Australian Polity, Volume 10 Number 1 & 2
March 2022 issue of Australian Polity
March 2022 issue of Australian Polity
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The recent US-China dialogue between Presidents
Biden and Xi produced a flurry of confusing
interpretations by commentators and the media.
The BBC, for example, chose both a pro-US and a pro-
China stance. The Corporation first headlined its report
‘US says opposed to “unilateral effort” to change Taiwan’
stating ‘US president Joe Biden had told his Chinese
counterpart Xi Jinping that the US is strongly opposed to
“unilateral efforts” to change the status quo or undermine
peace across Taiwan.’ A few hours later, the headline was
changed to ‘China warns US about “playing with fire” on
Taiwan’ and the story rewritten.
The confusion arises partially from the different
understandings attached to the words and phrases
used by the respective leaders. The day after the virtual
summit, President Biden said, ‘Taiwan makes its own
decisions’ and that it is ‘independent’, but later asserted
that ‘we are not encouraging independence’ and that US
policy remains unchanged. ‘We are not going to change
our policy at all,’ said Mr Biden. ‘We are encouraging them
to do exactly what the Taiwan [Relations] Act requires.’
While the US recognises the People’s Republic of China as
‘China’, it does not declare Taiwan as part of China. The PRC
insists that Taiwan is part of the PRC, but Taiwan rejects
this assertion. In January 2020, Taiwanese President
Tsai Ing-wen was clear: ‘We are an independent country
already and we call ourselves the Republic of China,
Taiwan.’ The Taiwanese government has not proposed
any constitutional change or formal legal declaration of
independence. In her National Day address President Tsai
reiterated four commitments: that Taiwan will adhere to
a free and democratic constitutional system; that the
Republic of China and the PRC are not subordinate to each
other; that Taiwan will resist annexation or encroachment
upon its sovereignty; and the Republic’s future must be
decided in accordance with the will of the people.
President Biden reflects the continuing US view of his
nation’s ‘one China policy.’ But Beijing assets a ‘one China
principle’, in the face of 70 years of reality. As former British
Prime Minister, Tony Blair, said ‘China needs to realise
that Western countries don’t view the self-ruled island
of Taiwan in a similar way to the semi-autonomous city
of Hong Kong. . . . They have to understand that Taiwan
is not the same as Hong Kong.’
There is a current discussion amongst strategic policy
wonks about whether the US is moving from a concept of
‘strategic ambiguity’ to ‘strategic clarity’ about its stance
on Taiwan. The former describes a position in which
the US refuses to state if Taiwan has sovereignty and
whether it would use military force to defend the island.
The latter involves a declaration of Taiwanese sovereignty
and a preparedness to come to the aid militarily of the
Republic. In between is a notion of ‘strategic denial’ - a
position that the US and its allies will defend Taiwan
without proclaiming its sovereignty.
Recent comments suggest that the West has adopted
the concept of ‘strategic denial’. When asked at a town
hall meeting in October, President Biden said the US
would defend Taiwan against any unilateral attempt to
change the status quo. During the virtual summit, Mr
Biden reminded President Xi that as a Senator, he had
voted to support Taiwan’s self-defence. Secretary of
State, Antony Blinken, said recently that allied nations
would be prepared to ‘take action’ if China uses force
against Taiwan. More recently, Defence Minister, Peter
Dutton, said it was ‘inconceivable’ that Australia would
not participate in any US military action, prompting the
usual bellicose rhetoric from China.
The Biden administration has also rejected a list of 16
‘erroneous’ US policies towards China. The list, like the
14 grievances that China issued against Australia, was
handed to Deputy Secretary of State, Wendy R. Sherman,
by Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, during a meeting in
Tianjin in July. A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson,
Zhou Lijian, told the media the following day that the US
must refrain from criticising Chinese communism, stating
that this was one of three ‘bottom lines’.
‘The first is that the US must not challenge, slander or
even attempt to subvert the path and system of socialism
with Chinese characteristics,’ he said. Secondly, the US
should not attempt to disrupt Chinese development.
Thirdly, it should not challenge China’s sovereignty or
territorial integrity. This list also contained grievances
levelled against Australia, including identifying China
as the source of Covid-19; criticising its human rights
record; and objecting to its actions in Hong Kong. It
also demanded that sanctions and visa restrictions on
Chinese officials be lifted.
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