."

Byrd also mentioned the need to find ways

to pay salaries of health workers, teachers

and other essential service providers to

prevent an economic collapse in

Afghanistan and suggested using "a

combination of Afghan revenues and aid

funding" for this purpose.

Meanwhile, the idea of paying salaries

directly to the teachers came up early last

month in a meeting between the UN's

special envoy for Afghanistan, Deborah

Lyons, and Afghan Deputy Foreign Minister

Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai.

None of these proposals, however, seem to

have been taken seriously in Washington.

A humanitarian crisis

In July 2020, before the Covid-19

pandemic hit the country hard, and long

before the Taliban returned to power in

Kabul, the Ministry of Economy in

Afghanistan said 90% of the people in the

country lived below the international

poverty line of $2 a day.

Meanwhile, since the beginning of its war

in Afghanistan in 2001, the US government

has spent $2.313 trillion on its war efforts,

according to figures provided by the Watson

Institute for International and Public Affairs

at Brown University in Providence, Rhode

Island; but despite spending 20 years in the

Afghan war, the US government spent only

$145 billion on the reconstruction of the

country's institutions, according to its own

estimates.

Last August, before the Taliban defeated

the US military forces, the US government's

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan

Reconstruction (SIGAR) published an

important report that assessed the money

spent by the US on the country's

development. The authors of the report

wrote that despite some modest gains,

"progress has been elusive and the prospects

for sustaining this progress are dubious."

The report pointed to the lack of

development of a coherent strategy by the

US government, excessive reliance on

foreign aid, and pervasive corruption inside

the US contracting process as some of the

reasons that eventually led to a "troubled

reconstruction effort" in Afghanistan. This

resulted in an enormous waste of resources

for the Afghans, who desperately needed

these resources to rebuild their country,

which had been destroyed by years of war.

On December 1, 2021, the United Nations

vijAy PRAShAD

Development Program (UNDP) released a

vital report on the devastating situation in

Afghanistan.

In the last decade of the US occupation,

the annual per capita income in Afghanistan

fell from $650 in 2012 to around $500 in

2020 and is expected to drop to $350 in

2022 if the population increases at the same

pace as it has in the recent past, the report

said. The country's gross domestic product

will contract by 20% in 2022, followed by a

The report pointed to the lack of development of a

coherent strategy by the US government, excessive

reliance on foreign aid, and pervasive corruption inside

the US contracting process as some of the reasons that

eventually led to a "troubled reconstruction effort" in

Afghanistan. This resulted in an enormous waste of

resources for the Afghans, who desperately needed

these resources to rebuild their country, which had

been destroyed by years of war.

30% drop in the following years.

The following sentences from the UNDP

report are worth quoting in full to

understand the extent of humanitarian

crisis being faced by the people in the

country:

"According to recent estimates, only 5% of

the population has enough to eat, while the

number of those facing acute hunger is now

estimated to have … reached a record 23

million. Almost 14 million children are likely

to face crisis or emergency levels of food

insecurity this winter, with 3.5 million

children under the age of five expected to

suffer from acute malnutrition, and 1 million

children risk dying from hunger and low

temperatures."

lifelines

This unraveling humanitarian crisis in

Afghanistan is the reason for the January 11

appeal to the international community by

the UN.

On December 18, 2021, the Council of

Foreign Ministers of the Organization of

Islamic Cooperation (OIC) held an

emergency meeting, called for by Saudi

Arabia, on Afghanistan in Islamabad,

Pakistan. Outside the meeting room, which

merely produced a statement, the various

foreign ministers met with Afghanistan's

interim foreign minister, Amir Khan

Muttaqi.

While in Islamabad, Muttaqi met with US

Special Representative for Afghanistan

Thomas West. A senior official with the US

delegation told Kamran Yousaf of The

Express Tribune (Pakistan), "We have

worked quietly to enable cash … [to come

into] the country in larger and larger

denominations."

A foreign minister at the OIC meeting told

me that the OIC states are already working

quietly to send humanitarian aid to

Afghanistan.

Four days later, on December 22, the

United States introduced a resolution (2615)

in the UN Security Council that urged a

"humanitarian exception" to the harsh

sanctions against Afghanistan.

