FALL 2032: PREPARING FOR ARMAGEDDON

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https://www.worlddefenseshow.com/en

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https://youtu.be/KEPHeKo7L4o

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SAUDI ARABIA SAID TO PRODUCE BALLISTIC MISSILES
Saudi Arabia is manufacturing ballistic missiles with China’s help,
according to a U.S. intelligence assessment reported on Dec. 23 by CNN.
Although Riyadh previously purchased missiles from Beijing, this is
believed to be the first time it has produced them domestically, and the
development is raising concerns about a new missile race in the Middle
East.
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Saudi Arabia is thought to be seeking to advance its missile capabilities
to bolster its capabilities in Yemen, where the kingdom remains
entrenched in a war against Iran-aligned Houthi rebels.
Satellite images of a site near al-Dawadmi, west of Riyadh, suggest that
Saudi Arabia is producing solid-fueled ballistic missiles, as evidenced by
signs of a “burn pit” that is used to dispose of solid-propellant leftover
from the production line.
The burn pit is “a strong signature” that the facility is manufacturing
solid-fueled missiles, according to experts Jeffrey Lewis and David
Schmerler of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies.
Compared to liquid-fueled missiles, which are generally filled with a
liquid propellant prior to launch, solid-fueled missiles are considered a
greater strategic risk because they can be fueled and concealed or
transported in one piece and fired on a moment’s notice.
In an Arms Control Wonk blog post on Dec. 23 analyzing the images,
Lewis and Schmerler assessed that the site “appears to have been built
with Chinese assistance.” The fuel production and test site is near the al-
Watah missile production facility. The missile facility was first publicly
identified by Lewis and his team in 2019, and the U.S. intelligence
community later that year publicly confirmed that Saudi Arabia had
expanded the al-Watah plant to include the rocket engine production and
test facility near al-Dawadmi. (See ACT, March and July/August 2019.)
The engine test stand observed at the site in 2019 closely resembles
those produced by China, leading the open-source analysts to identify
Beijing as a likely supplier of the technology.
U.S. officials across multiple agencies reportedly have been briefed by the
intelligence community on large transfers of sensitive ballistic missile
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technology from China to Saudi Arabia in recent months, according to
CNN. The specific model of solid-fueled missile being produced at the al-
Dawadmi site remains unknown, but given Beijing’s assistance, it could
be of Chinese design.
Saudi Arabia already possesses ballistic missiles purchased from China,
including the 3,000-kilometer-range Dong Feng-3, which the kingdom
displayed in 2014, and other Dong Feng-class missiles transferred from
Beijing in batches since 2018.
The new missiles will likely carry conventional weapons, given that Saudi
Arabia does not have nuclear weapons and is a party to the nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). But Riyadh is seeking to expand its civilian
nuclear power infrastructure and may be constructing a new uraniumprocessing
facility, known as Al-Ula, to produce yellowcake, also with
Chinese assistance. (See ACT, September 2020.) Saudi Arabia’s smallquantities
protocol safeguards agreement with the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) is outdated and would not permit the agency to
inspect a yellowcake production facility. Riyadh has denied the existence
of the Al-Ula facility, but any activity there would go unmonitored by the
IAEA, thereby raising concerns about potential covert nuclear operations.
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman said in March 2018 that “if Iran
developed a nuclear bomb, we will follow suit as soon as possible.” There
is no indication that Iran intends to produce a nuclear weapon at this
time, and negotiations to restore stringent limitations to Iran’s nuclear
program under the 2015 nuclear deal are ongoing.
The United States has repeatedly refused to sell ballistic missiles to Saudi
Arabia, citing proliferation concerns and a commitment to remain within
the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which seeks to limit the
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spread of ballistic missile technology. Although not illegal, China’s
assistance to Saudi Arabia contradicts its vow to abide by the MTCR.
China is not a member of the export control regime, but has pledged to
voluntarily abide by its guidelines, which prohibit the export of missiles
capable of delivering a 500-kilogram payload more than 300 kilometers.
Riyadh’s new ballistic missiles are likely to alter the power dynamics in
the Middle East and stymie efforts by the United States and others to
build on the Iran nuclear deal by negotiating limits on Iran’s missile
program. The development highlights the contradiction that “while
significant attention has been focused on Iran’s large ballistic missile
program, Saudi Arabia’s development and now production of ballistic
missiles has not received the same level of scrutiny,” Lewis told CNN
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https://youtu.be/31na2FIze7g

SAUDI ARABIA MANUFACTURING BALLISTIC
MISSILES WITH CHINA’S HELP: REPORT
Saudi Arabia is building its own fleet of ballistic missiles with assistance
from China, CNN reported Thursday, citing US intelligence sources.
While it was known that the kingdom had purchased missiles from China,
satellite images obtained by the network purportedly show that Saudi
Arabia is manufacturing the weapons in at least one facility as well.
US intelligence officials have been briefed on the issue and shown
evidence of “multiple large-scale transfers of sensitive ballistic missile
technology” between the Saudis and the Chinese, according to CNN.
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If confirmed, the news could throw a wrench in the Biden
administration’s goal of restraining Iran’s weapons manufacturing with
the help of Tehran’s longtime rivals in Riyadh.
China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said in a statement to CNN that it is
working with Saudi Arabia as “comprehensive strategic partners,”
maintaining that “such cooperation does not violate any international
law and does not involve the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction.”
China, led by Xi Jinping, is reportedly involved in “large-scale” transfers
of weapons with Saudi Arabia.
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Researchers at Middlebury’s Institute of International Studies who
reviewed the satellite images told CNN they were “unambiguous
evidence that the facility is operating to produce missiles.” The
researchers said the images showed a “burn pit,” suggesting a need to
dispose of material from ballistic missile production.
“Casting rocket motors results in leftover propellant, which is an
explosive hazard. Solid-propellant missile production facilities often have
burn pits where leftover propellant can be disposed of by burning,”
researcher Jeffrey Lewis told the outlet. “Burn operations are, therefore,
a strong signature that the facility is actively casting solid rocket motors.”
The images, however, don’t reveal much about how far the alleged
missiles could travel, who designed them, or how much ballistic material
they might carry.
