Year in Review 2025: Shifting Grounds

presents‌

Year in Review‌

Shiftin‌‌

g‌

I S S U E N O . 7 | 2 0 2 5 ‌

‌rounds‌

A Year of Flux‌

theyoungdiplomats.com‌

@ydsociety‌

A Year of Flux:‌‌

Diplomacy‌‌

By Curt Merlo/Boston Globe‌

in the Age of

Uncertainty‌

Cover references‌

Empathy mirroring -‌ ‌From creatingpraxis.comau‌

Wall crack -‌ ‌By Marija Zaric/Unsplash‌

By Curt Merlo/Boston Globe‌

Fore-‌

word‌

Tian Tian Dorge‌

Editor-In-Chief‌

A single turning point has not defined 2025. Rather, it has been shaped by an

accumulation of flux: protracted wars, shifting power configurations,

institutional strain, and an accelerating planetary crisis. Shifting Grounds: A Year

of Flux captures this moment of broad geopolitical instability. It brings together

emerging voices across regions and disciplines to examine how states,

societies, and institutions are navigating uncertainty, reimagining regional and

global cooperation, and reconfiguring global norms. Shifting Grounds: A Year of

Flux is organised into four sections, each examining a distinct set of pressures

reshaping the global order in 2025.

Section One: The Breaking Point examines some of the world’s most devastating

genocides, wars, and crises in 2025. It unpacks the weaponisation of aid in Gaza,

Sudan, and Ukraine. It confronts the world’s worst humanitarian crises in Sudan,

Myanmar’s worsening humanitarian situation, and systematic abuses in the

Democratic Republic of Congo. It also turns to Southeast Asia, exploring how

conflict has escalated amid faltering regional diplomacy.

Section Two: Global Reordering explores the redistribution of power and the

rise of new regional and international dynamics in the global system. From the

BRICS’ search for renewed international legitimacy and the significance of the

2025 ASEAN-GCC-China Summit, to analysis of “America First” foreign policy

under a second Trump administration and the growing influence of South-South

cooperation, this section highlights how global alignments are shifting. It also

considers the European Union’s expanding Indo-Pacific engagement, alongside

featured articles from our collaboration with the Australia Latam Emerging

Leaders Dialogue.

Section Three: Institutions Under Pressure analyses the strains on global

institutions, including the erosion of academic freedom across nations, failures

to protect journalism, the role of youth-led political movements in challenging

legitimacy, and constraints on global maritime governance. Additionally, it

reflects the 80th anniversary of the United Nations and the state of

multilateralism, incorporating perspectives from the youth-led Australian nonprofit

Global Voices.

Section Four: Planetary Diplomacy examines how climate governance and

environmental pressures are redefining international cooperation. It brings

together perspectives on the International Court of Justice’s Advisory Opinion

of 23 July 2025 regarding climate change, the outcomes of the COP30, climate

migration, resource diplomacy, and Pacific leadership in global climate justice.

This final section also includes a detailed evaluation of the European Union’s

sustainable development agenda, alongside case studies exploring

environmental governance and Indigenous perspectives.

As 2025 draws to a close, this Year in Review traces not only the pressures

testing the global order but also reflects on the possibilities for renewal,

resilience, and reform. We hope you enjoy reading Shifting Grounds: A Year of

Flux.

Thank‌

you‌

for‌

reading‌

Jazmin Wright‌

President‌

Dear Young Diplomats,‌‌

Thank you for supporting the Young Diplomats Society in 2025.‌ ‌

As a youth-led, volunteer organisation, amplifying young voices is at the heart of

everything we do. At the Young Diplomats Society, we seek to inspire, inform,

and empower our members, volunteers, and the broader community with

everything we do - we are proud to be a platform that continuously engages

young people and provides youth analysis on issues shaping our world.‌‌

It is with great pleasure that the Young Diplomats Society presents the 2025 Year

In Review, Shifting Grounds: A Year of Flux. This year has been a big year for

international affairs, marked by uncertainty and the reshaping of global norms.

This flagship Special Edition publication seeks to make sense of the shifts and

changes across the world through the analysis of young people. From protracted

wars to accelerating climate insecurity and rapid technological disruption, the

world has undergone significant shifts across various domains.‌‌

Special Edition publications are an extraordinary undertaking, encompassing

everything from writing and editing to design and production. I extend my

sincere gratitude and congratulations to our Editor-in-Chief, Tian Tian Dorge, and

the Publications team, as well as to our Marketing & Communications Director,

Stephen Kei, and the Marketing team, for the many hours dedicated to

producing this Special Edition. I also wish to thank our writers, editors, and

designers for their invaluable contributions, and express my appreciation to our

members and volunteers for their continued support of the Young Diplomats

Society, as well as our panellists supporting the Young Diplomats Society at the

launch event for this Special Edition.‌ ‌

As you read through the 2025 Year In Review, we encourage you to take a

moment to reflect on the year that was — a year defined by profound changes

and shifting dynamics around the world. Consider how these developments

have shaped global affairs, challenged established norms, and created new

opportunities for cooperation and innovation. We invite you to engage critically

with the ideas presented, and to think about the role each of us can play in

shaping a more resilient and inclusive future.‌

Thank you for your ongoing support and engagement with the Young Diplomats

Society. From the team at the Young Diplomats Society, we hope you enjoy

reading this edition of the Year In Review.‌

Jazmin Wright‌‌

President‌ ‌

Young Diplomats‌‌

Editorial Team

Design Team

Editor-In-Chief‌

Tian Tian Dorge‌

Senior Editors‌

Tanisha Shah

Saxon Wright-Casanova

Senior Correspondents‌

Evangelia Wichmann‌

Ojasvi Rana‌

Editors‌

Abby Wellington‌

Anna Chong‌

Emilie Everingham‌

Georgia Mitchell‌

Jason Hoang‌

Jessica Rainford‌

Madi Hasell‌

Mary Higgins‌

Steven Naaman‌

Wendy Lam‌

Marketing & Communications Director‌

Stephen Kei‌

Head of Design and Senior Marketing &‌

Communications Officer‌

Nícolas Buitrago‌

Senior Marketing & Communications

Officer‌

Nicole Koh‌

Marketing & Communications Officers‌

Adak Pabek‌

Claudia Miranda-Veloso‌

Ruby Miller‌

Lucy Tompson (Design Support)‌

Contributing Designers‌ ‌

Astrid Hickey‌

Emilie Everingham‌

Hajrah Nasir‌

Contributing Writers

Ain Muhaldin‌

Alexandra Robertson‌

Alister Gibson‌

Ananya Sarma‌

Caleb Murphy‌

Charlie Stephenson‌

Christina Cushen‌

Daniella Byishimo‌

Danny Loats

Gavin (Suyong) Wang‌

Iman Hurzook‌

Indigo Atkinson‌

Jeff Zhou‌

Jimena Laguna Pineda‌

Julia van Vliet‌

Kenneth Jim Joseph Jimeno‌

Layla Bautista

Mariami Modebadze

Maya Haggstrom

Melissa Dib

Menara Rathnayake

Nathan Pahljina

Nyx Joy

Praveena Gallage

Ruby Barlow

Shaun McMahon

Shajara Khan

Shivagha Sindhamani Pathak

Sophie Bottero

Talha Haroon

Tanisha Lamichhane

Tisha Shah

A special thank you to the Australia Latam Emerging Leaders Dialogue

(ALELD) for their valued collaboration in this year’s Year-in-Review.

SECTION 1 - THE BREAKING POINT:

ATROCITY, WAR, AND DIPLOMATIC COLAPSE ‌

0 3 ‌

WEAPONISATION OF AID AND HUMANITARIAN

ACCESS‌

Jeff Zhou‌

0 9 ‌

THE HIDDEN TRUTH BEHIND THE LARGEST

HUMANITARIAN CRISIS: THE DESTRUCTION OF

SUDAN

Layla Bautista‌

1 5 ‌

THE COLLAPSE OF ORDER, RISE OF PARALLEL

POWER AND THE CRISIS OF CIVILIANS IN THE

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

Menara Rathnayake‌

2 4 ‌

RUSSIA AND THE EU’S SECURITY LANDSCAPE IN

2025

Christina Cushen‌

2 9 ‌

SOVEREIGNTY, SHELLS AND SHIFTING

GEOPOLITICS: THE CAMBODIA-THAILAND 2025

CONFLICT AMIDST A CHANGING GLOBAL ORDER

Alexandra Robertson

3 6 ‌

ASEAN’S SILENCE AND MYANMAR’S STRUGGLE:

RECLAIMING THE HUMAN VOICE

Ain Muhaldin

SECTION 2 - GLOBAL REORDERING: THE RISE

OF NEW POWERS‌

4 5 ‌

BRICS AND THE SEARCH FOR A NEW LEGITIMACY

Danny Loats

Photo: Sameh Rahmi/NurPhoto via Getty Images‌

P H O T O : ‌G A Ë L G A B O R E L ‌/ ‌U N S P L A S H ‌

5 0 ‌

REASSURING REGIONALISM: IMPLICATIONS AND

INSIGHTS FROM THE 2025 ASEAN-GCC-CHINA

TRILATERAL SUMMIT

Julia van Vilet

5 6 ‌

AMERICA FIRST, ALLIES SECOND: THE TRUMP 2.0

RETURN AND THE NEW RULES OF FOREIGN

ENGAGEMENT‌

Mariami Modebadze‌

6 1 ‌

REORDERING FROM WITHIN: THE SOUTH’S QUIET

TRANSFORMATION OF POWER‌‌

Iman Hurzook‌‌

6 7 ‌

BEYOND VALUES: THE EUROPEAN UNION’S

GEOPOLITICAL AWAKENING AND ITS “PIVOT” TO

THE INDO-PACIFIC

Gavin (Suyong) Wang

74 ‌

INDIA IN THE AMERICAS: HOW GROWING

INVESTMENT COULD REBALANCE LATIN

AMERICA’S STRATEGIC LANDSCAPE ‌

Ruby Barlow‌

7 9 ‌

EXPLORING THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S

IMPACT ON THE UNITED STATES’ GLOBAL

STANDING‌

S‌hajara Khan‌

8 5 ‌

THE RETURN OF GEOECONOMICS: ALBERT

HIRSCHMAN’S WORLD REBORN

Talha Haroon

9 4 ‌

GREAT POWER CHESSBOARD: HOW THE UNITED

STATES SSEEKS TO CHINA’S LATIN AMERICA

REACH

Alister Gibson

Photo: SENEZ/Getty Images‌

9 9 ‌

SOUTH ASIA’S QUIET REORDERING: REGIONAL

COOPERATION BEYOND GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRY

Praveena Gallage

SECTION 3 - INSTITUTIONS UNDER

PRESSURE‌

1 0 7 ‌

ACADEMIC FREEDOM UNDER PRESSURE

Melissa Dib

1 1 2 ‌

THE DEATH OF THE PRESS VEST: THE FAILURE OF

JOURNALISTIC INSTITUTIONS‌

Maya Haggstrom‌

1 1 7 ‌

MULTILATERALISM‌

Indigo Atkinson‌

1 2 5 ‌

HOW YOUTH MOVEMENTS ARE CHALLENGING THE

POLITICAL STATUS QUO‌

Nathan Pahljina‌

1 3 0 ‌

DRIFTING SEAS: ASIA-PACIFIC SECURITY

GOVERNANCE IS HEADING TOWARD

FRAGMENTATION

Shivagha Sindhamani Pathak

1 3 6 ‌

THE RESSURGENCE OF CONFLICT IN AFRICA

Daniella Byishimo

1 4 2 ‌

T H

2025 MARKS THE UN’S 80 ANNIVERSARY

Charlie Stephenson

SECTION 4 - PLANETARY DIPLOMACY ‌

1 4 9 ‌

CLIMATE GOVERNANCE AND THE ICJ’S 2024

ADVISORY OPINION ON CLIMATE CHANGE ‌ ‌

Tisha Shah‌

1 5 7 ‌

A CRISIS OF CONSENT? HEGEMONY, CLIMATE

INJUSTICE, AND THE FUTURE OF

MULTILATERALISM AT COP30

Tanisha Lamichhane

1 6 5 ‌

BEYOND ECONOMICS: EVALUATING THE EU’S

TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

CHAPTERS

Jimena Laguna Pineda & Sophie Bottero

1 7 3 ‌

ANTHROPO, END SCENE, DO RARE EARTH

MINERALS BACK INDIGENEITY INTO A CORNER OF

GREENLAND?‌

Nyx Joy‌

1 8 0 ‌

CLIMATE MIGRATION RESHAPING GLOBAL

BORDERS

Caleb Murphy

1 8 6 ‌

RESOURCE DIPLOMACY: AUSTRALIA, THE LITHIUM

TRIANGLE, AND THE FUTURE OF RESOURCE

DIPLOMACY

Shaun McMahon

1 9 4 ‌

STEWARDS OF THE OCEAN: PACIFIC LEADERSHIP

IN GLOBAL CLIMATE JUSTICE.‌‌

Ananya Sarma‌

2 0 1 ‌

PHILIPPINES-UAE RELATIONS IN 2025: ENTERING A

NEW AGE OF DIPLOMACY‌‌

Kenneth Jim Joseph M. Jimeno‌

Photo: Iván Arenas, Chicago ACT Collective‌

1.‌

Breaking‌ ‌

‌

Point‌

P 1 ‌

Atrocity,‌‌

War, and

By Klawe Rzeczy/Newstateman‌

Diplomatic

Collapse‌‌

P 2 ‌

PA G E 1 2 ‌

Weaponisation‌

of ‌Aid‌and‌

Humanitarian‌

Access‌

Photo: Concern USA‌

Designer: Nícolas Buitrago‌

P 3 ‌

B y J e f f Z h o u ‌

Humanitarian aid has existed in various

forms throughout history, but for much of

that time it was closely tied to military

conflict; its modern, civilian-focused form

only beg‌an to emerge in the latter half of‌

the 20th century. Key principles, such as‌

impartiality and neutrality, took centuries‌

to develop. Today, there are thousands of‌

NGOs and organisations globally,‌

providing a variety of assistance in‌

response to both natural and human-made‌

disasters. However, a disturbing trend is‌

emerging in the humanitarian landscape:‌

the shift of aid from compassionate care‌

into an instrument of punishment. This is‌

evident in the ongoing wars in Gaza,‌

Sudan, and Ukraine. If the international‌

community continues to ignore the‌

weaponisation of aid, civilian suffering will‌

intensify, particularly among the most‌

vulnerable.‌‌

G a z a ‌

Photo: WFP/Ali Jadallah‌

P 4 ‌

Gaza, Sudan, and Ukraine Case

Studies‌

The devastating effects of restrictions on

humanitarian relief are most evident in Gaza.

In February 2025, Israel established the Gaza

Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) to distribute

aid in Gaza. Just a few months later, United

Nations (UN) officials ‌called for the‌

immediate shutdown of GHF, citing reports‌

that Israeli soldiers and foreign military‌

contractors were opening fire on people‌

seeking assistance at its distribution sites.‌

An estimated 859 individuals have been‌

killed around GHF sites since May 2025.‌

Médecins Sans Frontières medical teams‌

also joined the call to dismantle the GHF,‌

reporting a significant rise in patients with‌

gunshot wounds originating from the‌

distribution sites. Whilst GHF operations‌

were halted during the October 2025‌

ceasefire, a spokesperson for the institution‌

expressed a desire to resume operations.‌‌

Photo: World Food Programme USA‌

P 5 ‌

GHF is one of many examples illustrating how

Israel has weaponised aid. For instance, the

Israeli government has imposed vague and

sweeping mandates that prevent many aid

groups from assisting. Furthermore, they have

demanded that these organisations hand over

lists of their donors and Palestinian staff for

vetting. In response, 100 of them – including

Oxfam and Care – signed a letter accusing

Israel of "‌dangerously weaponising aid" in its‌

application of the new registration rules. On 28‌

March 2025, the United Nations Security‌

Council held a private meeting to discuss the‌

catastrophic humanitarian crisis and protection‌

of aid workers in Gaza. Another example‌

involved several Israeli groups that protested‌

the transfer of humanitarian supplies to Gaza‌

by blocking aid trucks from entering the area.‌

They aimed to put pressure on Hamas to

release hostages, but the actions drew criticism

from the governments of the United States

(U.S.), Jordan, Great Britain, and Germany.

Former U.S. National Security Advisor Jake

Sullivan condemned the attacks, stating, "It is a

total outrage that there are people who are

attacking and looting these convoys coming

from Jordan going to Gaza to deliver

humanitarian assistance." All the while, civilians

in Gaza continue to suffer from starvation and

disease.‌ ‌

Photo: International Crisis Group‌‌

P 6 ‌

The weaponisation of aid in Ukraine differs somewhat from that witnessed in

Gaza and Sudan. Since January of 2022, Ukraine has ‌received approximately‌

$380 billion in military and financial assistance from global partners. The‌

deeper issue lies in how Ukraine's own allies are weaponising aid. As the war‌

persists, the Trump administration is reevaluating America's role in providing‌

further support. Recently, it paused weapons shipments as part of a "review"‌

for accountability, but some experts believe the move was intended to‌

pressure Ukraine into peace negotiations. There is precedent for aid

functioning as political leverage; reports suggest that the Ukraine-U.S. Mineral‌

Resources Agreement granted Western firms preferential access to Ukraine's‌

critical materials in exchange for continued funding.‌‌

With no ceasefire in sight for Ukraine, the country is caught in a feedback loop.

It needs aid to survive the war, but the conditions tied to that aid constrain its

autonomy and resource sovereignty. Ukraine’s allies have transformed aid

from a humanitarian lifeline into a form of strategic control.‌‌

Photo: REUTERS/Sergey Pivovarov‌

U k r a i n e ‌

P 7 ‌

Path to a Better Future‌

Despite the scale and complexity of these wars and conflicts, there’s still hope

for a better humanitarian future. The most pivotal first step is greater oversight,

which means imposing more stringent requirements, improving the monitoring of

aid delivery, and better tracking how funds are utilised. It's also crucial to diversify

humanitarian assistance. Leslie Archambeault, Managing Director of Humanitarian

Policy for Save the Children USA, ‌emphasised the importance of "diversifying‌

funding with other NGOs and local organisations", as it is unrealistic to expect‌

one stakeholder to manage all the risk.‌

If the weaponisation of aid is uncovered, the international community has an

obligation to hold the groups or countries responsible accountable. The Obama

administration succeeded in pushing the Saudi government to allow aid into

Yemen by establishing a UN inspection process, and whilst imperfect, the action

demonstrated that there would be consequences for obstructing assistance

under the guise of security.‌‌

Overall, the crises in Gaza, Sudan, and Ukraine powerfully illustrate both the

promise and pitfalls of humanitarian aid: without it, many nations are left at the

mercy of their oppressors, yet the weaponisation of aid brings its own problems.

