2017-18 USC-UNESCO Journal for Global Humanities, Science & Ethical Inquiry

2 0 1 7 - 2 0 1 8 | I S S U E N O . 1

U S C - U N E S C O

GLOBAL

HUMANITIES,

SCIENCE

& ETHICAL

INQUIRY

T H E U S C L E V A N I N S T I T U T E F O R H U M A N I T I E S A N D E T H I C S

USC-UNESCO Chair on Global Humanities and Ethics Education

USC Levan Institute for Humanities and Ethics

University of Southern California

2017-18 USC-UNESCO

Journal for Global

Humanities, Science

& Ethical Inquiry

Dr. Lyn Boyd-Judson, UNESCO Chair on Global Humanities and Ethics Education

Isabella Carr, Assistant Director, USC Levan Institute for Humanities and Ethics

Lucine Beylerian, Madeline White; Jonathan Horwitz, and Brooke Helstrom

Undergraduate Editors-In-Chief; Editorial Team

Copyright 2019 the USC-UNESCO Journal for Global Humanities, Science, & Ethical Inquiry. All rights reserved. No part of this publication

may be reproduced or transmitted in any form without the express written consent of the USC-UNESCO Journal for Global Humanities, Science,

& Ethical Inquiry. Views expressed in this journal are solely those of the authors themselves and do not necessarily represent those of the

editorial board, faculty advisors, or the University of Southern California.

Contents

Endangered Holy Spaces: The Case of the Mosque-Cathedral of Córdoba

By Mary Cate Hickman

Introduction 4

Convivencia 5

Muslim Prayer Ban 8

Why the Cabildo is in Charge 11

Changes Under Catholic Management 13

Legal Argument Against Cabildo Ownership 16

Failure of Community Efforts 19

Failure of Government Efforts 21

A Role Model: The Alhambra 24

UNESCO Recommendations 26

Concluding Thoughts 27

The Efficacy of Geospatial Technology in Substantiating Human Rights Violations

By Alanna Schenk

Introduction 32

GIS Application to Human Rights 33

Ethical Implications 34

Application: Using GIS to Visualize Reports of Religious Violence 34

Methodology 35

Data 35

Data Quality Check 36

Case Studies: Egypt 36

Case Studies: Indonesia 39

Case Studies: Myanmar 42

Conclusion 45

Republican Identity in a Multicultural Society: Analyzing Political Discourse

about Islam and Muslims during the 2017 French Presidential Election

By Allison Whiting

Introduction 49

Part 1: The History of Secular Republicanism in France 50

Part 2: A Short History of Islam and Muslims in France 54

Part 3: Particular Challenges of Islam to Republicanism and

the Fight Over National Identity 56

Should There be a French Islam 61

Foreign Influences and Global Challenges 62

Terrorism and Islam 64

Part 4: Human Rights Perspectives 65

Part 5: Historical Partisan Stances on Laïcité and Islam 69

The French Left 69

The French Right 70

The National Front 72

Part 6: Current Evolution of These Stances in the 2017 Election Cycle 74

La Laïcité 75

National Identity 77

Terrorism 80

Doctrine and Behavior 82

Organizational Structure 85

Analysis 87

Conclusion 88

Out of Sight Out of Mind: The Detrimental Effects of Guantanamo Bay’s Philosophy

By Lucine Beylerian

Introduction 95

Background on Guantanamo Bay 95

I. Guantanamo Bay and the Executive Branch 97

II. How They Got There 99

III. Life in Prison: How Guantanamo Bay Detainees Were Treated 101

A Poor Environment 103

IV. Complicated Release 105

V. Wrongful Incarceration Settlements and Potential Reparation Systems 110

VI. Recidivism and Other Counterarguments 111

Conclusion 113

Cristiana, Socialista, y Aborto: Analyzing the Effects of the Nicaraguan Catholic Church and

Social Class on Abortion Policy

By Brianna Johnson

Introduction 119

Brief History of Nicaragua 120

Feminist Movement in Nicaragua 124

History of Abortion Policy 127

Abortion Today 130

The Catholic Church 134

Catholic Hierarchy 134

The Church Base 138

The Catholic Church in 2006 140

Conclusions 141

Letter from the Editors

Dear Reader,

This issue of the USC-UNESCO Journal for Global Humanities, Science and Ethical Inquiry spans

across many cultures, nations, and religions. The papers featured in this journal focus on ethical

issues within the realm of human rights, addressing crises that our writers felt deserve more

attention. These include the misappropriation of a UNESCO heritage site, the use of geospatial

technologies to track human rights violations, the mistreatment of Guantanamo Bay detainees from

capture to resettlement, anti-Islamic rhetoric in French political discourse, and the religious and

political conflict over abortion in Nicaragua.

Admittedly, UNESCO’s vision of “building peace in the minds of men and women” is broad.

However, it is our opinion that each student work builds upon some aspect of this mission. They

focus on the equal dignity of all cultures, the push for a global citizenry free of hate and

intolerance, and the free flow of ideas and knowledge-sharing for the betterment of society. Recent

UNESCO efforts have focused on artificial intelligence, fostering freedom of expression and

preventing violent extremism, and we feel that each student explored these action items in their

research.

It is important to note that this is an undergraduate journal. While funded by a larger university

program, each writer worked independently to create the final product published here. Each

researcher came forward with a proposal for their project and worked independently until handing

their papers over to editors for peer review.

As the inaugural cohort of the USC-UNESCO Journal for Global Humanities, Science and Ethical

Inquiry, there are many people to thank for their support throughout this journey. Firstly, Dr. Lyn

Boyd-Judson for providing this unique opportunity by establishing the project and jumpstarting

student research efforts. We would also like to thank the initial editors of the journal, Remaya

Campbell and Jonathan Horowitz, for encouraging our writers in their early drafts. We would be

remiss to neglect the many student workers at the Levan Institute for their assistance in completing

the final stages of publication, as well as Jill Turner for serving as our tireless copy editor despite

receiving large volumes of work with minimal time. Needless to say, this journal would be

incomplete without the patience and commitment of our writers. They wrote these papers as fulltime

students, and many continued the editing process as graduate students and employees

stationed across the globe.

USC-UNESCO JOURNAL FOR GLOBAL HUMANITIES, SCIENCE & ETHICAL INQUIRY

1

This journal owes its publication to Isabella Carr, who shepherded the project from beginning to

end. Our cohort has seen many editors, writers, and advisors, but Isabella provided consistent

insight, motivation and support. Her enthusiasm for finalizing this project was unmatched, and we

cannot thank her enough for providing us with such a profound achievement.

Publishing this journal has been no easy task, but we hope that our ultimate goal is achieved: that

in reading these works, you find new ideas and perspectives and they inspire you to exercise

ethical inquiry in your global citizenship.

Sincerely,

Lucine Beylerian and Madeline White

USC-UNESCO Cohort 1 Editors


2

MARY CATE HICKMAN

Endangered Holy Spaces: The Case of

the Mosque-Cathedral of Córdoba

USC-UNESCO Journal for Global Humanities, Science, & Ethical Inquiry

University of Southern California, Department of Religion Honors Thesis

Advised by Dr. Lyn Boyd-Judson

May 2018

I would like to acknowledge and give thanks to the following people: my advisor Dr. Lyn Boyd-

Judson, who is Director of the USC Levan Institute for Humanities and Ethics and the UNESCO

Chair on Global Humanities and Ethics; Maddi Eckert, primary translator; Vicki Seawright and

Veronica Castro, interview translators and transcribers; Martin Torres, translator; Rafael Yanez,

Angel Ronnie Mizin, Lola Molina Aranda, in-person interview translators; and Mazen Loan,

Jonathan Horwitz, Brooke Helstrom, Remaya Campbell, Madeline White, and Lucine Beylerian,

editors; Dean Varun Soni, Dr. Carolina Castillo Larrea, Dr. Nomi Stolzenberg, Dr. Michael Bunn

for their insightful feedback. The English translations of the Spanish documents quoted and

referred to in this article can be accessed on project’s website:

https://mosquecathedral.wordpress.com/.


3

INTRODUCTION

Situated on the Guadalquivir River, Córdoba is a relatively small town boasting a wellknown

multicultural history as the capital of Muslim Spain—called Al-Andalus—during the

Umayyad Dynasty. This prosperous time from the mid-8th century until the early 1000s is when the

Great Mosque of Córdoba (eventual Mosque-Cathedral) was built. 1 During the Reconquista, it was

common for Christians to demolish the mosques of the conquered Islamic rulers. However, the

Christians who took over Córdoba in 1236 CE decided to consecrate the impressive Great Mosque

of Córdoba as a place of Catholic worship instead. The architectural majesty of the mosque saved it

from ruin, even if the Catholic Church in Córdoba modified, destroyed, and added to it over course

of the new millennium. Today, it stands as a half-mosque, half-cathedral: a one-of-a-kind building

with two distinct religious identities.

However, this religious duality is not the source of fame. UNESCO has recognized it as

simply a mosque since its inscription to the World Heritage Site list in 1984. 2 Proclaiming it the

“most emblematic monument of Islamic religious architecture,” UNESCO lists four criteria, which

only mention the monument as a mosque, justifying its status as a World Heritage Site. 3 Even though

there are two religious infrastructures present, the mosque portion is singled out as being one of the

most influential buildings and continues to serve as a model for churches and mosques worldwide.

The cathedral portion itself is simply an imitation of the mosque’s design. As a World Heritage Site,

the Mosque-Cathedral should then enjoy an extra layer of protection, specifically in the mosque

space.

Unfortunately, the Mosque-Cathedral—this hyphenated name was introduced in the mid-

1980s—is in danger of losing its Islamic significance because of its local management. The manager

and de facto owner is the Cabildo of Córdoba, a group of 25 Catholic priests led by the bishop of

Córdoba, which consistently refuses to acknowledge, let alone protect, the very Islamic reasons why

UNESCO made the monument a World Heritage Site in the first place. According to the Cabildo,

the Catholic Church has owned temples such as the Mosque-Cathedral “from time immemorial.” 4

Furthermore, the Cabildo has placed a ban on Muslim prayer inside the Mosque-Cathedral,

disappointing visiting Muslims. However, by nominating the Mosque-Cathedral for World Heritage

Site status, Spain has allowed UNESCO some authoritative and investigative power over the

monument should it continue to be recognized. Though appealing to UNESCO is not the only way

to go about investigating the dubious management of the Mosque-Cathedral, it is certainly a viable

one. UNESCO proclaims to be genuinely committed to honoring and protecting heritage sites. 5

1

The Caliphate of Córdoba ended during this time but was not taken over by Christians until 1236.

2

In 1994, that name was changed to the ‘Historic Center of Córdoba’ and the property recognized was extended to

include the surrounding area.

3

UNESCO World Heritage Centre, "Historic Centre of Cordoba," UNESCO World Heritage Centre, accessed

December 10, 2017, http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/313.

4

Joaquín Alberto Nieva García, INFORMACIÓN MÁS PORMENORIZADA SOBRE LA INMATRICULACIÓN DE LA

CATEDRAL DE CÓRDOBA EN EL REGISTRO DE LA PROPIEDAD, report, accessed December 10, 2017,

https://www.diocesisdecordoba.com/catedral/situacion-juridica.

5

“Mission.” UNESCO World Heritage Centre. http://whc.unesco.org/en/about/.


4

Therefore, this article will suggest several ways in which UNESCO can use its resources and

international regard to help the community of Córdoba create a diverse managerial body for the

Mosque-Cathedral that will ensure the protection of the Islamic heritage.

In order to fully explain the current status of the Mosque-Cathedral, which is certainly

necessary to this article’s call for UNESCO intervention, this article will be the first ever

comprehensive case study on the Mosque-Cathedral that seeks to detail the ways in which social,

economic, political, and religious issues intersect to create a web of protection for a group of Catholic

priests who retain complete legal authority over one of the world’s most significant mosques. A case

study allows for a cogent analysis that is able to reveal the depth of the problem, therefore making

it harder to ignore. In writing this, I hope to not only highlight the main issues concerning the

preservation of religious monuments that have previously been unacknowledged but to inspire policy

change. Religious monuments are not ordinary cultural monuments. Not only are they

architecturally, historically, and culturally significant, but they also matter a great deal to a certain

faith tradition—in this case, two.

In this article, I advocate for diplomatic intervention from UNESCO not only on the basis of

the site’s criteria, but also on the basis of UNESCO’S primary goals and ethical reasoning. The

sections of this article include (1) convivencia as Andalusian identity, (2) the Muslim prayer ban, (3)

why the Cabildo is in charge, (4) changes under Catholic management, (5) legal argument against

Cabildo ownership, (6) failure of community efforts, (7) failure of government efforts, (8) the

Alhambra as a role model, (9) UNESCO recommendations, and (10) concluding thoughts.

CONVIVENCIA

My academic interest in this particular case of religious discrimination began when I visited

the Mosque-Cathedral in July 2016. I was struck by the juxtaposition of the constant references to

convivencia [coexistence] around Córdoba with the reality of being inside the Mosque-Cathedral,

where guards hovered over visitors while monitoring for signs of Muslim prayer. While reflecting

on my visit, I wondered why the marketed image of Córdoba, convivencia, did not align with reality.

This led me to embark on a research journey in order to find out why this discredited myth is

diligently promoted.

This section argues that a main reason for the issues regarding the Mosque-Cathedral is that

UNESCO and the city of Córdoba itself refuse to acknowledge religious intolerance out of fear of

tarnishing the city’s brand of convivencia.

The origins of convivencia began under Muslim rule from about 700-1200 CE, although the

word was not used to refer to this era until 1948 by Spanish cultural historian Américo Castro. Castro

used convivencia to refer to the peaceful, harmonious interactions among Muslims, Jews, and

Christians under Islamic rule in Al-Andalus during a time in world history when war was often

waged in the name of theology. 6 The Muslim leaders allowed Christian and Jewish citizens to

worship freely because the Quran acknowledges they are all of the same Abrahamic tradition and,

6

Stanley G. Payne, Spain: A Unique History (University of Wisconsin Press, 2011), 54.


5

therefore, should be protected. 7 Scholars who have followed in Castro’s footsteps by promulgating

convivencia consider the greatness and prosperity of Al-Andalus a result of interfaith cooperation.

And, as the capital of Al-Andalus, they exalt Córdoba as an example for what should exist in the

world today.

In turn, the Mosque-Cathedral has come to physically embody the interfaith utopia of

Córdoba: one holy space shared between two religious groups. However, contrary to popular belief,

the space has never simultaneously functioned long-term as a place of worship for both Muslims

and Catholics. During Muslim rule, the space was only a mosque. During Catholic rule and into

present-day, it has been only a cathedral. Thus, the hyphenated name, Mosque-Cathedral, is

misleading. 8 While it communicates the essence of convivencia, it hides 1000 years of reality during

which the space has almost never functioned as both a mosque and a cathedral.

This evidence suggests that convivencia may be more of a contemporary brand than a

historical truth. Indeed, several scholars have criticized the myth of convivencia, citing strong

historical evidence that Al-Andalus was actually a “highly divided and segmented society” where

Jews and Christians faced discrimination based on their faith traditions. 9 Of course, this just makes

Córdoba a society like any other—one which struggles with social issues such as racism,

discrimination, and intolerance. This interpretation of history remains unpopular amongst locals,

politicians, and the Cabildo, all of whom benefit from Cordoba’s utopian image in one way or

another—tourism, revenue, reputation, uniting values. Today, claiming that the period of Al-

Andalus was not as tolerant as traditionally thought is tantamount to attacking the city’s identity.

Coexistence has become the brand of Córdoba, which is successfully marketed to the world

with the hope of serving as a model for a multicultural Europe. 10 In 2009, U.S. President Barack

Obama referenced Córdoba specifically when talking about Islam’s “proud tradition of tolerance”

in Andalusia. 11 In 2016, Córdoba placed coexistence front and center in its campaign to become the

European Capital of Culture. However, the brand is not so much promulgated out of a genuine belief

in its accuracy as it is a draw for tourism. The local economy relies on convivencia to attract millions

of tourists annually, many Muslim, who are looking to experience Europe’s multicultural legacy. 12

In turn, locals cater to tourist expectations by presenting “marketable tropes” of Muslim heritage

7

One such book, The Ornament of the World, was written by a Harvard Literature professor, María Rosa Menocal.

Though steeped in the coexistence myth, the book is a wonderful resource for learning about Andalusian art and

culture.

8

After a plenary session of the government of Cordoba in the mid-80s, it was approved unanimously to refer to the

monument as Mosque-Cathedral. Manuel J. Albert, "El Gobierno Justifica Que En Los PGE Solo Se Llamase Catedral

a La Mezquita," CORDÓPOLIS, El Diario Digital De Córdoba, September 27, 2017, accessed June 03, 2018,

http://cordopolis.es/2017/09/27/el-gobierno-justifica-que-en-los-pge-solo-se-llamase-catedral-a-la-mezquita/.

9

Stanley G. Payne, Spain: A Unique History, 62.

10

Michele Lamprakos. “Memento Mauri: The Mosque-Cathedral of Cordoba.” – Memento Mauri: The Mosque-

Cathedral of Cordoba. Aggregate Architectural History Collaborative, December 12, 2016. http://weaggregate.org/piece/memento-mauri-

the-mosquecathedral-of- cordoba.

11

"Text: Obama’s Speech in Cairo," The New York Times, June 04, 2009, accessed December 09, 2017,

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/04/us/politics/04obama.text.html.

12

Ana Carbajosa and Jose Luis Roca, "Spain's Appeal to Muslim Tourists," EL PAÍS, October 13, 2014, accessed

November 08, 2018, https://elpais.com/elpais/2014/10/08/inenglish/1412763978_844905.html.


6

that exoticize the Islamic history of Córdoba. 13 This is often done by telling the history of Muslims

in Córdoba as if it had a resolved beginning, middle, and end. By doing so, past Muslim contributions

to the city can be appreciated as relics of an ancient era. In literature for the Mosque-Cathedral, the

Cabildo of Córdoba has referred to the city’s Islamic rule as nothing more than a “Muslim

intervention.” 14 Indeed, this brief intrusion on Catholic power still captures public interest. Several

communities in Andalusia still celebrate holidays commemorating battles of the Reconquista

[Reconquest], which end with a reenactment of Muslim defeats. 15 These are just two of many

examples of long-standing Islamophobia, which attenuate the brand of convivencia. Yet by

attempting to promulgate both the myth of convivencia and of a Catholic Spain, Muslim imagery is

“highly controlled.” 16 It is displayed as exotic but not completely belonging. Historical and not

dynamic. Exciting yet not threatening.

While historical Islamic contributions to Córdoba are exoticized, the contemporary Muslim

presence is largely ignored by tourists and citizens. Even a prominent local journalist stated in an

interview that she believes there to be only 100 or 200 Muslims in the city who do not have much

of an interest in praying at the Mosque-Cathedral. 17 In reality, the Muslim population of Córdoba

totals about 6,000-7,000 people, and tens of thousands of Muslim tourists visit each year expressly

to see the Mosque-Cathedral. 18,19

Local Muslims have acknowledged the problem that Córdoba is marketed as an open,

interreligious, and respectful city but only in an effort to attract tourists. 20 Muslim representatives

from the local Islamic Council [Junta Islamica] lamented that Córdoba is “not being the example

the world needs” in regards to addressing issues of Islamophobia that are prevalent in the local

community. 21 This lack of contemporary Muslim visibility buries the need to address current issues,

such as the Muslim prayer ban.

Interestingly, UNESCO makes no reference to convivencia in its description of the Mosque-

Cathedral. 22 Perhaps this is because the organization is aware that such a brand is contrary to reality.

If this is so, then UNESCO should feel compelled to investigate the reasons why. One fear UNESCO

and Córdoba might share is the decline in tourism and reputation that may follow public backlash.

Though it is difficult to know exactly how attention drawn to Córdoba’s religious intolerance would

impact tourism, this uncertainty should not prevent UNESCO from intervening on behalf of religious

13

Mikaela Rogozen-Soltar, “Al-Andalus in Andalusia: Negotiating Moorish History and Regional Identity in

Southern Spain.” Anthropological Quarterly 80, no. 3 (2007): 869.

http://www.jstor.org.libproxy2.usc.edu/stable/30052728.

14

Marta Jiménez, interview by Mary Cate Hickman, April 3, 2017, Final Marta Interview, transcript.

15

Rogozen-Soltar, “Al-Andalus in Andalusia,” 863-864.

16

Ibid 865-866.

17


18

While data for the demographic breakdown of tourists to the Mosque-Cathedral does not exist, activists have pointed

out the high volume of Muslim tourists. This is in alignment with the various tourist companies that profit from taking

Muslim tourists to visit the Mosque-Cathedral.

19

Representatives from the Islamic Council, interview by Mary Cate Hickman, April 4, 2017, Final IC Interview,

transcript.

20

Ibid.

21

Ibid.

22

UNESCO’s criteria can be found in the “Changes Under Catholic Management” section of this article.


7

freedom. 23 Likely, the international press would praise UNESCO for pressuring Spanish actors to

end the prayer ban and the discriminatory management of the Mosque-Cathedral. The attention

would grant UNESCO an opportunity to prove to the world that it is a competent, fair, and legitimate

guarantor of World Heritage Sites. UNESCO can effectively help the city accept that its Islamic

heritage is not only part of its past but continues to be a vibrant part of its present make-up.

THE MUSLIM PRAYER BAN

UNESCO states, “The Great Mosque has fully maintained its authenticity in terms of use

and function.” 24 This section demonstrates the falsity of this claim. The “Great Mosque” of Córdoba

is no longer a mosque in use nor function but an exclusive Catholic cathedral in which Muslim

prayer is actively prohibited.

On 31 March 2010, a group of about 120 Austrian Muslim tourists visited the Mosque-

Cathedral. Not long after entering, six or seven of them began to pray. Refusing to stop after being

scolded by security, two of the praying men were charged with disobeying and threatening law

officers and were subsequently arrested by national police. 25 Later, there were reported rumors that

one of the tourists had a knife. Although this claim was never substantiated, the Bishop of Córdoba,

Demetrio Fernández González blamed the Muslim tourists for this “premeditated” and “deplorable

episode of violence.” 26 His released statement said, “The shared use of the cathedral by Catholics

and Muslims would not contribute to the peaceful coexistence of the two beliefs.” 27 Although this

was a disheartening example of religious discrimination and Islamophobia, the story was not an

international scandal and was covered in only a couple of English-speaking newspapers. What came

to light from the incident, however, was the accepted bigotry towards Muslims in Córdoba who are

subjected to biased reporting which views them as threats, allowing the bishop to successfully

enforce a ban on Muslim prayer.

Most Muslims are well aware they are not allowed to pray in the mosque space from the

moment they enter thanks to signs throughout the monument reminding visitors it is a Catholic site

only. The tendency for guards to target Muslim tourists is referred to in an article by Eric

Calderwood, professor and expert in Al-Andalus, in which he quotes Kamel Mekhelef, the president

of the Association of Muslims in Córdoba:

Those aren’t anecdotes; they’re realities…Just 10 days ago, a couple

from Arabia came to visit, a man and his wife. I took them to visit the

mosque. Even though the guards there know me, the second we

23

Further analysis from this economical perspective would shed light on this issue and is an area of research worth

exploring.

24



25

Giles Tremlett, "Two arrested after fight in Cordoba's former mosque," The Guardian, April 01, 2010, accessed

December 10, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/apr/01/muslim-catholic-mosque-fight.

26

Ibid.

27

Ibid.


8

entered, they started talking with each other on their walkie-talkies and

following us. Because they have that paranoia that every Muslim who

enters there is going to try to pray. 28

On the one hand, the guards are only doing their job in ensuring that no Muslim prays, but

visitors are reminded repeatedly before entering from the official website and signs in front of the

ticket booth and entrance that the site is for Catholic worship only. Considering there has only been

one major incident with Muslims peacefully praying, overt suspicion towards Muslim tourists is an

unnecessary enforcement that seems to be motivated by anti-Muslim sentiments.

While practicing Muslims have passively resigned to being thought of as an irksome

reminder of the country’s Islamic past, there is a community of activists who challenge the ban.

Leader in Spanish Muslim rights, Mansur Escudero, prayed outside of the mosque in protest when

first announced. 29

So far, though, no one has been able to successfully lift the ban, which the bishops of Córdoba

and the Vatican have played responsibility tennis over since it was enacted in 1991. At that time,

then-Bishop of Córdoba, Infantes Florido, published a letter which stated that all Muslim prayer,

both individual and in a group, is prohibited. Such a decision was, in fact, up to the Vatican. 30 In

2004, the National Islamic Commission of Spain submitted a proposal to the Vatican requesting that

Muslims be permitted to pray inside the former mosque. Their proposal was rejected. On Christmas

of 2006, the Islamic Council sent a letter to the Vatican reiterating their desire to share the space

with Catholics. 31 According to representatives at the Islamic Council, Pope Benedict XVI answered

back saying that he did not see any problem with Muslims praying at the Mosque-Cathedral but the

matter needed to be discussed with the local bishop. 32 If the Vatican and Bishop of Córdoba have

both said the decision to keep the prayer ban is up to the other, there is a clear lack of transparency

concerning the reasons for the ban.

One reason comes from former bishop of Córdoba, Juan José Asenjo Pelegrina, who stated,

“The Lord is in the Holy Sacrament of the Eucharist, which makes it infeasible to celebrate the prayer

28

Eric Calderwood, "The Reconquista of the Mosque of Córdoba," Foreign Policy, April 11, 2015, accessed

December 08, 2017, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/04/10/the-reconquista-of-the-mosque-of-cordoba-spain-catholicchurch-islam/.

29

"Each in His Own House – and God in Them All: Christians and Muslims Locked in Dispute over Prayers in

Córdoba - Qantara.de," Qantara.de - Dialogue with the Islamic World, June 21, 2007, accessed December 10, 2017,

https://en.qantara.de/content/each-in-his-own-house-and-god-in-them-all-christians-and-muslims-locked-in-disputeover.

30

“The Mezquita-Cathedral of Cordoba: A Shared Space for Prayer - Webislam.” The Mezquita-Cathedral of

Cordoba: A Shared Space for Prayer, July 4, 2012. https://www.webislam.com/articles/72210-

the_mezquitacathedral_of_cordoba_a_shared_space_for_prayer.html.

31

Dale Fuchs, "Pope asked to let Muslims pray in cathedral," The Guardian, December 28, 2006, accessed December

10, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/dec/28/spain.catholicism.

32


transcript.


9

of another religious tradition on [the Mosque-Cathedral] grounds.” 33 This justification cannot be

considered valid because there is nothing in Catholic dogma stating that a member of a different

faith cannot pray in a consecrated space. 34 In fact, since the consecration in 1236, Catholics have

allowed certain Muslims to pray in the mosque. As recently as the 1970s, certain Muslim dignitaries

gained permission to pray, either as guests of the government or as members of the two Islamic-

Catholic conferences which occurred during the 1970s. In 1974, the first Islam-Christian congress

in Córdoba occurred in the Mosque-Cathedral, and the second, in 1977. 35 Presided over by the

Bishop of Córdoba and cardinals who came in the name of the Pope, all Muslim congressmen were

allowed to pray before the mihrab. 36, 37 Yet in 2017, the Cabildo stated that the Mosque-Cathedral

“has been dedicated for almost 800 years to Catholic worship, which is incompatible with the Islamic

faith, just as Catholic worship is incompatible with the Islamic faith in Islamic temples.” 38 This

alarming statement signifies that the reasons given for the prayer ban are camouflage excuses for a

discriminatory policy.

This corollary is also supported by the second main reason Catholic officials give for the

prayer ban. The Cabildo claims that it does not feel obligated to share their cathedral with a previous

religious owner as long as the Hagia Sophia is not open to Christian prayer. Bishop Florido said in

a 1991 letter that Muslims would not be allowed to pray in the Mosque-Cathedral because there is

no reciprocity in the Muslim world, specifically in regards to the Hagia Sophia. 39 It is surprising that

this anachronistic reason has persisted as long as it has. To briefly summarize, the Hagia Sophia was

built as a Christian Orthodox church in 537 CE before being converted into a mosque in 1453 when

Muslims took over Constantinople. 40 The Orthodox church emerged from the Great Schism that

resulted in the two main branches of Christianity: Catholic and Orthodox. The Catholic Church’s

claim and desire to pray at a site that has never been christened a Catholic worship space is

hypocritical to their first reason already resolved—that Catholic worship must happen in an

exclusively Catholic space. But Florido seems to be unaware that no worship of any religious

tradition at all happens at the Hagia Sophia, as it has been officially and strictly a museum since

1935. 41 In fact, the historical owners of the site, Muslims and Orthodox Christians, are both fighting

for the right to pray at the Hagia Sophia, which is currently owned and managed by the Turkish

Ministry of Culture and Tourism. Additionally, Muslims have allowed the pope to pray in their

33

Juan José Asenjo Pelegrina, "Uso Compartido De La Catedral. Nota De Prensa," Diócesis De Córdoba, July 30,

2013, accessed June 03, 2018, https://www.diocesisdecordoba.com/noticias/uso-compartido-de-la-catedral-nota-deprensa.

34

Private conversation with Father James Heft.

35

Miguel Santiago, interview by Mary Cate Hickman, April 6, 2017, Final Santiago Interview, transcript.

36

Ibid.

37

A mihrab is a niche in the wall of a mosque, at the point nearest to Mecca, toward which the congregation faces to

pray.

38

Consultoria, S.L. Marca. “El Cabildo reprende a Ambrosio por replantear la titularidad de la Mezquita.”

AhoraCórdoba, June 22, 2017. http://www.ahoracordoba.es/cabildo-reprende-ambrosio-replantear-la-titularidad-lamezquita/.

39

“The Mezquita-Cathedral of Cordoba-Webislam.”

40

“HAGIA SOPHIA.” Hagia Sophia Info. HagiaSofia.com. Accessed December 9, 2017.

http://www.hagiasophia.com/listingview.php?listingID=18.

41

Ibid.


10

mosques. Much to the chagrin of conservative Catholics and Muslims, Popes Benedict and Francis

prayed at the Sultanahmet Mosque—more commonly known as the Blue Mosque—which has

exclusively served as a mosque since its doors first opened in Istanbul in 1616. 42 In summary, the

Hagia Sophia is closed to prayer for all religious groups (which may in fact be a topic worth exploring

on its own): Muslims do not prohibit Catholics from praying there; rather, the Turkish government

has imposed a ban on both Catholics and Muslims from using it as a worship space. It is a disquieting

misuse of power for the Catholic Church to continue to cite what it must know to be a fallacious

claim regarding protocols at the Hagia Sophia.

UNESCO states on its website that it promotes “cultural heritage and the equal dignity of all

cultures” in order to strengthen “bonds among cultures,” “promotes policies as platforms for

development and cooperation” and “stands up for freedom of expression, as a fundamental right and

a key condition for democracy and development.” 43 If UNESCO does not intervene to protect the

Muslim freedom of expression in what they deem to be the “most emblematic monument of Islamic

religious architecture,” then what would be worthy of such attention? 44 UNESCO, therefore, needs

to not only acknowledge the Muslim prayer ban but actively work to ensure this discrimination does

not continue.

WHY THE CABILDO IS IN CHARGE

With all the attention paid to the mismanagement of the Mosque-Cathedral, many have

suggested that the Cabildo should not retain that power. In the next section, I will examine instances

when activists and members of government have challenged the Cabildo’s authority. First, however,

I must establish the Cabildo’s precedent as the body in charge, starting with its claim that 800-plus

years of Catholic occupancy entails Catholic ownership and management.

In response to challenges to the Cabildo’s authority, the Diocese of Córdoba proudly

published a six-page report in 2014 delineating its “legitimate” claims to legal ownership of the

Mosque-Cathedral. 45 The recent timeline of this challenge to authority is because until twelve years

ago, no one knew the Church owned the Mosque-Cathedral. The site was not registered to anyone

because until 1998 the Reglamento Hipotecario [Mortgage Regulation] (MR) stated that dedication

to Catholic faith was “enough to demonstrate ecclesiastic ownership” of a Catholic temple. 46,47

42

Interestingly, UNESCO’s website states that the Great Mosque of Córdoba was the second biggest in surface area,

after the Holy Mosque in Mecca, previously only reached by the Blue Mosque (Istanbul, 1588).

43

“Our Vision,” UNESCO, https://en.unesco.org/about-us/introducing-unesco.

44

UNESCO World Heritage Centre, “Historic Centre of Cordoba.”

45

Joaquín Alberto Nieva García, INFORMACIÓN MÁS PORMENORIZADA SOBRE LA INMATRICULACIÓN DE LA

CATEDRAL DE CÓRDOBA EN EL REGISTRO DE LA PROPIEDAD, report, accessed December 10, 2017,


46

Ibid.

47

It is an interesting moment in history for the Catholic Church in Spain to argue itself as a victim of religious

discrimination when Catholicism is the only religion mentioned by name in the very constitutional article they try to

claim is their discriminator, which states: the government should strive to “maintain appropriate cooperation relations

with the Catholic Church and also with other confessions.”


11

The Diocese’s report states that the recent registration offers a sort of protection, especially

in the case of legal defense of their ownership. 48 Therefore, the Church lobbied to have multiple

properties in the registry. Though the MR law was modified to allow registration in 1998, the

Diocese did not feel pressure immediately to do so because its ownership had been “undisputed and

unchallenged.” 49 It was not until 2006 that the Diocese of Córdoba registered the Mosque-Cathedral

as Santa Iglesia Catedral de Córdoba, the name by which it was declared a National Monument in

the 19th century. This was made possible not only by the amendment in the MR but by Article 206

of the Ley Hipotecaria [Mortgage Law] (ML) which grants the bishop power of public notary. Thus,

the Bishop of Córdoba registered the site himself without public disclosure. So, even though the

Diocese of Córdoba lacked a written title of domain, it was able to register churches via its

administrative privileges granted by Article 206. 50 Ostensibly, the Catholic Church bought one of

the most famous world monuments for a registration fee of 30 euros. There was outrage when the

news went public three years later.

As lawyers, members of government, and activists questioned the constitutionality of the

laws which permitted the Church’s furtive registration, the Church has had to defend its claim to

ownership of the Mosque-Cathedral. 51 Hence, its 2014 report addresses the “alleged”

unconstitutionality by stating that the Church cannot be blamed for the law when “there are judicial

bodies in charge of deciding this.” 52 This statement implies that the Catholic Church feels secure

that no court will rule the laws unconstitutional, and for good reason: historically, the Spanish

government has protected the Church.

In the event of Spain’s Constitutional Court declaring the ML unconstitutional, it is highly

likely the court would grant amnesty to those who have registered sites under the law. 53 Diocese

officials are confident in their possessions. The 2014 report states, “Whoever questions the

registration of the Church’s assets, and dares to question the legitimacy of the ownership of these

assets by the Church, is questioning the legitimacy of the Spanish Constitution itself.” 54 The Diocese

of Córdoba views their obligation to constantly reiterate their legitimate claim of registration and

defend their assets to third parties as onerous and unfair. Considering the report names King

Ferdinand III’s declaration of ownership to the Church in the 13th century and King Felipe IV’s

statement that the bishop is “the rightful owner” in 1659, the Diocese’s ownership claims are not

48

García, INFORMACIÓN MÁS PORMENORIZADA SOBRE.

49

Ibid.

50

Article 206 states, “The State, the Province, the Municipality and the Public Law Corporations or organized services

that form part of the political structure of them and those of the Catholic Church, when they lack the written title of

domain, may register the real estate property that belong to them through the timely certification issued by an official

in charge of their administration, which will express the title of acquisition or the way in which they were acquired.”

51

Luis Gómez and F. J. VARGAS, "La Iglesia inscribió 4.500 propiedades sin publicidad y sin pagar impuestos," EL

PAÍS, May 05, 2013, accessed December 09, 2017,

https://politica.elpais.com/politica/2013/05/05/actualidad/1367768798_397124.html.

52

García, INFORMACIÓN MÁS PORMENORIZADA SOBRE.

53

Ibid.

54

Ibid.


12

surprising. Nevertheless, that does not mean the Diocese is allowed to ignore the religious freedoms

set forth by the Spanish Constitution. 55

CHANGES UNDER CATHOLIC MANAGEMENT

Having examined the religious discrimination taking place against Muslims as well as the

legal preference toward Catholics, we can see the Cabildo is in charge not for its superior ability to

manage the site but for political and historical reasons. It is now necessary to focus on the

Christianization of the mosque space, a direct threat to the monument’s World Heritage Site criteria:

Criterion (i): The Great Mosque of Cordoba, with its dimensions and the boldness of its

interior elevation, which were never imitated, make it a unique artistic

creation.

Criterion (ii): Despite its uniqueness, the mosque of Cordoba has exercised a considerable

influence on western Muslim art from the 8th century. It influenced as well the

development of ‘Neo-Moresque’ styles of the 19th century.

Criterion (iii): The Historic Centre of Córdoba is the highly relevant testimony to the

Caliphate of Cordoba (929-1031): this city—which, it is said, enclosed 300

mosques and innumerable palaces—[was] the rival of Constantinople and

Baghdad.

Criterion (iv): It is an outstanding example of the religious architecture of Islam. 56

Note how all four have to do with the site as a mosque and not a cathedral. The language of

UNESCO’s criteria is striking against the description provided by the Cabildo on its own website

and literature, which states: “This distinction [inscription as a World Heritage Site] was granted on

the basis of four fundamental criteria: representing a masterpiece of human creative genius, being

the manifestation of a considerable exchange of human values, providing a unique testimony to a

cultural tradition and being an outstanding example that illustrates a significant era of humanity.” 57

Unfortunately, the Cabildo of Córdoba has been quietly and discreetly chipping away the

Islamic history for years. 58 Acts of preservation and renovation of the Mosque-Cathedral have

consistently favored the building’s Catholic heritage since the rightward shift of the Spanish

government and a conservative Catholic hierarchy in the 1980s. Since then, the site’s management

has Christianized the space in the following ways: with its name change from Mosque of Córdorba,

censorship of the history, proposals for renovations which destroy parts of the original mosque, and

dispersion of Catholic pieces throughout the mosque area. These changes demonstrate that the

Cabildo has no interest in preserving the Islamic heritage of the space.

55

Article 16.3 of the Spanish Constitution states, “No religion shall have a state character” and Section 14 states,

“Spaniards are equal before the law and may not in any way be discriminated against on account of…religion…”

56



57

“Mosque-Cathedral Monumental Site of Cordoba,” The history, accessed December 10, 2017, https://mezquitacatedraldecordoba.es/en/descubre-el-monumento/la-historia/.

58

Calderwood, “Reconquista.”


13

Michele Lamprakos of the University of Maryland published a comprehensive article on the

architectural history of the site that I will summarize in an effort to demonstrate the negative effects

that Catholic ownership has had on the physical building throughout its history.

In the early 1000s, it was tradition for mosques in conquered Andalusian cities to be

consecrated as Catholic chapels until their eventual demolition to make room to build a cathedral. 59

Fortunately, the grandiosity of the Great Mosque of Córdoba kept it safe from total destruction.

Instead, the mosque building was subjected to a series of modifications. Over the next hundreds of

years, several additions, most notably in the 1500s, with the building of the crucero [transept], and

a massive choir and presbytery turned the chapel into a proper cathedral where a bishop could reside.

Hundreds of years of additions meant that some changes, such as the transept, mimicked the

“structural, spatial, and symbolic qualities of the mosque” whereas others did not. 60 In the late 1400s,

the Bishop of Córdoba, Iñigo Manrique, proposed to renovate the mosque-area by adding a Gothicstyle

nave. In the early 1500s, Bishop Alonso Manrique de Lara, proposed to “transform” the mosque

by demolishing a majority of it. 61 When a huge protest erupted from the town council, the proposal

went all the way up to Holy Roman Emperor Charles V, who allowed a less destructive plan to move

forward. Still, much of the original mosque was lost. Upon seeing the demolition himself in 1526,

Charles V was disappointed and regretted his approval to destroy part of the mosque. 62 UNESCO

withholds acknowledgement of these renovations by simply stating on their profile for the site,

“There were consecutive extensions carried out over three centuries, and in 1236 the Christian

Cathedral was installed.” 63 Nevertheless, the Christianization of the mosque continued until the

1800s when a liberal Spanish government came to power and permitted the restoration of the original

Islamic fabric of the mosque: bishops and state architects restored the mihrab, demolished the

baroque vaults, stripped whitewash from the arches, removed chapels, retablos, and tombs. Portals

of the east facade were restored and partially reconstructed in the early twentieth century, welcoming

back the Islamic heritage of the building. In fact, most of what visitors see today is a result of these

restorations.

During the UNESCO World Heritage Site nomination process in the 1970s, there were

debates if the cathedral portion was nothing more than a “trophy” of the reconquista or a legitimate

site of historical and religious significance. This debate attests to UNESCO’s recognition of the

value of the Christian architecture although it ultimately concluded that this was not worth including

in the criteria for World Heritage status.

59

Lamprakos, “Memento Mauri: The Mosque-Cathedral of Cordoba.” Lamprakos goes into great depth in her article,

“Memento Mauri: the Mosque-Cathedral of Cordoba,” which synthesizes a great deal of literature on the Mosque-

Cathedral, specifically focusing on the architecture of the space, not just throughout Catholic ownership but during the

Umayyad dynasty. I will be citing heavily from her work in the next paragraphs and recommend anyone who is

interested in knowing more to read her entire article.

60

Lamprakos, “Memento Mauri: The Mosque-Cathedral of Cordoba.”

61

Ibid.

62

Juan Gómez Bravo, “Catálogo de los obispos de Córdoba, y breve noticia historica de su iglesia catedral, y

obispado, Volume 1.” 419-420. https://play.google.com/store/books/details?id=CyM-AAAAYAAJ&rdid=book-CyM-

AAAAYAAJ&rdot=1.

63

UNESCO World Heritage Centre, “Historic Centre of Cordoba.”


14

The year 2010 saw the most notorious example of Christianization when the Cabildo

removed the word “mosque” from the name of the building, officially designating it the “Córdoba

Cathedral.” 64 The name change was an obvious attempt to erase the Islamic significance and sparked

public fury. Still, it took a petition of more than 400,000 signatures, press in the world’s leading

newspapers, and three years’ time to have the name reinstated as the “Mosque-Cathedral of

Córdoba” in June 2013.