Saudi Arabia asked the United States this month for urgent help with
replenishing Riyadh’s missile defense weaponry, which it says is running
dangerously low.
Officials asked the US to sell it scores of interceptors used to shoot down
airborne weapons. The interceptors are manufactured by
Massachusetts-based Raytheon Technologies and cost about $1 million
apiece.
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https://x.com/i/status/1474444714564747264
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SAUDI ARABIA-CHINA DEFENSE RELATIONS:
PROGRESS ON HYPERSONIC COOPERATION
Saudi Minister of Defense Prince Khaled Bin Salman visited China on
25/6/2024.
During the visit, he discussed with the Chinese side defense cooperation
in several fields, including HYPERSONIC MISSILES.
The following note highlights key aspects in this regard including:
- Progress in Saudi-Chinese negotiations on HYPERSONIC MISSILE
TECHNOLOGY
- Insights on the recent Saudi-Chinese engagement related to MISSILE
COLLABORATION and its implications
- Details of a potential agreement, including its technical components
and expected timeline
- Advancements in SAUDI MISSILE INFRASTRUCTURE, supported by
collaboration with China
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Saudi Minister of Defense Prince Khaled Bin Salman led a Saudi
delegation during an official visit to China on 25/6/2024.
During the visit, Saudi officials discussed with their Chinese counterparts
defense cooperation in several fields, including hypersonic missiles.
AN INITIAL AGREEMENT IS SAID TO HAVE BEEN REACHED BETWEEN
SAUDI ARABIA AND CHINA CONCERNING HYPERSONIC MISSILES.
The note provides a comprehensive overview of the following aspects:
- The initial agreement reached
- The Chinese contribution concerning HYPERSONIC MISSILES
The note also highlights talks between Saudi and Chinese officials
concerning cooperation in defense projects.
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SAUDI ARABIA’S HYPERSONIC AMBITIONS: PROCUREMENT
PRIORITIES, TIMETABLE, AND SUPPLIERS
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) intends to acquire and localize a
variety of hypersonic weapons in the medium-term future. SAUDI
CROWN PRINCE MOHAMMAD BIN SALMAN BIN ABDULAZIZ has
directed the Saudi Ministry of Defense (MoD), SAMI, and GAMI to
purchase both OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE HYPERSONICS.
Our 1,674-word report (6-pages) draws from confidential information
obtained by our sources to provide a definitive account of Riyadh’s plans
to become the region’s first hypersonic weapon user. Our intelligence
reveals the weapon priorities, procurement timetable, end-users (e.g.
service branches), and possible suppliers set out by CP Mohammad.
Early discussions have already taken place with some hypersonic-capable
countries, as the Saudi Ministry of Defense (MoD), SAMI, and GAMI have
been urged to fast-track efforts.
Our special report is structured as follows:
Key Judgements
-CP MOHAMMAD’S ROADMAP TO HYPERSONICS: WEAPON PRIORITIES;
END-USERS; “FIRST USER” POLICY AND TIMETABLE
-POSSIBLE SUPPLIERS OF HYPERSONICS: COOPERATION WITH BRITAIN;
POSSIBLE INVESTMENTS IN MBDA’S FC/ASW; CHINA’S HYPERSONICS
AND TOT PACKAGE UNDER DISCUSSION; JAPAN’S HVGP: OPTION AND
LEVERAGE; TALKS WITH RUSSIA OVER KINZHAL; INDIA’S BRAHMOS-II, A
DISTANT OPTION.
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https://youtu.be/acUAuAyPiXQ

‘NO DEFENSE AGAINST’ RUSSIA’S ORESHNIK
MISSILE – EX-PENTAGON ANALYST
The new weapon could shift the balance of power in favor of Moscow
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2 Aug, 2025 14:48

Neither Ukraine nor its Western backers have any means to counter
Russia’s newly deployed intermediate-range Oreshnik missile, Michael
Maloof, a former senior Pentagon security analyst, told RT in an interview
on Friday.
Maloof noted that the Oreshnik could “easily shift the balance of power
overwhelmingly in favor” of Russia in any conflict, including the ongoing
hostilities with Ukraine.
“Having a hypersonic [missile] for which there’s no defense currently… is
astonishing. It absolutely alters that balance of power dramatically, for
which the Ukrainians have no defense,” he said.
He noted that while the US is working to adapt missile defense systems
such as THAAD to counter hypersonic threats, these programs remain
under development. “There’s no operational ability at this point to deal
with a hypersonic missile,” Maloof said, adding that the Oreshnik could
reach its targets within mere minutes.
The former analyst added that the missile also travels at a speed of over
7,000 miles (11,000km) an hour. “There’s no defense against that,” he
said.
The missile system, Maloof stated, has already been tested successfully
in Ukraine in battlefield conditions. He was referring to a strike on
Ukraine’s Yuzhmash military industrial facility in the city of Dnepr in
November 2024.
Russian President Vladimir Putin said afterward that the missile’s
warheads flew at speeds exceeding Mach 10 and could not be
intercepted by existing air defenses. The missile could also carry
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conventional and nuclear payloads and travel up to several thousand
kilometers.
According to Putin, the Oreshnik strike on Ukraine was a response to the
country’s decision to use Western-supplied long-range missiles for
attacks deep into Russia.
On Friday, the Russian president said that the first serially produced
Oreshnik missile system had entered service with the armed forces. He
also noted that the question of supplying the weapons to Belarus,
Russia’s key ally, will likely be resolved by the end of the year.
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PUTIN ANNOUNCES COMPLETION OF FIRST
MASS-PRODUCTION ORESHNIK
The hypersonic missile system is already being delivered to Russia’s
forces, the president has said
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1 Aug, 2025 11:54
The first mass produced Oreshnik hypersonic missile system has entered
service with Russia’s armed forces, President Vladimir Putin announced
on Friday during a briefing on the state of the military operation in
Ukraine.
Russia battle-tested the new hypersonic missile in November by
conducting a strike on a military factory in Ukraine. The Oreshnik missile
is believed to be nuclear-capable, although Putin had previously stated

its conventional form can inflict damage comparable to a low-yield
nuclear explosion.