During the meeting, which lasted about

40 minutes, nobody raised the matter that

the US, which had proposed the resolution,

had decided to freeze the $10 billion that

belonged to Afghanistan. Nonetheless, the

passage of this resolution was widely

celebrated, since everyone understands the

gravity of Afghanistan's crisis.

Meanwhile, Zhang Jun, China's

permanent representative to the UN, raised

problems relating to the far-reaching effects

of such sanctions and urged the UNSC to

"guide the Taliban to consolidate interim

structures, enabling them to maintain

security and stability, and to promote

reconstruction and recovery."

A senior member of the Afghan central

bank, Da Afghanistan Bank, told me that

much-needed resources are expected to

enter the country as part of humanitarian

aid being provided by Afghanistan's

neighbors, particularly from China, Iran and

Pakistan (aid from India will come through

Iran).

Aid has also come in from other

neighboring countries, such as Uzbekistan,

which sent 3,700 tons of food, fuel and

winter clothes, and Turkmenistan, which

sent fuel and food.

Early this month, Muttaqi traveled to

Tehran to meet with Iranian Foreign

Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian and

Iran's special representative for

Afghanistan, Hassan Kazemi Qomi. While

Iran has not recognized the Taliban regime

as the official government of Afghanistan, it

has been in close contact with Kabul "to help

the deprived people of Afghanistan to

reduce their suffering." Muttaqi has,

meanwhile, emphasized that his

government wants to engage the major

powers over the future of Afghanistan.

Vijay Prashad is an Indian historian,

editor and journalist. He is a writing fellow

and chief correspondent at Globetrotter

US needs more Asians to avoid demographic death

Now that Elon Musk has tweeted that

"population collapse is potentially the

greatest risk to the future of

civilization," it must be true. America's total

fertility rate fell in 2020 to only 1.67 births

per female, the lowest in history, and well

below the replacement level of 2.1.

Ten years ago, when I published How

Civilizations Die, the United States still

made babies at the replacement rate, though

(as I noted) this depended on high fertility

among two groups of Americans:

Evangelical Christians and Hispanics.

Now demographic winter has descended

on America, and there is no obvious path to

recovery. The only medium-term solution

lies in the immigration of skilled adults, and

the only two prospective sources of largescale

immigration of skilled adults are China

and India.

Civilizations die because they want to.

Nations that live for the present and eschew

a vision of their future do not take the

trouble to raise children. Today's

demographic decline has precedents in the

hollowing-out of Hellenistic Greece after the

Alexandrian conquests, and the decline of

Rome several centuries later.

In the modern era, religious commitment

has been the strongest predictor of the

desire to bring future generations into the

world; other writers, notably the British

demographer Eric Kaufmann, have made

parallel arguments.

What demographers call the great fertility

transition occurred with urbanization and

the end of child labor. In agricultural

societies and early modern industry,

children were cheap labor and considered

(as in wrongful death lawsuits) a resource

with a definable monetary value.

Once national pension systems replaced

family care for the aged, and children no

longer were expected to work until early

adulthood, children offered spiritual rather

than monetary value.

Now we have another 10 years' worth of

data, and they bear out my 2011 thesis: the

decline in American fertility tracks (and in

fact is predicted by) the decline in religious

commitment among Americans. This has

deep implications for public policy. If

religious faith is the most important

determinant of fertility, public policy can

have only a modest impact on birth rates.

The annual Gallup survey on American

attitudes towards religion includes the

question: "How important would you say

religion is in your own life - very important,

fairly important, or not very important?"

As shown in the above chart, the US Total

Fertility Rate tracks the percentage who

answered "very important" closely. The link

between fertility and faith passes all the tests

for statistical robustness.

Where data are available, we observe a

close relationship between religious

commitment and fertility. In a May 2021

survey, the Pew Institute reported:

"Orthodox Jewish adults report having an

average of 3.3 children, while non-Orthodox

Jews have an average of 1.4 children.

Orthodox Jews also are five years younger,

on average, when they give birth to their first

child (23.6 vs 28.6 among non-Orthodox

Jews)."

Data for American Christians are less

clear-cut. Samuel Perry and Cyrus Schleifer

of the University of Oklahoma reported in

2020 that fertility fell to 2.3 children in 2016

from 2.7 children in 1972. The rate of church

attendance had a small positive correlation

with fertility, they concluded, but the fertility

of conservative Protestants declined

regardless of the rate of church attendance.