All people deserve justice, dignity, and the right to live free from starvation and

war. There should be no strings attached to this principle, and society mustn't

remain passive in the face of such violations.‌‌

Photo: Yahya Hassouna/AFP/Getty‌

P 8 ‌

P 9 ‌

The Hidden

Truth Behind

the Largest

Humanitarian‌

Crisis:‌

The

Destruction of

Sudan‌

By Layla

Bautista‌


P 1 0 ‌

Photo: AFP‌

As 2025 comes to an end, Sudan’s civil

war shows no sign of resolution. The

conflict, which began in ‌April 2024‌,‌

continues between the Sudanese Armed‌

Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid‌

Support Forces (RSF). More than‌150,000‌

civilians‌ have been killed, over‌11 million‌

people have been displaced, and‌

approximately ‌4 million people‌have fled‌

to neighbouring countries. With hospitals‌

destroyed, aid blocked, millions starving,‌

and entire regions placed under military‌

siege, Sudan now faces the world’s‌

largest humanitarian crisis.‌

In November 2025, the RSF captured the

city of El Fasher in North Darfur and

broadcast the capture in real time across

social media.‌‌

The violence has been so extensive that‌

satellite imagery has‌documented‌long,‌

dark trails believed to be bloodstains‌

stretching across the streets. The‌

Sudanese military withdrew after‌

suffering major territorial losses and‌

being overpowered by the RSF.‌

Rape, mass murder, and indiscriminate

killings have become widespread across

the country. War crimes and crimes

against humanity are being ‌livestreamed‌

and circulated online‌, with some RSF

fighters appearing to boast about their

actions. The International Criminal

Court’s prosecutor has‌warned‌that the

atrocities committed in the Sudanese

city of El-Fasher could constitute war

crimes and crimes against humanity.‌

P 1 1 ‌

Photo: Stimson‌

Further complicating the crisis, the United

Arab Emirates has been accused of

supporting the RSF through arms supplies

and gold-trading networks. Emirati officials,

however, have repeatedly‌rejected these‌

claims, insisting that the UAE is not‌

involved in the conflict and maintains a‌

neutral stance. Some analysts ‌contest‌that‌

the conflict resembles a proxy war. Sudan’s‌

land is rich with valuable minerals,‌

including Africa’s largest gold reserves.‌‌

Beyond its mineral wealth, Sudan

possesses ‌extensive‌agricultural land‌

and is the world’s leading producer of‌

gum arabic, an essential ingredient used‌

in food, pharmaceuticals, and cosmetics.‌

Sudan also plays a critical role in regional‌

water diplomacy, spanning 400 miles of‌

the Blue Nile. These factors make Sudan‌

a significant prize for outside actors‌

seeking influence in the Horn of Africa‌

and along the Red Sea.‌

P 1 2 ‌

Photo: Italian institute for International

Political Studies‌‌

The RSF traces its origins to the Janjaweed militia, an

armed Arab militia group responsible for widespread

atrocities in Darfur during the early 2000s. What began

as a government-mobilised militia tasked with crushing

a rebellion by Darfuri groups, who accused Khartoum

of political marginalisation and economic neglect,

quickly evolved into an instrument of state violence.

Backed with weapons, funding and aerial support from

the state, the Janjaweed carried out scorched-earth

campaigns that included mass killings, systematic rape,

village burnings, and forced displacement. Their

attacks targeted non-Arab communities across Darfur,

resulting in an‌ estimated‌ 200,000 deaths and millions‌

more displaced. International outrage eventually led to‌

sanctions and the indictment of former President Omar‌

al-Bashir by the International Criminal Court for‌

genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.‌

P 1 3 ‌

Today, the same patterns of violence have re-emerged. Darfuri

communities, predominantly non-Arab and ethnically African groups,

are once again being targeted by Arab-aligned militias, including the

RSF.‌ Many observers‌ warn that what is unfolding in Sudan is not‌

simply a continuation of past atrocities, but a renewed genocide. The‌

RSF has bombed airports to trap civilians within the country, aid‌

convoys have halted, and the country has become so dangerous for‌

journalists, preventing the spread of independent reporting. Despite‌

mounting evidence of mass atrocities and the desperate pleas of the‌

Sudanese people, the international response has been minimal,‌

offering little relief to a population that continues to endure immense‌

suffering.‌

Photo: AFP‌

P 1 4 ‌

The Collapse of Order,

Rise of Parallel Power,

and the Crisis of

Civilians in‌‌

the Democratic Republic of Congo‌

B y M e n a r a

R a t h n a y a k e ‌

P 1 5 ‌


Context‌

For the Democratic Republic of Congo

(DRC), 2025 was not merely another

cycle of renewed violence in its eastern

provinces. It was marked by a decisive

rupture in an already fragile postconflict

order, exposing systemic

patterns of abuse, governance failures,

resource mismanagement, and

breakdowns in regional diplomacy as

armed groups have hardened in their

efforts to assert territorial governance

and deploy systemic coercion

mechanisms.‌‌

This reality has forced a reckoning with‌

long-denied patterns of impunity and‌

injustice. Multiple human rights‌

organisations and the Office of the‌

United Nations High Commissioner for

Human Rights (OHCHR) reported‌

unprecedented levels of civil harm, as‌

mass violations and large-scale‌

displacement have become structural‌

features of daily life.‌‌

The cumulative image emerging from 2025

is of a multi-layered crisis: a local and

regional struggle for power involving the

Congolese state, entrenched armed militias

and assertive regional actors, which has

metastasised into a humanitarian crisis and

a juridical conundrum.‌‌

The eastern provinces of North and South‌

Kivu in the DRC saw the ‌dramatic‌

intensification of armed violence‌, with the‌

United Nations (UN) formally declaring on 5‌

September that principal parties, namely‌

the rebel M23 militia (backed by the‌

Rwanda Defence Forces, RDF), the national‌

armed forces of the DRC (the Forces‌

Armées de la République démocratique du‌

Congo, FARDC), and affiliated pro-‌

government militias such as Wazalendo‌

have committed ‌gross human rights‌

violations‌ that may constitute war crimes‌

and crimes against humanity.‌‌

P 1 6 ‌

Alexis Huguet/AFP‌

The Ascendancy of Armed

Militias from Insurgency to De

Facto Governance‌

At the epicentre of the year’s escalation was the M23 rebel movement, which‌

launched the Goma offensive in early January, taking over Goma and‌

announcing a self-declared ‌parallel administration‌, despite lacking formal‌

government recognition.‌‌

Such attacks are deeply rooted in long-standing ethnic tensions and the‌

control over rich mineral resources, including cobalt, gold, and copper, and‌

chronic political instability in eastern DRC. UN investigations have ‌documented‌

the group’s bureaucratic, quasi-state governance of towns and resource sites,

the establishment of taxation and collective levies, arbitrary detainment of‌

locals, controlling local administrative structures, as well as the consolidation‌

of military strength, which has enabled the group to hold territory long enough‌

to entrench a degree of coerced civilian compliance. The militias, including‌

Goma, have taken over key urban centres in the Kivu provinces in January and‌

Bukavu in February. This de facto authority, according to reporting, was‌

undergirded by material, operational, and personnel support originating across‌

the border in Rwanda, which is a connection ‌Kigali denies even as observers‌

and UN investigators describe as pivotal to M23’s endurance‌.‌‌

P 1 7 ‌

Patterns of Violence

and Humanitarian

Fallout‌

Photo: AFP/GETTY IMAGES‌

Such backing enabled the M23 to wage

offensives and capture the economic

rents of mineral extraction, thereby

sustaining a chronic conflict economy.

Whilst the national military (FARDC),

alongside allied militias grouped under

the name Wazalendo, have attempted to

resist loss of state territory, their

counter-insurgencies have been

accompanied by ‌serious abuses‌,‌

including extortion, threats on civilians,‌

killings, as well as beating and whipping.‌

Such abuses committed by the‌

Wazalendo have targeted the‌

Banyamulenge (Southern Kivu‌

Congolese Tutsis), who have been‌

accused of supporting the M23. The‌

Rwandan government has used this to‌

justify the resurgence of M23 and their‌

backing of the armed militia. This year‌

saw the rise of competing sovereignties‌

and parallel power structures infiltrating‌

the country, as the fragmentation of‌

authority and the state's inability to‌

guarantee governance and civilian‌

protection had turned the east into‌

uncertain zones of fear and impunity.‌‌

The human suffering produced by 2025’s

conflict simply cannot be overstated.

The takeover of cities, the destruction of

infrastructure, and mass displacements

have dissipated social cohesion, eroded

basic services and triggered waves of

insecurity, disease and deprivation.

Multiple human-rights organisations have

highlighted the use of explosive

weapons in densely populated areas by

both rebel and government-backed

forces. ‌Over 7 million people have been‌

forced to flee from their homes due to‌

retaliatory militia actions.‌These‌

displaced populations have found‌

themselves exposed to shelling and‌

arbitrary violence, whilst displacement‌

camps near strategic towns such as‌

Goma have been dismantled and‌

attacked.‌

Photo: Luis Tato/AFP)‌

P 1 8 ‌

Photo: WFP‌

By mid-year, the UN and humanitarian‌

agencies described eastern DRC as‌

among the world’s most acute crises due‌

to heightened food insecurity, limited‌

access to water and sanitation, disrupted‌

health services, and the collapse of‌

education in many areas. Attacks on‌

infrastructure and the forced movement‌

of civilians compounded the challenge of‌

delivering aid. At the same time, recent‌

incidents, including the ‌deadly bombing‌

in Sange‌ that killed dozens and displaced‌

many more, underlined the ongoing‌

volatility even amid high-level peace‌

initiatives. The UN has further reported‌

surges in arbitrary crime, kidnappings,‌

and attacks on humanitarian workers‌

operating in zones of conflict.‌

Extrajudicial executions, arbitrary‌

detentions, reprisals against human rights‌

defenders, journalists and members of‌

civil society have been ‌reported‌by the‌

UN as such groups are perceived as‌

critical of the M23.‌‌

‌

Perhaps even more harrowing is the

documented systematic sexual and

gender-based violence: gang rapes, sexual

slavery, and widespread sexual assaults,

often used intentionally to degrade, punish

and subjugate civilians seen as opposing

M23 or as belonging to “undesired”

communities, disproportionately affecting

young girls and women. In North and South

Kivu, nearly ‌40 per cent of survivors‌of

sexual and gender-based violence are

children, with ‌UNICEF‌‌estimating‌that

during the most intense phase of the

conflict, a child is raped every 30 minutes.