The first mass produced Oreshnik hypersonic missile system has entered
service with Russia’s armed forces, President Vladimir Putin announced
on Friday during a briefing on the state of the military operation in
Ukraine.
Russia battle-tested the new hypersonic missile in November by
conducting a strike on a military factory in Ukraine. The Oreshnik missile
is believed to be nuclear-capable, although Putin had previously stated
its conventional form can inflict damage comparable to a low-yield
nuclear explosion. Putin ordered the serial production of the hypersonic
missile system following a successful field test last year.
Now, the first mass produced Orenshik missile has been completed and
has already been delivered to Russian forces, the president announced
during Friday’s briefing. He also noted that the question of supplying
Oreshnik missiles to Belarus will likely be resolved by the end of the year,
adding that specialists from both countries are now working on preparing
positions for the system’s future deployment.
Putin also announced that Russian forces are advancing along the entire
conflict front line, including in the border zone, the Donetsk and Lugansk
Republics, as well as in Russia’s Zaporozhye and Kherson regions. The
president attributed the success to the courage and heroism of Russian
soldiers.
Commenting on Russia’s recent liberation of Chasov Yar, formerly a
pivotal Ukrainian stronghold in Donetsk Region, Putin stressed that
Moscow is taking back what is its own, not seizing foreign territory.
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The Russian president reiterated that Moscow remains open to
negotiations, stating that they are “always in demand and always
important, especially if it is based on a desire for peace.”
Last month, Russia and Ukraine conducted their third round of direct
negotiations in Istanbul, Türkiye. The meeting lasted about 40 minutes
after which the two sides agreed to exchange prisoners of war and the
bodies of slain soldiers and civilians. Russia also proposed the creation of
three online working groups to more swiftly resolve political, military and
humanitarian issues.
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FORGET NUKES. THIS IS RUSSIA’S NEW
DETERRENCE WEAPON
Why Russia doesn’t need to go nuclear to make its point – and how
Oreshnik makes that clear
Just before dawn on November 21, 2024, a fireball streaked across the
sky over the Dnieper River. It wasn’t a meteor. It wasn’t a drone.
The explosion that followed – precise, deep, and eerily silent on the
surface – tore through the massive Yuzhmash defense facility in
southeastern Ukraine. Footage of the strike spread within hours, picked
apart by open-source analysts and intelligence services alike. But it
wasn’t until Russian President Vladimir Putin confirmed it that the world
had a name for what it had witnessed:
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Oreshnik – a new kind of Russian ballistic missile.
Capable of reaching speeds above Mach 10, surviving reentry
temperatures of 4,000C, and delivering kinetic force that rivals tactical
nuclear weapons, the Oreshnik isn’t just fast. It’s different.
In less than a year, it has moved from classified prototype to serial
production, with confirmed plans for forward deployment in Belarus by
the end of 2025. Its emergence suggests that Russia is rewriting the rules
of strategic deterrence – not with treaty-breaking escalation, but with
something quieter, subtler, and potentially just as decisive.
So what exactly is the Oreshnik missile? Where did it come from, what
are its capabilities – and how might it reshape the battlefield?
RT explains what’s known so far about Russia’s latest breakthrough in
non-nuclear strategic weaponry.
How the Oreshnik works
The missile that struck the Yuzhmash facility in Dnepropetrovsk (known
in Ukraine as Dnipro) left behind no scorched landscape, no flattened
perimeter. Instead, analysts examining satellite imagery noted a narrow
impact zone, structural collapse below ground level, and almost surgical
surface disruption. It wasn’t the scale of destruction that stood out – it
was its shape.
This signature pointed to something new. According to available data and
expert observations, the Oreshnik carries a cluster-type penetrative
warhead, likely composed of multiple high-density submunitions. The
detonation occurs only after the payload burrows into its target – a
design meant to maximize internal damage to hardened military
infrastructure.

Putin has stated that Oreshnik’s warheads can withstand reentry
temperatures up to 4,000C. To survive such heat and remain stable at
terminal speed, the payload would need to be encased in advanced
composite materials – likely drawing on recent developments in heatresistant
ceramics and carbon-carbon structures used in hypersonic glide
vehicles.
One of the defining features of the system is its ability to maintain
hypersonic velocity during the final phase of flight. Unlike traditional
ballistic warheads that decelerate as they descend, Oreshnik reportedly
retains speeds exceeding Mach 10, possibly Mach 11, even in dense
atmospheric layers. This enables it to strike with massive kinetic energy,
increasing penetration and lethality without requiring a large explosive
charge.
At such speeds, even a non-nuclear warhead becomes a strategic
weapon. A concentrated high-velocity impact is enough to destroy
command bunkers, radar sites, or missile silos. The weapon’s
effectiveness doesn’t rely on blast radius, but on precise, high-energy
delivery. That makes it both harder to detect and harder to intercept.
In doctrinal terms, Oreshnik represents a new category: A non-nuclear
strategic ballistic missile. It occupies the space between conventional
long-range strike systems and nuclear ICBMs – with enough reach, speed,
and impact to alter battlefield calculations, but without crossing the
nuclear threshold.
From Poplar to Hazel: The origins of Oreshnik
Though the Oreshnik missile system entered the public spotlight in 2024,
its technological roots trace back decades. The architecture, design
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philosophy, and even its name follow a lineage shaped by one institution:
The Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology (MITT).
Founded during the Cold War to develop advanced solid-fueled missile
systems, MITT has long been responsible for some of Russia’s most
sophisticated mobile strategic platforms. These include the Temp-2S,
Pioner, and later, the Topol family – Russia’s first mobile intercontinental
ballistic missiles.
The naming convention has remained surprisingly consistent over the
years. Most of MITT’s missiles are named after trees: Topol (Poplar),
Topol-M, Osina (Aspen), Yars (a type of ash), Kedr (Cedar). The new
system, Oreshnik (Hazel), fits within that tradition – both symbolically
and organizationally.
Analysts believe that the Oreshnik may be based in part on the RS-26
Rubezh, a mobile ICBM developed by MITT and tested from 2011 to
2015. The RS-26 was essentially a shortened version of the Yars ICBM,
designed to deliver high-precision strikes at intermediate ranges.
