Chapter Five 1999 Post-Elections Period - Leicester Research ...
151 rooted in traditional community values. In this respect, the individual is supposed to negotiate personal needs within the framework of community needs (Nussbaum, 2003, p.2; Bourgault, 1995, p.4-5). Unfortunately, in the context of the 1999 elections, the obvious problem could only be located in the electorate who had chosen to vote along regional and ethnic lines and had chosen violence as a means to express their frustration with the electoral process. This presented problems for editorial writers since that could shift the blame away from the easy villains - the politicians. One editorial writer noted: Malawians need to understand their responsibilities to their community. Committing violence against other Malawians goes against our values as a nation. What is worrying is that the regionalism that has only been spoken about as a mere threat to national unity by word of mouth, is now becoming a reality. (Malawi News, 1999a, p.2). Another writer in the Chronicle (1999b, p.1) noted: Malawians, we are a peaceful community. We should not succumb to frustration and violence. Stop harming your neighbours. Let us seek redress through the proper channels. The newspapers turned to the relevant age-old villains for blame attribution. For example, instead of blaming the nation for failing to observe its own values, the BNL newspapers and the Chronicle placed the blame on the UDF leadership, blaming them for lacking in unifying abilities (See Table 5.2) as one editorial (Chronicle, 1999a, p.1) noted: There are politicians who preach unity but they practice the contrary. Politicians continue to say inciting things and divide the country further. Malawi is one country and one people. Boundaries were made by our colonisers which continue to hound us. The issue is not improved when a
152 leader who has been declared a winner in an election then proceeds to lambast the loser to the point where, once again animosity becomes the order of the day. The writer of an editorial in the Daily Times (1999c, p.2) noted: “The UDF leaders are arrogant, and regard themselves as leaders of the UDF alone rather than the nation.” The NPL newspapers blamed the opposition leaders for encouraging the violence by refusing to accept the outcome of the elections (See Table 5.2). Such a way of viewing the problem could have led the NPL stable to argue that there was no unity problem in Malawi. The problem was with opposition politicians who refused to accept the outcome of the elections (See Table 5.2). In the end, the Unity Frame‟s problem definition and causal attribution failed to resonate with the traditional Malawian values of intense humanness, caring, sharing, respect, compassion and associated values which ensure a happy and quality community life. The very people (citizens) who were supposed to put into practice these values had disregarded them. The consequence was that subsequent frame components such as the moral evaluations and treatment recommendation were basically an agglomeration of half-hearted calls for national unity and dialogue, and condemnation of politicians. This did not address the larger problem of the electorate‟s preference of candidates from home. Further, it served to highlight the partisan nature of Malawi‟s press and its reflection of the political divisions existing in the country. 5.2.4.2 Resonant Problem Definition and Causal Attribution The Electoral Process Frame was suffused with morally judgemental words and images that arose directly and inevitably from the problem definition and causal analysis. Once the BNL stable and the Chronicle had identified the MEC as having intentionally
FRAMING POLITICAL COMMUNICATION IN
iii To the memory of late my father
v ACKNOWLEDGEMENT Together with the
vii Fortenberry, Dr. Merle Ziegler,
3.2 The Data…………………
xi LIST OF TABLES Table 3.1 Profile
xiii Table 7.2 Newspapers frame com
xv LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AFORD Alli
2 why the newspapers‟ discourse i
4 had successfully convinced Wester
6 be able to establish whether or n
8 The first reason is that the pres
1.2.2 1999 Post-Election Case Study
12 Mutharika, a former World Bank e
14 Malawi, and how this study will
16 this study was denied. Thus, the
18 provide a better understanding o
20 The next chapter examines the th
22 about each other. The social fra
24 . . . to frame is to select some
26 Journalists select whom to quote
28 text and separate the issues inh
30 society” (Gitlin 1980, p.10; D
32 African media have coupled it wi
34 especially true with respect to
36 content. The argument is that th
38 ownership and that owner‟s ali
40 ownership and its influence on j
42 Khaila and Chibwana (2005) noted
44 respondent are reported to be in
46 their role in a multiparty socie
48 Within this strand of literature
50 Chipangula (2004:23), in her com
52 In short, the government has not
2.5.1 Editorials and Opinion Column
56 In this respect, as will be note
58 (1972)‟s agenda-setting theory
3.0 Introduction 60 Chapter Three M
62 Contextual factors in case studi
64 (problem definition, causal inte
66 Journalists, through editorials,
68 coded and uncoded text could be
70 For the 1994 case study, the edi
72 of parliament was the 38 th Sess
74 a. What are the perceived moral
76 literature on culture, politics,
78 However, even though the above m
80 For the 1994 editorial corpus, t
82 3.5.2 Researcher Positioning and
3.6 Limitations of the Study 84 Hav
86 These include the issue of objec
88 researcher of the task of interp
90 Chapter Four 1994 Post-Election
92 prominent among them were the BN
94 The parliamentary corpus consist
4.3.1 Unity Frames 96 The first par
98 Any leader governing a fragmente
202 in the 11 speeches (See Table 6
204 to arrogance. There were 13 suc
206 Political actors recognize that
208 The Failed Government Frame was
210 For example, one of the main st
212 Admittedly, we were critical to
214 newspapers maybe an indication
7.0 Introduction 216 Chapter Seven
218 detected in both the newspapers
220 adopt that issue as a cause for
222 commercial city of Blantyre for
224 the Unity Frame, in particular,
226 prescriptions. The Failed Gover
228 political communication. In det
Table 7.3: Parliamentary frame comp
232 Table 7.4: Chi Square Test diff
234 was rooted in this aspect of mo
236 argument that framing in politi
238 study established generalisatio
240 understand how the press have m
242 Thus, in 1994, the Nation and t
244 divisive rhetoric when celebrat
246 president. The Electoral Proces
248 The state is also important in
250 when Rob Jamieson changed the C
252 In the 2004 post election perio
254 and analytical national interes
256 The first is value association
258 Perhaps one of the most strikin
260 target audience to think, feel
262 an objective press working in t
264 limbo at the BNL newspapers. On
266 organizations often face cash c
268 Thus, the government must lead
270 problem is diversification of m
272 Another area requiring further
274 Assembly cues. This type of jou
276 1994 - The first multiparty ele
278 APPENDIX III OPEN CODING FOR A
280 APPENDIX V PILOT STUDY HOLSTI I
282 that you change the labelling o
284 APPENDIX VII A MODEL FOR FRAMIN
286 Asen, R. (1999) „Toward a nor
288 new management ideas in constru
290 Cho, S. H., & Gower, K. K. (200
292 Daily Times (1994c) „Potentia
294 Eko, L. (2004) Hear all evil, s
296 Study Research. (paper presente
298 Hall, S. (1980) Race, Articulat
300 Jamieson, R. (1999) „Calling
302 on public opinion: The rise and
304 Malawi News (1999g) „Let the
Palgrave. 306 McManus, M. (1994). M
308 Nampuntha, C. (1994) „Aid, fa
310 Patel, N. (2004) In Ott, M., Im
312 the Church. Ecumenical Review,
314 Snow, D.A. & Benford. R.D. (198
Media Review, Vol. 5, No.1. p. 1-16
318 Watkins, S. C. (2001). Framing
320
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