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COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE

COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE

CHAPTER 3 POLITICAL

CHAPTER 3 POLITICAL MARKET OF LOCAL LAND USE POLICY The Influence of Physical Characteristics Property rights develop to internalize externalities when the gains of internalization exceed the costs of internalization of externalities (Demsetz 1967; Alchian and Demsetz 1973). In the common pool resources, the scarcity of resources increases the necessity of property rights because of its nature of externality and subtractability. The potential efficiency gains by internalizing these externalities increase the demand of property rights (Lubell at al. 2005). Until a community’s physical condition reaches to the extent to which there is a need for governments to intervene, communities experience economic development and growth because those physical characteristics demand for growth. However, as growth intensifies, the demand for growth loses its influence and start to switch to the demand for growth management. This is the point where the gains or benefits of anti-growth policy become greater than the costs of providing anti-growth land use policies. Therefore, the benefits of pro-environmental land use regulation would be greatest when growth rates is high enough to increase the scarcity of local land and infrastructure resources, and decrease the open space (Kang and Feiock 2006; Lubell at al. 2005). While some local jurisdictions experience slow growth, others experience rapid growth, which results in various negative externalities such as transportation, housing, environments, etc. Moreover, the increasing demand of housing for the population growth gears up the pressure of additional infrastructure provision (Jeong 2006). In addition, rapid urbanization of a city decreases the available open spaces, and consequent environmental and quality of life concerns follow. Cities have limited boundary of their 35

lands. As growth and urbanization pressures intensify, the cost of internalizing negative externalities is less than gains of internalization. Hence, many citizens will begin to demand growth control in order to internalize various negative externalities. In other words, the gains of pro-environmental policy that constrains development would be greater than costs of making that policy. The natural resources also matter for the demand of pro-environmental property rights. Florida is a state that has one of longest coastal lines and lots of water resources such as wetlands and lakes. This water related resources are very sensitive to new development (Lubell et al. 2005). Thus, the length of coastal lines and the size of water resources may increase the value of pro-environmental land use policy change. H 1: Population, population growth, density, shorelines, and the size of water area will increase the likelihood of the pro-environmental amendments to local comprehensive plans. The Influence of Community Interests In land use regulation arena, community interests can be said as “shared interest” of people for governments to supply a certain land use policy in their jurisdiction. Types of shared interest in a jurisdiction may affect local land use policy changes. However, even though most literature in land use policy area emphasizes that these community characteristics determine how land is used in urban areas, how these interests are organized and are effective on land use policy changes is implicit. As Gerber (1999) argues, the land use policy is political process, in which only some interests can be successful. Therefore, it is important to identify what interests regarding land use issues can be articulated and successful through political process. By using Mancur Olson’s (1965) collective action logics, many recent literatures explain that some interests can be easily organized for collective action and articulate policy preferences through policy making process (Lubell et al. 2005). In other words, the groups that are better able to deliver to political resources to local elected officials are more likely to receive their preferred policies. 36