Development was quietly paused in the mid-2010s – likely in response to
the constraints of the INF Treaty, which prohibited land-based missiles
with ranges of 500-5,500km.
That treaty is no longer in force. After the US formally withdrew in 2019,
Russia was free to resume development in a domain that had been frozen
for decades. The appearance of Oreshnik just five years later suggests
that its core components – propulsion systems, targeting modules, and
mobile chassis – were already well advanced.
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Production and deployment: From prototype to Belarus
What began as a one-off operational strike has since evolved into a fullscale
weapons program. In June 2025, during a meeting with graduates
of Russia’s top military academies, Putin announced that the Oreshnik
missile system had entered serial production.
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The speed of this transition – from battlefield debut to mass production
– is notable. It suggests that both the missile system and its supporting
infrastructure had been maturing quietly in the background, likely
building off earlier research conducted under the RS-26 program.
Even more significant than the production itself is the plan for forward
deployment. On July 2, 2025, during an Independence Day gathering in
Minsk, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko publicly confirmed
that the first Oreshnik units would be stationed on in Belarus by the end
of the year.
The move carries both logistical logic and strategic weight. Belarus has
long provided heavy-duty mobile chassis for Russian missile systems –
including the one used by Oreshnik. That industrial synergy makes Minsk
a natural hub for deployment, but this is more than technical
convenience.
With a minimum range of 800km and a maximum reportedly almost
5,500, the Oreshnik stationed in Belarus would place virtually all of
Central and Western Europe within reach. For Russia, it represents a nonnuclear
forward deterrent. For NATO, it introduces a new class of threat
– one that is fast, precise, and difficult to intercept, yet remains below
the threshold of nuclear retaliation.
In practical terms, this also opens the door to a possible joint Russian-
Belarusian command structure for missile operations outside Russian
territory – a development that would further formalize military
integration between the two states.
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A new doctrine without nukes
For decades, the term ‘strategic weapon’ has been synonymous with
nuclear arms – tools of last resort, deployed not for use but for
deterrence. Oreshnik changes that equation.
By combining intercontinental reach, hypersonic speed, and precision
penetrative capability, the system introduces a new tier of force: One that
sits below the nuclear threshold, but far above conventional long-range
artillery or cruise missiles.
Unlike nuclear warheads, Oreshnik’s payloads can be used without
inviting global condemnation or risking escalation beyond control. Yet
their destructive potential – especially against hardened military targets
or critical infrastructure – makes them a credible tool of strategic
coercion.
This is the core of what we can call a ‘non-nuclear deterrence doctrine’:
The ability to achieve battlefield or political objectives through advanced
conventional systems that mimic the strategic impact of nuclear weapons
– without crossing the line.
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In this emerging framework, Oreshnik is not just a missile. It is a
prototype of future war logic: Fast enough to strike before detection,
survivable enough to evade interception, and powerful enough to shape
decisions before war even begins.
Sources estimate the missile’s operational range at 22,000km, though in
practice it may be virtually unlimited. Such a missile could patrol
potential conflict zones indefinitely, awaiting launch commands. Upon
receiving orders, it could maneuver toward targets from unpredictable
vectors, making interception extraordinarily difficult.
Effectively, the Burevestnik is designed to serve as a “doomsday
weapon” – a guaranteed retaliatory strike platform in the event of
nuclear war.
Outflanking defenses
A nuclear-powered cruise missile would be capable of striking anywhere
on the globe from any direction. It could exploit satellite communications
to update flight paths, evade interception, and even receive new target
information mid-flight. Naturally, preventing accidents is critical, but it’s
likely that specialized recovery systems – possibly involving parachutes –
have been developed.
The ability to safely operate a nuclear-powered engine stems from
technological breakthroughs achieved in the 1990s and 2000s, when
Russian scientists successfully built compact nuclear reactors. These
advancements paved the way not only for the Burevestnik, but also for
other projects like the Poseidon underwater drone.
Notably, the US and the Soviet Union both explored nuclear-powered
aircraft concepts during the Cold War. Despite extensive research on
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platforms like the B-36 and Tu-95, both nations ultimately abandoned the
projects due to insurmountable engineering challenges, astronomical
costs, and radiation safety concerns.
Today, with more advanced reactor technology, Russia seems poised to
achieve what Cold War engineers only dreamed of: a practical, nuclearpowered,
unlimited-range missile.
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Is the Burevestnik ready?
Can the Burevestnik be considered operational? Full details remain
classified, but tests in 2020–2021 at Kapustin Yar and Nenoksa strongly
suggest significant progress. The completion of permanent launch sites
points to an impending deployment phase.
According to some reports, Russia could begin fielding Burevestnik
missiles as early as 2025-26 – potentially in large numbers. Thanks to
their nearly limitless range, these missiles could patrol vast areas,
including the Arctic, Siberia, or the Pacific Ocean, remaining invisible to
conventional defense systems.
A major challenge for America’s Golden Dome initiative will be detecting
and tracking such missiles – no easy task. It would likely require
unprecedented coordination with the US Navy and the full use of spacebased
tracking systems.
Space: The final frontier of missile defense
Ultimately, defeating a weapon like the Burevestnik would demand a fully
integrated space-based missile defense component. Satellite tracking,
rapid identification of launch zones, and intercept capabilities far beyond
current systems would be necessary. Even advanced naval assets like
Aegis-equipped ships would face a monumental challenge.

For now, there is no simple solution. And while Washington scrambles to
prepare, Moscow holds a major advantage – especially when considering
additional next-generation weapons like the Poseidon nuclear drone.
In this high-stakes race, Russia may have already moved the strategic
chessboard – and set up a checkmate that America’s Golden Dome might
not be able to prevent.
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SAUDI ARABIA'S HYPERSONIC MISSILE RUSH
Saudi Minister of Defense Prince Khaled Bin Salman Bin Abdulaziz was
quoted as saying that the Kingdom is exploring various options
concerning hypersonic missile projects, one of which includes potential
collaboration with Russia.
