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x - Faculty of Computer Science - Technische Universität Dresden

x - Faculty of Computer Science - Technische Universität Dresden

Field

Field of Specialization: Security and Privacy Lectures Staff SWS Security and Cryptography I, II Köpsell 2/2 Cryptography and -analysis Franz 2/1 Data Security Franz 2/1 Information & coding Theory Schönfeld 2/1 Channel Coding Schönfeld 2/2 Steganography and Multimedia Forensics Franz 2/1 Data Security and Cryptography Clauß 0/4 Privacy Enhancing Technologies … Clauß, Köpsell 0/4 Computers and Society Köpsell 2/0 Seminar: Privacy and Security Clauß et.al. 2/0 Seminar: Trustworthy Smart Grids Franz 2/0 Seminar: Secure app. development Borcea-Pfitzmann 2 Seminar: Security in ubiquitous Systems Borcea-Pfitzmann 2 Introduction to Data Protection Law Wagner 2/0 2

Areas of Teaching and Research • Multilateral security, in particular security by distributed systems • Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs) • Cryptography • Steganography • Multimedia-Forensics • Information- and coding theory • Anonymous access to the web (project: AN.ON, JAP) • Identity management (projects: PRIME, PrimeLife, FIDIS) • Multilateral Security: SSONET and succeeding activities • Steganography (project: CRYSTAL) and Multimedia forensics 3

  • Page 1: Security in Computer Networks Multi
  • Page 5 and 6: 5/48 Examples of changes w.r.t. ano
  • Page 7 and 8: The massmedia „newspaper“ will
  • Page 9 and 10: Multimedia Forensics
  • Page 11 and 12: Multimedia Forensics
  • Page 13 and 14: Areas of Teaching and Research •
  • Page 15 and 16: 15 General Aims of Education in IT-
  • Page 17 and 18: General Aims of Education in IT-sec
  • Page 19 and 20: General Aims of Education in IT-sec
  • Page 21 and 22: …but no this way! First stupid an
  • Page 23 and 24: Aims of Education: Offers by other
  • Page 25 and 26: 3 Cryptographic basics Table of Con
  • Page 27 and 28: History of Communication Networks (
  • Page 29 and 30: Important Terms computers interconn
  • Page 31 and 32: threats: Threats and corresponding
  • Page 33 and 34: confidentiality integrity availabil
  • Page 35 and 36: commands universal universal Trojan
  • Page 37 and 38: Which protection measures against w
  • Page 39 and 40: money time Considered maximal stren
  • Page 41 and 42: Strength of the attacker (model) At
  • Page 43 and 44: Electromagentic radiation >dir AUTT
  • Page 45 and 46: Why should I protect myself... ? ..
  • Page 47 and 48: Previously on Security and Cryptogr
  • Page 49 and 50: Multilateral security (2nd version)
  • Page 51 and 52: Prevent the unintended Achieve the
  • Page 53 and 54:

    Protection Goals: Definitions Confi

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    Correlations between protection goa

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    Physical security assumptions Each

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    Shell-shaped arrangement of the fiv

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    Golden rule Correspondence between

  • Page 63 and 64:

    66 Lookahed: Why autentication: Adm

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    PIN protects access to chip New Ger

  • Page 67 and 68:

    Identification of IT-systems by IT-

  • Page 69 and 70:

    Password based authentication • S

  • Page 71 and 72:

    One-way functions - cryptographic h

  • Page 73 and 74:

    MD5 Hash in the Wild • United Sta

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    mission statement:= “USCYBERCOM p

  • Page 77 and 78:

    Password based authentication • E

  • Page 79 and 80:

    Remaining problems of password base

  • Page 81 and 82:

    • main idea: Cryptanalytic Time -

  • Page 83 and 84:

    • 2 nd example - breaking of PINs

  • Page 85 and 86:

    Remaining problems of password base

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    Remaining problems of password base

  • Page 89 and 90:

    Password based authentication • S

  • Page 91 and 92:

    Password based authentication • S

  • Page 93 and 94:

    Password based authentication • s

  • Page 95 and 96:

    Password based authentication • s

  • Page 97 and 98:

    Password based authentication • p

  • Page 99 and 100:

    Password based authentication • (

  • Page 101 and 102:

    • OTP Implementations - hash chai

  • Page 103 and 104:

    Biometrics: Physiological / Behavio

  • Page 105 and 106:

    • Enrolment phase: • Verificati

  • Page 107 and 108:

    • Pros: Biometrics: Pros and Cons

  • Page 109 and 110:

    • Pros: Biometrics: Pros and Cons

  • Page 111 and 112:

    • Pros: Biometrics: Pros and Cons

  • Page 113 and 114:

    ROC Curve and Security Problems of

  • Page 115 and 116:

    Enhanced Security: Multi-biometric

  • Page 117 and 118:

    Computer virus vs. transitive Troja

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    Further problems 1. Specify exactly

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    Aspects of distribution Distributed

