Commando News Magazine Edition 22 July 2025

Registered by Australia Post ~ Publication No PP100016240 Edition 22 ~ July 2025

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CONTENTS

REGISTERED BY AUSTRALIA POST PUBLICATION No PP100016240

AUSTRALIAN COMMANDO ASSOCIATION INC.

NATIONAL OFFICE BEARERS

PRESIDENT: MAJGEN Greg Melick AO RFD KC

(Ret’d)

VICE PRESIDENT: MAJ Steve Pilmore OAM RFD (Ret’d)

SECRETARY: Jeff McLean

TREASURER: MAJ David Wonson

PUBLIC OFFICER: MAJ Brian Liddy RFD (Ret’d)

STATE ASSOCIATION OFFICE BEARERS

ACA NSW PRES.: Mr Peter McCaffrey

ACA NSW SEC.: Mr Bruce Poulter

ACA QLD PRES.: Mr Mark Stanieg

ACA QLD SEC.: Mr Chris Jackson

ACA ACT PRES.: Mr Brendan O'Conner

ACA ACT SEC.: Mr Alex Meliuinas

ACA VIC PRES.: COL Doug Knight RFD (Ret’d)

ACA VIC SEC.: Mr Glenn MacDonald

ACA WA PRES.: Mr Steve Butler

ACA WA SEC.: Mr Paul Shearer

ACA TAS REP.: Mr Mike Turner

Editor’s Word....................................................................3

ACA National VP Report..................................................7

ACA NSW Report.............................................................9

ACA VIC Report .............................................................13

Significant Commando Dates ........................................17

Special Operations in Support of

Allied Landings in Hollandia .......................................19

Double Diamond ............................................................33

Commandos for Life ......................................................37

WW2 Commemorations in Sarawak, Malaysia..............39

Book Reviews .................................................................45

WWII Netherlands Forces

Intelligence Service.....................................................49

RSL Media Release.........................................................54

PTSD article....................................................................59

Leaving the ADF ............................................................61

Franchising .....................................................................64

WEBSITE/MEDIA

MANAGER:

WEBSITE:

EMAIL:

FACEBOOK:

EDITOR:

Vacant

www.commando.org.au

acanx.webmaster@gmail.com

Australian Commando Association

COL Doug Knight RFD (Ret’d)

The Australian Commando Association’s membership consists of Servicemen and

women who served with World War II Independent Companies, Commando

Squadrons and Regiments, all elements of Special Operations Australia (also

known as the Allied Intelligence Bureau), 1 and 2 Commando Companies, 301 and

126 Signal Squadron, 1 st Commando Regiment, 4 RAR (Commando) and the 2 nd

Commando Regiment. The Association also consists of Associate members who

have served in units that support Commando units in time of war and peace and

Social members whose direct family member was either Killed in Action, Died in

Service or Killed in Training or a member of the ACA who has passed.

DISCLAIMER: Opinions expressed within this publication are those of the authors,

and are not necessarily those of the Editor, Publisher, Committee Members or

Members of our Association. We welcome any input as long as it is not offensive

or abusive but if any member has a problem with a printed article we would like to

be informed in order that the author may be contacted. We do encourage your

opinion.

Official Publishers:

Statewide Publishing P/L

ABN 65 116 985 187

Deadline for next edition (Edition 23, 2025)

SATURDAY, 30 TH AUGUST 2025

All news on members and interesting articles

accepted.

(Subject to editor’s approval.)

Doug Knight

Registered by Australia Post ~ Publication No PP100016240 Edition 22 ~ July 2025

PO BOX 682, SURFERS PARADISE QLD 4217

PHONE: 0432 042 060

EMAIL: russell@commandonews.com.au

Printed by BOOST Design & Print

FRONT COVER: Special Warfare operators and enablers

Web: boostgraphicdesign.com

from 1 st Commando Regiment conduct foreign weapons

Email: boostdesign@optusnet.com.au

training at 2 Company, based in Melbourne. 1 st Commando

Regiment is the Australian Defence Force’s designated

Special Warfare unit, with 2 Company being the home of

Special Operations Command in Victoria.

COMMANDO ~ The Magazine of the Australian Commando Association ~ Edition 22 I July 2025 1

A WORD FROM THE EDITOR

Welcome to Edition #022 July 2025 of

COMMANDO – The Maga zine of the

Aust ralian Com mando Asso ciation. This

is my ninth edition and there are continuing to be

developments of significance both for the maga zine,

ex service Special Forces Associations and for

Australian military history.

This Edition

There is a very detailed article on numerous Special

Operations conducted in Dutch New Guinea

(Hollandia) during WW2.

French Honour for ACA National President

Major General Greg Melick AO RFD SC was

recently awarded the French Officer of the Ordre

National du Mérite (National Order of Merit) by the

French Ambassador for his service to Australian French

relations including as Head of the Centenary of Anzac

Planning Team. More information is contained in the

DVA media release in this edition. Our congratulations

to Greg on this prestigious award.

Magazine Distribution

There have been ongoing adjustments to a

distribution process including electronic distribution

via email. If you are experiencing difficulties with

receiving your electronic or hard copy (for those

eligible) in the first instance, contact your ACA State

Branch Secretary or the Magazine Editor with relevant

detail.

For those members that use the website to

download a digital copy of the magazine as previously

advised it is now restricted to financial members

through the members only portal of the ACA website.

Book Reviews

Same Same but Different. A very recently published

thought provoking and insightful story by John

Reymnse, formerly of 7RAR and SASR in Vietnam, the

senior instructor at the Parachute Training School and

later an officer in the 1 st Commando Regiment. Only

100 have been initially printed and if you’re interested

in this fascinating life story contact and purchase

details are included in the review.

Welfare and Australian Special Forces Associations

As detailed in the last edition the Review of Veteran

Suicide has prompted ACA to review our current

practises regarding the welfare of ex service personnel

particularly those who served in Special Operations

units and HQ and a proposal is currently being staffed

through the various associations to improve our ability

to support SOCOMD veterans. More information to

follow in future editions and the ACA webpage.

Professional development

In my ongoing search for items for professional

development for inclusion in this magazine I recom -

mend the following articles to anyone interested in

special operations education and training.

Some recent items from overseas special opera -

tions organisations are as follows.

US

Strategic Disruption: An Operational Framework

for Irregular Warfare. By Bryan L. King, National

Defense University available at https://www.swcs.mil/ -

Spe cial-War fare-Journal/Article/3977247/strategicdisruption-an-operational-framework-for-irregularwarfare/.

This article makes specific mention of a

recent RAND study ‘Strategic Disruption by Special

Operations Forces- A Concept for Proactive

Campaigning Short of Traditional War’ which is

available for download in pdf from https://www. -

rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1794-1.html.

Both articles make a number of interesting observa -

tions and recommendations that may be relevant to

the Australian context.

Also for those who may not be aware the US

Department of Defense (DoD’s) Irregular Warfare

Center at https://irregularwarfarecenter.org/ is a valu -

able research and education source for those special

operations professionals keen to improve their

professional knowledge. The most recent edition of

the US Army Military review which is specifically

focused on Irregular Warfare can be obtained at

https:// www. armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-

Review/English-Edition-Archives/Nov-Dec-2024/.

Within this edition there are also a number of very

interesting articles on operations in the Ukraine and

civil resistance and emerging changes in the Indo

Pacific region.

For a general overview of the way in which the US

will be conducting military operations in the Indo

Pacific region in the near future a recent RAND study

‘Sustaining U.S. Army Operations in the Indo-Pacific-

(Continued on page 5)


4 COMMANDO ~ The Magazine of the Australian Commando Association ~ Edition 19 I August 2024

Editor’s Word (Continued from page 3)

Potential Roles of Allies and Partners’ is available for

download from https://www.rand.org/ pubs/ re search_ -

reports/ RRA2434-3.html and also worthy of study.

Although a US sourced webite SOF News provides

curated news, analysis, and commentary about special

operations, national security, and conflicts around the

world. I’m sorry what time are you going. So they

called washing their frames you know I’m listening to

those guys. No a world overview of special operations

activities. See https://sof.news/update/.

Sweden

In February 2021, the Centre of Special Operations

Research (CSOR) was established at the Swedish

Defence University. The Centre's activities rest on four

cornerstones – research, education, academic

outreach and operational support to the Armed

Forces' special operations units and produces a

number of technical research papers which are

available at https://www. fhs.se/en/swedish-defenceuniversity/

colla boration/specialized-centres/thecentre-of-special-operations-research-csor.html.

Israel

With the ground war continuing in Gaza with the

Israeli Defence Force (IDF) having been on operations

since 7 October 2023 the Institute for National

Security Studies at the Tel Aviv University around the

same time published a paper ‘Military Power:

Overhauling the IDF and Adjusting Its Missions by

Ofer Shelah, Tamir Hayman, and Liran Antebi which

has initiated considerable debate, particularly from

almost senior members of the IDF and is worthwhile

reading. The document is available at https://www. -

inss.org.il/ publication/military-2023/.

I trust that you will find this edition both informative

and educational and when finished with your hard

copy please share it with a friend or mate; if you are

reading the magazine online forward it to a mate so

that he or she can also be informed.

The Editorial Committee would appreciate any

feedback on the style, content, or delivery of this

magazine.

Doug Knight

Commando 4 Life

Editor - Commando Magazine

Email - acanx.commandomageditor@gmail.com

W: www.commando.org.au

Australian Commando

Association Inc


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6 COMMANDO ~ The Magazine of the Australian Commando Association ~ Edition 22 I July 2025

ACA National VP’s Report

I have recently decided that this is my last year

serving on the National Committee of the Australian

Commando Association. I have simply run out of puff

and as well I can’t see myself standing helplessly by to

watch what’s going to happen next to the Army

Reserve Commandos in a role where I am expected to

miraculously do something.

In addition, even trying very hard I have not been

able to reconcile the decision to initially take the Green

Beret off non-RA Inf soldiers and then to remove it

entirely from the traditional owners – the 1 st Com -

mando Regiment.

We’ve been told that “Special Warfare” (SW) has

been selected as a “new skill” to save the 1 st Com -

mando Regiment from disappearing from the Aust -

ralian Defence Force ORBAT and with the advent of the

2 nd Commando Regiment, the 1 st didn’t have a discrete

skill set. You have already read about the concept that

SW is actually not a new skill.

It is the case that 1 st Cdo Regt needs a unique skill

set, but to me it also seems to ignore the three

rotations of the 1 st Cdo Regt to Afghanistan. I seem to

remember “Round out, Reinforce and Rotate” or

some thing similar, as a description of what 1 Cdo Regt

was supposed to do. When 2 Cdo Regt was being

flogged with deployments back in the day, the then

Special Operations Commander (SOCAUST) took what

some doubters called a very big gamble, and he

deployed Chockos to the ME theatre of operations.

I was fortunate to accompany that same SOCAUST

to the Melbourne International terminal at Tullamarine

on the day several months later when he greeted one

such Chocko rotation back from Afghanistan and his

manner and enthusiasm in greeting the FE Com -

mander was obvious for all to see. The Chockos had

not only done all that was asked of them, but they did

it well and had paid back SOCAUST’s “gamble” in

spades as well as allowing their comrades at 2 Cdo

Regt to have a Christmas at home with their families

having missed two or three in a row.

Not too many CMF/Army Reserve units have

deployed to a theatre of war in the eighty years since

WW II (i.e. One) and the way in which the three

deployed FEs operated to me is more than a justi fi -

cation for their existence. It is a part-time unit which

with only a few months build-up training behaved just

like the full-time units they replaced so I don’t under -

stand why Army is looking for further financial justifi -

cation for the existence of the oldest SF unit in the

Australian Defence Force.

Whilst we are looking at the cost of keeping units

accommodated a quick look will reveal that over the

last decade or two the full time SF units have had in

excess of $1 billion spent on their facilities. I acknow -

ledge straight away that this expense is totally justifi -

able and worthwhile given their roles and tasks.

However, HQ 1 st Cdo Regt still lives in accom moda -

tion that nearly 50 years ago AAFCANS/ASCO dis -

carded as unsuitable for them at that time. Further -

more, the only new piece of major infrastructure ever

purposely built for a sub-unit of the 1 st Cdo Regt was

ironically opened on Remembrance Day in 1984 – I say

ironically on Remembrance Day as all we can do it to

remember it as it’s been demolished. Apparently there

were too many stairs in the building, and it didn’t have

alternate disabled access. It didn’t matter that it was

the home of a Special Forces Airborne unit that as a

rule had very few, if any, disabled members even

though if we did they would have been made very

welcome.

I accept that perhaps I have become a grumpy old

man who is missing the point but clearly I have missed

the point for a very long time and for me time is up.

I implore one of you who reads this, or has a mate

who you think would fit, looks at taking up a role in one

of the State based branches of the Australian Com -

mando Association – we have them in the ACT, QLD,

NSW, VIC and WA. They are all most effective even

though they have different areas of concern to focus on

– even State by State.

In addition, the State Associations also nominate

who stands for the National Committee and I think they

need to now do more work there as the focal points for

this national body are clearly changing.

Finally, I did warn the then SOCAUST that removing

the Green Beret from 1 Cdo Regt would be a divisive

factor, and I know the current SOCAUST agrees that it

is likely to be that.

The modern-day Commando seems to think that

Commando history started less than 20 years ago.

However, the permission of the Commandant General

of the Royal Marines to, just prior to 1955, allow one of

the “colonies” to adopt their famous headdress,

especially for part-time soldiers, was an incredibly

significant event.

To first have the All-Corps availability of the Beret

inevitably whittled away and then to allocate it just to

one full-time reasonably new SF unit flies in the face of

the history of the Beret.

(Continued next page)


To financially reward full-time Commandos fairly for

their skill sets makes all the sense in the world to me

but the Beret was never meant to be tied to pay levels.

To then make the Beret an RA Inf only award is yet

another decision that flies in the face of history yet

again.

And then to find out that this outcome was a plan

hatched by a few individuals almost seven years ago

casts doubt on the veracity of all the justifications we

have read regarding the decision.

I feel mainly for the future part time members of the

1 st Commando Regiment who are yet to join and will

never experience the satisfaction of pulling on a

military dress item that has such international signifi -

cance all because a few didn’t want to share it in the

way it was initially introduced for all members of

Australian Commando units.

I have nothing more to offer other than wishing all

members of current and future Commando units the

very best.

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PRESIDENT’S REPORT

19 June 2025

RECENT ACTIVITIES

ANZAC Day

Preparations

Intelligence Bureau (AIB). FELO specialised in pro pa -

ganda and psychological warfare. Allan was later

promoted to Sergeant and is listed as having parti -

cipated in Operations LOUSE, SHRILL and finally AGAS

in British North Borneo for which he was awarded a

Mentioned in Dispatches.

Debbie and Kristy West whose father and grandfather were also

members of Z Special Unit patiently sitting with Allan preparing

for the Anzac Day march.

Source: Anthony Bosch

Former Commandos cleaning the Martin Place memorial

prior to Anzac Day.

Source: Facebook

Dawn Service

Anzac Day this year, Mr Miles chairman of Opera -

tion Pilgrimage gave the Ode at the new memorial

during the dawn service in Georges Heights. See later

in this report.

Sydney ANZAC Day Parade

During this year’s Anzac Day Parade marching in

front of ACA New South Wales were family members

carrying the former NSW Z Special Unit Association

Banner and marching with them was William ‘Allan’

Campbell Russell. Allans’ operative number was AKK

124 and he initially served with 3 Field Ambulance part

of the EMU Force in the South-west Pacific Area and

was taken on strength by Z Special Unit on 26 January

1944. He had previously been attached to FELO (Far

East Liaison Office) which was another special

operations unit under the command of the Allied

Carrying the banner is Allan’s daughter Tany Bosch and her

husband Eddie. The two women walking with Allan are Debbie

and Kristy West along with a contemporary commando veteran.

The banner was made by the West girls as the official association

banner had been lost. The ACA NSW contingent can be seen

following behind the Z Special Unit Association Banner 1 .


1

The New South Wales Branch of the Z Special Unit Association was the

only State branch that adopted this ‘modernised’ version of the Asso -

ciation badge.


Twenty-seven former commandos attended

the unveiling Ceremony.

Source: Defence media

Allan in discussion with two contemporary commando veterans

prior to the Anzac Day Parade.


Media from Channel 9 news interviewing Allan Russell

at the March in Sydney.


Permanent Commando Memorial

unveiled in Sydney

Author: Corporal Michael Rogers, Army News

Note: This article has been modified slightly by the

editor to correct several errors of fact contained within

the original article.

A permanent memorial to the Officers Com -

manding (OC)s of 1 Commando Company has been

dedicated at the site of the unit’s original barracks in

Georges Heights, Sydney.

Twenty-seven former commandos, wearing their

Green berets, surrounded the sandstone plinth as it

was unveiled by former Chief of Army, Lieutenant

General (Ret’d) Ken Gillespie, on April 6.

It accompanies an historical marker that was un -

veiled in June last year to mark the location of the

former barracks, which is now parkland, with none of

the original buildings remaining.

The bronze plaque lists the OCs of the company,

from its raising in 1956 until 2000.

It accompanies a historical marker unveiled in June

2024 to mark the location of the former barracks, which

is now parkland with no original buildings remaining.

The project was undertaken by Allan Miles, chair -

man of Operation Pilgrimage, a group of former com -

mandos who conduct charitable works.

“I can’t express the emotions I had at the ceremony,

and to be in the presence of so many of my mates who

travelled from all over the country to witness the

acknowledgement of our service,” Mr Miles said.

Seeing the plinth unveiled after years of work was

profoundly satisfying for Mr Miles, who served in the

unit from 1963 to 1976.