The note provides a comprehensive overview of the following aspects:
- The status of talks with Russia concerning hypersonic missiles
- Other countries eyed by Saudi Arabia for cooperation
- A prerequisite for the Kingdom to move forward with a deal
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The note also highlights Prince Khaled's stance on expanding defense
cooperation with Russia in light of the Kingdom's strategic relations with
the U.S.
SAUDI ARABIA SEEKS HYPERSONIC MISSILE
TECHNOLOGY TO COMPETE WITH IRAN
Saudi Arabia has reportedly intensified efforts to acquire hypersonic
missile technology to compete with its regional rival, Iran and reportedly,
has initiated discussions with Russia to obtain this advanced missile
technology.
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Iran's "Fattah" Hypersonic Missile
(DEFENCE SECURITY ASIA) — Saudi Arabia and its defense industry are
reported to have intensified efforts to acquire hypersonic missile
technology in order to compete with its primary regional rival, Iran,
which already possesses hypersonic missiles.
According to regional defense publication, Riyadh has initiated
discussions with Russia to obtain this advanced missile technology.

Saudi Arabia Defense Minister Prince Khaled bin Salman AbdulAziz was
quoted as saying that the oil-rich country is exploring various options for
its hypersonic missile development project, including collaboration with
Moscow.
Crown Prince Mohamd bin Salman also shares the aspiration to secure
this technology, expressing a desire to expand defense cooperation with
Russia.
However, Riyadh has alternative options should its plans to collaborate
with Russia on hypersonic missile technology not materialize, including
partnerships with other countries.
To date, only the United States, Russia, North Korea, and China are
known to have the capability to develop hypersonic missiles.
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Saudi Arabia is perceived as lagging behind Iran in the development of
hypersonic missiles.
Last year, Iran became the first country in the Middle East to introduce
hypersonic missiles, named “Fattah-1” and “Fattah-2.”
Although introduced last year, Iran notably refrained from using these
missiles in its recent attacks on Israel, opting instead for older guided
missiles that do not utilize hypersonic technology.
In June of last year, Iran unveiled its first hypersonic missile, “Fattah-1,”
capable of reaching speeds of Mach 15.
Iranian authorities claim it cannot be intercepted by any air defense
system due to its high velocity.
Iran’s hypersonic guided missile “Fattah II” is equipped with a
Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV).
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Regional military observers have noted that the development of the
“Fattah-1” missile increases concerns in the United States and Israel
regarding Tehran’s missile capabilities.
According to state media, “Fattah-1” can travel at speeds exceeding Mach
15, equivalent to over 5,000 meters per second, and no advanced U.S. or
Israeli air defense system can intercept it.
After “Fattah-1,” in November last year, Iranian authorities unveiled the
latest variant of its hypersonic missile, “Fattah II,” claimed to be capable
of speeds between Mach 15 and Mach 20, surpassing all anti-ballistic
missile defense systems of the U.S. and Israel.
The latest “Fattah II” missile is equipped with a Hypersonic Glide Vehicle
(HGV), ensuring it achieves maximum speeds and can strike targets over
1,400 km away.
Iran first disclosed its hypersonic missile capability last June, claiming it
could target Israel within six to seven minutes.
The “Fattah II” variant, with its HGV capability, allows for even shorter
attack durations due to the missile’s minimal Radar Cross Section (RCS).
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Since 2022, Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps has stated that it is
developing hypersonic missiles, representing a “generational leap” in the
country’s missile technology.
The introduction of hypersonic missiles, “Fattah-1” and “Fattah-2,”
followed the launch of Iran’s fourth-generation ballistic missile,
“Kheibar,” in May last year, which drew criticism and condemnation from
Western nations, particularly the U.S. and its key ally, Israel.
The “Kheibar” missile is capable of hitting targets up to 2,000 km away
and can carry a conventional warhead weighing up to 1,500 kilograms.–
DSA
SAUDI MBS DETERMINED TO ACQUIRE
RUSSIAN HYPERSONIC TECHNOLOGIES
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman (MBS) intends to expand
defense relations with Russia in several domains.
MBS is said to have addressed the subject during his meeting with
Russian President Vladimir Putin on 6/12/2023 in Riyadh.
This note provides a comprehensive overview of the following:
- MBS expressing interest in Russian hypersonic missile technologies
- His interest in other advanced Russian defense systems
- President Putin’s reaction and suggestion
The note also highlights how MBS’ plans for expanding defense relations
with Russia were reflected in the Saudi 2024 defense budget.
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SAUDI ARABIA REPORTEDLY INTENSIFIES EFFORTS TO
ACQUIRE HYPERSONIC MISSILE TECHNOLOGY
Saudi Defense Minister Prince Khaled bin Salman Abdulaziz was quoted
by Middle Eastern defense media as saying that the kingdom is exploring
various options for its hypersonic missile development project, including
potential collaboration with Moscow.
(DEFENCE SECURITY ASIA) – Saudi Arabia and its defense industry are
reportedly intensifying efforts to acquire hypersonic missile technology
to compete with its main regional rival, Iran.
Iran already possesses hypersonic missiles and recently employed them
successfully in attacks against Israel.
Riyadh has reportedly initiated discussions with Russia to explore the
acquisition of this advanced missile technology.
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According to Middle Eastern defense media, Saudi Defense Minister
Prince Khaled bin Salman Abdulaziz confirmed the kingdom is evaluating
various options for its hypersonic missile development project, including
potential collaboration with Moscow.
Reports indicate that Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman also shares
the ambition to acquire hypersonic technology and is keen to expand
defense cooperation with Russia.
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Iranian hypersonic missile
However, Riyadh is keeping its options open in case the partnership with
Russia does not materialize, considering collaborations with other
countries possessing hypersonic missile technology.
Currently, only the United States, Russia, North Korea, Iran, and China are
known to have developed hypersonic missile capabilities.

Saudi Arabia finds itself lagging behind Iran, which introduced its
hypersonic missiles last year, becoming the first Middle Eastern nation to
possess such technology.
Iran’s hypersonic missiles, named “Fattah-1” and “Fattah-2,” were
unveiled in 2023.
The first, “Fattah-1,” can travel at speeds of up to Mach 15, and Iranian
officials claim it is impervious to interception by any existing air defense
systems.