  • Page 123 and 124:

    Availability Infrastructure with th

  • Page 125 and 126:

    more detailed notation Symmetric en

  • Page 127 and 128:

    Key exchange using symmetric encryp

  • Page 129 and 130:

    more detailed notation Domain of tr

  • Page 131 and 132:

    more detailed notation Symmetric au

  • Page 133 and 134:

    Key distribution using digital sign

  • Page 135 and 136:

    Whom are keys assigned to? Comments

  • Page 137 and 138:

    severity a) passive a1) ciphertext-

  • Page 139 and 140:

    Basic facts about “cryptographica

  • Page 141 and 142:

    Grundlagen - Sicherheit kryptograph

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    security information theoretic acti

  • Page 145 and 146:

    Hybrid cryptosystems (2) Even more

  • Page 147 and 148:

    Information-theoretically secure en

  • Page 149 and 150:

    ciphertext S 00 01 10 11 equally di

  • Page 151 and 152:

    154 Keys have to be very long for i

  • Page 153 and 154:

    Definition for information-theoreti

  • Page 155 and 156:

    Another definition for information-

  • Page 157 and 158:

    Symmetric authentication systems (2

  • Page 159 and 160:

    About cryptographically strong syst

  • Page 161 and 162:

    clear: in NP � but difficulty can

  • Page 163 and 164:

    Search of prime numbers (1) 1. Are

  • Page 165 and 166:

    Z n : ring of residue classes mod n

  • Page 167 and 168:

    Calculating with and without p,q (3

  • Page 169 and 170:

    Compose ? Calculating with and with

  • Page 171 and 172:

    Calculating with and without p,q (7

  • Page 173 and 174:

    Calculating with and without p,q (9

  • Page 175 and 176:

    Calculating with and without p,q (1

  • Page 177 and 178:

    Calculating with and without p,q (1

  • Page 179 and 180:

    Calculating with and without p,q (1

  • Page 181 and 182:

    184 The s 2 -mod-n-Pseudo-random Bi

  • Page 183 and 184:

    s 2 -mod-n-generator as symmetric e

  • Page 185 and 186:

    s 2 -mod-n-generator as asymmetric

  • Page 187 and 188:

    Security of the s 2 -mod-n-generato

  • Page 189 and 190:

    Security of PBGs more precisely (1)

  • Page 191 and 192:

    Security of PBGs more precisely (3)

  • Page 193 and 194:

    constructive proof often Scheme of

  • Page 195 and 196:

    Alg.2: has to demand uniformity Why

  • Page 197 and 198:

    GMR - signature system (2) Construc

  • Page 199 and 200:

    To factor is difficult (1) Theorem:

  • Page 201 and 202:

    Solution of problem 1 (1) Tree of r

  • Page 203 and 204:

    Note In the proof you dispose the

  • Page 205 and 206:

    Key generation 1) Choose two prime

  • Page 207 and 208:

    Proof (2) Holds, of course, for m

  • Page 209 and 210:

    secret area plaintext x random numb

  • Page 211 and 212:

    secret area text with signature and

  • Page 213 and 214:

    ( x s ) Attack on digital signature

  • Page 215 and 216:

    Active Attack of Davida against RSA

  • Page 217 and 218:

    secret area plaintext x random numb

  • Page 219 and 220:

    Faster calculation of the secret op

  • Page 221 and 222:

    64-bit block plaintext L 0 IP round

  • Page 223 and 224:

    L i-1 L i = R i-1 Decryption Why do

  • Page 225 and 226:

    Generation of a key for each of the

  • Page 227 and 228:

    L i-1 One round complement compleme

  • Page 229 and 230:

    Generalization of DES 1.) 56 � 16

  • Page 231 and 232:

    e.g. 64 bits with DES ECB Main prob

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    Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) All lin

  • Page 235 and 236:

    � plaintext block n memory for ci

  • Page 237 and 238:

    Block length a Length of the output

  • Page 239 and 240:

    shift register 1 b CFB for authenti

  • Page 241 and 242:

    Plain Cipher Block Chaining (PCBC)

  • Page 243 and 244:

    Utilization of indeterministic bloc

  • Page 245 and 246:

    Diffie-Hellman key agreement (1) pr

  • Page 247 and 248:

    andom number 1 Domain of trust secr

  • Page 249 and 250:

    Find a generator in cyclic group Z

  • Page 251 and 252:

    x, s(x), “pass” or “fail” r

  • Page 253 and 254:

    Signature system for blindly provid

  • Page 255 and 256:

    Reconstruction of the secret: Thres

  • Page 257 and 258:

    adio television videophone phone in

  • Page 259 and 260:

    adio television videophone phone in

  • Page 261 and 262:

    Since about 1990 reality Video-8 ta

  • Page 263 and 264:

    Problems with exchanges Unsolved pr

  • Page 265 and 266:

    Questions: Attacker (-model) • Ho

  • Page 267:

    Questions: Attacker (-model) • Ho

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