The DRC national army and allied militias

were ‌documented‌ killing civilians,

committing rape and gang rape, looting and

pillage, especially during frontline retreats,

whilst the recruitment and use of children

under the age of 15, mainly girls, used for

sexual purposes, was ‌documented‌ among

Wazalendo.‌ ‌

MONUSCO/Aubin Mukoni‌

P 1 9 ‌

Geopolitical

Dynamics, Resource

Economics, and the

International Order‌

The 2025 conflict in the DRC cannot be understood‌

purely as a domestic crisis, as it is deeply entangled‌

with regional geopolitics, resource economies, and‌

global supply chains. The eastern provinces are rich in‌

critical minerals, including coltan, cobalt, and other‌

vital resources for modern technology, making them a‌

valuable strategic asset. ‌Rebel control ‌over mining‌

areas, the imposition of levies on extraction and trade,‌

and the financing of operations through resource‌

revenues (a ‘war economy’) risk transforming the‌

region into a persistently contested and economically‌

predatory zone. Reports indicate that M23 has‌

developed structured mechanisms to capitalise on‌

these mineral resources, thereby consolidating both‌

financial and military power. As the DRC’s critical‌

mineral sites feed directly into global industries and‌

supply chains, including electronic, electric vehicles‌

and renewable energy sectors, the conflict’s‌

implications ripple far beyond central Africa. This‌

dynamic raises ‌critical questions ‌about the adequacy‌

of existing regulatory frameworks, traceability‌

initiatives and corporate social responsibility in light‌

of unethical sourcing practices. Ultimately, the failure‌

of the international community to decisively curb‌

abuses or to sustain long-term engagement beyond‌

episodic humanitarian aid risks normalising violence,‌

entrenching impunity, and undermining the normative‌

order that undergirds international humanitarian law.‌

Photo: Joe Plimmer/Guardian

pictures/Louis Tato/AFP/Getty/Alamy‌

Photo: Luis Tato/AFP/Getty Images‌

Photo: Junior Kannah/AFP/Getty

Images‌

P 2 0 ‌

Photo: Mofa Qatar/AFP/Getty Images‌

Ceasefires,

Diplomacy, and

an Illusion of

Peace‌

This year, many international and regional actors attempted to mandate

ceasefires, humanitarian pauses, and peace agreements. US and Qatariinitiated

mediations to ad hoc regional initiatives encompassing frameworks

and ceasefire-monitoring protocols. However, diplomacy oscillated on the

ground as such accords were tested. In November, a framework signed in

Doha represented progress on paper, but limited implementation thereafter

evidenced the gap between diplomatic formality and battlefield reality. In

early December, a high-profile U.S.-brokered ceremony sought to bind Kigali

and Kinshasa to a peace compact, and yet within hours, fighting re-erupted,

exposing how localised dynamics and armed actors not party to agreements

can quickly overturn fragile arrangements, demonstrating that peace talks and

diplomatic ceasefires were ineffective. Ceasefire declarations alone could

not resolve the deeper systemic crisis. Without deep structural and systemic

reform, any momentary calm will remain fragile, collapsing under the weight

of local predation and structural impunity.

P 2 1 ‌

Photo:N AFP‌

The Crisis of

Accountability‌

One of the most urgent, yet unresolved, questions of 2025 is accountability.

The year saw renewed efforts by human rights groups and UN institutions to

document abuses and call for justice; however, OHCHR’s Fact-Finding

Mission reported ‌human rights violations by all parties‌. With this lies‌

stagnant and formidable structural impediments to accountability. Parallel‌

governance structures, including rebel-run administrations, militias with‌

ambiguous chains of command, and state security forces operating in‌

fragmented and contested zones, hinder the identification and prosecution‌

of perpetrators. The anonymity of many fighters, the widespread use of‌

coerced recruitment, and mass displacement ‌disrupts evidence collection‌.‌

Domestic judicial mechanisms are also limited and compromised, as courts‌

are politicised or enmeshed in ‌local power dynamics‌, risking selective‌

justice. International mechanisms, such as the International Criminal Court‌

(ICC), hybrid tribunals, or UN-mandated investigative commissions, confront‌

political resistance, concerns over sovereignty, and practical burdens,‌

including logistical constraints, funding, and enforcement obstacles.‌‌

P 2 2 ‌

The Inflection Point

Between Collapse and

Possibility‌

Beyond the immediate humanitarian crisis, 2025 also‌

illuminates the broader challenges of accountability‌

and international law as the year has revealed the‌

convergence of entrenched systemic vulnerabilities‌

with the enduring predation of armed actors. The‌

scale and coordination of atrocities raise compelling‌

questions regarding war crimes and crimes against‌

humanity. Yet, structural impunity, regional complicity,‌

and weak judicial institutions threaten to render‌

justice elusive. The year stands as a stark reminder‌

that the cessation of hostilities alone cannot resolve‌

the DRC’s crises; rather, sustainable peace requires‌

the simultaneous pursuit of legal accountability,‌

institutional reform, and socio-economic‌

reconstruction.‌ ‌

Ultimately, 2025 marks an inflection point: it exposes‌

‌the consequences of protracted neglect and‌

‌unaddressed abuses while providing a moment of‌

‌potential redress. How the Congolese institutions,‌

‌regional actors, and importantly, the international‌

‌community respond will determine whether the DRC‌

‌emerges from this cycle of violence toward stability,‌

‌or whether impunity and fragmentation will continue‌

‌to define the lived reality of its eastern provinces.‌

Photo: AP/Moses Sawasawa‌

P 2 3 ‌


Russia‌‌and the‌ ‌

EU’s ‌Security‌ ‌

Landscape‌ ‌

in ‌2025‌

B y C h r i s t i n a C u s h ‌

P 2 4 ‌

In 2025, Russia’s engagement continues to test the limits of international

law. This has left many European nations telling their citizens to prepare for

the possibility of war with Russia, with Danish and German intelligence

agencies stating that they may need to ‌prepare for an attack within the next‌

five years‌. Norway is restoring its military bunkers, while Poland is preparing‌

to reintroduce conscription.‌‌

In Helsinki, Finland, the government has built an underground city that is‌

currently used for leisure, but which some analysts contend may need to‌

be used to protect the civilian population. Finland has long been on alert,‌

given its geographical proximity, but more importantly, due to “‌Russian‌

President Vladimir Putin‌ordering an attack on two things: history and‌

geography.” Recent satellite imagery ‌indicates‌ that Russia is expanding its‌

military presence along the Finnish border. This means that there is a‌

“potential for tens of thousands of ‌Russian soldiers to be stationed near‌

Finland’s border‌ in the future.” In 2025, the United States (U.S.) President‌

Donald Trump has signalled that European states “can no longer take US‌

military support for granted‌”. This is important, as until now the West has‌

relied on America, particularly as Russia’s actions have underscored “‌[t]he‌

need for Europeans‌to strengthen their [own] defences urgently.”‌

Photo: Dmitri Lovetsky/AP for POLITICO‌

P 2 5 ‌

Photo:‌ ‌Bundeswehr/Jankowski)‌

Photo: State Duma‌

B o r i s P i s t o r i o u s ‌ ‌

D u m a V y a c h e s l a v Vo l o d i n ‌

German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius

stated recently that Russia has become

“‌the most significant and direct threat to‌

NATO‌.” Following recent U.S. discussions‌

of providing Ukraine with further missiles,‌

Russia issued a stern warning to the West,‌

stating that “‌NATO has long been‌

preparing for a potential armed clash‌

with Russia‌, constantly working out‌

possible options—from the Arctic to the‌

Black Sea.” This has led NATO to issue a‌

strong warning, with members stating that

“‌Russia should be in no doubt‌: NATO and‌

Allies will employ, in accordance with‌

international law, all necessary military‌

and non-military tools to defend‌

ourselves and deter all threats from all‌

directions.”‌

Recently, the Chairman of Russia’s State

Duma, Vyacheslav Volodin, stated that‌

“The United States and its allies are trying

to allow themselves to ‌carry out acts of‌

aggression with missiles against Russia‌.” In‌

contrast, following the air violations over‌

Estonia, the Foreign Minister of Poland‌

warned Russia at the United Nations‌

Security Council that “‌[i]f another missile‌

or aircraft enters our space without‌

permission‌, deliberately or by mistake,‌

and gets shot down and the wreckage‌

falls on NATO territory, please don't come‌

here to whine about it”. This warning by‌

Poland has been interpreted as a signal‌

that the EU is not fearful of Russia’s‌

provocations. At the United Nations‌

General Assembly earlier this year, the‌

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy‌

stated that “‌[i]f it takes weapons to do it,‌

if it takes pressure on Russia, then it must‌

be done‌. And it must be done now.‌

Otherwise, Putin will keep driving the war‌

forward — wider and deeper.”‌

P 2 6 ‌

Photo: Justin Tallis/AP‌

The‌ ‌

Peace‌

Deal‌

On 23 November, President Volodymyr Zelensky was reluctant to surrender

any territory, but he has stated that “‌The pressure on Ukraine [now] is one of‌

the hardest…‌Ukraine may face a very difficult choice: either the loss of‌

dignity or the risk of losing a key partner.”This pressure over a peace deal‌

has followed the U.S. President Donald Trump's call to accept a deal‌

negotiated with Putin. A ‌28-point plan‌leaked but not officially released by

the U.S. includes that ‌the official language will become Russian, with a‌

further implication of Ukraine being forced to halve the size of its military‌.‌

This brings greater concern for the Ukrainian people that Russia will attack‌

Ukraine in the future.‌‌

Photo: REUTERS / Jason Lee for LatinAmerican Post‌

P 2 7 ‌

Photo: White House‌

This deal has been condemned by the EU,

with 14 leaders signing a statement stating

that no territory of Ukraine must be

surrendered. More importantly, concerning

the “‌proposed limitations on Ukraine's armed‌

forces‌, which would leave Ukraine vulnerable‌

to future attack.” As Trump pressures Ukraine‌

and Russia to end the war, Ukraine continues‌

to negotiate to protect its own sovereignty,‌

while Russia has signalled it could sign the‌

deal by the week’s end. The U.S., being the‌

third-party negotiator, has stated that this‌

draft peace deal offers “‌a strong framework‌

for ongoing negotiations‌. It is based on input‌

from the Russian side, but it is also based on‌

previous and ongoing input from Ukraine.”‌‌

Ukraine, in contrast, is continuing to fight for

their sovereignty and to protect its borders.