After this victory, Google Maps changed the name of the site to “Cathedral of Córdoba” in

November 2015. 65 Unlike the previous incident which took a grassroots movement to reverse the

name change, Google reverted the name back to the Mosque-Cathedral of Córdoba after only a few

weeks of backlash. Though these nominal changes ultimately did not affect the physical preservation

of the site, they are symbolic exertions of dominance by the Catholic Church over the Muslim

population and history of Andalusia. Moreover, these two naming controversies bring to light the

enormous amount of power the Church has to enact whatever change to the Mosque-Cathedral it

sees fit as well as the harsh reality that the Cabildo must be constantly monitored in order to prevent

a significant erasure of history.

While these incidents were visible to a concerned international audience, changes in the

content presented to visitors (e.g. brochures, tours, websites) and to the building itself take more of

an effort to see, even if the omissions are equally injurious. The nonprofit activist group Plataforma

Mezquita Catedral [Platform of the Mosque-Cathedral] has issued several reports to ICOMOS

concerning Cabildo-approved changes, though their complaints have gone ignored. 66 In the mid-

2000s, the Cabildo debuted new brochures for visitors that included a historical background section

which began with the consecration of the Church in 1236. 67 The introduction asked visitors “to be

respectful with the identity of the space as a Christian temple” and included a sidebar as the only

mention of its Moorish past, calling it “The Muslim Intervention.” 68 On the Cabildo’s website, the

timeline for the Mosque-Cathedral begins in the sixth century, claiming the building was originally

built by Visigoths as the Basilica of Saint Vincent. 69 There is much debate on the true origins of the

building. However, the general consensus amongst experts, is that originally it was the site of Janus,

then a Visigothic church, then a mosque, and then finally, a cathedral. However, some historians

argue that the site’s supposed history as a site of Janus and Visigothic church is questionable and

suggest its first function was as a mosque. 70 As for the space itself, several Christian paintings and

64

Eric Calderwood, “The Reconquista of the Mosque of Córdoba.”

65

Pilar Álvarez, "Google Maps puts “Mosque” back into Córdoba monument’s name," EL PAÍS, November 26, 2014,

accessed December 10, 2017, https://elpais.com/elpais/2014/11/26/inenglish/1417013420_573603.html.

66


67

Ibid.

68

Ibid.

69

“The History.” Conjunto Monumental Mezquita Catedral de Córdoba. Cathedral Chapter of Cordoba. Accessed

December 9, 2017. https://mezquita-catedraldecordoba.es/descubre-el-monumento/la-historia/.

70

Juan Velasco, "Fernando Arce: "La existencia de la Basílica de San Vicente bajo la Mezquita es un mito,"

CORDÓPOLIS, el Diario Digital de Córdoba, December 03, 2017, accessed December 10, 2017,

http://cordopolis.es/2017/12/03/fernando-arce-la-existencia-de-la-basilica-de-san-vicente-bajo-la-mezquita-es-unmito/.


15

statues have been disseminated throughout the mosque portion of the site. 71 Such blatant omissions

of history, villainization of Muslim rulers, and lack of respect for the mosque space itself confirm

the Cabildo has no pride in the building’s history and takes no responsibility to give visitors even a

somewhat-objective record. The Cabildo’s actions would not be as problematic if they were not the

only organization managing the entire site. Other incidents have occurred in Spain where art and

architecture have been destroyed because Catholic priests, the sole managers of most churches, may

grant preservation responsibilities to whomever they wish. 72 In sum, the Cabildo has complete

control over the Mosque-Cathedral’s physical space and historical narrative. It uses this power to

downplay, or, at times, to erase the site’s Islamic history to the benefit of its Catholic history. Such

a biased and unregulated management system which threatens the criteria of the mosque should be

of interest to UNESCO as a protector of religious heritage.

LEGAL ARGUMENT AGAINST CABILDO OWNERSHIP

Because of the muddiness of the unofficial ownership by the Church, there is no clear legal

status, regulation, statutes, or supervision. 73 Such a situation is not conducive to effective

conservation of Islamic heritage.

The Catholic bias of Spanish courts makes this legal case seem like a lost cause. However, a

distinguished local lawyer and law professor at the University of Córdoba plans to take the Cabildo

to court. Since the public became aware in 2009 of the Diocese’s registration of the Mosque-

Cathedral, Antonio Manuel Rodríguez has been building the Platform’s case demanding government

ownership, claiming that this is not a case of expropriation because the building was never the

Cabildo’s property to begin with. 74 Rodríguez argues that the Mosque-Cathedral does not belong to

the Cabildo—“I want that to be clear because it seems like it is and it is assumed, but it is not.” 75

Rodríguez believes government ownership would protect the Mosque-Cathedral from

privatization as well as allow for a diverse managerial body comprised of culture, art, and tourism

71


72

One notable example is the Ecco Homo fresco in Borja, a town in northeastern Spain. The city became the site of an

international controversy when an elderly woman botched a restoration of a fresco from 1930 of Jesus Christ. Since

the church building and all the art within it were registered to the Catholic Church, the priests are the ones responsible

for preservation and legally had the authority to give this woman permission, despite her not having any training of

any kind. The mayor of Borja stated the government’s inability to intervene because the church was not their property.

The fresco was not catalogued because it was private property. This is the statement the priest who allowed an 80-

year-old woman to attempt to restore the fresco made: ‘I didn’t know anything. Everything was done by her own will.

I didn’t see her work. I led mass and I left...the chapel is always open and that Cecilia [the 80-year-old woman], upon

seeing the paint chipped and flaking, decided to restore the painting’ (Europa Press, "El párroco de Borja pide tapar el

Ecce Homo para evitar mofas," Diario Córdoba, August 24, 2012, accessed December 09, 2017,

http://www.diariocordoba.com/noticias/sociedad/parroco-borja-pide-tapar-ecce-homo-evitar-mofas_740375.html.

And Europa Press. “Expertos tratarán de salvar el 'Ecce Homo' de Borja mal restaurado.” El Periódico de Aragón,

August 22, 2012 http://www.elperiodicodearagon.com/noticias/expertos-trataran-de-salvar-ecce-homo-de-borja-malrestaurado_784456.html?_ga=2.42095715.731719715.1505501705-151329531.1505501698.

73

This will bring about an important comparison to the Alhambra in Granada, which does have a clear legal status.

74

Antonio Manuel, "The Mosque of Córdoba: A paradigm in danger." January 20, 2014. Accessed December 08,

2017. http://antoniomanuel.org/the-mosque-of-cordoba-a-paradigm-in-danger/.

75

Antonio Manuel Rodríguez, interview by Mary Cate Hickman, April 5, 2017, Final Antonio Interview, transcript.


16

experts; legal officials; and religious leaders. I will summarize his legal argument and emphasize the

most salient points in an effort to break down a complex understanding of ownership under Spanish

real estate law.

First, registration does not mean the legal acquisition of ownership of the property. In an

interview, Rodríguez explained, “Just because I register the moon in my name doesn’t mean it’s

mine.” 76 In Spanish law, registration only means inscription, which legally differs from ownership.

The Mosque-Cathedral was registered by the Diocese of Córdoba, but since they do not have not a

property title, it is not legally owned.

Second, the laws allowing the registration are unconstitutional. 77 Rodríguez stated,“It was as

simple as going to the register and inscribing the site, benefitting from the lack of publicity that

would have erupted if the Church had gone through public administration to register.” 78 The existent

Franco-era law from 1946 permits a simple way to register estates that belong to public

administration and to the Catholic Church. The “flagrant unconstitutionality” of Article 206 of the

Ley Hipotecaria [Mortgage Law] (ML) made possible what previously was impossible after 1998

when the Reglamento Hipotecario [Mortgage Regulation] (MR) was updated to allow the

registration of properties tax-free as a space “dedicated to prayer.” 79 In 2006, Mosque-Cathedral was

registered to the Diocese of Córdoba. This moment in the history of the Mosque-Cathedral is crucial.

Via these changes, the Church was able to self-certify its right to the Mosque-Cathedral because it

simply just had to say it owned the property, even without the title of property. Alejandro Torres, a

professor at the Public University of Navarra, noted what is clear in the constitution: giving a bishop

the powers of a public notary is “not compatible with the constitutional principles of religious

equality, neutrality, and separation between the Church and State.” 80 The registration is legally null

without any necessity for an explicit law of disentailment. 81 If articles 206 of the ML and 304 of the

MR were declared unconstitutional either by the courts regarding a supervening unconstitutionality,

the site could be governmentally owned.

Third, religious consecration does not equal acquisition. Currently, as set forth in Córdoba’s

registry of the Santa Iglesia Catedral de Córdoba (the Mosque-Cathedral’s legally registered name),

the ceremony establishing “ownership” took place during the 1236 reconquest and included drawing

a cross signifying “the liturgical and canonical expression of the seizure by the Church. The entire

building was converted into a Christian temple...The building is dedicated to Catholic Worship.” 82

76

Ibid.

77

In October 2012, the Catalan group Entesa proposed in the Senate an abolition of the reform of the 1998 Aznar law.

Ultimately, it failed with 8 votes against 12. PP and Partido Nacionalista Vasco [Basque Nationalist Party] (PNV)

voted against, despite recognizing the legal complexity of the matter and the concerns of unconstitutionality.

78


79

Article 206 states that “...those of the Catholic Church, when they lack a registered title of ownership...will be able

to register for a property title…” Article 206 was published in the Mortgage Law 3/20/1946 and then updated on

January 1, 1997 and finally updated June 26, 2015. Article 304 of the MR states that “Properties of the public domain

can also be objects of inscriptions, conforming to special legislation...in regard to the properties of the Church, the

certifications will be issued by the respective dioceses.” https://www.boe.es/buscar/act.php?id=BOE-A-1947-3843.

80

Gómez and Vargas, "La Iglesia inscribió 4.500.”

81

Antonio Manuel, “A Paradigm in Danger.”

82

Ibid.


17

Legally, a physical title and antecedent are necessary to justify the legal ownership of real estate,

which must also be susceptible as private property. 83,84 There is no physical title for the Mosque-

Cathedral because religious consecration is not listed as a means of obtaining a title in Article 609

of the Spanish Civil Code. Interestingly, both the Catholic Church and Rodríguez cite Article 609

as in their favor: “Ownership is acquired by occupancy. Ownership and other rights over property

are acquired by law, by gift, by testate and intestate succession and as a result of certain contracts

by tradition. They may also be acquired by prescription.” 85 Rodríguez points out that “consecration”

is not listed in Article 609. 86 Thus, consecration does not confer title.

Fourth, history shows that the Mosque-Cathedral has been recognized as government

property. All changes to the Mosque-Cathedral were authorized (or stopped), not by the Church, but

by the King or Queen. 87 If it had been private property, the King would not have controlled it.

Lastly, historical occupation does not equal acquisition. The legal process for cataloguing

the Mosque-Cathedral as a titled, public property could have been very simple. 88 Rodríguez explains

that since similar conquests during the early 1000s of famous sites such as the Aqueduct of Segovia,

Theater of Meridá, and the Alhambra were not considered valid to pass to the Church in Spain’s new

democracy, neither should the Mosque-Cathedral. The former sites were added into the public

registry without any issue, but the religious aspects of the Mosque-Cathedral kept it out until 1998

because up until then, temples set aside for Catholic worship were not included in the registry as

they were considered the property of the public domain.

Under Spanish law, registration of the Mosque-Cathedral means it can be considered private

property, becoming susceptible to acquisition by usucaption. 89 But, if the property were owned by

the government, prescription would not be an option—it only is germane in regards to private, not

public or governmentally-owned property. 90

In this case, ownership plays an insular role in management. Not only has UNESCO

continued to let the Cabildo proudly own the Mosque-Cathedral in this way, they have omitted any

mention of the Cabildo in their World Heritage description of the site. Still, in 2014 the Cabildo took

credit for the elevation of the site to Exceptional Value, meaning UNESCO recognizes the Cabildo

as the managers but chooses to not publicize the information. This could be for several reasons, but

perhaps one is that UNESCO acknowledges the problematic and potentially illegal nature in which

the Cabildo manages the Mosque-Cathedral.

83

An antecedent is how a claimant receives a property.

84


85

Testate succession occurs when a person dies and leaves a will. Their estate will be distributed as they bequest in the

will however legal rights will still have to be satisfied. Intestate Succession occurs when someone dies without a will

and their estate is distributed by the laws of intestacy which are governed by the Succession Act of 1964.

86


87

Lamprakos, “Memento Mauri: The Mosque-Cathedral of Cordoba.”

88


89

Usucaption is a legal term which refers to a method in which one can become the legal owner or title holder of a

property after possessing it for a certain period of time.

90

The Spanish rule that prescription (colloquially known in the U.S. as adverse possession) does not run against public

property is also the common law rule in England and the U.S.


18

FAILURE OF COMMUNITY EFFORTS

The call for UNESCO intervention comes after considering the assiduous, but ultimately,

futile efforts of activists against the powerful local Catholic Church.

In Córdoba, there are two types of activists invested in reclaiming public ownership of the

Mosque-Cathedral: those who are Muslim and those who are not. The most prominent local Muslim

activist group is Junta Islamic or the Islamic Council. Formed in 1984, the Islamic Council was

created with the initial objective of obtaining the right to pray at the Mosque-Cathedral. When their

first petition was rejected, co-founder Mansur Escudero began performing his Friday prayers outside

the monument as a protest against the Church’s decision. After Escudero died in 2010, the Islamic

Council retracted its call for shared use of the Mosque-Cathedral, instead only advocating for

government ownership so as to not be seen as threatening. 91 Although the Islamic Council has never

advocated for the Mosque-Cathedral to be a Muslim-only space, the local community, and the

bishop, perceives the group to be waging an attempt to reconquer Al-Andalus. 92 Therefore, the

current leaders of the activist group have sidelined their goal of a shared prayer space so as to not

interfere with secular activists wanting to reclaim the Mosque-Cathedral from the Church.

The Islamic Council now focuses on pushing for more amenities for Muslims and a more

positive presence Córdoba for the six to seven thousand Muslims who reside there. 93,94 While that

community is a small minority among Córdoba’s 326,000 residents, the five small mosques in the

city do not come close to meeting the needs of the high volume of Muslim tourists. 95 Representatives

of the Islamic Council stated that “almost all Muslims in the world want to go to Córdoba at least

once in their life” and recounted an experience they had taking a group of 40 French Muslims to

pray in a hotel because no mosque in Córdoba could hold a group that large. 96 Their efforts also

include bringing halal food to Córdoba and raising money for an Islamic Center that would be a

resource for local Muslims as well as tourists. 97 Finally, the Islamic Council supports secular

activists who are pursuing a legal battle against the Church, though they admit that they are “not

clear” on the legal details, which goes to show how convoluted ownership is. 98 Representatives from

the Islamic Council express hope for the opportunity to one day pray at their home mosque, though

acknowledge several generations will likely pass before change occurs.

91


transcript.

92

Juan José Asenjo Pelegrina, “Uso Compartido De La Catedral. Nota De Prensa.”

93

In 2010, there were just over one million Muslims in Spain, making up 2.3% of the population. By 2020, Pew

projects there to be 1.6 million making up 3.3% of the population. Actually, Spain is in the bottom third for percentage

of Muslims making up their population, though number-wise they have the fifth most.

94

Interestingly, it is converts who make up an important and politically active minority in Spain’s Muslim population

("In Spain, dismay at Muslim converts holding sway," The Christian Science Monitor, November 07, 2006, accessed

December 10, 2017, https://www.csmonitor.com/2006/1107/p04s01-woeu.html).

95


transcript.

96

Ibid.

97

Ibid.

98

Ibid.


19

Meanwhile, one secular group comprised of Catholic Spaniards is actively pursuing a case

against the Church in the name of historical preservation of their town’s history. The Plataforma

Mezquita Catedral [Mosque-Cathedral Platform] is a nonprofit, non-religious activist group which

has been the most successful in pushing against Catholic dominance over the space. The Mosque-

Cathedral Platform [MCP] was founded in 2013 when schoolteacher Miguel Santiago reconnected

with his former student, now-lawyer Antonio Manuel Rodríguez. Their newly formed platform had

three main objectives: first, change the name from the Cathedral of Córdoba to Mosque-Cathedral

of Córdoba; second, reclaim governmental ownership; and third, establish a council bestowed with

shared managerial powers between the private institution of the Catholic Church and public

institutions in tourism, culture, research, and art preservation. 99 So far, MCP has only achieved their

first objective, as previously discussed, and the Platform is currently focused on their second

objective, to reclaim ownership from the Cabildo. MCP has been invested in building a legal case

against the Cabildo with Rodríguez. However, Jiménez, a journalist who works for MCP, expressed

the Platform’s concerns over the wide disparity between their small organization and the financial

resources of the Catholic Church which the Cabildo utilizes. Nevertheless, Antonio Manuel

Rodríguez, who is also a law professor at the University of Córdoba, is heavily invested in the case,

as has already been discussed. Besides the legal case, MCP has tried grassroots efforts to reach its

objectives as well. In late 2017, MCP organized a petition with over 400,000 citizen signatures who

signed in favor of making the monument public. This petition, along with evidence of the Bishop of

Córdoba’s attempts to cover up the Islamic history of Andalusia, was submitted to the Andalusian

Government. Despite this pressure from the evidence, petition, MCP, and the Andalusian City

Defender, the Andalusian Government has avoided ruling on the ownership issue. 100

Despite not having much hope for accomplishing the second objective, Santiago and MCP

have big plans for the third. Santiago, who is also the spokesperson for the Platform, hopes for a

more secular use of the space: concerts, film screenings, university activities, and research. He says

that currently everything the Platform proposes must go through the Cabildo. Mentioning France’s

1905 law which returned all religious sites to the government, Santiago envisions a council

comprised of public and church officials who make decisions regarding the space as a cooperative

effort. When pressed on the inclusion of a member from the Islamic Council to be invited to sit on

the proposed council, Santiago recoils, saying that it would be up to the proposed council to decide.

MCP is overall sympathetic to the Muslims in Córdoba, but is most interested in advocating for the

Mosque-Cathedral to be “public, well-managed, and respected in history and memory.” 101 Their

secular approach in advocating for proper preservation of the space and an accurate presentation of

history has proven to be effective, and hopefully will continue to be. 102

99

Miguel Santiago, interview by Mary Cate Hickman, April 6, 2017, Final Miguel Interview, transcript.

100

El País, “La Junta De Andalucía Evita Pronunciarse Sobre La Titularidad De La Mezquita De Córdoba Desde

2014,” EL PAÍS, January 27, 2018, accessed June 03, 2018,


101

El País, “La Junta De Andalucía.”

102

For a thorough survey of the conferences, nonprofits, and dialogues that occur, I highly suggest reading Al-Andalus

Rediscovered by Marvine Howe.


20

One aim of this article is to encourage UNESCO to support the missions of these two local

groups by fostering a dialogue between them and the Cabildo, which so far has been near

impossible. 103 UNESCO says that one of its goals is to “encourage participation of the local

population in the preservation of their cultural and natural heritage.” 104 With this in mind, UNESCO

needs to support the local population, such as MCP and the Islamic Council, who are trying to

preserve the cultural heritage of the Mosque-Cathedral.

FAILURE OF GOVERNMENT EFFORTS

The government, which is currently left-leaning, has not had success in reclaiming ownership

of the Mosque-Cathedral either. Whereas the Islamic Council wants to pray in the mosque and MCP

wants the Islamic integrity preserved, the left-leaning government is most interested in the revenue

of what is estimated to be over 20 million euros that the Cabildo does not declare nor pay taxes

on. 105,106,107 Rodríguez stated what many know to be true: “Spain is a tax paradise for the Catholic

Church.” 108 Thus, the last reason in this call for UNESCO intervention is for ethical reasons—

Cabildo’s management is breaking EU law, and in a country where the judicial system rarely sides

against the Catholic Church, there is sufficient reason to approach a policy change from an

international diplomatic standpoint.

In a 2016 report, the City Council Secretary General for Córdoba, Valeriano Lavela, stated

that the Mosque-Cathedral does not belong to the Church or any other organization or individual

and that the Church’s acquisition of it has no legal basis. In a contradictory move, considering that

she vowed in 2015 to return the title to public domain, the mayor of Córdoba, Isabel Ambrosio, a

member of Partido Socialista Obrero Español [Spanish Socialists Workers’ Party] (PSOE),

undermined Lavela’s authority by calling the report an “opinion” that held no legal merit. 109 The

ambivalent statements the government has issued concerning the ownership of the Mosque-

Cathedral contributes to the complex politico-legal reality of the building which continues to allow

Cabildo management.

103

Representatives from both groups mentioned the Cabildo’s refusal to talk with them.

104

UNESCO World Heritage Centre, "World Heritage," UNESCO World Heritage Centre, accessed June 03, 2018,

https://whc.unesco.org/en/about/.

105

The PP is the People’s Party, a conservative and Christian democratic political party in Spain. It is one of the four

major parties of modern Spanish politics. IU is United Left, a political coalition that was organized in 1986, bringing

together several left-wing political organizations.

106

Europa Press, "Ambrosio no ve amenaza para los cat," Diario Córdoba, May 17, 2017, , accessed December 10,

2017,http://www.diariocordoba.com/noticias/cordobalocal/ambrosio-no-ve-amenaza-catolicos-titularidad-publicamezquita_1147071.html.

107

Consultoria, "El Cabildo reprende a Ambrosio.” The diocese reiterated No. 6 Court of Instruction of Córdoba in

2015 and the General Directorate of Heritage of the Ministry of Finance in 2014 which found the Catholic Church to

be the rightful owner of the site since 1236.

108


109

Antonio Gutiérrez, "Ambrosio le vuelve a recordar a Lavela que su opinión es "particular, "CORDÓPOLIS, el

Diario Digital de Córdoba, April 24, 2016, accessed December 10, 2017, http://cordopolis.es/2016/04/24/ambrosio-levuelve-a-recordar-a-lavela-que-su-opinion-es-particular/.


21

The Cabildo does not have a tax license, meaning they do not declare the revenue from

required admission tickets to the site. This creates a total guessing game as to the actual amount the

Diocese reaps each year. Rodríguez estimates it is around 15 million euros a year; the Islamic

Council estimates it at around 24 million; Pedro García estimates it at 20 million. 110 Though the

exact number is unknown, it can be assumed the amount is large based on the site’s popularity. Even

though the Cabildo is not required to declare it, the monument is funded with public money by the

Andalusian Ministry of Culture and the national government. 111 This demonstrates a concerning

imbalance: not only does the city function without millions of euros in taxes that could be used to

bolster the local economy or improve infrastructure, but the government uses tax dollars to fund the

monument’s upkeep. This financial situation is unethical as well as potentially illegal under

European Union law.

In June 2017, the European Union Court of Justice declared the tax exemption that local

Spanish Catholic Churches enjoy on the tax on Constructions, Installations, and Works (ICIO) to be

an illegal assistance by the Spanish state if the “exercised activities have an economic nature, an

aspect that a national judge can determine.” 112,113 Though the 1979 concordat grants “full and

permanent exemption from taxes on property and earnings from property, as regards to income and

asset” to the Catholic Church, the CJEU states that the exemption does not apply “to income arising

from economic activities or from assets belonging to the Church in respect of which use has been

assigned to third parties; nor shall it apply to capital gains or to income which is subject to deduction

at source of income tax.” 114 This ruling is a rather straightforward indication that Cabildo should

now be legally required to pay taxes on the revenue from the required entrance tickets to the Mosque-

Cathedral. The PSOE raised this question to the attention of the national government since the

110

Ibid.

111


112

"La Mezquita-Catedral no pagará IBI por ser templo ‘de culto’ y BIC," Periódico digital La Voz De Córdoba,

October 17, 2017, accessed December 10, 2017, http://www.lavozdecordoba.es/actualidad/2017/10/17/no-pagara-ibitemplo-culto-bic/.

113

The role of the Court of Justice of the European Union is to ensure that EU law ‘is interpreted and applied the same

in every EU country; ensuring countries and EU institutions abide by EU law.’ The members of the court include one

judge from each EU country as well as 11 advocates general. In this case, a group of recently renovated religious

schools in Spain were denied an ICIO tax refund by the city of Getafe because the renovations had ‘no religious

purpose.’ The case concerned the interpretation of Article 107(1) TFEU. So, the Congregacion is a registered Catholic

religious entity who was going to renovate and extend the building used by the school for meetings, classes, and

conferences. When they applied for a refund of the ICIO tax they paid (about 24 thousand euros) they were denied by

the municipal tax office because the construction and renovations were for ‘an activity of the Catholic Church which

had no religious purpose.’ An order from 5 June 2001 granted the Catholic Church full exemption from ICIO tax in

regards to buildings belonging to the Church, ‘regardless of the nature of the activities for which those buildings were

used.’ Later, an amendment was passed in October 2009 to clarify the ICIO exemption applied ‘only to buildings used

for exclusively religious purposes.’ However, it was annulled by the National High Court of Spain and the Supreme

Court of Spain because the order reduced the scope of the 1979 concordat exemption. The city of Getafe argued that

the 2009 amendment provides a necessary limitation since ‘an exemption of this kind could be incompatible with EU

law on State aid—given the scale on which the Church carries on economic activities (the running of schools,

hospitals, etc.).’ Apparently, only the European Commission was aware of this potential discrepancy but ‘has not

adopted a final position on the matter.’ The national court’s judgment from 9 October 2014 is ‘uncertain’ whether or

not the ICIO tax exemption could permit state aid when used for economic activities.(C-74/16,

https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/institutions-bodies/court-justice_en).

114

C-74/16 (Court of Justice of the European Union June 27, 2017).


22

Mosque-Cathedral is partly “affected by tourist economic activity.” 115 The Spanish Parliament

responded that the ruling of the CJEU is contrary to community law “so it is not necessary to modify

or annul.” 116 This statement represents a concerning lack of adherence to EU law that undermines

the very reason for which EU law exists.

Furthermore, government officials assert that the Catholic Church is exempt from taxes

because other religious groups enjoy this exemption as well. 117 While it is true that the Catholic

Church’s tax benefits are similar to those other religious groups receive, such as evangelicals, Jews,

and Muslims, there is no group apart from the Catholic Church reaping millions of euros each year

from tourism to its worship sites.

Though the Cabildo’s tax evasion does not explicitly threaten the Islamic heritage of the

Mosque-Cathedral, it demonstrates the inability of the government in Córdoba to enact any sort of

accountability on the Cabildo, despite having legal justification. Taking this into account, it can be

determined that the power of the Cabildo is significantly greater than perhaps previously thought by

an outsider and should be addressed by UNESCO as this power negatively affects one of the most

important World Heritage Sites.

In May 2017, Mayor Ambrosio commissioned a team of experts to achieve governmental

ownership of the Mosque-Cathedral because she believes it “belongs to everyone.” 118,119 The

Cabildo was outraged and called her mayoral actions an “attack on the Catholic community of

Córdoba” that “only generates division among the population.” 120,121 The Cabildo added that the

Mosque-Cathedral “has been dedicated for almost 800 years to Catholic worship, which is

incompatible with the Islamic faith, just as Catholic worship is incompatible with the Islamic faith

in Islamic temples.” 122,123 Mayor Ambrosio defended herself saying, “The city is in a position to be

able to provide arguments for the Mosque-Cathedral to be municipal property.” 124 Just five days

after the commission met on 20 June 2017, the Diocese of Córdoba attempted to stir up Islamophobic

115

"La Mezquita-Catedral no pagará IBI por ser templo "de culto" y BIC."

116

Europa Press, "El Gobierno no ve necesario cambiar las exenciones fiscales de la Iglesia tras el fallo de la UE.”

117

"La Mezquita-Catedral no pagará IBI por ser templo "de culto" y BIC.”

118

Europa Press, "Ambrosio no ve amenaza para los cat," Diario Córdoba, May 17, 2017, accessed December 10,

2017,http://www.diariocordoba.com/noticias/cordobalocal/ambrosio-no-ve-amenaza-catolicos-titularidad-publicamezquita_1147071.html.

119

Partido Socialista Obrero Español a social-democratic political party in Spain.

120

S.L. Marca Consultoria, “El Cabildo reprende a Ambrosio.”

121

“The mosque in the cathedral,” The Economist, October 08, 2015, accessed December 10, 2017,

https://www.economist.com/news/europe/21672363-catholic-church-accused-land-grab-mosque-cathedral.

122

Ibid.

123

Ambrosio responded that the commission would not ‘pose any threat to Catholics since the Mosque-Cathedral was

publicly owned until the 2006 inscription’ did little to quell their fear considering the Catholic Church believes their

ownership began over seven hundred years ago in 1236. First deputy mayor, Pedro García, a member of the United

Left (IU), stated that it is ‘curious’ that the People’s Party (PP) defends the private interests of the Church before the

commission of experts to study the public ownership of the Mosque-Cathedral, when ‘the obligation of a public

official is to defend the public’ (Europa Press, “Ambrosio no ve amenaza.”)

124

Europa Press “Ambrosio no ve amenaza.”


23

fear by publicly accusing Qatar of funding Muslim efforts to reclaim the temple. 125 The government

quickly denied these outrageous claims, and the Diocese never pursued them. 126

Though government ownership of religious monuments is not a universal policy that should

be adopted, it is a policy worth considering in specific cases, such as this one. In Spain where the

Catholic Church still has a concordat with the Vatican and is actively enforcing a prayer ban on

Muslims while ignoring the monument significance as a mosque, it is reasonable to turn to

government ownership which can allow for cooperation with religious groups.

According to the UNESCO website, “the Town Council, as the closest authority, is

responsible for developing urban planning policies and strategies to protect and enhance the

property.” 127 However, the Town Council has little to no authority in managing the Mosque-

Cathedral. Despite this being the case, UNESCO recognized the Mosque-Cathedral as a site of

Exceptional Value in 2014. 128 The Cabildo took the award as an endorsement of their authority and

management. 129 The conflation of UNESCO approval and the Cabildo’s management creates a likely

undesired link between UNESCO and the discriminatory practices of the Cabildo.

The Cabildo’s backlash against officials who call for governmental ownership demonstrates

its desire to retain complete power and the imperative of UNESCO intervention. The Cabildo has

gone so far as to use UNESCO endorsement of the site as justification for their authority in all

matters relating to the Mosque-Cathedral. The legal difficulties described in this section combined

with the Cabildo’s aggressive attitude are flagrant signals diplomatic intervention is required.

UNESCO should turn to its mission and “support States Parties’ public awareness-building activities

for World Heritage conservation.” 130 Local activists and government officials have been unable to

abrogate the Cabildo’s ownership of the Mosque-Cathedral. Hoping to establish effective

management, UNESCO can encourage the Cabildo to abdicate sole managerial powers.

A ROLE MODEL: THE ALHAMBRA

If there are doubts regarding the role religious bias plays in the case of the Mosque-Cathedral,

there is a secular example only 175 km away that could not be managed more differently. To the

southeast in Granada, there is a site of equal significance: the Alhambra. Upon first look, it seems

the Mosque-Cathedral and the Alhambra are twins: both were inscribed to the UNESCO World

125

Hannah Strange, “Spanish Church accuses Qatar of meddling in bitter fight over Mosque-Cathedral of Cordoba,”

The Telegraph, June 24, 2017, accessed December 10, 2017, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/06/24/fightcordoba-mosque-cathedral-erupts-bitter-accusations-qatari/.

126 Alfonso Alba, "El Gobierno Niega Intereses Extranjeros En La Mezquita De Córdoba," CORDÓPOLIS, El Diario

Digital De Córdoba, September 24, 2017, accessed June 03, 2018, http://cordopolis.es/2017/09/25/el-gobierno-niegaintereses-extranjeros-en-la-mezquita-de-cordoba/.

127

There is also a Municipal Office for the Historic Centre with specialized technicians and administrative personnel

to manage the guardianship and to promote the Historic Centre of Cordoba” (http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/313).

128

EFE. "La Unesco eleva a Bien de Valor Universal Excepcional el t." Diario Córdoba. June 25, 2014. Accessed

December 10, 2017. http://www.diariocordoba.com/noticias/cordobalocal/unesco-eleva-bien-valor-universalexcepcional-titulo-mezquita_889968.html.

129

S.L. Marca Consultoria, "El Cabildo reprende a Ambrosio.”

130

UNESCO World Heritage Centre, "World Heritage."


24

Heritage Site in 1984 for their exemplification of Andalusian art, architecture, history, and

significance. Both World Heritage sites were extended in 1994 to include the area surrounding the

main buildings. 131 Both sites are popular tourist destinations in southern Spain, showcasing

Mozarabic art and style. The only real difference between the two is that one is a religious temple of

worship and the other is not—causing them to be managed in completely different ways.

The Alhambra is managed by two boards and two commissions made up of diverse experts

and representatives. The Managing Board oversees the daily activities. It includes a director,

secretary general, and five representatives. 132 The Board of Members, which is comprised of 21

representatives from a variety of organizations including University of Granada, ministry of culture,

city council, Andalusian Institute for Historical Heritage, National Archaeological Museum, the

World Monuments Fund, and even the mayor of Granada, is the most authoritative body on decisionmaking

regarding the site. 133 The Permanent Commission is the body in charge of supervising,

monitoring, and executing the decisions made by plenary sessions of the entire council. The

Permanent Commission includes a president, vice president, five advisors, and one secretary. Lastly,

there is the Technical Commission, which is an advisory group made up of a president, ten board

members, and a secretary. The robust membership of the managing bodies of the Alhambra suggest

an effort to ensure objective preservation and use of the site.

The facilities at the Alhambra for cultural and educational purposes are extensive: spaces for

conferences, audio-visual projections, and a library. Events include forums, meetings of scientific

or cultural experts, and classes on conservation, restoration, and biodiversity. Accredited researchers

can obtain a special membership card in order to conduct research on the premises.

Most impressive, though, is the deliberate focus on transparency. On the website are this

year’s and previous budgets, there is a page listing ongoing projects, tourism statistics, etc. The

publication of this information makes the secrecy of the Cabildo, which does not publish anything

similar, all the more striking. Unlike the Cabildo, who uses UNESCO to defend illegal tax

exemption, the Alhambra credits its diverse management to the commitment it made to UNESCO,

as seen on the Alhambra’s website:

The significance of this is that Spain is now part of an international commitment to carefully

preserve and protect the Historical-Artistic Monuments Complex and the surrounding area.

It is the responsibility of the Spanish administration and the Administrative Body of the

Council of Andalusia, to see that the above mentioned commitment is sustained. 134

131

The Alhambra and Generalife was changed to the ‘Alhambra, Generalife and Albayzin, Granada’

(http://whc.unesco.org/en/decisions/3233).

132

There is one representative from each of the following services: Conservation and Protection, Investigation and

Diffusion, Public Visit and Commercialization, Gardens, Forests, and Orchards, Central Control.

133

Three of the members are the president of the Andalusian Council, the regional minister of culture of the

Andalusian Council, and the mayor of Granada.

134

"The Alhambra and the Generalife: World Heritage," La Alhambra y El Generalife, , accessed December 09, 2017,

http://www.alhambra-patronato.es/index.php/The-Alhambra-and-the-Generalife-World-Heritage/37

M5d637b1e38d/0/.


25

Not only do the differing management bodies indicate that sites of religious significance need

more monitoring, but it provides an exceptional model after which the Cabildo and local government

of Córdoba could look towards while transitioning to a governmentally owned monument in the

most efficacious way possible. Activists in Córdoba have noted the similarities between the two and

cite the Alhambra as an example of how the Mosque-Cathedral could be managed. 135 There is

nothing in the solution put forth by this article that would prohibit mass, prayer, and other worship

services occurring just as they do now. If the Mosque-Cathedral became governmentally owned, a

new management policy could be modeled after the Alhambra, which would not only be in the best

interests of preserving the building itself but in accommodating visitors with a more authentic

learning experience.

UNESCO RECOMMENDATIONS

At this point, UNESCO intervention seems necessary, or at the very least, reasonable. Now,

the question must be asked, what is the most effective way for UNESCO to take action? UNESCO

does not hold legislative nor judicial power; its influence is rooted in the respect and cooperation of

state parties. This means there is not one particular way to accomplish policy change. One possibility

is that UNESCO places the Historic Centre of Córdoba on the Potential Danger List, for violating

one of the following the criteria: “modification of juridical status of the property diminishing the

degree of its protection” and “lack of conservation policy.” 136 Placing the Historic Centre of Córdoba

on the Potential Danger list could be a diplomatic way to pressure the Cabildo into working with the

local government, professionals in conservation, and Muslims to create a governing body that best

represents the interests of the community while ensuring proper preservation. The press that would

come from the site being moved to the Danger List could bring about the same level of attention and

awareness that successfully drove the Cabildo to change the name of the monument back to Mosque-

Cathedral. However, before taking such a dramatic step, there is the option to simply start a dialogue

with the Cabildo regarding the concerns set forth in this article. Upon establishing a relationship

with the Cabildo, UNESCO could make two suggestions regarding management: (1) abrogation of

the current ban of Muslim prayer and (2) establishment of a multi-partisan council to manage the

Mosque-Cathedral. The multipartisan council must include Catholic and Muslim members, as well

as art historians, tourism experts, cultural experts, historians, religious scholars, etc.

Because laws pertaining to buildings of religious significance are often biased and difficult

to challenge, UNESCO should recognize that its World Heritage Sites with religious significance

are often in need of additional regulation.

135

Both Rodríguez and representatives from the Islamic Council referred to the Alhambra as an example in their

interviews.

136

UNESCO World Heritage Centre, "World Heritage in Danger," UNESCO World Heritage Centre, accessed

December 10, 2017, http://whc.unesco.org/en/158/.


26

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

Religious monuments must not be exempted from standards to which secular monuments are

held, especially, if a religious monument has significance to more than one religious group.

UNESCO has commissioned an Initiative on Heritage of Religious Interest, which seeks to protect

sites of religious heritage and foster dialogue. The Mosque-Cathedral is in need of protection, and

the local community is in need of support to even establish a dialogue with the Cabildo. 137

The case of the Mosque-Cathedral is not a univariate problem. Córdoba’s historic past

competes with the contemporary brand of coexistence. The local Catholic Church enjoys Franco-era

benefits to own and manage one of the most famous Mosques in the world in a way that discriminates

against Muslims, erases the Islamic heritage of the Mosque-Cathedral, and evades paying taxes on

tourist revenue. The confusion and contradictions of local and regional governments as well as the

meager efforts of the activists are insufficient in challenging Catholic ownership. By teasing out

these layers, it is understandable why this problem has remained hidden for so long. Yet, it also has

demonstrated its seriousness and shown why it is expedient for UNESCO to address the issues and

consider the policy recommendations set forth in this article.

Córdoba is a city branded as a beacon of interfaith hope for the world. Even though its past

may not live up to this reputation, there is no reason why its future could not. Córdoba is capable of

the the storied, sacred, and enviable coexistence historically attributed to it. In such a future, the

courts will step outside of their religious contexts and rule in favor of the same secular principles

which guided their country to democracy in 1978. Only then, the right to freedom of religious

expression can prevail. Muslims may have their prayer in the Great Mosque of Córdoba and

Catholics may celebrate mass, living in coexistence, which may not be anything more than an

acceptance of differing, though cherished, faith traditions.

Yet, this research is still not finished. Further areas that need to be analyzed are the data on

annual tourist revenue (currently unavailable), the historical strong-arming by the Spanish Catholic

Church against its government, management of more comparable sites in Spain, and judicial

precedents. Moreover, other religious monuments outside of Spain, such as the Notre Dame and the

Hagia Sophia, are caught in their own legal problems concerning the role religious groups should be

allowed to play in the case of ownership, management, and protection. There is much to be studied

both in the other Spanish sites registered by local dioceses and other significant religious sites around

the world. Ensuring the proper preservation of the sites begins with an open and frank dialogue

concerning the immense influence religion has over politics, not just in Spain, but throughout the

world.

137

Interviewees stated there was currently none, despite their own efforts.


27

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Albert, Manuel J. "El Gobierno Justifica Que En Los PGE Solo Se Llamase Catedral a La Mezquita." CORDÓPOLIS,

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30

ALANNA SCHENK

The Efficacy of Geospatial Technology

in Substantiating Human Rights

Violations

USC-UNESCO Journal for Global Humanities, Science, & Ethical Inquiry

March 2019


31

INTRODUCTION

Geography and geospatial technologies have existed for centuries, from George

Washington’s beginnings as a land surveyor, to aerial photos taken with handheld cameras during

World War I, to the development of websites to respond to natural disasters and humanitarian

crises. However, geospatial technologies and geographic information systems (GIS) that closely

resemble their current forms have only existed since the late 1960s but inform almost every aspect

of our lives, from marketing to public safety to disaster management.

‘Geospatial technologies’ is a term used to describe the wide breadth of tools that

contribute to the geographic mapping of human societies and the Earth. According to the American

Association for the Advancement of Science, geospatial technology is “technology relating to the

collection or processing of data that is associated with location” 1 . There are three common uses of

geospatial technologies. The first is global positioning systems (GPS), a satellite-based geolocation

system that operates globally and is made available to the public by way of GPS units. The second

is remote sensing, which denotes the procurement of information and images from afar. The third

is geographic information systems (GIS) which are information systems that facilitate the

foundation, organization, and presentation of data in a georeferenced form; this is often in the form

of maps and charts (AAAS).

Over the past few years, due to developments in technology, geospatial technologies have

developed into a large system of scientific, government, and commercially operated satellites

accompanied by desktop GIS. Data is collected by an arrangement of sensors and platforms;

which, whether manned or unmanned, can be found on the ground, in the sea, space, or air. Of the

wide array of sensors and platforms, the most expansive imagery data is collected from space by

way of both government-owned and private industry-owned satellites. Satellites are incredibly

useful as they orbit far higher than any airborne platform and can reach above the sovereign

airspace of nations or other areas where airborne and seaborne platforms are not granted access.

Once imagery data is collected, computers facilitate the storage and transmission of

imagery. A layered set of maps is created when data on environmental phenomena, socioeconomic

data, signals intelligence, or human intelligence is used in conjunction with powerful software.

But how are these maps and graphics built? The foundation layer is typically an image of a specific

location with visible locational features and terrain. Next, a variety of contextual and detailed

information is layered onto this foundation layer. This can range from elevation data, infrastructure

data such as sewer lines and power grids, boundary data, population data, political/religious

geography, natural and manmade features, and navigation data, among others. This ‘layering’ of

data in maps is due to the fact that all data has a spatial or locational component, which refers to

an exact point on Earth’s surface.

