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COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE

COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE

Table 14. Heckman

Table 14. Heckman Selection Model of Ratio of Large/ Small Scale 1 Variables Institutions Formal Institutions Mayor Expenditure District Turnover Informal Institutions RPC ILA Community Interests Development Interests Construction Real Estate Environmental Interests White Income Homeownership Degree Mediating Effects White*Institutions Income*Institutions Homeown*Institutions Constant Rho Sigma Lamda Wald test of independent Equations Wald test of model fit Observation Without Interaction 8.65 (4.61)* 0.00 (0.00)* .10 (.05)** -.09 (.05)* 3.54 (3.40) -.00 (.00) -89.4 (42.1)** 75.9 (91.5) -.08 (.09) .0002 (.0001)** .16 (.19) .10 (.17) 24.4 (11.9)** .27 (.09) 39.7 (.79)*** 10.4 (.96) Chi2=7.50*** (1d.f) Chi2=81.0*** (13d.f) Censored=2065 Uncensored=1137 1 robust standard error clustered at the city level Interaction with Mayor 21.21 (12.7)* 0.00 (0.00)* .09 (.05)** -.09 (.05)* 3.97 (3.38) -.00 (.00) -96.3 (42.8)** 95.2 (85.6) -.09 (.09) .0002 (.0001)** .30 (.20) .07 (.17) .01 (.33) .0006 (.0003)* -.53 (.37) 17.5 (8.4)* .28 (.09) 39.6 (.81)*** 10.7 (3.63) Chi2=8.50*** (1d.f) Chi2=72.4*** (13d.f) Censored=2065 Uncensored=1137 83 Interaction with District Election 7.38 (4.48) 0.00 (0.00) .38 (.09)*** -.08 (.05) 3.44 (3.36) -.00 (.00) -92.7 (43.0)** 56.2 (93.9) -.12 (.10) .0002 (.0001)** .28 (.19) .12 (.17) .00 (.00) .0000 (.0000)* .009 (.003)*** 21.4 (11.6)* .29 (.10) 39.6 (.84)*** 11.2 (3.71) Chi2=8.83*** (1d.f) Chi2=91.8*** (13d.f) Censored=2065 Uncensored=1137 Interaction with RPC 8.55 (4.59)* 0.00 (0.00)* .10 (.05)** -.08 (.05) -1.18 (21.2) -.00 (.00) -89.2 (42.5)** 75.8 (90.1) -.11 (.12) .0004 (.0001)** .10 (.25) .08 (.17) .04 (.18) -.0001 (.0002) .11 (.33) 26.6 (15.9)* .27 (.09) 39.7 (.81)*** 10.7 (3.82) Chi2=7.63*** (1d.f) Chi2=66.5*** (13d.f) Censored=2065 Uncensored=1137

There are two community interest indicators that are statistically significant in the hypothesized directions. First, one of pro-development interest variables (proportion of construction industry) is negatively related to the pro-environmental land use policy change. 1% increase of construction industry proportion is correlated with the 0.9% decrease of ratio of large/small scale amendments. Secondly, one of community wealth variable (median income) is positively related to the pro-environmental land use policy change. If a community has $1000 more median income than other communities, then the ratio of large/small scale amendment increases by 0.2%. However, the other community interest variables are not statistically significant. Column 2, 3, and 4 report the Heckman selection model with interaction terms. In the second column, the interaction term between strong mayor form of government and median income is statistically significant at p=.10 level in a positive direction. Confirming the hypothesized direction, this can be interpreted that, as a community’s affluence increases, mayors are more likely to prefer pro-environmental land use policy change. In other words, as a community has a strong mayor, then the influence of community affluence is much higher in that city. In a reverse logic, if a city has manager or other types of form of government, then the influence of community affluence is reduced in that city. The most interesting finding is in this analysis at the column 3. Even though interaction terms between election institution and community interests in the previous probit model, this model does provide strong statistical significant influence on proenvironmental land use policy change. Interaction terms between district election and community affluence variables (median income and homeownership) are positively significant at p=.10 and .01 levels respectively. These results mean that community’s proenvironmental interests may easily influence on local land use policy decision making when the community has more council seats elected by district. In other words, even though environmental interests are disperse (Lubell et al. 2005), their influence might be much higher when local governments have more council members who are elected by district. However, as column 4 shows, the roles of informal institutions are not statistically significant at all. This is a quiet different result from the panel probit model. 84