“When we placed the plinth on its base, a young

kookaburra flew down and landed on it – a positive

sign – then it started laughing, and so did we,” he said.

“The day was everything I could have asked for. It

doesn’t get much better than that.”

1 Commando Company was raised in 1955 in

Sydney as a Citizen Military Force (CMF) unit to main -

tain the specialist commando and special operations

skills learnt by Australian forces during World War 2.

It was the first post war unit of its kind to be

concurrently raised in Australia along with 2 Com -

mando Company in Melbourne.

The companies operated independently until they

were combined to form the 1 st Commando Regiment in

1981, though they remained in their original locations

until, in 2006 when 1 Commando Company relocated

from Georges Heights to HMAS Penguin in Balmoral

and later to Holsworthy Barracks.

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The battle banner covering the plinth was presented to Mark

Skipper, son of Major Jack Skipper, OC 1 Commando Company

1959-1961.

Source: Defence media

The first OC of 1 Commando Company was Major

William Grant, a WW2 commando veteran who served

in the 2/5 th Independent Company and later with 2/12 th

Commando Squadron.

The memorial was dedicated by Australian War

Memorial Director Matt Anderson, and blessed by

Major Brett Gallagher, of the Salvation Army.

Peter McCaffrey

President

ACANSW



AUSTRALIAN COMMANDO ASSOCIATION VICTORIA

Incorporated in Victoria A0014983Z

ABN 87 282 474 621

PRESIDENT’S REPORT

12 June 2025

RECENT ACTIVITIES

ANZAC Day

Dawn Service at 2 Coy, 1 st Commando Regi -

ment Fort Gellibrand. Once again, the OC and CSM

of 2 Coy had organised a memorable Dawn Service

followed by a gunfire breakfast attended by many

current and former unit members, ACAVIC Association

Members and families as well as a few local Williams -

town inhabitants.

Melbourne ANZAC Day Parade

With 2025 being the 80 th anniversary of the suc -

cessful conduct of operations SEMUT I-IV, the ACAVIC

Committee approved the inclusion of the historical Z

Special Unit Association Banner In the march pre -

ceding the Commando Association Banner. The

banner was donated to ACAVIC as part of the hand -

over of funds and memorabilia from the M & Z Com -

mando Association Victoria in 2010 when the asso -

ciations amalgamated.

The Z Special Unit Association Banner proudly displayed at the end

of the ANZAC Day march in the grounds of the Melbourne Shrine

of Remembrance. Left to right are: CDTLCPL Thakur, Vyom,

CDTLCPL Kamal Kumar, Arjun Raj, CDTSGT Tang, Khoi,CDTLCPL

Hau, Damien, CDTLCPL Rajesh, Tanav.

Source: D.Pelling

Melbourne High School Army cadets prepare for the

commencement of the ANZAC day parade.

Source: D.Pelling

Former Warrant Officer Class 2 Dave Waterston proudly marches

with his grandfather’s Boer War, father’s World War Two

and his own service medals.

Source: Facebook


Other Victorian ANZAC Day Ceremonies

Former 2 Coy member CPL Louis Van der Heyden and a civilian

friend Matt Nidd at the Mansfield Dawn Service.

Source: Facebook

Bruce Parker, Robert McDowell and Barry Rust.

Source: D. Pelling

Former LT Mike Hall in Green Beret with friends at the Chelsea

Cenotaph for the ANZAC day service.

Source: Facebook

ANZAC Day Luncheon

ACAVIC conducted our traditional ANZAC day

luncheon at the Amora Hotel in Richmond and was

attended by 60 members and family as well as a

number of families from past World War Two veterans

including Elizabeth Mackenzie, formerly from Head -

quarters, Services Reconnaissance Department. Eliza -

beth is one of only a handful of World War 2 veterans

from the WW2 Commando and Special Operations

community still resident in Victoria.

Elizabeth conversing with her grandson Adam Jesser,

a Sergeant with the Victorian Police.

Source: D. Pelling

Family of Charlie Black, 2/4 buying raffle tickets from Secretary

Glenn’s grandchildren.

Source: D. Pelling


Robin Hood Trophy

The archery activity held on 1 June at the Yarra

Valley Archery Park was the best attended archery

event to date to compete for the coveted Robin Hood

trophy, a tri association shield between SASAV, (Royal

Marine Association-Vic) RMA & ACAV.

There were 23 attendees, the majority were repre -

senting Commandos.

Top Male shooter was Travis Holland (SASAV)

Top Female ~ Susan (RMA)

Top Junior ~ Ben Howard (ACAV)

Encouragement Award ~ Bev Fuller (SASAV)

The Robin Hood Shield was closely contested with

only 4 points separating the 3 teams. The winners

were:

Gold

ACAV

Silver

RMA

Bronze

SASAV

Both RMA and SASA have vowed to unseat the

Commandos from their perch at the top of the tree.

After the trophies were awarded and formalities

concluded 21 of the participants adjourned to the

Home Hotel in Launching Place 500 metres down the

road where tall tales and true were recounted over a

meal and a few beverages. All who attended thorough -

ly enjoyed the day and agreed to attend the event next

year and to encourage friends to attend.

The activity is very low key and relaxed in a homely

all-weather venue.

Thanks to our hosts, Bev & Ian, at Yarra Valley

Archery Park for another great family activity.

FORTHCOMING ACTIVITIES

September Shrine Commemoration

The annual Commando Memorial Service will be

conducted at the Shrine of Remembrance com -

mencing at 12:30 on Sunday, 28 th September 2025.

Presidents’ Shield Pistol Shoot

The annual Presidents’ Shield Pistol Shoot will again

be conducted at the Yarra Valley Pistol Club on the

morning of Sunday, 12 th October where once again

ACAVIC will face off against SAS Vic and potentially

some others from the special force’s community.

HISTORICAL COLLECTION

Unfortunately, with the passing of World War 2

veterans and their spouses ACAVIC continues to

receive donations of significant items for the Historical

Collection as a result of our ongoing social interactions

with the World War Two veterans’ families. A recent

donation of an unpublished diary of a member of 2/4

Cdo Sqn and a comprehensive collection of 2/4 th the

Commando Squadron Magazine were donated by

Lorraine Black, wife of ex President of WW2 Com -

mando Association, Charlies (known as Charlie) Black

2/4 th . Cheryl Hoban has donated the diary of Mac

Walker Doug. Cheryl is the liaise person for 2/4 th Assoc,

and has been for many years. Her father was 2/4 th Frank

Turner.

Also received from Rodney McNabb, the son of

Sandy McNabb, formerly of No.1 Australian Inde -

pendent Company and the author of the unit’s history

‘We Were the First’ are his father’s diaries from his time

with the company in Bougainville. In addition, from the

family of former Captain John Morrison MID (2/8 Cdo

Coy, SRD and Force 136) we received his handwritten

Signals Log for the duration of Operation PONTOON

in Malaya where he was the liaison with the Malaysian

Communist Party guerrillas for the period 24 February-

December 1945.

Looking for a Klepper Aries Canoe. ACAVIC is

working with the recently appointed 1 Commando

Regiment historian, Major Craig Smith (who is a long

serving army reservist with extensive history at the

Army History Unit) and together we will be partici -

pating with the Curator at the Infantry Museum to

assist in planning for the Infantry Museum to conduct a

‘Commando Exhibition’ commencing in September

2025 to coincide with the Infantry Corps Conference

And then remain for a further 12 months. The Infantry

Museum are very interested in acquiring a Klepper

Aries Canoe for their permanent Infantry and Special

Forces equipment display. I am aware that there are

such canoes held by ACA and SASA members and

other collectors around the country and if any reader is

interested in donating a canoe to this worthwhile cause

then please contact either the Editor of this magazine

or the Curator at the Infantry Museum.

November Commemoration and 80 th Anniversary

of the AGAS and SEMUT Operations

This year’s commemoration at the Tidal River Com -

mando Memorial will be conducted on Sunday, 23 rd

November commencing at 12:30. This year will be the

80 th anniversary of the successful AGAS and SEMUT

Operations in North Borno in 1945.

Fort Gellibrand Christmas Function

This year’s Christmas function at Fort Gillibrand will

be conducted on Saturday, 13 th December com -

mencing at 12:30. All more members of ACAVIC are

welcome to attend.

JAYWICK SERIES

Further to the last edition, the production is going

well. The webpage specifically for ‘Commando’

readers can be found at www.wonder ship. com. au/ -

opera tion-jaywick and has been recently updated to

include more information and photography.

DOCUMENTARY ON OPERATION COPPER

ACAVIC is assisting documentary maker, Mr John

Schindler, who is currently midway through producing

a documentary on Operation COPPER. John is also

being assisted by Jack Thurgar, SC MBE OAM RFD

Major (Ret’d), a member of ACA. In the production of


the movie John has been attempting to contact

families of former SRD operatives who participated in

Operation COPPER but to date has been unable to

locate family members of the following deceased

operatives.

a. NX 82 924 Lieutenant Alan Robert Gubbay.

b. VX 6078 Lieutenant Thomas Joseph Barnes.

c. NX 202843 Lance Corporal Spencer Henry

Walklate.

d. WX 27629 Signaller John Richard Chandler.

e. NX 92651 Private Ronald Edward Eagleton.

If any reader knows of any family contacts of the

above can they get them to contact John Schindler

directly on Mobile: +61 418 740182 or info@schind -

ler.com.au or through his website www.schind -

ler.com.au. Further family involvement in this project

could be of great benefit to all involved and the final

documentary.

Ongoing liaison

ACAVIC continues to liaise with, and attend regular

meetings with, the Victorian Veterans Council, Legacy,

RSL and DVA networks to promote ACAVIC’s

objectives/expectations and support require ments in

the very crowded Welfare and Advocacy arena.

Doug Knight

President

ACAVIC

Mobile: 0400 877 323

Email: acavic.president@gmail.com

23 June 2025

TIDAL RIVER WALKING TRACK OPEN SPACE

DEVELOPMENT - UPDATE

Currently there is no update on the conduct of the

review of Parks Victoria commissioned earlier this year

by the Victorian State Government and despite there

being a reduction in available funding for veteran

memorial and commemoration activities ACAVIC will

submit a grant proposal later this year to the Victorian

Veterans Council for maintenance and upgrading of

the Commando Memorial at Tidal River.

ACAVIC will also be working on a possible sub -

mission for the construction of a Special Operations

memo rial to be co-located with the Commando

Memorial. It is not widely known that there were

operatives that deployed on early Inter Allied Services

Department (IASD) 1 operations including LIZARD 1 and

most likely LIZARD 2 into Timor in 1942.

WELFARE

Following the recent completion of the Royal

Commission into Defence and Veteran Suicide and the

ongoing enhancement of repatriation legislation,

formal introduction of the new legislation on 1 st July

2026 is currently being planned by Australian Com -

mando Association (ACA) - National and Victoria

branches, Australian Special Air Service Association

(ASASA) - National and VIC branch and the Australian

Special Operations Engineer Regiment Association

(SOERA) National and VIC branch. The current concept

is to establish a Special Forces Veterans Hub to provide

a variety of welfare services to the estimated 40,000 exservice

personnel who have served within Special

Forces units with an additional appx 150 current and

former serving SOCOMD members in Victoria and

Tasmania. Current projections is that the submission

will be forwarded to Defence in the coming months for

consideration.

1

Later to become Special Operations Australia (SOA).


MAY

SIGNIFICANT COMMANDO DATES

MAY to SEPTEMBER

May 1941

No 1 Independent Company was raised and trained at

Wilsons Promontory Victoria, the home and birthplace

of the Australian Commando. 2021 marks the 80 th

Anniversary of the Australian Commando. Happy

birthday to all former and current Australian

Commandos.

May 1942

2/6 th & 2/7 th Ind Coy’s were formed at Wilsons

Promontory, Victoria.

6 May 1969

WO2 Ray Simpson, DCM is awarded the Victoria Cross

for Valour in South Vietnam. Ray was attached to

AATTV from 1 Commando Company.

25 May 2006

Alpha Commando Company, 4 RAR (Commando)

deploys to Timor Leste to help secure the country as a

result of the unrest in the country. The Coy secures the

Air Point Disembarkation/Departure and enable the

ADF to make entry into the county.

JUNE

17 May 1942

Inter-Allied Services Department (ISD) is formed in

Melbourne, Victoria.

01 June 1942

ISD begins training of Operatives for deployment to

Timor at School, Wilsons Promontory, Victoria.

May 1943

53 men of 2/3 rd Cav Commando Squadron conducts an

attack on Ambush Knoll in New Guinea against the

Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) and takes the position.

The IJA attempts several counter attacks over several

days but are repelled each time.

07 May 1943

M Special Unit is raised and became the Surveil -

lance unit of SRD. As a consequence, all Coast watcher

units eventually came under command M Special Unit.

29 May 1943

2/7 th Independent Company conducts combat

operations in Bena Bena, New Guinea as part of Bena

Force.

3 May 1945

2/4 th Commando Squadron is involved in one of the last

campaigns of WW2 when it landed on Tarakan Island

and took part in the Borneo campaign. In the coming

days and weeks, the 2/4 th Cdo Sqn saw extensive

service during the liberation of Tarakan, suffering heavy

casualties with four officers and fifty-two other ranks

being killed or wounded in this time.

8 May 1945

The War in Europe ends with the total surrender of

Germany and becomes known as Victory in Europe

Day (VE Day).

11 May 1945

2/9 th & 2/10 th Cav Commando Squadrons land at Dove

Bay, Wewak and established the beachhead. The

landing also included 2/3 Machine Gun Bn, plus a

Battery of 75mm, manned by 2/1 Tank Attack Regt.

13 - 19 May 1945

2/10 th Cav Cdo Sqn is surrounded by Japanese troops

in the Wewak area and fights off numerous attacks.

29 June 1942

2/5 th Independent Company launched a raid on a

Japanese aerodrome at Salamaua, New Guinea, the

first Allied attack on Japanese land forces anywhere.

05 June 1945

2/10 th Cav Commando Squadron in action against

Japanese bunker system south of the main Aust ralian

position in Mandi during the Aitape - Wewak

Campaign.

25 June 1955

1 Commando Company (Sydney) first parade at

Victoria Barracks, NSW.

June – July 2000

Elements of Bravo Commando Company, 4 RAR

(Commando) deploys to the Solomon Islands as part of

Operation PLUM BOB, to help withdrawal of Australian

Nationals from the troubled Island.

10 – 14 June 2010

Alpha Commando Company, 2 nd Commando Regiment

engages heavy insurgent numbers during the Battle of

Eastern Shah Wali Kot, Afghanistan. This battle is later

awarded the Battle Honour Eastern Shah Wali Kat,

which is the first battle honour to be awarded to an

Australian Commando unit and Australian Special

Forces.

19 June 2009

4 RAR (Commando) was renamed the 2 nd Com mando

Regiment at Tobruk Lines, Holsworthy Barracks NSW.

22 June 2013

CPL Cameron Stuart Baird, MG is Killed in Action

and subsequently is Posthumously Awarded the

Victoria Cross (VC) for Valour, whilst serving as a

Commando Section Commander with Bravo Com -

pany, 2 nd Commando Regiment in Afghanistan.


Significant Commando Dates

(Continued from previous page)

JULY

July 1942

2/8 th Independent Company (Double White) was raised

at Wilsons Promontory, Victoria.

1 July 1942

133 men of No. 1 Independent Company drowned

when the MV Montevideo Maru sank after being

torpedoed by USS Sturgeon off the northern coast of

the Philippines.

17 July 1942

Four operatives of ISD are landed in Portuguese Timor

as part of Operation LIZARD from the MV Kuru. They

linked up with Sparrow Force sometime later in Mape.

This is the first Operation by ISD later renamed the

Services Reconnaissance Department (SRD) the cover

name for Special Operations Australia (SOA) during

WW2.

22 July 1943

The 2/8 th Cav Commando Squadron sailed for Lea,

New Guinea via Milne Bay on board the SS Ormiston.

1 July 1945

2/3 rd & 2/5 th Cav Commando Squadrons landed on

Green Beach in Balikpapan.

7 July 1945

The 10 remaining SRD members of Operation RIMAU

are executed in Singapore.

July to August 1945

2/6 th Cavalry (Commando) Regiment in action

defending Bandi Plantation during the Aitape - Wewak

Campaign.

7 July 1955

2 Commando Company (Melbourne) was raised at

Albert Park Barracks, Melbourne VIC.

27 July 1955

The Commandant Royal Marines grants approval for 1

and 2 CMF Commando Companies to wear the

Sherwood Green Beret once they had met the same

physical requirements and competency tests as UK

Army Commandos who supported the RM Commando

Brigade.

22 July 2002

Tactical Assault Group – East (TAG-E) (C Cdo Coy), 4

RAR (Commando) deemed ‘Operational’ and is the

Federal Governments’ force of choice for a resolution

to a Domestic Counter Terrorism Incidents in Australia.

AUGUST

2 August 1942

2/6 th Independent Company deploys to New Guinea

on board MS Tasman.

3 August 1942

ISD/SRD training is moved to the ‘House on the Hill’ in

Fairview, Cairns. It was also known as Z Experimental

Station (ZES).

August 1943

2/4 th Cav Commando Squadron lands in Milne Bay,

New Guinea

2/5 th Independent Company reforms as the 2/5 th

Cavalry (Commando) Squadron (Cdo Sqn) of the 2/7 th

Cavalry Commando Regiment encamps at Wongabel

on the Atherton Tablelands after returning from New

Guinea.

