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5 years ago

COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE

COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE

Implications As I

Implications As I discussed in the first chapter, this research is to integrate four partial explanations of land use policy change such as Deterministic View, Property Rights Model, Interest Group Model, and Political Economist View. Built upon the IAD framework, the political market framework provides a possibility of being a more comprehensive framework to understand land use policy change at the local level. While building a comprehensive framework, there are several implications in this research. First, as the previous chapter’s results indicate, institutions matter on local land use policy change. Local political institutions provide incentives and constraints on local land use policy decision. The results show that strong mayor council form is an important factor that affects the pro-environmental land use policy change. Because of the existence of a single executive authority, strong mayors are easily able to deal with the pressures of changing land use policies (Feiock 2004; Maser 1998; Hansell 1998). Also, this strong mayor position shapes and provides opportunity structures in which elected leaders easily do political credit claiming through changing local land use policy more proenvironmental while other forms of government such as reformed one did not provide political leaders incentives. Because too stringent land use policy may reduce the room where managers administer their communities for balancing community needs, managers may not want pro-environmental land use policy change. In addition, their performances are usually judged by community improvement in terms of economic development (McCabe et al. 2001). In addition, the structure of legislative institutions seemed to have an impact on land use policy change. Because environmental interests are unorganized and dispersed in a whole community, those interests are not easy to collectively work together. However, as the results of the second model show, larger proportion of district representation in city councils removes entry barriers for community interests seeking to preserve environment (Gerber and Phillips 2004; Lubell et al. 2005). This implies that district representation on city council may be more amenable to environmental pressures and more inclined to favor pro-environmental policies as a means to reelection (Lubell et al. 2005). 85

Another important implication is that rules are not independent from other rules (Ostrom 1990). As the results show, the configuration of rules is important. Even though there have been much progress in many literature (Svara 1999; Frederickson and Johnson 2001; DeSantis and Renner 1994, 2002; Lubell et al. 2005; Gerber and Phillips 2004), much of previous research has used political institutions not being affected by other important institutions. From configuration of political institutions, this research helps measuring local political institutions. In this research, I pulled the factors that affect mayors’ centralized authority and political dimensions to code strong mayor council form of government. To deal with election types, I used proportion of council members of elected by district. From the results of both models, it is important to configure institutions when we do an institutional analysis. Along with the above political aspects of local governments, unelected bureaucrats influence local policy decision making. The second model confirms that the planning capacity is a critical factor of pro-environmental land use policy change. This implies that, even though planners seek and balance various interests such as pro- and anti-environmental interests, their educational orientation to achieving environmental goals makes planners rigorously engaged in the local policy making process. In addition, increased pressures of growth management by state have provided planning experiences to local governments. More activities regarding planning issues along with planners’ informational and technical powers increase the higher possibility for planners to influence land use policy decision making (Rudel 1989). These powers work as a barrier to political opportunism for elected officials to promote their own policy preferences (Feiock and Kim 2000) as well as a factor of promoting bureaucrats’ own preferences (Teske and Schneider 1993). Another important implication is in the influence of political turmoil on the land use policy decision. As the results show, higher turnover rates are negatively related to the pro-environmental policy change. In urban policy making process, councils act as multiple principals while executive bodies work as agents. So, when a council faces risks of frequent turnover, the monitoring costs and information asymmetries will be higher than when council stable. This makes executive bodies easily pursue their preferences. In 86