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x - Faculty of Computer Science - Technische Universität Dresden

x - Faculty of Computer Science - Technische Universität Dresden

Development

Development of the fixed communication networks of the German Post services television view data TELEBOX data transmission TELEFAX TEMEX Telex Teletex DATEX-L DATEX-P videophone video conference radio broadcasting television videotext networks networks networks networks 1986 starting 1988 starting 1990 starting 1992 phone network integrated text- and data network BIGFON communal aerial installations ISDN video con- ference network broadband cable network broadcast networks broad- band ISDN broadband cable network integrated broadband network switched networks 31

threats: Threats and corresponding protection goals 1) unauthorized access to information computer company receives medical files 2) unauthorized modification of information undetected change of medication 3) unauthorized withholding of information or resources detected failure of system example: medical information system no classification, but pragmatically useful example: unauthorized modification of a program ≥ total correctness protection goals: confidentiality integrity availability for authorized users 32 � partial correctness 1) cannot be detected, but can be prevented; cannot be reversed 2)+3) cannot be prevented, but can be detected; can be reversed

  • Page 1 and 2: Security in Computer Networks Multi
  • Page 3 and 4: Areas of Teaching and Research •
  • Page 5 and 6: 5/48 Examples of changes w.r.t. ano
  • Page 7 and 8: The massmedia „newspaper“ will
  • Page 9 and 10: Multimedia Forensics
  • Page 11 and 12: Multimedia Forensics
  • Page 13 and 14: Areas of Teaching and Research •
  • Page 15 and 16: 15 General Aims of Education in IT-
  • Page 17 and 18: General Aims of Education in IT-sec
  • Page 19 and 20: General Aims of Education in IT-sec
  • Page 21 and 22: …but no this way! First stupid an
  • Page 23 and 24: Aims of Education: Offers by other
  • Page 25 and 26: 3 Cryptographic basics Table of Con
  • Page 27 and 28: History of Communication Networks (
  • Page 29: Important Terms computers interconn
  • Page 33 and 34: confidentiality integrity availabil
  • Page 35 and 36: commands universal universal Trojan
  • Page 37 and 38: Which protection measures against w
  • Page 39 and 40: money time Considered maximal stren
  • Page 41 and 42: Strength of the attacker (model) At
  • Page 43 and 44: Electromagentic radiation >dir AUTT
  • Page 45 and 46: Why should I protect myself... ? ..
  • Page 47 and 48: Previously on Security and Cryptogr
  • Page 49 and 50: Multilateral security (2nd version)
  • Page 51 and 52: Prevent the unintended Achieve the
  • Page 53 and 54: Protection Goals: Definitions Confi
  • Page 55 and 56: Correlations between protection goa
  • Page 57 and 58: Physical security assumptions Each
  • Page 59 and 60: Shell-shaped arrangement of the fiv
  • Page 61 and 62: Golden rule Correspondence between
  • Page 63 and 64: 66 Lookahed: Why autentication: Adm
  • Page 65 and 66: PIN protects access to chip New Ger
  • Page 67 and 68: Identification of IT-systems by IT-
  • Page 69 and 70: Password based authentication • S
  • Page 71 and 72: One-way functions - cryptographic h
  • Page 73 and 74: MD5 Hash in the Wild • United Sta
  • Page 75 and 76: mission statement:= “USCYBERCOM p
  • Page 77 and 78: Password based authentication • E
  • Page 79 and 80: Remaining problems of password base
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    • main idea: Cryptanalytic Time -

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    • 2 nd example - breaking of PINs

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    Remaining problems of password base

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    Remaining problems of password base

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    Password based authentication • S

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    Password based authentication • S

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    Password based authentication • s

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    Password based authentication • s

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    Password based authentication • p

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    Password based authentication • (

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    • OTP Implementations - hash chai

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    Biometrics: Physiological / Behavio

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    • Enrolment phase: • Verificati

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    • Pros: Biometrics: Pros and Cons

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    • Pros: Biometrics: Pros and Cons

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    • Pros: Biometrics: Pros and Cons

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    ROC Curve and Security Problems of

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    Enhanced Security: Multi-biometric

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    Computer virus vs. transitive Troja

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    Further problems 1. Specify exactly

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    Aspects of distribution Distributed

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    Availability Infrastructure with th

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    more detailed notation Symmetric en

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    Key exchange using symmetric encryp

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    more detailed notation Domain of tr

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    more detailed notation Symmetric au

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    Key distribution using digital sign

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    Whom are keys assigned to? Comments

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    severity a) passive a1) ciphertext-

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    Basic facts about “cryptographica

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    Grundlagen - Sicherheit kryptograph

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    security information theoretic acti

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    Hybrid cryptosystems (2) Even more

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    Information-theoretically secure en

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    ciphertext S 00 01 10 11 equally di

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    154 Keys have to be very long for i

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    Definition for information-theoreti

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    Another definition for information-

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    Symmetric authentication systems (2

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    About cryptographically strong syst

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    clear: in NP � but difficulty can

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    Search of prime numbers (1) 1. Are

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    Z n : ring of residue classes mod n

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    Calculating with and without p,q (3

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    Compose ? Calculating with and with

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    Calculating with and without p,q (7

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    Calculating with and without p,q (9

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    Calculating with and without p,q (1

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    Calculating with and without p,q (1

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    Calculating with and without p,q (1

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    184 The s 2 -mod-n-Pseudo-random Bi

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    s 2 -mod-n-generator as symmetric e

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    s 2 -mod-n-generator as asymmetric

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    Security of the s 2 -mod-n-generato

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    Security of PBGs more precisely (1)

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    Security of PBGs more precisely (3)

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    constructive proof often Scheme of

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    Alg.2: has to demand uniformity Why

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    GMR - signature system (2) Construc

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    To factor is difficult (1) Theorem:

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    Solution of problem 1 (1) Tree of r

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    Note In the proof you dispose the

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    Key generation 1) Choose two prime

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    Proof (2) Holds, of course, for m

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    secret area plaintext x random numb

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    secret area text with signature and

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    ( x s ) Attack on digital signature

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    Active Attack of Davida against RSA

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    secret area plaintext x random numb

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    Faster calculation of the secret op

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    64-bit block plaintext L 0 IP round

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    L i-1 L i = R i-1 Decryption Why do

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    Generation of a key for each of the

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    L i-1 One round complement compleme

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    Generalization of DES 1.) 56 � 16

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    e.g. 64 bits with DES ECB Main prob

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    Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) All lin

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    � plaintext block n memory for ci

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    Block length a Length of the output

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    shift register 1 b CFB for authenti

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    Plain Cipher Block Chaining (PCBC)

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    Utilization of indeterministic bloc

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    Diffie-Hellman key agreement (1) pr

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    andom number 1 Domain of trust secr

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    Find a generator in cyclic group Z

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    x, s(x), “pass” or “fail” r

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    Signature system for blindly provid

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    Reconstruction of the secret: Thres

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    adio television videophone phone in

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    adio television videophone phone in

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    Since about 1990 reality Video-8 ta

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    Problems with exchanges Unsolved pr

  • Page 265 and 266:

    Questions: Attacker (-model) • Ho

  • Page 267:

    Questions: Attacker (-model) • Ho

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