6 August 1945

At 0815 Japanese Standard Time, the Atomic Bomb

“Little Boy” is dropped from USAAF B-29 Super fortress

(Enola Gay) on the Japanese city of Hiroshima, killing

over 66,000 people.

9 August 1945

The Atomic Bomb “Fat Man” is dropped from USAAF

B-29 Superfortress (Bocks’ Car) on the Japanese city of

Nagasaki, killing approx. 40,000 people.

15 August 1945

Offensive action against Japan ends and is commonly

known as Victory over Japan Day (VJ Day). However,

SRD and some other Army units were conducting

mopping up operations against Japanese troops in

Borneo until late September 1945. These Japanese

troops did not believe the war had ended until the

Japanese Emperor made a public announcement.

August to September 2005

Alpha Commando Company, 4 RAR (Commando)

deploys to Uruzgan Province, Afghanistan as part of

Special Forces Task Group (SFTG) Rotation I.

14 July 1956

CAPT George Cardy of 1 Commando Company is

presented the first Australian Green Commando Beret

on an Australian Commando. Unit personnel from both

companies who undertook Commando training in the

UK were awarded Royal Marine Green Beret upon the

completion of their training and assessment.


Special Operations in Support of Allied Landings

in Hollandia in April 1944

By Noah Salittle, a former member of 2 Commando Company with an interest in military history.

Introduction

Allied (mainly US) forces landed simul ta -

neously on 22 nd April 1944 in Hollandia (now

Jayapura, then in what was Dutch New

Guinea, part of the Netherlands East Indies (NEI)) in

Operation RECKLESS; and Aitape (actually at the Tadji

airfield, about 7 km southeast of Aitape down the

coast, in New Guinea) in Operation PERSECUTION.

These were the first of six landings along the north

coast of the island of New Guinea between April and

July 1944. The twin Allied landings at Hollandia were

the first stepping stone out of the Australian territories

of Papua and New Guinea, on the path to the

liberation of Philippines and the intended final invasion

of Japan.

It is also of interest in that it sheds light on the

achievements of one of the less well-known Australian

World War II “special” organisations, the Far Eastern

Liaison Office (FELO).

Background

The Japanese 18 th Army command had anticipated

a new Allied amphibious operation against the north -

east New Guinea coast by March or April 1944. Their

estimates placed the most likely area of attack between

Madang and Hansa Bay, including Karkar Island. The

Japanese were also aware a group of “enemy agents”

had landed from a submarine in Tanahmerah Bay in

Dutch New Guinea. A similar incident was reported in

late March 1944 in the Aitape area. 3 These and other

instances seemed to indicate that “enemy (i.e. Allied)

espionage activities” were being rapidly expanded. 4

Wewak was nevertheless rated the next most probable

target, with Hollandia least likely but not entirely

excluded. 5 (Continued on page 21)

Figure 1 - Landings in New Guinea April to July 1944 –

note Hollandia (RECKLESS) and Aitape (PERSECUTION)

both on 22 Apr 1944 1

Why of interest to us

Operation RECKLESS is of interest for a number of

reasons, including illustrating the challenges in:

• operating in a multi-national Allied envi ron -

ment – US, Australian and Dutch elements were

involved;

• co-ordinating the activities of multiple “special”

Australian and Dutch agencies 2 ; and

• inserting, maintaining and extracting small units

in remote areas far from timely friendly support.

It also begs the questions of what effect, if any,

these operations had.

1

U.S. Army Center of Military History, US Army Campaigns of World War

II, New Guinea, <https://history.army.mil/html/books/072/72-9/in dex. -

html>, p. 20, (New Guinea) (accessed 25 Jun 2024).

2

The various Australian and Dutch “special” agencies had changes of

name and command and control arrangements throughout the war. In

short: the original Interallied Services Department (ISD) became Special

Operations Australia (SOA) (cover name Services Reconnaissance

Department (SRD)), nominally under the Allied Intelligence Bureau (AIB)

which was an Australian-led element under the (Allied) GHQ Southwest

Pacific Area (SWPA); the RAN Coast Watching Service morphed a few

times, but ended up as the North East Area (NEA) Section of the AIB;

Dutch naval and military intelligence staff started off as part of ISD, but

ended up as the Netherlands East Indies (NEI) Section of the AIB (the

Dutch who made up this section were from the SO/SI Branch of the newly

created Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service (NEFIS), i.e. NEFIS-III);

and the Military Propaganda Section of the AIB ended up as the Far

Eastern Liaison Office (FELO), but outside of the AIB. Except where

necessary, we’ll try and stick with the final names. “Z” Special Unit was

the UNCLAS means by which SOA could draw on logistics and

administrative support and was the unit to which AMF personnel at least

were posted; and “M” Special Unit performed a similar role for AIB HQ,

the NEA Section and for another organisation, the (British) Secret

Intelligence Australia (SIA).

3

The Tanahmerah Bay incident was presumably the “Harris” party from

AIB/NEA (see text) although the dates in the translation of the Japanese

text are perhaps incorrect. The Aitape incident could be the FELO “E”

Party (under AIB/NEA control) led by LT G A V Stanley RANVR which was

inserted in the Sepik River valley on 31 Mar 1944, although it did not

reach the immediate Aitape area until 3 weeks after the PERSECUTION

landing. It was however actively involved along with other parties in

reporting Japanese activities during the Allied follow-on operations in

that area. See NAA: B3476, 66B, Item 410718 at naa.gov.au, “Report by

Commander J C McManus, RAN (Supervising Intelligence Officer, North

Eastern Area, on North Eastern Area Operations covering period from

April 1943 – November 1945”, digital pp 9, 10 (NAA Item 410718); and

Feldt, Eric, The Coastwatchers, (Penguin Books, 1946), p. 376.

4

Reports of General MacArthur, Japanese Operations in the Southwest

Pacific Area, Volume II, Part I, prepared by his General Staff, complied

from Japanese Demobilization Bureaux records, Government Printing

Office, (Washington, D.C., 1994 edition), p. 261, footnote 40. <https:// -

history.army.mil/books/wwii/MacArthur%20Reports/MacArthur%20V1/in

dex.htm#contents>, (MacArthur Vol II)

5

MacArthur Vol II, p. 263


Contact us for more info…

https://www.flinders.edu.au/study/pathways/military-veterans


The Landings

Figure 4 - US 41 st Division troops landing in Humboldt Bay. 8

Around Hollandia, in the six weeks or so after

landing, US forces completed mopping-up operations

against Japanese stragglers with total losses to the

Americans of 124 killed, 28 missing, and 1,057

shown 42 wounded. Japanese forces suffered at least 3,300 killed

nd Division). 6 and 611 taken prisoner. 9

At Aitape, US losses were light also – 19 dead and

40 wounded, with the Japanese suffering 525 killed

and 25 captured. 10

Strategically, RECKLESS and PERSECUTION had

isolated the various elements of the Japanese 18 th

Army in New Guinea and split it from the Japanese 2 nd

Army in Dutch West New Guinea. A US official history

noted:

“The Hollandia operation was a masterpiece of

sound planning that took full advantage of

extremely accurate intelligence obtained from

reading Japanese codes. For MacArthur it proved

the decisive operation on New Guinea and was the

turning point in his war against the Japanese”. 11

Figure 2 - RECKLESS landings at Humboldt Bay (WHITE Beaches)

and Tanahmerah Bay (RED Beaches). Note the force landing at

Tanahmerah Bay should be the US 24 th Division (not the incorrectly

US deception plans fed into the Japanese pre dis po -

sition to expect an Allied landing in Hansa Bay. The

deception was so successful that on 22 nd April the US

24 th and 41 st Divisions, led by Lt. Gen. Robert L. Eichel -

berger, commander of I Corps and the RECKLESS Task

Force, landed unopposed 40 km miles apart in the

vicinity of Hollandia at Humboldt Bay (WHITE Beach)

and Tanahmerah Bay (RED Beach).

Simultaneously at Aitape, the US 163 rd Regimental

Combat Team (PERSECUTION Task Force) waded

ashore against no opposition.

Figure 3 - US 24 th Division landing at Tanahmerah Bay,

22 nd April 1944. 7

Special Operations

The only parts of the NEI that remained in Dutch

hands throughout the war were a few areas in Dutch

New Guinea. In April 1944, the Japanese occupied key

points on the north coast and their immediate

hinterlands, the Birdshead Peninsula in the western

part of the island, and only as far as about halfway

along the south coast to the (Australian) Papua border.

An Allied military force was present in Merauke

(southeast corner of Dutch New Guinea and only about

230 km from Australian islands in the Torres Strait) for

the duration of the war. Much of the rest of the island

was “no-man’s land”, occasionally patrolled or over -

flown by Allied and sometimes Japanese forces.

6

Reports of General MacArthur - The Campaigns of MacArthur in the

Pacific Volume 1, prepared by his General Staff, U.S. Government

Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1966, <https://history.army.mil/ -

books/wwii/MacArthur%20Reports/MacArthur%20V1/index.htm#con -

tents>, p. 147. (MacArthur Vol I)

7

Securing New Guinea: The U.S. Navy in Operations Reckless and Per -

secution 21–22 April 1944, Naval History and Heritage Command,

<https://www.history.navy.mil/browse-by-topic/wars-conflicts-andoperations/world-war-ii/1944/reckless-and-persecution.html>

(accessed

29 Jun 2024). (Securing New Guinea).

8

Salecker, Gene Eric Firestorm at Hollandia, Warfare History Network.

<https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/article/firestorm-at-hollandia/>

(accessed 21 Apr 2024)

9

Securing New Guinea

10

Wikipedia, <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Landing_at_Aitape>

(accessed 29 June 2024)

11

New Guinea, p. 19


There were many strands to Special Operations

support for the US landings in Hollandia and Aitape in

April 1944:

• The first Allied attempt to infiltrate the area to

collect intelligence on Hollandia had ended in

failure in October 1943. All members of this

Dutch/Australian party – WHITING (21A) 12 - were

killed or executed before they even reached

Dutch New Guinea.

• The Australian “Harris” 13 Party landed near Hol -

landia in March 1944, but after a contact with

Japanese soon after landing all were killed, died,

went missing or eventually evaded to friendly

lines after much hardship.

• Two Dutch parties starting from the interior

moved north to Hollandia but arrived in their AO

just after the US landings – CARROT and SHARK.

• An Australian party, sometimes together with the

two Dutch parties, moved north from the interior

to their AO near Hollandia – FELO “O” Party.

• The US Alamo Scouts carried out a number of

beach and immediate hinterland recons on and

just after the landings; and

• Special Operations Australia (SOA) planned, but

never launched, 5 operations to collect intel li -

gence or carry out raids.

WHITING

While it is not directly relevant to operations in

support of RECKLESS and PERSECUTION, there had

been a previous attempt to collect intelligence in the

Hollandia area – the ill-fated WHITING party 6 months

earlier, in October 1943. 14 This was an operation

planned by what was then the NEI Section of the then

ISD 15 in 1942 and, unlike all the other ISD operations in

New Guinea, WHITING did not pass to AIB, Section

‘C’ 16 in December 1942. The party, almost entirely

Dutch, consisted of: LT H N Staverman, KNIL 17 ; CPL D

J Topman, KNIL; SGT L G Siffleet, AIF; PTE H Pattiwael,

KNIL; and PTE N Raharing, KNIL.

SGT Siffleet was an AIF member of ISD (i.e. he was

posted to “Z” Special Unit) and was loaned to the

Dutch party because of his communications skills and

perhaps due to his Dutch heritage. 18

WHITING was accompanied most of the way by

NEA’s LOCUST party (itself a former ISD party) and was

under LOCUST’s control, until such time as they split off

for Hollandia. The combined party flew from Port

Moresby to Bena Bena (about 100 km NW of

Japanese-held Lae up the Ramu Valley). From there

they set off on foot on 21 st January 1943, with about

400 native carriers. A week later CPL D J Topman,

KNIL, after a disagreement with the party leader

Staver man was returned to Australia. On 10 th June

1943 a base camp was established at Lumi, about 50

km southwest of Japanese-held Aitape. After the travel

by air to Bena Bena, the combined party had walked

about 830 km and travelled 360 km by waterway to

reach this point.

On 7 th July 1943 WHITING set off for Dutch New

Guinea with guides, police and porters and established

a base camp at Woma, about 25 km south of Vanimo

(and still about 25 km east of the border with Dutch

New Guinea). On 4 th October 1943, still inland from

Vanimo, Staverman and Pattiwael were ambushed by

the Japanese and Staverman was killed. Pattiwael

made his way back to the base where he rejoined the

others. Eventually Pattiwael, Siffleet and Raharing were

captured by local tribesman, taken to Aitape and

handed over to the Japanese. All the party members

were then executed. An infamous photograph of the

beheading of SGT Siffleet was taken by a Japanese

officer and recovered by US forces in Hollandia, after

the April 1944 US landings there. This photograph

regularly appears in articles about the exploits of

Australian special organisations during World War II.

12

21A was the Dutch codeword for this operation.

13

Named after its leader CAPT Harris (more on him later).

14

NAA: A3269, O8/A (Item 235327) Special Operations Australia

Vol II (Operations), (SOA Vol II), digital p. 203

15

ISD later became SOA.

16

The Australian part of Section ‘C’ (the original Coastwatchers) later

became NEA Section of AIB.

17

KNIL was the Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger – Royal Netherlands

Indies Army, which was the Dutch military force in the NEI.

18

Siffleet, Leonard G. NX143314 (N213944), b. Gunnedah, NSW 14 Jan

1916, executed 24 October 1943. Notwithstanding the fact that

WHITING remained under ISD control, on 7 May 1943 while he was still

in the field, Siffleet was transferred from “Z” Special Unit to “M” Special

Unit.

Figure 5 - The execution of SGT Siffleet, AIF. 19

19

Australian War Memorial (AWM), https://s3-ap-southeast-2.amazon aws. -

com/ awm-media/collection/101099/screen/4096111.JPG (accessed 8

June 2025).


“Harris” Party

This was an intelligence collection operation

mounted by the NEA Section of the AIB, in support of

the upcoming Allied landings near Hollandia. 20 Hol -

landia was an area for which AIB would normally have

given precedence to the Dutch NEFIS. The Dutch how -

ever had so few people they could not provide a party

and moreover they had no-one who had ever been to

Hollandia, so NEA was tapped instead. The party made

available, the Harris Party, was composed of exper -

ienced operatives of campaigns in New Guinea and

the Islands. It consisted of CAPT G C “Blue” Harris 21 , LT

Ray Webber, SGT Ron Cream, PTE Phil Jeune, TPR

Gregory Shortis, GNR Jack Bunning, A/B Julius Mc -

Nicol, Indonesian SGT Launcelot as interpreter, and 4

native scouts – SGTs Yali, Mas, Buka and PTE Mariba.

merah and then move on foot to the Cyclops

mountains, overlooking from the north and west

respectively Lake Sentani, where the three Japanese

air fields were located, and Hollandia. The alternate

landing point was Muris Bay, about 25 km west of Cape

Tanahmerah, in which event the party would base

them selves on the high ground south of Lake Sentani.

Figure 7 - Harris Party key locations.

Figure 6 - The Harris party aboard USS DACE, prior to landing.

Left to right back row: PTE Phil Jeune, LT Ray Webber, CAPT G.C.

Harris, GNR Jack Bunning, TPR Gregory Shortis, SGT Launcelot

(KNIL), SGT Ron Cream (did not go ashore);

front row: PTE Mariba, SSGT Yali, Able Seaman Julius McNicol,

DSM, SGT Buka, SGT Mas. 22

The plan was for the party, with call sign 7DN, to

stay ashore for 2 weeks and then be extracted before

the Allied landings took place. The NEA com mu ni ca -

tions group at the BULLDOZER camp inland on the

Idenburg River was to act as a relay station for the

party’s communications.

The party embarked on US Submarine USS DACE in

Finschhafen, New Guinea. The party was to land in a

small cove on the northwestern tip of Cape Tanah -

20

The account of this operation is largely based on NAA 410718, digital

pp. 9 and 46; Feldt pp. 364-364; and Second World War Official

Histories, Volume VI – The New Guinea Offensives (1st edition), Chapter

28 – To Morotai and the Palaus, at the Australian War Memorial website,

<https://s3-ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/awm-media/col lection/ -

RCDIG1070065/document/5519394.PDF> (accessed 3 Jun 2024).

21

CAPT G. C. Harris, PX98 ; ANGAU, “M” Special Unit . Patrol officer; of

Lae, NG; b . 4 Jun 1911, Wales, UK . Executed by Japanese 25 Mar

1944.

22

Australian War Memorial, <https://s3-ap-southeast-2.amazon aws.com/ -

awm-media / col lection/P01090.001/ screen/6570960.JPG (accessed 21

Apr 2024)

Instead, after a periscope recon of Tanahmerah Bay

and after consultation between Harris and the sub -

marine captain, they landed on the night of 23 rd March

1944 at a beach about 16 km east of Cape Tanah -

merah. Fortunately (for him) SGT Cream was taken ill

with malaria and could not disembark with the now 11

strong party.