Arguably, other factors drove American

fertility down. Immigration (including

illegal) from Latin America dropped off

sharply after the 2008 financial crisis, and

Hispanics were disproportionate

contributors to fertility.

The Hispanic birth rate dropped from

97.4 births per 1,000 women in 2007 to 65.3

births per 1,000 women in 2019, a faster

rate of decline than among the non-

Hispanic population. That may have to do

with economic factors, but it could also

reflect the assimilation of Hispanics into

mainstream American culture. We do not

have enough evidence to judge.

Why has religious commitment declined?

Part of the blame may lie with religious

leadership.

The Gallup data for American confidence

DAviD P. GolDmAn

in organized religion show a fall by about

half since 1973 in the proportion of

respondents who have "quite a lot" or "a

great deal" of confidence in religious

institutions.

Remarkably, the decline in religious

commitment is overwhelmingly a

Protestant phenomenon, according to the

Gallup data. Since the early 1950s, the

proportion of Americans who identify as

Catholic has remained in the mid-20%

range, while the proportion of Protestants

has collapsed by about half.

The first option is desirable but likely to have a small effect. The second

and third options are inseparable. Reversing the long-term decline of labor

productivity requires the reconstruction of America's depleted manufacturing

sector, and that in return requires a much larger number of engineers

than American universities presently produce.

The percentage who identify with no

religion rose from around zero in the early

1950s to 20% in 2020. Catholic numbers, to

be sure, are supported by immigration from

mainly Catholic countries.

The fall in religious affiliation is mainly a

Protestant phenomenon, but the decline in

fertility is similar across denominations.

Sociologist David Ayers, in a July 2021 study

for Crisis magazine, concluded "in the

United States, the facts show sharp drops in

fertility among Catholic women overall, and

among those who have ever been married,

similar to what we find among Americans as

a whole."

The great wave of secularization came to

America, the country "with the spirit of a

church," somewhat later than it did to the

rest of the industrial world and had the same

impact on fertility. Secular trends of this

kind are difficult to reverse (but not

impossible: Russia's total fertility rate rose

from a 1999 low of 1.16 to an estimated 1.83

in 2020).

Among the high-income countries only

Israel, with a total fertility rate (TFR) just

over 3 - almost double its peer nation

average - has a fertility rate above

replacement. Excluding the highly religious

Haredi portion of the Israeli population, the

fertility rate is still 2.6, far higher than the

rest of the industrial world.

Israel is the exception that proves the rule.

By Western standards, Israel is the most

religious among the high-income nations.

Up to 98% of Jewish Israelis "always" place

a mezuzah (a small box containing handwritten

Bible verses) on their door, 92%

circumcise their male children, 70%

maintain Jewish dietary laws at home, 70%

fast on Yom Kippur and 78% take part in a

Passover Seder, according to one survey.

A Jew's decision to live in Israel with all

the attendant risks and obligations

(including universal military service) by

itself implies a high degree of faith even

among the professedly secular.

Germany has an extremely low fertility

rate but has had considerable success in

attracting skilled or semi-skilled

immigrants. As of 2018, 4.8 million citizens

of other European Union countries had

moved to Germany, almost 10% of the

country's 49 million citizens of working age

(20 to 64 years old).

But this trend cannot continue for long

because the fertility rate of the countries that

sent migrants to Germany (Poland,

Romania, Italy, Spain and so forth) is even

lower than Germany's.

Germany's demographic profile appears

dire, but it has postponed the inevitable

aging crisis through skilled immigration.

Italy's situation seems hopeless; its

population is aging faster than its peers and

it is losing skilled working-age adults rather

than importing them.

Immigrants to Italy come overwhelmingly

from Africa and the Middle East and cannot

replace the diminishing number of

productive adults.

The position of the United States is

somewhat better than the high-income

country average for projected old-age

dependency (China's much-discussed

demographic problem is about the same as

the high-income average). But the United

States is headed in the same direction as

Germany and China.

What should the United States do about

this? Declining fertility is a cultural and

confessional phenomenon and not directly

susceptible to government initiatives. There

are only three options open to public policy:

Encourage a higher fertility rate through

economic incentives; Attempt to reverse the

long-term decline in productivity growth to

allow a smaller base of taxpayers to support

a larger proportion of retirees.

Source : Asian Times

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