At the International Crimea Platform Summit,

lawmaker Ruslan Stefanchuk stated that

Ukraine won’t accept any Russian recognition‌

of territory or any limits on its defence‌

forces‌. On 24 November 2025, Zelensky went‌

on to say in the Swedish Parliament that the‌

forced recognition of Russian territory‌

“‌would break the principle of territorial‌

integrity and sovereignty‌.” In this context, the‌

current peace deal negotiations remain‌

extremely vulnerable. Russia has ‌threatened‌

to seize additional Ukrainian territory‌should‌

Kyiv step away from the negotiations,‌

underscoring the precarious situation‌

between diplomatic engagement and‌

defence of statehood.‌‌

P 2 8 ‌

Sovereignty,‌ ‌

Shells and‌ ‌

Shifting

Geopolitics‌ ‌

The Cambodia-Thailand 2025 Conflict

Amidst a Changing Global Order‌

B y A l e x a n d r a R o b e r t s o n ‌

P 2 9 ‌


The 2025 international landscape has been defined by profound volatility. This‌

year has been marked by enduring conflict, technological shifts, nationalist‌

assertions, and shifting global alliances, which have pressured the foundations of‌

traditional diplomatic relations. The renewed five-day conflict on the Cambodia-‌

Thailand border has been described as “‌the deadliest confrontation between the‌

two neighbours in a decade‌,” resulting in 43 deaths and the displacement of‌

300,000 people. Both states used military force rather than peaceful diplomacy,‌

while modern weaponry, social media tactics, and international courts were also‌

leveraged to compensate for diplomatic shortcomings.‌

Historical and Political Context‌

The Cambodia-Thailand conflict is deeply rooted in a ‌century-old disagreement‌

over borders. The infamous 1962 International Court of Justice (ICJ) judgement‌

awarded the Preah Vihear temple to Cambodia and inflicted a “‌collective‌

memory of loss and humiliation‌” on the Thai military. Thailand continues to show‌

deep political resistance to further involvement by the ICJ.

On 24 July 2025, Cambodian rockets were fired into Thailand’s territory near

another disputed temple, Prasat Ta Muen Thom. Cambodia’s use of unguided,

indiscriminate ‘Grad Rockets’ and new landmines hit civilian-populated areas,

violating International Humanitarian Law (IHL) obligations. The two states

ultimately de-escalated through intervention by external parties, including the

U.S., China, and Malaysia, which helped secure a fragile ceasefire on 28 July 2025.

However, the peace deal remains uncertain, as both states have shown

reluctance to fully commit to a long-term diplomatic resolution.‌‌

Photo: Tang Chhin Sothy/AFP

P 3 0 ‌

Volatility and the Breakdown‌

of Regional Mechanisms‌

(Diplomatic Paralysis)‌

Photo : U.S. Mission to ASEAN‌

The Cambodia-Thailand conflict epitomised the volatility defining

2025. Unlike previous encounters, the recent confrontation between

the two states involved the deployment of advanced military systems,

indicating an unprecedented level of warfare.‌

‌

Regional bodies like ASEAN failed to maintain stability or uphold

diplomatic peace, resulting in no effective intervention.‌

‌

The fragility deal persists as the states are not fully committed to

peace, with newly laid landmines having exploded, gunfire continuing,

and the failure to release 18 prisoners of war.‌

P 3 1 ‌

Shifting Global Alliance‌ ‌

The conflict demonstrated the "‌depth of global arms proliferation in‌

South-East Asia.‌" Both states have been diversifying their security

relationships through shifts in alliances, including the deployment of

high-end weaponry supplied by Russia, China, Sweden, and the United

States (U.S.).‌

‌

Despite Thailand possessing a significantly larger defence budget and

more active military personnel than Cambodia's smaller, aging

armament, Thailand's dominance masks shifting alliances.‌

Cambodia has rapidly modernised its forces through deepening ties

with China to supply modern weaponry since 2008. China became

Cambodia's most important security trading partner. During the most

recent border clash, Cambodia deployed ‌Chinese PHL-81 multiple‌

rocket systems ‌and ‌Russian BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles.‌

‌

Thailand has pivoted its alliances towards China, whilst simultaneously

moving away from the U.S. since the 2014 Thai Military Coup. Thailand is

increasingly favouring Chinese military systems due to "‌cheaper and‌

less restrictive‌" weaponry. Unlike the U.S., China does not impose

restrictions on how buyers use its systems.‌

‌

The deployment of ‌Thailand's Gripen ‌aircraft marked their first known

use in the most recent cross-border conflict, prompting international

scrutiny of Sweden's export controls, which are intended to limit sales

to conflict zones. Consequently, since the start of the most recent

conflict, Sweden has refused to sell additional jets to Thailand. The

conflict has attracted international scrutiny, creating diplomatic issues

for supplier nations when governments change or conflicts erupt years

after a sale.‌

P 3 2 ‌

Navigating Uncertainty:‌

Political Exploitation as‌

an Internal Weakness‌ ‌

The crisis revealed how internal political‌

weakness can be exploited. A “‌fierce war‌

of words‌” continued even after the‌

ceasefire, with Cambodia appearing “‌more‌

agile, more assertive and more media‌

savvy‌” in earning international sympathy‌

and domestic support.‌

‌

Former Cambodian leader Hun Sen utilised‌

aggressive social media tactics, posting‌

constantly on Facebook in Khmer and‌

English, to portray himself as the‌

unwavering defender of Cambodian soil.‌

Tactically, Hun Sen utilised social media to‌

“‌push its arguments‌” against the Thai‌

government by leaking private‌

conversations with the Thai Prime Minister,

Paetongtarn Shinawatra. The leak caused‌

political chaos in Thailand and led to‌

Shinawatra’s suspension by the‌

Constitutional Court.‌‌

The use of social media for asymmetrical

political warfare to exploit internal

weaknesses and political divisions created

significant volatility. Aggressive social

media taunting illustrates how, in today’s

current age, asymmetrical information

strategies can be leveraged to exploit

internal political pressures, shape

international perception and increase

instability between states.‌‌

Photo: Chad J. McNeeley

Photo: Chalinee Thirasupa/Reuters‌

P 3 3 ‌

Innovation Driving Change:‌

‌Turning to International Courts‌ ‌

As diplomacy faltered, international courts emerged as an alternative‌

‌method of relief in the escalating conflict. Cambodia proactively‌

‌appealed to the UN Security Council and the ICJ to rapidly‌

‌internationalise the conflict, while Thailand refused to cooperate. More‌

‌significantly, the conflict prompted a push for international legal‌

‌accountability concerning violations of IHL. The states relied on IHL and‌

‌international pressure to achieve accountability and encourage stronger‌

‌compliance with IHL.‌‌

Human rights groups, such as ‌Fortify Rights‌and Human Rights Watch‌,‌

‌have urged the UN to establish an independent ‌“Fact-Finding Mission‌” to‌

‌investigate alleged war crimes due to increased civilian harm.‌‌

Photo: Reuters‌

P 3 4 ‌

Photo: Tang Chhin Sothy/AFP‌

The 2025 Cambodia-Thailand conflict has exposed a clear change in the global order.‌

It revealed the breakdown of traditional diplomacy and regional peace efforts, forcing‌

external intervention from the U.S. and China. Both States relied on the rise of‌

advanced weaponry supplied by various countries during the high-intensity conflict.‌

As negotiations failed, the growing role of international courts was necessary to‌

provide relief and accountability. At the same time, modern warfare extended‌

beyond the battlefield, as the rise of social media enabled leaders like Hun Sen to‌

challenge the Thai government and position themselves more favourably on the‌

international stage. Ultimately, this year's volatility demonstrated that contemporary‌

warfare is no longer limited to the battlefield. Today, conflicts and wars are also‌

fought through social media, international courts, and shifting global alliances,‌

particularly when conflict is fuelled by political instability and historical resentment.‌ ‌

Photo: REUTERS / Jason Lee for LatinAmerican Po

Photo: Reuters‌

P 3 5 ‌

ASEAN’s Silence and

Myanmar’s Struggle:‌

Reclaiming the Human Voice‌

Photo: ‌Council on Foreign Relations

“When diplomacy forgets the people it serves, silence becomes complicity:”‌

B y A i n M u h a l d i n ‌


P 3 6 ‌

Myanmar’s Ongoing‌ ‌

Humanitarian‌

Catastrophe‌

More than ‌7,100 civilians have been‌

killed, a third of them women and‌

children, yet these figures cannot‌

capture the full weight of suffering.‌

Behind every number is a life cut short,‌

a family displaced, and a community‌

shattered by a war waged against its‌

own people.‌

As global attention wanes, justice for‌

the Rohingya and the millions living‌

under military oppression remains‌

distant. Eight years after the mass‌

atrocities began, ‌Amnesty International‌

continues to document crimes against‌

humanity, including mass killings,‌

systematic sexual violence, and‌

widespread forced displacement. The‌

crisis has shaken and continues to shake‌

the moral foundations of Southeast‌

Asia, yet regional responses remain‌

hesitant.‌

Today, several neighbouring states have

revived efforts to “re-engage” the junta

through informal dialogues, invoking

ASEAN’s principle of “constructive

engagement.” But such engagement risks

drifting into appeasement. E‌ven ASEAN’s‌

own 2025 review acknowledged that‌

progress under the ‌Five-Point Consensus‌

has been “substantially inadequate.”‌

Thailand’s decision to invite junta Foreign

Minister Than Swe to the recent regional

consultations illustrates this contradiction.

Missing from the table were the National

Unity Government, civil-society actors, and

the millions displaced by the conflict. In the

name of neutrality, ASEAN has rendered the

most vulnerable effectively invisible.