Painted in black, the missile reportedly has a range of 1,400 kilometers.
Regional military analysts warn that the development of the “Fattah-1”
hypersonic missile has heightened concerns in the United States and
Israel over Iran’s growing missile capabilities.
Iranian media state that “Fattah-1” hypersonic missile can cruise at Mach
15—equivalent to more than 5,000 meters per second—rendering it
immune to advanced air defense systems in both the U.S. and Israel.
“Its maneuverability and flight path at varying altitudes make it
impossible to intercept with other air defence missiles,” a senior official
from Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps claimed.
In November 2023, Iran revealed an upgraded version called “Fattah-2,”
capable of reaching speeds between Mach 15 and Mach 20.
It was also designed to evade all American and Israeli anti-ballistic missile
defense systems.
The unveiling took place during a visit by Iran’s Supreme Leader,
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, to the Ashura Aerospace Science and Technology
University, where these missiles are manufactured.
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The “Fattah-2” is reportedly equipped with a Hypersonic Glide Vehicle
(HGV) that ensures it reaches its maximum speed and extends its range
beyond 1,400 kilometers.
Iranian authorities claim that this missile could strike targets in Israel
within six to seven minutes.
With its HGV capabilities, the “Fattah-2” is expected to further reduce
response times and has a minimal radar cross-section (RCS), making it
difficult to detect.
Since 2022, Iran’s Revolutionary Guard has pursued the development of
hypersonic missiles as part of a generational leap in the country’s missile
technology.
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Kheibar (Khoramshahr 4) ballistic missile

The unveiling of the “Fattah-1” and “Fattah-2” missiles followed the
launch of Iran’s fourth-generation ballistic missile, “Kheibar,” in May
2023.
The “Kheibar” missile has a range of 2,000 kilometers, capable of
reaching targets in Israel, and can carry a conventional warhead weighing
up to 1,500 kilograms.
Iranian military officials state that the missile can achieve speeds of Mach
15 outside the atmosphere and Mach 8 within it.
The introduction of these missiles has drawn criticism and condemnation
from Western nations, particularly the United States and its ally, Israel.
— DSA
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HYPERSONIC WEAPONS RACE: SAUDI ARABIA EYES RUSSIA
TIES TO ACCELERATE HYPERSONIC MISSILE PROGRAM
In a significant development for Middle Eastern military dynamics, Saudi
Arabia is reportedly accelerating efforts to acquire hypersonic missile
technology to keep pace with regional adversary Iran. Recent reports
indicate that Saudi officials have initiated discussions with Russia to
explore options for acquiring this advanced missile technology, aiming to
close the defense capability gap with Iran, which recently showcased its
hypersonic missile prowess in a conflict with Israel. With Crown Prince
Mohammed bin Salman and Defense Minister Prince Khaled bin Salman
Abdulaziz leading the push, Riyadh is evaluating multiple potential
partnerships, signaling a significant step in the kingdom’s strategic
defense ambitions.
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The Middle East has witnessed a rapid acceleration in missile technology,
largely due to Iran’s aggressive strides in developing and deploying
hypersonic capabilities. Hypersonic missiles, traveling at speeds of Mach
5 and above, pose a unique challenge to traditional missile defense
systems, thanks to their speed, maneuverability, and flight path
variability. As of 2023, only a few countries possess these capabilities,
namely the United States, Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. Iran’s
advancement, however, marks the first instance of a Middle Eastern
nation achieving hypersonic missile proficiency.
In response to Iran’s expanding missile arsenal, Saudi Arabia’s defense
apparatus is intensifying efforts to bolster its own capabilities. With its
regional adversary holding weapons capable of penetrating advanced air
defenses, Riyadh’s security calculus is being redefined, leading to the
reported exploration of an alliance with Russia for hypersonic
technology. Defense Minister Prince Khaled bin Salman Abdulaziz
recently confirmed that Saudi Arabia is evaluating various options to
initiate a hypersonic missile program, with an eye on Russian
collaboration as a possible avenue for expediting the process.
The push for hypersonic missile capabilities represents a marked shift in
Saudi Arabia’s defense policy, traditionally aligned with Western allies,
particularly the United States. Although still a possibility, a partnership
with Russia suggests a broader diversification strategy within Saudi
Arabia’s foreign policy framework. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman
has publicly supported expanding Saudi-Russian defense ties, seeing this
as an opportunity for the kingdom to foster technological independence
while securing its regional defense posture.
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According to defense analysts, Saudi Arabia’s exploration of hypersonic
technology, with Russia as a likely partner, could serve as a balancing
move in the Middle Eastern military landscape, allowing Riyadh to project
greater deterrence against its adversaries. Additionally, Russia’s existing
expertise with hypersonic systems—evident in its “Avangard” and
“Kinzhal” missiles—positions it as an appealing option for Saudi Arabia,
especially as the United States remains reticent in sharing hypersonic
technologies with non-NATO allies.
Iran’s hypersonic missile development has unfolded swiftly over the past
few years. In 2023, Iran unveiled the “Fattah-1” and “Fattah-2”
hypersonic missiles, showcasing capabilities that regional military
analysts describe as game-changing. Painted in black and equipped with
advanced propulsion and maneuvering technology, the “Fattah-1” can
travel up to Mach 15, or approximately 5,000 meters per second. Iranian
officials claim it is immune to existing missile defense systems, raising
concerns among the United States and Israel, both of which have
invested heavily in anti-missile technologies.
The “Fattah-1” has a range of 1,400 kilometers, a sufficient distance to
strike targets across the region, including Israel. Iran’s Revolutionary
Guard Corps asserts that the missile’s ability to change altitudes and
paths mid-flight renders it exceptionally difficult to intercept, thus posing
a significant threat to adversarial air defense systems. In November 2023,
Iran further expanded its arsenal with the introduction of “Fattah-2,” a
more advanced model that reportedly reaches speeds between Mach 15
and Mach 20 and is equipped with a Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV). This
HGV capability extends the missile’s range and allows it to maintain high
speeds, making it challenging for traditional radar systems to track and
intercept.