A small reconnaissance party, led by Harris, went

ashore first but were capsized and discovered by local

inhabitants. Harris tried to signal to abort the mission,

but the remainder of the party nevertheless made their

way ashore and were likewise capsized, resulting in the

party’s radio becoming unserviceable. The party

remained in the vicinity of their landing site the rest of

that night and, after securing locals’ assistance to act as

guides, they set off inland the next morning. Within a

matter of hours, the party were contacted by a

Japanese force who had been alerted by the local

villagers – 3 members of the party, including Harris,

were killed and the remainder scattered. Two of the

party subsequently died or went missing while evading

(Mas and Buka), 4 hid in the vicinity and contacted

Allied forces when they landed (Jeune, Webber, Laun -

celot, McNicol), Yali made his own way to Aitape, a

little over 220 km to the east, down the coast) and

Mariba was captured and then escaped, eventually

recontacting Allied forces 8 months later. Jeune and

Webber had initially sought to make their way to the

BULLDOZER camp on the Idenburg River but realised

the impossibility of doing so and instead hid in the

general area of Hollandia.

www.survitecgroup.com


SHARK/CARROT/BULLDOZER/INTERLUDE

The following account of the Dutch parties moving

from the hinterland north to Hollandia is taken largely

from a Dutch account, unless otherwise specified. 23

Two parties were prepared to collect intelligence in

support of RECKLESS. They were to be inserted

together at a base in the remote highlands of Dutch

New Guinea and then move off, together for part of

the way, to two target areas. SHARK party was destined

for Hollandia (for the RECKLESS landing on 22 April

1944) and CARROT party was destined for Wakde

(about 200 km northwest of Hollandia, where a US

landing, Operation STRAIGHT LINE, was eventually

made on 17 th May 1944). In the case of SHARK, the

intelligence was to be collected specifically on

Japanese dispositions in the Hollandia-Sentani lake

area. 24

The parties flew into the Allied base at Merauke, on

the south east coast of Dutch New Guinea near the

border with (Australian) Papua on 17 th January 1944,

where preparations were already underway for a KNIL

group (BULLDOZER) who would establish a base camp

in the interior about 560 km to the north on the Iden -

burg River. This camp was not to be under NEFIS

control but under the control of the Dutch Netherlands

Indies Civil Administration (NICA) territorial com -

mander in Merauke and reported to the KNIL HQ in

Melbourne. The camp included a KNIL protection

element which could be used to support both parties.

The camp was under the command of CPT J P K van

Eechoud 25 and had detailed to it, 1LT F E Meijnderts,

Health Officer 1 st Class van Duijl, an NCO and 7 men,

plus 4 infantry groups of 10 men.

The parties flew into the BULLDOZER site from

Merauke on 2 nd and 3 rd February 1944 by a Dutch Cata -

lina seaplane, which landed on the Idenburg River. A

reconnaissance of the immediate area showed no signs

of Japanese presence.

CARROT consisted of: 1LT RF de Bruine, 26 SGT R de

Jong, SGT PA Schelfhout, SGT Woewoeng, Navy

Communicator van der Bijl, SGT L Houkes, plus a 9-

member KNIL protective detail, and 3 porters.

SHARK consisted of: Naval Lt 3 rd Class H P Swart,

SGTMAJ D. Schram (communicator), SGT AF Heck,

CPLs Lengkong and Lompolioew, SGTMAJ Singerling,

a 9-member KNIL protective detail, and 4 porters.

Figure 8 - NEFIS-III members on a training exercise

in July/August 1943.

1 – de Bruine (CARROT); 2 – Schelfhout (CARROT);

3 – van Brandeler, head of the KI detachment; and

23

Nortier, J.J., Acties in de Archipel, (T Wever BV, Franeker, 1985), pp.

186-193.

24

NAA: A3269, C30. Item 235152, SHARK (NEFIS) Patrol Report, (NAA

235152), digital p. 5.

25

Van Eechoud was a former chief of police in Manokwari (a coastal town

in Dutch New Guinea) and KNIL reservist officer and spent the first part

of the war with a hold-out group of Ambonese and Papuans around the

Wissel Lake deep in the interior. He was evacuated to Australia in 1943

where he joined NICA (the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration)

which were militarised units of Dutch colonial administration who were

to follow the Allied landings in Indonesia and reintroduce Dutch rule.

After the Hollandia landings he joined the Americans in Hollandia as the

senior NICA officer attached to the United States Army. After the

Japanese surrender in August 1945 he became the commander of the

Dutch forces and NICA units in the whole of New Guinea. When, on 5 th

March 1946, New Guinea reverted to civil rule, van Eechoud continued

for a time as Acting Resident. See Penders, C.L.M., The West New

Guinea Debacle: Dutch Decolonisation and Indonesia, 1945-1962,

(Adelaide: Crawford House Publishing, 2002), pp. 87, 88.

Figure 9 - 2LT Swart (SHARK). 28

26

De Bruine had come to Australia with the van den Brandeler detachment

from the Korps Insulinde (KI) in Ceylon. KI was the Dutch SO/SI unit

which supplied staff to the Anglo-Dutch Country Section of SOE’s India

Mission (which later took up the cover name Force 136). The only part

of the NEI that India Mission (under the Allied Southeast Asia Com -

mand, SEAC) was responsible for was Sumatra. This detachment had

been sent to Australia to work under NEFIS to carry out operations in the

major part of the NEI which was in the AO of the Allied SWPA

Command.

27

<https://www.flickr.com/photos/charlesinshanghai/45882063055/>

(accessed 3 Jun 24)

28

Zedric, Lance, “Seagull Party - Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service

& The Alamo Scouts”, in Recon Magazine (March/April 2019 Issue)

(Seagull Party).


From the beginning the Dutch had problems with

communications, command and control, with NEFIS,

KNIL HQ and NICA all having a say. According to de

Bruine, “much of it came back to the old Dutch fault,

that there were too many people, who had something

to give orders for.”

On arrival at the BULLDOZER camp, van der Bijl (the

CARROT communicator) proved to be unsuited to the

field phase of the mission, and it was decided to leave

him at the base camp. The loss of this communicator

posed subsequent difficulties for communications.

By 10 th March 1944, all the preparations had been

done, and the party was ready to leave, except for the

problem they only had 1:250,000 maps (i.e. 1 cm = 2.5

kms). Adequate mapping was vital, for example, in

arranging resupply drops. The parties had been

pressing for aerial photos, but these were not

forthcoming due to bad weather, lack of aircraft and a

suspicion that no aircraft would be made available,

because GHQ had such low expectations of the parties

producing anything. With the backing of the head of

NEFIS-III in Melbourne, the parties were now refusing

to set off until they had adequate maps/photos. Finally

they received aerial photos of some resupply points

with scant explanatory details.

Back in Melbourne, CAPT van der Veen had just

become the head of Planning and Operations of

NEFIS-III. The head of NEFIS COL Spoor was con -

cerned that the parties might not get to their AOs in

time for the landings and had asked van der Veen

whether the terrain could be traversed in time. Van der

Veen went to the map of Dutch New Guinea (which

had many “white patches” on it) measured with his

hand the distance as the crow flies and said that any

infantryman could cross that distance in 14 days. Van

der Veen later recollected this conversation and said,

“Maybe I gave my answer too confidently because

Spoor then said: ‘Then go and get them there.’” He

was then ordered to go into the field and personally

make sure CARROT and SHARK got themselves to the

start point of their operational route, at Lereh (“only”

about 100 km southwest of Hollandia).

The next day van der Veen, and his 5-man pro -

tective detail (now termed the INTERLUDE party) was

on a Catalina flying boat on their way to Merauke.

When he had succeeded in getting SHARK and

CARROT to the start point at Lereh, he was to return to

Australia. Flying in with van der Veen to the Idenburg

base camp on 21 st March 1944 was an Australian FELO

party of 12 men (more on them later). It was decided to

fly all the parties from the BULLDOZER camp 50 km to

a suitable water landing point near the Lereh start

point, in order to reduce unnecessary foot movement

and save time.

An AIB/NEA base communications party was also

deployed to the BULLDOZER base camp (more on

them later also).

On 21 st and 22 nd March 1944 the combined

INTERLUDE/SHARK/CARROT/FELO parties were flown

from the BULLDOZER base camp in a Catalina to Rees

Lake, with a B25 Mitchell medium bomber flying cover.

The landing on and the egress from the “lake” proved

difficult, as the lake had many floating grass islands and

was much larger than expected. Some parties took 3

days to get out of the lake/swamp to dry land.

No sooner had parties reached dry land than locals

found them and agreed to act as guides. Six days later,

on 31 st March 1944, the party got to their step off point

at Lereh, having left behind their protection parties at

the edge of the swamp in order to make better time

and simplify resupply. INTERLUDE ended and van der

Veen could return – he left Lereh on 3 rd April and was

eventually picked up from Rees Lake on 16 th April.

Figure 10 - Approximate route of CARROT/SHARK parties.

It was decided to combine the two Dutch parties

and forget CARROT’s original AO at Wakde. CARROT

of course had anyway no communicator as he had

been left behind back at the BULLDOZER camp.

Over the next month the two parties slowly made

their way forward to the Hollandia AO, finally arriving

near Genjem (60 km west of Hollandia) on 23 rd April

1944, the day after the landings had started. The

parties had some close calls with small Japanese

parties seeking to escape Hollandia and at one stage

some of the party members had been surprised by the

Japanese and scattered, some making their way

independently all the way back to the start point at

Lereh.

Finally on 23 rd May 1944, the parties linked up with

US forces near Genjem and by 25 th May 1944, they

were on their way to the now well-established US base

at Hollandia.


Throughout the operation communications had

been muddled and unclear: CAPT van Eechoud at the

BULLDOZER camp supposedly had oversight of the

whole operation, but because the parties could not

make contact with BULLDOZER, their reports instead

went direct to Merauke. He also received reports from

the FELO party and the NEA base communications that

were not sent on to Merauke. According to van

Eechoud, “it was sometimes difficult to even deter -

mine who had sent a telegram.” The SHARK Patrol

Report noted in particular that “we regretted we did

not have direct communications with the US

Headquarters concerned” 29 (i.e. US 6 th Army).

SHARK/CARROT and the FELO party had occa -

sional contact with each other during this period, each

apparently remaining ignorant/suspicious of the other’s

tasks, but with the FELO party occasionally helping

SHARK/CARROT communications There was a sus pi -

cion in the Dutch camp that the FELO party had been

sent by GHQ SWPA to keep an eye on the Dutch. The

Dutch likewise were dismissive of the FELO party as

they, according to Dutch accounts at least, had no-one

in the group who could speak the local lingua franca

Malay (not true).

The large protection party at BULLDOZER was in

the end not needed, because there were only the most

tenuous of communications with SHARK/CARROT any -

way.

A Dutch post operation summary noted blandly that

SHARK/CARROT “got intelligence on Japanese

escape routes”. 30

FELO “O” Party

Unless otherwise noted, this account of FELO “O”

party is largely drawn from a manuscript by a member

of that party. 31

This was the first FELO operation outside of Aust -

ralian New Guinea and the members themselves

referred to it as “Operation Hollandia”. The group was

an experienced one – three of the Australians had

served in the Middle East and they had all served

previously on operations in New Guinea. The party

consisted of: CAPT R Cole; SGT A N Denning; SGT M

G Berrie – communicator, CPL A J Lulofs – who was of

Dutch descent and spoke Malay (the lingua franca of

the area); and 8 FELO-trained New Guinea policemen.

29

NAA 235152, p. 6

30

4283 'New Guinea Parties',betreffende de missies van diverse NEFISparties

(o.a. 'Oaktree') in de periode 1943-1944 met als doel het

inwinnen van militaire inlichtingen in door de Japanners bezet gebied,

Netherlands Archives, <https://www.archieven.nl/nl/zoe ken?mivast=0& -

mizig=210&miadt=298&micode=400&milang=nl&mizk_alle=%27New

%20Guinea%20Parties%27%2C%20betreffende%20de%20missies%20v

an%20diverse%20NEFIS-parties&miview=inv2>.

31

Far Eastern Liaison Office (F.E.L.O), - Dutch New Guinea Party “O”, By

QX10230 Maitland George (Phill) Berry. (Note: should be Berrie) (“O”

Party).

Prior to departure the party trained at the Jungle

Training Centre at Canungra and later at SOA’s Fraser

Commando School (FCS), both in Queensland.

Their mission was: “to discourage native co-opera -

tion with the enemy”; and “to gain intelligence for the

task force about to invade Hollandia”. Given that FELO

was essentially a military propaganda (psyops, in

modern parlance) organisation, it is no sur prise that

their first task would be psyops, but, as later noted,

there were few locals in the area to work with. Their

focus then shifted to gathering intelligence. As noted

in the FELO end of war report:

“Where FELO parties and agents operated in

enemy-occupied territory, they also had a subsidiary

function to collect intelligence and pass it to our

own forces”. 32

The party left Brisbane on 17 th March 1944 by a

Dutch Catalina flying boat for Merauke, via Townsville.

With them was the NEA communications group which

was to man their communications base camp. Flying in

with them was Dutch CAPT van der Veen, from

Melbourne, with his INTERLUDE group. Their task of

the NEA communications group was to relay messages

between the party and the NEA radio station located

close the US 6 th Army HQ near Finschhafen, New

Guinea.

Despite high-level agreement between the Dutch

and AIB HQ, on arrival in Merauke on 19 th March, the

FELO party felt unwelcome and received, it seemed to

them, only grudging co-operation from the Dutch at

Merauke. The Dutch apparently did not want FELO

operating there nor did they want New Guinea

policemen to accompany the FELO party. Given the

party had the approval of GHQ SWPA, there was little

the Dutch in Merauke could do though. The FELO

party knew there would be two Dutch patrols operating

in essentially the same area, but they had no visibility

of the tasks of those patrols. As far as “O” Party were

concerned, they just wanted to be left alone to get on

with their own job.

The party flew into the BULLDOZER base camp on

20 th March 1944, with the NEA comms team and two

days later, on 22 nd March, they were flown by Catalina

on a short 20-minute flight to land on the Rees Lake,

near the start point of their mission at Lereh. Like the

Dutch party of van der Veen, CARROT and SHARK

before them, they had difficulty negotiating the swamp

around the lake and at one stage joined up with the

Dutch. After parting ways in the swamp, eventually

CARROT, SHARK, INTERLUDE and “O” Party all

eventually found themselves together at Lereh. By this

stage they had had constant rain since leaving the base

32

NAA A3269 , T 3/A, Item 235384, Report on the Activities of the Far

Eastern Liaison Office for the Period June 1942 to Sep 1945, digital p.

6, (NAA 235384).


camp on the Idenburg River. The combined parties

remained at Lereh doing short patrols out for a week or

so. The parties then moved off, sometimes combined

moving up and down the tracks depending on where

supply drops had been arranged, making their way

closer to Hollandia.

Over the next few weeks, they were in occasional

contact with the combined SHARK/CARROT, some -

times sharing resupply drops and helping the Dutch

with their communications.

Their impression of the Dutch was poor – in their

view, the Dutch apparently had poor tactical aware -

ness, e.g. often camping in native villages and they

were unfit for the rigours of the terrain; they hadn’t

brought any “trade goods” with them to secure local

help – and “O” party had to lend them some of their

own goods; their porters were untrustworthy (they

were prisoners on release) and the Indonesian police

(or perhaps KNIL members ?) with them seemed sullen

and unwilling. Locals told the Australians that they had

been treated harshly by the Dutch and their “Malay

police”. The Australians believed that they got on far

better with the locals than did the Dutch.

By 21 st April 1944 (the day before the RECKLESS

landings) they were close to the Hollandia area and

were directed to move closer in order to give the

Japanese the impression they were a large force. They

had had only one contact with the Japanese before the

landings, but in the weeks after there were numerous

contacts with groups of Japanese fleeing south and

then west through inland routes to move west up the

coast to Japanese positions at Sarmi. They found

them selves essentially in the middle of a major

Japanese escape route.

Over this period, the party accounted for 52

Japanese killed. When they finally joined up with US

forces around Genjem on 22 nd May they had been on

the move for 62 days. They moved from there to

Hollandia for return to Australia.

The FELO history notes that:

“much information (on) Japanese movements

was obtained and passed to US 6 th Army. Very

few natives were contacted, as the country was

thinly populated. For this operation CAPT Cole

was awarded the Military Cross, SGT Berrie the

Military Medal and CPL Lulofs a Mention-in-

Despatches.” 33

NEA Communications Support

NEA Section of AIB provided communications

support for these operations. On 21 st March 1944 a

W/T relay station was established at the BULLDOZER

camp. Its function was to relay information from the

33

NAA 235384, digital pp. 31, 32

Dutch parties operating in the area and to act as an

alternative link for NEA’s (soon to fail) Harris party. 34

The base station had call sign 4LF and consisted of

CAPT Millar, SGT Baillie, SGT Morphett and SGT Atkin.

Its tasks were to relay traffic for 7DN (Harris) and for

8PV (Cole) (FELO) for VIV LT Paterson, DSIO, New

Guinea at Cape Cretin (about 7 km south of Finsch -

hafen, New Guinea, near the US 6th Army HQ). It was

also responsible for passing administrative traffic

between the Dutch administration at Merauke and the

Dutch at the camp. 35

Figure 11 - NEA communications network from base station

(VIV) to parties in the field and communications within

Dutch New Guinea.

On 22 nd April 1944, NEA also put two “intercept”

(i.e. relay) stations ashore with US forces at Hollandia

(2OP, CAPT Book, AIF) and Tadji (6WD, LT Aiken, AIF).