Products can be incredibly simple or advanced based on the type of information used and

the level of analytic complexity. Ultimately, this allows for complicated ideas and subjects to be

1

“What are Geospatial Technologies?” (American Association for the Advancement of Science, 2018).


32

conveyed to larger audiences. Data and pertinent hardware and software are now accessible to

corporations, non-governmental organizations, and universities. Thus, decision and policy makers

can now make more spatially informed decisions on humanitarian relief and intervention,

environmental resource management and conservation, among a multitude of other topics.

The purpose of this paper, specifically, is to show the efficacy of GIS to substantiate opensource

and other claims of religious violence. Through the use of the three case studies—Egypt,

Indonesia, and Myanmar—this paper will examine if religious-targeted attacks correlate with

where religious minorities live and where reported religious discrimination occurs.

GIS APPLICATION TO HUMAN RIGHTS

GIS contributes to the synthesis of diverse types of geospatial data, uncovers spatial

patterns, and streamlines confirmation of others’ observations, which can deliver visual proof to

document and confirm other recordings of human rights violations. Although the commercial

application and viability of geospatial technologies is already being realized, there is also a

significant possibility for these technologies to be used in the monitoring, intervention, and

prosecution of human rights violations.

One limit to the quality of images gathered by satellites is bad weather conditions and

clouds. However, remote sensing is an effective solution. Remote sensing, or data gathered from

airborne cameras and platforms, can produce imagery that displays details of one-meter or smaller.

This makes images gathered by remote-sensing devices suitable for examining human rights

abuses and supplying humanitarian aid as it is incredibly useful for visualizing reports and

providing access to data in inaccessible areas. In particular, active remote sensing - sensors that

send out a wave using their own source of light- are valuable in that data and imagery are collected

throughout the day and the night 2 . A variety of organizations and agencies use active remote

sensing in security scenarios such as marine monitoring and search and rescue missions, among

others.

Ranging from the confiscation of indigenous land to mass genocide, GIS and satellitebased

reports allow an array of organizations to gather evidence of human rights violations. In

Myanmar, the production of GIS maps of damaged agricultural areas after Cyclone Nargis in 2008

provided a visualization that served as a report basis for the provision of food aid and technical

assistance from the UN and various NGOs 3 . Currently in Myanmar, the analysis of satellite

imagery tells professionals about the burning of Rohingya villages due to scorched earth imagery.

Similarly, GIS and other geospatial technologies are essential in identifying geographic patterns

like disease groupings resulting from pollutants and contaminants, areas with limited water access,

and evacuation routes during natural disasters. These technologies can also be used to look at mass

grave mapping, natural resource extraction, and infrastructure destruction. Ultimately, the usage

and implementation of geospatial technologies in combination with internet-based platforms and

2

Passive vs. Active Sensing, (Natural Resources Canada, 19 Nov. 2015).

3

Matt Freeman, “Esri ArcWatch December 2008 - Cyclone Nargis Leaves Its Mark on the Map,” (Esri, 2008).


33

on-the-ground reporting systems increase the capability of authorities and organizations to collect,

analyze, and propagate authoritative and precise information.

ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS

As with most technological developments, it is important to acknowledge and address the

ethical implications of using geospatial technologies. Geospatial technologies are, in fact,

surveillance technologies. With more data, the possibility for invasion of privacy of specific groups

and individuals increases. Because data gathered using geospatial technologies and GIS are used

to inform decision-making, manipulated or inaccurate data can have drastic consequences on

policy outcomes.

These technologies can also possibly intensify inequalities over the globe. Those with

better access to technology and data are typically bigger organizations, while smaller organizations

and individuals have less access to data and expertise. The scale and power of GIS technology

exacerbates the unevenness between nations, groups, and individuals, including the ‘geographical

digital divide’ between nations. However, to this end, relevant organizations can use GIS to create

a broadband map to understand the ‘digital divide’ and to assist policy decisions on the distribution

of broadband subsidies 4 .

APPLICATION: USING GIS TO VISUALIZE REPORTS OF RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE

Over the last few decades, religious hostilities and restrictions have increased around the

globe. According to the Pew Research Center, the number of countries with very high levels of

social and governmental religious restrictions is now at one of the highest recorded levels; these

restrictions are a result of both government policies and social hostilities. In fact, according to the

Pew Research Center, religious hostilities are increasing in every major region of the world except

for the Americas. Over the past decade, North Africa and the Middle East had the most defined

increase; in 2012, 30% of the nations around the world had a high or very high level of government

religious restrictions. In 2012, Egypt, Indonesia, and Myanmar had some of the highest levels of

restriction on religion.

The term “government restrictions” refers to government actions, policies, and legislation

that constrain religious beliefs and practices. Such restrictions could pertain to governments

outlawing conversions, prohibiting specific faiths, or giving preference to a certain religion or

religious group. Examples of government harassment include pejorative and deprecating

statements such as Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s declaration that Europe should close

its borders to Muslim immigrants in an attempt to “keep Europe Christian.” 5 Some believe that

4

Ashley Hitt, “Mapping the Digital Divide: How GIS Is Impacting Lives,” (Connect Ohio, 2018).

5

Robert Mackey, “Hungarian Leader Rebuked for Saying Muslim Migrants Must Be Blocked ‘to Keep Europe

Christian,’” The New York Times, September 3, 2015,

https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/04/world/europe/hungarian-leader-rebuked-for-saying-muslim-migrants-mustbe-blocked-to-keep-europe-christian.html?auth=login-facebook&login=facebook


34

government restrictions on certain religious groups often result in religious violence against the

same groups.

Thus, this paper aims to see if geospatial technology can support other suggestive findings

and demonstrate a link between government restrictions on religion with sectarian violence and

attacks against religious institutions and figures. As mentioned earlier, the three countries with the

highest level of governmental religious restrictions are Egypt, Indonesia, and Myanmar. In the

following experiment, I will analyze the correlation between high levels of religious restrictions

and violence in areas where religious minorities live. It is important to note that correlation does

not mean causation, as there are likely other social, political, and economic dimensions that are

also motivations for violence.

METHODOLOGY

This research uses the Global Terrorism Database, an open-source database with

information on terrorist attacks across the globe, and Esri’s ArcMap software, used for creating

maps to detect points of religious conflict around the world. The Global Terrorism Database was

downloaded and overlaid on the basic administrative boundaries of each country. The national

boundary, administrative boundary, and population data shapefiles were taken from Esri’s open

source data as a part of the ArcGIS default layer package. The data was compiled and run through

spatial analysis using ArcMap, to create maps for visualization.

Targets were kept where the value designated was either ‘religious figures,’ ‘religion

identified,’ ‘places of worship’ or ‘religious affiliation institutions.’ This includes Imams, priests,

bishops, mosques, churches, shrines, relics, and organizations affiliated with religious entities.

DATA

The Pew Research Center’s assessment of global restrictions on religion evaluated over

198 countries and self-administering territories in 2012. In total, this covered over 99.5% of the

global population. The Government Restrictions Index is made up of 20 questions. To answer the

index questions, researchers used 18 widely circulated and cited sources of information. This

included reports from the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, Freedom House,

Amnesty International, the U.S. Department of State, and Human Rights Watch, among others.

Rather than commentaries and opinions, only solid reports about explicit actions, policies, and

laws were used.

The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) is an open-source database housed at the University

of Maryland. The GTD is composed of computerized data originally from the Pinkerton Global

Intelligence Service (PGIS). It includes information on events of terrorism, both domestic and

international, from around the world and temporally spans 46 years, from 1970 to 2016. From

1970 to 1997, PGIS instructed researchers and analysts to record acts of terrorism from reports,


35

newspapers, and wire services, among other sources. Terrorism is defined by PGIS as “the

threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence to attain a political, economic, religious or

social goal through fear, coercion or intimidation.” Thus, criminal acts that did not have political

or ideological motivation were not included–this includes combat between rival armed forces. The

GTD contains information on over 170,000 terrorist attacks and is currently the most wide-ranging

and broad unclassified database on terrorist attacks around the globe. The database contains

information on a minimum of 45 variables for each case but contains more than 120 variables for

more recent incidents. From 1998 to 2016 alone, over 4,000,000 news articles and 25,000 news

sources were reviewed to collect incident data. The GTD is unique and useful in that it provides

information on the frequency of attacks and the geographic distribution of attacks, as well as

examining terrorism tactics per region.

DATA QUALITY CHECK

Of note, there are also a few weaknesses associated with this data. The first is that opensource

terrorism databases rely on data pulled from the news and reports and is thus skewed

towards terrorism acts that are particularly newsworthy. The second is that open sources like the

news often are lacking in information on specificities related to the terrorist incident like details

about the terrorist organization. In particular, details about state terror used against internal citizens

are often not reported with great specificity.

CASE STUDIES: EGYPT

In Egypt, state policies are regressing into a set of oppressive policies that violate both

international human rights laws and basic human rights. The Egyptian constitution stipulates

freedom of religion and belief as “absolute,” but only provides adherents of particular religions the

right to worship freely and without harassment. The government does not officially recognize

Christians, members of the Bahai Faith, Jehovah’s Witnesses, or the Church of Jesus Christ of

Latter-day Saints 6 . These groups suffer from institutionalized discrimination, because they suffer

restrictions of employment and building permits for religious institutions. This includes not being

allowed to renovate and build places of worship along with restrictions from government

employment.

In particular, Christians in Egypt (otherwise known as Coptic) face unusually high levels

of persecution. Coptic Christians make up about 10% of the 92 million people who reside in Egypt

and are the largest Christian minority in the Middle East 7 . According to the charity Open Doors,

in 2017, 128 Christians were killed in Egypt for their religion and 200 were forced out of their

6

United States, “2018 Annual Report,” (US Commission on International Religious Freedom, 2018).

7

Baheg Bistawros, “The Coptic Christians of Egypt Today: Under Threat of Annihilation,” (Regent University,

1996).


36

homes. In 2015, the U.S. State Department reported that the Egyptian government “failed to

protect Christians targeted by kidnapping and extortion.” 8

Indeed, restricted religious minorities, especially Coptic Christians, are confronted with

terrorist attacks and sectarian violence. For example, on April 9, 2017, there were suicide

bombings in Tanta and Alexandria, Egypt where 45 worshippers celebrating Palm Sunday were

killed. 9 Islamic State militants claimed responsibility. Additionally, in May, an elderly Christian

woman was stripped by a crowd in Minya and paraded through the streets, while her house was

set on fire. 10

While the president of Egypt has not openly discriminated against Christians, local

authorities in towns and villages deny Christian rights through discriminatory daily practices. The

Guardian reports that “Christians were overlooked for jobs or promotions, university students were

given bad grades or failed, schoolchildren were made to sit at the back of the class, shop owners

were boycotted and hospital patients were not given proper treatment” (Sherwood, 2018) 11 .

Although this discrimination is not usually violent, extremists interpret and promote this

perception of Christians, which results in sectarian violence.

Local authorities in rural and less populated areas reportedly discriminate against

Christians the most (U.S. Mission Egypt, 2018) 12 . Human rights advocates have also noted that

the government is delayed in responding to religious sectarian violence and conflict away from

major cities. This governmental delay in responding to sectarian violence outside of major cities

plays an integral role in the escalation of violence since clashes are rarely investigated and

punished.

8

Bruce Alpert, “Hostility Toward Religious People Increasing, Says Report,” (VOA, 2017).

9

Faith Karimi et al., “ISIS Claims Responsibility for Egypt Church Bombings,” (Cable News Network, 2017).

10

Patricia Ramirez, “Egypt: Elderly Christian Woman Stripped And Paraded Through Streets By Muslim Mob,”

(The Inquisitr, 2016).

11

Harriet Sherwood, “Christians in Egypt Face Unprecedented Persecution, Report Says,” (The Guardian, 2018).

12

U. S. Mission Egypt, “Egypt 2017 International Religious Freedom Report,” (U.S. Embassy & Consulate in

Egypt, 2018).


37

Figure 1

Figure 2

As seen in Figure 1 and

Figure 2, attacks with a religious


38

motivation have a different spatial distribution than total terrorist attacks in Egypt. Upon analysis

of total terrorist attacks, it is evident that the spatial distribution of attacks is centered in Cairo and

expands out, with a high number in heavily populated areas. This can be seen through the

population dataset overlaid on the map.

In comparison to the distribution of the total terrorist attacks, religious motivated attacks

were centered around a few focal points with no correlation to heavily populated areas and were

spatially less consistent. Reported discrimination in Egypt by local authorities in less populated

and rural areas and religious violence, as seen on the map, was similarly distributed. Thus, religious

violence did parallel the geographic area where religious minorities lived and where reported

religious discrimination occurred instead of heavily populated areas. This is a suggestive finding,

although not statistically significant, as other factors could be contributing. However, it shows the

potential and capacity for GIS to detect patterns of human rights violations, which can then be

proven through other methods. Many human rights violations go unnoticed due to a variety of

reasons, including lack of central authority and governmental abuses, but this is an effective way

to bring awareness and visibility.

CASE STUDIES: INDONESIA

In Indonesia, the largest Muslim majority country, there is a growing trend of religious

violence, which targets Ahmadis, Christians, Baha’is, and Shias. 1 As per a census report from

2000, 88% of the Indonesian population is Muslim (with a Sunni majority), 6% is Protestant, 3%

is Roman Catholic, and 2% is Hindu. 2 Indonesia’s Ministry of Religious Affairs estimates that

eight million Catholics and 19 million Protestants live within the country. 3 However, despite this

array of religious representation, Buddhism, Judaism, other Christian denominations, and

traditional indigenous religions face persecution. In fact, through acts of discrimination,

harassment, and violence, many groups face limited freedom of association and expression.

In 1998, President Suharto resigned after over 30 years in power, which resulted in a strong

thread of religious militancy emerging. 4 The discrimination, violence, and harassment felt by

minority religious groups is enabled within the formal legal parameters in Indonesia that claim to

promote “religious freedom,” but instead destabilize religious harmony. The 1945 constitution and

the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights clearly promises religious freedom; yet

over the past few years, rules, legislation, and regulations have been reinforced that subject

marginal religions to formal discrimination, which makes them tremendously defenseless to

adherents of the majority community who decide to take the law into their own hands. Many of

these perpetrators are from Sunni militant groups. In recent years, intimidation and violence

against religious minorities has increased. Beyond discrimination and physical attacks, places of

1

“In Religion's Name | Abuses against Religious Minorities in Indonesia,” (Human Rights Watch, 2017).

2

“Indonesia,” (U.S. Department of State, 2010).

3

“Indonesia.” (U.S. Department of State, 2011).

4

Seth Mydans, “The Fall of Suharto: The Overview; Suharto, Besieged, Steps Down After 32-Year Rule in

Indonesia.” (The New York Times, 1998).


39

worship have been shut down, new construction of worship facilities have been paused, and

members of religious minorities have been arbitrarily arrested.

In many cases, terrorization and provocation of minority groups by military Islamist groups

are eased by the passive or active participation of Indonesian government officers and security

services. Local authorities either collaborate in rescinding building licenses for places of worship

or relocating religious minority communities. In a few instances, Christian churches have had their

permits rescinded by local authorities after pressure from Islamist groups, even though their

construction was deemed legal and met all requirements. Furthermore, there are many instances in

Indonesia where police do not assist in preventing religious minority targeted violence or provide

support in the aftermath of such episodes. Police are often reluctant to suitably probe and

investigate accounts of violence against religious minorities, and the justice system has proven to

be equally as ineffective in defending these minorities.

Upon further examination, it is also notable that the geographic distribution of religious

minorities in Indonesia correlates with religious targeted terrorist attacks. The Maluku Islands have

a considerable population of Christians, while East Nusa Tenggara has the highest proportion of

Catholics, with over 55%. Furthermore, Medan has a high population of Christians and Hindus.

These three geographic areas have been mapped below; the results correspond with their

populations’ religious make-up.

Figure 3


40

Figure 4

Figure 5


41

Figure 3 shows the Malaku Province of the Maluku Islands, which is an archipelago within

Banda Sea, Indonesia. The Malaku Province is divided into two provinces: the primarily Muslim

North Maluku Province, which stretches from Morotai to Sula, and the Maluku Province, which

is almost evenly split between Muslims and Christians and encompasses the area from Wetar to

Seram to Buri. In the heavily Christian Malaku Province of the Malaku Islands, many of the terror

attacks were related to religion. In fact, the number of terror attacks related to religion in the

Malaku Province is proportionally higher than other regions where the population is more

religiously homogeneous.

Likewise, Figure 4 is a map of Sumatra in Indonesia. The focus is Medan, which is the

capital of the North Sumatra province of Indonesia. Christians, Protestants, Catholics, and Hindus

all have a presence within the city. Although Medan is the fourth most populated city in Indonesia,

every single attack data point both within the city and the immediate surrounding area had a

religious motivation according to the map. This stands at a stark contrast with more

homogeneously Muslim provinces in Sumatra.

Figure 5 depicts East Nusa Tengarra, which has a sizeable Catholic population. It is the

only province in Indonesia where Roman Catholicism is the main religion. There are also large

Christian and Protestant communities, with those practicing Islam comprising the largest minority.

Although there were fewer points in this province than in others, the sole attack did target a

religious institution.

It is important to note that correlation does not imply causation as religious violence is

context-dependent and complicated, dependent upon other political, economic, and social factors.

However, there was a strong correlation between reported discrimination in religiously diverse

provinces and the proportion of religious targeted terrorist attacks compared to other terror attacks.

CASE STUDIES: MYANMAR

Myanmar is a nation in Southeast Asia with a majority Buddhist population. Within the

country, religious identity strongly relates to ethnic origin. 5 The Burmese ethnicity makes up most

of the population, while there are over 135 other ethnic groups represented within Myanmar.

Reflected in discriminatory policy including restrictions on employment, marriage, and freedom

of movement, there are high levels of hostility between Myanmar’s ethnic minorities and the

Burmese state. In Myanmar, Christians and Rohingya Muslims are suffering so horribly that the

country has been deemed one of the worst abusers of religious freedom by the U.S. Commission

on International Religious Freedom. 6 Religious and ethnic minorities face a number of abuses; the

Rohingya population are one such example. 7

The Rohingya people, an ethnic Muslim minority group, have had a presence in Myanmar

since the 15th century with a particularly large influx of immigration during the 19th and 20th

5

Nina Evan, “Myanmar (Burmese) Culture - Religion,” (Cultural Atlas, 2017).

6

Thomas Reese, “Burma's Religious Freedom Crisis,” (National Catholic Reporter, Dec, 2016).

7

“Myanmar: Major Ethnic Groups and Where They Live,” (Al Jazeera, 2017).


42

centuries when Rakhine was colonially part of British India. 8 The Rohingya differ ethnically,

linguistically, and religiously from Myanmar’s dominant Buddhist groups and live primarily in

the Rakhine State of Myanmar. Since independence from British India, Myanmar’s successive

governments have refuted Rohingya’s historical claims to the area and have denied the group

recognition as one of the country’s 135 ethnic groups. In 1948, legislation initially gave them

citizenship but was highly exclusionary. Then, in 1982, measures were taken to strip them of full

access to citizenship as the Citizenship Act of Myanmar was passed, which required that a person’s

ancestors belong to a group or race present in the country before British rule in 1823. During that

time, the Rohingya had still been categorized as illegal immigrants. Finally in 2015, President

Thein Sein cancelled the temporary identification cards for the Rohingya people, which took away

their right to vote. 9 Today, the Rakhine state, a political entity that represents the Buddhist majority

of the area, refuses to grant the Rohingya people citizenship status through legal documentation

which, in turn, has made them stateless. According to the United Nations Office for the

Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “More than 240,000 people in total have been displaced in

Myanmar.” Currently, a large number of Rohingya people are fleeing from Myanmar into

neighboring countries such as Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. However,

domestic, regional, and international opinion on the Rohingya and the government’s level of

authority differ greatly.

While the democratically elected State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi has been given peace

prizes for work to preserve democracy in Myanmar, Suu Kyi has not reacted to the brutality that

militia forces within Myanmar are conducting against the Rohingya. Suu Kyi finds herself

politically deadlocked between a powerful military, nationalist Buddhist majority parties and an

arguably undemocratic Constitution, as Suu Kyi’s government is not able to tell the military not

to launch offensives. It is therefore clear that the forces in control of Myanmar are in fact the

militias, who have a stronghold on the state. As Suu Kyi finds herself in power, the militias are

losing authority, and therefore resorting to increased use of force. As the government loses this

authority, the militia is securing their power through violent measures. From rape and murder to

burning of villages, some international organizations including Amnesty International are citing

the situation as “a vicious system of state sponsored, institutionalized discrimination that amounts

to apartheid.” 10

8

Eleanor Albert and Andrew Chatzky, “What Forces Are Fueling Myanmar's Rohingya Crisis?” (Council on

Foreign Relations, 5 Dec. 2018).

9

“Will Anyone Help the Rohingya People?” (BBC News, 2015).

10

“Myanmar: Rohingya trapped in dehumanising apartheid regime,” (Amnesty International, 2017).


43

Figure 6

The Rakhine state of Myanmar lies on the western border of the country. As can be seen in Figure

6, a vast majority of the religious motivated attacks were in fact in the Rakhine state. This supports

existing information about discrimination about the Rohingya. Furthermore, in open-source

publications, many violent attacks were reported to have been in the northern Rhakine state where

the majority Muslim population lives. Looking at Figure 6, is it clear that religiously motivated

attacks were significantly focused in the central and northern Rhakine state. Similarly, this map

supports the assertion that attacks were not consistent with heavily populated areas. Instead, they

were consistent with the spatial distribution of a religiously oppressed group. This is another

suggestive finding that supports the capability of geospatial technology to accurately model

interactions between humans and communicate patterns


44

CONCLUSION

This paper utilizes existing GIS data to analyze the spatial correlation between religious

discrimination and religious targeted terrorist attacks in Egypt, Indonesia, and Myanmar. As

standalone evidence for violence driven by religious discrimination, the results are not statistically

significant as religious violence is context-dependent and complicated. While not statistically

significant, these findings are suggestive and show that geospatial technology is effective in

detecting initial patterns and confirming other available claims of religious violence.

The findings in this paper do support the hypothesized correlation between government

hostility towards religious groups and manifested religious violence against the same groups. In

all three case studies, the attacks against religious figures, institutions, and places correlated with

areas where religious minorities live and where reported religious discrimination occurs, rather

than the highly populated metropolitan areas. This stands in stark contrast with the spatial

distribution of other terror attacks in highly populated areas. Ultimately, GIS is effective in

substantiating open source and other claims of religious violence.


45

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Council on Foreign Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, 5 Dec. 2018,

www.cfr.org/backgrounder/rohingya-crisis.

Bistawros, Baheg. “The Coptic Christians of Egypt Today: Under Threat of Annihilation.” Regent University, 1996.

Freeman, Matt. “Esri ArcWatch December 2008 - Cyclone Nargis Leaves Its Mark on the Map.” Esri,

www.esri.com/news/arcwatch/1208/myanmar-cyclone.html.

Karimi, Faith, et al. “ISIS Claims Responsibility for Egypt Church Bombings.” CNN, Cable News

Network, 10 Apr. 2017, edition.cnn.com/2017/04/09/middleeast/egypt-church-explosion/index.html.

“Indonesia.” U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of State, 17 Nov. 2010,

www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2010/148869.htm.

“Indonesia.” U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of State, 13 Sept. 2011,

www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2010_5/168356.htm.

“In Religion's Name | Abuses against Religious Minorities in Indonesia.” Human Rights Watch, 18 May 2017,

www.hrw.org/report/2013/02/28/religions-name/abuses-against-religious-minorities-indonesia.

Mackey, Robert. “Hungarian Leader Rebuked for Saying Muslim Migrants Must Be Blocked ‘to Keep Europe

Christian,’” The New York Times, 3 Sept. 2015,

https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/04/world/europe/hungarian-leader-rebuked-for-saying-muslimmigrants-must-be-blocked-to-keep-europe-christian

“Mapping the Digital Divide: How GIS Is Impacting Lives.” Connect Ohio,

connectednation.org/ohio/2018/11/14/mapping-the-digital-divide-how-gis-is-impacting-lives/.

“Myanmar: Major Ethnic Groups and Where They Live.” Myanmar | Al Jazeera, 14 Mar. 2017,

www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2017/03/myanmar-major-ethnic-groups-live-1703

09143208539.html.

Mydans, Seth. “The Fall of the Suharto: The Overview; Suharto, Besieged, Steps Down After 32-Year Rule in

Indonesia.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 21 May 1998,

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www.nrcan.gc.ca/node/14639.

“Myanmar (Burmese) Culture - Religion.” Cultural Atlas, culturalatlas.sbs.com.au/burmese-myanmarculture/religion-0147526d-2bb5-4e42-b224-18094703aff7.

“Myanmar: Rohingya trapped in dehumanising apartheid regime.” Amnesty International, 21 Nov. 2017,

https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/11/myanmar-rohingya-trapped-in-dehuman

ising-apartheid-regime/

Ramirez, Patricia. “Egypt: Elderly Christian Woman Stripped And Paraded Through Streets By

Muslim Mob.” The Inquisitr, The Inquisitr, 27 May 2016,

www.inquisitr.com/3140616/egypt-elderly-christian-woman-stripped-and-paraded-throug

h-streets-by-muslim-mob/.

Reese, Thomas. “Burma's Religious Freedom Crisis.” National Catholic Reporter, 15 Dec. 2016,

www.ncronline.org/blogs/faith-and-justice/burma-s-religious-freedom-crisis.

Sherwood, Harriet. “Christians in Egypt Face Unprecedented Persecution, Report Says.” The

Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 10 Jan. 2018,

www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/10/christians-egypt-unprecedented-persecution-report.

United States, “2018 Annual Report.” 2018 Annual Report, U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom,

2018.

U.S. Mission Egypt | 29 May, 2018 | Topics: News. “EGYPT 2017 INTERNATIONAL

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT.” U.S. Embassy & Consulate in Egypt, 29 May 2018,


46

eg.usembassy.gov/egypt-2017-international-religious-freedom-report/.

Voa. “Hostility Toward Religious People Increasing, Says Report.” VOA, VOA, 14 Apr. 2017,

learningenglish.voanews.com/a/hostility-toward-religious-people-increasing-says-report/3810195.html.

“What Are Geospatial Technologies? - AAAS Are Geospatial Technologies? ... GPS ! 8 Remote

Sensing Images and Data Collected Remotely Often by Satellite, but Other Platforms Also.” Dokumen.tips,

dokumen.tips/documents/what-are-geospatial-technologies-aaas-are-geospatial-technologies-gps-.html.

“What Are Geospatial Technologies?” American Association for the Advancement of Science,

www.aaas.org/content/what-are-geospatial-technologies.

“Will Anyone Help the Rohingya People?” BBC News, BBC, 10 June 2015,

www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-33007536


47

ALLISON WHITING

Republican Identity in a Multicultural

Society:

Analyzing Political Discourse about Islam and Muslims

during the 2017 French Presidential Election

USC-UNESCO Journal for Global Humanities, Science, and Ethical Inquiry

Undergraduate Thesis presented to the Global Studies Program

University of Southern California

December 2017


48

INTRODUCTION

At first glance, the way in which French politicians are talking about France’s Muslims

might seem like a strictly local issue. After all, it is a particularly French issue, arising from a

bitter history of colonialism and conceptions of national identity that tend to be more exclusive

than those of similar countries, such as Great Britain. However, when one considers several

factors, including the history of Muslims in France, the political conditions under which they

became an object of national mistrust, and the global conditions that have fanned the flames of

right-wing nationalist discourse, one can easily see that the issue of Muslims in France isn’t just

about Muslims in France. Most of all, it’s a story of the difficulty experienced when diverse

populations, all of whom have strong loyalties to diverse identities, try to live together in a

democratic state that is experiencing deep anxiety about its own identity. Some states openly

profess a policy of multiculturalism, like Great Britain and the United States, but France has taken

a different position entirely, one of undifferentiated republican citizenship relying on shared

cultural values, that is increasingly more difficult to defend as ethnic groups begin to

deterritorialize, 1 or become detached from their ancestral lands.

In a sense, France’s reaction to Islam is not unlike someone rejecting an organ

transplant. When the body falsely identifies a new organ as a threatening foreign element, it goes

into shock, spending a lot of energy reacting to what might not constitute a threat at all, while the

health of the body is put at risk. This is not to say that there are no difficulties integrating those

from a highly religious culture into one that highly values secularism, but rather that the highly

politicized, extremely anxious rhetoric hasn't helped in the integration effort.

It is paradoxical that France, a nation directly descended from enlightenment philosophies

of radical equality before the law, struggles to hard to manage the diverse identities within its

borders. I have undertaken this research to untangle this paradox, specifically how the tension

between national identity and other identities, whether religious or ethnic, that has arisen in an

increasingly global and interconnected world can be explored in a specific case study. There is no

better way to study this issue than through the analysis of political discourse, as it is the space

where national identity is constantly defined and redefined, as well as the point where ideology

can begin to transform into action. Thus, political discourse has immediate consequences for

French citizens, especially French Muslims, as they attempt to navigate their identities as both

Muslims and French citizens. I am defining political discourse as the totality of speeches, press

releases, debates, and other manners where parties or candidates can express a political opinion to

the public.

This paper is divided into six sections. The first two sections focus on the history of secularism

and of Islam in France, respectively, to give the reader appropriate background knowledge. The

1

Appadurai defines the concept of deterritorialization as the process of diasporic groups moving away from their

ancestral lands. Deterritorialization “affects the loyalties of groups (especially in the context of complex diasporas),

their transnational manipulation of currencies and other forms of wealth and investment, and the strategies of states”

(1996, 49).


49

third section explains some reasons why contemporary political discourse in France is particularly

challenging, drawing on both global and domestic trends in Islam. I then explain why debates

about the place of Islam in French society are relevant to the study of religious and cultural rights

in general. The next section attempts, in broad strokes, to trace the modern history of political

responses made to the presence of Islam in France by the major ideological divisions in French

politics. The final section presents an analysis of the current state of political discourse concerning

Muslims. I have gathered what I consider to be a representative sample 2 of speeches, press

releases, interviews, and other texts from each of the top 5 candidates in the 2017 election 3 which

the candidates or their party representatives address the topic of Islam. My analysis concludes

with a summary of the current state of partisan thinking about the interactions of Islam and French

national identity.

I conclude that although some aspects of Muslim religious practice are culturally and

morally incompatible with French values, French politicians have, through discourse, created a

modern French national identity that, unlike past concepts of French identity, is hostile to Muslim

citizens. The results of this exclusive discourse have far more disastrous consequences for national

unity than the illiberal religious practices it aims to stamp out. Thus, if France wants to maintain

its status as an inclusive, enlightened, unified nation, notions of national identity must be changed

to become more inclusive of minority groups.

PART 1: THE HISTORY OF SECULAR REPUBLICANISM IN FRANCE

It is impossible to understand the conflict between France and its Muslim citizens today

without understanding the reasons why France imagines itself as a secular nation, because it is the

concept of secularism, or laïcité, that underpins most of the political discussions about the

integration of Islam into French society. Among modern state systems, the French system of

secularism is very unique, and contrasts with other systems, such as a Concordat system, where

specific religious groups are legally recognized by the government, or in systems where one

particular religion is privileged over all others and adopted as the official state religion, such as in

England. 4 In the French system of laïcité, all political power that the Catholic church, the religious

power of the day in France, could attain is instead transferred back to the state, in order to “build

a common field based on reason,” emancipating the individual citizen from the influence of any

religion or religious organizations. 5

France’s desire for a secular state dates back to the French Revolution of 1789, which was

a rebellion against traditional power structures, such as the monarchy and the Catholic church, that

2

I consulted about 10 distinct sources from each candidate. Some of these samples were shorter, such as brief

speeches, while others were quite long (mainly the programs of candidates, which are anywhere from 20-50 pages

long, and longer speeches by the candidates, which when transcribed, fill around 15 pages).

3

I concentrated on finding texts from the year leading up to the election, but for the sake of comprehensiveness, I

was at times forced to consult sources from after the May election.

4

Anne-Cécile Robert and Henri Peña-Ruiz. "State and Secularism, the French Laïcité System." In State and

Secularism. (World Scientific Publishing Pte.) 2010. 125

5

Ibid, 127.


50

had ruled over France for hundreds of years. From the time of the baptism of Clovis I, King of the

Franks, in 496, the population residing in the region of modern-day France was almost entirely

Catholic; French was seen as equivalent to being Catholic. For this reason, the Catholic church

was eminently powerful in France for centuries. It was this relationship that was heavily

questioned during the French Revolution and subsequent restructuring of the French state.

The revolutionaries saw the conflict and inequality that a strong church-state collaboration

caused and wanted to prevent it from becoming a problem for the new republic. This desire was

so strong that in the time immediately following the revolution, revolutionaries banned

Catholicism and re-christened cathedrals, such as the famous cathedral of Chartres, as “temples of

reason” and removed religion from public life in a process of de-Christianization. 6 However, the

eminent authority on laïcité, Jean Baubérot, insists that even though the eradication of religion

would seem to be the agenda of the Jacobin regime, it was really a movement of anti-clericalism

in protest of the large amount of political power held by the church and its clergy. 7 Some anticlericalists

were even religious, like the Jesuits who themselves eschewed political

involvement. 8 Over time, the moderate and democratic elements of the anti-clericalist movement

won out against those who would prohibit the practice of religion outright. Given this history, it

is erroneous to see French secularism as an attack on religious belief itself. Instead, laïcité should

be viewed as France’s attempt to free itself from the powerful hold of the Catholic church on

society so that individual citizens were free to choose for themselves what they wanted to believe.

The revolution of 1789 and its ideological goals have been continually relevant to France’s

political culture. Besides a brief hiatus during the time of Napoleon, where Catholicism was again

made the official religion, France has tried to bring about its dream of "a social harmony that was

unconditional and free, accessed by a citizenship that was solely defined by the individual’s

adherence to the founding principles of the revolution as a kind of civic, secular faith” through

strict application of the doctrine of laïcité. 9 The next major step that the French state took toward

this end was to enact the law of December 9, 1905, which reads as follows:

Section 1: The Republic shall ensure freedom of conscience. It shall guarantee free

participation in religious worship, subject only to the restrictions laid down hereinafter in

the interest of public order.

Section 2: The Republic may not recognize, pay stipends to or subsidize any religious

denomination. Consequently, from 1 January in the year following promulgation of this Act,

all expenditure relating to participation in worship shall be removed from State, region and

municipality budgets.

6

Paul R. Hanson, Historical Dictionary of the French Revolution. Lanham, Md: (Scarecrow Press, 2004).

7

Jean Baubérot, “La Laïcité Falsifiée,” (La Découverte; Paris, 2012), 459-460.

8

Ibid, 450.

9

Gino G. Raymond, From Islam en France to Islam de France: Contradictions of the French left's responses to

Islam. (Patterns of Prejudice, 43(5), 2009), 482.


51

This law was enacted in response to the Catholic church’s outsized role in French public

affairs, especially in education, and was passed only after lengthy negotiations with the church,

which was predictably reluctant to relinquish the power it had regained in society since 1789. The

French state wanted to remove the church from the educational sphere, because it had too much

influence over the minds of young people. The government considered this unacceptable, as in its

model the school is the site where young people are transformed into citizens of the republic

through a common secular education. Benedict Anderson points out that states often take control

of the means of education to promote official nationalisms, raising up national citizens through

schools. 10 With church and state officially separated, France expressed itself as a political nation,

where religious establishments did not interfere in the relationship between the citizen and the

state, and the state was able to socialize its young people, conduct its political programs, and create

a public sphere completely separate from the influence of religion. Overall, this law was not antireligious

per se, as it protects religions by moving them out of the realm of public life and away

from state interference. It creates a system of separation where the state controls civil society and

has total political power and no religious power, and religious authorities have no political power

and continue to hold religious power; rendering public spaces neutral so that all religions could

peacefully coexist.

Many French philosophers and political commentators feel that the spirit of this law—

emancipating the individual citizen from religious powers so that he is free to have freedom of

religion, conscience and an unmediated relationship with the state— represents the purest and most

desirable version of republican secularism. For example, Haoues Seniguer, a French political

scientist, believes that “the strict and egalitarian application of the spirit of the 1905 texts would

be quite sufficient and would suit… all citizens, whether they are of Islamic religion or not. It

allows freedom of conscience, in public and private, as long as it does not call into question order,

freedom of others, and the authority of the state and its agents.” 11 , 12 He argues that the letter of the

1905 law has been used politically to justify the creation of further laws which are in conflict of

the spirit of the original legislation, some of which are often decried as impediments to the

religious freedom of Muslims. Among these are the law of 2004 that banned all ostentatious

religious symbols in schools, and the 2010 law that banned the covering of the face in public.

Seniguer denigrates what he considers to be an overreach of the French state, saying, "It is less the

vast majority of Muslims who would politicize Islam than the French public authorities, denying

10

Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. (Rev. ed.

London; New York; Verso, 2006), 91.

11

Haoues Seniguer. « La laïcité à l'épreuve de l'islam et des musulmans: le cas de la France », (Revue d'éthique et

de théologie morale, vol. 254, no. 2, 2009), 84.

12

“L’application stricte et égalitaire de l’esprit des textes de 1905 suffirait bien amplement et conviendrait, je le

crois fort, à tous les citoyens, quels qu’ils soient, de religion islamique ou non. Celle-ci permet la liberté de

conscience, de culte, en public et en privé, tant qu’elle ne remet pas en cause l’ordre, la liberté des autres et l’autorité

de l’État et de ses agents.”


52

them equal treatment and independence in the management of their religion.” 13 , 14 It is easy to see

his point, as the law of 1905 does guarantee that citizens will have complete freedom of conscience

and religion. He believes that the law makes it clear that the state should not intervene in the

private lives of its citizens just because it finds practices, such as the wearing of the burqa, shocking

or repulsive, as long as these practices do not violate the rights of fellow citizens. 15

Other commentators, like historian Vanessa R. Schwartz, feel differently, saying that “it is

impossible, given the remarkable anticlericalism of the Revolution and of the republicanism it

established, not to understand that there is a sense that the state is free from religion rather than

there to preserve religious freedoms in France.” 16 Indeed, there are elements to laïcité as it is

conceived and practiced in present-day France that can be perceived as anti-religious and anti-

Muslim, though these elements are arguably absent from the original law establishing laïcité. This

is partially because France privileges the frame of secularism (and secular human rights), above

all other frames, whether religious or non-religious. Religious value systems sometimes find

themselves in conflict with “universal” human rights standards, such as standards of gender

equality, which Jean Baubérot defines as a “supreme value,” even though it has not always been

defended in France as such. 17

Baubérot, and others like him, believe that laïcité is in need of a makeover, that it has

drifted quite far from the equalizing principle that it was intended to be. He believes that French

citizens should move beyond what he feels are the two reasons that secularists support laïcité, out

of a “more or less considered, historically secular culture” or a blanket hatred for Islam and

Muslims. 18 Political parties, Baubérot insists, must stop using republican secularism as a rhetorical

tool to discriminate against disadvantaged religious identities, and instead respect it as the

equalizing force it was meant to be. 19 Unfortunately, it seems that Baubérot’s recommendations

have fallen on deaf ears, as French politicians have only doubled down on discourses of laïcité in

relation to Frenchness and in opposition to Islam, as illustrated in the 2016 burkini ban, even

though the higher French courts ultimately rejected this overreach. The definition of laïcité has

grown narrower and more politicized than the 1905 law had originally intended, and the

consequences of this shift have been great and far-reaching. I will expand on this point in section

six, as I analyze each candidate’s position on laïcité.

13

Haoues Seniguer, « La laïcité à l'épreuve de l'islam et des musulmans: le cas de la France », (Revue d'éthique et

de théologie morale, vol. 254, no. 2, 2009), 66.

14

“Ce sont moins les musulmans dans leur immense majorité qui politiseraient l’islam que les pouvoirs publics

français, en leur refusant justement une égalitéde traitement et une indépendance dans la gestion de leur culte.”

15

Ibid, 70.

16

Vanessa Schwartz, Modern France: A very short introduction (Very Short Introductions). (Oxford; New York:

Oxford University Press, 2011), 20.

17

Specifically, when anti-clericalist movements during the time of the revolution were decidedly anti-feminist.

Disgust for the pious Catholic woman was simply replaced with disgust for the veiled Muslim while French

instances of sexism were left unchecked (Baubérot 2012, 92-93).

18

Jean Baubérot, “La Laïcité Falsifiée,” (La Découverte; Paris, 2012), 121.

19

Ibid, 122.


53

PART 2: A SHORT HISTORY OF ISLAM AND MUSLIMS IN FRANCE

France's contact with Islam reaches back to the 700s, when French forces led by Charles

Martel stopped the invasion of Muslim armies from Spain at the Battle of Tours. Although this

event, a battle that took place 1300 years ago, seems distant from current concerns about Muslims

and national identity in France, it is anything but trivial. In fact, Charles Martel is often employed

as a symbol of the relationship of France to Muslims and Islam, specifically its portrayal as an

adversarial relationship. The most important early and sustained contact with Muslim societies

that France had was undoubtedly through its colonial empires in North Africa and the Middle

East. During the colonial period, France ruled over vast sections of land in these regions and

attempted to transform the native peoples into proper French secular subjects. Among these

territories, Algeria was undoubtedly the most important. Algeria was once imagined to be just as

much a part of France as Hawaii is a part of the United States today. It was also an extremely

important economic asset to France. 20 As in most colonial situations, abuse of the native people

was rampant and the Code de l'Indigénat 21 , a much-hated law that governed the native Algerians,

was a powerful instrument of abuse. 22 This law governed the rights of native Algerians and even

gave them the right to be French citizens. However, the law also stated that "the Muslim

indigenous is French; however, he will continue to be subjected to Muslim law. He may be

admitted to serve in the terrestrial and marine Army. He may be called to functions and civil

employment in Algeria. He may, on his demand, be admitted to enjoy the rights of a French citizen;

in this case, he is subjected to the political and civil laws of France.” 23 Thus, even though religious

conversion was not required to become French, Algerian Muslims were forced to renounce

membership of the Islamic community of his or her birth. Ironically, this document was meant to

encourage assimilation and to encourage many Algerians to claim their French

citizenship. Instead, only a few Algerians became French citizens, and the foundations of

opposition between French identity and Islam were laid.