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Saudi Arabia’s interest in hypersonic missiles is motivated by several key
factors. Firstly, the strategic balance in the Middle East has been under
pressure with Iran’s growing missile capabilities, as demonstrated in
recent conflicts involving hypersonic missile strikes against Israel.
Secondly, the hypersonic missile race is quickly transforming the nature
of warfare in the region, requiring rapid advancements in both offensive
and defensive technologies.
A potential acquisition of hypersonic missile capabilities would offer
Saudi Arabia multiple benefits:
Deterrence and Regional Power Projection: Hypersonic missiles could
provide Riyadh with a credible deterrent against Iran, enhancing Saudi
Arabia’s regional influence and balancing Iran’s growing power.
Enhanced National Security: Hypersonic missiles would be a strategic
tool for responding to perceived Iranian threats, particularly as Iran’s
missile reach extends to Saudi borders.
Defense Autonomy: Developing or acquiring hypersonic technology
allows Saudi Arabia to reduce dependence on the United States, aligning
with the kingdom’s Vision 2030 initiative to diversify partnerships and
achieve greater technological autonomy.
Saudi Arabia has not publicly disclosed the type of hypersonic system it
seeks to acquire, whether it be a glide-vehicle-based missile or a highspeed
cruise missile. However, given the versatility and advantages
offered by the HGV systems seen in Iran’s “Fattah-2” missile, it is likely
that Saudi Arabia will aim to acquire a comparable system.
Russia’s position as a global leader in hypersonic technology makes it a
practical choice for Riyadh. Moscow has developed multiple hypersonic
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missile systems, such as the Avangard HGV and the Kinzhal air-launched
ballistic missile, both designed to evade U.S. missile defenses. If Saudi
Arabia’s discussions with Russia materialize into a formal defense
partnership, Riyadh could benefit from Russian expertise and potentially
even receive operational hypersonic systems within a few years.
Moscow, on its part, would likely welcome such a partnership, especially
given the economic potential. Hypersonic missile deals could serve as a
lucrative market for Russia amidst its own strained relations with
Western nations, helping the Kremlin finance its domestic defense
initiatives. A potential arms trade with Saudi Arabia could also strengthen
Russia’s geopolitical leverage in the Middle East, allowing it to
counterbalance U.S. influence in the region.
The United States is likely to monitor Saudi Arabia’s efforts closely,
particularly as Riyadh explores partnerships with countries beyond its
traditional allies. American policymakers have long viewed Saudi Arabia
as a key pillar in its Middle Eastern strategy, providing stability in the Gulf
and acting as a counterweight to Iranian influence. An intensifying Saudi-
Russian defense partnership might create unease in Washington, which
has traditionally supplied advanced weaponry to Riyadh.
The U.S. has been reluctant to share its hypersonic technology with non-
NATO allies, and for Saudi Arabia, this has become a clear barrier to
accessing the latest missile technology from its longstanding ally.
Washington’s concerns may deepen should Saudi Arabia make significant
advances in hypersonic capabilities with Russian support. Moreover, with
Russia and China pushing for increased influence in the Middle East, a
U.S.-allied nation acquiring hypersonic technology from Russia could
further strain Riyadh-Washington relations.
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While Russia remains a strong candidate, Saudi Arabia is reportedly
leaving the door open to collaborations with other nations. Among the
five countries with hypersonic missile technology, China stands as
another potential partner. Beijing has made substantial advances in
hypersonic systems, particularly with its DF-ZF hypersonic glide vehicle,
and it might be open to sharing technology with Riyadh, especially given
the close economic and strategic ties between the two nations.
For Saudi Arabia, the pursuit of hypersonic missile technology is not
merely about keeping up with Iran but about achieving broader strategic
autonomy. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s Vision 2030 plan
envisions a Saudi defense industry capable of producing advanced
systems domestically, with hypersonic technology representing a
pinnacle of such ambitions.
The potential acquisition of hypersonic missiles by Saudi Arabia carries
significant implications for the Middle East’s security dynamics:
Regional Arms Race: A Saudi acquisition of hypersonic missiles could
spark a broader regional arms race, prompting other Gulf states to seek
similar capabilities.
Shift in U.S. Military Focus: With a new level of advanced weaponry in
Saudi hands, the U.S. might need to adjust its military presence and
support strategies in the region.
Broader Global Ramifications: The hypersonic arms race is not confined
to the Middle East. Saudi acquisition of these technologies may influence
how other U.S. allies in other regions approach their defense policies.
Analysts warn that the Saudi-Iran competition could further destabilize
the region, adding yet another layer to the complex web of geopolitical
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tensions. Hypersonic missiles, which are highly destabilizing due to their
preemptive strike potential and virtually unstoppable nature, may add
new security challenges for neighboring nations.
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AMERICA’S LARGEST EVER WEAPONS DEAL
GOES TO SAUDI ARABIA
https://youtu.be/PNsnPnROJsA
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The US has signed a $142 billion arms deal with Saudi Arabia the largest
defense agreement in American history the package includes advanced
air and missile defense systems maritime security equipment and
modernization of Saudi land forces it also encompasses training and
support to enhance Saudi military capabilities this deal is part of a
broader $600 billion investment package between the two nations
reinforcing their STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP AND COMMITMENT TO
REGIONAL STABILITY according to the Trump administration
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US, SAUDI ARABIA HOLD HIGH-LEVEL DEFENSE
MEETING AT THE PENTAGON
Al Arabiya English Published: 04 August ,2025: 02:36 PM GST
US and Saudi officials convened at the Pentagon last week for a high-level
forum to strengthen defense ties between Washington and Riyadh.
The two-day meeting marked the 9th session of the Strategic Joint
Planning Committee (SJPC), led by Pentagon policy chief Elbridge Colby
on the US side and Assistant Minister of Defense Dr. Khalid Biyari
representing the Saudi delegation.
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“The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a critical, longstanding defense partner
for the United States that seeks to grow more capable and self-reliant in
its defense. We are working hard to partner with Saudi Arabia to enable
it to do so,” Colby said in a post on X.
Chief Pentagon Spokesman Sean Parnell said both sides exchanged views
on key defense priorities and regional security challenges. He noted that
the delegations reaffirmed their support for the enduring bilateral
relationship.