These stations were “responsible for keeping all local

Operational Authorities informed of all AIB intelligence

received from Field Parties”. 36

Alamo Scouts

The US 6 th Army in New Guinea felt the need for an

organic reconnaissance capability that could not meet

their own existing forces or those of the AIB/NEA. The

US Navy had established the Amphibious Scouts

and for a time in 1943 experienced members of

AIB/NEA were attached to this unit. It was however not

a happy union and both sides were relieved to part

ways. This unit was disbanded in December 1943. 37

Those opera tions were later described by LCDR Eric

Feldt (Super vising Intelligence Officer (SIO), i.e. the

head of NEA, until April 1943) as “adventures, not

calculated operations”. 38 In order to create his own

34

NAA 410718, digital p. 9

35

NAA: B3476, 148 PART 1, Item 509465 at naa.gov.au, “North Eastern

Area Status Reports – Coastwatching”, p. 271. (NAA 509465)

36

Operations of the Allied Intelligence Bureau, GHQ SWPA, Volume IV,

Intelligence Series, G-2, GHQ Far East Command, 1948, p. 82 (AIB Vol

IV); and NAA 509465, digital pp. 308. 309

37

Finlayson, Kenneth, Alamo Scout Diary, https://arsof-history.org/ -

articles/v4n3_alamo_scouts_page_1.html, p. 5. (Alamo Scout Diary)

38

Feldt, p. 331


recon nais sance force, by a deft bureaucratic sleight of

hand, Com manding General US 6 th Army, LTGEN

Krueger estab lished a “training centre” (the Alamo

Scouts Training Centre (ASTC)) to become the “Alamo

Scouts” instead of trying to create a new unit, an

option that required approval by the Army General

Staff, back in Washing ton DC. Krueger also converted

the 98 th Field Artillery Battalion (Pack) into the 6 th

Ranger Battalion, for use when the need for a larger

raiding capability was identified. 39

The original nucleus of the Scouts were trained at

the Alamo Scout School near Cairns on the Great

Barrier Reef in Queensland by LCDR William Coultas,

RAN and US Army LTCOL Fredrick W. Bradshaw, who

later became the commander of the ASTC. The ASTC

became a solely US organisation and was established

initially on Fergusson Island, off the eastern coast of

New Guinea, starting classes there in December

1943. 40

The Alamo Scouts conducted numerous operations

in Australian and Dutch New Guinea from February to

July 1944 and later went on to take part in operations

in the Philippines, including the famous, successful

February 1945 raid to rescue more than 500 US and UK

prisoners at Cabanatuan, on Luzon island. From their

first operational mission in the Admiralty Islands (New

Guinea) in February 1944, until the end of World War

II, the Alamo Scouts conducted 106 intelligence col -

lection missions behind Japanese totalling 1,482 days.

This was accomplished without a single man killed or

captured. 41

The Alamo Scouts conducted a number of opera -

tions just before and after the Hollandia RECKLESS

landings: 42,43

• SOMBAR Team - Hollekang Beach – 22-27 April

1944; and Hollekang to Tami – 30 July 1944

• REYNOLDS Team - Demta 22-29 Apr 1944

• THOMPSON Team - Tablasoefa (Tanahmerah

Bay) 22-25 April 1944 and

• HOBBS Team - Hollekang Beach 22-27 April

1944; and Pim Jetty to Nefaar 30 Apr 1944

… and CHALKO Team in support of PERSECUTION,

landing on Ali island, 12 km east of Aitape on 24 th April

1944.

Seven Dutch soldiers and two NEI police members

were attached to the HOBBS, REYNOLDS, SOMBAR,

and THOMPSON teams for the landing at Hollandia. 44

39

Alamo Scout Diary, p. 6

40

United States Army John F Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School,

<https://www.swcs.mil/Portals/111/sf_alamo-scouts.pdf> (accessed 8

Jan 2024)

41

Army Historical Foundation, <https://armyhistory.org/the-alamoscouts/>

(accessed 8 Jan 2024)

42

<http://www.alamoscouts.org/main-index/missions/> (accessed 21 Apr

2024).

43

Seagull Party

44

Seagull Party

Figure 12 - Alamo Scouts landings in support of RECKLESS.

When the Dutch CARROT/SHARK parties came out

of the field and linked up with US forces, they met up

with the Alamo Scouts. Out of this and other previous

higher-level discussions came the opportunity for a

number of NEFIS members led by LT C van der Star

and including Swart (SHARK), de Bruine and de Jong

(both from CARROT) to learn from the Alamo Scouts, in

terms of tactics, organisation and weapons. This was

known as the SEAGULL party. They joined the Alamo

Scouts Training Centre at Camp KASSOE (now relo -

cated here, near Hollandia) in July and August 1944

and in that period accompanied Alamo Scouts on a

number of missions in Dutch New Guinea. 45

SOA

SOA had a number of projects in the planning/pre -

paration stage intended to support RECKLESS and

PERSECUTION. 46 None of these however were actually

carried out. These were:

• PHOENIX - This plan called for 16 men to be

parachuted into Lake Sentani. They were to

destroy all serviceable aircraft on the three

Japanese airfields on the morning of the land -

ing, cut the road between Humboldt Bay and

the airfields, and to establish OPs to monitor

enemy movements in the period immediately

after the landings.

• PHOENIX I - This involved 8 men inserted by

parachute to attack enemy aircraft on the Tadji

air field, near Aitape, on the eve of the RECK -

LESS and PERSECUTION landings.

• PHOENIX II - A party of 8 men to be parachuted

into the night before the landings to attack the

airfields at But and Dagua (both in New Guinea,

about 40-50 kms northwest along the coast from

Wewak, about a quarter of the way to Aitape).

• ROC - This called for 4 men to be parachuted

into the area south of Cape Tanahmerah to

collect intelligence on enemy movements; and

• DODO - A party of 4 men to be parachuted into

Lake Sentani to collect intelligence over a 2-

week period prior to the landings.

45

Seagull Party

46

NAA: A3269, O8/A (Item 235327) Special Operations Australia Vol II

(Operations), digital pp. 250, 258-260. (SOA Vol 2)


The SOA explanation for the failure to carry out

these operations was put down to circumstances

beyond their control: lack of submarine and aircraft

transport; and the increasing tempo of the campaign in

New Guinea which meant that many projects had

become unnecessary by the time they could be put

into effect.

So, what can we learn?

We haven’t in the space available delved deeply

into the practical aspects of these operations at the

tactical level, so we’ll aside discussion of the issue of

challenges in inserting, maintaining and extracting

small units deep in contested territory. Instead, we’ll

look at some more strategic questions.

Operating in a multi-national environment

Each side had different priorities – the US were

focused on successful landings at Hollandia and Aitape

as a prelude to the stepping stones all the way to the

Philippines and Japan. The US probably didn’t need

the Australian contribution, but for political and prac -

tical reasons was probably happy enough for Australia

to play a supporting role – in particular some RAN and

RAAF assets made useful, minor contri bu tions which

under the US-led SWPA command structure were

directly focused on supporting the Task Forces. This

pattern of US-led operations with minor, but useful

Allied (mainly Australian) supporting assets, focused on

US priorities, repeated itself for the rest of the war in

the landings all the way from Hollandia to the Philip -

pines, bypassing most of the NEI.

The Dutch, we suspect, were more concerned with

getting a stake, however small, in the reconquest of

Dutch New Guinea - and from there the remainder of

the NEI. From the Dutch perspective, it probably didn’t

matter what the Dutch did with their meagre forces as

long as they did something. They didn’t perform well,

and their own HQ staff suspected that GHQ had low

expectations of them. They provided Catalina aircraft

for insertions of the parties, a base for communications

(operated by Australians) and had a political (NICA)

presence in the BULLDOZER camp, ready to move

forward to plant the flag at Hollandia after the US

landings.

Notwithstanding commitments made between the

Dutch command in Australia with AIB HQ and GHQ,

the Dutch on the ground initially proved uncooperative

regarding the presence of the Australian “O” party,

and especially the party’s New Guinea members.

It's hardly surprising that, within the framework of a

multi-lateral agreed strategy, each member of a

Coalition will seek where possible to further their own

individual national interests.

Co-ordination of the activities

of “special” agencies

Compared to other theatres and even elsewhere

with SWPA, the co-ordination of the activities of multi -

ple “special” Australian, and Dutch (and US) agencies

seemed relatively friction free.

We could leave aside the initial issue of the

Dutch/Australian friction in the field as it essentially

only involved small numbers of people in a remote

location and in the end, the damage was minimal.

Having said that, this should not have happened. AIB

should have enforced the agreed co-operation

between the Dutch and the FELO party. Perhaps the

Dutch contribution was expected to be so little that

this dispute essentially didn’t matter as the AIB had

other more pressing priori ties to disentangle.

On the Australian/AIB side, the field was free of

some of the more problematic players – the British SIA,

for example, had no interest in the area and was busy

focusing its limited resources on the islands of eastern

NEI and Java. SOA was not in the end involved and

one must wonder whether there was any real prospect

of them taking part. They had already largely been

frozen out of operations in New Guinea, in favour of

NEA Section and FELO. The fortuitous availability of

the NEA Harris party and Hollandia’s proximity and

geographical/social similarities to New Guinea would

not have made it a major stretch to use NEA, instead

of SOA, for that mission. We’ll address below what

effect SOA’s participation might have had, but the fact

that “transportation was not available” (and the pace

of the war was outpacing the planning cycle) reflects

the priorities GHQ attached to SOA participation. It

was left in the end to the reliable work-horse – the

Coastwatchers/NEA. They had a party available to go

(i.e. the Harris party waiting at the NEA training camp

at Tabragalba, Queensland), the party members were

experienced, the AO was similar to their usual opera -

ting environment in New Guinea and importantly NEA

had shown themselves throughout the war to be

focused on what GHQ SWPA really wanted. Unlike

SOA for much of their time, they were never in the

position of having to “sell” their services to interested

customers. And NEA were “Australian”, not a possible

British “Trojan Horse”, as SOA was sometimes consi -

dered. NEA had had experience since before the war

of managing far flung field communications networks

and had had experience of good co-operation with

FELO in New Guinea. FELO for its part had played a

constructive field role in harsh conditions New Guinea

and worked well with NEA and the wider Aust -

ralian/Allied command.

The US side was even simpler. MacArthur had

simply refused to allow the Office of Strategic Services

(OSS), the newly formed World War II SO/SI organi -

sation - the forerunner to the post war CIA - to operate

in the SWPA. He had moreover created his own

reconnaissance force, the Alamo Scouts, focused on his

interests, i.e. sea-borne reconnaissance in direct

support of the US 6 th Army. The Alamo Scouts were

moreover firmly embedded in the US military com -

mand and control system and managing/coordinating

them posed no significant challenges.


Was it necessary?

It also begs the questions of what effect, if any,

these operations had and following on from that

whether they were really necessary.

The US had good SIGINT coverage, so Japanese

intentions and major activities were known.

“ULTRA was critical to MacArthur’s decision, as it

gave him a detailed understanding of Japanese

deployments, strengths and weaknesses. Past

experience meant “[t]he Allies could prepare for

the daring Hollandia invasion with full con fi -

dence in ULTRA’s unequivocal picture of their

enemy. In February and March 1944 at least 12

Japanese freighters were sunk by airpower or

naval action, often tipped by ULTRA. SIGINT had

indicated Hollandia and Aitape were only lightly

defended. However, Aitape became a drawn-out

slug fest, a month-long battle of attrition. The

Japanese were stronger than intelligence had

indicated.” 47

The Allies had air superiority - having already

destroyed almost all the Japanese aircraft at Hollandia;

and they had maritime superiority – the Japanese fleet

had pulled back to the Philippines. This presumably led

to the increased availability of IMINT. In both places

the US achieved tactical surprise with light losses and

disproportionate success, although Aitape did prove

more difficult after the initial landings.

Around Hollandia, the Harris party failed to provide

any information. The two Dutch parties provided little.

The only information that appeared to be of use was

that provided by the FELO “O” party – and the core of

that information was presumably either “negative” i.e.

“there are no Japanese in area X” – or shed light on

small Japanese parties fleeing Hollandia after the

landings – targets which would probably not have been

amenable to coverage by either SIGINT or IMINT. In a

post war report it was noted re the FELO party:

“Although few natives were contacted, considerable

information on Japanese movements was extracted

and forwarded to the 6 th Army at Finschhafen” 48 “O”

party accounting for a little over 50 Japanese dead was

not in itself significant, but hints at a possibly more

impactful result, if additional parties had been

deployed to cover the Japanese escape routes.

Presumably it was Alamo Scouts that provided the

most useful tactical information – their targets were

geographically limited, and the tasking would have

been more precise. Having said that, the landing at

Tanahmerah Bay (RED Beach) turned out to be

problematic – “the first wave searched for the old

Dutch road that was to lead them off the beaches and

toward the Lake Sentani airfields. As troops and

supplies started to pile up on the two beaches, the

men discovered that there was no old Dutch road.”

Wrote naval historian Admiral Samuel Eliot Morison:

“There simply was no way to get men or vehicles off

this beach except by the way they had come; they

might as well have landed at the base of an unscalable

cliff.” 49 The next day it was decided to divert supplies

from RED beaches to the WHITE beaches at Humboldt

Bay. Even at the WHITE beaches though, there were

problems. At WHITE Beach 1 for example, supplies

began to pile up on the beach when engineers could

not build an exit off the beach due to soft sand and

swamp. Further problems ensued when a lone

Japanese aircraft bombed an abandoned Japanese

ammunition dump on the beach causing casualties and

confusion as it and US supplies on the beach started

exploding.

The state of beaches and exits off them would pre -

sumably have been the focus of beach recons by the

Alamo Scouts. It appears however that the Scouts were

only deployed just before the landings and pre sumably

this would have been insufficient time to have changed

the landing plans anyway. In the absence of any

criticism of the Alamo Scouts at Hollandia, perhaps it

could be argued that the result could have been far

worse, if the Scouts had not gone in. All of which is to

say however is that some things – impassable sand and

swampy ground – are not readily knowable through

SIGINT or even IMINT. Someone needed to have

stepped onto the beach, beforehand.

Minimal resources were involved in supporting the

operations of the various parties, considering the size

of the fleets and air support available for the landings

themselves. Although all Allied forces on operations

were under GHQ command, GHQ seemed happy

enough for the Dutch to use their own Catalinas for the

insertion of the parties and their own B25s for resupply.

A US submarine was made available for the insertion of

the ill-fated Harris party. Notwithstanding the fate of

the Harris party, overall personnel losses were minimal.

It’s probably worth reflecting on why SOA did not

get a role in support of RECKLESS and/or PERSE -

CUTION. As noted above, SOA ascribed this to the

quick progress of the campaign and the lack of

transport. These factors may well be true, but con -

sideration should also be given to:

• The Allies already had air and sea superiority,

and were landing in overwhelming force, so

there was probably little to be gained by tipping

their hand and launching attacks on Japanese

airfields or infrastructure on the eve of the

landings; and

47

Excerpted from Oleson, Peter C. “Intelligence in the Southwest Pacific

Campaign” in The Intelligencer Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies,

Volume 28, Number 1, Winter-Spring 2023, p. 787

48

AIB Vol IV, p. 88

49

Salecker


• Prior intelligence showed the Japanese forces to

be vulnerable (although resistance was stiffer

than expected at Tadji) and unsuspecting. The

Japanese already knew of an increased

“espionage” activity in the areas concerned, but

that still did not persuade them to expect an

attack on Hollandia and Aitape. If up 5 SOA

parties had been deployed (and discovered) in

the weeks leading up to the landings, that could

have cost the Allies that tactical surprise.

In a frank assessment after the war, in 1948 the US

GHQ Far East Command described attempts at intel -

ligence collection on Hollandia saying:

“The frustrated attempts of previous AIB parties

and the inability of Dutch parties working up

from the south to properly coordinate their

communications had combined to make this the

AIB’s outstanding failure to date”. 50

FELO

A final comment needs to be made on the role

played by FELO. Disappointment is often ascribed to

veterans of various wartime secret organisations ruing

the fact that their old organisations’ efforts were not

recognised at the time, or even many years afterwards.

In most cases, that is simply not true – decorations

were awarded at the time; official histories and papers

have often long been declassified and available online

for those who know where to look; and accounts in

book or other manuscript form, perhaps written in a

way a little old-fashioned by today’s standards, have

long been in print (and in some cases so long that they

are now out of print).

In the case of the role played by FELO field parties,

that disappointment however has some basis in fact.

Primarily a military propaganda unit, FELO however

also deployed 14 “field parties” - first deploying in

March 1943 in New Guinea and, from March 1944 on,

in the NEI and British North Borneo and Sarawak.

Operating in enemy-occupied or -threatened areas,

the FELO field parties’ role often became in dis -

tinguishable from those of SOA or AIB/NEA, to whose

parties they were sometimes attached. The major

ground-truthing contribution to the RECKLESS landing,

for example, was made by the Australian FELO “O”

Party. In the weeks after the PERSECUTION landing,

another FELO group, “E” Party, under AIB/NEA control

and operating in the hinterland of Aitape, likewise

made a significant contribution – termed a “success” in

AIB’s after-war report - to monitoring Japanese move -

ments away from the coast. FELO’s contributions over -

all to the “behind the lines” war effort in the SWPA

seem to have gotten lost amongst the telling of the

better known feats of other organisations. This is a

story in need of retelling more widely.

50

AIB Vol IV p. 80



Footnotes and photographs inserted by the Editor into the original article extracted from

Double Diamond Issue Number 3, July 1949.

RED TAPE AND MISFORTUNE. THE UNDOING

OF NO. 1 INDEPENDENT COMPANY

Doc

1

Bristow, ex-MO of the No. 1 Inde pendent

Company and ex-POW gives a graphic

precis of the short and unfortunate history of

his unit. Today, the doctor is Chief Medical Officer at

the Austin Hospital, HEIDELBERG, Victoria.

An English training team with the famous Freddie

Spencer Chapman as Chief Instructor selected

WILSON'S PROMONTORY as an ideal spot for com -

mando training in February 1941. In March, Australian

and New Zealand officers and NCO's moved in and,

while camps were built around them, the leaders of the

two companies went through a training course. And

then on May 10, No. 1 Independent Company was

formed.