Although there have been French Muslims since the times of the indigenous code in

Algeria, there were no large waves of immigration into France from Muslim majority countries

until after World War II. Following this conflict, France, depleted of resources and sorely in need

of manual laborers, invited Algerian male workers to help rebuild France. They arrived in droves,

settling in temporary residences outside of the borders of large French cities such as Marseille or

Paris. After a few years, thanks to generous policies of family reunification, their wives

and children joined them in France. Unfortunately, while their settlement became permanent,

Algerian émigrés were not integrated into French cities. As a result, Muslim families were

effectively segregated outside of large cities in suburban communities called banlieues with

20

Lionel Babicz. "Japan–Korea, France–Algeria: Colonialism and Post-Colonialism." (Japanese Studies 33, no. 2,

2013), 202.

21

Code of the Indigenous People.

22

France. Décret n o 136 du 24 octobre 1870.

23

Ibid.


54

little access to jobs and transportation. 24 This situation has made economic conditions very

difficult, as immigrants have struggled to find jobs that are accessible to them after the

reconstruction of France was complete. This resulted in widespread discontent, especially among

youth, as their unemployment rates now often rise above double the French average, with women

and youth of North African origin having the highest rates of unemployment. 25 Even though some

of the differences in employment rates are due to differing skill levels, it has been empirically

demonstrated that job applicants who are perceived as non-European (meaning neither white nor

Catholic) are heavily discriminated against in the job market. 26

Today, the situation in the banlieues continues to worsen, with several zones in the

banlieues being treated as “no-go zones for police.” 27 Tensions reached a boiling point in October

of 2005 when riots in one banlieue, Clichy-sous-Bois, broke out after two young boys died while

running from police. Even then, the French state seemed paralyzed in the face of the conflict,

unable to effectively quell tensions between the state and the people of the banlieue. 28 French

sociologist Hugues Lagrange explains this paralysis by asserting that "France is committed to a

concept of citizenship that ignores both cultural origin and religious orientation, so it has been

difficult for the country to recognize that it has been fragmented by segregation of a religious and

cultural sense.” 29 Due to the state’s willful ignorance of French Muslims’ specific needs based on

their disadvantaged identity positions, French Muslims have had a difficult time feeling like they

belong in France, even though many polls suggest they want to belong in France. 30 This is

unsurprising, given that many French leaders from Charles De Gaulle to Marine Le Pen,

have emphasized the fact that they believe Muslims are not fully French. 31

In response to being denied a “French” identity, French Muslims, even “those who

are modern-oriented, well-educated, and pursue careers in the professions, government, and

commerce” cling to other identities, such as their identities as a Muslims or Algerians. 32 This type

of identification is a global phenomenon, as many diasporic groups who have struggled for

recognition from their host cultures participate in what Arjun Appadurai calls “culturalist

movements” that draw on “migration or secession” and are “self-conscious about identity, culture,

24

Jennifer Fredette, Constructing Muslims in France Discourse, Public Identity, and the Politics of Citizenship,

(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2014), 129.

25

Dominic McGoldrick, Human rights and religion: The Islamic headscarf debate in Europe. (Oxford; Portland,

Or.: Hart, 2006), 32.

26

Ibid, 35.

27

Ibid, 56.

28

Ibid, 57.

29

Hugues Lagrange, “Hugues Lagrange: An Outcast Generation.” (The Observer, Guardian News and Media, 5

Nov, 2005).

30

Jonathan Laurence and Justin Vaïsse, Integrating Islam: Political and religious challenges in contemporary

France. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2006), 47

31

Jennifer Fredette, Constructing Muslims in France Discourse, Public Identity, and the Politics of Citizenship,

(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2014), 151.

32

Samuel P Huntington, The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order (1st Touchstone ed.), (New

York: Touchstone, 1997), 101.


55

and heritage.” 33 Deterritorialization, or the movement of populations from their ancestral lands,

“affects the loyalties of groups (especially in the context of complex diasporas)” like the Muslim

immigrants in France. 34 In a deterritorialized world, “Political boundaries increasingly are

redrawn to coincide with cultural ones.” 35 As a result, a global resurgence in Islamic identity has

touched every facet of life all over the world and commanded the loyalties of Muslims to the global

Muslim community instead of to traditional state forces. 36 In contrast to western civilizations in

which the highest form of loyalty was thought to be to the nation, Huntington asserts that for

Muslims the highest forms of loyalty have been to kinship groups, such as the family and the tribe,

on the one hand, and also to Islam, on the other hand. 37 Muslim leaders “stress the differences

between their civilization and Western civilization, the superiority of their culture, and the need to

maintain integrity of that culture against Western onslaught.” 38 Whether or not Huntington is

overstating Muslims’ allegiance to authorities outside the nation, the fact remains that religiosity

is on the rise amongst Muslims, as "the young are religious, their parents secular.” 39 As France has

not managed to bring these Muslim citizens on the margins into the fold, they often in turn reject

the nation.

PART 3: PARTICULAR CHALLENGES OF ISLAM TO REPUBLICANISM AND THE

FIGHT OVER NATIONAL IDENITY

There is no single answer to the question of whether or not Islam can be French, because wrapped

up in this question are many different questions. First, there is the question of what “Islam”

is. Islam is practiced by several billion people around the globe, from the current mayor of London

to the head of ISIS. Because Islam is a religion without an official head (there is no equivalent of

the pope in Islam), it is quite open to interpretation by the faithful, so no one person has the

authority to claim what “true Islam” is, though many have tried and will try again. Thus, Islam is

a living religion, not a monolithic faith. However, just because something is difficult to define

does not mean that one is exempt from attempting to define it, or, in this specific case, attempting

to define and analyze those parts of Islam that are perceived as threats to French identity.

The most threatening aspects of Islam to the French republican system, broadly defined, are as

follows: the public and all-encompassing nature of Islam that threatens the separation of church

and state, illiberal teachings that focus on differences between people instead of emphasizing their

equality before the law, and the perceived unwillingness (or inability) of Muslims to modify the

tenants of their religion to align with those of the secular religion of French republicanism. There

33

Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at Large Cultural Dimensions of Globalization. (Public Worlds. Minneapolis:

University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 15.

34

Ibid, 49.

35

Samuel P Huntington, The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order (1st Touchstone ed.), (New

York: Touchstone. 1997), 125.

36

Ibid, 110.

37

Ibid, 174.

38

Ibid, 213.

39

Ibid, 101.


56

are, of course, more issues, but working with these categories gives us a framework within which

these issues can be systematically analyzed.

There are many scholars who claim that Islam is fundamentally no different than other

cultural or religious systems in the demands that it imposes on its followers. Commentators, such

as Tariq Modood, argue that "Muslims’ claims are no more threatening or different in the way they

address liberal states than other claims for cultural diversity.” 40 However, this approach ignores

the reality of conflict that exists between Muslims and liberal state systems all over the world. In

reality, there are aspects of Islam as it is practiced by many Muslims today that come into

fundamental conflict with the demands of a secular society such as France. Some conservative

scholars, such as Samuel Huntington, famous for his 2007 book, The Clash of Civilizations and

the Remaking of World Order, have a rather grim prognosis for the improvement of such relations

based on the existence of these conflicts. He argues that the “underlying problem for the West is

not Islamic fundamentalism, it is Islam, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the

superiority of their culture and are obsessed by the inferiority of their power.” 41

While undoubtedly many people will find his comments Islamophobic, simply decrying

them as such prevents us from honestly assessing his statement. Many prominent scholars, such

as Tariq Ramadan, who, while taking a slightly more hopeful stance on a positive outcome for “the

place of Islam within European states” insist that it is still important to understand how Islam

differs from other world religions. 42 Ramadan points out that Islam as a religion is concerned with

all aspects of a person’s life (not just the private aspects, as secular governments such as France’s

would like) and demands certain behaviors of its practitioners that are often related to public and

quotidian behavior. Religious scholar Charles Taylor adds that “for mainstream Islam, there is no

question of separating politics and religion,” 43 which is clearly an issue in a state like France where

politics and religion are legally bound to never meet.

Political conflicts such as the numerous episodes of national anxiety over the headscarf

that France has experienced since 1989 are an excellent example. While I will address the

contested significance of the headscarf in subsequent sections of this paper, what is not disputed

about the headscarf is that it is a garment intimately tied to the Islamic faith and meant to designate

its wearer as affiliated with that religious tradition. Thus, in keeping with French secularism,

French Muslim women who wish to work as civil servants, or participate in key state institutions

like the public-school system, must not wear religious attire, including headscarves. Dominik

McGoldrick explains this prohibition by pointing out that “the French theory is that if the public

sphere is free of religious symbols then all citizens can be treated equally within it.” 44 Because

France’s version of republican secularism emphasizes equal, undifferentiated citizenship, any

40

Tariq Modood. 'Anti-Essentialism, Multiculturalism, and the Recognition of 'Religious' Groups', in Will Kymlicka

and Wayne Norman (eds) Citizenship in Diverse Societies, pp. 175-195. (Oxford: Oxford University, 2000), 188.

41

Samuel Huntington, The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order (1st Touchstone ed.). (New York:

Touchstone, 1997), 217.

42

Tariq Ramadan. To Be a European Muslim. (Leicester: Islamic Foundation, 2002), 207-8.

43

Taylor, et al. Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition. (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University

Press, 1994), 62.

44

Dominic McGoldrick, Human rights and religion: The Islamic headscarf debate in Europe, 73.


57

attempt by citizens to identify themselves as members of a certain religious group in the eyes of,

or in service to, the state is regarded as unacceptable. For Muslim women, and especially Muslim

schoolgirls, who feel that wearing the headscarf is an integral part of their religion, there is an

irreconcilable disconnect between what they believe is their duty as a Muslim and what the

government of France sees as their duty as a French citizen.

The perceived Muslim threat to the second element of the republican triad, egalité, is often

invoked in discussions about the incompatibility of Islam as a value system with French

republicanism. Often, discussions between the French state and Muslims revolve around rights

issues, such as the status of women and girls in Islam, or issues of freedom of conscience. For

example, although the headscarf can be, and is, interpreted to mean many things by Muslim

women, many French believe that the headscarf signals the lower social status of women within

Islam, which is incompatible with official French state policy. 45 Of course, different interpretations

of the teachings of Islam have varying degrees of compatibility with life in a secular state, but

Muslims themselves must choose how to negotiate competing values. Bowen explains that “many

Muslims in France consider their social lives to be mainly governed by French norms, while others,

doubtless a much smaller number might see only Islamic rules as shaping their lives. For those in

the middle, those who see both as legitimate, or because they see a practical reason to pay attention

to both, life is a bit more complicated. How do they combine or accommodate or broker among

these competing sets of norms?" 46

In many cases, European Muslims have remained faithful to conservative Islamic

values. Statistically speaking, Muslim support for gender equality and other progressive causes,

such as the acceptance of homosexuality, access to abortion, and the right to divorce, is

significantly lower than that of Western Christians, though some Christian religions also prohibit

these thing. 47 When French Muslims are specifically polled, there is also a “sharp relationship

between the Muslim religion of respondents and conservative views about women’s role in

society.” As previously mentioned, Muslims often feel compelled to express these cultural values

in their everyday lives, (such as if a Muslim man refuses to shake the hand of a female colleague

because of his beliefs about gender) which can cause social tension. In addition, the public nature

of Islam has created a situation in which Muslims make more group demands than any other

religious or ethnic group in France. While reasonable accommodations ought to be made for

minority groups in the name of religious freedom when possible, Statham explains that “some

migrants’ exceptional demands are less easy to accommodate, because they actually challenge the

very essence of liberal values.” 48 This can be seen in public reactions to requests for special

accommodations made by Muslims, such as "requests for separate women’s hours at pools, or

demands for access to women doctors at hospitals, [which] reflect a growing French impatience

45

John Bowen, Can Islam be French?: Pluralism and pragmatism in a secularist state (Princeton studies in Muslim

politics). (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 2010.

46

Ibid, 157.

47

Claire Adida, David Laitin, & Marie-Anne Valfort, Why Muslim integration fails in Christian-heritage societies.

(Harvard University Press, 2017), 86.

48

Paul Statham, et al. “Resilient or Adaptable Islam?” (Ethnicities, vol. 5, no. 4, 2005), 431.


58

with conceptions of gender that are seen as contravening those prevailing in France." 49 The French

public is very vocal in their wishes to privilege “universal” republican values, and thus the

government is often unable to accommodate Muslim citizens’ requests. 50 The French population

as a whole is dissatisfied with levels of assimilation. When asked in a recent survey whether

Muslims have successfully integrated themselves into French society and why, the majority of

those polled expressed the belief that Muslims have not integrated because they do not have the

desire to integrate. 51 Although the existence of economic and social barriers to such integration is

widely documented, and Muslims cannot be blamed for integration difficulties stemming from

these factors, some Muslims have also categorically refused to assimilate, because they fear the

“westernization” of themselves and their children. 52 This fear suggests to many people that an

element of cultural superiority and unwillingness to compromise values exists on both sides and

makes dialogue between hardline secular republicans and conservative Muslims very difficult. 53

This situation has not improved in recent years, as religiosity among second and third-generation

Muslim immigrants residing in France remains very high, and this religiosity is perceived as

threatening to the regime of laïcité. 54 Complicating this problem is the fact that young Muslims

in France are more observantly religious than their older counterparts, suggesting that they are, if

anything, more attached to traditional Muslim values than generations before them. 55

Although France is a secular republic, it does attempt to initiate dialogue with religious

organizations within its borders for various reasons. Historically, many of the discussions were

with the Catholic church, and indeed, the famous 1905 law on secularism was passed after lengthy

negotiations with the Catholic church. Loobuyck et al. refer to this practice as “structural

dialogue,” and they point out that to engage in this type of dialogue, "the government must know

who the partner is to speak with. Most of the time, for established religions, this was clear.” 56 For

Islam, however, this is not the case. Unlike Catholicism, there is no de-facto religious structure or

leadership in place with which the government can engage. Thus, Loobyuck remarks, “For the

governments, it was not easy to determine where a structured dialogue with ‘the’ Islam could

start.” 57 The French state had to look for a solution. Ultimately, Socialist Minister of Interior

Pierre Joxe was able to bring together a number of prominent and influential Muslims to create

Conseil de Reflexion sur L’Islam en France in 1990. Joxe's main goal was “to set up a structure

representative of Islam in France… so that this body could enter into dialogue with the public

authorities…the absence of a hierarchical structure in Islam, on one hand… and the great diversity

49

Bowen, Can Islam be French?: Pluralism and pragmatism in a secularist state, 195.

50

Ibid, 190.

51

Adida, Why Muslim integration fails in Christian-heritage societies, 79.

52

Statham, “Resilient or Adaptable Islam?”

53

Ibid.

54

Adida, Why Muslim integration fails in Christian-heritage societies, 83.

55

Laurence and Vaisse, Integrating Islam: Political and religious challenges in contemporary

France, 95.

56

Patrick Loobuyck, et al. “Church–State Regimes and Their Impact on the Institutionalization of Islamic

Organizations in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis.” (Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, vol. 33, no. 1,

2013), 62

57

Ibid.


59

of Muslim moments that coexist in France” made this very difficult to achieve. 58 This body was

charged with advising the French government on matters about Islam in France, specifically about

places of worship. It assisted in the production of several documents, such as the Charter of the

Muslim Religion in France, but it ended up being a failed project due to infighting and lack of

popular support for its resolutions.

In 2001, the French government again attempted to organize a representative body so that

it could communicate with representatives of Islam in France more easily. Nicolas Sarkozy was

instrumental in creating this body, which was named the French Council of the Muslim Religion

(CFCM), and he was a big proponent of structural dialogue in general. 59 Just as in the case of

the Conseil de Reflexion sur L’Islam en France, there has been much internal conflict that has

greatly impacted the legitimacy of the group as a representative body. This conflict stems from

the perception of favoritism by the French government towards certain elements that compose the

CFCM, especially the Great Mosque of Paris. The conflict was brought to the forefront of public

debate in 2003, as "the results of the CFCM elections reflected changes in the French Muslim

community. The Great Mosque of Paris lost its favorable position within the Union of Islamic

Organizations of France (Union des Organisations Islamiques de France or UOIF), which had the

reputation of having strong ties with the Muslim Brothers; and the National Federation of Muslims

of France (Fédération Nationale des Musulmans de France or FNMF), which also had relations

with the Moroccan government.” 60 Even though popular support for the Grand Mosque waned,

its leaders still remained in power because of a previous agreement about the distribution of power

made between the French government (which privileges the Great Mosque of Paris) and the

organization. 61 This obvious display of favoritism made waves within the council, as "the UOIF

further decried the operation and overall need of the Council as it was seen as a puppet of the

government” and "the Moroccan Gathering of Muslims of France (Rassemblement des

Musulmans de France, or RMF) broke away from the UOIF” further splintering the CFCM,

becoming "a major player and provid(ing) a new president.” 62

Representative organizations’ reputation for being puppets of the state is not unearned, as

the French government has not tried to deny its interest and intent to steer the direction of these

organizations and the future of Islam in France. The French right especially has “set the course

for a better integration of the Muslim community by transforming Islam en France to an Islam de

France.” 63 What this means practically is that "France, in particular...has explicitly attempted to

craft an Islam à la française in an attempt to remain loyal to the republic and as a means of

58

Brigitte Basdevant-Gaudemet, “Islam in France.” The Legal Treatment of Islamic Minorities in Europe, (edited by

Roberta Aluffi and Giovanna Zincone Peters, 2004), 64.

59

Jeremy Ahearne. Government through Culture in Contemporary France, (2014), 24-25

60

Patrick Loobuyck, et al. “Church–State Regimes and Their Impact on the Institutionalization of Islamic

Organizations in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis.” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, vol. 33, no. 1,

2013, 67.

61

Loobuyck, “Church–State Regimes and Their Impact on the Institutionalization of Islamic Organizations in

Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis.”, 67.

62

Ibid.

63

Raymond, From Islam en France to Islam de France: Contradictions of the French left's

responses to Islam, 481.


60

promoting Muslim integration.” 64 Whether or not this has been helpful to integration efforts is

unclear, but France still has a long way to go before it can realize its goal of creating a uniquely

French Islam, where tenants of republicanism and Islam fit together seamlessly.

SHOULD THERE BE A FRENCH ISLAM?

In an attempt to contend with some of the difficulties Islam presents to integration, some

French politicians have tried, by supporting specific elements of the French Muslim establishment,

to support the rise of an Islam that is compatible with life in a non-Muslim majority country. Most

of this work revolves around the issue of supporting specific interpretations of Islamic law, a

project very controversial in nature. There are many schools of interpretation, ranging from

fundamentalist to progressive in nature, and the French government has sought to promote

interpretations of Islamic law that are harmonious with French laws and social norms through the

creation and support of bodies like the CFCM. For example, the right to have an abortion is

guaranteed to women under French law, but Muslim scholars disagree on whether or not this is

permitted to women under Islamic law. Some scholars, like Hichem El Arafa, conclude “that all

abortion is forbidden, because life is sacred.” 65 Others, such as Ahmed Jaballah believe that

abortion is permitted up until the point of viability. 66 Both scholars draw from the same sources

of Islamic law, such as the Koran and Hadith, but one interpretation is much more in sync with

French law than the other. Some concerns are more practical, such as the concern over whether

or not a marriage performed at a French courthouse is also an acceptable marriage in the sight of

God. This is an issue because France does not recognize religious marriage.

Scholars such as Tariq Ramadan are critical of the efforts to adapt Islam to a European

framework. He claims that the universal values promoted by the Muslim religion are by nature

not adaptable and believes that Islamic jurisprudence (or fiqh, in Arabic) must not change based

on the cultural context in which Muslims find themselves. 67 However, other efforts, such as the

1999 fatwa, or opinion, decreed that Muslims, who have traditionally been forbidden to take out

loans on interest, could, for the good of their families and children, take out a loan to purchase a

house if no other option was available to them. 68 The jurists cited the fact that practical solutions

must be devised for those Muslims who find themselves in great need, as the Koran states that

religion is not meant to foist upon the believer any hardship. In other instances since, Muslim

leaders have also emphasized the “normative specificity of Europe,” explaining that rules meant

for Muslims in majority Muslim countries were not necessarily meant for Muslims in

Europe. 69 One influential French imam, Soheib Bencheikh El Hocine, has explained by saying that

64

Loobuyck, “Church–State Regimes and Their Impact on the Institutionalization of Islamic Organizations in

Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis.” 71-72.

65

Bowen, Can Islam be French, 135.

66

Ibid, 136.

67

Laurence and Vaïsse, Integrating Islam: Political and religious challenges in contemporary

France, 126.

68

Bowen, Can Islam be French, 139

69

Ibid, 145.


61

“many aspects of Malekite fiqh, which is predominant in Algeria, made sense “in an era where life

was organized around clans, not housing projects.” 70 While these developments seem positive,

due to the organizational structure of Islam, individual Muslims may or may not be influenced by

these new interpretations of Islamic law, and due to strong input from the Muslim world, may

actually see these teachers as false-prophets. Nevertheless, it is an overall positive and hopeful

trend that scholars and imams have continued to adapt fiqh to the European context.

FOREIGN INFLUENCES AND GLOBAL CHALLENGES

It would be remiss to say that the problems that French Muslims have communicating with

their government come solely from tensions between the two parties. In fact, Mustapha Belbah

remarks that today’s French Muslims interact differently than their predecessors, in that they seem

to believe that it is their duty to establish a dialogue with the French state in regard to establishing

a place of worship. They are interacting with and asking more from the state than ever

before. However, relations still are not friendly between the two parties, partially because of

outside influences that complicate problems. Belbah remarks from his own experience that “the

issues that public actors have to address in this regard are of a local nature… however, in every

situation I have observed, negotiations have been disrupted by exogenous issues.” 71 Many of these

issues arise with the questions about how mosques are funded, where they are located, and how

imams are trained. Still others are connected to more global political movements, terrorist

organizations, and the rift their recent attacks on France have caused between French Muslims and

the rest of the nation.

Because of the structure of the French government and the 1905 law prohibiting the formal

recognition and subsidizing of any religion by the French government, Muslims in France cannot

look to the government for financial assistance in organizing their places of worship. This is not

the case in many other places in Europe, though there often is a lack of mosques to serve Muslim

residents, as constitutions are much more amenable to state-religious cooperation. Because

France’s Muslims are not able to afford to run their own mosques themselves, they turn to other

countries to finance their mosques and to pay their imams. 72

Furthermore, France suffers from a shortage of French imams, as it has historically had

great difficulty organizing their training because of norms of religious and state separation. Thus,

imams are often sent by other countries and are not French citizens or French speaking. These

characteristics can manifest themselves in ethnic division in mosques. Though it is “impossible to

estimate the number of imams in France: some say there are 1000, around 4% of whom hold French

70

Laurence and Vaïsse, Integrating Islam, 129.

71

Mustapha Belbah, Global and Local Dimensions of Islam in France. (South African Historical Journal, 61(1),

2009), 54-55.

72

Sana Elouazi, “Morocco Leads Foreign Funding for French Mosques.” (Human Rights Without Frontiers, 14

Feb, 2018)


62

nationality.” 73 For this reason, there are very few, if any, truly French mosques. Rather, it is

widely known and accepted among the Muslim community that certain mosques are for certain

groups of people. For example, the Paris mosque was financed through support by the Algerian

government. For this reason, when I visited the mosque in April 2017, I was not surprised to meet

an Algerian imam there, nor was I surprised to see pictures of famous Algerians lining the walls

of study rooms, nor that Algerian couscous was offered as a meal. When I asked him, the imam

told me that the majority of those in his congregation were of Algerian descent, while other

Mosques run by Tunisian and Moroccan imams had mostly Tunisian and Moroccan congregants

respectively.

This principle of self-segregation characterizes other mosques throughout the

country. Scholar John Bowen spoke with an imam, who told him that "the mosque’s leaders

invited him” to be an imam in that particular mosque "in part because they were divided into

Algerian and Moroccan camps, and thought that a Tunisian imam could be neutral." 74 While

French Muslims certainly have the right to segregate themselves the way they see fit, and probably

feel most comfortable within groups of shared national origin, this self-segregating behavior and

emphasis on retaining ties to their ancestral countries can cause conflict between individual

Muslims and work against the French government’s attempts to unify their population under the

banner of undifferentiated French citizenship.

However, global Islam inserts itself into the French mosque in other ways through foreign

financing. In a French senate report entitled Mission of Information on the Organization, Place,

and Financing of Islam in France and its Places of Worship, French officials determined that

Morocco, Algeria, and Saudi Arabia together give over 10 million dollars a year to finance Islam

in France, and thus have some influence on what goes on in French mosques. For example,

between December 2015 and 2016, 20 Salafist mosques (Salafism being a hardline version of

Sunni Islam exported by Saudi Arabia) were shuttered in France. 75 France 24, a state-owned

international news and current affairs television network based in Paris, estimates that there are

120 such mosques influenced by Saudi ideology and money in France. The prevalence of foreign

imams trained in extremist theology certainly do not help relations between Muslims and the

French state, nor do they help individual Muslims much, since as Belbah points out, many of the

teachings put forth by foreign-trained imams are not practical for people in the economic or

cultural situation in which French Muslims find themselves. 76 Thus, many French Muslims are

caught in between the French state, on one hand, and foreign actors with dubious motives on the

other.

The French state understands this dynamic, and has on several occasions made it clear that

it would not broker deals with Muslims or mosques it considered to be under

73

Basdevant-Gaudemet, “Islam in France.”, 72.

74

Bowen, Can Islam be French? Pluralism and pragmatism in a secularist state, 39.

75

Yasmeen Serhan “France's Disappearing Mosques,” The Atlantic, August 1, 2016,

https://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2016/08/french-mosques-islam/493919/

76

Belbah, Global and Local Dimensions of Islam in France.


63

foreign influence. 77 This position seems justified until one realizes that financially, there can be

no real organization of Muslims without outside funds, and thus outside influence, in France.

TERRORISM AND ISLAMISM

Another global force that complicates the relationship between Muslims, the French State,

and their fellow citizens is the existence of and intense media focus on Islamic terrorism. Since

2015 there have been three major terrorist attacks in France committed by Muslims: the Charlie

Hebdo massacre in early 2015, the coordinated attack on a restaurant and a popular concert venue

in November 2015, and the running down of civilians on a popular boulevard in Nice on Bastille

day of 2016. In France, as in the rest of the west, “a backlash against Muslim communities, evident

since the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, occurs any time perpetrators claim

a global Islamic agenda.” 78 This was especially true in these three situations, as the targets or

attack dates chosen were symbolic, and the attacks were perceived as a strike to the heart of French

values and national identity, pitting Muslims against their non-Muslim counterparts. These

incidents were used as proof of the failure of the Muslim citizen to adequately align himself with

a French identity. 79

In contrast to other terrorist groups, when Muslim terrorists carry out acts of violence, they

are automatically assumed to be acting because of some larger cultural impetus instead of for

personal reasons. 80 According to French political scientist Haoues Senigeur, the narrative that there

is an overdetermined and strong link between Muslim beliefs and violence creates the false

perception that “behind every bearded Muslim man or covered woman who is a little attached to

their faith, hides a fundamentalist or a madman of Allah.” 81 , 82 Proof of this phenomenon lies in

the fact that in the wake of the Charlie Hebdo massacre there was a huge increase in anti-Muslim

violence, with the number of incidents that occurred in the two weeks following the attack equal

to thoses of anti-Muslim violence reported in the previous year. 83 The media and others begin to

question whether there is something about Muslim culture that makes it prone to produce

violence. The Charlie Hebdo attacks in particular give credence to this idea, because they are best

explained by a wish to punish blasphemers against Islam. 84 While an overwhelming majority of

77



78

Jeffrey Reitz, “The Status of Muslim Minorities Following the Paris Attacks”. Edited by Iacobucci, E., & Toope,

S. After the Paris attacks: Responses in Canada, Europe, and around the globe, (2015), 22.

79

Laurence and Vaïsse, Integrating Islam: Political and religious challenges in contemporary

France, 247.

80

Mohammed Fadel, “A Tale of Two Massacres: Charlie Hebdo and Utoya Island”. Edited by Iacobucci, E., &

Toope, S. After the Paris attacks: Responses in Canada, Europe, and around the globe, (2015), 30.

81

Haoues Seniguer, « La laïcité à l'épreuve de l'islam et des musulmans: le cas de la France », (Revue d'éthique et

de théologie morale, vol. 254, no. 2, 2009), pp. 67

82

"Derrière chaque musulman un tant soit peu attaché à sa foi, barbus et femmes « couvertes » d’un fichu a fortiori,

se dissimulerait un « intégriste » ou « un fou d’Allah » en puissance”.

83

Ruth Marshall, “The (In)secure Citizen: Islamophobia and the Natives of the Republic after Paris”. Edited by

Iacobucci, E., & Toope, S. After the Paris attacks: Responses in Canada, Europe, and around the globe, (2015), 44.

84

Fadel, “A Tale of Two Massacres: Charlie Hebdo and Utoya Island”, 30.


64

Muslims in France condemn violence being committed in the name of Islam, media narratives and

remarks by politicians have made the differences between Islam, Islamism, and terrorism very

murky. 85

This dynamic only serves to further isolate French Muslims from society and actually

makes conditions more conducive to the flourishing of radical ideas among Muslims. While there

are radical Islamic associations that try to recruit in France that have had some success, on a whole

the prevalence of radicalization is overstated. 86 Radicalization almost never grows out of the

traditional religious practice that immigrants have imported from their countries of origin. Instead,

foreign Salafist imams target adolescents who feel very isolated from both the culture of their

parents and of France, providing them with a sense of belonging that they did not previously

have. Laurence and Vaisse further analyze this process, explaining that “as descendants of

immigrants lose contact with the country and politics of their ancestors,” they do not form any

attachment to the culture in which they find themselves (often for reasons of discrimination) and

“radicalization takes on an ideological form that is divorced from a specific national culture or

diaspora…it is instead defined by adherence to a transnational or ‘globalized Islam.’” 87 Although

in recent years France has deported over thirty imams for sympathizing with terrorism, "the

domestic and international association of Islam and terrorism in the eyes of the general population

is taking a heavy toll in the realm of integration” and there is little hope for improvement until

terrorism and Islam can be separated enough that a new wound is not opened every time another

terrorist attack takes place. 88

Whether Islam can or cannot be French is not a question that any scholar can answer

definitively without letting history take its course. It is quite clear that both sides have defects: the

French for allowing their idea of secularism and national culture to become extremely exclusive,

and Islam, for promoting ideas sometimes contrary to even the most basic tenants of French

society, such as equality between genders, making republican criticism quite easy in many

cases. What is not clear is how either side’s ideas will evolve. As it stands now, both sides will

have to change to accommodate each other, taking a convergent approach rather than a

confrontational one. However, it remains to be seen whether or not either side will be flexible

enough for positive change.

PART 4: HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVES

It has become obvious that after the 1980s, the changed definition of laïcité into restrictions

on religious freedom has specifically burdened Muslims and other religious minorities. From a

human rights standpoint, these are troubling developments. This part of my thesis will be

dedicated to explaining to what extent France’s newly defined laïcité has infringed on the cultural

and religious rights of its citizens by exploring relevant human rights documents and case studies.

85

Laurence and Vaïsse, Integrating Islam, 263.

86

Ibid, 244.

87

Laurence and Vaisse, Integrating Islam, 248.

88

Ibid, 263.


65

When one thinks of states that regularly violate human rights standards, France does not readily

come to mind. Indeed, as the place where many of the enlightenment ideas that have informed

human rights discourse originally came to be, France is perceived to have a particularly good

human rights record compared to many other nations around the world. However, where France

often fails when it comes to human rights is in how it treats newcomers, or those perceived as

belonging to a group not already accepted into French society. In 2016 Human Rights Watch

reported that “in a June review of France, the UN Committee for the Elimination of Racial

Discrimination expressed concerns about discrimination against migrants and ‘people of foreign

origin’ in access to employment, housing, culture, and health care, and difficulties they face in

education.” 89 Many of the people discriminated against in these ways, especially in the category

of “culture” mentioned by the UN committee, are Muslims. While in France the freedom to

choose one’s religion is sacrosanct, as discussed previously, the French government has created

impediments to new religious and cultural practices, instead preferring to promote a predetermined,

unified national culture which has little room for the traditions of newcomers. Elsa

Stamatopoluou, author of the volume Cultural Rights in International Law: Article 27 of the

Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Beyond, sheds some light on France’s behavior,

asserting that “one of the most significant difficulties in dealing with cultural rights is that these

rights have evoked, for some governments, the scary spectrum of group identities and group rights

that they fear could threaten the ‘nation’ state and territorial integrity.” 90 For France, a nation

practically obsessed with the notion of undifferentiated republican citizenship, this is an especially

threatening implication of better securing the rights of minorities to free cultural and religious

practice.

However, this does not negate France’s responsibilities to its citizens in this area. As the

Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic Religious and

Linguistic Minorities states in Article Two, minorities “have the right to enjoy their own culture,

to profess and practice their own religion, and to use their own language, in private and in public,

freely and without interference or any form of discrimination.” Article Four states that states "shall

take measures to create favorable conditions to enable persons belonging to minorities to express

their characteristics and to develop their culture, language, religion, traditions, and customs, except

where specific practices are in violation of national law and contrary to international

standards.” 91 Whether or not France violates the terms of this article are unclear, as while it seems

on the surface that France does not promote an environment in which religious and cultural practice

of minorities is encouraged, good arguments can be made that France is within its rights to prohibit

certain forms of religious practice. For example, after France’s ban of ostentatious religious

symbols in schools, it is in fact, illegal, under French law, to wear a hijab in a public

school. Furthermore, since many other countries, such as Turkey and Syria, have at times

89

Human Right Watch. World Report 2016: Events of 2015. (Seven Stories Press, 2016), 261.

90

Elsa Stamatopoulou, Cultural Rights in International Law Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human

Rights and Beyond. Leiden ; (Boston, Martinus Nijhoff, 2007), 7.

91

Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities.

(Office of the High Commissioner, 18 Dec, 1992).


66

implemented similar rules, it could be argued that international standards on this specific issue are

unclear.

European legislation is similarly constructed to allow for some ambiguity on this issue,

as Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights stipulates that “freedom to manifest

one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are

necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order,

health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others." 92 Of course France

has managed to legislate bans on certain forms of religious expression, and has employed

the “interests of public safety,” “the protection of public order” and also “the protection of the

rights and freedoms of others" as rationales for these prohibitions. Take the ban on what the

French call the voile integral, colloquially known as the burqa ban in the United States, which is

actually a ban on full-face covering and not on burqas specifically. The French have defended this

ban by insisting that it is in the interest of the public safety, because this legislation also effectively

bans other garments like ski masks, which are able to conceal a person’s identity if he or she wishes

to commit a crime. France has a similar rationale in the banning of the full-face veil, as they reason

that the burqa could be used to conceal one’s identity while committing a terrorist act.

French politicians also justify this ban, and the accompanying ban on forcing someone else

to wear a headscarf, by interpreting the burqa as a sign of oppression; thus, a ban on this practice

could be interpreted as protecting the rights of Muslim women. Debate on the true meaning of the

burqa and hijab rages in France, as it does all over the world. Many Muslim women argue that it

is primarily a religious symbol and not a way to keep women out of the public sphere. Adam Kunz

gives a three-part framework for how many Muslim women understand the veil or burqa, saying:

"In some respects, the veil is simply religiously overt; it serves as a mechanism for association

with God, an opportunity to indicate religious submissiveness and humility” that secondly "the

veil can be a source of power or liberation; a woman who covers those parts of her that society has

sexually commoditized can be free to engage in business and education without fear of being

compartmentalized” and “lastly, for the Muslim woman desiring home and family relationships,

the veil becomes an expression of devotion to virtue and morality and signals to potential spouses

that she desires similar reciprocation.” 93

Many disagree with this interpretation of the headscarf. For example, former president,

Nicolas Sarkozy, said in 2009 that “the problem of the burka is not a religious problem, it's a

problem of liberty and women's dignity. It's not a religious symbol, but a sign of subservience and

debasement. I want to say solemnly the burka is not welcome in France. In our country, we can't

accept women prisoners behind a screen, cut off from all social life, deprived of all identity. That's

not our idea of freedom.” 94 Unfortunately, bans on burqas and hijabs in France have the opposite

effect that politicians intend. Instead of freeing women, these laws often have the effect of keeping

92

European Convention on Human Rights. European Court of Human Rights. 1994.

93

Adam Scott Kunz. Public exposure of burqas, secularism, and France's violation of European law. (The George

Washington International Law Review, 44(1), 2007), 82-83.

94

Angelique Chrisafis. “Nicolas Sarkozy Says Islamic Veils Are Not Welcome in France.” (The Guardian, Guardian

News and Media, 22 June, 2009).


67

women more sequestered, as they do not have the option of dressing in a way they consider to be

modest. For example, if a woman decides that she cannot remove her headscarf, she could lose

access the very opportunities that would assist in integrating her into French society. This is

especially true in the workplace, since the European Court of Justice ruled in March 2017 that

employers had the right to ask their employees not to wear any visible religious symbol to

work. Media commentators have pointed out that Muslim women who practice veiling could

be forced out of the workplace if the majority of employers in France decide to implement bans

against religious wear for their employees.

Issues like this have already begun to come up in France, such as the much-publicized

“affaire baby loup,” in which a woman working at a private French day care center was fired

because she refused to remove her hijab at work. The French political establishment has thus set

up a false dichotomy, where one can either support secularism via the banning of the full-face veil

and the banning of religious symbols in school, or one can support the rights of women to dress

and practice their religion as they wish, as is guaranteed to them by numerous EU and UN

resolutions. Most French citizens are partial to the first option, in fact 80 percent of French citizens

polled approved of the ban on religious symbols in public spaces, and actually wanted the law to

go further, applying to private workplaces as well. 95 This is ostensibly because supporting the

right of a woman to dress as she pleased would go against the higher values of French nationalism

and secularism as they have been defined.

Some academics, such as Adam Kunz, are convinced that France has indeed violated the

human rights of its Muslim citizens under Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

He points out that:

To establish that a law is directed to one or more of the legitimate aims set out in the second

part of Article IX... a government can show that the law is either targeted at protecting

individual health and well-being, or is intended to protect the general welfare of a larger

populace” and that "a government must show that, given the circumstances, the

government's interest in protecting the population from religious pressure outweighs the

individual’s interest in religious expression. 96

He brings to the reader’s attention a case that came before the European courts in which a

Sikh man took issue with the government enforcing motorcycle helmet laws, when he felt that he

should not be forced to remove his turban for religious reasons. In that case, he explains that the

court rightly ruled against the Sikh man because “the government can infringe individual liberties

where the risks of physical harm are high,” circumstances that are not true when considering the

situation of headscarf-wearers in France. 97 While this is true, I contend that France does have a

legal case for its various headscarf bans, because, in these cases, "as in most rights cases…there

95

“Widespread Support For Banning Full Islamic Veil in Western Europe.” (Pew Research Center's Global

Attitudes Project, Pew Research, 8 July, 2010).

96

Kunz, Public exposure of burqas, secularism, and France's violation of European law, 130-133.

97

Ibid.


68

has to be a balance between conflicting rights and interests” and the state (and most citizens) has

a strong interest in promoting its version of secularism. 98 This doctrine, the practice of striking a

balance between various rights and interests, is referred to by the European Courts as the doctrine

of the “margin of appreciation.” It gives the courts the decision to privilege certain interests over

others. In this case, the French government is respecting the wishes of the 80% who are in favor

of the headscarf ban.

PART 5: HISTORICAL PARTISAN STANCES ON LAÏCITÉ AND ISLAM

To understand today’s political atmosphere in France with respect to Islam, it is necessary

to trace their historical views on the subject. To do so, I divide the contemporary political

landscape in France into three parts: the Left (inclusive of the Socialists, Communists, and their

political descendants), the traditional Right (inclusive of the modern Les Républicains and its

predecessor, Union pour un Mouvement Populaire), and the extreme Right party National Front.

THE FRENCH LEFT

Ideologically the French Left descends from the 1798 revolution and its Jacobin ideals of

secularism and anticlericalism. The French Revolution still remains relevant for today’s political

culture because the Left is ideologically underpinned by the rebellion against old institutions, such

as religion, and values “instead a social harmony that was unconditional and free, accessed by a

citizenship that was solely defined by the individuals’ adherence to the founding principles of the

revolution as a kind of civic, secular faith.” 99 Their Enlightenment conception of the individual,

undifferentiated, citizen in relation to the state has remained fundamental to left-wing views on

Muslims in France, and has caused problems for left-leaning parties in finding solutions to

integration difficulties, especially of minorities like Muslims that have strong religious identities.

Communist Party tensions with Muslim immigrants arose in the 1970s, when the Communist Party

started to lose its working-class voter base to the anti-immigrant National Front. In an attempt to

win back those voters, the Communists began to act out against immigrants and institutions that

were considered their representatives. 100 However, due to a series of ideological shifts 101 by the

Communists during the 1980s, today’s Communist Party is the only major party in France that has

consistently defended the right of Muslims in France to wear religious garments. In a bold move,

the 10 September 1992 edition of l’Humanite, the journalistic voice of the Communist Party in

France, asserted that Islam and communism had the same basic goal of community, and since then,

French Communists have more or less supported the Muslim fight for religious rights in France.

98

McGoldrick, Human rights and religion: The Islamic headscarf debate in Europe, 28.

99



100

Ibid, 484.

101

Namely shifts away from anti-immigrant discourse toward a more inclusive platform.