Colby welcomed Saudi efforts to build up its self-defense capabilities and
“to make greater contributions toward achieving shared regional
objectives,” Parnell added.
The meeting came amid a series of recent US arms sales to the Kingdom.
Earlier this year, the Trump administration approved a $3.5 billion
weapons deal that included 1,000 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air
Missiles (AMRAAM) and 50 AIM-120C-8 guidance sections.
Washington also cleared the sale of precision-guided munitions to Saudi
Arabia in March.
Separately, the top US military general for the Middle East announced
last month that Saudi Arabia’s first Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
(THAAD) battery had become fully operational.
The current defense relationship builds on a broader framework
established during President Donald Trump’s first official foreign visit to
Saudi Arabia in May. That trip resulted in the signing of $142 billion in
Memoranda of Intent, which included major Saudi investments in the US
defense industrial base.
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During last week’s SJPC, Colby reaffirmed the Pentagon’s commitment to
deepening the defense partnership and “encouraged rapid progress” on
implementing the agreements signed in May.
“Both leaders recognized US-Saudi defense cooperation as a force
multiplier for regional security, and reviewed opportunities to deepen
cooperation,” said Parnell, the Pentagon spokesman.
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THE COMING US-SAUDI NUCLEAR DEAL

With the daily parade of Gaza calamities, American, Saudi, and Israeli
officials have quietly shelved normalizing Israeli-Saudi relations. But a
Saudi-bankrolled “peace” deal and a generous US civilian nuclear
agreement to get Riyadh to recognize Israel is really just a matter of time.
For those within the Beltway, the deal is too audacious to let die.
The real problem is the nuclear bit, which raises the curtain on a Saudi
bomb and a future nuclear food fight in the Middle East. Saudi Crown
Prince Mohammed bin Salman wants Washington to green-light Saudi
efforts to enrich uranium, which could bring the Kingdom within weeks
of acquiring a bomb—just as enrichment capabilities already did for Iran.
The Saudi crown prince, known as MBS, has been brutally frank: He will
not hesitate to dump the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) if he
thinks Iran is building bombs. Of course, whatever Washington allows
MBS to do with his nuclear program will prompt other Middle Eastern
states Washington has nuclear cooperation agreements with—
the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, and Egypt—to demand the same,
creating not one, but potentially many nuclear weapons-ready states.
Ever eager to close a deal with Riyadh, nuclear enthusiasts will be quick
to note that any cooperation would be safeguarded by the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Nuclear enthusiasts further suggest that
Saudi uranium enrichment could be conducted under the watchful eyes
not just of the IAEA but of Americans, and that key portions of the plant
might be “black boxed” to keep the Saudis from diverting any sensitive
technology. Others have suggested introducing remote shutdown
mechanisms for the plant.
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Cast in the context of a “breakthrough” Middle East peace package,
Congress and the press will celebrate. Pro-Trump, pro-nuclear
Republicans and pro-Israeli, net-zero carbon emissions Democrats will
join in a bipartisan moment. The deal will be sealed.
What could go wrong? If Iran is MBS’s nuclear role model, plenty. The
Islamic Republic exploited its “peaceful,” IAEA-safeguarded power
reactor at Bushehr as a procurement front for illicitly acquiring bombmaking
goods. By the time US and other Western intelligence agencies
tracked this trade, it was too late to block. The Saudis understand this.
The bottom line is clear: Even if Washington restricts its civilian nuclear
cooperation with Riyadh to building IAEA-safeguarded light-water power
reactors, the deal could literally bomb.
Wouldn’t our intelligence on ally Saudi Arabia be better than it has been
on Iran? Perhaps, but so far, it’s been pretty awful. In 1988, the Central
Intelligence Agency did discover that Riyadh bought SS-2 medium-range
missiles from China but only after the deal was sealed. In 2003, when
China exported DF-21 ballistic missiles to the Kingdom, the CIA again
found out and was even allowed to verify the missiles were not nuclearcapable,
but only after the missiles were delivered.
Several years later, when intelligence finally leaked out that China
secretly built missile factories for the Saudis, the Trump administration
was mum on whether there was an intelligence failure and allowed
speculation that it had blessed the transaction. Then, in 2020, when US
intelligence confirmed China was helping the Kingdom mill uranium
domestically, it did so, again only after the mining and milling were well
underway.
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This track record of studied inadvertence, then, brings us to the next
worry: MBS wants Washington to green-light the Kingdom enriching
uranium, even though this IAEA-“safeguarded” activity is precisely what
has brought Tehran to the brink of having several nuclear bombs. Will
monitoring this process be enough? By the time anything suspicious gets
detected, it’s too late to block the last few steps needed to make bombs.
The tough part of the process—acquiring enough fissile material for a
bomb—will be over. Weaponization is both faster and easier to conceal.
Black-boxing key portions of this activity and employing American
enrichment operators and observers would not change this calculation.
On Saudi soil, foreign operators can be forced to leave. This is precisely
what the Kingdom did in the 1970s when it expelled foreign oil
companies.
What can be done? First, a normalization deal may be greased with US
security inducements, but any nuclear carrots should be hived off from
the package and treated like any other trade agreement: with a required
Congressional majority approval. Currently, the Atomic Energy Act only
requires the White House to announce nuclear agreements and wait 90
legislative days for them to come into force. This is a formula for
congressional inattention. Instead, Congress should amend the Atomic
Energy Act to require both houses to approve nuclear deals with
countries that want to enrich uranium or separate out plutonium from
spent fuel or that publicly announce their willingness to violate the NPT.
This would cover Saudi Arabia but also other worrisome future cases.
Second, Congress should require the intelligence community to certify
that it can reliably detect a potential nuclear military diversion early
enough for authorities outside the Kingdom to intervene and prevent the
construction of a bomb. In the nuclear field, this is called “timely
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warning.” The intelligence community should explain publicly how such
warning can be achieved and what actions would prevent Saudi Arabia
from acquiring a bomb.
These efforts may seem to be a lot, but doing anything less risks dropping
the ball on blocking the bomb’s further spread.
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