Views
5 years ago

x - Faculty of Computer Science - Technische Universität Dresden

x - Faculty of Computer Science - Technische Universität Dresden

x - Faculty of Computer Science - Technische Universität

Security in Computer Networks Multilateral Security in Distributed and by Distributed Systems Transparencies for the Lecture: Security and Cryptography I (and the beginning of Security and Cryptography II) Stefan Köpsell (Slides mainly created by Andreas Pfitzmann) Technische Universität Dresden, Faculty of Computer Science, D-01062 Dresden Nöthnitzer Str. 46, Room 3067 Phone: +49 351 463-38272, e-mail: sk13@inf.tu-dresden.de, https://dud.inf.tu-dresden.de/ 1

  • Page 2 and 3: Field of Specialization: Security a
  • Page 4 and 5: 4/48 Examples of changes w.r.t. ano
  • Page 6 and 7: Anonymous plain old letter post is
  • Page 8 and 9: Areas of Teaching and Research •
  • Page 10 and 11: Multimedia Forensics
  • Page 12 and 13: Areas of Teaching and Research •
  • Page 14 and 15: Aims of Teaching at Universities Sc
  • Page 16 and 17: General Aims of Education in IT-sec
  • Page 18 and 19: General Aims of Education in IT-sec
  • Page 20 and 21: General Aims of Education in IT-sec
  • Page 22 and 23: Offers by the Chair of Privacy and
  • Page 24 and 25: 1 Introduction Table of Contents (1
  • Page 26 and 27: adio television videophone phone in
  • Page 28 and 29: History of Communication Networks (
  • Page 30 and 31: Development of the fixed communicat
  • Page 32 and 33: threats: Threats and corresponding
  • Page 34 and 35: Transitive propagation of errors an
  • Page 36 and 37: Protection against whom ? Laws and
  • Page 38 and 39: protection concerning protection ag
  • Page 40 and 41: area of physical control of the att
  • Page 42 and 43: The Internet • Telecommunication
  • Page 44 and 45: EU-Parliament about the global inte
  • Page 46 and 47: • place • time confidentiality
  • Page 48 and 49: Multilateral security • Each part
  • Page 50 and 51: Multilateral security (3rd version)
  • Page 52 and 53:

    Attorney Miller, specialized in mer

  • Page 54 and 55:

    56 Additional Data Protection Goals

  • Page 56 and 57:

    Correlations between protection goa

  • Page 58 and 59:

    Interference: detect judge Tamper-r

  • Page 60 and 61:

    Interference: detect judge Attack:

  • Page 62 and 63:

    AUTHENTICATION Slides are from Andr

  • Page 64 and 65:

    Identification of human beings by I

  • Page 66 and 67:

    Identification of IT-systems by hum

  • Page 68 and 69:

    • Simple approach User Password b

  • Page 70 and 71:

    Password based authentication • E

  • Page 72 and 73:

    • MD5 Examples for cryptographic

  • Page 74 and 75:

    MD5 Hash in the Wild mission statem

  • Page 76 and 77:

    Password based authentication • E

  • Page 78 and 79:

    Remaining problems of password base

  • Page 80 and 81:

    Remaining problems of password base

  • Page 82 and 83:

    • Example: Cryptanalytic Time - M

  • Page 84 and 85:

    Cryptanalytic Time - Memory Trade-O

  • Page 86 and 87:

    Remaining problems of password base

  • Page 88 and 89:

    Password based authentication • S

  • Page 90 and 91:

    • … a new Web 2.0 service The S

  • Page 92 and 93:

    • security problems User • poss

  • Page 94 and 95:

    Password based authentication • s

  • Page 96 and 97:

    Password based authentication • s

  • Page 98 and 99:

    Password based authentication • s

  • Page 100 and 101:

    • One Time Password One time pass

  • Page 102 and 103:

    Biometrics for Authentication • P

  • Page 104 and 105:

    Biometric characteristics: Requirem

  • Page 106 and 107:

    • Pros: Biometrics: Pros and Cons

  • Page 108 and 109:

    Safety Risks of Biometrics 111

  • Page 110 and 111:

    Demonstration of Fingerprint Clonin

  • Page 112 and 113:

    Biometric Systems: Types of Failure

  • Page 114 and 115:

    Biometric Systems: Types of Failure

  • Page 116 and 117:

    Admission and access control Admiss

  • Page 118 and 119:

    Basic facts about Computer viruses

  • Page 120 and 121:

    Golden Rule Design and realize IT s

  • Page 122 and 123:

    Trustworthy terminals Trustworthy o

  • Page 124 and 125:

    Basics of Cryptology Achievable pro

  • Page 126 and 127:

    0 0 1 1 plaintext x Example: Vernam

  • Page 128 and 129:

    Sym. encryption system: Domain of t

  • Page 130 and 131:

    Key distribution using asymmetric e

  • Page 132 and 133:

    more detailed notation Domain of tr

  • Page 134 and 135:

    gfjjbz r 1 � r 2 � r 3 … �

  • Page 136 and 137:

    a) key (total break) Goal/success o

  • Page 138 and 139:

    Basic facts about “cryptographica

  • Page 140 and 141:

    security Security classes of crypto

  • Page 142 and 143:

    “Sicherheit des Schutzmechanismus

  • Page 144 and 145:

    Combine: Hybrid cryptosystems (1)

  • Page 146 and 147:

    Information-theoretically secure en

  • Page 148 and 149:

    ciphertext S 00 01 10 11 equally di

  • Page 150 and 151:

    Vernam cipher (one-time pad) All ch

  • Page 152 and 153:

    155 Preparation: Definition for inf

  • Page 154 and 155:

    (3)�(4) is clear with const':= W(

  • Page 156 and 157:

    Key distribution: Symmetric authent

  • Page 158 and 159:

    Limits: Symmetric authentication sy

  • Page 160 and 161:

    About cryptographically strong syst

  • Page 162 and 163:

    Factoring assumption � PPA F (pro

  • Page 164 and 165:

    3. Primality tests: Search of prime

  • Page 166 and 167:

    Calculating with and without p,q (2

  • Page 168 and 169:

    Calculating with and without p,q (4

  • Page 170 and 171:

    squares and roots Calculating with

  • Page 172 and 173:

    Calculating with and without p,q (8

  • Page 174 and 175:

    Calculating with and without p,q (1

  • Page 176 and 177:

    Calculating with and without p,q (1

  • Page 178 and 179:

    Calculating with and without p,q (1

  • Page 180 and 181:

    to b) F : input n repeat forever Ca

  • Page 182 and 183:

    Method s 2 -mod-n-generator • key

  • Page 184 and 185:

    s 2 -mod-n-generator as sym. encryp

  • Page 186 and 187:

    n s PBG Security of the s 2 -mod-n-

  • Page 188 and 189:

    Security of the s 2 -mod-n-generato

  • Page 190 and 191:

    Security of PBGs more precisely (2)

  • Page 192 and 193:

    Reminder: Summary of PBG and motiva

  • Page 194 and 195:

    Scheme of security proofs (2) (adap

  • Page 196 and 197:

    GMR - signature system (1) Conseque

  • Page 198 and 199:

    GMR - signature system (3) Problem:

  • Page 200 and 201:

    to show : 1) Permutation -1 � QR

  • Page 202 and 203:

    Solution of problem 1 (2) Propositi

  • Page 204 and 205:

    secret area plaintext with signatur

  • Page 206 and 207:

    Proof (1) c • d � 1 (mod �(n)

  • Page 208 and 209:

    Naive insecure use of RSA RSA as as

  • Page 210 and 211:

    secret area plaintext RSA as asymme

  • Page 212 and 213:

    ( x c ) Attack on encryption with R

  • Page 214 and 215:

    m 2 Transition to Davida’s attack

  • Page 216 and 217:

    Defense against Davida’s attacks

  • Page 218 and 219:

    secret area text with signature and

  • Page 220 and 221:

    c th roots are unique Shown : each

  • Page 222 and 223:

    L i-1 L i = R i-1 One round Feistel

  • Page 224 and 225:

    Expansion Use key S 1 Mixing S 2 S

  • Page 226 and 227:

    The complementation property of DES

  • Page 228 and 229:

    S 1 S 2 S 3 S 4 Encryption function

  • Page 230 and 231:

    Stream cipher synchronous self sync

  • Page 232 and 233:

    plaintext block n Electronic Codebo

  • Page 234 and 235:

    Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) (2) All

  • Page 236 and 237:

    x 1 x 2 x 3 . . . x b-1 0 S 1 S 2 S

  • Page 238 and 239:

    Block length a Length of the output

  • Page 240 and 241:

    Block length a Length of the output

  • Page 242 and 243:

    Block length a Length of the output

  • Page 244 and 245:

    248 Collision-resistant hash functi

  • Page 246 and 247:

    Discrete logarithm assumption � P

  • Page 248 and 249:

    Diffie-Hellman (DH) assumption: Dif

  • Page 250 and 251:

    Security is asymmetric, too Digital

  • Page 252 and 253:

    text with signature and test result

  • Page 254 and 255:

    Threshold scheme (1) Threshold sche

  • Page 256 and 257:

    Threshold scheme (3) Polynomial int

  • Page 258 and 259:

    adio television videophone phone in

  • Page 260 and 261:

    adio television videophone phone in

  • Page 262 and 263:

    Excerpt from: 1984 With the develop

  • Page 264 and 265:

    Mechanisms to protect traffic data

  • Page 266 and 267:

    ===T===Gate===

faculty of computer science - Fakultät Informatik - Technische ...
Statistics beyond Physics - Technische Universität Dresden
OCL By Example Lecture - Technische Universität Dresden
Graphs - Www-st.inf.tu-dresden.de - Technische Universität Dresden
Optimierung und Frustration: - Technische Universität Dresden
2. Mobile Internet - Faculty of Computer Science - Technische ...
5. Adaptation - Faculty of Computer Science - Technische ...
3. Adaptation - Faculty of Computer Science - Technische ...
02 - Technische Universität Dresden
Wiki Event Navigation - Computer Networks - Technische Universität ...
3. Mobile Internet - Faculty of Computer Science - Technische ...
4. Context Awareness - Faculty of Computer Science - Technische ...
Content Sharing - Technische Universität Dresden
6. Context Awareness - Faculty of Computer Science - Technische ...
7. Location-based Se.. - Faculty of Computer Science - Technische ...
Computer Science and Engineering - Technische Universiteit ...
5. Location-based Se.. - Faculty of Computer Science - Technische ...
First Presentation - Faculty of Computer Science
diplomarbeit - Computer Networks - Technische Universität Dresden
Technische Universität Dresden - Computer Networks - Technische ...