69

In 2004, the Communist Party was the only party not to vote overwhelmingly for the provisions

recommended by the Stasi commission. 102

The Socialist Party, on the other hand, has taken a different approach, one more in tune

with traditional republican thinking, in order to differentiate themselves from the Communist

Party, and to escape accusations of promoting anti-republican politics of difference. Though

historically the Socialist Party has been very welcoming toward immigrants and in favor of

improving their cultural situation as well as their economic situation, there have been a number of

socialist immigration initiatives and other commitments that they never were able to keep because

of political pressure from the extreme Right and others on the Right who opposed immigration. 103

For example, the Socialist Party attempted to give foreign residents the right to vote in municipal

elections, but the measure was handily defeated, as only those French citizens who identified

themselves as Socialists supported the issue with any consensus. 104 These immigration-positive

stances have historically attracted a measure of support for the Socialists by immigrant and human

rights groups. However, the Socialists have been dragged by political necessity into debates

wherein laïcité is framed as a national identity issue. The mainstream socialist position is one of

uncompromising assimilation into a certain ideal, though there are fringe groups associated with

immigrants that take a more pluralistic stance on the topic. 105 However, Socialists seem to share

a high degree of existential anxiety with their counterparts on the Right, and tend to doubt that the

extent of assimilation will ever be satisfactory.

THE FRENCH RIGHT

For the purposes of this paper, the Right includes the modern party Les Républicains, which

is represented by candidate François Fillon, and its predecessor party, Union pour un Mouvement

Populaire. While the French Left has its ideological underpinnings in the Jacobin revolutionaries

who toppled the French monarchy in 1789, the Right descends from that monarchy, its supporters,

and from the traditionally strong institution of the Catholic church. This history has undoubtedly

influenced the Right’s political positions on Islam, namely in the preference the Right has shown,

and continues to show, for traditional institutions such as the Catholic church. Thus, it follows

that historically the French Right has not fully supported the law of 1905, nor other provisions of

secularism when it came to issues with the Catholic church. It is ironic then that staunch opposition

to the public expression and practice of Islam, and further immigration of Muslims in the name of

laïcité, comes from a party that itself has deep ties to religion.

102

The Stasi Commission was set up by President Jaques Chirac in 2003 to investigate and create a report with

recommendations to lawmakers concerning the wearing of the Islamic headscarf in France in keeping with the

doctrine of laïcité after the headscarf began to be hotly debated in society and politics. These reports set the

groundwork for further legislation on the issue of headscarves, such as the 2004 law.

103

Catherine Coroller. ‘Sur l’islam, une image brouilleé’, (Libération, 26 February, 2007), 486.

104

Miriam Feldblum, Reconstructing citizenship: The politics of nationality reform and immigration in

contemporary France (SUNY series in national identities). (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), 42.

105

Ibid, 45.


70

The Left’s opposition to Islam began in the mid 80s under socialist president François

Mitterrand. Before this time, there was a tacit agreement between French political parties that

immigration was not an issue that should be brought into question politically, and the Socialist

Party of the 1980s especially took this to heart, welcoming immigrants into France and framing

the issue in a “pluralist, inclusive way.” 106 Scholar Gino G. Raymond explains that at this time,

“Socialists had emphasized their desire to switch the focus from the purely economic to improving

the social, cultural and political possibilities available to France’s immigrant community, thereby

changing the perception of this community from that of a problematic adjunct to one of an integral

and valued part of the fabric of French society.” 107

However, as people started to lose confidence in the Socialists, as they were perceived to

lack answers to pressing social problems like unemployment, the Right sensed an opportunity to

act. 108 As citizens began to look elsewhere for answers to both their political questions and

frustrations, and because some found the anti-immigrant positions of the National Front attractive,

the Right began to politicize the issue of immigration, partially co-opting portions of National

Front rhetoric, and unite around it to further undermine socialist support in France. 109 While

economic problems were not demonstrably related to immigration, French citizens were happy to

unite around any explanation for their problems that seemed reasonable. The acceptance of this

proposition was so widespread that by 1984 the French were overwhelmingly in favor of further

restrictions on immigration, whereas ten years earlier they would have been opposed. 110

It was around this point that immigration themes began to be framed as issues of national

identity and “the legitimation of extreme right themes extended to the denunciation of

egalitarianism and the appropriation of the differentials logic.” 111 In 1984 the conservative

politician Alain Griotteray released his book Immigrants: The Shock a book that emphasized the

differences between the culture of immigrants and that of the receiving society. These anxieties

were directed specifically toward immigrants of the Muslim faith, as they began to take advantage

of family reunification policies and become more visible in French daily life. 112 Tensions came to

a boil in 1989, when young Muslim schoolgirls in the Creil banlieue of Paris were suspended after

they refused to remove their Islamic headscarves when asked by their teachers. This sparked a

national discussion about the compatibility of Islam and French identity. Talk around the veil

went from being solely about other countries to being about France, and many on the right resented

the introduction of what they felt was a foreign element into France. 113

106

Feldblum, Reconstructing citizenship: The politics of nationality reform and immigration in contemporary

France, 38.

107



108

Ibid, 39.

109

Ibid.

110

Ibid, 42.

111

Ibid, 49.

112 Jeremy Ahearne, Government through Culture in Contemporary France. 2014. Almeida, D. Exclusionary

secularism: The National Front and the reinvention of laïcité. (Modern & Contemporary France, 25(3). 2017), 249-

263.

113

Ibid.


71

Even though these debates are usually framed in the context of laïcité, it would be wrong

to claim secularism as the real impetus behind the opposition, as figures on the right continue to

consort with religious authorities and show tacit support for religion, namely Catholicism, in the

French public sphere. Since Catholicism is largely seen as part of “French culture,” framing issues

of religion within arguments about national identity allows them to pick and choose which

religions they would like to subtly—or openly, in some cases—support, and which ones they can

denigrate by calling them un-French.

The Right, instead of staying out of religious life in the way the 1905 law on secularism

mandates, has instead sought to bring together representatives of different faiths so that it can

dialogue with them more easily. 114 This approach has manifested itself in the creation of

administrative bodies that are said to represent religions such as Islam in France. In recent years

the biggest proponent of this approach, and for engaging with religions altogether, has been former

president Nicolas Sarkozy. Sarkozy was instrumental in creating the CFCM, the Conseil Françiase

du Culte Musulman, as well as casting a new definition of laïcité, which he calls positive laïcité,

which suggests that "the State should not now even aspire to be entirely neutral in its dealings with

different religions, despite Article 2 of the 1905 law” because of his belief that some religions are

better for society than others. 115 Sarkozy is, of course, referencing Catholicism, which he has

publically supported since 2007, even going so far as to suggest that it was a bad decision to split

the church from the French state.” 116 It is not surprising that given overt support for a Catholic

presence in the public sphere, the restrictions of laïcité have fallen almost completely on the

shoulders of the Muslim citizen since 2008, the second year of the Sarkozy presidency. 117

THE NATIONAL FRONT

Though other extreme right parties do exist in France, Marine Le Pen’s National Front

(FN) is the most established and by far the most popular; thus, for the purposes of this paper, it

can be assumed that the terms “far right,” “extreme right” and “National Front” are synonymous.

The history of the National Front is one that is very close to Catholic and royalist forces after

WWII, including "right wing Catholics, authoritarian royalists, Vichy nostalgics, net-pagan

nationalists, and New Right doctrinaires.” 118 Thus, because of this history, especially because of

the support of those who backed the Nazi party during WWII, and the connections to French forces

fighting against Algerian independence, the National Front has historically been seen as a racist

party, or at least a party with a strong racist element. In the early years of the party, it was regarded

as a sort of fringe element within French society, and never gained traction electorally. The

National Front’s discourse did not resonate with voters into the 1970s (it is notable that the

114

Ahearne, Government through Culture in Contemporary France, 29.

115

Ibid, 28.

116

Ibid, 28-29.

117

Ibid, 30.

118

Almeida, Exclusionary secularism: The National Front and the reinvention of

laïcité, 251.


72

Communist party also failed electorally on a platform of anti-immigrant sentiment), but the party

and its leader, Jean-Marie Le Pen, came into the popular imagination in the 1980’s as antiimmigrant

discourse began to resonate with the French citizen. 119 Thus, the National Front’s

immigrant hate platform started to gain ground in the 1980s as immigration issues began to be

politicized, and the Right, trying to differentiate itself from the Socialist government in power,

began to legitimate the FN by adopting some of its rhetoric 120 . As a result, “the linkage between

the National Front and growing politicization of immigration played a role in shifting the collective

assessment of Le Pen.” For many analysts, “the electoral successes of the anti-immigrant National

Front platform in Paris and nearby Dreux in 1983 marked the first successful politicization of

immigrant issues and the initial legitimation of the Le Pen rhetoric.” 121 After this point, the

National Front had a much stronger foothold in the political imagination of the nation, and like the

right, began to frame its dislike for Muslims with the argument that they were disrupting the

national identity, which, "for a party which until recently openly maintained privileged relations

with different segments of Catholic traditionalism and integralism, this newfound devotion to

secularism appear[ed] to constitute a fundamental identity change.” 122

Almeida theorizes that Marine Le Pen, Jean-Marie Le Pen’s daughter and current leader of

the party, especially has included values like laïcité in the FN’s platform to de-radicalize the FN

and improve its respectability among various populations, in a departure from earlier deference to

Catholic influences. As late as 2001, the ties with Catholicism were absolutely apparent in the

party platform, 123 which sought to reintroduce older “Catholic values” back onto the scene. By

2007, the strategy was different. Le Pen retired Catholic symbolism and began to appeal to

symbols of republicanism and the nation. Marine Le Pen made this strategy integral in her

campaign, and by her ascendency to FN leadership in 2011, all reference to Catholic ideologues

was replaced by references to republican greats. Le Pen has also distanced herself from Catholic

values by backing away from anti-homosexual, anti-abortion, and anti-Semitic rhetoric, in an

attempt to appeal to a younger generation. 124

In keeping with this new staunch republicanism, the FN is very opposed to Islam and

Muslims in France. Peter Davies says it best when he explains that “the FN believes in a policy

of exclusion for threatening, ‘foreign’ elements inside the nation,” namely Muslim citizens that

the FN considers un-French. 125 Davies explains that “party writers have claimed not only that

North African immigrants find assimilation hard—that is, if they actually want to assimilate—but,

119

Miriam Feldblum, Reconstructing citizenship: The politics of nationality reform and immigration in

contemporary France (SUNY series in national identities). (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), 37.

120

Ibid, 38.

121

Ibid, 39.

122

Dimitri Almeida, Exclusionary secularism: The National Front and the reinvention of laïcité. (Modern &

Contemporary France, 25(3). 2017), 250.

123

References to prominent Catholics, such as Edmund Burke, appeared frequently in party literature (Almeida

252).

124

Almeida, Exclusionary secularism,, 252.

125

Peter Davies, The National Front in France: Ideology, discourse and power. (London; New York: Rutledge.

1999), 141.


73

as we will see, that France and Islam are fundamentally incompatible.” 126 These sweeping

generalizations often contain just enough truth to sound plausible, while having no factual basis.

Davies explains that “there are at least two dimensions to the FN’s critique of Islam. In the broad,

external context, the party claims that it is a conquering religion, whose expansionist force

threatens the Christian identity of the West; while in the internal and domestic sphere, the FN

views Islam as a potent agency of social disorder, incompatible with the chief features of French

society.” 127 There are many instances of the FN using war-like language to describe the

relationship of France to its Muslim citizens, as it claims Muslims want to either destroy France,

or make it an Islamic state. 128 Much of this rhetoric comes out of a certain understanding of the

concept of jihad, which literally means “persuasion”, but which has been used by various actors

to mean something closer to “holy war.” 129 The National Front has attached itself to this meaning

of jihad, and thus believes that Islam and Muslims are dead set on conquering France for Islam.

As proof, the FN latches onto certain episodes, such as an instance where a popular fast-food

company allegedly decided to start selling halal products instead of what the FN believed to be

perfectly good French beef, as proof that Muslims were slowly conquering France. 130 Because of

this rhetoric, the FN implicitly justifies taking drastic action against Muslim minorities,

characterizing them no longer as an oppressed minority group within a powerful country, but

instead an invading army, hell-bent on destroying the French way of life.

Opposition parties claim that “the FN is a prime example of a neo-racist movement—a

party that has labelled immigrants ‘unassailable.’" 131 Many commentators think that the National

Front isn’t really in line with the traditional “French" values that they claim to hold, but has instead

changed the definition of laïcité to mean something it originally didn’t. One French writer asserts

that the spirit of laïcité is that it allows people to live together, not that it should be a context for

promoting intolerance, how it is interpreted by the National Front. 132 Whatever the case, what is

clear is that the National Front’s definition of laïcité does not leave much room for Muslim

religious practice.

PART 6: CURRENT EVOLUTION OF THESE STANCES IN THE

2017 ELECTION CYCLE

This section presents a discourse analysis of political rhetoric about Islam used by

the five major French political parties and their candidates in the 2017 presidential election. My

aim is to present a general picture of each candidate’s view on Islam and related issues. I will

analyze five political parties/candidates: Emmanuel Macron, current president of France and

126

Ibid, 143.

127

Davies, The National Front in France: Ideology, discourse and power, 146.

128

Ibid, 147.

129

Ibid, 146.

130

Almeida, Exclusionary secularism: The National Front and the reinvention of laïcité. Modern & Contemporary

France, 254.

131

Davies, The National Front in France: Ideology, discourse and power, 141.

132

Seniguer, « La laïcité à l'épreuve de l'islam et des musulmans: le cas de la France » 64.


74

member of En Marche, a centrist party (albeit Macron himself as the founder of the party has a

socialist background); Benoît Hamon, candidate of the Socialist Party; Jean-Luc Mélenchon,

candidate for the party La France Insoumise, a left-wing party influenced by communist political

ideology; Marine Le Pen, candidate for National Front, the major extreme right party in France;

and François Fillon, candidate for Les Républicains, the successor party of the Union pour un

Mouvement Populaire and the main center-right party in France. This section is organized around

five core themes: laïcité, national identity, terrorism and Islamism, Islamic doctrine and behavior,

and organizational structure. I conclude with an analysis of the political position of Muslims in

France as it stands after the 2017 election.

LA LAÏCITÉ

Every candidate explicitly addressed the meaning of laïcité, or secularism, during their

campaign. Each of these candidates possesses a distinct definition of laïcité that emerged from

their ideological roots and their view of French society. They do, however, all agree that laïcité,

whatever its definition, is integral to French society and should be fiercely defended.

I analyze these positions beginning with those of the current president, Emmanuel

Macron. For Macron, laïcité has four parts. First, laïcité allows people of different religious

convictions to live together and respect each other. 133 Secondly, laïcité secures common treatment

of citizens of all religions by French law and conversely requires that all French citizens follow

the law equally. 134 Third, laïcité guarantees complete freedom of belief to all citizens, as well as

the freedom to practice their religion within the confines of French law. 135 Lastly, laïcité ensures

the complete separation of church and state, so that the state does not intervene in church business,

and the church does not intervene in state business. 136 Macron frequently affirms his conviction

that the presence of Muslims and Islam in France does not mean that the principle of laïcité must

be reviewed, or called into question. 137 He invokes the demonstrated support of the Muslim

community for the principle of laïcité, and insists that they, like him, believe that laïcité is a source

of freedom instead of restriction. 138 He argues that there are people who “confuse secularism with

the prohibition of religious symbols—and some use this confusion to score political points,” 139 but

that he wants to be very clear about what is allowed and what is not allowed. As it follows, Macron

expresses clear support for the prohibition of religious symbols in state schools 140 and for

continued freedom to wear religious symbols in public spaces like streets. 141

133

Emmanuel Macron. Questions Religieuses Et Laïcité. En Marche!

134

Ibid.

135

Ibid.

136

Ibid.

137

“Emmanuel Macron Au Dîner Du Conseil Français Du Culte Musulman.” 2017, and “Communiqué De Presse -

Entretien D'Emmanuel Macron Avec Anouar Kbibech, Président Du CFCM.” 2017

138

“Questions Religieuses Et Laïcité.” En Marche!

139

“Trop de Français confondent la laïcité et l’interdiction des manifestations religieuses – et certains font de cette

confusion leur fonds de commerce”, Questions Religieuses et Laïcité

140


141

Ibid.


75

Benoît Hamon, the candidate for the Socialist Party, has similar views on laïcité to Macron

because of their similar socialist political backgrounds. Like Macron, he emphasizes that laïcité

entails freedom of belief or unbelief, the separation of the church and the state, and that it allows

those of different beliefs to live together in harmony. 142 Hamon does bring some particularity to

the discussion of laïcité. While Macron cited public support as an argument for the abiding of

laïcité, Hamon appeals heavily to history, specifically the law of 1905. 143 Hamon also decries

what he sees as the instrumentalization of the principle by the Right and the far Right as a weapon

against certain religions, saying in an interview with Martin Brésis that “the Right and the extreme

Right instrumentalize secularism as a reactionary principle and use it as a sword against our

Muslim compatriots.” 144 Hamon believes that laïcité should be applied equally to everyone.

While Jean-Luc Mélenchon shares certain elements of his views on laïcité with the

Socialists and Macron, such as viewing laïcité as freedom of conscience, 145 a guarantor of equality

vis à vis the law, 146 and a way for people of differing beliefs to live in harmony with one another, 147

he brings in other unique perspectives due to his affiliations with far-left and communist

ideologies. Thus, his justifications for laïcité do not solely rest on appeals to the law of 1905, nor

does he mention public consensus. Rather, Mélenchon justifies the principle of laïcité by

appealing to the need for solidarity as a people, emancipation from institutional powers such as

religion, and the need for the state to only allocate funds for projects that serve the interests of the

entire public. 148 He emphasizes that the only way that these goals will be achieved is if the state

is strictly neutral in manners of religion. Although he goes out of his way to explain that his

version of laïcité is not atheistic, 149 his rhetoric seems rather hostile towards religion, especially

religious groups he believes are “communitarian,” as he says in the newspaper Marianne that his

laïcité “is coupled with a hostility in principle to communitarisms,” 150 and also toward his fellow

candidates, whom he believes are contorting the definition of laïcité to serve their constituents’

interests. 151

On the extreme-right, Marine Le Pen defines laïcité quite differently than her counterparts

on the eft. When Marine Le Pen mentions laïcité, she speaks less about freedom of religion than

she does about the restrictions that she would like to put on French citizens in the name of national

unity. For example, she wants to extend the ban on religious symbols in schools to cover other

142 Brésis, Martin et al. “Laïcité Et Religions: Ce Que Proposent Les Candidats.”

143 “Hamon Sur Les Banlieues: Hollande Aurait Dû Faire ‘Une Autre Politique Économique Et Sociale.’” 2017, and

Brésis, 2017

144

ibid and “‘Dimanche En Politique’. Invité: Benoît Hamon.” 2017, and Brésis 2017: “La droite et l'extrême droite

instrumentalisent la laïcité pour en faire un principe réactionnaire et l’utilisent comme un glaive contre nos

compatriotes musulmans”.

145

Dupas and Sintes, “Laïcité: Pour Une République Vraiment Laïque.”

146

Ibid.

147

Ibid.

148

Dupas and Sintes, “Laïcité: Pour Une République Vraiment Laïque.”

149

Ibid.

150

“Ma laïcité… elle se double d’une hostilité de principe aux communautarismes” Renaud and Mélenchon 2017.

151

Ibid.


76

parts of the public sphere, including streets and public transportation. 152 Her justification for these

policies is her belief that “the street belongs, by nature, to the public space, and that there is a

danger that everyone will exhibit their religion in the public space,” 153 which divides the French

populations into communities based on their religion. In her view, this separation is unacceptable

because the republic is indivisible. Woven into all of this rhetoric is an association of what she

calls “communitarianism” with Islam. Thus, Le Pen effectively blames Muslims for divisions that

exist within the nation, although she gives few reasons for why she believes this to be

true. Naturally, her competitors criticize her for using laïcité as a rhetorical tool against Muslims,

and evidence supports their accusation.

François Fillon, the candidate for the moderate right-wing party, explicitly defines laïcité

in a very similar manner to his counterparts on the left: laïcité is a separation of church and state, 154

all religions have a place in France, 155 and French people of all beliefs can be reconciled to each

other as fellow citizens. 156 However, Fillon continues in the tradition of the French Right of subtly

bringing religion into the public sphere, having identified himself as a Catholic

candidate. 157 Because of his Catholic identity, he is very critical of parties on both the extreme

left and the extreme right which he sees as anti-religious. 158 However, on the issue of Islam and

laïcité, Fillon’s rhetoric is often contradictory. On one hand, he denounces the far-Right for using

laïcité as a tool against Muslims, saying that “the National Front makes the… mistake…of a

dangerous stigma, which instrumentalizes secularism to make it an instrument of

discrimination,” 159 conversely he believes that the principle of laïcité is called into question by

certain Muslims. 160 On multiple occasions Fillon asserted that indeed there is a “problem” with

Islam in France linked to laïcité, namely that Muslims have not done enough to assure that the

practice of their religion fits within the parameters of laïcité. Fillon, like Le Pen, makes strong

connections between Islam and a threat to the principle and practice of laïcité in France.

NATIONAL IDENTITY

French discourses on national identity are intimately related to discussions about laïcité,

but there are also additional elements in national identity as constructed by each candidate that can

shed light on perspectives on Islam. In Macron’s platform, French values are absolutely integral

to French identity. Often these values are poorly defined, such as when he invokes “French values”

152

Martin, “Laïcité Et Religions: Ce Que Proposent Les Candidats.”

153

“Si donc je veux interdire le port d’insignes religieux ostentatoires dans la rue, comme ils sont déjà prohibés à

l’école depuis 2004, c’est que la rue appartient, par nature, à l’espace public, et qu’il y a un danger à ce que chacun y

exhibe sa religion,” Brésis 2017.

154

Brésis,“Laïcité Et Religions: Ce Que Proposent Les Candidats.”

155

Ibid.

156

“Discours De François Felon à La Villette.” 2017.

157

Renaud, 2017.

158

Brésis, “Laïcité Et Religions: Ce Que Proposent Les Candidats.”

159

Ibid. “Le Front National tombe dans le premier écueil, celui d'une stigmatisation dangereuse, qui instrumentalise

la laïcité pour en faire un instrument de discrimination”.

160

“Discours De François Fillon à La Villette.” 2017.


77

as a rhetorical strategy, which allows the listener to insert his or her conception of “French values”

into the discourse. 161 However, Macron does identify concepts like universal aspirations, a shared

national destiny, and humanistic values as quintessentially French values, saying that “Our country

is based on a totally different conception of the social bond: France is the combination of a fertile

plurality, a singular collective destiny, an aspiration to the universal.” 162 In addition to these,

Macron specially mentions the equality of men and women as a French value. 163 While Macron

is very careful never to mention a specific religious or ethnic category that he considers more

French than another, there seems to be little room for difference of opinion on these value

propositions, some of which more religious French citizens, both Catholic and Muslim, might have

trouble accepting. Further cementing the immutability of these values, Macron frequently

emphasizes that immigrants and citizens are obligated to conform to the values of the republic, not

that the values of the republic ought to conform to the values of individuals, rendering cultural

adjustment a decidedly one-sided affair. 164

Benoît Hamon takes a completely different view of French national identity. In his

opinion, France is fundamentally flawed, failing in its promise—what he calls its “republican

pact”—to ensure the equality of all citizens. 165 In his view, it is this lack of equality, and not the

question of identity, that defines modern France. He says that “the Republic is failing on its central

promise: equality. The question of identity has come to supplant the social question. I do not reject

the debate on national identity. But this debate is dangerous in a society because of a loss of

reference. Identity is a narration and not a return to ‘origins.’” 166 Hamon believes that the

prevalence of the identity debate over the debate on social equality has divided France into two

parts: Muslim and non-Muslim. 167 He is proud of France, especially when it comes to the

promotion of French culture, but is not so proud of France that he defines France by lofty values.

He instead acknowledges the unsavory parts of French history and culture, such as the historical

and present existence of sexism. 168 Thus, he does not attribute problems in French society to a

shifting identity, but instead lays the blame at the feet of the French state’s failure to live up to the

values it espouses.

Mélenchon’s vision of French identity is very much influenced by his left-wing ideas. He

conceptualizes France as a melting pot that erases the particular identities of its citizens so that

they adopt a common French identity that encourages the unity and indivisibility of the French

nation, saying that “the French Republic is a crucible. It rejects any conception of the national

identity that is intended to exclude. It links common identity to the universalist tradition, that of

161

“Immigration Et Asile.” En Marche!

162

Brésis, 2017, “Notre pays est fondé sur une conception totalement différente du lien social: la France, c’est la

conjugaison d’une pluralité féconde, d’une destinée collective singulière, d'une aspiration à l’universel”.

163


164

“Meeting à Montpellier Du 18 Octobre | Emmanuel Macron.” 2016.

165

Auffray and Laïreche, 2016.

166

Ibid: “La République est défaillante sur sa promesse centrale : l’égalité. La question identitaire est venue

supplanter la question sociale. Je ne rejette pas le débat sur l’identité nationale. Mais ce débat est dangereux dans

une société en perte de repère. L’identité est une narration et non un retour aux «origines».”

167

Belattar, 2017.

168

Jeziorski, 2017.


78

the struggle for freedom and equality.” 169 Mélenchon insists that capitalism, combined with any

other model of integration, leads to the fracturing and inequality of society. 170 In keeping with

other far-left nationalist movements, he believes in economic and cultural protectionism. He is

also anti-Europe, citing its influence as eroding to France’s national identity. 171 In Mélenchon’s

opinion, the national identity is threatened, and actions must be taken to restore liberty, equality,

fraternity, and of course, laïcité, to France.

Marine Le Pen forcefully emphasizes the independence of France as a nation and its

resulting strong and particular identity. She believes that this identity is not multicultural, does

not change, and must be accepted by those who choose to live in France, asking whether France

“want[s] a multicultural society, following the model of the English-speaking world, where

fundamental Islam is progressing and we see major religious claims” or rather an “independent

nation, with people able to control their own destiny?” 172 According to Le Pen, this identity is

wrapped up in France’s history, morals, and way of life, as well as the Christian heritage of France

that Le Pen believes is the origin point for enlightenment and humanistic values like laïcité. 173 Le

Pen presents French identity as being in jeopardy, and although she explicitly denies that she

targets Muslims specifically, she has a habit of juxtaposing discourses about Islam alongside those

covering threats to the national identity. 174 Furthermore, she frequently depicts immigrants as

being at war with France, 175 and thus a threat to the nation and its identity, which has no room for

other traditions or values. Marine Le Pen’s appeal to French history, 176 particularly Catholic

history, sets an almost impossible standard of Frenchness that French Muslims cannot very well

hope to achieve.

Although he emphasizes that France has its own unique history and values, Francois Fillon

is not as alarmist as Marine Le Pen, conceding that there have been enriching contributions to

French culture made by foreigners. 177 This acknowledgement suggests that Fillon is open to an

evolving notion of identity, but not to large shifts in what is considered French. Thus, he insists

like Le Pen that immigrants must not simply integrate into society, but assimilate, by adopting

French values and ways of life as their own, saying that France has “not made the choice of

communitarianism.” 178 He believes that Muslims in particular are resistant to assimilation, and

points out that other religions have evolved to be compatible with the values of the republic as he

169

Dupas and Sintes, p. 13: “La République française est un creuset. Elle rejette toute conception de l’identité

nationale destinée à exclure. Elle rattache l'identité commune à la tradition universaliste, celle des luttes pour la

liberté et l'égalité”.

170

Dupas and Sintes, p. 6

171


172

“Conférence Présidentielle n°4: « La Citoyenneté ».” 2017. Marr and Le Pen, 2016.

173

Rachile, 2016.

174

Marr and Le Pen, 2016.

175

Viscusi, “In Their Own Words” May 2017. In the past, Le Pen has compared Muslims Praying in the streets to

Nazi occupiers.

176

I am talking here primarily about her frequent referencing of Charles Martel.

177

Le Débat De La Primaire De La Droite Et Du Centre (1/3), 2016.

178

Ibid: “nous n'avons pas fait le choix du communautarisme, du multiculturalisme”.


79

views them. 179 Fillon has high expectations for Muslim immigrants to France, but he does

acknowledge that what is foreign is not automatically undesirable.

TERRORISM

Every candidate agrees that terrorism is a grave threat to the safety of France’s citizens,

but none of the candidates agree on the best way to stop the terrorist threat. Nor do they all place

blame on the same forces for creating the threat in the first place, as some candidates believe that

forces outside of France are at fault, and others believe that France should be pointing fingers at

itself. Discourse about terrorism gives important clues as to how the candidates view France’s

relationship to its immigrant population and the Islamic world in general.

Emmanuel Macron mentions terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism frequently in his

speeches and press communiques. 180 He acknowledges that these attacks have made the

relationship between the Muslim community and the French public tenuous, although he claims

that the French people are not naturally prone to anti-Muslim bigotry. 181 Instead of emphasizing

the guilt of a select few Muslims, Macron brings the entire Muslim community into the discussion

on terrorism, saying that even moderate Muslims have the responsibility to fight against the

ideology of fundamentalist Islam. 182 He believes that jihadist and fundamentalist ideology is a

perversion of Islam, telling Muslims that they both “must continue to fight with determination

those who seek to make your places of worship and transmission of your traditions places where

hate is preached.” 183 He also claims that Islam is not inherently violent, but he is incredibly

concerned about Islamic fundamentalism. 184 He defines fundamentalism quite broadly, as an

ideology marked by intolerance for the other and disregard for the republican values of liberty,

equality, and fraternity, along with other universal humanistic values. 185 Thus, because Macron’s

model of national identity is values-based, identification with fundamentalist or extremist Islam

makes one fundamentally un-French.

Hamon speaks about terrorism much less frequently than Macron and frames the issue not

as one of national identity, but rather in a context of social disenfranchisement, as a predictable

response to modernity by those who have been harmed by globalization. 186 Hamon also

emphasizes that the effects of terrorism have been global, and that other nations besides France

have experienced them. 187 Thus, terrorism cannot simply be a rejection of French, and only

179


180

Brésis 2017, Communiqué De Presse - Entretien D'Emmanuel Macron Avec Anouar Kbibech, Président Du

CFCM.” 2017, “Emmanuel Macron Au Dîner Du Conseil Français Du Culte Musulman.” 2016, “Full Transcript of

Emmanuel Macron Speech.” 2017

181


182

“Emmanuel Macron Au Dîner Du Conseil Français Du Culte Musulman.” 2017.

183

Ibid. “Nous continuons à poursuivre avec détermination ceux qui cherchent à faire de vos lieux de culte et de

transmission de votre tradition religieuse des lieux de prêches de haine.”

184

“Emmanuel Macron Au Dîner Du Conseil Français Du Culte Musulman.” 2017

185

Brésis, 2017.

186

“Discours De Benoît Hamon Du 28 Août 2016 à Saint-Denis.” 2016.

187

Ibid.


80

French, values. Because of this, he rejects the impulse to consider terrorists or fundamentalists

un-French, saying that France must stop saying that terrorists “are too bad to be French, so they

must be stripped of their nationality.” 188 Instead he lays blame at the foot of the French state for

failing in its obligations to protect vulnerable citizens from circumstances that would lead to

radicalization. He further implicates the French by chastising them for their discriminatory

response to terrorist attacks, reasoning that their bigotry is simply fuel for terrorist

ideology. 189 Despite all of this, Hamon emphasizes that the terrorist threat is very real and that he

has a will to fight it, albeit differently than other candidates. 190

Mélenchon takes a very similar view of terrorism to Benoît Hamon. He believes that

terrorist violence ultimately stems from the effects of propaganda put into place by an elite to

withhold wealth from the poor and from immigrants, thus leaving them vulnerable to

radicalization. 191 Like Hamon, Mélenchon believes that terrorism is a problem of social inequality

more than anything else, but unlike Hamon, he emphasizes that the focus on terrorism is being

used for other political ends, such as restricting the freedoms of all citizens. 192 Thus, Mélenchon’s

strategy to fight terrorism does not rest solely on a policing strategy because he recognizes that

“the answer to the roots of blind violence is… multifactorial.” 193 Mélenchon believes that fighting

groups like ISIS is a worthy cause, but that the government should cease fear-mongering and begin

devoting itself to solving the social causes of radicalization.

Marine Le Pen characterizes terrorism as primarily a foreign force which was able to sneak

into France because of soft immigration policies in the 1980s and blossom because of acceptance

of multiculturalism and diversity in French society. 194 Le Pen mocks those who would disagree

with her, sarcastically saying that “the fault must therefore go back to the French, who did not

know how to welcome, tolerate, adapt” to immigrants whom she considers to be at war against

France. 195 Thus, her views on terrorism are directly connected with her anti-immigration views. 196

She believes that terrorism exists because of a fundamental difference between Muslim civilization

and French civilization, arguing that terrorists simply want to destroy the French way of life by

conquering the French nation and replacing it with what they believe to be a superior lifestyle. 197

She rejects any notion that unfavorable conditions within French society have contributed to the

radicalization of young French, instead preferring to denigrate young French Muslims who have

188

Auffray and Laïreche, 2017, “L’autre déni consiste à dire ‘ils sont bien trop mauvais pour être Français, il faut

donc les déchoir de leur nationalité’.”

189


190


191

Maillard and Pirenne, 28

192

Maillard and Pirenne, 29-30

193

Maillard and Pirenne, 28: “La réponse aux racines des violences aveugles n’est pas policière, mais

multifactorielle”.

194

“Conférence Présidentielle n°4 : « La Citoyenneté ».” 2017.

195

Ibid. “Et quand, dans les années 2000, une partie des migrants, ou de leurs enfants, sont entrés en guerre contre

la France, il est alors impossible de nier qu’il y a un problème, la faute doit donc en revenir aux Français, qui n’ont

pas su accueillir, tolérer, s’adapter!”

196

“Discours De Marine Le Pen Au Meeting à Bordeaux.” 2017.

197

Bay, 2016.


81

been radicalized as fundamentally un-French. 198 Thus, she is in favor of policies that would strip

jihadists of their French nationality. Le Pen does concede that not all Muslims are terrorists, but

believes that republican Muslims and other French citizens must do more to assert themselves

against an ever-more dangerous terrorist threat.

François Fillon’s views on terrorism have some elements in common with Le Pen’s,

namely that he also views terrorism as an ideological battle over French society, fought between

the French and those who hate the French way of life, ideals, and society. 199 He is also in

agreement that only some Muslims are to blame, and uses the same kind of language as Le Pen to

describe the relationship between Muslims who accept the secular order and fundamentalists.

However, he also believes that Muslims are directly responsible for combating radicalization

within their community. 200 Fillon differs from Le Pen in his estimation of the source of the

terrorist problem. While Le Pen believes that immigrants have always been anti-French, Fillon

has a much more historically accurate view of immigration, and rightly points out that problems

with radicalization did not start until relatively recently in the history of Muslims in France. 201 He

believes that the true source of the radical currents present in France are foreign influences,

including the Muslim Brotherhood, the Saudi Government, and other entities that promote Salafist

ideology, saying that he wants “clarification of our relations with Saudi Arabia and Qatar which

shelter the doctrinaires of radical Islam and the promoters of the ‘burkini.’” 202 It seems that Fillon

wants to appear tough on the issue of terrorism—further evidenced by the fact that he wrote an

entire book on the subject—but he does not use the same doomsday-type language as Marine Le

Pen, as he seems optimistic that French society will survive this threat as it has others in the past. 203

DOCTRINE AND BEHAVIOR

The candidates also frequently speak about Islamic religious doctrine and the behaviors it

inspires, specifically what could be done to improve both so that they are more consistent with

republican values. While all of the candidates point out areas in which they believe Muslims could

do better, the degree to which they believe Muslims have not assimilated, or should assimilate,

varies greatly.

Emmanuel Macron indicates that ultimately Muslims are assimilable, but he believes there

are several things that Muslims need to do before they are fully integrated into French

society. First, Macron believes that Muslims who live in France need to learn the French

language. 204 Secondly, he believes that some Muslims are illiterate when it comes to French

values, and says that for immigrants, “emphasis will be placed on learning rights and duties, and

198

“Les 144 Engagements Présidentiels.”, Front National.

199


200

Brésis, 2017.

201

“Femmes Voilées, Burqa Etc. Phénomène Récent : Que S'est-Il Passé ?” 2016.

202

“Discours De François Fillon à La Villette.” 2017. Je veux la clarification de nos relations avec l’Arabie saoudite

et le Qatar qui abritent les doctrinaires de l’Islam radical et les marchands de « burkini ».

203

Brésis, 2017.

204



82

in particular women's rights and secularism.” 205 The value of gender equality is perhaps the most

frequently mentioned by Macron in this context, specifically in the context of veiling, refusing to

be treated by a physician of the opposite sex, and refusing to shake hands with opposite sex

colleagues and acquaintances. 206 Macron also mentions the value of liberty, especially in the

context of religious veiling, as he believes that women should be free from coercion in their

decision to wear or not wear the veil. 207 Taken together, the evidence suggests that Macron

believes that many Muslims do not accept French values. However, Macron does allow for the

possibility of improvement, as he believes that most Muslims would like to be better integrated

into French society. He does not believe that most Muslims are “communitarians” or “enemies of

the republic,” but rather confused about what is acceptable in France and what is not. 208 He

emphasizes the primacy of French law, in place of any religious law, in helping make these

determinations. 209

Benoît Hamon believes that the behavior of Muslims in society is not necessarily a problem

in most cases, but he does admit that he has concerns about Muslim’s acceptance of gender equality

norms. 210 During his campaign, he was caught up in a scandal around a journalist’s report about

cafés outside of Paris that do not allow women to enter. In the eyes of the public, Hamon did not

condemn this behavior harshly enough, thus he had to be very sure that there was no ambiguity on

this issue during his campaign. Even in the wake of the controversy Hamon continued to defend

Muslims, but he also admitted that there are certain religious minorities that test the republic on its

commitment to its values, and that he is uncompromising when it comes to addressing these

groups. 211 He believes that responses to perceived gender equality issues, such as France’s 2016

ban of the burkini (modest Islamic women’s swimwear), have been embarrassing to the nation,

saying that “until now, the Right and the extreme Right have competed on the issue of the identity

controversy. But what is new is that on the left also, the burkini has aroused embarrassing or

distressing reactions.” 212 Even though he does not like the burkini, nor the separation it imposes,

he believes that the laws of the republic secure the rights of women to wear it. 213 He believes that

the burkini ban and other similar bans arise from an irrational hysteria over Islam that has taken

hold of France in the past two decades. 214

205

Ibid. Un accent sera notamment porté sur l’apprentissage des droits et des devoirs, et en particulier du droit des

femmes et de la laïcité.

206

Ibid, “Meeting à Montpellier Du 18 Octobre | Emmanuel Macron.” 2016, “Questions Religieuses Et Laïcité.” En

Marche!

207


208

Quilt-Maupoil, 2017

209


210

“Benoît Hamon : ‘La Volonté De Tourner La Page Est Claire.’” 2017.

211

Ibid.

212

“Hamon Sur Les Banlieues : Hollande Aurait Dû Faire ‘Une Autre Politique Économique Et Sociale.’” 2017, and

Discours de Benoît Hamon à Saint-Denis, 2016: “Jusqu’à présent c’est la droite et l’extrême droite qui se faisaient

concurrence sur le registre de la polémique identitaire. Mais c’est nouveau. A gauche aussi, le burkini a suscité des

réactions embarrassantes ou navrantes.”

213

Ibid.

214



83

Mélenchon is similarly embarrassed about the responses of policy-makers to incidents like

the burkini ban and does not want to institute anything like a clothing police. 215 Mélenchon

personally opposes the wearing of the veil as a self-described “militant feminist;” however, he is

not very friendly toward religious symbols other than to say that he does not believe that people

should be forced to dress a certain way in the public square. 216 In fact, Mélenchon has, at times,

been outright hostile to religious symbols, mocking them by saying that he does "not see how God

would be interested in a cloth on the head.” 217 Instead of emphasizing the religious identity of

France, Mélenchon often emphasizes its lack of religion, and the enlightenment values that have

replaced religious values in France. 218 In this stance he is mirroring the actions of other Marxinfluenced

leaders who emphasize national values over religious ones. He heavily discourages

public identification with Islam by adherents.

Marine Le Pen, on the other hand, discourages all forms of public identification with a

religion, including the headscarf and the burkini, and thinks that the state should take steps to make

them illegal and to enforce these bans. 219 Le Pen believes that identification with these symbols

means that Muslims are opting out of republican society. 220 She believes this correlates with a

retreat of republican values and an increase in communitarianism. Gender equality is a serious

concern of hers, as she views incidents such as the café scandal that entrapped Hamon as a

harbinger of a communitarian future. 221 She not only believes that Muslims are fighting against

the laws of the republic, saying that “Islamic fundamentalism, which is a political-religious

ideology, wants to assert its superiority over the law of the Republic,” 222 but that there is a willful

ignorance of this fact by lawmakers who allow Muslims to break laws, such as the ban on the fullface

veil, without punishment. 223 Thus, Le Pen believes that aggressive assimilation policies

are necessary rather than the softer policies of integration that are often championed by her

opponents.

François Fillon does not believe that there is a conspiracy by any French elements to

spread fundamentalist Islamic theology, but rather that it is a phenomenon that has been caused by

outside forces acting upon unwitting French Muslims. 224 As support for this view, he cites the fact

that fundamentalism in France has only recently become a problem, so it could not have emanated

from domestic elements, saying that “there once were fewer veiled women in the streets of France,

and yet there were so many Muslims. There was no burqa, there was not this kind of permanent

215

“L'Emission Politique.” 2017.

216

Ibid.

217

Ibid. “Je ne vois pas en quoi Dieu s’intéresserait à un chiffon sur la tête? Mais c’est mon affaire à moi, je ne veux

pas imposer.”

218

Laïcité: Jean-Luc Mélenchon S'oppose Violemment à Marine Le Pen, 2017.

219

Brévis, 2017.

220

Ibid.

221

“Discours De Marine Le Pen Au Meeting à Bordeaux.”

222

Brévis, 2017. “Le fondamentalisme islamique, qui est une idéologie politico-religieuse, veut affirmer sa

supériorité sur la loi de la République.”

223

Ravier, 2016.

224



84

provocation.” 225 He believes Islam itself has been hijacked by fundamentalists and transformed

from a previously tolerant Islam to the version of today that is incompatible with the values of the

republic, especially that of gender equality. 226 When Fillon speaks of the veil, he does so quite

often implying a context of coercion, as if he does not believe that there are Muslim women who

would choose to wear the veil themselves. 227 Thus, his narrative takes on the characteristics of a

white savior narrative, where Muslim women need the French people to step in and liberate them

from their oppressors. Fillon does express hope for the future of Islam in France but emphasizes

that the fundamentalist strains must be snuffed out.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

Each candidate is dissatisfied with the state of Muslim organization in France. However,

not all of the candidates are willing to work to improve the state of Muslim organization; some

feel this way because they believe it is unconstitutional for the government to interfere, and some

feel this way because they are fearful that a better organized Muslim community would be a more

politically powerful entity than the one that exists now.