Many things happened during our training period,

but I think the wildest time was when the Australians at

No.1 camp decided to stage a commando raid on the

New Zealanders in No. 2 camp. All went well —

Aldershot grenades and black eyes included — except

for two Aussies who held up the New Zealand ration

truck at the ores roads. While one haltered the truck

with a Tommy gun, the other approached the driver

with a revolver inviting the driver to leave the cabin.

However, the would be ‘Dick Turpin’ forgot the jockey

in the back of the truck who upset all calculations with

a well swung turnip. "Dick Turpin" finished up return -

ing to camp on a stretcher.

A UK manufactured Aldershot Training Grenade was about the size

of a coconut, and round with a wick thing on top.

Source: Wikipedia

Later that night, the New Zealanders raided the

Australian canteen where the "victory" was being

celebrated. As the "raiders" entered the windows, the

Aussies poured out the door, the whole mob passing

over an unfortunate New Zealander who thought he

could hold the door single-handed. He was the sole

casualty and also arrived home on a stretcher.

Pub Crawl in Brisbane

Highlight of the move to KAVIENG was the day

ashore at BRISBANE. My most vivid recollection was

the pub crawl organised by Bill Dolby who is one of

the most useful men I have ever met. Officially a

plumber he had mastered most trades. At least 40

when he joined the AIF Bill was later awarded the BEM

for his work in BOUGAINVILLE and with the coast

watchers.

In KAVIENG we had our teething troubles. Never

before had this type of unit left Australia. We had no

weapon table, and from the local administrative view -

point we did not fit into any classification. We lived in

civilian buildings and drew our pay from the civilian

administration. Pound notes paid to us every fortnight

were returned later by the shopkeepers to the bank

and reissued to us next payday. DFO nearly died when

Teddy Geode as OC Advance Party bought a schooner

for £8000 charging it to the AIF.

Where the devil would he get authority to buy a

ship. So fierce was the storm that DFO 2 BRISBANE,

sent a special inspecting officer to investigate. The only

row that equalled this was when the RAAF borrowed

my camera and photographed the bomb dump at

KAVIENG. I innocently sent the film, with some per -

sonal photos, to Rabaul to be developed. Only the

landing of the Japs saved me from a courts-martial and

things.

Palmer and Party Dodge Japs

When the Japs came, we were spread out from

1

Medical Officer. 2

District Finance Office.


MANUS 3 to VILA 4 . Palmer 5 and his party got out about

Easter, 1942, after many difficulties. The efforts of

Mackie 6 and his men on BOUGAINVILLE have a special

place in Australian history.

Our only action at KAVIENG was during the air raid

on January 21, 1942. The boys were magnificent and

enjoyed themselves thoroughly. We reckoned we shot

down five Zeros and dive-bombers with our Brens 7 and

Vickers 8 but after we were captured the Japs told us

seven planes were lost in the raid.

We'll never forget old "Tugboat" of B Company,

who crossed the drone at strafing height to get water

for his gun. Later, to get a better field of fire, he and his

No. 2 hoisted their gun out of the pit and fired from the

open drome. Don Dennis pumped a whole Bren

magazine into a low-flying plane and had the satis -

faction of seeing it hurtle into the sea. Private Ander -

son of D Company manned the Bren on the ‘Induna

Star’ 9 and maintained a lone fight with Zeros until

fatally wounded.

headed. Had the tele radio remained serviceable I

believe Jim Wilson would have kept a small party with

him and sent the bulk out on the "Induna Star’. To have

tried to conceal and feed 130 men in the bush on New

Ireland would have been madness.

The capture of the "Induna Star" was the worst of

all luck. The monsoon blew up a heavy sea and

delayed us an hour when we were embarking at New

Ireland facing St. George's Channel. Next morning

when we were only eighty miIes from the

TROBRIAND’S, the sheltering clouds blew away and a

Jap sea plane picked us up at the end of its beat.

Bomb Killed Four

Blowing a hole in the after hold, the first bomb

killed four and wounded thirty-five. Then a destroyer

came to get us. I will never forget the helpless feeling

as she came up with her 4.7's 12 trained on us. As she

turned to come into the wind, her guns swung to keep

us in sight. Some wit remarked: "This would be a hell

of a time for them to change their minds".

A World War II Japanese destroyer clearly single gun mount

at the front of the vessel.

Source: Wikipedia

MV Induna Star

Source: https://www.birtwistlewiki.com.au/wiki/SS_Induna_Star

With the landing of 4,000 Japs, Jim Wilson 10

decided to move elsewhere – wisely, I think. A major

tragedy was the destruction of the civvy tele radio

which was our only communication with Moresby. The

loss made the troops very bitter towards the civilians

responsible. The report given to Eric Feldt and pub -

lished by him was no help. The nearest functioning

radio was at the TROBRIAND’S 11 which is where we

3

MANUS ISLAND, PNG.

4

Port Vila then in New Hebrides and now VANUATU.

5

Lieutenant Ellen Palmer was with No. 4 Section on MANUS ISLAND.

6

Lieutenant Jack Mackie.

7

Bren light machine gun.

8

Vickers heavy machine gun.

9

A Motor Vessel that was commandeered and used for their attempted

escape.

10

Major James Edmond Wilson, the Officer Commanding.

11 12

TROBRIAND’S Island group nearly I 400 nautical miles. Main armament 4.7 inch guns.

In the POW camp at Rabaul, No. 1 Independent

Com pany was outstanding. When it came to

"obtaining" such things as cigarettes, our boys usually

organised the work. "Par" time for removing a case of

cigarettes was two minutes. The plan was elaborate,

requiring nit-keepers, disposers of the case, cartons,

and packets. On one celebrated occasion a party

organised by Bill Taylor carried in a `patient’ writhing

with pain. At Bill's urgent whisper I told the guards,

who were sympathetic, that he was too sick even to be

lifted off the stretcher. After the guards left, the

"patient" got up and we smartly grabbed the carton of

cigarettes he had been lying on.

The lads marched off to the Monte Video Maru on

June 22, 1942, never dreaming that the end was so

close. The Nips had orders to separate officers and

troops, so when reveille sounded that morning, we

found machine guns at all points of the camp and


officers were placed in a hut guarded until all the

troops and civilians had left.

To quote Major Wilson as the landing craft took us

into Rabaul as prisoners: "Was there ever such a body

of good fellows with such a miserable end".

Their memory will last. We will think of old Starkey

who carried an army stretcher on his back in case Lex

Noonan 13 with wounds to his leg could not make it; of

Orrible Obbs the faithful; of Bert in the Orderly Room

who turned the managership of a big company to join

the AIF — all fine fellows lost in a tangle of red tape

and misfortune.

Group portrait of four prisoners of war (POWs)

from Zentsuji Camp Shikoku, Osaka, Japan.

Identified from left to right: NX70432 Chaplain Victor Spiro Turner,

8 th Division AIF VX18194 Major John Finch Akeroyd, Royal

Australian Army Medical Corps (RAAMC) VX39436 Captain Vincent

George Bristow, RAAMC, 1 Independent Company and TX6004

Chaplain John Lovett May, 8 th Division.

Source: AWM

13

SX6384 Lance Corporal Alex Noonan had been shot in both legs.

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01 July 2014

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Alpha Company

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Died of Wounds

Kabul Province, Afghanistan

04 July 2011

SGT Todd Langley

Charlie Company


Killed in Action

Helmand Province, Afghanistan

15 July 2017

SGT Ian Turner

Bravo Company


Died in Service in

Sydney, New South Wales

16 July 2014

SGT Gary Francis

Operational Support Company


Killed in Training

Mount Cook, New Zealand

27 August 2017

WO2 Mick Craig, CSM


Attached to 1 st Commando Regt.

Died in Service

Swansea, New South Wales

30 August 2012

LCPL Mervyn McDonald & PTE Nathan Gallagher

Alpha Company, 2 nd Commando Regiment

Killed in Action

Helmand Province, Afghanistan


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WW2 Commemorations in Sarawak, Malaysia

Earlier this year there were several com me mo -

rations conducted in Bario on 25 th and Kuching

on 27 th of March conducted in Sara wak, Malay -

sia, in World War 2 by operatives of Special Operations

Australia (SOA, with cover name Services Recon -

naissance Department (SRD)), under the Allied Intel -

ligence Bureau (AIB). These operatives were deployed

on a series of operations known as SEMUT I-IV.

Interestingly none of the local media or Sarawak

Government material nor that provided by the

Australian High Commission mentioned the other

significant SOA operations conducted in the adjoining

state of Sabah – Operation AGAS I-IV; and Operation

STALLION I-XI. Some elements of SEMUT I also

operated in Sabah as well.

There are also a number of significant errors in The commemorations were conducted by the Sara -

attributing the SEMUT operations to “Z” Special Unit. wak State government and there was repre sentation by

“Z” Special Unit was not an operational unit under the Australian High Commissioner and Defence

command of SOA or of AIB, but rather was the nonoperational

Army unit used to provide “cover” for AIF RAR. From the local media and Australian High Com -

Adviser. The ADF Honour Guard was provided by 1

personnel posted to SOA and to provide an overt mission reporting, as well as the SOCOMD Facebook

means by which SOA could draw on military adminis - page it is unclear as to whether there were any

trative, transport and stores resources. British, RAAF Australian ADF SOCOMD representation at this

and other members of SOA were held against different important international event.

establishments. The operations were planned, pre -

pared, directed and conducted by SOA. 1, 2

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1

See the History of Special Operations Australia, Volumes 1 and 2

available on-line at the National Archives of Australia (NAA). Volume 1

spells out in detail the administrative and command and control

arrangements for ISD (the earlier version of SOA) and for SOA (NAA Item

235324); Volume 2 spells out in detail the operations conducted. (NAA

Item 235327)

2

Commando magazine Edition 14 March 2023.

Map showing the locations of the Malaysian states of Sarawak and

Sabah and of SEMUT, AGAS and STALLION.

Source: ww.ditchthemap.com

Note: This article is based upon information obtained

in two articles from the Borneo Post Online dated 27

March 2025 and media releases from the Australian

High Commission in Malaysia and a number of

corrections of fact have been made.

Premier: Vital to remember role

of Allied forces in freeing Sarawak from

Japanese occupation (Borneo Post on-line

27 March 2025)

“KUCHING (March 27): The role of the Allied forces

in liberating Sarawak from Japanese occupation must

be remembered, said Premier Datuk Patinggi Tan Sri

Abang Johari Tun Openg.

Following a grand tribute at Padang Merdeka here

today to mark the 80 th Commemoration of the

Operation SEMUT 1 parachute landing in Bario, Abang

Johari expressed his gratitude to the High Com -

missions of Australia, New Zealand, and the United

Kingdom for successfully organising the event, which

shed light on the history of World War II.


Media advertising sponsored by the Sarawak State government advertising the two commemoration events.

Source: Google


“During that time, the security forces of these three

nations played a crucial role in helping to free us from

Japanese occupation. This is a piece of history that we

must remember.

Captain Sharulrizal hands over the Ibu Pertiwi flag to Sarawak

Premier Abang Johari.

Photo by Chimon Upon, Borneo Post

“During that time, the security forces of these three

nations played a crucial role in helping to free us from

Japanese occupation. This is a piece of history that we

must remember.

“The engagement between the locals and also the

Singaporean forces paved the way for a new chapter,

especially in Bario and the Kelabit community,” he told

reporters.

Abang Johari said as mentioned by Deputy Minister

in the Premier’s Department (Labour, Immigration and

Project Monitoring) Datuk Gerawat Gala, efforts were

made to provide medical care and schools were

established, bringing a new landscape and approach

to Bario.

“This also marked a new era for Sarawak after World

War II,” he added.

The ceremony, which honoured the extraordinary

courage and sacrifice of the Allied forces and local

resistance fighters who fought to liberate Borneo,

featured an elite parachute jump from 8,000 feet

performed by four Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF)

officers.

Adding to the spectacle was the CN235 aircraft, a

twin-engine tactical airlifter, expertly operated by No. 1

Squadron RMAF from Kuching Airbase.”

“KUCHING (March 27): Eighty years ago, deep in the

jungles of Sarawak, Australian Operatives from the

Services Reconnaissance Department (SRD) and local

Dayak warriors fought side by side in a covert mission

to weaken Japanese control.

Known as Operation SEMUT, the mission not only

helped liberate Borneo but also laid the foundation for

a lasting partnership between Australia and Malaysia. 3

This week, that legacy was honoured with com me -

morative events in Bario on Tuesday and in Kuching

today, including a historic parachute reenactment by

the Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF), symbolising the

wartime parachute drops by Australian and Allied

forces 4 .

For Colonel Corey Shillabeer, Australia’s Defence

Advisor to Malaysia, the most important legacy of

Operation SEMUT is ensuring that its history is

remembered and understood by future generations.

Colonel Shillabeer (left) during the commemoration ceremony for

the 80 th anniversary of Operation SEMUT in Bario on Tuesday.

Photo: Australian High Commission

“The most important legacy is just our deep and

trustworthy partnership that has proven the test of time

over many, many decades.

“Yesterday (in Bario on March 25), is only one day in

our history, but it’s an important day, particularly for

Sarawak,” said Colonel Shillabeer when met by The

Borneo Post here yesterday.

On March 25, 1945, as part of Operation SEMUT,

members of Australia’s SRD, an elite covert force,

parachuted into Sarawak.

Their mission was to gather intelligence, disrupt

Japanese operations, and support local resistance

efforts.

The key to the mission’s success were the Kelabits

of Bario and other Dayak communities, who guided the

soldiers, provided shelter, and fought alongside them.

A RMAF Special Operations parachutist descends

with the Sarawak flag.


3

There were in fact four separate SEMUT missions SEMUT I-IV undertaken

in different locations in Sarawak and British North Borneo.

4

About half of all the British Borneo parties were led by British service

personnel who had previously lived and worked in North Borneo.


A Malaysian Army parachutist descends during a re-enactment

of the Operation SEMUT landing in Bario, commemorating the 80 th

anniversary of the World War II mission.


Speaking to reporters after the event, Captain

Sharulrizal Sabri, an RMAF Air Special Forces (Paskau)

officer, said their preparation time was limited due to

the short notice.

“But with experienced parachutists, I’m confident

that our officers can perform well.

“We followed the given instructions to join this

exercise, and our preparations took about a week,” he

said.

Among those present were New Zealand High

Commissioner to Malaysia Mike Walsh; Deputy High

Commissioner of Australia to Malaysia Simon Fellows;

Deputy British High Commissioner Tom Sheperd;

Australian defence advisor to Malaysia Colonel Corey

Shillabeer; and members of the Sarawak Cabinet.

On March 25, a similar commemorative event was

held in Bario, paying tribute to the historical signi fi -

cance of SEMUT I-IV operations and honouring the

contributions of those involved.

The first phase of Operation SEMUT began as a

reconnaissance mission, with a team of 45 personnel

led by Major T.H Harrison parachuting into Bario, deep

in the Borneo hinterland in March 1945.

However, due to changes in operational plans, this

team remained independent and expanded its opera -

tions across northern Sarawak, from Brunei Bay to the

Padas River, as well as into southern British North

Borneo and parts of Dutch Borneo.

The team operated in the region until late Septem -

ber 1945, during which they gathered crucial intel -

ligence and played a key role in eliminating over 1,000

Japanese troops alongside local guerrilla fighters.

Additionally, they helped restore civil order and

temporary administration in the liberated areas, while

also rescuing eleven US airmen and numerous loyal

Malays, Chinese, and indigenous people imprisoned

by the Japanese.

The second phase (SEMUT II) of the mission saw the

deployment of 25 personnel under Major GS Carter on

April 16, 1945, in the Baram River region of Sarawak.

This team extended their operations across the Miri-

Seria hinterlands, covering areas between the Sibuti,

Beluru, and Kemena Rivers, as well as the Tinjar, Baram,

Tutoh, and Akah Rivers, gathering intelligence and

assessing local political attitudes toward post-war

governance.

After landing in Bario under Harrison’s command,

they proceeded on foot to the Baram River to begin

their mission.

The operation continued until October 15, 1945,

though a detachment led by Captain WLP Sochon was

dispatched to the Rejang River in May to initiate

SEMUT III, with personnel being gradually extracted at

different intervals.

Ultimately, the mission successfully fulfilled its

objectives, notably in organising native guerrilla forces

and re-establishing administrative structures to restore

law and order in the region 5 .

Operation SEMUT, named after the Malay word for

‘ant,’ symbolised the small yet determined tactics

employed in collaboration with local resistance Dayak

fighters.

Colonel Shillabeer salutes during the 80 th Commemoration of

Operation SEMUT 1 parachute landing 1945 at Padang Merdeka.


5

This included offensive operations against some hold-out Japanese

forces who would not recognise the Japanese surrender.


Another media advertisement sponsored by the Sarawak State government advertising the two commemoration events.

Source: Google


Ops SEMUT: Marking 80 th Anniversary of

Australian Special Operations operatives 6

and Dayak warriors’ covert mission to

liberate Borneo

“This year is the 80 th anniversary since the 25 th of

March 1945, that Australians first landed into Sarawak

to work with your local Dayak groups to liberate

Borneo at the end of World War II, after your period of

Japanese occupation.

“So, we’ve always had shared interests, particularly

in this region and those shared interests continue to

this day,” Colonel Shillabeer said.

He emphasised that Operation SEMUT must not be

forgotten, urging continued efforts to ensure its

historical significance is taught and commemorated.

“The story of Operation SEMUT goes back further,

and so our defence cooperation partnership has

extended beyond that,” he said.