Excluding those directly affected reduces

dialogue to performance and makes

“‌Myanmar-owned and -led solutions‌” ring

hollow. Without meaningful participation

from the people enduring the violence,

ASEAN’s initiatives cannot address the

political and humanitarian realities on the

ground.‌

P 3 7 ‌

By‌Institute for European Policymaking‌ ‌

@ Bocconi University‌

Even Brunei Darussalam’s experience offers a telling example.

During its 2021 Chairmanship, Brunei’s envoy ‌Erywan Yusof‌

attempted to meet detained State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi,‌

Myanmar’s ousted civilian leader. The junta refused, viewing the‌

request as a threat to its authority. The episode exposed the limits‌

of ASEAN diplomacy: a bloc bound by consensus in the face of‌

cruelty. Yet it also demonstrated that genuine mediation requires‌

listening to all sides, including those the junta seeks to silence.‌

Photo:‌ ‌The New York Times‌

Regional Paradox and ASEAN‌

Nations such as Malaysia and Singapore, once vocal critics of the

junta’s presence in ASEAN forums, have oscillated between moral

condemnation and quiet concession. Malaysia’s 2025

Chairmanship promises a “multipronged, creative track,” yet its

willingness to host informal engagements with junta

representatives contradicts this ambition. To legitimise

perpetrators under the banner of dialogue is to blur the line

between diplomacy and complicity.‌

Four years into this humanitarian catastrophe, ASEAN’s indecision

has hardened into inertia. The bloc’s adherence to “‌non-‌

interference‌” has become a shield against moral accountability. In

failing to enforce its own consensus, ASEAN has allowed the junta

to weaponise time, turning negotiation tables into waiting rooms

for impunity.‌

Beyond ASEAN, the international community has echoed this

passivity. Though vocal in its condemnation, the ‌United Nations‌

ultimately supported ASEAN’s central role in responding to the

crisis. The UN’s delegation of responsibility, often framed as

respect for regional sovereignty, conceals indifference. In the

meantime, airstrikes continue to decimate villages, women face

systematic sexual violence, and children grow up knowing only the

sound of artillery.‌

P 3 8 ‌

Photo: International Crisis Group‌

Citizen-Centred Peacebuilding‌

If regional diplomacy is to mean anything,

it must begin with the people of Myanmar,

not the generals who claim to represent

them. The junta’s so-called “stability” is

built upon displacement, censorship, and

collective terror. Nearly 30,000 individuals

remain detained‌ for political reasons.‌

Those detained endure harsh conditions‌

and risk their lives for resisting a regime‌

that refuses to recognise their voices,‌

underscoring that any meaningful‌

diplomacy must place the people at its‌

centre.‌

ASEAN’s future credibility depends on

whether it transforms its engagement

model from elite-centred negotiation to

citizen-centred peacebuilding. The region

cannot afford another cycle of empty

communiques. The true measure of

diplomacy lies not in the comfort of the

meeting room, but in the lives it changes

outside it.‌

Among the most harrowing aspects of

Myanmar’s ongoing crisis is the gendered

nature of violence. Women and girls face

targeted violence, not only as political

dissidents but also as bearers of

community identity. Human Rights Watch

has reported ‌sexual violence‌as a weapon

of war deliberately deployed to humiliate

communities and dismantle social

cohesion. Despite the violence against

women, they remain largely absent from

formal peace processes.‌

UN Women‌ emphasises the need for

systemic prevention and empowerment

of women, affirming that including

women’s organisations and grassroots

networks is not an act of charity but a

prerequisite for durable peace. Peace that

excludes half its people is destined to

fracture.‌

P 3 9 ‌

Reimagining Responsibility‌

The international response must evolve from rhetoric to resolve. To genuinely

pressure the junta, ASEAN and its partners, such as China and India, must influence

the military to halt hostilities, reduce civilian harm, and engage in meaningful

negotiations. This can be achieved through coordinated sanctions, the suspension

of weapons sales, and cross-border humanitarian aid via community-based groups.‌

Furthermore, ASEAN should support the U.N. Security Council resolution imposing‌

a global arms embargo. Member states such as Thailand must end the forced return‌

of asylum seekers, curb the exploitation of Myanmar migrants, and block financial‌

transactions linked to sanctioned junta entities. The path forward is not isolation‌

but integrity and diplomacy anchored in justice.‌

Photo: International Crisis Group‌

P 4 0 ‌

Resilience and the

Future of ASEAN‌

In the heart of Myanmar, resilience persists. Across

some conflict zones, villagers have built ‌forest and‌

bunker schools‌concealed from military aircraft,

determined to keep children learning despite

relentless attacks on classrooms. Additionally,

doctors risk their lives to run underground clinics, and

artists record testimonies of loss and defiance. These

acts of ordinary courage illuminate what ASEAN’s

formal diplomacy has failed to achieve: genuine

solidarity. The region’s leaders would do well to listen

to these voices: to recognise that the moral strength

of Southeast Asia lies not in its summits, but in

people’s shared struggle for dignity.‌

The Myanmar crisis tests ASEAN’s very identity.‌

Founded on the ideals of cooperation and mutual‌

respect, the bloc now faces a question far deeper‌

than political alignment: what does it mean to be a‌

community? The answer cannot be found in legal‌

clauses or cautious statements, but in collective‌

moral will.‌

Photo: Stringer/AFP (Al Jazeera)‌

Photo: Nikkei Asia‌

To uphold its legitimacy, ASEAN must reimagine itself‌

as more than an association of governments; it is a‌

moral coalition of peoples. This means embracing the‌

courage to act even when consensus falters. The‌

principles of sovereignty must never outweigh the‌

sanctity of human life.‌

Photo: Frieze‌

P 4 1 ‌

Leading by Listening‌

Photo: AFP/Getty Images‌

The Myanmar crisis is not merely a political impasse; it is a test of

regional conscience. True diplomacy begins with the courage to listen –

to the mothers mourning their children, to the refugees rebuilding their

villages, and to the voices that have been systematically erased.‌

If ASEAN and the broader international community wish to reclaim‌

legitimacy, they must first reclaim humanity. Peace will not be restored‌

through statements or summits, but through a collective awakening: that‌

the lives of Myanmar’s people are not collateral to diplomacy – they are‌

its very purpose.‌

P 4 2 ‌

2.‌

Global‌

‌

Reordering‌

P 4 3 ‌

PA G E 9 4 ‌

‌The

Rise‌

of New‌ ‌

Powers‌

PA G E 9 5 ‌

P 4 4 ‌

BRICS‌‌

and the

Search for‌

‌a New‌

‌Legitimacy‌

By: Danny Loats‌

2025 saw steady progress by BRICS nations amid a turbulent and rapidly shifting

international environment marked by the Israel-Palestine and Russia-Ukraine conflicts,

renewed tariff uncertainty, and broader geopolitical instability. Against this backdrop, a

close inspection of BRICS’ actions offers clues as to whether the grouping can assume

a role of real global leadership, or whether it remains a loose grouping without the

capacity to influence and shape the global geopolitical agenda.‌

‌

BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), founded in 2009 (previously known

as “BRIC,” until South Africa joined in 2010), and often contrasted with the G7, is a

grouping of emerging economies centred on three pillars: economy and finance,

politics and security, and cultural ties. With an ideology of “true multilateralism” and

equality among its member states, BRICS has slowly developed an institutional

architecture through initiatives such as the Contingent Reserve Arrangement and the

New Development Bank, which both launched in 2015 to support South–South

development financing.‌ ‌

Photo By: Ilya Hou/Unsplash‌

P 4 5

Designer: Nicole Koh‌

Expansion and

Membership

Dynamics‌

In 2025, BRICS expanded significantly. Indonesia,

Southeast Asia’s most populous nation, joined as a

full member, bringing the total to ten. BRICS also

launched a new tier of “partner countries” to allow

states to participate without full membership.

Nigeria, Africa’s most populous nation, was among

the nine states admitted under this new category.

The membership now spans East Asia, Southeast

Asia, South America, the Middle East, and Africa,

which is home to nearly half the world’s population.

Additionally, with the grouping now exceeding the

G7’s GDP when measured in purchasing power

parity, BRICS’ appeal to the Global South is clear and

growing.‌‌

Photo By: Deshawn Wilson/Unsplash‌

In its early years, joining BRICS carried some perceived geopolitical risk, particularly for

states wary of being seen as drifting away from Western-led institutions. As the grouping

has expanded, both in terms of membership and purpose, that risk has decreased. The

entry of diverse middle powers and the introduction of a less-committal “partner country”

tier have further normalised engagement with BRICS and reduced the political cost of

participation. Over forty states have now formally expressed interest in joining in some

capacity.‌‌

Much of the appeal of joining comes down to the simple logic of diversification. For most

emerging economies, economic and strategic diversification is appealing on practical

grounds, not ideological ones. Hedging reduces dependence on a single centre of power,

though BRICS members continue to remain heavily integrated with Western markets. In

2024, BRICS countries exported an average of 12.3 per cent of their total exports to the

United States, led by China and India, which accounted for around 2.3 per cent of BRICS’

total GDP. BRICS’ economic engagement with the US remains structural and significant.

BRICS countries are unlikely to seek to replace these Western ties. Diversification rather

than replacement is the objective of the BRICS, and the grouping is increasingly delivering

on that objective.‌

P 4 6 ‌

This year’s BRICS Summit in Rio resulted in

a jointly signed 126-point Declaration.

While many assertions were broad and

aspirational, several stood out as highly

tangible and concrete solutions for

strengthening South-South cooperation.