Emmanuel Macron believes that the French government is obligated to act to help Muslims

structure their representative bodies in such a way that Muslims feel represented so that radicalism

is discouraged. 228 According to Macron, less than ten percent of French Muslims currently feel

represented by governing bodies such as the CFCM. 229 He blames this situation on disorganized

and counterproductive interference by the state in the attempt to organize Muslims. 230 Thus,

Macron wants to create a new national federation for Islam in France. 231 He wants to work with

Muslims to make sure that this new body is legitimate and representative of the majority of

Muslims in France, 232 Macron also believes that reforms such as training imams on French soil

through French universities and expanding the role of Muslim chaplains in the military will also

help to construct a version of Islam that is friendlier to the republic saying, “The challenge is to

improve the training of imams so that besides their strictly religious mission they know history

and the values of the Republic better.” 233 He is also in favor of assisting in the building of new

225

“Femmes Voilées, Burqa Etc. Phénomène Récent : Que S'est-Il Passé ?” 2016. “Il y avait moins de femmes

voilées dans les rues de france autrefois et pourtant il y avait autant de musulmans. Il n'y avait pas de burqa, il n'y

avait pas cette espèce de de provocation permanente.”

226

Ibid.

227

“Discours De François Fillon à Maisons-Alfort.” 2017.

228


229

Ibid.

230

Ibid.

231

Ibid.

232

Ibid.

233

“Questions Religieuses Et Laïcité.” En Marche, and Entretien d'Emmanuel Macron avec Anouar Kbibech 2017:

“L’enjeu est d’améliorer la formation des imams pour qu’à côté de leur mission proprement religieuse, ils

connaissent mieux l’histoire et les valeurs de la République


85

places of worship for Muslims. 234 He feels that together these efforts will put French Muslims in

charge of their own management and thus reduce the influence of foreign elements.

Benoît Hamon has different ideas about reforming the organization of Islam within

France. He is in favor of assisting Muslims to better the financing of Islam, but he thinks that all

management must be done by Muslims themselves, not by the French government. 235 He does

not, however, refer to laïcité as the reason for this, but instead believes that putting the money in

the hands of elected officials would subject it to the political whims of these officials, which would

be unhelpful to Muslims. Instead, Hamon is in favor of a tax on halal products, which would then

be collected and given to a governing body—he names the CFCM specifically— for

administration. 236 Hamon is also in favor of training imams domestically, but recognizes that there

are many obstacles to doing so, saying that he is in favor “of the creation of university institutes in

France. But who will be the instructors? Since there are none in France, we cannot ignore the

instructors from abroad.” 237 Thus, he believes that it is necessary to engage in dialogue with

Muslim-majority countries in order to bring teachers to France. 238 This could potentially weaken

or nullify the effect of training imams in French, but seems more practical than the solution

proposed by Macron, which does not take these difficulties into account.

Mélenchon, on the other hand, is much stricter about the possibilities of government

involvement in religious organizations. In harmony with his interpretation of laïcité, he believes

that government should have practically no involvement with the management of religion,

including funding it in any way; he says he will “refuse public funding for the construction of

religious buildings, religious activities and religious institutions.” 239 He is in opposition to popular

laws that create a loophole in laïcité by allowing the state to partially fund religious schools. He

also wants to get rid of other legal loopholes that allow the state to interfere with religion all across

France and its overseas territories. 240 He believes that the money the state gives toward religious

causes is basically stolen from the people and should instead be used toward causes that would

benefit the entire citizenry. 241 Thus, Mélenchon is opposed to the state creating any new

administrative body with and on behalf of Muslims, assisting in the training of imams, or helping

to build new places of worship, 242 even though doing these things would most likely result in a

better relationship between France and its Muslim population and decreased foreign influence on

French Muslims.

Le Pen’s views on this issue are similar to Mélenchon’s. She is in favor of prohibiting state

funding of religion, and thus does not want the state to interfere in the training of imams or in

234

“Emmanuel Macron Au Dîner Du Conseil Français Du Culte Musulman.” 2017.

235


236

Ibid.

237

Ibid. “je suis partisan comme vous de la création d’instituts universitaires en France. Mais qui seront les

formateurs ? Dès lors qu’il n’y en a pas en France, on ne peut pas faire l’impasse sur les formateurs issus de

l’étranger.”

238

Ibid.

239


240

Ibid.

241


242



86

building new places of worship for Muslims. 243 Le Pen, however, does address the place of foreign

influence on French Islam, as she would like to prohibit all foreign funding of French mosques,

salaries for imams, and anything else that would benefit Muslims as a group. 244 Le Pen would also

like to prohibit sermons being delivered in any language other than French 245 and would like to

see all mosques associated with radical ideology be closed down. 246 Le Pen’s policies would likely

be disastrous for Muslims in France, as they would have little or no means to fund their religious

activities. This would likely lead to the further buildup of hostilities between the French

government and its Muslim citizens, thus adding fuel to the argument that Muslims cannot exist

peacefully in France.

François Fillon distances himself from Marine Le Pen on this issue quite substantially. In

keeping with other mainstream candidates, such as Hamon and Macron, Fillon favors the creation

of a body that would strictly control the administration of Islam in France. 247 He believes that the

CFCM has failed in its mission because it is not seen as legitimate by French Muslims, and so a

new structure must be created in concert with responsible and reputable Muslim leaders in

France. 248 He wants this structure to be completely divorced from politics because he cites

political involvement as one of the reasons for the failure of the CFCM. Nevertheless, he expresses

a desire to have legitimate intermediaries between religious communities and the state and

proposes making it mandatory for religious groups to set up an administrative body so that the

state can easily liaise with it. 249 In addition to these reforms, Fillon believes that the financing of

Islam is in need of reform, and thus believes that “it is indispensable to put an end, when it exists,

to the foreign financing of religions,” citing a need for greater transparency. 250 These reforms are

well within the mainstream and within the realm of possibility, and would likely improve relations

between Muslims and the French government.

ANALYSIS

These five candidates do not agree on much. They have wildly different ideas about

everything from national identity to the funding of mosques, but each candidate does agree that

there are certain values that define the republic. From Hamon, who sees France failing to live up

to these values, to Le Pen, who sees these values as threatened from the outside, everyone agrees

on the existence of these common values. Chief among them is gender equality, which is

universally and wholly supported by each candidate (at least in word). However, the political

reality is that there are many French citizens, Muslim or not, who do not align themselves with the

value of gender equality. The label that is applied to these kinds of people is that of

243

“Les 144 Engagements Présidentiels.” Front National.

244

Ibid.

245

Martin Brésis et al. “Laïcité Et Religions: Ce Que Proposent Les Candidats.”

246

“Les 144 Engagements Présidentiels.” Front National.

247

“Quelles Mesures Et Critères Pour Intégrer Les Composantes De L'Islam à La République Française?” 2016.

248

Ibid.

249

Fillon, François. Mon Projet Pour La France. 2017.

250

Ibid. “Il est indispensable de mettre fin, lorsqu’ils existent, aux financements étrangers des cultes.”


87

“fundamentalist.” Thus, when candidates speak of their intolerance of fundamentalism, they mean

that they are opposed to ideologically motivated violence, but encoded in their language is a

message to those who hold these, albeit unprogressive, views that there is no place for them in the

republic: that they are not French. Although it is certainly not desirable that France would have to

relax its commitment to universal values, it is impossible for them to maintain a model of

citizenship that excludes a portion of their citizenry which in the current reality is an extremely

diverse population.

While Benoît Hamon is perhaps the closest candidate to being able to imagine and accept

a citizenry with a diversity of views, accommodate a multiculturalist view of national identity, and

hold a view of Islam that is nuanced by the history of colonialism and current inequality, even he

does not present real solutions to the problems facing Muslims in France today. Furthermore, even

though his views line up most closely with what my research suggests is a faithful interpretation

of French history and historical conceptions of identity that keeps in mind the changing world of

the present, they are not at all popular among the French public, as Hamon received a paltry 6%

of the popular vote in the first round of the presidential elections. The other candidates, who

together received the support of 94% of French voters, talk about Islam in ways that either do

damage to the relationship between Muslims and the state or simply don’t improve it. Of course,

some views have gained more traction and done more damage than others, especially those of

Marine Le Pen and the National Front. Her politics are designed to stir up ethnic tensions. Her

policies are designed to target Muslims, and she interprets history and tradition in a way that is

incredibly exclusive of Muslims. Unfortunately, this strategy has worked marvelously for Le Pen,

as the share of vote her party has received has practically doubled since she took over the reins of

the party in 2012.

The other candidates’ views typically fall somewhere within the range between those of

Le Pen and those of Hamon. Fillon’s hypocrisy in his embrace of his Catholic roots, Melenchon’s

dismissive, hardline secularism, and Macron’s embrace of the status quo (and resulting inability

or unwillingness to come up with innovative solutions to social problems) certainly do nothing to

change relations for the better. However, each candidate’s rhetoric does contain a glimmer of

hope: specifically, Fillon’s willingness to create new ways in which to engage in dialogue with

Muslims, Melenchon’s acknowledgment that radicalization stems at least partially from social

inequality, and Macron’s commitment to training imams and improving mosques. It remains to

be see whether these measures will be enough to ease tensions within France’s diverse population.

CONCLUSION

Until the 1980s, there was no fundamental conflict between being French and being

Muslim, either in rhetoric or in practice. But in today’s France, Muslims are held to an almost

unattainable standard if they are to prove their French-ness. Drawing heavily from the theories of

Arjun Appadurai in his seminal work Modernity at Large, I believe that this discourse of

incompatibly arose out of the general acceptance and political mobilization of what Appadurai


88

calls the Primordialist Theory. He defines this theory as the belief that “all group sentiments that

involve a strong sense of group identity, of we-ness, draw on those attachments that bind small,

intimate collectivities, usually those based on kinship or its extensions. Ideas of collective identity

based on shared claims to blood, soil, or language draw their affirmative force from the sentiments

that bind small groups.” 251 Primordialist Theory is the general idea that intergroup strife is

unavoidable because of the strength of kinship bonds or other fundamental differences. In

layman’s terms, the Primordialist Theory is an explanation for why there is so much ethnic conflict

between Muslims and non-Muslims in French society: because ethnic differences are always

bound to cause conflict.

Appadurai acknowledges that while primordialist theory is attractive because of its

simplicity, it is simply not true. He argues that “if all societies and nations are composed of smaller

units based on primordial ties, and if there are ethnic animosities buried in every national closet,

why do only some explode into explicit primordialist fury?” 252 This means that France is not

simply doomed to eternal ethnic strife. Of course, many politicians would blame the immigrant

population for bringing what Appadurai calls the “primordialist bug” along with them, meaning

that it is immigrants who are directly responsible when ethnic relations sour. However, the

research I have done here gives much more credence to Appadurai’s rebuttal to the primordialist

argument, which asserts that “beyond a doubt that very often the creation of primordial sentiments,

far from being an obstacle to the modernizing state, is close to the center of the project of the

modern nation-state.” 253

Modern France is a perfect example of this phenomenon in practice. In order to shore up a

threatened concept of national citizenship, France’s political leaders have introduced discourse

that has inflamed ethnic divisions among the populace. While, as Benedict Anderson points out,

the creation and demarcation of the imagined national community through rhetoric is a necessary

process, France’s attempt to assert its identity and values has backfired spectacularly, as it has

turned many Muslims into partial and marginalized citizens and made political tensions worse.

The nation-state has been the organizing principle around which the modern world

functions, and it is important to understand that citizens in a nation-state system belong not only

to a bureaucratic entity that provides services and structure to daily life, but also to a defined

cultural entity. However, scholars like Damian Tambini observe that “structural shifts such as

globalization and the increasing mobility of capital are widely thought to threaten the viability of

nations as political and social units,” meaning that while bureaucratic bonds may remain, cultural

and social ties are becoming weaker. 254 Therefore, for France to survive as a nation-state, it must

do whatever it can to promote unity among its population. The spread of extreme-right identitarian

rhetoric in mainstream French politics contributes to the decline of the republican nation-state

model rather than preserving it as its proponents pretend. If France wants to preserve domestic

251

Appadurai, Modernity at Large Cultural Dimensions of Globalization. 140.

252

Ibid, 141.

253

Ibid. 146.

254

Damian Tambini, “Post-National Citizenship,” (Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 24, no. 2, 2001), 195.


89

peace and its status as a united nation, it must make a concentrated effort to erase the ethnonationalist

rhetoric that has emerged since the 1980s, reimagine itself, and create new systems of

national belonging that are inclusive of every French citizen. Thus, France will have to somehow

relax its definition of French-ness in order to survive, even if it means admitting that those who do

not accept their value system can still be a part of the republic. This seems to be, according to the

scholars referenced in this conclusion, the way out of the primordialist bind.

There is little doubt that many readers will share my discomfort at what could become the

future of the now beleaguered nation-state. The nation-state is the only legitimate and able

protector of human rights that exists in an anarchic international system. Unfortunately, in the case

of France, politicians have erroneously placed practices like the wearing of the hijab in the same

anti-republican category as terrorists and those who would commit true crimes against women,

such as rape or murder, for purely ideological reasons. As a first step, French politicians must be

sure to draw stronger rhetorical and practical lines between terrorists and other ideologically

motivated wrongdoers who violate the human rights France seeks to protect, and Muslims who

may practice some, less nefarious, form of “undesirable” religious expression. Beyond this, the

path forward is unclear. Yet the tension between the reality of the forces of globalization acting

toward the decline of the nation-state and the nation’s ability to be able to hold fast to universal

human rights values is plain. While an embrace of multiculturalism is absolutely paramount to

saving the nation-state model, also important are the universal human rights values that make this

model worth saving.


90

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Statham, Paul, et al. “Resilient or Adaptable Islam?” Ethnicities, vol. 5, no. 4, 2005, pp.427–459.

Tambini, Damian. “Post-National Citizenship.” Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 24, no. 2, 2001, pp. 195–217.

Taylor, et al. Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press,

1994.

“Quelles Mesures Et Critères Pour Intégrer Les Composantes De L'Islam à La République Française?” Performance

by François Fillon, Youtube.com, Fillon.net, 21 Nov. 2016. “Questions Religieuses Et Laïcité.” En Marche!

Quilt-Maupoil, Tristan. “Débat: Le Pen Et Macron S'écharpent Sur Le Burkini.” Le Figaro, 20 Mar. 2017.

Viscusi, Gregory. “Marine Le Pen Calls Multiculturalism a Weapon for Islamic Extremists.” The Sydney Morning

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“Widespread Support For Banning Full Islamic Veil in Western Europe.” Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes

Project, Pew Research, 8 July 2010


93

LUCINE BEYLERIAN

Out of Sight Out of Mind:

The Detrimental Effects of

Guantanamo Bay’s Philosophy

Analysis of the recent history and inquiry into future

implications of the prison in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.


May 2019

Summary: Since its foundation, the prison at Guantanamo Bay has received scrutiny for

allegations of torture and overall mistreatment of prisoners. But, few voices question how the

detainees are released, and what happens to them after they are released from the prison. This

paper will examine the prison's past through first-hand accounts of detainees and guards, in

addition to present opinions and experiences of released prisoners.


94

INTRODUCTION

Since 2002, the prison in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba has served as a detainment facility for

the most threatening people to the national security of the United States. At least this is what the

American public is led to believe. In actuality, a number of the prisoners detained throughout the

site’s history have been innocent men, caught in the wrong place at the wrong time. These men

have been punished with years of lost freedom, humiliation, and even torture at Guantanamo Bay,

all without speedy trial. Even if the United States had the intelligence to support their suspicion

that these men were engaging in threatening acts of terror, it abandoned any claims to its ideals

and founding beliefs when these detainees continued to be held with minimal evidence and for

years with no formal charges.

Stories of forceful detainment and torture within Guantanamo Bay have received much

scrutiny in the media, but little attention has been given to prisoners after they have been released.

If the men in the prison are unseen, the men who have been released are simply unknown. Some

may think that the only obligation of the United States is to release innocent detainees because the

Guantanamo Bay prison is seen as a human rights violation in and of itself, but this paper will

argue that the real ethical problem the United States faces lies with the prisoners who have been

resettled in other nations.

BACKGROUND ON GUANTANAMO BAY

Over the years, the purpose of the Guantanamo Bay prison has been widely debated by

politicians, humanitarian organizations, and reporters alike due to its controversial legal and ethical

history. To begin, the detention system was only ever deemed ‘legal’ because the prison is not

technically part of the United States or any other nation. The naval base at Guantanamo Bay is

considered a “legal black hole” due to the wording used in the documents that allow the United

States to use the land as a base. 1 Although the naval base is located in the domain of Cuba, it is

categorized as a rental property of the United States military. However, poor relations between the

two nations have led to consensus that it cannot be considered US soil either, because the Cuban

government does not cash the check, creating a state of ambiguity. 2

Five years after Cuba won its independence, the fledgling state entered a lease agreement

in February 1903 with its powerful neighbor, the United States, for the purposes of “coaling and

naval stations” at Guantanamo Bay. 3 Thirty years later, the 1934 Treaty of Relations was signed

to update the lease agreement. The updated agreement included the following clause:

1

"Guantánamo Public Memory Project," Guantánamo Public Memory Project – GTMO's Legal Black Hole,

accessed March 23, 2018, http://gitmomemory.org/timeline/guantanamos-legal-black-hole/.

2

Rosenberg, Carol. "It's More than a Terror Prison: 12 Things You Probably Didn't Know about Guantánamo."

Miami Herald. November 07, 2018.

3

Elsea, Jennifer K., and Daniel H. Else. "Naval Station Guantanamo Bay: History and Legal Issues Regarding Its

Lease Agreements." Congressional Research Service, November 17, 2016.


95

So long as the United States of America shall not abandon the said naval station of

Guantanamo or the two Governments shall not agree to a modification of its present limits,

the station shall continue to have the territorial area that it now has, with the limits that it

has on the date of the signature of the present Treaty. 4

As the friendship between Cuba and the United States deteriorated in the 1950s, the naval

base in Guantanamo Bay became isolated and self-sufficient to prevent the Cuban government

from controlling its operations. For a brief period between 1991 and 1996, the base detained

thousands of Cubans and Haitians seeking asylum from their countries. It did not have a prominent

use until the aftermath of September 11, 2001 when President George Bush declared a war on

terror and issued a military order to detain non-citizens who were suspected of terrorist

involvement. 5

While the name of Guantanamo Bay is known throughout the world, its history is not well

known to all, thus it is important to understand the basics of what the camp was like between the

time it opened to house suspected terrorists to present day. When the first prisoners arrived in

January 2002, they were housed in a temporary structure called Camp X-Ray—notorious for being

an indisputable human rights violation. 6 The camp was constructed with a series of wire fences

and concrete, astoundingly similar to cages (see Figure A in section III) . Each cell was

approximately 8 square feet, with many “rooms” exposed to the elements. In addition to the

inhumane detainment cages, Camp X-Ray is also known to sit in a very muggy and humid area,

making it even more unbearable. The makeshift camp was in use for approximately four months

until detainees were transferred to Camp Delta, a more permanent structure built to replace the

temporary Camp X-Ray. 7 Camp Delta was created by welding metal shipping containers to create

approximately 720 cells. 8 Subsequent GTMO camps such as Camp Echo, Camp 5, Camp 6 and

Camp 7 were built using millions of dollars each to house detainees in a maximum security setting.

Each camp has its differences, but for the most part they served similar purposes. Some parts of

these camps remain transparent to the press and claim to abide by the Geneva Conventions, but

little is known about Camp 7, including how much it cost taxpayers to build or even why it remains

secretive. According to Vice Adm. Patrick Walsh, it can be compared to a standard supermax

prison in the United States, but due to the lack of documentation, this fact is difficult to confirm. 9

Over the course of its history, the prison in Guantanamo Bay has held 780 prisoners. Over

500 detainees were transferred out of the prison during the Bush administration, another 197 were

transferred out during the Obama administration, and as of April 2019, one has been transferred

by the Trump administration. Fifty nine countries have accepted former detainees to resettle within

4

Ibid.

5

Ibid.

6 "Guantánamo Bay: 14 Years of Injustice," Amnesty International UK, January 12, 2018

7

Savage, Charlie. "Camp X-Ray: A Ghost Prison." The New York Times. September 01, 2014.

8

Rosenberg, Carol. "Guantánamo Prison: A Primer." Miami Herald. October 26, 2016.

9

Ibid.


96

their borders, and five detainees have been approved for release but await their transfers. 10 Four

detainees have died in custody since 2009. Today, there are forty prisoners remaining, most of

whom are unlikely to be released or transferred under the Trump presidency. 11

I: GUANTANAMO BAY AND THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH

During his campaign for Presidency, Barack Obama vowed that he would close the prison

at Guantanamo Bay before he left office. This proved to be challenging due to its legal ambiguity

and history of human rights violations, but nevertheless Obama signed an executive order on

January 22, 2009, to close the prison within a year. 12 In 2011, Congress blocked his initiative to

transfer the remaining prisoners to the United States, by enacting the Ike Skelton National Defense

Act, which states that no funds can be used to purchase a facility within the United States to house

detainees held at the prison in Guantanamo Bay, making it very difficult to place the detainees in

such a short amount of time. This act also contains many regulations and prohibitions relating to

detainee transfers. 13 In 2016, Obama announced a plan yet again to close the prison, stating the

following as his reasoning:

"For many years, it has been clear that the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay does not

advance our national security—it undermines it. It’s counterproductive to our fight against

terrorists, who use it as propaganda in their efforts to recruit. It drains military resources,

with nearly $450 million spent last year alone to keep it running and more than $200 million

in additional costs needed to keep it open going forward. Guantanamo harms our

partnerships with allies and other countries whose cooperation we need against

terrorism." 14

Ultimately by the end of his presidency, Barack Obama failed to transfer the remaining

detainees, thus leaving the prison behind for his successor, Donald Trump.

Contrary to his predecessor Barack Obama, President Donald J. Trump is openly

supportive of the continuation of the Guantanamo Bay prison. During his campaign before the

2016 election, he claimed that he intended to keep the facility open and “load it up with some bad

dudes.” 15 In his State of the Union address in January of 2018, Trump discussed Guantanamo Bay

as necessary in the fight against al-Qaeda and ISIS. Utilizing polarizing rhetoric and diction such

10

Due to the complicated nature of the status of former detainees, other nations had the ability to accept or deny

former detainees. This type of transfer entails that the new host country is responsible for the wellbeing of any

former GTMO detainees who resettle within their borders.

11

"Guantanamo by the Numbers." Human Rights First. September 14, 2018.

12

Connie Bruck, "Why Obama Has Failed to Close Guantánamo," The New Yorker, June 19, 2017, accessed March

31, 2018, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/08/01/why-obama-has-failed-to-close-guantanamo.

13

John R. Crook. "Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law." The American

Journal of International Law 105, no. 2 (2011): 333-76.

14

Melanie Garunay, "President Obama Presents the Plan to Close Guantanamo: "This Is About Closing a Chapter in

History"" National Archives and Records Administration, February 23, 2016.

15

W.J. Hennigan, "Donald Trump's Keeping Guantanamo on the Political Radar," Time, January 31, 2018, accessed

March 31, 2018, http://time.com/5126446/donald-trump-state-union-guantanamo/.


97

as “detain,” “evil,” and “annihilate,” his speech summoned great applause from conservative

listeners. What the audience failed to realize is that when Trump calls these ‘combatants’ evil and

claims the US should detain them, treating them “like the terrorists they are,” he fails to recognize

how uncertain the implicating intelligence was, and the many times the United States has been

wrong in the past about some of the former detainees. 16 It is reasonable to say that the United States

should have the power to question suspected combatants or terrorists, but it is neither just nor

thorough to assume that the intelligence leading to their imprisonment was always correct and that

these detainees should therefore automatically be treated “like the terrorists they are.” If the United

States believes that its citizens deserve certain rights, then why abandon such ideals for all humans

outside its borders? Although the interest and safety of the citizens of the United States should

certainly be the first priority of the government, those who are not so fortunate to hold a citizenship

which ensures protection should still be able to claim a certain level of human rights. The United

States believes that its citizens deserve a fair trial of their peers if they are accused of a crime, but

that ideal is nowhere reflected in how foreigners—specifically those from the Middle East—are

treated. 17

As a defense to keep the prison functioning and restrict the release of detainees, Trump

relies on false precedent, claiming, “In the past, we have foolishly released hundreds and hundreds

of dangerous terrorists, only to meet them again on the battlefield — including the ISIS leader, al-

Baghdadi, who we captured, who we had, who we released.” 18 The first problem with this

statement is its factual inaccuracy. Trump alludes to the fact that US authorities had the leader of

ISIS detained and then foolishly released him. In truth, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was not the leader

of ISIS when the US had him in custody; he became the leader after his release. This rhetoric fails

to acknowledge the possibility that after being mistreated by American forces at Guantanamo, al-

Baghdadi felt inspired to lead an anti-American terrorist group. But, if Americans were to

acknowledge that possibility, there would be less reason to keep Guantanamo’s doors open, which

would then eliminate the feeling of security in the midst of the War on Terror. The second issue

with this statement is that he only uses this one man as evidence for barring the release of the rest

of the detainees. This singular incident is used as a reason to maintain a policy against foreigners,

which allows prejudice and stereotypes to dictate who could be suspicious and sacrifice some for

the many. This is flawed logic that reflects a utilitarian ideology, one that the founding fathers of

the United States were nearly unanimously against. Although some reports claim that former

Guantanamo detainees are suspected of reengaging in terrorist activities, thereby supporting

Trump’s argument, he still fails to understand the other variables which factor into the release

process and rates of recidivism among detainees. President Trump uses al-Baghdadi as a scare

16

Donald J. Trump, "Remarks by President Trump in State of the Union Address," The White House, accessed

March 26, 2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-state-union-address/.

17

To clarify, this concept is highly debated among International Human Rights Organizations. Some believe that

there is such thing as universal human rights, but others disagree. In this paper, I am specifically arguing that this

should be the human rights policy of the United States since its founding ideals are centered on the rights of its

citizens.

18

Ibid.


98

tactic to persuade the American public that the actions of the US in Guantanamo Bay are justified,

when in reality it is an over-reaction—a failure to abide by founding values. President Trump

concluded his State of the Union address by stating, “As long as we are proud of who we are and

what we are fighting for, there is nothing we cannot achieve. As long as we have confidence in our

values, faith in our citizens, and trust in our God, we will never fail.” 19 The question is, what values

is he citing that the United States should be confident in? If this is in reference to the founding

values of the Declaration of Independence, he is contradicting himself because those values

advocate for equality for all, which is not reflected in his rhetoric about foreigner, combatant or

non-combatant. Trump’s citation of one released man becoming a terrorist along with Attorney

General Jeff Sessions’ statement that “It remains essential that we use every lawful tool available

to prevent as many (terrorist) attacks as possible,” is proof that the current administration abandons

American values for the sake of safety. 20 It is clear that the United States is so afraid of terrorism

that it has sacrificed liberty for security since the opening of Guantanamo Bay.

II: HOW THEY GOT THERE

Despite popular belief that all Guantanamo detainees are terrorists, the stories of how some

of the detainees ended up in Guantanamo state otherwise. A large portion of those unjustly detained

in GTMO are members of the Chinese Uighur minority, who are predominantly Muslim and

persecuted in China. In the span of eleven years, twenty-two Uighurs passed through

Guantanamo’s disheveled system. Due to their contentious relationship with China, some members

were detained for an additional year after being deemed “no longer enemy combatants” because

they simply could not be sent back to their home. 21 Their original home was the Xinjiang province

in Western China until the Mao Zedong's communist government came to power in 1949 and

began to resettle the area with Han Chinese. 22 While the Han people were incentivized to move

to the region by “state sponsored jobs,” the Uighurs, who already inhabited this area, were

denied/forced out of these opportunities. 23 The 2000 census of the Xinjiang region concluded that

the Han population surged to over 40 percent, where in 1949 it was only 7 percent. 24 In addition

to the economic disadvantages placed on the Uighurs, the state government also banned civil

servants from fasting during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, thereby essentially excluding

19

Donald J. Trump, "Remarks by President Trump in State of the Union Address," The White House, , accessed

March 26, 2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-state-union-address/.

20

"Guantanamo Bay Naval Station Fast Facts," CNN, February 01, 2018, , accessed March 20, 2018,

https://www.cnn.com/2013/09/09/world/guantanamo-bay-naval-station-fast-facts/index.html.

21

Lara Setrakian, The Abc News Law, and Justice Unit, "EXCLUSIVE: Guantanamo's Innocents: Newly Released

Prisoners Struggle to Find a Home," ABC News, May 23, 2006, , accessed January 15, 2018,

http://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=1997083&page=1.

22

Adam Wolfe, "China's Uighurs Trapped at Guantanamo," Asia Times Online - News from Greater China; Hong

Kong and Taiwan, November 04, 2004, , accessed March 26, 2018,

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/FK04Ad02.html.

23

Ibid

24

"Why Is There Tension between China and the Uighurs?" BBC News, September 26, 2014, , accessed March 26,

2018, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-26414014.


99

the Uighurs from holding such positions. 25 Hostility has only increased with time, leading to

hundreds of deaths in 2009, both Uighur and Han, due to ethnic rioting stemming from hatred for

the government. 26 This region is acknowledged today for “gross violations of human rights …

including arbitrary and summary executions, torture, arbitrary detention and unfair political trials,”

which especially targeted the Uighurs. 27

This unrest led Uighurs to flee China in an attempt to escape persecution by the Chinese

government. Many of these individuals settled in Afghanistan, which lies just west of the Xinjiang

province. In the wake of 9/11, when the United States began searching for Osama Bin Laden and

other al-Qaeda members in Afghanistan, locals were encouraged to report any suspected terrorists

in exchange for large sums of money. 28 As outsiders to the region, it is understandable why locals

pointed to Uighurs as terrorists for the reward money, despite their innocence. The Uighurs seeking

asylum in Afghanistan were essentially sold to the United States as terrorists, then transported to

Guantanamo Bay prison. Most were initially kept with no trial, to then be released after being

declared innocent by the United States, some spending up to ten years in the prison. 29

The case of the Uighur Muslims is clearly unjust, but they are not the only group who

suffered such a fate. Melissa Hoffer describes a story of Mohamed Nechla, Lakhdar

Boummediene, Hadj Bouddella, Belkacern Bensayah, Saber Lahmar, and Mastafa Ait Idir of

Bosnia. They were all arrested when suspected of plotting to bomb the US Embassy in Sarajevo,

Bosnia. Per recommendation of the United States, Bosnian officials arrested the men and held

them in jail for three months before the Bosnian federal prosecutor recommended they be released.

Despite his recommendation, the US pressured the Bosnian government to release the men into

US custody. On January 18, 2002, “they were handed over to nine soldiers and then hooded,

handcuffed, and jammed into waiting vehicles,” then taken to Guantanamo. 30

Even worse is the story of Mohammed Jawad told by David Frakt. He was an illiterate boy

who was essentially tricked into confessing to crimes which he may or may not have committed,

ending in his transfer to Guantánamo. His detainment occurred because after being arrested in

connection to a grenade thrown at US authorities, he was threatened into giving a confession when

he was told that if he did not confess to this crime, he and his family would be killed. Since he

could not write, a confession was written for him in Farsi, a language he neither spoke nor read,

and he signed it with a fingerprint. He was told what he was signing was release paperwork. He

was then turned over to the US authorities, who were told that he was solely responsible for the

attack. He was hooded, handcuffed, and whisked away to one detention center after another,

25

Ibid

26

Ibid

27

Amnesty International Report 2002 (London: Amnesty International Publ., 2002), 75.

28

"Pawns in Guantanamo's Game," Boston.com, March 11, 2007, accessed November 29, 2017,

http://archive.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/editorials/articles/2007/03/11/pawns_in_guantanamos_game

29

Al Jazeera, "The Guantanamo 22," China | Al Jazeera, December 09, 2015, accessed March 26, 2018,

https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/specialseries/2015/12/uighur-guantanamo-22-151206112137598.html?xif=.

30

Mark P. Denbeaux and Jonathan Haftez, eds., Guantanamo Lawyers: Inside a Prison outside the Law (New York:

New York University Press, 2011), 85-88.


100

enduring hours of coercive interrogation techniques, until eventually ending up in Guantanamo. 31

Lt. Col. Darrel Vandeveld, the lead prosecutor in the case against Jawad later resigned and testified

in the appellate court, stating that “he believed Jawad was innocent, posed no threat to the United

States or its allies, and that he should be rehabilitated and sent home to Afghanistan.” 32 Mohammed

Jawad, like many other detainees, was wrongfully arrested, interrogated, treated and detained, as

well as treated as an adult when he should have been granted minor status. 33 Luckily for him, he

was able to get out of Guantanamo and go back home. Unfortunately, not all detainees have been

so fortunate.

Yet another case of unwarranted transfer is the story of Tawfiq, described in a letter he

wrote to his lawyer George M. Clarke. He prefaces his story by describing it as his “kidnapping

from Iran and [his] sale to the American government.” Men carrying AK-47 rifles stormed into

the Iranian house he was staying in and took him to a detention center owned by Iranian

intelligence services. They took away all of the money in his possession, in addition to his passport,

identity card, and clothing. After being transported to several different detention centers, Tawfiq

was taken to Afghanistan because the Iranian government convinced the Afghan government that

he and the other detainees similarly acquired were members of al-Qaeda. 34 After spending

approximately 50 days at a CIA black-site, he was sent to Guantanamo, despite having no

documented ties to Al Qaeda. 35

It is clear from these stories that those who ended up in the Guantanamo Bay prison were

arrested or accused of crimes using a system which completely abandons ideals of the American

justice system. In fact, it seems that there was no system in place at all, and that some of these men

were either randomly selected as suspicious or were deemed so by an unreliable source. It is

important to understand how Guantanamo detainees ended up in the prison, because some may

assume that they all deserved to be there, or that there was incontrovertible evidence against them.

Unfortunately, since they were suspected of terrorism against the United States, most don’t really

care why or how the detainees arrived at Guantanamo, because the United States was likely too

focused on portraying a win in the war on terror.

III. LIFE IN PRISON: HOW GUANTANAMO BAY DETAINEES WERE TREATED

Countless stories have been told describing the horrific conditions and unfair treatment in

the Guantanamo Bay prison. Not only were the detainees tortured for the benefit of US

intelligence, they were also deprived of standard legal rights and representation. Such atrocities

31

Ibid.

32

"Mohammed Jawad," Human Rights Watch, April 17, 2015, accessed March 24, 2018,

https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/10/26/mohammed-jawad.

33

Mohammad claims that he was likely around 16, but he was unsure due a lack of birth records.

34

Mark P. Denbeaux and Jonathan Haftez, eds., Guantanamo Lawyers: Inside a Prison outside the Law (New York:

New York University Press, 2011), 88-90.

35

Carol Rosenberg, "Where Is War on Terror? Last Guantánamo Captives Were Caught All over the World,"

Miamiherald, January 11, 2017, accessed March 26, 2018, http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nationworld/world/americas/guantanamo/article125779389.html.


101

are often cited by human rights organizations since these stories encompass the brutal mistreatment

which occurred in Guantanamo Bay. The following stories aim to describe what life was like in

GTMO:

Bisher al-Rawi, kept in Guantanamo from 2002 to 2007, still remembers the screaming he

heard from other detainees down the hall when he was held in the Guantanamo Bay prison. In a

video published by the Guantanamo Public Memory Project, he describes his experience: “When

I hear another prisoner screaming, screaming out of pain, and he is right in front of me, or right

next to me, he is screaming not because he has done anything wrong… he is screaming because

he is ill, because the guard has just sprayed him with pepper spray without doing anything. And

he is screaming for that, and nobody gives a damn… and next door you feel your heart is being

torn. 36 Al-Rawi and his family moved to England to flee from the Iran-Iraq war when he was about

sixteen. Many years later, Al-Rawi was in Gambia pursuing a business interest when he was pulled

aside in the airport due to a “small problem.” He says that “the small problem ended up years of

my life in Guantanamo.” 37,38 When he was first pulled from his life, he was sent to the “Dark

Prison,” a secret US facility in Afghanistan. He describes his experiences there as some of the

worst of his life; he was kept in complete darkness for the majority of his detainment there. He

was then transferred to Bagram prison, and then finally to Guantanamo. He was never charged but

interrogated hundreds of times until he was put on a plane four and a half years later and sent home

again with no explanation. On reflecting on his life, he says “one struggles after the release. You

do not know where you are, you do not know the real world, how to function in the real world.” 39

Like most others, Al-Rawi was held in a prison with no charges, no explanation, representation,

or even humanity, but somehow no one has been held accountable for this wrongdoing.

Moazzam Begg, detained for three years, begins his story of Guantanamo by describing

how he was spat at repeatedly and how dogs were put so close to his face “that [he] could almost

feel the saliva dropping off the dog’s mouth.” 40 He says he was held without a trial, charge, or

explanation. Like countless others, he was bombarded in his home in the middle of the night,

hooded, and carried away. Upon arriving in Guantanamo, his clothes were ripped off with a knife,

and he was forcibly shaved. He recounts a memory of an unnamed prisoner 421, who he says he

will never forget. Begg remembers seeing the man’s number because the man was tied up with his

hands behind his back. “He was slumped; his body had slumped. They had clearly put him there

to break him, started punching him and then unshackled him. Punching him to see if he was putting

it on and then they dragged him away and then they beat him some more and eventually he was

killed.” 41 Moazzam Begg had to watch as a prisoner in the same position as him was practically

beaten to death, waiting to see if his fate would be the same. Even for those who were not tortured

36

Bisher Al-Rawi, interview, Guantanamo Public Memory Project, http://gitmomemory.org/stories/bisher-al-rawi/.

37

Ibid

38

The small problem resulted in years in Guantanamo Bay

39

IAl-Rawi, interview, Guantanamo Public Memory Project

40

Moazzam Begg, interview, Guantanamo Public Memory Project, , http://gitmomemory.org/stories/moazzam-beg/.

41

Ibid.


102

to the same extent, the realities of detainment at Guantanamo Bay had such detrimental

psychological effects that most prisoners will never be the same. 42

Omar Deghayes, detained from 2002-2007, ironically was studying law and human rights

before he was taken to Guantanamo. He recounts the sadness and cruelty he felt in the prison and

says after spending time at Guantanamo, “you will not leave a similar person anymore.” 43 He said

that at times, he was so cold that he felt as if he was living inside a fridge under blinding lights,

for six years. It is no surprise that he felt “broken, physically broken, psychologically broken.” 44

He left Guantanamo with no apologies, explanations, or charges.

Brandon Neely gives a slightly different perspective on the Guantanamo Bay prison. He

was a prison guard stationed there from 2002-2004 and says that every morning, the guards were

told “…that these guys, all of them, had either helped plan 9/11 or were caught red handed on the

battlefield, weapon in hand, fighting American soldiers ... These are the people that would kill you

in a heartbeat if you turn your back on them." 45 One can imagine what kind of brutality could result

after instilling such harsh and radical preconceived notions about the detainees. They were also

told that this prison was different than other military prisons, so the Geneva Conventions did not

apply. The Guantanamo prison guards may have done some terrible things, but they were taught

that in doing so they were serving and protecting their country.

A POOR ENVIRONMENT

Camp X-Ray was a particularly dark time for Guantanamo detainees because the it was the

first detainment area created when the first batch of detainees arrived in 2002. Camp X-Ray was a

temporary detainment structure to hold the prisoners until the permanent structure was built. The

first prisoners of Guantanamo were held there in 8 square-foot cages made of concrete and wire. 46

The wire along with the water and ‘restroom’ buckets sound shockingly similar to a dog kennel.

Pictured below were the living conditions of the detainees at Camp X-Ray.

42

Matt Apuzzo, Sheri Fink, and James Risen, "How U.S. Torture Left a Legacy of Damaged Minds," The New

York Times, October 08, 2016

43

Omar Deghayes, interview, Guantanamo Public Memory Project, http://gitmomemory.org/stories/omar-deghayes/.

44

Ibid.

45

Jenifer Fenton, "Ex-Guantanamo Guard Tells of Violence against Detainees," CNN, October 28, 2011, accessed

March 25, 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2011/10/28/world/meast/guantanamo-guard/index.html.

46

"Camp X-Ray: A Ghost Prison," The New York Times, September 01, 2014, accessed March 30, 2018,

https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/09/01/us/guantanamo-camp-x-ray-ghost-prison-photographs.html.


103

Figure A: Camp X-Ray 47

Enhanced interrogation techniques were a common practice at the prison after George W.

Bush approved of them post 9/11. 48 “Enhanced interrogation” is a term used by the United States

to describe treatment that lies very close to torture. These techniques include waterboarding, sleep

deprivation, standing on broken feet, solitary confinement, stress positions, nudity, threats, etc. 49

The Red Cross wrote a report in 2003 that raised questions of psychological torture and also

claimed their investigators found a system devised to break the will of the prisoners through

“humiliating acts, solitary confinement, temperature extremes, [and the] use of forced positions.” 50

Although torture is against the Geneva Conventions, reports of torture persisted for many years

during the prison’s sixteen year history.

47

Petty Officer 1st Class Shane T. McCoy, January 11, 2002, Getty Images, Guantanamo Bay, Guantanamo's Camp

X-Ray, Then And Now, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/22/guantanamo-campxray_n_3134702.html?slideshow=true#gallery/293445/0.

48

John Haltiwanger, "Torture Used by U.S. Military at Guantanamo Bay Despite Being Banned, UN Says,"

Newsweek.com, December 13, 2017, accessed March 31, 2018, http://www.newsweek.com/torture-used-usmilitary-guantanamo-bay-despite-being-banned-un-says-747373.

49

Human Rights First: "Enhanced Interrogation" Explained, February 2016.