Beyond World War II, Australia has played a key role

in Malaysia’s history, supporting the country through

the Malayan Emergency and the Indonesian-Malaysian

Confrontation.

Today, both nations continue their defence co -

operation through the Five Power Defence Arrange -

ments (FPDA), a security pact that also includes

Singapore, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom.

Recognising the importance of this shared past,

there is growing interest in educating younger genera -

tions with plans for commemorative parks, historical

exhibits, and continued public engagement.

“A way of trying to drag more tourists here to

Sarawak or get more exposure to the young people of

Malaysia, is to memorialise these sorts of actions where

Allied forces have worked together with Malaysians

and Sarawakians here,” he said.

He noted that efforts are already underway to

establish a meaningful memorial in Sarawak, driven by

the local community with government support.

“I know my colleagues are working hard, particularly

from the local community here in Sarawak, to raise

funds for a small but very meaningful memorial to be

placed in a place where it is driven by your govern -

ment,” he said.

The memorial, he explained, would serve as a space

for reflection.

“As an area that people can just come and reflect,

reflect on those that have served before and those that

have paid the ultimate sacrifice.

“It means a lot to veterans. It means a lot to

Australians, English, New Zealanders, and of course

our Malaysian Armed Forces colleagues, and the

different groupings that have fought alongside us as

well,” he said.

6

Incorrectly referred to in the original article as Commandos, the

personnel on SOA operations were additionally trained and referred to

as operatives, albeit that many may have previously served in the

Australian Independent Companies and Commando Squadrons.

He added that discussions are ongoing at both the

federal and state levels to bring this initiative to life.

“So, watch this space, but it’s certainly an ambition

that we have, and we’ll continue to work closely with

your government—at the federal level and state

level—to realise that aspiration,” he said.

Shillabeer stressed that remembrance is not just

about the past, but about honouring those who made

sacrifices and ensuring their stories live on.

“That’s why recognising this particular day, and the

days that follow, is important—so we never forget,” he

said.

For Australians, Colonel Shillabeer said the phrase

‘Lest we forget’ is not just a tribute.

“When we say that, they’re not just words, it’s a

promise. A promise that we hold on to, to make sure

we never forget the sacrifices of those that have served

and the families that support them,” he added.

Among those present at the re-enactment of the

Operation SEMUT parachute landing in Bario on

Tuesday were Australian High Commissioner to

Malaysia Danielle Heinecke; Tourism, Creative Industry

and Performing Arts Minister Dato Sri Abdul Karim

Rahman Hamzah; and Deputy Minister in the Premier’s

Department (Labour, Immigration and Project

Monitoring) Datuk Gerawat Gala.

Colonel Shillabeer shakes hands with Abdul Karim during the

80 th anniversary commemoration of Operation SEMUT in Bario.

The High Commissioner to Malaysia, Her Excellency Danielle

Heinecke, is second from the left.


ACA Follow up

During the commemoration it was mentioned by

one of the Sarawak government ministers that there is

a plan to build a small monument to the SEMUT

operations in the significant participation of the local

population in supporting and assisting the operations.

As previously mentioned there are a number of factual

errors in these articles and these will be highlighted

that the Australian High Commission in Malaysia as

well as the Borneo Post to ensure that should such a

memorial be directed that it will contain the correct

information and not perpetuate the common public

mythology surrounding “Z” Special Unit and incorrect

use of its’ postwar Association logo and Australian

Army unit badge.


BOOK REVIEWS

SAME SAME BUT DIFFERENT

Since our last edition there have been very

few new publications on the Australian mili -

tary or special forces until I very recently,

through the Parachute Training School Face -

book page, became aware that a former

fellow officer from 2 Company, 1 st Commando

Regiment, Captain John Remynse, had

recent ly published the story of aspects of his

life.

Having known John for more than 30

years, and served with him both in Com -

mandos and whilst attending numerous

courses at the Parachute Training School at RAAF

Williamstown and I was directly involved in a major inci -

dent there and subsequent associated legal activi ties, I

immediately obtained one of only 100 copies pro -

duced to date.

I received it yesterday and I am already halfway

through reading John’s intriguing story of his life

commencing with his service in 7 RAR and later SASR

in Vietnam and his later return to Vietnam in a very

By John Remynse

different capacity and the very significant

influences and changes that made upon

him.

The book was originally started by John as

a collection of short stories about a young

Australian soldier's infantry and SAS service

during the war in Vietnam. It grew into a

journey about life, death, learning and

growth.

The book draws upon John’s 25 years of

experience as a soldier and leader, followed

by another 25 years in the corporate and

academic world, to explore leadership failures and how

to avoid them.

Based upon my reading to date I highly recommend

John’s book and look forward to being able to provide

a more detailed review in the next edition.

The book is available in both hard copy and e-book

format directly from John at https://same but dif -

ferent.au/orders-and-payments.

THE ETHICS OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS

This article provides a book review of 'The Ethics of Special Operations' in which the authors explore ethics

across four primary missions: raids, recoveries, reconnaissance, and rebels.

Australian military forces are often ethically

tested and have almost consistently made

deci sions grounded in integrity while respect -

ing international law. The rare exceptions

high light the costs of failing to do so – the

hearts and minds of locals, the integrity of

command, the trust of the Australian public,

and the moral injury of the team involved.

These costs are documented in the ledger of

the Afghanistan Inquiry and similar reports of

breaches from other nations.

The writers of The Ethics of Special Operations

By Darren Cronshaw, and Matthew van Blerk.

Extracted from The Cove 18 June 2025

have been helping Special Operations Forces

(SOF) navigate the moral minefields of their

work across different national contexts.

Deane-Peter Baker is one of Australia’s

leading military ethicists, based at UNSW,

and the most widely utilised ethicist in ADF

teaching from ADFA courses to Special

Operations Command’s (SOCOMD’s) ethical

armouring courses. Roger Herbert served for

26 years as a SEAL officer and then taught

ethics at the US Naval Academy. David

Whetham is Professor of Ethics and the Military


Profession at King’s College London, co-editor of

Making the Military Moral, and an Afghanistan Inquiry

contributor.

The book acknowledges that war fighters have

always faced ethical dilemmas, but the challenges and

complexity are greatly increased in contexts of

terrorism involving non-state actors, humanitarian

missions, hostage recovery, and the training of local

and proxy forces – areas of operation for SOF.

Furthermore, SOF have become a preferred tool

alongside cyber-attacks and drones in many con -

temporary conflicts, though these conflicts often fall

short of war within contested statecraft. The resulting

pace and dilemmas of operating in this grey zone is

challenging for operators, no matter how specially

screened, highly trained, and well-resourced they may

be. The writers argue that SOF require the best “ethical

armouring” to operate ethically and to return not just

physically but morally intact.

With illustrative case studies covering World War II

to the present day and considering how ethical

frameworks in some contexts need to be renewed and

occasionally rethought, the writers explore the ethics of

SOF across four primary missions: raids, recoveries,

reconnaissance, and rebels.

Raids

Conventional forces are trained for conformity and

predictability. SOF cultivate a more independent mind -

set, imagination, and creativity at lower ranks, as well

as training with specialist technology and equipment.

This uniquely equips them for specialist missions, but

they are not exempt from ethical guidelines.

Utilising the mission sets of ‘raids’, the authors

explore the ethical complexity that can arise. For

example, Op JAYWICK ingeniously attacked Japanese

shipping in Singapore, with operatives disguised as

local fishermen under a Japanese flag. Arguably, this

was merely justifiable deception and not perfidy;

however, it did lead to a second-order effect of locals

being blamed and punished for the sabotage.

More recently, Operation NEPTUNE SPEAR (the bin

Laden mission) was a military success, but stretched

respect for territorial integrity and more concerningly,

was ethically questionable in using a medical vacci na -

tion program to locate him, which has threatened trust

in other vaccination programs. Unethical stretch ing,

albeit justified by necessity and big payoffs, can have

second and third-order effects.

Recoveries

How can SOF and government decision-makers

evaluate when and how to recover hostages or POWs

held by hostile powers? What is the duty to recover

citizens, whether POWs as from the Son Tay POW

camp in North Vietnam, or hostages such as those

rescued by SAS from the Iranian Embassy in London?

Recoveries can be risky for hostages and operators.

The ‘leave no one behind’ philosophy can be

exploited by adversaries. Ransoms may be appropriate

as an alternative to force, but they can encourage

further hostage-taking and finance terrorism. Often,

deception is necessary in recoveries, but that must

have moral limits, such as not disguising operators as

Red Cross workers or journalists. Recoveries typically

raise the commander’s 'trilemma' or triangular balance

of prioritising the mission, civilians, and/or mates.

The Australian lived experience, like that of other

FVEY nations (the Five Eyes intelligence alliance of

Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom,

and the United States), has been to use military reco -

very as a choice of last resort, if at all. Other

Government Agencies (OGAs) have taken primacy for

resolution, leaving the SOF community often frustrated

at the inability to enact their trained capabilities.

Reconnaissance

Reconnaissance is another specialist capability of

SOF that raises another set of ethical trilemmas.

Operators spend long durations deep in enemy

territory and face serious consequences if caught. To

what extent do they go to protect their identity and

cover to avoid discovery? What limits are placed on

disguising themselves, using an enemy uniform,

spreading misinformation, or mistreating adversaries or

their bodies or property?

The infamous case study of an ethical trilemma

faced during a SOF reconnaissance mission is Seal

Team 10 on Operation Red Wing, made famous by the

movie Lone Survivor. When encountered by local

villagers, the team debates whether to kill them but

ultimately decides to release them. However, when

their position was disclosed, they were hunted, their

positions overrun, and three of the four operators

(along with others in a rescue helicopter) were killed.

Do dire outcomes ever outweigh discrimination and

non-combatant immunity? Would the ends of saving

them justify killing the citizens, albeit as part of an

‘extreme emergency’, or was the decision a coura -

geous adherence to international law and respect for

non-combatants?

The team’s commander, Lieutenant Michael

Murphy, had previously heard Admiral Eric Olson,

Commander of USSOCOM, address a SEALS

audience: “Never sacrifice what you know is right for

what is convenient or expedient. Live the life of a

leader – one of values, character, courage, and com -

mitment. What you do and what you tolerate in your

presence best demonstrates your standards.” (p.117)

This kind of trilemma (mission, mates, or civilians) calls

for the best virtues, including a pre-prepared com mit -

ment to ethical principles.

Rebels

Another strategic mission for SOF is the irregular

warfare tasks of training, advising, and assisting local

forces. This raises challenges when the local forces may

not commit to the same ethical standards. For


example, Myanmar armed forces trained by US have

engaged in violence and ethnic cleansing against

Rohingya Muslims. On the other hand, a Western

military may be more willing to commit to a war or

proxy war when its forces do not suffer the immediate

consequences. Supporting any conflict must consider

the risk of escalation and other second and third-order

effects. This calls for diligent diplomacy as well as welldeveloped

cultural intelligence. When supporting local

groups, military leaders also need to consider longterm

commitment to their wellbeing; e.g., whether

they will evacuate them if the battle goes wrong as

needed to be decided at Kabul, rescuing Afghans who

served alongside ADF.

Rethinking just war?

SOF ethics are practised by individual soldiers and

their teams, but there are also ethical considerations

regarding government and command decisions about

when and how to deploy SOF. The authors discuss the

ongoing relevance of just war principles jus ad bellum

(when to go to war) and jus in bello (how to fight the

war) but suggest we also need to consider new jus ad

vim conventions for a ‘theory of just and unjust use of

force’.

Force-short-of-war still needs to consider

discrimination, proportionality, and necessity. However,

the writers acknowledge that force-short-of-war may

require a more nuanced and flexible framework, as it

does not necessarily demand the same standard of last

resort (since SOF may be a viable first resort to prevent

outright war) or public declaration (given the need for

secrecy and deniability). Nonetheless, there is a

pressing need for a new principle to monitor the

likelihood of escalation (or at least factor that into

proportionality).

Such ethical deliberations likely underpinned Israel’s

decision to pre-emptively destroy Egyptian, Jordanian,

and Syrian aircraft on their runways rather than wait for

an invasion. They hypothetically could have led the

USA to topple Saddam with special operations forces

as anticipatory self-defence, before he could develop

Weapons of Mass Destruction but without outright war.

Additionally, they may have influenced Russia’s choice

to employ their special operations forces during the

‘little green men’ invasion to instigate the Russian

annexation of Crimea in 2014, in ways that delayed

Ukraine and the world’s response while also limiting

bloodshed and avoiding outright war. At that time, in

stark contrast to their later criminally and morally inde -

fensible invasion of Ukraine, Russia was dis crimi nating

and proportional, using special operations forces not

as a last resort but as a surprising first resort.

Another insightful case study was when Navy Seals

broke the expectation of secrecy and blew the whistle

on Chief Eddie Gallagher for shooting civilians and

stabbing a prisoner. Part of SOF ethics is to be aware

of moral numbing, situational stressors, exceptional -

ism, and the group effects that lead to war crimes and

their cover-up.

The Ethics of Special Operations is important

reading for SOCOMD personnel and those supporting,

instructing, and commanding them. With the release of

both the Defence Strategic Review (DSR) and the

National Defence Strategy (NDS), it also promises to

be insightful for others working in broader Defence,

with a focus on near-region engagement and part -

nered operations.

Notes: The book’s publisher details are Deane-Peter

Baker, Roger Herbert and David Whethem, The Ethics

of Special Operations: Raids, Recoveries, Recon nais -

sance and Rebels (Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 2024).

Authors Biographies

Darren Cronshaw is Chaplain at 6 th Battalion, Royal

Australian Regiment. Previous postings were Army

School of Transport, 1 st Recruit Training Battalion and

Defence Force School of Signals. He is also Professor

of Practical and In -

ter cultural Theo -

logy with Aust ralian

Col lege of Minis -

tries (Sydney Col -

lege of Divinity).

His hobby is push -

ing the boun da ries

of resilience in Iron -

man triath lons.

Matthew van

Blerk is Officer

Com manding of

Corps Advanced

Training Wing

(CATW) at Defence

Force School of

Signals (DFSS).


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WWII Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service –

Operating from Australia

Published by dutchaussieadmin on January 29, 2023

https://dacc.net.au/v2/archive/dutch-australian-history/military-political-history/wwii-netherlands-forcesintelligence-service-operating-from-australia/

This article has been slightly edited to Include some additional information relevant to Australia.

Dutch Navy and Army Intelligence Service

– 1941

The Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service

(NEFIS) was a Dutch military intelligence

service during and after World War II. The

purpose of the NEFIS was initially to collect intel -

ligence for the Allied forces with regard to the

Netherlands East Indies (NEI) 1 that was occupied by

Japan.

The service originated in 1941 when the Dutch

naval commander Vice-Admiral C.E.L. Helfrich sent a

liaison officer to the Australian Commonwealth Naval

Board in Melbourne. This officer, Captain-Lieutenantat-Sea

2 Salm, was also engaged in intelligence work.

He then gathered around him a number of persons

who specialized in intelligence work. His organisation

was given the name Navy and Army Intelligence

Service. When Japan invaded the NEI in February

1942, a number of prominent and high-ranking

authorities of the NEI Government were already

ordered to move to Australia. This included a number

of staff officers of the Royal Netherlands East Indies

Army (K.N.I.L.), including Major Jhr. J.M.R. Sandberg,

Captains Dirk Cornelis Buurman van Vreeden, G.L.

Reinderhoff, S.H. Spoor and H.J. de Vries. Later,

Lieutenant Colonel N.L.W. van Straten, from Timor, and

Captain of the military police F. van der Veen would

also be added.

Australian period: 1942-1945

Figure 1 - LTCOL SH Spoor, took over NEFIS in January 1944.

After the war the then LTGEN Spoor became Chief of Staff (i.e.

head) of the KNIL and Royal Dutch Army forces in the NEI from

1946 until Indonesian independence in 1949.

In April 1942, the Naval and Army Intelligence

Service was further expanded to include Major Spoor

(now promoted). Captain Reinderhoff became his first

employee. Lieutenant-at-Sea, 1 st Class J.A.F.H. Douw

van der Krap also joined. In total, about 50 men and

women worked in this service. The name ‘NEFIS’ then

arose because the contacts with the other Allied staffs

all had English as their working language and the

Dutch name was not considered practical. 3 They also

needed a clearly legible letterhead. In contacts with

the Allied allies, this organisation was henceforth

further referred to as the Netherlands Forces

Intelligence Service.

The start-up phase of NEFIS was problematic. The

Dutch authorities wished to cooperate as much as

possible with the Allies and in particular its Com -

1

i.e. modern-day Indonesia.

2

Equivalent to Australian Naval Commander.

3

NEFIS started off in Australia as the combined Marine- en Leger

Inlichtingen Dienst (Navy and Army Intelligence Service), which was a bit

of a mouthful. KNIL HQ was initially at 441 St Kilda Rd, Melbourne.

NEFIS initially had office space in Melbourne with ISD (Inter Allied

Services Department, which was the original form of what later became

Special Operations Australia (SOA), cover name Services Reconnaissance

Department). The bulk of Dutch military/intel elements moved to

Brisbane to be close to the Allied GHQ the Southwest Pacific Area

(SWPA) which had moved there earlier.


mander-in-Chief General Douglas MacArthur. 4 How -

ever, the Dutch branch within the collected intel ligence

services (which had to cooperate under the established

the Allied Intelligence Bureau) A.I.B), was barely able to

provide important information and/or contributions in

the short term, since one had to start with virtually

nothing.

Here the years of neglect regarding the estab lish -

ment of a professional intelligence service before the

outbreak of the war retaliated. In the period April 1942

– April 1943, the NEFIS suffered enormous pressure to

come up with results. The American general staff was

especially in urgent need of geographical and

topographical information about the NEI, in particular

New Guinea.