For instance, a Multilateral Guarantees

Initiative was announced to reduce

development financing risk by pooling

guarantees across BRICS institutions. This

responds to longstanding frustrations with

World Bank and IMF governance, where

voting power has not kept pace with

changes in the economic order. This

development importantly provides BRICS

nations, particularly those with lower

credit ratings, with an additional avenue

for accessing development financing.‌

A BRICS Precious Metals Exchange was

also launched in October 2025,

introducing a new platform for trading and

pricing bullion outside of traditional

Western exchanges. Its significance lies

not in directly challenging Western-led,

US-dollar-backed exchanges but in

providing member states with an

additional trading option, greater

flexibility, and autonomy. This remains

consistent with the interpretation that

BRICS is building parallel mechanisms that

sit alongside existing ones, rather than

seeking to replace them.‌ ‌

‌Practical Initiatives and

Institutional Agility‌‌

The Rio Declaration also referenced

cooperation on sanctions mitigation,

economic security, and more resilient

supply chains and trade corridors.

Although many of these commitments are

in early development and brief in detail,

they indicate a growing desire among

BRICS member states to mitigate the risk

of financial coercion from sanctions. Over

time, these efforts could lead to the

gradual normalisation of trade pathways

outside Western-dominated, dollarbacked

financial systems. An increasing

proportion of intra-BRICS trade is already

settled in national currencies rather than

the US dollar. This is most visible in trade

between Russia and China, which now

takes place largely in rubles and yuan. At

present, these currency trends are largely

driven by practical realities, especially

sanctions on Russia, rather than by a fully

coordinated BRICS-wide currency

strategy. Still, they nevertheless signal that

BRICS’ parallel financial channels are

maturing.‌

Photo By: Markus Krisetya/Unsplash‌

Photo By: Zoshua Colah/Unsplash‌

P 4 7 ‌

The Emerging‌ ‌

Development Model‌

Photo By: AhmedUnsplash‌

While many of BRICS’ initiatives are defensive or aimed at giving member nations

greater flexibility, another shift is underway with greater long-term significance.

Some observers have identified the emergence of a new, distinct, powerful, and

highly desirable economic development paradigm. Diversification alone does not

explain the growing appeal of BRICS; states are not merely hedging for the sake of

it. The attraction lies in BRICS offering something substantively different. Its

institutions emphasise infrastructure, industrial capacity, and tangible

development projects, in contrast with the more financialised, policy-conditional

lending and development focus associated with the IMF and World Bank.‌‌

This model places heavy emphasis on financing and delivering infrastructure such

as ports, roads, rail, and energy systems, rather than governance or

macroeconomic reform. Unlike traditional Western-led financing, which tends to

separate lending from execution, BRICS-led projects, led by Chinese, Indian, and

now Brazilian and Emirati firms, typically involve all stages of the project lifecycle,

including funding, design, construction, procurement, logistics, etc. For many

emerging economies, diversifying into the BRICS is not just about risk

management but also about accessing a development model that promises

tangible, supported, and material benefits.‌‌

P 4 8 ‌

Internal Constraints and

Diverging Interests‌

However, internal tensions remain a

constraint that requires careful

management. Long-standing divergences

in the outlooks of BRICS member states

continue to impact the grouping. For

example, India remains deeply tied to

Western security networks, including the

Quad, and tends to take a more cautious

approach to China’s growing leadership

ambitions within BRICS. As BRICS

membership widens, diverging interests

are likely to increase. BRICS’ consensusbased

decision-making, part of the

unifying ideology of “true multilateralism”

and equality among member states, risks

the grouping becoming slower and more

difficult to manage.‌ ‌

Critics argue that these limitations are

likely to result in BRICS functioning more

as a symbolic coalition, rather than an

operational one capable of real global

leadership. Yet, the developments of

2025 challenge the narrative that BRICS

is merely symbolic. Despite internal

tensions, the grouping progressed

several modest but impactful initiatives

to strengthen South-South cooperation.

The picture that emerges is not one of a

bloc seeking to replace Western-led

institutions, such as the IMF, WTO, and

World Bank, but rather one of building

complementary mechanisms that

expand strategic options for member

states.‌‌

Incremental Legitimacy in a

Shifting Order‌

BRICS’ actions in 2025 demonstrate a quiet kind of legitimacy-building, not dramatic or

revolutionary, but practical, incremental, and increasingly relevant. If 2025 was the year

of consolidation, then 2026, with India set to assume the BRICS chair, is likely to reveal

how this growing institutional confidence translates into a clearer long-term role and a

more defined leadership presence in the global order.‌‌

Photo By: Markus Spiske/Unsplash‌

62‌

P 4 9 ‌

REASSURING REGIONALISM:‌

Implications and Insights from the‌‌

‌

2025 ASEAN-GCC-China Trilateral Summit‌‌

‌

By Julia van Vliet‌

The 46th ASEAN-GCC-China summit was held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, on May 26-27

as the 46th ASEAN summit, but the first conference between ASEAN, the Gulf

Cooperation Council (GCC) and the People’s Republic of China. The summit

represented ‌the shifting global diplomatic environment‌ after Trump’s re-election, and

the U.S. subsequently changed its position in multilateral affairs. The summit’s focus on

multilateral trade facilitation, regionalism, and cooperation between participating states

is arguably a logical counter-reaction to a ‌changing global landscape‌.‌

Designer: Stephen Kei‌

P 5 0 ‌

Photo (left): Hasnoor Hussain/Reuters‌

The summit emphasised multilateral commitments to international trade and

economic collaboration, grounded in the region’s deep cultural and historical

connections. An increased urge to boost regional economic cooperation is

captured in the frequent repetition of ‘regionalism’. It represents ‌a natural impulse

to the changing nature‌ of the current multilateral trading climate. The summit

reflected a strategic move by ASEAN, the GCC, and China, as the U.S. is introducing

tariff increases ‌ranging from 19% to 40%‌. Key highlights of the meeting focused on

regional cooperation and free trade agreements in response to the US’s growing

tariffs; an indisputable reason for looking to strengthen ties amongst each other.‌‌

Photo (right): MEDIA MULIA/The Malaysian Reserve‌

The summit further highlighted topics such as the Myanmar ceasefire, maritime

security in the South China Sea (SCS), and the ‌ASEAN Political-Security Community

(APSC) Strategic Plan,‌ a pillar of the ASEAN Community Vision 2045. More

generally, though, this summit suggested a reaction to current global events

relevant to participating parties: the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Gaza and the

U.S.'s volatile trade policies. Gaza is repeatedly alluded to in the joint statement,

with declarations of support for a ceasefire and a two-state solution. The summit

was attended by no fewer than 17 countries, each with differing viewpoints,

priorities, and agendas.‌

Photo (Mid): Mohd RASFAN / AFP‌

P 5 1 ‌

Qatar‌

Beyond China, Qatar is the only state explicitly mentioned by name in the final

press statement of the summit, which recognises its efforts “to reach a ceasefire‌

and facilitate aid delivery”‌. Indeed, through its efforts to achieve peace in Gaza,

Qatar has demonstrated its structural commitment to serve as the peace broker

of the Middle East. Being directly recognised for their peace-brokering efforts

strengthens Qatar's image as a neutral agent. Yet, this may also be part of their

larger strategy amid the U.S.-China rivalry, amounting to strategic hedging‌in

foreign policy: maximising benefits with the U.S. and China while not fully

committing to either. In trying to achieve peace in Gaza, Qatar and the US have

been strong allies. Nevertheless, its role in the summit offers an opportunity to

gain favour with China as well.

Photo: Fath Rizal/ Prime Minister’s Office of Malaysia / NHA File Photo‌

P 5 3 ‌

Malaysia‌

Photo: AFP‌

Malaysia is one of ASEAN's founding members and a strong player in the region.

As ASEAN faces existential challenges from the prolonged conflict in Myanmar,

border conflicts between Thailand and Cambodia, and tensions in the SCS,

Malaysia’s chairmanship comes at a pivotal moment. While members involved in

the SCS tensions, such as the Philippines and Vietnam, are sceptical of

Malaysia’s close relationship with China, Malaysia sought to use its position to

enhance unity and regional resilience. Moreover, Malaysia’s chairmanship also

comes at a crucial time in the enduring conflict in Myanmar. ‌Malaysian PM Anwar‌

emphasised‌his intention to resolve the conflict through diplomatic channels

mediated by ASEAN, as outlined in the ASEAN‌Five-Point Consensus‌adopted in

2021. Facilitating peace in Myanmar through ASEAN engagement was an

important topic in Malaysia’s foreign policy, ‌highlighting‌Malaysian leadership in

directing these efforts. Thus, the trilateral summit can be seen as one of

Malaysia’s efforts to highlight unity and collaboration within ASEAN, and to the

outside world.‌‌

P 5 2 ‌

The People’s‌ ‌

Republic of China‌

China, ASEAN’s largest trading partner, was represented at the summit by

Premier Li Qiang, ‌who reaffirmed‌in his opening remarks the economic potential

of greater regional cooperation between China, ASEAN and the GCC. Both the

Premier’s remarks and the joint statement emphasise China’s aim to promote its

economic capacity across the region. Particularly, the promotion of enhanced

connectivity under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the ‌Global Civilisation

Initiative (GCI)‌, along with a push to finalise the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area 3.0

(FTA), and a GCC-China Free Trade Deal. By highlighting the BRI, China

effectively embeds its aims and vision within a multilateral framework endorsed

by ASEAN and the GCC, despite most GCC states ‌remaining cautious‌about the

commitment. Li Qiang also specifically ‌references‌ the GCII, a CCP initiative

complementary to the BRI that aims to strengthen China’s political influence

within Western-centric models. Consequently, China’s goal of enhancing

economic cooperation has proved successful, as an ‌upgraded FTA‌was signed at

the ASEAN Summit in October, solidifying economic ties between China and

Southeast Asia. China’s efforts at the trilateral summit demonstrate its ability to

leverage the growing urge for regional cooperation into policy endorsements of

some of China’s larger goals and visions.

Photo: WANG ZHUANGFEI/CHINA DAILY‌

P 5 4 ‌

Conclusion & Implications‌

The ASEAN-GCC-China trilateral summit outlined important topics for the

gathered parties and also reflected a shift in the circumstances of contemporary

international affairs. The developments of the humanitarian crisis in Gaza

warranted a unified position for peace, given Qatar's involvement in ceasefire

negotiations and its subsequent portrayal as a peacebroker in the Middle East.