50

Neil A. Lewis, "Red Cross Finds Detainee Abuse in Guantánamo," The New York Times, November 30, 2004,

accessed March 31, 2018,


104

The Geneva Conventions clearly prohibit any use of torture, corporal punishment, or any

“other measures of brutality.” 51 The conventions also have specific measures to ensure that

prisoners of war are not to be mistreated, but there has been controversy in the past as to whether

detainees held at Guantanamo can be considered prisoners of war. 52 The United States technically

classified the detainees as ‘enemy combatants’ rather than POWs, since a POW can only be

someone held during an international armed conflict. 53 The detainees did not have POW status

because there was no international armed conflict at the time—they were technically detained

during the war on terror, but since said ‘war’ is not against a specific nation, and rather a terrorist

organization, it cannot be considered an armed conflict. In 2006 due to mounting pressure, the

Bush administration agreed to apply the Geneva conventions to detainees both held in Guantanamo

Bay and other US prisons abroad. 54

Detainees at Guantanamo Bay came from far and wide, and due to their ambiguous

homelands (i.e. the Uighurs, and those who came from regions experiencing war), releasing those

who were considered to no longer be enemy combatants were difficult to place. Since the United

States would not accept these men, those who were unable or disallowed to return home had to be

placed in other nations as a favor to the United States. This idea seems like a practical solution,

but in reality some former detainees are continually mistreated, but are no longer in the public eye,

and beyond the scope of the United States.

IV. COMPLICATED RELEASE

As noted in section I, the release process for Guantanamo detainees proved to be very

complex. It’s obvious that in addition to the political reasons to close the prison—i.e. costs,

resources, undermining national security—the prison also stood as a reminder of an unfortunate

past which Barack Obama wanted to conclude. With insurmountable reports of torture and other

human rights violations, one would think that it would be best to close the prison. But ironically,

those who remain in the prison are not the individuals who pose the largest human rights concern.

This may be a shocking claim considering the heinous history of the prison, but former detainees

report that their lives are worse after being released from Guantanamo. Detainees who live in the

prison today are carefully monitored by the proper authorities, as well as supported by human

rights organizations and the Red Cross. Although it may seem as if the United States was acting

in the best interest of the detainees by releasing them to other countries, in reality some detainees

are not much better off. Many former detainees, including Lotfi Bin Ali—whose story is featured

below—claims that his resettlement is far from a new home. Rather, he describes his relocation

51

"Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949."

International Committee of the Red Cross.

52

Teng Lee, "Difference Between Enemy Combatants and Prisoners of War," Guantanamo Public Memory Project

Difference between Enemy Combatants and Prisoners of War Comments, October 23, 2012.

53

Ibid.

54

"U.S. Shifts Policy on Geneva Conventions," The Washington Post, July 12, 2006.


105

city of Semey, Kazakhstan as a “second Guantanamo.” 55 Although the idea of resettling former

detainees is a valiant effort to correct the wrongs of Guantanamo Bay, its execution has been far

off from the treatment these men deserve.

When prisoners are released from Guantanamo, the United States no longer claims

responsibility for their well-being. The US entrusts each country that accepts the former detainees

to ensure they are looked after, and specifically asks that they are monitored and unable to travel. 56

The problem is, this places trust in another nation to fix the wrongdoings of the United States. If

the United States is the party at fault, it should be their responsibility to ensure that the people who

suffered in vain are taken care of. The United States was founded upon the rights to free speech,

religion, press, etc, but that is not the case for many of the countries ex-Guantanamo prisoners are

sent to. If the US believes that its citizens should retain these rights, other people, especially people

who have been wronged by the US and deemed non-threatening, should be given the same

opportunity.

Tracking down former Guantanamo Prisoners is quite challenging. Little attention is paid to

resettled prisoners because some think that the responsibility to support them no longer lies with

the United States. Additionally, when Donald Trump took office, he dissolved the Special Envoy

for Guantanamo Closure, which was in charge of tracking former detainees. 57 Now that this envoy

no longer exists, it is nearly impossible to discover facts about the whereabouts of former

detainees, which would be helpful information whether the US thinks they are innocent or not.

Some former detainees have come forward with their stories, but there are still countless unheard

voices surrounding this issue.

One case that exemplifies the difficulty to resettle detainees is that of the Uighurs.

The placement of the Uighur prisoners discussed earlier has proven to be uniquely difficult,

especially because they were rejected by their original country, China. This difficulty mainly came

from the coercive economic pressure China would put on any nation who volunteered to take in

the former detainees of Uighur descent. The only alternative to sending them to a foreign nation,

since the United States was also not an option, would be to send them back to China. But if these

men were sent back to China, they would likely be detained, or even killed. 58 Thus, the United

States waited until they could find nations willing to accept them, further delaying the release

process.

A few Uighur detainees were placed on the Pacific Island of Palau. One of the detainees,

Ahmat Abdulahad waited years in Guantanamo before a country offered him refuge. Recounting

his experience, Abdulahad says “Once we arrived here, really, we felt we were free. But still we

55

Life After Guantanamo: Exiled In Kazakhstan," YouTube, October 15, 2015, accessed May 01, 2018,

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dUBbxIoGNaw.

56

Nick Capote and Enjoli Francis, "For More Than 7 Years, Former Guantanamo Detainee Still Waiting for

'Home'," ABC News, October 19, 2016, accessed March 31, 2018, http://abcnews.go.com/International/yearsguantanamo-detainee-waiting-home/story?id=42856923.

57

Benjamin R. Farley, "Maybe Dismantling the GTMO Closure Office Wasn't Such a Good Idea," Just Security,

April 23, 2018.

58

Al Jazeera, "The Guantanamo 22," China | Al Jazeera, December 09, 2015, accessed March 26, 2018,

https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/specialseries/2015/12/uighur-guantanamo-22-151206112137598.html?xif=.


106

did not have a real taste of freedom. We were supposed to get a passport. We only have an ID. We

are not allowed to claim citizenship. Although we have some rights, we have no nationality. We

are not citizens of any country.” 59 Instead of finding a home, Ahmat arrived from Guantanamo as

a stateless man, unable to establish himself or travel, along with Davut Abdureham, another Uighur

sent to Palau, who claims he cannot put his dark past of Guantanamo Bay behind him because he

still feels like a prisoner. 60

Abubakir Qasem, a Uighur held in Guantanamo for almost five years, was transferred to

Albania with a few other men. Their group was overjoyed to have the chance to start over and live

their lives peacefully, but upon arrival they discovered that the people of Albania were not

accepting of their pasts. In his interview with the Guantanamo Public Memory Project, he says

that he would claim his innocence, but the mere fact that he spent time in Guantanamo was enough

to make people look at him differently. 61 The prison became a “big black stamp on his head.”

adding “that makes me sad when I think about how my future is gone now because of my life in

Guantanamo.” 62 His lack of citizenship in Albania makes him a stateless man as well, unable to

travel away from a population that sees him as a terrorist.

Kail Mamut’s post-Guantanamo Bay experience exacerbates the issue of detainee

placement by far, because he has now passed his statelessness to a new generation. He is also a

Uighur who spent seven years in Guantanamo and was transferred to Bermuda with three other

men. These men, although thankful for being released from the prison, are now essentially

prisoners of the island of Bermuda. None of the men are allowed to have citizenship of Bermuda

since they are merely seeking refuge there. Due to their lack of citizenship, they are not permitted

to have a passport and cannot travel at all. Despite their innocence, they are still treated as though

they have done something wrong. Mamut’s case has worsened because he has since had children,

who also suffer from this statelessness because the Bermudian government refuses to consider

them or their father for citizenship. 63 Ultimately, Mamut’s resettlement has caused

multigenerational statelessness, implicating his children for crimes they did not commit (nor did

their father) and, therefore, depriving them of a normal life.

Most former Guantanamo detainees are not heard from after their release or resettlement

to different countries, because the public loses interest, as they are out of sight, out of mind. Vice

News, in their segment titled Life After Guantanamo: Exiled in Kazakhstan, proves just how

difficult it is to contact and document the lives of these men, in addition to how miserable they

are. Lotfi Bin Ali was arrested in 2003 and accused of having connections with the Tunisian

59

Ibid.

60

Tamsyn Burgmann, "Tiny Republic Urges Canada Stand up to China, Resettle Former Guantanamo Inmate," The

Chronicle Herald, December 07, 2014, accessed March 31, 2018, http://thechronicleherald.ca/canada/1256156-tinyrepublic-urges-canada-stand-up-to-china-resettle-former-guantanamo-inmate.

61

Abubakir Qasem, interview, Guantanamo Public Memory Project, http://gitmomemory.org/stories/abibakir-

Qasem/.

62

Ibid

63

Nick Capote and Enjoli Francis, "For More Than 7 Years, Former Guantanamo Detainee Still Waiting for

'Home'," ABC News, October 19, 2016, accessed March 31, 2018, http://abcnews.go.com/International/yearsguantanamo-detainee-waiting-home/story?id=42856923.


107

Combat Group and al Qaeda, but in 2004 he was classified as a non-combatant by the Department

of Defense. According to a document by the Department of Defense, Lotfi is considered to be of

“medium intelligence value,” and is classified as “low risk” due to his chronic heart condition. 64

Despite these classifications, Lotfi was held in Guantanamo for over ten years before being

transferred to Kazakhstan. 65

After being resettled, former detainee Lotfi Bin Ali calls his new home “a second

Guantanamo.” 66 He claims that everyone sent to Kazakhstan from Guantanamo has health

problems including himself, as he suffers from chronic heart problems. One prisoner sent to

Kazakhstan died suddenly of kidney failure just weeks after being transferred there from

Guantanamo. 67 Lotfi Bin Ali receives support and care through the International Committee of the

Red Cross as well as the Kazakh Red Crescent, who provide him with a small apartment in the

city of Semey, located in eastern Kazakhstan. Although it may seem like he is being taken care of,

he complains that he has a difficult time refilling his heart medication. Additionally, he reported

to the Vice News journalists that he hadn’t seen a heart specialist in over a year, despite the fact

that he is supposedly entitled to seeing one at least once a year. Since there is no specialist in the

city of Semey, and he is not allowed to leave the city, it is likely that he will never get to see one. 68

Although Lotfi does not look fondly on his time in Guantanamo, as he was held with no

real charges and without hope of a future, he still states that given the chance, he would go back

to Guantanamo rather than stay in Semey. The mere fact that Lotfi would rather return to a prison

riddled with the history of gross human rights violations is proof that his resettlement is not only

failing him, but is damaging him as well. Lotfi faces many challenges in his new city, where he

finds he can neither communicate his grievances related to his heart, nor properly integrate into

society since there are significant language and culture barriers. Alfiya Meshina, the director of

the Red Crescent of Semey responded to Lotfi’s complaints about integration with the suggestion

that he should shave his beard so people won’t be as afraid of him. 69 After continual arguing with

Meshina, Lotfi and his representatives were told to contact the ICRC, who responded that “these

individuals are not under our care, and we suggest also not under the care of the Kazakh Red

Crescent Society in the sense of having responsibility for their status; however, we are attentive to

their situation and wish for them to be well adapted in their new countries.” 70 Essentially, the ICRC

only claims to be offering humanitarian aid to these detainees, when in actuality someone is

imposing constricting rules on them. Meshina claims that the matters of Lotfi’s settlement are

between the governments of the United States and Kazakhstan and refused to reveal the details.

Lotfi has expressed that he does not feel like a free man, especially when the individuals creating

64

Doc. No. Department of Defense-20290627 (2004). Joint Task Force Guantanamo.

65



66



67

Ibid.

68

Ibid.

69

Ibid.

70

Ibid.


108

the Vice News segment came for a visit. He was questioned by the local police several times during

their visit, including questioning about missing his Russian lesson and having people over his

apartment. Meshina’s response to Lotfi’s claim of fake freedom was that he should not complain

because he is not in shackles, and he lives better than poor people in Semey do. 71 It is clear that

the standard of freedom in Kazakhstan is very different from the freedoms the United States deems

as inalienable. Although it may be difficult to find a country whose values reflect those of the

United States to take in the former detainees, this should not be a reason to send them somewhere

that considers lack of handcuffs to be freedom.

The entire idea behind resettling former Guantanamo detainees is to ensure that they can

live out their lives in peace, away from danger and regions where terrorist organizations thrive. As

discussed above, many of the former detainees are trapped in countries where they do not feel they

belong, or they feel that they do not have sufficient access to necessary resources. Although these

conditions should not be acceptable considering the past these detainees have endured, they are

not as tragic as the story of Omar Khalifa Mohammed Abu Bakr. Khalifa is a Libyan citizen who

was held in Guantanamo for fourteen years. In 2016, he was one of two released detainees sent to

Senegal to resettle. 72 He says that he was adjusting to life well in Senegal; he became engaged to

a woman and was making plans to begin working and carrying on with his life. 73 Khalifa was told

that he would stay in Senegal permanently and would be taken care of by their government.

Senegalese officials seemed open to his asylum when they announced, “this asylum, granted in

accordance with the relevant conventions of international humanitarian law, is also part of the

tradition of Senegalese hospitality and Islamic solidarity with two African brothers who have

expressed the wish to be resettled in Senegal after their enlargement.” 74 Despite this statement and

the guarantee of the US State Department, Khalifa was informed in March of 2018 that his time in

Senegal had ended and that he would be deported back to Libya. Not only was he promised safety

in Senegal, he was promised that he would under no circumstances be transferred back to Libya,

as this agreement was part of Khalifa’s negotiation for release. This promise was made in exchange

for information about terrorist groups and members in Libya, who would likely kill Khalifa for

revealing them. Normally, the State Department Office of the Special Envoy for Guantanamo

Closure would be responsible for issues concerning former detainees, but this office was shut down

by the Trump administration since he would like to keep the prison open. 75 In the words of

Khalifa’s lawyer, irrespective of who sits in the White House today, the United States should honor

its promises. For Mr. Khalifa, “this is a matter of life or death.” 76 Khalifa said in his interview with

71

Ibid.

72

Murtaza Hussain and Glenn Greenwald, "Guaranteed Safety by the U.S., Former Guantánamo Detainee Now

Faces Deportation to War-Torn Libya and Likely Death," The Intercept, March 31, 2018, accessed September 19,

2018

73

Ibid.

74

Ibid.

75

Searcey, Dionne, and Charlie Savage. "Senegal Eyes Deporting Ex-Detainees as Critics Accuse U.S. of Neglect."

The New York Times. April 05, 2018. Accessed September 19, 2018.

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/05/us/politics/guantanamo-detainees-senegal-libya.html.

76

Ibid.


109

The Intercept, “If the U.S. government told me two years ago that I would remain in Senegal

temporarily, only to be sent to Libya after two years, regardless of the situation in Libya, I would

have refused resettlement in Senegal. I would have even chosen to remain at Guantánamo over

torture and death in a dungeon in Libya.” 77

The dismantling of the Special Envoy for Guantanamo Closure may be because the Trump

Administration does not believe the remaining detainees should be transferred, but the lack of a

governmental department dedicated to released detainees also means there is no office which

receives issues concerning detainees already resettled. Being that the most prominent concern

about released detainees is reengaging in terrorist related activities, the US should be concerned

with keeping resettled detainees in place to ensure they aren’t “reengaging.”

These stories are proof that if the United States was attempting to correct its wrongdoings

by resettling former detainees, the mission is silently failing because now that these men have been

released, the US is less inclined to care about their wellbeing, and the government is less inclined

to be held accountable for it. If something were to happen to these men, the United States could

point fingers at the nations who hold these former detainees, but once again, the US should hold

itself accountable if they are the ones who caused this international dilemma in the first place.

V. WRONGFUL INCARCERATION SETTLEMENTS AND POTENTIAL REPARATION

SYSTEMS

The United States has admitted that many of the detainees of the Guantanamo Bay prison

should have never been there and should have never been considered enemy combatants. Many of

these former detainees were said to just be in the ‘wrong place at the wrong time.’ If all that is true,

then the United States should be responsible for compensating them for their unfair treatment, loss

of time, money, and even life. In the United States, if a citizen is wrongfully incarcerated, he or

she could be eligible to receive large sums of money for compensation for such a horrible mistake.

Although such settlements are common practice within the US legal system, this treatment is not

given to those who were wrongfully detained in Guantanamo Bay and arguably suffered far more

than someone in a state facility in the United States. By exploring situations of wrongful

incarceration of US citizens, perhaps we can find a better solution than mere repatriation without

support.

Reggie Cole, a man convicted of murder in 1994, sued Los Angeles County for wrongfully

convicting him, leading to sixteen years in jail. In 2009, a judge overturned his conviction, freeing

him from prison in 2010. His attorneys believe that LAPD detectives arrested him using illegal

methods and then concealed crucial evidence in the case, since there was no physical evidence

connecting him to the conviction. Cole’s lawyer is suing LA county for 5.2 million dollars to make

77

Murtaza Hussain and Glenn Greenwald, "Guaranteed Safety by the U.S., Former Guantánamo Detainee Now

Faces Deportation to War-Torn Libya and Likely Death," The Intercept, March 31, 2018, accessed September 19,

2018


110

up for lost time and to help him move past the injustice he suffered. In January 2017, the “City

Council backed a proposed offer from a mediator in the Cole case, according to city staff.

A council committee then voted Monday in favor of authorizing the $5.2-million payment.” 78 The

only thing that separates the story of Reggie Cole and former Guantanamo Bay prisoners is their

citizenship, which unfortunately is the only thing which carries any weight in the world—but it

shouldn’t be. If the United States prides itself on its ethical standing in the world, it should not

hold such a large disparity between citizens and others, especially if those others were treated

unjustly by the United States itself.

Some former detainees of Guantanamo Bay have seen a better future. Omar Khadr, a

Canadian citizen who spent ten years in the prison sued the Canadian government for not

protecting its citizen in a time of need, where his captors (the US) abused him. Khadr was only

fifteen when he was taken into custody, making him the youngest detainee in the Guantanamo Bay

prison. He was arrested in Afghanistan for being involved in a grenade throwing at a U.S. soldier. 79

In a CNN article published on July 5 th 2017, it was said that he was expecting 10.5 million dollars

in compensation from the Canadian government (around 8 million US dollars). 80 Khadr’s lawyers

argued for this deal because he claims he was subject to sleep deprivation and general mistreatment

while being detained, in addition to the fact that the “Canadian government violated Khadr’s rights

by sharing intelligence information about him with the U.S.” 81 Unfortunately, for those detainees

who have no home country or real citizenship, such a future is nearly impossible unless the United

States admits their wrongdoings to these innocent men.

VI. RECIDIVISM AND OTHER COUNTERARGUMENTS

There are a few arguments, including those of President Trump’s administration, which

support the continuing operation of the prison in Guantanamo Bay. President Trump’s primary

argument from his 2018 State of the Union Address is that releasing the detainees from

Guantanamo could give them the opportunity to ‘return to the battlefield.’ Some sources agree

with this position on releasing the detainees because of rates of recidivism and how they could

lead to another terrorist attack. Those who do not support the release of these men believe that

their imprisonment is for the greater good due to the risk they pose to the country at large. The

primary issue with this stance is that keeping these men imprisoned is arguably not for the greater

good, since the continued existence of the prison is used as a recruitment tool for terrorism

78

Emily Alpert Reyes and Dakota Smith, "L.A. to Pay $5.2 Million in Wrongful Imprisonment Case," Los Angeles

Times, January 23, 2017, accessed March 23, 2018, http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-wrongfulsettlement-payouts-20170118-story.html.

79

Epatko, Larisa. "Canada to Give Apology, Millions to Compensate Former Gitmo Detainee." PBS. July 05, 2017.

Accessed September 19, 2018. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/canada-to-give-apology-millions-tocompensate-former-gitmo-detainee.

80

Steve Almasy, "Reports: Former Gitmo Detainee to Get $10 Million from Canada," CNN, July 05, 2017, accessed

March 25, 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2017/07/04/americas/canada-omar-khadr-reported-settlement/index.html.

81




111

organizations such as ISIS. 82 There is also speculation that the use of orange jumpsuits in many of

the violent videos ISIS has posted on the internet is a commentary on the orange jumpsuits worn

by detainees in Guantanamo. 83 Thus, the treatment of the detainees in Guantanamo is cited as a

reason to hate America and join an organization to fight the terrible actions of the United States,

meaning it would be in the best interest of the United States to close the prison. Although it is fair

to say that it may be a risk to release prisoners from Guantanamo, it may be just as dangerous to

keep it open, as the mere existence of the prison implicates the United States as an unethical nation.

Below is a chart created by the United States Department of Defense which cites rates of

recidivism among former Guantanamo detainees. The document containing the chart describes the

term “confirmed reengaging” as “a preponderance of information which identifies a specific

former GTMO detainee as directly involved in terrorist or insurgent activities.” 84 The document

defines “terrorist activities” as actions including “planning terrorist operations, conducting a

terrorist or insurgent attack against Coalition or host-nation forces or civilians, conducting a

suicide bombing, financing terrorist operations, recruiting others for terrorist operations, and

arranging for movement of individuals involved in terrorist operations.” 85 The percentages of

confirmed reengaging detainees may be easy to cite as a reason to restrict transfer, but the lack of

transparency as to how the government has this information questions the credibility of it. The

United States claims that they do not track each former detainee individually as they leave them

in the hands of their new country, but it seems that they do considering the chart below.

Additionally, if the US does track them, why hasn’t anyone done more to protect those who are

suffering in their new countries? Also, if this information is true, why hasn’t anything been done

to restrict those who they have confirmed to be executing one of the previously listed acts of

terrorism? If the United States has such in-depth information, one would think they would be

taking measures to prevent such actions from occurring.

82

Garunay, Melanie. "President Obama Presents the Plan to Close Guantanamo: ‘This Is About Closing a Chapter in

History.’" National Archives and Records Administration.

83

Human Rights First, Al Qaeda and ISIS Use of Guantanamo Bay Prison in Propaganda and Materials. September

2017.

84

"Summary of the Reengagement of Detainees Formerly Held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba," Office of the Director

of National Intelligence, October 2017

85

Ibid.


112

Figure 2 86

Relevancy of the previous numbers aside, it must be considered whether the United States

can be blamed for this reengagement. Since the United States never prosecuted or convicted the

released detainees of any crimes, they, therefore, cannot assume that the actions they observe are

examples of reengaging in terrorist activities. Conversely, it very well may be that after witnessing

and experiencing the atrocities of Guantanamo Bay, released detainees resorted to exercising

violence against their captors. Furthermore, resorting to this lifestyle could be the consequence of

not protecting these released men after they left Guantanamo. If there were more regulations

pertaining to the release and care of former Guantanamo detainees, it is possible that these

supposed rates of recidivism could be lower.

Ultimately, most of the above is based on speculations, but unfortunately that is the only

way to attempt to understand the process of release and surveillance on former detainees. Due to

the lack of transparency about the entire system relating to Guantanamo Bay, there is no way of

knowing just how bad it is. If the government won’t tell the public, they will just have to listen to

the men who have endured this terrible journey.

CONCLUSION

Ultimately, the United States has created a legal and ethical mess of the prisoners held at

Guantanamo Bay. It is understandable in the wake of 9/11 that the fear of terrorism was the driving

force of government decisions, but such a defense cannot be used as an excuse to ignore poor

decisions made in the past to avoid apologizing for them. One would hope that the past can be left

86

"Summary of the Reengagement of Detainees Formerly Held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba," Office of the Director of

National Intelligence, October 2017, accessed April 19, 2018


113

behind so that the future can be void of such ethical violations, but realistically there are likely

worse events to come, because after all, the rejection of past failures often leads to the repetition

of such events. The mere existence of a prison of this nature sends a message to the international

community that the United States, who claims to be a morally superior nation capable of

intervening in global conflicts, finds torture, unjust detainment, and careless repatriation to be

acceptable.

Since the United States has wrongfully imprisoned so many former detainees of

Guantanamo Bay, it should hold itself accountable for the lives of those who have been released.

Those who live as stateless men should be protected by the United States if it is to ever overcome

the gross ethical misconduct against the former detainees. If the United States believes itself to be

ethically superior to other nations, it must first acknowledge its wrongdoings in addition to creating

legislation to prevent this history from repeating itself. If the United States so willingly gives up

liberty for security, even if it is for those who do not hold its citizenship, does it really deserve

either of them?


114

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117

BRIANNA JOHNSON

Cristiana, Socialista, y Aborto:

Analyzing the Effects of the Nicaraguan Catholic Church

and Social Class on Abortion Policy


University of Southern California, Department of Political Science

in partial fulfillment for the POSC 323 Honors Thesis

Advised by Dr. Jefferey Sellers

April 2018


118

INTRODUCTION

In 2003, an eight-year-old Nicaraguan girl named Rosa was raped in Costa Rica, contracted

two sexually transmitted diseases, became pregnant, and sought a legal abortion. At the time, laws

in both Costa Rica and Nicaragua allowed for “therapeutic” abortion, meaning that abortion could

be allowed in order to preserve the mother’s health. However, the procedure could only be

approved if it was authorized by a committee of at least three physicians and had the permission

of the woman’s (or young girl’s) spouse or closest relative. Rosa’s parents petitioned the

Nicaraguan government for this procedure but found it difficult to find physicians willing to grant

authorization because the Nicaraguan Ministers of Health and Family publicly opposed Rosa’s

parents’ request, calling all abortion “a crime” even though that was not legally the case. In

addition, the Nicaraguan Minister of the Family sought ways to suspend parental rights over Rosa

in order to “ensure that Rosa was properly cared for.” 1 After further struggles to ensure a fair, nonpartisan

commission, the committee concluded that Rosa’s health would be at equal risk whether

she continued or terminated the pregnancy. Eventually, Rosa was able to receive the abortion due

to advocacy efforts by Nicaraguan feminist groups. A subsequent criminal investigation into the

legality of her abortion cleared all those advocating on Rosa’s behalf of wrongdoing based on the

committee’s declaration that the pregnancy endangered her health and life. 2 This case intensified

the already fierce public and political Nicaraguan debate around abortion issues. 3 At the time, one

poll showed that 64 percent of Nicaraguans did not think that Rosa should have been forced to

carry the pregnancy to term. 4 Ignoring this public support, the Nicaraguan Cardinal Obando y

Bravo announced the Sunday after Rosa received her abortion that everyone responsible, except

for her rapist, was excommunicated from the Church. 5

I begin with the case of Rosa in order to show that the importance of abortion in the highly

Catholic country of Nicaragua is hard to overstate. It also incorporates each of the relevant actors

in the history of Nicaraguan abortion policy, such as the Catholic Church and the feminist

movement and how they are entangled in a constant struggle to affect how policy is actually

implemented on the ground. The Church has almost always won that battle, harming the country’s

most vulnerable women and young girls.

1

N. Miles, “Abortion Ruling Splits Nicaragua,” BBC News (March 4, 2003). Available at

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/2817051.stm.

“Lucia Salvo irresponsable,” El Nuevo Diario (February 23, 2003);“Raped Nicaraguan girl aborts baby,” BBC News

(February 21, 2003). Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/2789279.stm.

Ministerio de Salud, Hospital Vélez País, Informe Cientifico Técnico (Caso “Rosa), (February 18, 2003).

2

Ministerio Público de Nicaragua, Departamento de managua, Resolución sobre el caso de la menor “Rosa,”

(March 3, 2003).

3

Goldberg, Michelle. The Means of Reproduction: Sex, Power, and the Future of the World. Michelle Goldberg.

New York: Penguin Press, 2009.

4

Kampwirth, Karen. "Abortion, Antifeminism, and the Return of Daniel Ortega." Latin American Perspectives 35,

no. 6 (2008): 122-36.

5

Velásquez Sevilla, Mirna, and Ary Neil Pantoja. 2003. “Abortistas Excomulgados.” La Prensa, 24 February.

Retrieved from http://www.laprensa.com.ni/.


119

The competing dynamics between these factions came to a head in 2006, when a bill that

banned abortion in all cases, including if the mother’s life was threatened, unanimously passed the

National Legislature. Daniel Ortega endorsed the bill, thereby gaining the support of the Catholic

Church necessary to win the presidential election and resume the position he had lost sixteen years

prior. This position was a complete reversal for Ortega, whose party, the left-wing socialist

Sandinistas, had previously advocated for increased abortion rights.

Why Daniel Ortega switched his position, making abortion laws more conservative and

changing norms that had existed for over a century, was confusing to outsiders to Nicaraguan

politics. But to insiders, the change and resulting bill were the culmination of decades of economic

inequality pervasive throughout society, combined with the mitigated influence of the feminist

movements as the Catholic Church strategically positioned itself to maintain its authority. In

essence, extreme inequality mapped itself onto the Church, and the Church’s strategy to preserve

elite influence caused it to pursue an abortion policy that left lower and middle class women

burdened with the bill’s effects.

BRIEF HISTORY OF NICARAGUA

Nicaragua in the 1960s was under the rule of Luis Somoza and then his brother Anastasio,

a continuation of the Somoza family dictatorship that had been in place since 1936. While the

country’s private sector and wealthy elites did not hold significant political power, they accepted

this arrangement because of the benefits they received from a growing economy. Nicaragua’s

economic model was primarily centered on exporting coffee, bananas, cotton, and other

agricultural commodities that were vulnerable to international market fluctuations. The three

largest capitalist groups (BANIC, BANAMERICA, and the Somozas) gained huge profits from

this model during the high growth of the 1950s and early 1960s, while the lower and middle classes

saw few returns. This unequal distribution of wealth and consequent poverty continue to be the

norm throughout Nicaragua.

Though the poor scarcely benefitted from this economic model, the economy’s growth

dampened discontent temporarily. 6 But in 1972, an earthquake levelled the capital city of

Managua, severely injuring the country’s industrial production and private sector activities. This,

combined with a series of droughts that devastated agricultural production, resulted in a decimated

economy. Due to Nicaragua’s export-led economy, the lower and middle classes that provided the

labor for industrial and agricultural production suffered most under this crisis. 7 In response to the

earthquake, huge amounts of international aid poured in. Somoza took over the administration of

international aid and loans from the Catholic Church, contracting his own companies to lead the

reconstruction so that most of the aid was directed into his own pockets. Since the hurt economy

6

Belli, Humberto. Breaking Faith: The Sandinista Revolution and Its Impact on Freedom and Christian Faith in

Nicaragua / Humberto Belli. Westchester, Ill.: Published by Crossway Books for the Puebla Institute, 1985.

Belli shows that growing public-sector employment provided the Somozas with support during this period.

7

Sawchuk, Dana. “The Catholic Church in the Nicaraguan Revolution: A Gramascian Analysis.” Sociology of

Religion, vol. 58, no. 1, 1997, pp. 39-51.


120

could no longer provide a political cushion to Somoza, his blatant corruption sparked extreme

discontent among both the masses and elite in Nicaraguan society.

After 1972, the country began to splinter in its opposition to the Somozas: the majority of

the population, particularly the poor, supported the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN,

also known as the Sandinistas), a socialist revolutionary group with ideological bases in liberation

theology and Marxism. Most Church officials and the economic elite supported a more moderate

opposition option based in capitalism. But as time went on, reaching consensus on an economic

and political agenda that would appease both parties became impossible. Eventually, massively

popular support of the Sandinistas pushed the Catholic Church and the elite to publicly endorse

the Sandinistas, albeit temporarily.

The Sandinistas declared victory on July 19, 1979, and a new government was formed

under a provisional junta headed by Daniel Ortega and including Violeta Chamorro, the widow of

a prominent businessman whose murder by the Somozas had hastened the FSLN revolution. The

new government set to solving many of the inequalities common under the old regime. They seized

land from many of the country’s wealthiest citizens, began an education crusade that increased the

literacy rate from 50 to 87 percent and expanded healthcare access. In 1984, the Sandinistas ran a

fair election and were reelected with 67% of the vote. 8

This peace did not last long. Almost immediately after the Sandinistas declared victory,

the United States began funding the Contras, a military group in opposition to the Sandinistas, who

began a civil war in order to resist the Marxist Sandinistas. And while the Church had supported

– or at least feigned support for – the FSLN, by the time of the Sandinistas’ victory, the Catholic

Church openly opposed the Sandinistas. This public change came in May 1980, after Violeta

Chamorro and Alfonso Robelo, the sole wealthy business people in the revolutionary junta,

resigned in protest, claiming that the FSLN was reneging on promises to establish democracy in

Nicaragua. The Church also began funding the Contra. Though there was eventually a ceasefire

between the Nicaraguan and American governments, the economic devastation caused by the war

and the United States’ economic embargo on Nicaragua decimated the economy by the end of the

1980s. Unfortunately, the benefits of many of the Sandinista projects done on behalf of the poor

were mitigated by the economic devastation.

In the 1990 elections, the FSLN party lost to the National Opposition Union, commonly

referred to as UNO and led by former Sandinista junta member Violeta Chamorro. Though UNO

was comprised of a coalition of both liberal and conservative opposition parties, Chamorro largely

represented the center-right interests of the upper-class business elites. Her government began

dismantling many of the initiatives made by the Sandinista government, including privatizing

state-owned businesses and breaking up many of the pro-women organizations.

8

Osborne, Teresa Squires, "Politics and Education: The Nicaraguan Literacy Crusade" (1990). Dissertations and

Theses. Paper 2038.

Latin American Studies Association. The Electoral Process in Nicaragua : Domestic and International Influences :

The Report of the Latin American Studies Association Delegation to Observe the Nicaraguan General Election of

November 4, 1984. Austin, Tex.]: Association, 1984.


121

The FSLN regained power in the 2006 presidential election, with Daniel Ortega once again

on top of the ticket. But this time, the Sandinista party was no longer the red and black

revolutionary party of the 1980s: prominent Sandinista leaders had left the party or had even been

expelled for dissenting from Ortega. Neon pink, green, and yellow propaganda posters now

represented the party’s softer, more moderate agenda. The new Sandinista slogan “Cristiana,

Socialista y Solidaria” marked yet another symbol of the party’s change—Ortega had once been

an atheist, but converted to Catholicism shortly before the election, and won partly due to his

endorsement by the Catholic Church. This evolution is important to keep in mind as I map on it

the histories of the feminist movement, the Catholic Church, and abortion policy in Nicaragua.

Figure 1 is the 1980s revolutionary flag. 9

Figure 2 shows the flag in the streets post-revolution. 10

9

Traveler, Scott. “FSLN Red and Black Revolutionary Flag.” Around the World and Back, 2 Jan. 2002,

www.scotttraveler.com/2002/01/09/sandinista-country/.

10

Major, Mark. “The Sandinista Revolution and the ‘Fifth Freedom.’” MR Online, 13 July 2017,

mronline.org/2005/08/15/the-sandinista-revolution-and-the-fifth-freedom/#lightbox/0/.


122

Figure 3 is an FSLN propaganda poster. 11

Figure 4 shows the brighter FSLN posters in 2010. 12

11

Kenning, Thomas. “Augusto Sandino, National Hero.” Open Ended Social Studies, 24 June 2016,

openendedsocialstudies.org/2016/06/24/augusto-sandino-national-hero/.

12

Jarquín, Leyla. “Sandinista Propaganda Poster.” El Nuevo Diario, 20 Dec. 2009,

www.elnuevodiario.com.ni/nacionales/64491-ortega-quiere-su-alba-dios/.


123

THE FEMINIST MOVEMENT IN NICARAGUA

The issue of abortion has been central to the leftist feminist agenda that has been working

as an organized political movement since the end of the Somoza family dynasty in 1979. 13 In fact,

Karen Kampwirth, a scholar who studies revolutionary movements in the Global South, has

defined the battle over Rosa’s abortion as a “public battle between feminist and antifeminist

forces,” rather than as a strictly religious or political fight. 14 Marike Blofield, an expert on Latin

American politics, writes that abortion is inherently a topic central to any women’s movement, as

a woman’s unique role in reproduction makes their options more restricted than men’s: “hence

control over whether and when to bear children crystallizes for many the essence of feminist

demands.” 15 Therefore, understanding the fight over abortion rights throughout Nicaraguan history

can clarify the decades-long struggle between feminists, the Sandinista party, and antifeminists.

The start of Nicaraguan feminism is typically credited to the end of the Somoza

dictatorship, when women were empowered by the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional

(FSLN) in its efforts to overthrow the Somoza dictatorship. Patricia Flynn and Linda Reif, who

each write about women’s issues in Latin America, claim that women were heavily involved in

the Sandinista effort, comprising over 30 percent of the Sandinista combatants, including many

top guerrilla leaders. 16 While there is controversy regarding that statistic, it is widely

acknowledged that women played a significant role in the burgeoning socialist revolution and

subsequent government.

This involvement engaged women politically, mobilizing them in order to implement the

Sandinista literacy program, immunize children, harvest coffee, and protect their neighborhoods.

The first major Sandinista-affiliated national women’s organization was Asociación de Mujeres

Nicaragüenses Luisa Amanda Espinoza (AMNLAE). It was founded in 1977, joined the Sandinista

revolutionary coalition, and remained an FSLN support group when the FSLN became the ruling

party. AMNLAE did a broad array of work on behalf of women, mostly through Casas de la Mujer

(Women’s Houses). These Houses provided services in the areas of legal counseling, health,

psychological counseling, and job training. But AMNLAE had a particular focus on sexuality and

contraception. They implemented sex education in schools, hosted sex education television and

13

Kampwirth, Karen. "Resisting the Feminist Threat: Antifeminist Politics in Post-Sandinista Nicaragua." NWSA

Journal 18, no. 2 (2006): 73-100.

Victoria González-Rivera has written extensively on Nicaraguan feminism, showing that it dates back to the 1800s.

However, the dominant narrative, as told by both feminists and anti-feminists, is that feminists first began

organizing in the 1980s.

González-Rivera, Victoria. 2002. “Memorias de la Dictadura: Narrativas de Mujeres Somocistas y Neo-Somocistas

(1936-2000).” In Mujeres, Género e Historia en América Central, 1700-2000, ed.

14

Kampwirth, Karen. "Abortion, Antifeminism, and the Return of Daniel Ortega." Quote from p. 123.

15

Blofield, Merike. "Women's Choices in Comparative Perspective: Abortion Policies in Late-developing Catholic

Countries." Comparative Politics 40, no. 4 (2008): 399-501. Quote on p. 400.

16 Reif, Linda L. 1986. “Women in Latin American Guerrilla Movements: A Comparative Perspective.” Comparative

Politics 18(2): 147-69.

Flynn, Patricia. 1983. “Women Challenge the Myth.” In Revolution in Central America, ed Stanford Central

American Network. Boulder: Westview Press. Statistic on pg. 416.


124

radio programs on government media, and had regular access to the media to share their specific

perspective.

The Sandinista mobilization of women challenged gendered power structures, just as the

broader revolutionary movement did to power structures as a whole. 17 Indeed, legal equality of

men and women was established in the new FSLN constitution. But to say that the revolution was

inherently supportive of women’s issues would be an overstatement, if not completely false.

Without pressure from AMNLAE and other associated women’s movements, the FSLN likely

would not have focused on women’s sexual and reproductive rights. This is visible in the case of

the Secretarías de la Mujer (Women’s Secretariats), which were created in all the major labor

unions in the early 1980s, including the agricultural workers union, Asociación de Trabajadores

del Campo (ATC). Perhaps because of the Secretariat’s powerful role within one of the most

important unions in the country, the women of the ATC successfully pressured the FSLN to open

hundreds of day care centers and address issues like sexual harassment and access to contraception.

However, there remained a constant tension between the goals of the broader revolution

and the feminist movement. Sandinista leaders were reluctant to directly challenge established

Nicaraguan gender norms and gender inequality. Kampwirth writes that “the women of AMNLAE

accepted an ever more subservient relationship with the FSLN, on the grounds that the war could

never be won without softening demands for gender equality, at least temporarily.” 18 This revealed

itself when AMNLAE and other women’s groups advocated for a woman’s right to reproductive

freedom to be added to the constitution, but it was rejected. 19 Today, most scholars agree with

Anna Fernández Poncela when she writes:

In the 1980s, the Sandinista government promoted only nominal and formal equality between men

and women. Through the transformation of the economic structures of production, the political

system, and social organization, gender relations that linked women’s reproductive functions to

domestic subordination, and the symbolism that legitimated that connection, remained effectively

intact. [...] There was only a minimal transition in the social role of the Nicaraguan women… 20

Because of this constant in-fighting, the once-unified women’s movement divided in the late

1980s, with AMNLAE staying with the Sandinistas and more and more groups declaring

themselves as autonomous, separate from any specific party or union. One of these groups was the

Colectivo de Mujeres de Matagalpa (Matagalpa Women’s Collective). It focused primarily on

reproductive issues, broadcasting over the radio and performing feminist theater on the topic of

abortion, soon adding classes in literacy, midwifery, and the law.

17

Kampwirth, Karen. "Resisting the Feminist Threat: Antifeminist Politics in Post-Sandinista Nicaragua."

18

ibid. Quote from Pg. 77.

19

De Santis, M. (1990, Sep 30). Nicaragua rolls back reproductive rights. Off our Backs, 20, 3. Retrieved from

http://libproxy.usc.edu/login?url=https://search-proquestcom.libproxy1.usc.edu/docview/197157955?accountid=14749

20

Fernández Poncela, Anna M. “Nicaraguan Women: Legal, Political, and Social Spaces.” In: Elizabeth Dore (ed.)

Gender Politics in Latin America. Debates in Theory and Practice. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1997.


125

In 1987, another group of feminists formed Partido de la Izquierda Erótica (Party of the

Erotic Left, or PIE), a lobbying group that promoted gender equality as a constitutional value. In

1987, they succeeded in adding ten articles specific to women’s rights issues into the constitution.

The PIE did not last into the 1990s, but all twenty-plus members of PIE became founding members

of the autonomous feminist organizations that emerged in the 90s.

However, FSLN’s loss to Violeta Chamorro and the UNO coalition resulted in major

reversals in the Nicaraguan feminist movement and abortion policy. From the outset, Chamorro

ran on traditional, anti-feminist values, once saying to a reporter, “I am not a feminist nor do I wish

to be one. I am a woman who is dedicated to my home, as Pedro taught me.” When she took office

in April 1990, she immediately began overturning many of the Sandinista-era gender reforms. Day

care centers were shut down, and state funds for marriage counseling, work against domestic

violence, and services for victims of physical and sexual assault were eliminated.