In April 1943 the NEFIS was reorganised. This was

the official (re)start of the NEFIS. Now that the various

Allied intelligence services were bundled and directly

under the command of the head of the Intelligence

Section ‘G2’ of the General Staff of General Douglas

MacArthur, Major General Charles Willoughby, the

NEFIS was also increasingly able to connect with the

growing demand of the Allied high command,

although still had to work with structurally insufficient

resources and people.

Tasks and organisation

The NEFIS was now given the following clearly

defined tasks, divided into three sections:

• (Section I) Collecting, processing and dis tribu -

ting all intelligence concerning the NEI that may

be important for warfare (Operational Intel li -

gence, Interrogation, Geographical Intelligence,

Intelligence Summaries, Topographical Registry

and Information, Photo Interpretation, Press

review, Research)

• (Section II) The concern for security of the Dutch

armed forces in Australia (Security)

• (Section III) Obtaining intelligence in a special

manner and carrying out “Special Operations”

(Command missions in enemy territory). 5

Section I was now led by Major Spoor (Assistant

Director), Section II by Ltz 6 Douw van der Krap

(Assistant Director) and III by Ltz J. Quéré (Assistant

Director). The latter would be succeeded in August by

Ltz L Brouwer.

At the beginning of the war, the NEFIS was

exclusively concerned with obtaining information from

the Netherlands East Indies (NEI) occupied by the

Japanese (Section I). Later, espionage and sabotage

actions were also added, which were carried out by

agents also called ‘parties’, which were dropped into

occupied territory with the help of aircraft and sub -

marines (Section III). These commando units have had

an extremely difficult time, and many did not return

from their missions in the first period. 7

The NEFIS had greatly misjudged the newly created

situation in the occupied territories. In the meantime,

the Japanese had set up a large espionage network

and made extensive use of the resurgent nationalist

sentiment among the Indonesian population, which

cooperated with the Japanese. Once a commando had

landed on occupied territory, the chance of betrayal

was very high, which was therefore common. For the

sent commandos who were captured, it actually meant

(after torture) a certain death penalty.

Within the NEFIS as well as among the political

leadership of the NEI committee, there was great

turmoil about the actions to be carried out. ‘Parties’

were also dropped on New Guinea in which Captain F.

van der Veen was involved.

Move to Camp Columbia, Brisbane

Following the establishment of the Netherlands

East Indies Government-in-Exile in Camp Columbia,

Wacol, Brisbane in June-August 1944, NEFIS was

further expanded and three sections were added:

• (Section IV) Military Intelligence: (M.I.)

• (Section V) Civil Affairs Intelligence

• (Section VI) Technical Photo Service (T.P.S.)

4

MacArthur headed the Allied (but essentially American) GHQ (SWPA)

Command. The SWPA AO included the near Pacific, New Guinea, British

Borneo and the NEI minus Sumatra.

5

It was therefore NEFIS-III which ran the SO and Secret Intelligence (SI)

operations into the NEI.

6

Ltz = Luitenant ter Zee, depending on the Class of the rank, covers the

equivalent Australian Naval ranks of Sub-Lieutenant to Lieutenant

Commander.

Figure 2 - The Dutch HQ at Camp Columbia, Brisbane

7

“Commando:” is a loose and inaccurate description of the men who took

part in these operations. Later in the war, NEFIS did form some

“Intelligence Commando” (InCo) units to provide protection and support

to the SO/SI “parties”.


In the meantime, the NEFIS strength had grown to They were added to NEFIS Section III. Also in 1944,

more than 300 men and women, not including navy Section I sent Major GL Reinderhoff to the staff of U.S.

and civilian personnel. Lieutenant-Colonel S.H. Spoor General Walter Krueger of the 6 th U.S. Army, who had

was now appointed as the new director of NEFIS. also landed on New Guinea in the meantime, to assist

Section I was commanded by Major G.L. Reinderhoff, the Americans on the spot in planning future landings.

Section II under Lieutenant-at-Sea J.C. Smit, Section III These Free Dutch went commando quite literally

under Lieutenant-at-Sea A.A. Fresco, Section IV under and served alongside the SOE’s Force 136 Intelligence

Lieutenant-Pilot-at-Sea J.H. Perié, Section V under Dr. in the region. Ultimately, No. 2 (Dutch) Troop of the No.

G.W. Locher. Section VI was not yet operational. The 10 (Inter-Allied) Commando (also came out of the

organisation of the NEFIS was now prepared for the Koninklijke Brigade “Prinses Irene”) would contribute

expected invasion of Java and the other territories of volunteers to the enterprise as well. In all, the Korps

the NEI.

Insulinde would muster no less than 36 teams made up

of 250 agents. They made 17 landings in Sumatra in

Korps Insulinde

1943-44, in addition to operations in Borneo, the

Celebes, New Guinea, and Java. 9

NEFIS Operations 10

The early operations of NEFIS were made as part of

ISD. The operations under ISD are noted in “The

Official History of the Operations and Administration

of Special Operations – Australia (SOA), also known as

the Inter-Allied Services Department (ISD) and Services

Reconnaissance Department (SRD) Volume 2 –

Operations – copy no 1 [for Director, Military Intel -

ligence (DMI), Headquarters (HQ), Australian Military

Forces (AMF), Melbourne]. Source: National Library of

Australia

NEFIS was eventually given its own clandestine

operations unit, dubbed the Korps Insulinde (KI).

Drawn initially from 150 men of the 1st Battalion,

Koninklijke Brigade “Prinses Irene,” which had trained

Almost all of the operations under ISD were un -

in England in 1940-41 then had been shipped to the

successful and resulted in loss of the parties. From April

Pacific, arriving at Ceylon just after the fall of Java.

1943 onwards NEFIS became a stand-alone section

They were stranded in Ceylon and grew increasingly

under the overarching AIB and ran operations – some

frustrated of doing nothing. Finally on 1 August 1942 a

of them jointly with Australians – into Dutch New

special commando unit was established named Korps

Guinea, the eastern islands of NEI and Dutch Borneo.

Insulinde, who underwent guerrilla training. From June

Throughout the course of the war, NEFIS-III mounted

1943, 38 men of the Insulinde Corps concluded the

33 operations.

training and were ready for commando actions in the

(Continued on page 53)

NEI. 8

Figure 3 - Members of Korps Insulinde (KI) in training

Figure 4 - Map of NEFIS operations under ISD.

8

This is not accurate. Sumatra (part of the NEI) was in the AO of the

British-led South East Asia Command (SEAC), based in India/Ceylon. The

KI was formed to be the holding unit for Dutch servicemen who were

working in the Anglo-Dutch Country Section (ADCS) of SOE’s India

Mission (which Mission later became known by the cover name “Force

136”). Dutch operations from India/Ceylon were therefore only deployed

to Sumatra. As the war progressed, the Dutch and British thought that

some of these men could be better employed working operations into

the other parts of the NEI from Australia and for that reason a number of

KI members were transferred to NEFIS.

9

The landings in Sumatra were made under SOE (India) arrangements with

approval of SEAC, the landings in the other parts of the NEI were made

under arrangements of NEFIS, with the approval of SWPA.

10

The section on NEFIS operations has been more heavily edited and cutdown.

Some NEFIS operations have previously been covered in this

magazine – operations on the Vogelkop Peninsula of Dutch New Guinea

(Edition 20 in 2024) and operations in support of US landings in

Hollandia (this Edition 22).



later war of independence. In 1948, the NEFIS merged

into the new overarching Central Military Intelligence

Service. This service came directly under the command

of Commander-in-Chief General Spoor. It would

eventually have had a short existence in view of the

soon-to-be-followed transfer of sovereignty. The

director had become Lieutenant Colonel G.L.

Reinderhoff, who would transfer to the Royal

Netherlands Army after the transfer of the NEI to the

new Republic of Indonesia. Back in the Netherlands

Korps Insulinde grew into today’s modern Korps

Commandotroepen.

Figure 5 - NEFIS members near Merauke, Dutch New Guinea.

Figure 6 - Guerilla fighters from Manokwari, Dutch New Guinea.

Members of the patrol displaying their captured Japanese

weapons, in the middle Koos Ayal (a 16-year-old Ambonese girl).

These fighters, mainly left behind KNIL members, were extracted

from Dutch New Guinea by the NEFIS party RADISH in late 1944.

Source: NOID

Return to the Netherlands East Indies

In 1945 the NEFIS was reorganised so that after the

Japanese capitulation the service could form the new

security service in the NEI In September and October

1945, the NEFIS was transferred from Camp Columbia

(Brisbane) to the NEI and was established in Batavia on

Java.

After a chaotic start, the service in the NEI started

collecting information about the new local political

groups. The intelligence service played an important

role during the transition period as well as Indonesia’s

Editor’s Note

One Indonesian former member of NEFIS-III, Julius

Tahija, has close links to the Victorian Branch of

Australian Commando Association, through his

surviving sons George and Syakon. Julius, a member of

the KNIL, was by chance already in Australia during the

Japanese invasion of the NEI. Julius acquitted himself

admirably in mid 1942 as part of a short-lived and

unsuccessful joint Australian-Dutch military operation

launched from Darwin into the eastern islands of the

NEI (Operation PLOVER), gaining the Netherlands’

highest award for bravery. He later joined NEFIS,

serving as an instructor at Z Experimental Station,

Cairns and on operations in Operation TURNIP III (mid

1944) and Operation FIRTREE (early 1945) in the

eastern islands of the NEI. He married an Australian

girl, the first female dentist to graduate from

Melbourne University, he had met while serving in

Melbourne. After the war back in the NEI he became

the senior aide to LTGEN Spoor 11 , entered politics

briefly and finally emerged as a successful business -

man. His son George, who lives in Jakarta, has

attended several ACA-VIC functions and has been a

strong supporter over the years. 12

11

Lieutenant General Simon Spoor was the commander in charge of

Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service at Camp Columbia, Brisbane,

Queensland 1942-45. He was then appointed army commander in the

Dutch East Indies. https://campcolumbia.com.au/lieutenant-generalsimon-spoor-in-charge-of-dutch-intelligence-at-camp-columbia/

12

See Edition 15 (2019) of this magazine for an article on Julius Tahija by

Jim Truscott and Rick Moor.

For all advertising please contact…

Russell Maddocks

Statewide Publishing P/L ~ 0432 042 060

Email: russell@commandonews.com.au

www.commandonews.com.au



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The Positive Relationship between

Sport and Physical Activity and PTSD

Exercise has a positive clinical effect

on depressive symptoms and may

be as effective as psychological or

pharmaceutical therapies for some

individuals with PTSD.

Rosebaum et al, 2014 suggests

Physical activity/exercise is a highly

effective method in reducing

symptoms of depression and for

people experiencing other mental

health disorders.

Evidence demonstrates that an

appropriate exercise intervention

can achieve significant benefits to

symptoms, depression, anxiety and

stress, changes in body shape and

sedentary time associated with

PTSD, and non-significant trends for

sleep quality improvement according

to Rosenbaum, 2013.

The associated symptoms and the

improvements may be related to

psychosocial benefits of the

intervention, rather than functional

capacity, but there is also a strong

empirical (observational) link

between improvements in functional

capacity and psychological status

according to the author, 2016.

People with PTSD are four times as

likely to have type 2 diabetes

(Lukaschek et al, 2013) and rates of

overweight and obesity are as high

as 92%.

To add to these statistics, sufferers

of PTSD are shown to be less

physically active due to a number of

factors including pain, dysfunctional

and general lack of desire or both,

according Boscarino et al, 2004.

Adding some form of regular

physical activity can have a

significant effect on a sufferer of

PTSD. It’s important to note, the

type of activity doesn’t matter, what

matters is that the person is moving

and also having fun doing it.

If you would like to become

physically active again and help to

combat some of your PTSD related

symptoms then please consult your

GP and discuss your options for

referral to another health care

professional (exercise physiologist

or physiotherapist) for help with your

other associated or co-morbid

conditions ie lower back pain,

arthritis and or obesity.



Leaving the ADF

At some point in their career, all ADF members will

leave the military and transition to civilian life. It’s a

significant decision that can involve your family.

Planning early will make sure you’re informed and

ready to enter the next phase of your life.

You must complete your transition with ADF

Transition Support Services so you understand the

process, your administrative requirements, and the

support available to you. We encouage you to involve

your family throughout your transition experience.

Transition support network

Transitioning to civilian life is a shared responsibility.

When you decide to leave the ADF you should engage

with your family, your Unit, and ADF Transition Support

Services.

Your Unit can speak to you about the transition

process and connect you with your local ADF Transition

Centre. Your Centre will introduce you to a Transition

Support Officer who will help you and your family

through the transition process and:

• provide you with an individual transition plan

• offer career coaching during your transition and

up to 12 months afterwards

• help you meet your administrative requirements

• help you leave with all documentation like

service, medical, and training records

• facilitate connections to Defence and govern -

ment support services

nationally throughout the year. You’ll receive

information from Defence and other organisaitons on

topics like finance and superannuation, health,

relocating, employment, and ex-service organisation

support.

ADF Member and Family Transition Guide

The ADF Member and Family Transition Guide – A

Practical Manual to Transitioning contains detailed

information on the transition process for ADF

members. The Guidce includes information on support

services and administrative reuqirement. It includes

checklists to help you navigate transition process.

ADF Transition Seminar

You and your family can attend an ADF Transition

Serminar at any time during your ADF career to help

you prepare for your transition. Seminars are held



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Defence Personnel Primed to Thrive In Franchising

Kerry Miles, Director, FranchiseED

While entering the world of fran -

chising may not be top of mind for most

Australian Defence Force personnel

planning a transition to civilian life, it is

a career path that presents many

synergies and can play to your proven

strengths.

The battleground of franchising

requires strict adherence to systems and

procedures, hard work, dedication,

leadership and teamwork to achieve the

shared mission of business success.

This makes those leaving the Aust -

ralian Defence Force perfect candidates

to conquer the challenge of franchising when returning to

civilian life. The structure of a franchise system provides

franchisees with the ability to work to set policies and

procedures while at the same time allowing the inde -

pendence to lead, inspire and develop their own teams

to achieve shared goals.

These are all concepts very familiar to those who have

train and served in the Australian Defence Force, and

ones that make you suited to forging your own path to

business success in franchising. Indeed, the transition

from defence to the franchise sector can be a ‘win win’

situation for franchisors and franchisees alike.

Franchise businesses are actively seeking out high

quality and committed candidates as franchisees, while

you may be targeting a new autonomous career where

you are calling the shots and putting your considerable

skills to good use.

Where others may fail, those trained in the Australian

Defence Force bring an appetite for hard work, a hunger

for success, the proven ability to lead teams and the

discipline to adhere to set systems to survive and thrive

in the world of franchising.

Your life experiences and skills sets could be highly

suited and transferrable to owning and operating your

own franchise business, of which there are countless

options to choose from. Everything from fitness fran -

chises, food franchises, home improvement franchises

and everything in between are available. It all depends

on what you love doing and where you see yourself

thriving.

There are over 1200 franchise systems operating in

Australia, from the world’s biggest consumer brands to

local success stories and up-and-coming franchisors

providing just about every product or service imaginable.

Within these systems, there are nearly 100,000 franchise

units in Australia, which are local and usually individually

owned and operated businesses.

The opportunities are endless in franchising and what -

ever path is chosen, it is one in which the owner-operator

is in charge and driving their own destiny, with the

security of a set plan of attack and supporting systems for

long-term sustainable success.

As former Australian Defence Force personnel are

comfortable with following systems and

procedures in order to successfully

complete a mission, you are therefore

very well equipped to deal with the

challenges of franchising and make a

new owner-operator business work.

While having the right skills set,

experience and attitude is a compe -

titive advantage in franchising, they do

not alone guarantee success. Just like

in the Australian Defence Force, pre -

paration is the key to setting the course

for victory.

Knowledge is power and nowhere

more so than in the world of franchising where new

franchisees are taking the ultimate leap of faith into

owning and operating their own business.

Thoroughly researching the sector, the options that

are available and are best suited to each individual

circumstance, and fully understanding and managing the

financial and lifestyle expectations and demands, should

be the starting point in any franchising journey. I cannot

emphasise this point enough. While there are consider -

able opportunities in franchising, you need to work out

which one is right for you and to ensure the franchise you

choose is both ethical and sustainable.

While a franchise provides a set structure to follow,

compared to buying an independent business, this in

itself is no guarantee of success. Seeking out quality

information and resources on franchising in order to make

informed choices, and exploring the reality of being a

franchisee, is the logical starting point for any former

Australian Defence Force personnel considering their

future career options.

If you are wanting to educate yourself about

franchising, there’s a lot of free information at

www.franchise-ed.org.au.

If you a looking at buying a franchise and

would like to understand how FranchiseED can

help you, book a free 15-minute conversation with

Kerry at https://calendly.com/kerry-franchise-ed/

meeting-with-kerry-miles-1

About the Author:

Kerry is at the forefront of understanding what it takes

to create thriving franchises with a comprehensive

perspective encompassing both the franchisor and

franchisee. Shifting from 5 years owning a business within

the franchise sector, to more than 10 years heading up

Griffith University’s Franchise Centre as General and

Business Manager Kerry’s work is unique and driven by

maintaining an independent perspective. Her clients

include prospective franchisees, large and small franchise

organisations and not-for-profits looking to scale up their

operations. For more information visit www.franchiseed.org.au.

You can connect with her via LinkedIn

www.linkedin.com/in/kerry-miles-franchiseed/


Commando News Magazine Edition 22 July 2025

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