But while feminists saw many of their gains overturned, they also viewed the FSLN’s loss

as a signal that they should separate themselves from a party that not only constrained them, but

now held no power. Autonomous feminism emerged in full force, becoming more radical than

before. But in response to the changes feminist political movements had been making, antifeminism

gained steam, focusing on objecting to increases in sexual and reproductive rights. These

anti-feminists focused on things like reasserting Christian values in education and advocating for

“traditional family values.” In this, the anti-feminists had a strong ally in the traditional Catholic

Church—not only in action by the Church, but also in theology. Though the Nicaraguan Catholic

Church had a robust liberation theology branch that was more concerned with social and economic

justice than individual sexual behavior, the conservative branch that adhered to Vatican teachings

regarding sexuality and reproduction dominated the Church. 21 As Kampwirth and others write, all

of the anti-feminists grounded their opposition in their conservative theological beliefs and in the

Catholic Church’s positions. 22 But support of anti-feminism went beyond indirect ideological

support. In fact, many of the anti-feminists were specifically mobilized by the Catholic Church,

such as Asociación Nicaragüense por la Vida (Nicaraguan Association for Life, or

ANPROVIDA), which received financial support from the Church. 23

The feminists isolated themselves from the FSLN, resulting in them no longer having the

ear of the government. But they had also worked to separate themselves from Ortega himself, who

was accused of having sexually abused his eleven-year-old step daughter. Because of this, factions

of the feminist movement (Movimiento Autónomo de Mujeres) joined with the FSLN’s rival,

Movimiento de Renovación Sandinista or MRS, to run against the FSLN. Hence, the FSLN and

Daniel Ortega in particular were no longer politically allied with the feminists going into the 2006

21

ibid. Quote on p.85.

22

Lancaster, Roger N. Thanks to God and the Revolution: Popular Religion and Class Consciousness in the New

Nicaragua / Roger N. Lancaster. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988.

Vuola, Elina. 2001. “God and the Government: Women, Religion, and Reproduction in Nicaragua.” Paper presented

at the 2001 meeting of the Latin American Studies Association (LASA), Washington D.C., September 6-8.

Retrieved from http://lasa.international.pitt.edu/Lasa2001/VuolaElina.pdf.

23



126

election and abortion ban vote—in fact, there were possibly even feelings of resentment. Without

the feminists, the FSLN was no longer pushed to the left on reproductive issues, and instead was

willing to compromise on those issues in order to win the presidency.

The ebbs and flow in the strength of the feminist movement in Nicaragua were closely tied

to the application of the country’s abortion policy. When the feminists were closely tied to the

ruling government, such as in the case of the FSLN, reproductive health measures and access to

abortion expanded. However, the defeat of the FSLN by the Chamorro regime in 1990 resulted in

a splitting of the feminist movement and disengagement of the feminist movement within the

FSLN, which opened the party to other alliances (such as the Catholic Church) that ultimately

restricted reproductive health and abortion access. The history of the feminist movement regarding

reproductive health and abortion shows this dynamic that, as scholar Merike Blofield writes, “the

strength of feminists is vital for the promotion of abortion reform in Catholic countries” 24

HISTORY OF ABORTION POLICY

In the late 1800s, a reform made during the Liberal revolution of José Santos Zelaya

allowed for an exception to the otherwise complete illegality of abortion in Nicaragua: it would be

legal in order to save the life of the mother or in cases of rape. However, this did not change

extremely punitive cultural conceptions of abortion. Up until the Sandinista revolution, societal

attitudes were to the point that women arriving at a hospital suffering from botched abortions were

allowed to die without treatment because doctors and staff refused to treat the women. 25 This was

partially for religious reasons: in 1869, Pope Pius IX prohibited all forms of abortion for Catholics,

and Pope John Paul II made opposition to abortion a priority for the church during his tenure from

1978 to 2005.

While the Sandinista government did not change Nicaraguan abortion laws, feminists

within the movement shifted many of these cultural norms and pushed for increased access to

women’s health care. For instance, the Sandinista government began a women’s hospital that

instituted new research freeing women from patriarchal medical abuses. One such study found

illegal abortions to be the primary cause of maternal death in Nicaragua. This study resulted in

victims of botched abortions being treated equally to other patients. In addition, hospitals were

able to broaden the conditions under which women could receive legal abortions. 26

During the 1980s, the FSLN continued the criminalization of abortion in order to avoid

conflict with the Catholic Church. 27 In fact, in her conference paper, the religious scholar Elina

Vuola connected the emergence of the autonomous feminist groups in the 1990s specifically to

their disapproval of the fact that the FSLN made no changes to the abortion law. 28 However, there

24

Ibid. Quote on p. 409.

25

De Santis, M. (1990, Sep 30). Nicaragua rolls back reproductive rights.

26

De Santis, M. (1990, Sep 30). Nicaragua rolls back reproductive rights.

27

Most of the literature maintained that abortion was criminalized throughout the 1980s, although Karen Kampwirth

claims the FSLN decriminalized it in Feminism and the Revolution: Nicaragua, El Salvador, Chiapas.

28

Vuola, Elina. 2001. “God and the Government: Women, Religion, and Reproduction in Nicaragua.”


127

was no official policy on legal abortion procedures. Only when the FSLN lost the 1990 election

did Nicaragua’s Ministry of Health (MINSA) set an official policy on legal abortion procedures as

the Sandinistas left office. 29 This guidance maintained that abortion is illegal with the exception

of “therapeutic” abortion, which, as in the case of Rosa, must be determined by at least three

physicians with the consent of the woman’s spouse or closest relative. 30 However, the law was

extremely vague, defining neither “therapeutic abortion” nor providing guidelines for how

physicians control a woman’s access to it. This term has been used before; at least seven other

countries use the term “therapeutic abortion” in their legislation: France, Germany, Spain, Canada,

USA (California), Honduras, Guatemala. Those countries interpret therapeutic abortion in various

ways, but the term has been defined to include any or all of the following indications: to save the

woman’s life, to protect the woman’s health (physical or mental), in cases of fetal malformation,

in cases of rape or incest. 31 Nicaragua’s law is the only that does not define the implementation

and scope of the policy. The case of Rosa made it clear that a vague law exposes women and girls

seeking an abortion to partisan, ideologically-driven information, assessment, and care. Political

pressures caused Rosa’s committee of doctors to delay endorsing, risking her well-being as they

waited.

Returning to the 1990s, the incoming government, ruled by Violeta Chamorro, took apart

many of the feminists’ achievements, focusing specifically on reproductive health and abortion.

One of the most stark images of this change was a new textbook used in all public schools called

“Morals and Civics” that emphasized the sinfulness of abortion. 32 But since the FSLN’s abortion

policy was considered impractical and poorly written, it was never dismantled. However, it is clear

from the disparity of legal abortion requests from 1989-2003 that the Chamorro administration

interpreted the guidance much more restrictively than its predecessor. Nicaragua’s Health Ministry

estimated that in 2005, ten percent of all pregnancies ended in an abortion or miscarriage—

approximately 7,500 abortions—yet only six therapeutic abortions were approved that year. 33 Part

of the way Chamorro’s government restricted access to abortion was through instating a new

conservative director of the Bertha Calderón hospital, the largest maternity care facility in the

country, who shut down the standing committee previously implemented by the FSLN to

determine whether crisis pregnancies were eligible for a legal abortion. 34

29

This simply put the earlier Zelaya administration reform into writing.

Ministerio de Salud de Nicaragua. Norma de atención al aborto. Dirección de Atención Integral a la Salud de la

Mujer, Niñez y Adolescencia. 1989.

30

This is listed in Articulo 164: “El aborto terapéutico será determinado cientificamente, con la intervención de tres

facultativos por lo menos y el consentimiento del cónyuge o pariente más cercano a la mujer, para los fines legales.”

31

McNaughton, Heathe, Ellen Mitchell, and Marta Blandon. "Should Doctors Be the Judges? Ambiguous Policies

on Legal Abortion in Nicaragua." Reproductive Health Matters 12 (2004): 18-26. List on p. 21.

32


33

Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO), “Derogation of Therapeutic Abortion in Nicaragua: Impact on

Health” (Organización Panamericana de la Salud (OPS), “Derogación del Aborto Terapeutico en Nicaragua:

Impacto en Salud”), (Managua, Nicaragua: PAHO 2007), p.14

34

Wessel, Lois. “Reproductive Rights in Nicaragua: From the Sandinistas to the Government of Violeta Chamorro,”

Feminist Studies, Vol. 17 (1991), Kingwood College, p. 4, 6.


128

The following table comes from HL McNaughton’s “Reproductive Health Matters” in

which he conducted a study that collected data from Nicaragua’s largest maternity hospital. As

Figure 5 shows, there was a dramatic drop in the number of therapeutic abortion requests after the

FSLN left office. The study pored through the records of the patients who requested therapeutic

abortions, and found that approvals or denials for therapeutic abortions were not consistently based

on medical diagnoses. McNaughton writes, “Doctors denied requests from women with confirmed

diagnoses of preeclampsia, hepatitis, diabetes, colon cancer, alcohol addiction, mitral valve

prolapse, measles, and mental retardation . . . Some requests from women with tuberculosis,

German measles, pregnancies due to rape, mental health, and cardiac pathologies were approved,

while others were denied.”

Figure 5 35

Figure 6 36

35

McNaughton, Heathe, Ellen Mitchell, and Marta Blandon. "Should Doctors Be the Judges?” Figure on pg. 22.

36

ibid.


129

This vague and conservative law remained in effect until October 2006, when days before

the Nicaraguan presidential election, the National Assembly unanimously voted to completely

abolish therapeutic abortion. The law also specifies prison sentences of one to three years for the

person who performs the abortion and one to two years for the woman who procures it. 37 Daniel

Ortega, party leader of the FSLN and former president during the 1980s, won with the support of

the Catholic Church. It was said that he gained the Church’s endorsement because of his own

support of the abortion ban, a reversal of the FSLN’s previous positions on abortion.

The Nicaraguan laws regarding abortion were only changed twice—once in 1989 to clarify

the law and in 2006 to make it more conservative. However, pertinent Nicaraguan structural forces

had a huge degree of control over actual access to abortion.

ABORTION TODAY

The previous section reviewed the history of abortion policy in Nicaragua, emphasizing

the role of the feminist movement in strengthening access to abortion and other reproductive

services. It also illustrated that when the feminist movement no longer had access to those in

positions of power, such as under the conservative administrations of Chamorro and her successors

Alemán and Bolaños, and then under Ortega’s second Sandinista administration, more restrictive

abortion policies were put in place. This section will review the class-biased consequences of this

abortion ban, focusing on the personal and daily impacts in the lives of Nicaraguan women, with

the majority of this burden placed on the poor.

Nicaragua is the second-poorest nation in the Western Hemisphere, just behind Haiti, with

40% of Nicaraguans living on less than $2 per day. 38 As mentioned earlier, that little wealth is also

distributed extremely unequally—Nicaragua’s Gini Index, which measures inequality, was 60.3

from 1994-2000, the second highest in the world, and 49.2 in 2005. 39 The greatest wealth

differential is in the urban-rural divide: people in rural areas are twice as likely to be poor than

people in urban areas (68 percent versus 29 percent). 40

This overview of Nicaragua’s socioeconomic situation is essential for understanding how

the abortion laws impact women in class-biased ways. In general, there is a multitude of evidence

37

Penal Code of the Republic of Nicaragua, as amended on September 13, 2007, art. 143.

38

“The World Factbook: NICARAGUA.” Central Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, 2 Apr. 2018,

www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/nu.html.

“Nicaragua.” U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of State, 16 Feb. 2018,

www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1850.htm.

39

Nicaragua, 2002 Article IV Consultation and Requests for a Three-Year Arrangement under the Poverty

Reduction and Growth Facility and for Interim Assistance under the Enhanced Initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor

Countries: Staff Report, Staff Statement, Public Information Notice, Press Release, and News Brief, on the Executive

Board Discussion, and Statement by the Executive Director for Nicaragua. International Monetary Fund, 2003.

Brown, Mark Malloch, editor. Human Development Report 2001. 2001, Human Development Report 2001,

hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/262/hdr_2001_en.pdf.

World Bank, GINI Index for Nicaragua [SIPOVGININIC], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St.

Louis; https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/SIPOVGININIC, April 18, 2018.

40

World Bank. 2008. Nicaragua: Poverty Assessment, Volume 1. Main Report. Washington, DC. © World Bank.

https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/8097 License: CC BY 3.0 IGO.


130

that restrictive abortion policies overwhelmingly hurt the poor. This is primarily because even

under restrictive laws, wealthy women can often pay for safer abortions, even if they are illegal.

On the other hand, poor women who have unwanted or unsafe pregnancies are faced with two

options: either they have an unsafe abortion, risking injury or even death, or they carry the

pregnancy to term, adding the burden of paying for a child they cannot afford to care for. If the

pregnancy is life-threatening, carrying the pregnancy to term adds yet another risk.

Restrictive abortion policies like those in Nicaragua result in much higher unsafe abortion

rates than in countries with liberal abortion access. According to the United Nations, in developing

countries this difference is especially pronounced: “the average unsafe abortion rate was 26.9 per

1,000 women aged 15 to 44 years among countries with restrictive abortion policies, compared

with 7.8 per 1,000 women aged 15 to 44 years among countries with liberal abortion policies.” 41

(See Figure 7).

Figure 7

Higher unsafe abortion rates in turn have severe consequences for women and families daily. That

unsafe abortions result in higher levels of maternal mortality is evident. In 2013, the average

maternal mortality rate in developing countries with restrictive abortion policies was significantly

higher than in countries with liberal abortion policies: 227 maternal deaths versus 97 maternal

deaths per 100,000 live births. 42 Nicaragua’s maternal mortality rate in 2013 was slightly higher,

41

United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2014). Abortion Policies and

Reproductive Health around the World (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.14.XIII.11). P. 15.

42

ibid. P. 16.


131

at 100 deaths per 100,000 live births; since the blanket ban, maternal mortality rates have risen

over 100 percent. 43 In Nicaragua, unsafe abortion is the main cause of maternal death for women

of all ages. 44

However, this burden of unsafe abortions and higher death rates rests primarily on the poor

and most vulnerable women. Wealthy women are known to fly to Miami or nearby countries where

abortions are permitted. 45 Writing about Nicaragua’s neighbor El Salvador, Michelle Oberman

sums up the realities of illegal, unsafe abortion for the poor: “They are women who live far from

cities, in cinder-block homes with dirt floors and no running water. They are the women who

continue to use coat hangers in the age of the Internet because they cannot afford to purchase

abortion drugs online.” 46 But beyond affecting the poorest, restrictive abortion laws place a heavy

burden on Nicaragua’s youngest. Nicaragua has the highest adolescent pregnancy rate in Latin

America—28% of women give birth before turning 18 years old, and one in four live births are

delivered by girls aged 10 to 19. 47 Nicaragua also has one of the highest child-sex abuse rates, with

93 percent of those teenage pregnancies being a result of rape. 48 The graph below, gathered from

a UNFPA report, represents the distribution of adolescent pregnancies in Nicaragua among girls

by socioeconomic variables.

Figure 8 49

Percentage of women aged 20-24 giving birth before a specific age

Before Age 18 Before Age 15 Total

28.1 4.4 119.2

Adolescent Birth Rates (ABR) per 1,000 women aged 15 to 19

Urban Rural No Education Primary Secondary or higher

98.8 153 215.3 170.5 77.9

Statistics on the breakdown in adolescent pregnancy among different economic strata were

not available for Nicaragua, but the following are in its neighboring countries of Honduras and the

Dominican Republic. It should be noted that the Dominican Republic’s abortion law is similar to

43

Heimburger, Angela and Lance Lattig, Abortion Ban Killing Women, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 20, 2007, at 25A.

("Even according to the government's own figures, maternal mortality has shot up by 100 percent in the past year.").

44

Letter from the CEDAW Committee to Members of the Nicar. Nat’l Assembly (October 16, 2006).

45

Replogle, Jill. “Nicaragua Tightens up Abortion Laws.” The Lancet 369, no. 9555 (2007): 15-16.

46

Oberman, Michelle, and EBSCOhost. Her Body, Our Laws : On the Front Lines of the Abortion War, from El

Salvador to Oklahoma / Michelle Oberman. 2018.

47

Loaiza, Edilberto, and Mengjia Liang. Adolescent Pregnancy: A Review of the Evidence. New York,

2013,Adolescent Pregnancy: A Review of the Evidence.

48

Isaza, Ximena Casas, et al. Stolen Lives: A Multi-Country Study on the Health Effects of Forced Motherhood on

Girls 9-14 Years Old. Planned Parenthood Global.

49

Loaiza, Edilberto, and Mengjia Liang. Adolescent Pregnancy: A Review of the Evidence.


132

Nicaragua’s, while Honduras’s law allows for abortion in the case of life-threatening pregnancies.

Clearly, adolescent pregnancies are occurring most frequently among the poorest and those living

in rural areas.

Adolescent Birth Rates (ABR) per 1,000 women aged 15 to 19

Poorest Second Middle Fourth Richest

Honduras 155.6 129 120.5 84.3 49.5

Dominican

Republic

171.8 124.4 84.7 63.4 39.1

Nicaragua’s law, however, results in deaths beyond unsafe abortions even for women who

carry their pregnancy to term. It is illegal to provide medical care for women that in any way

directly or indirectly ends their pregnancy. For instance, Public Radio International (PRI) reported

a story in which a woman named Franci Machado was diagnosed with thyroid cancer when she

was two months pregnant. She needed chemotherapy to save her life, but chemotherapy would kill

the fetus, so doctors refused to treat her. Stories like this abound in Nicaragua. 50 There have been

various estimates as to how many women have been affected by this law: a November 2007 report

estimated that within the year after the ban, 87 women died, and twelve more committed suicide. 51

A Central American advocacy group named IPAS estimates that at least 100 women died between

2011 and 2016 because they were denied abortions. 52 As the data was not collected between 2007

and 2011, the ban has likely taken more lives. It is also probable that the estimates within those

time frames (2007 and 2011–2016) are far below the actual number of women that have died, as

there are no official measures collected by the government or independent agencies.

50

Kalantari, Shuka. “Women in Nicaragua Fight for the Right to Get Abortions That Could Save Their

Lives.”Public Radio International, 16 Aug. 2016, www.pri.org/stories/2016-08-16/women-nicaragua-fight-rightget-abortions-could-save-their-lives.

A famous story was that of a 27 year-old pregnant woman with cancer who was not able to receive treatment due to

the law. Human rights groups such as Amnesty International publicly spoke against the law. The woman eventually

died, leaving behind a ten year old daughter.

Carroll, Rory. “Nicaragua Prevents Treatment of Pregnant Cancer Patient.” The Guardian, Guardian News and

Media, 23 Feb. 2010, www.theguardian.com/world/2010/feb/23/nicaragua-cancer-treatment-abortion.

51

Investigan denuncia a red de mujeres, MSN, Nov. 27, 2007, available at

http://latino.msn.com/noticias/articles/articlepage.aspx?cp-documentid=5429875.

Another report included a statement from Dr. Leonel Arguello, president of the Nicaraguan Society of General

Medicine, who said that between January 1 and September 15, 2007, 82 women died from treatable pregnancy

conditions. Only six of the 82 would have required the use of therapeutic abortion. Many of the remaining 82 were

due to doctors refusing to treat pregnancy complications out of fear of receiving up to six years of jail time.

Filadelfo Aleman, Nicaragua’s Abortion Ban Putting Women’s Lives at Risk, US Rights Group Says, INT’L

HERALD TRIB., Oct. 2, 2007.

52

Kalantari, Shuka. “Women in Nicaragua Fight for the Right to Get Abortions That Could Save Their Lives.”


133

THE CATHOLIC CHURCH

Nicaragua is an extremely Catholic country, with 95.5 percent of the country identifying

as Catholic in 1970 and 58.5 percent in 2005. 53 Though there has been a sharp decline in the

proportion of Catholic Nicaraguans, the Catholic Church has leveraged the legacy of its power

prior to 1970 in order to retain cultural influence. However, maintaining this position of power has

led the Catholic Church to act in the interest of self-preservation, which explains many of its

political actions since the end of the Somoza regime. This section will review this history of the

Catholic Church’s involvement in Nicaraguan politics, paying special attention to its intervention

in matters related to reproductive health, how its internal politics impacts its external politics, and

the ways in which the Church perpetuates the class divide that dominates the 2006 abortion bill’s

effects.

The Nicaraguan Catholic Church is generally understood to be extremely divided between

two different groups, which Dana Sawchuk coins the “hierarchy” and the “base.” 54 The terms refer

not only to divisions between Church officials, but also to divisions within the Nicaraguan

socioeconomic sphere, suggesting that these divisions are one and the same. The hierarchy refers

both to bishops and archbishops within the Church, as well as their economic and social ties to the

bourgeoisie. In contrast, the base refers to the Church laity and priests, but also to the people that

make up the lower rungs of the Nicaraguan socioeconomic ladder. Therefore, as Sawchuk writes,

“We can take hierarchy and base as concepts which express both the institutional location and

class affiliation of groups within the Church.” 55 I will be adopting these terms as I explain how

this division has played out throughout the Church’s recent history.

CATHOLIC HIERARCHY

Political scholar Michael Gismondi believes that this division between the hierarchy and

base has partisan political implications. And in the case of Nicaragua, where the Church has

historically aligned itself with the state, class politics and religion have an even stronger

correlation. Concessions are made between the two groups, which bind them in a strategy of

“mutual penetration, identification, and feeling of obligation and respect between clergy and

dominant classes.” 56 Gismondi’s “clergy and dominant classes” are the hierarchy, which plays out

in the history of Nicaragua. During the Somoza dictatorship the Catholic Church lent political

cover and support to the Somozas, and in return the dictatorship gave the Church autonomy and

53

Gooren, Henri (2005a) ‘Catholic and Protestant Culture Politics in Nicaragua: A Media-Based Inventory’,

Pentecostdies, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 1-17.

“Nicaragua.” U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of State, 17 Nov. 2010,


54

Sawchuk, Dana. “The Catholic Church in the Nicaraguan Revolution: A Gramscian Analysis.” Sociology of

Religion, vol. 48, no. 1, 1997, p. 39-51.

55

ibid.

56

Maduro, Otto. Religion and Social Conflicts / Otto Maduro; Translated from the Spanish by Robert R. Barr.

Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1982. Quote on p.125.


134

control over the state’s education. This process resulted in the Church producing religious

discourses that “sacralize this dominance,” 57 giving religious authority to a social structure that

favors the hierarchy. Sawchuk pinpoints this argument within the Nicaraguan Catholic Church,

writing that “each faction [hierarchy and base] sought religious legitimation for its own political

project.” 58 Bruneau concurs, hinting that a religious institution doesn’t always make decisions on

theological grounds, but rather in order to maintain its influence in society. 59 The class divide

within the Church, favoring the wealthy, is used in interest of self-preservation, and can be seen

especially in the case of the 2006 abortion law.

Though the Catholic Church has historically allied itself with the hierarchy, 60 the 1960s

were a time of attempted radical change within the Church’s ideology, a change which restructured

the hierarchy and base structure. The encyclicals of Pope John XXIII in 1961 and 1963 stressed

the human right to a “decent standard of living, education, and political participation.” 61 He also

emphasized that the Church should commit itself to human development, which became a

dominant theme during the Vatican II Council from 1962 to 1965. In the 1968 Medellín

Conference, the Church officially advocated for social and economic change specific to Latin

America. Furthermore, the Church said it was a Christian responsibility to denounce and act

against material poverty, and to support the poor as agents of change in society—even to the point

of drastic transformations of social structures. This began to weaken the Church’s historical

alliance with Latin American elites.

Although this change was theoretically taking place and stirring the larger, international

Church, the Nicaraguan Catholic hierarchy was resistant to liberalization. It sought to continue

receiving privileges from the Somoza government, despite the fact that the regime did not allow

political participation and did not act to alleviate widespread poverty. In fact, the Church remained

one of the “six keys” to Somoza’s success, with another being the economic elite. 62 The Somozas

looked to the Church for legitimacy, as it gained none from its clearly rigged elections. The Church

was given autonomy, money, and land, as well as near-complete control of the state’s education

system by the Somozas, and in return, the bishops gave the Somozas uncritical support. 63 This

support was so strong that when the Somozas massacred over 200 protesters who were

57

Hourtart, F. “Religion et lutte des classes en Amerique Centrale,” Social Compass, 26, 1979. Quote on p. 231.

58

Sawchuk, p. 47.

59

Bruneau, T. 1982. The Church in Brazil: The Politics of Religion. Austin: Univ. of Texas Press.

60

In this article, Williams maps out a history in which the Church consistently allies itself with the Conservative

party, made up of the economic elite, in order to maximize influence. The Conservative opposition - the Liberals -

threatened the Church’s “vested interests.” p. 343

Williams, Philip J. "The Catholic Hierarchy in the Nicaraguan Revolution." Journal of Latin American Studies 17,

no. 2 (1985): 341-69.

61

Campion, Donald R., and Eugene K. Culhane. Mater Et Magistra : Christianity and Social Progress ; an

Encyclical Letter of Pope John XXIII / Edited by Donald R. Campion and Eugene K. Culhane. New York: America

Press, 1961.

62

The “six keys” is Michael Gismondi’s term.

Gismondi, Michael. 1986. Transformations in the Holy: Religious resistance and hegemonic struggles in the

Nicaraguan revolution. Latin American Perspectives 13: 13-36.

63

Sawchuk, p. 43.; Williams (1985)


135

demonstrating the presidential candidacy of Anastasio Somoza in 1967, the Archbishop Alejandro

y Robleto publicly published a letter defending Somoza’s police action. 64

While the Medellín documents and the rise of liberation theology began to shake the

dictatorship, Church opposition to the regime truly began in 1970 with the appointment of

Archbishop Obando y Bravo. 65 As the Nicaraguan laity grew increasingly discontent with the

Somozas, the Church was forced to reconsider its public and unrelenting support of the

dictatorship. This is reflected in the infamous story of Somoza’s gift of a Mercedes to the new

Archbishop. 66 Though it was customary for the dictatorship to give the bishops lavish gifts,

Obando y Bravo sold the car in order to feed the poor, symbolizing a break with Somoza and a

care for the poor in accordance with the recent Medellín teachings. Although this story is a local

favorite, Sawchuk points out that Obando y Bravo actually used the car until anti-Somoza

Catholics turned it into such a source of embarrassment that he finally rid himself of it. Sawchuk

argues that this symbolizes that the Church was extremely hesitant to break attachments to the

Somozas and Nicaraguan elites, and that the Church’s siding with the poor was done primarily out

of self-preservatory interests in order to keep the support of the Catholic Nicaraguan masses. 67

This story is also a reminder that even with the Church reforms in the 1960s, the bishops trained

before Vatican II maintained their traditional interests. 68

While the Church was beginning to publicly express discontent with the dictatorship, they

were not willing to part completely. Though the pastoral letters of 1971 and 1972 advocate a more

just political and social regime, the hierarchy never goes so far as to criticize Somoza directly. 69

In fact, bishops seemed more concerned with rising leftist opposition; they issued a warning

directed at the Somozas that unless the political system was given more flexibility, other

undesirable forces such as the FSLN would take power. Even after the earthquake of 1972 in which

the Somozas stole huge amounts of international aid, the bishops did not criticize the regime for

over a year.

The pre/post Vatican II tension between the interests of the church hierarchy and base were

reflected in how the Church was split in its opposition to the Somozas. As the country’s economy

worsened after 1972 and both the country’s elites and lower classes soured in their support of the

dictatorship, it became unavoidable that the Church would have to distance itself from the

Somozas. Overrun by the interests of the hierarchy over the base, the Church advocated for

moderate opposition—bourgeois reform over revolution. Samandu and Jansen argue that

cleavages in the Church opposition developed along the same lines as the political opposition in

64

Crawley, Eduardo. Dictators Never Die : A Portrait of Nicaragua and the Somoza Dynasty / by Eduardo Crawley.

New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979.

65

Liberation theology, which I will discuss in further detail later on, emerged in Latin America in the 1960s as a

response to deep political and economy poverty.

66

This story appears in Gismondi (1986); Sawchuk (1997); Williams (1985)

67

Sawchuk, Dana. “The Catholic Church in the Nicaraguan Revolution: A Gramscian Analysis.” Sociology of

Religion, vol. 48, no. 1, 1997, p. 39-51.

68

Williams, p. 351

69

Comisión Evangélica Latinoamericana De Educación Cristiana. Hablan Los Obispos De Nicaragua / [ilus.,

Manuel Valdivia]. Comisión Evangélica Latinoamericana De Educación Cristiana. Cuadernos De Capacitación -

CELADEC ; 5. Cn. Lima, Perú]: Comisión Evangélica Latino Americana De Educación Cristiana, 1979.


136

Nicaraguan secular society, in which the views of the hierarchy converged with the views of the

economic elites. 70 The economic elite proposed a more “humane capitalism run in a just, Christian

manner,” which the Church adopted as well. 71 This convergence was criticized publicly by Noel

García SJ. García, a member of the church who spoke at the Primer Encuentro Pastoral held in

January 1969, at which he criticized “the majority of the clergy for openly identifying with

landowners and businessmen and for seeking after their own economic benefit.” 72

Part of the Church’s hesitation in supporting the Sandinistas was due to the FSLN’s Marxist

roots. The Church perceived Marxism as a threat to Christianity, as its founder, Karl Marx declared

that “Religion is the opiate of the masses,” and because Marxism was thought to be “inextricably

linked to the ‘atheistic materialism that represses the Christian spirit.’” 73 The Church’s hierarchy

both in Nicaragua and abroad identified Marxism and its corresponding revolutionary movements

as the “greatest enemy of religion and the institution” of the church. 74 This was partially due to the

Church’s recent history fighting communism: until the 1930s, much of the Church’s strategic

political alliances were defensive against the perceived threats of economic liberalism and anticlericalism.

During the 1940s and 50s, those alliances fell back on their defensive tendencies and

found communism to be the next growing threat. In response, the Church created papal encyclicals;

in Nicaragua, the Church drew up a specific defense strategy called “Acción Católica,” which was

an organization of militant lay groups that carried the Church’s influence to places where

communism was a perceived threat. 75 The Church illustrates a history, then, of organizing against

political or ideological movements, in order to preserve or increase its own influence.

Due to the Church hierarchy’s alliance with the business elites and its self-preservational

tendencies guarding it against Marxism, the Church hierarchy strongly condemned the FSLN and

advocated a moderate opposition stance, even as the FSLN grew in popularity. This is shown in

Church statements and actions during this time that pushed for peace and condemned (or

“desacralized”) the revolutionary violence they feared. The bishops’ Christmas pastoral of 1977,

issued a call to action explaining, “Christians are called to active nonviolence, since active

nonviolence is precisely the kind of praxis that allows one to be revolutionary without renouncing

the gospel and to remain faithful to Christ without renouncing the revolution.” 76 At the time of this

pastoral, the archbishop was moderating a national dialogue that specifically excluded the FSLN

per the requests of the economic elite. The panel included the UDEL, the Conservative Party, the

Institute de Desarrollo (Development) Nicaragüense (INDE), the Consejo Superior de Empresa

70

Samandu, Luis and Ruud Jansen. 1982. “Nicaragua: dictadura somocista, movimiento popular e iglesia,” Estudios

Sociales Centroamericanos 33:189-219.

71

Gismondi, p.27

72

Primer Encuentro Pastoral en Managua, ‘De Cara al Futuro de la Iglesia en Nicaragaua’, Documentos (Managua,

1969), 38-9, 100-22).

73

Sawchuk, p. 47.

74

Richard, Pablo and Guillermo Meléndez, La Iglesia de los Pobres en América Central, (San José, 1982). Quote on

p. 555.

75

Williams, p. 346

ibid.

76

IEPALA (Instituto de Estudios Políticas para América Latina y Africa) 1979. Nicaragua: el pueblo vence a la

dinastía, Madrid. Quote on pg. 87.


137

Privada (Private Business) (COSEP), and the Catholic hierarchy. The economic elite and Church

hierarchy were closely connected.

This dialogue fell apart when Pedro Chamorro, a wealthy anti-Somoza businessman, was

killed by the dictator’s son. Only then, when it was clear that the vast majority of the country

supported the FSLN and that revolution was near-inevitable, did the Church hierarchy begin to

change its tone, if only slightly. In an interview with the primary newspaper opposing Somoza, La

Prensa, Archbishop Obando y Bravo cautioned that only when all forms of resistance have been

exhausted can collected armed resistance be justified. This was a very different message than the

letter he had published just a few days before Chamorro’s murder which called on the youth to

resist the temptation to take up arms. 77

The Church’s tendency to sacralize the elite’s dominance or their political desires is clear

in the tone of the Church hierarchy’s statements throughout this time. During his August 1978

message, Archbishop Obando y Bravo said,

We understand that those who choose violence often do so driven by desperation and in the belief

that after the bitterness of the process, goodness and justice will shine through. We believe, however,

that violence not only threatens to make more remote the possibility of constructing the Kingdom

of God based on brotherhood and justice but also is self-defeating for those who would use it...To

think of resolving our antagonisms once and for all by means of escalation, be it in the form of

government repression or revolutionary insurrection, would only plunge our society into an abyss

of blood and destruction with incalculable consequences for our social and spiritual life. 78

He equates the immorality of the dictatorship with the violence of the revolution, shrouding his

partisan message in religious language difficult for Catholic Nicaraguans to resist. They were still

able to, however, because of their own religious legitimation in the form of a new Christian

revolutionary ideology. In reviewing the Church’s actions during this time, it should be clear that

the hierarchy entered a strategic alliance with the FSLN only when it became clear that the

Sandinistas would inevitably win due to massive support from the Church’s own base.

THE CHURCH BASE

The Church’s base was energized and legitimized partially through the liberation theology

inspired by the Medellín documents. Liberation theology emerged in Latin America in the 1960s

as a response to deep political and economic poverty, as well as the increased literacy of poor,

mostly Catholic Christians who began to read the Bible and interpreted that God was on the side

of the poor and the oppressed. They believed that their Christianity was compatible with this new

revolutionary ideology, partially because of liberation theology. Liberation theology also

emphasized the democratization and decentralization of the Church, largely against the strict

authority of the Church hierarchy.

77

CEN, ‘Mensaje al Pueblo de Dios al Iniciarse el Año 1978’ (Managua, 6.1.78).

78

August 1978 message, Archbishop Obando y Bravo, 1978:109.


138

Originally, the Christian Student Movement began much of the organized political action

against the Somozas. This increased especially after the early 1970s. But the lower priests who

joined their fold also legitimated the movement for other Catholics who wanted to support this

cause but felt uneasy because of the Church hierarchy’s dissuasion. Maryknoll Friar Miguel

D’Escoto and Trappist Friar Fernando Cardenal joined the FSLN movement; Friar Gaspar García

Laviana published an open letter on Christmas of 1977 that read: “To all my Nicaraguan brothers:

I ask you, for the love of Christ, to support the struggle of the Sandinista front.” 79 They not only

legitimized the struggle, but also provided much of the intellectual basis for the revolution. Four

priests became government ministers, and the base of the Church provided much of the labor power

for the Sandinistas’ national reconstruction projects. The Church couldn’t deny that their own laity

was highly supportive of the efforts made by the Sandinistas, which made it difficult to publicly

oppose them.

Though the Church had supported, or at least feigned support, for the FSLN by the time of

the Sandinistas’ victory, the resignations of the only wealthy business owners, Violeta Chamorro

and Alfonso Robelo, from the revolutionary junta in May 1980 returned the Church hierarchy to

open opposition to the Sandinistas. No longer were the business elites, with whom the Church was

intertwined, represented in the Sandinista government. It was obvious that the Church adopted the

political views of the business class; statements made by the Church that completely aligned with

those of Cosejo Superior de la Empresa Privada (COSEP, a private sector umbrella organization). 80

As Sawchuk writes, it also showed in how the Church’s interests were “based on a ‘neo-

Christendom’ model, a new way between capitalism and communism in which the Church had

complete power and there was no ‘option for the poor’ that did not include the wealthy.” 81

But as the power of COSEP and the business class was consistently weakened by the

government, the Church hierarchy assumed the lead of the opposition to the Sandinistas. The

Church and social hierarchies even created a campaign of disinformation against the new

Sandinista government as a totalitarian, Marxist, atheistic prosecutor of the Church. Besides

resisting the Sandinistas on the basis of their Marxist ideology, the Church was also frustrated that

they didn’t enjoy the same stature and privileges under the Sandinistas that they had under the

Somozas. Because the Sandinistas did not need the legitimation of the Church, as they had the

overwhelming support of the masses and a few high-profile priests in their ranks, they did not grant

the Church the power and freedom the Church desired.

Both globally and in Nicaragua, the Church interpreted the ecclesiastical institution as

being threatened and began to “turn inward” in order to maintain their “attachment to both

traditional orthodoxy and hierarchical ecclesiastical power.” 82 The 1980s saw a persecution of

progressive Church circles, which Richard and Meléndez argue was “fruitful for the dominant

79


dinastía, Madrid. Quote on pg. 93.

80

Sawchuk, Quote on pg. 43

81

Sawchuk, Quote on pgs. 47-48

82

Richard, Pablo and Guillermo Meléndez, La Iglesia de los Pobres en América Central, (San José, 1982). Quote

on p. 556.


139

classes in Central America.” 83 The Pope, during a visit to Nicaragua in March 1983, described the

“Church of the Poor” as an “internal enemy,” and spoke specifically against the FSLN, including

its limiting of religious education. 84

Sawchuk writes that “the institutional necessities of self preservation and self-reproduction

play a role in determining the positions of actors.” 85 That the Church and the social elite primarily

acted in order to maintain their own status seems abundantly clear as Church opposition to the

Sandinistas hardened as it saw its influence being diminished. The bishops sided with the Contras

against the FSLN and worked to secure more US aid for the Contra forces. With the permission of

the Vatican, they also expelled many of the priests and members of the religious base working on

the side of the FSLN, including those in government positions.

This contentious relationship between the Church hierarchy and the Sandinistas lasted

throughout the 1980s, resulting in the bishops supporting the candidacy of Violeta Chamorro over

the Sandinistas. Central American scholars Richard and Meléndez write that the Church

considered that “the election of the devout Catholic aristocrat Violeta Barrios (Chamorro)

return[ed] to the bishops and their closest collaborators the ‘right’ to an active and distinguished

public life.” 86 In other words, the Church and societal elite fought to preserve their influence and

power and believed that Chamorro was the best method to restore their power. When Chamorro

won, even the Pope described the elections as “God’s victory.” 87 Chamorro returned to the Church

control over education and influence over matters of reproductive health.

THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN 2006

During the 16 years Daniel Ortega was out of office, he made alliances with the

Conservatives, splitting with the feminists in order to win favor with the Catholic Church. In 2006,

he emerged madeover—peaceful, reconciliatory, and above all, Catholic. He had converted to

Catholicism and married a Catholic woman, Rosario Murillo. In fact, Archbishop Obando y Bravo,

who had once excommunicated priests involved with the FSLN and who had funded the Contras

from the Church, was the officiant at their wedding.

During the campaign, Ortega’s wife publicly endorsed the abortion bill being pushed by

the Catholic Church to the national legislature. 88 In return, Archbishop Obando y Bravo gave a

sermon on ‘the prodigal son’ during a mass shortly before the elections. This was widely

83

Richard and Meléndez, p. 557.

84

Riding, Alan. “POPE SAYS TAKING SIDES IN NICARAGUA IS PERIL TO CHURCH.” The New York Times,

The New York Times, 5 Mar. 1983, www.nytimes.com/1983/03/05/world/pope-says-taking-sides-in-nicaragua-isperil-to-church.html.

85

Sawchuk, p. 41.

86

Richard and Meléndez, p. 564.

87

Richard and Meléndez, p.559.

88

Murillo, Rosario 2006. “Extracto de la entrevista ofrecida por Rosario Murillo, jefa de campaña del Frente

Sandinista de Liberación Nacional, a la elmisora Nueva Radio Ya.” August 21.

http://www.izquierda.info/modules.php?name=News&file=print&sid=1498 (accessed by Dana Sawchuk, September

8, 2006).


140

interpreted as Obando y Bravo’s endorsement of Ortega’s presidential candidacy and was a stark

contrast to the Archbishop’s anti-Ortega sermon right before the 1990 presidential elections. 89

The Catholic Church drove the effort to pass the abortion ban through posters, billboards,

and pamphlets urging Nicaraguans to vote against pro-abortion candidates. It also held a 200,000

person rally in the capital, Managua. 90 Although drafted by the National Legislature, the bill drew

much of its language from a text by the Nicaraguan Catholic Bishops Conference.

From the end of the Somoza regime until 2006, the Catholic Church consistently worked

to preserve its own institutional strength in Nicaraguan society. This self-preservation tendency

resulted in the Church continually favoring the wealthy elite over the poor, which allowed the

Church to push for an abortion law that would continue its political power, even though the bill

most seriously impacts the poor.

CONCLUSIONS

Three main structures of Nicaraguan society—he feminist movement, the Catholic Church,

and the economic inequality—influenced the creation of the 2006 abortion ban bill. In particular,

the strength of the feminist movement and its closeness to the government were essential to

liberalizing abortion policy. When the feminists fell out of favor with the FSLN, the party opened

to closer ties with conservatives and the Catholic Church. Because the Church acted in order to

preserve influence within the Nicaraguan political structure, it continuously advocated for the

interests of the wealthy elite both in and outside the official Church hierarchy. The Church did this

partly through political alliances, such as the ones it made with the Somozas, the Contras, the

Chamorro government, and eventually Daniel Ortega in the run up to the 2006 election. However,

it also did this by “sacralizing” the dominance of the elite, creating religious discourse that

benefited the elite over the poor. For this reason, the Church pushed for an abortion policy that is

itself class-biased and disproportionately harms the poorest, most vulnerable women and young

girls in Nicaraguan society. The fact that the Church has “sacralized this dominance,” preaching

that abortion is evil, resulted in very religious people, including poor women, voting against safer,

more available options for reproductive health.

This paper shares a story rarely heard about the Global South. Several other countries have

abortion policies similar to Nicaragua’s, including El Salvador, a neighboring Central American

country. These structures of inequality, powerful self-interested institutions, and the silencing of

women’s rights groups have a hidden complicity that is not unique to Nicaragua, but affects

vulnerable women around the world.

89

European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies/ Revista Europea de Estudios Latinoamericanos y del

Caribe. .89 (Oct. 2010): p47+.

90

Carroll, Rory. “Nicaragua Votes to Outlaw Abortion.” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 27 Oct. 2006,

www.theguardian.com/world/2006/oct/27/topstories3.mainsection.


141

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