Moreover, the summit further emphasised the tightrope walk of Malaysia’s

chairmanship of ASEAN in a time of crossroads. While internal tensions within

ASEAN complicate bilateral relationships, Malaysia sought to host a summit to

strengthen economic ties and regional autonomy within ASEAN and among

participating parties. Moreover, Trump’s recent tariff increases contribute to a

shared sentiment among the tripartite to increase regionalism and

interconnectedness. This development has provided China with an opportunity

to translate this urge into endorsements and frameworks that support its vision

for its position in global affairs. Despite cooperation requiring participating

parties to set aside differences and frustrations, the summit embodied the

current momentum of regionalism and hints at a growing alignment between

China, ASEAN, and the GCC as the stability of the global order is cast in doubt.‌

P 5 5 ‌

Photo: alliance / Anadolu‌

First, America First, Allies Second:‌‌

America Allies

Trump 2.0 Return The and‌‌

The Trump 2.0 Return ‌

the New Rules of Foreign Engagement‌

Foreign of Rules New the

Mariami by Mariami Modebadze‌

by

69


P 5 6 ‌

President Donald Trump’s return to the White House has revived the

“America First” foreign policy, which aims to advance the United States'

(U.S.) interests and security while repositioning America’s global role.

Accordingly, the America First agenda embodies a strategic pragmatism

that seeks to maximise U.S. influence, while representing a fundamental

reimagining of America’s role in the world, grounded in the pursuit of

national interest above all else. The renewed approach of the Trump

administration 2.0 ‌seeks‌ to champion core American interests and,

accordingly, prioritise the nation's and its citizens' needs first. This

approach signals a profound shift in U.S. foreign policy, marked by

economic nationalism, reduced U.S. multilateralism, and weakened

engagement with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the

United Nations (UN), creating uncertainty among allies and other nations

globally.‌ ‌

Just two months into his second term, Donald Trump has reshaped U.S.

foreign policy to champion core American interests and put America and

American citizens “first”. Since 1945, the U.S. has acted as the principal

advocate and underwriter of an open, rules-based global system grounded

in international law. Under a Trump administration, this commitment to

multilateralism shifted. In line with this shift, the U.S., one of the founding

members of the UN, has ‌withdrawn‌from and ended ‌funding‌to several UN

organizations, including the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC);

the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (‌UNESCO‌); and the

UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

(UNRWA)‌

Furthermore, the U.S. will not participate in the

UNHRC and will not seek election to that body.

According to the White House, the three UN

organisations require renewed scrutiny and a

reassessment of U.S. membership to determine

whether they continue to support U.S. interests.

Conducting a review also extends to all organisations,

conventions, and treaties that may be contrary to

those interests. These instances of American

disengagement from the UN reflect a broader

reorientation of foreign policy towards prioritising

national interests rather than multilateral

commitments.

Withdrawn

Funding ended

Funding ended

P 5 7 ‌

Trump has repeatedly criticised NATO for its current 2% defence

spending goal, set in 2014 at the Wales Summit, arguing that the

target should be raised to 5% by 2035. The disparity highlighted the

unfairness and signalled a policy shift resulting from setting defence

spending as a fixed percentage of each member’s gross domestic

product.‌

Under U.S. pressure, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte has been

working to convince NATO to sign the deal. Rutte stated that the

expanded resources are‌‌

“a quantum leap that is ambitious, historic and

fundamental to securing our future.”‌

Photo: Belga / Eric Lalmand‌

The new budget contains firm language and explicitly links Ukraine’s

security to NATO's security. Mark Rutte reinforced this position by

stating:‌ ‌

We aim to keep Ukraine in the fight today so that‌‌

it can enjoy a lasting peace in the future.‌

Together, these statements indicate a commitment to sustain

support for Ukraine and a recognition that collective defence policy

requires long-term investments by all member allies to boost

military mobility, strengthen cybersecurity, enhance military-civilian

cooperation, and expand military hardware capabilities. Signing a

new defence shift by leaders from the 32 allied countries and raising

the defence spending benchmark from 2% to 5% of GDP could

force allies to face domestic budget constraints and competing

social welfare obligations.‌‌

P 5 8 ‌

The Trump administration, in its economic reconstruction programs and

international funding cuts, considerably forced global institutions, allies, and other

nations to step up their contributions. Multilateral institutions, which have

historically relied on U.S. contributions, face funding instability and reduced

operational capacity. Meanwhile, European allies are being pushed to accelerate

their pursuit of strategic autonomy and regional governance mechanisms. The

uncertainty among allies arises as the cooperative multilateralism that has long

underpinned American diplomacy is now undergoing a profound transformation.

The policy reflects a form of American nationalism rooted in a renewed sense of

political and economic realism: maintaining U.S. global power through a more

unilateralist and interest-driven lens.‌‌

Photo: Carlos Barría/Reuters‌

P 6 0 ‌

Reordering‌

From Within:‌

The South's Quiet Transformation of Power‌

By: Iman Hurzook‌

‌Photo By: Stimson Centre‌

P 6 1 ‌


‌Photo By: ‌Liesl L‌ouw-Vaudran/Italian Instute for International Political Studies‌

The South's Quiet Transformation of Power‌

In 2025, South–South cooperation has become a strategic force quietly reshaping how

influence is negotiated across the international system. The African Union ‌joining the

G20‌, the ‌expansion of BRICS‌, and a growing number of ‌small-group agreements‌,

particularly in the Indo-Pacific, point to a gradual but real shift in how influence is

negotiated. These changes show that many states in the Global South are no longer

relying on existing structures to adapt.‌

In 2025, South–South cooperation has become a strategic force quietly reshaping how

influence is negotiated across the international system. The African Union ‌joining the

G20‌, the ‌expansion of BRICS‌, and a growing number of ‌small-group agreements‌,

particularly in the Indo-Pacific, point to a gradual but real shift in how influence is

negotiated. These changes show that many states in the Global South are no longer

relying on existing structures to adapt.‌

P 6 2 ‌

Photo By: Kanin/Adobe‌

Indonesia has prioritised keeping its

economic and diplomatic options open. It has

participated in BRICS discussions while

deepening ‌cooperation with the OECD‌

through work on investment policy and

governance standards. Vietnam has continued

to manage its heavy trade dependence on

China by expanding ‌security coordination‌

with the United States, and simultaneously

exploring multiple economic and diplomatic

options. In Kenya, public pressure over debt

exposure prompted a review of the financing

structure of major projects, including the

Standard Gauge Railway‌. Taken together,

these choices show governments planning for

ongoing uncertainty rather than expecting

stability to return.‌

Some of this recalibration draws on historical regional experience. In Southeast Asia,

governments have spent decades managing major-power competition while maintaining

open economic ties. At this year’s ‌ASEAN Regional Forum‌and ‌East Asia Summit‌, officials

repeatedly underscored that volatility remains a structural feature of the regional

environment. A similar logic is visible elsewhere. In West Africa, ‌regional economic

arrangements‌ have offered governments a buffer against external shocks. In parts of Latin

America, regional bodies have stepped up cooperation on ‌food security and climate

resilience‌, focusing on strengthening supply chains against climate pressures rather than

signalling geopolitical alignment.‌

The practical dimensions of South–South cooperation are most visible in the sectoral

initiatives governments have pursued. India and Bangladesh have begun linking their ‌digital

payment systems‌, building on existing connectivity arrangements rather than announcing

new platforms. Brazil has been ‌engaging regional partners‌ ahead of COP30, including

Colombia and Chile, to find areas of alignment on climate priorities without pushing formal

blocs. These examples point to a shift away from symbolic statements toward

incremental, problem-specific cooperation shaped by risk and capacity rather than

rhetoric.‌

P 6 3 ‌

Navigating Major Powers Alignment‌ ‌

India and China shape this recalibration in different ways. India’s approach is shaped

by its long-standing commitment to strategic autonomy and by a preference for

cooperation that can shift by issue. This has been evident in its use of ‌the ‌Quad‌ to

manage regional security concerns, in its steady maritime capacity-building efforts

across the Indian Ocean, and in the technical partnerships it has developed with

several African governments on digital services and public administration. China’s role,

by contrast, remains more infrastructure-focused. ‌Belt and Road‌ financing continues to

shape transport and energy planning from East Africa to Southeast Asia, even as

several governments face ‌growing pressure‌ to revisit project timelines, debt

sustainability, and implementation terms. Most states are not choosing between the

two powers. They draw on each when it supports domestic priorities, and step back

when the terms risk creating economic or political imbalance. The selective nature of

this engagement is the more significant trend. It shows that agency lies with the

governments managing these relationships, rather than with the major powers

competing for influence.‌

Photo By: Laura Marques/COP30‌

The influence of middle powers is central to this recalibration. Türkiye has ‌m‌anaged its

ties‌ with NATO, Russia, and the Gulf in ways that preserve economic space and protect

strategic autonomy, a balance that officials in Ankara increasingly present as necessary

for navigating the current environment. ‌Brazil has adopted a comparable posture in its

climate diplomacy. Its role in developing the ‌Tropical Forest Forever Facility‌ahead of

COP30 reflects an effort to shape environmental financing around regional priorities

rather than the strategic preferences of larger powers. The African Union’s ‌entry into

the G20‌points to the same dynamic, with regional institutions looking to expand their

influence without binding themselves to any single major power. Taken together, these

choices show how governments are widening their room for manoeuvre by working

flexibly across different partners and shaping cooperation around domestic constraints

rather than external expectations.‌

P 6 4 ‌

A shift is taking place in how governments frame cooperation itself.

Rather than trying to build a single Southern bloc or position

themselves against the West, many states are experimenting with

flexible networks that shift according to the problem at hand. In

practice, this has meant working with one set of partners on ‌climate

adaptation‌, another on digital standards, and others on food security

or supply-chain stability. These arrangements are not about unity for

its own sake; they are a way for governments to keep options open

while still delivering tangible results at home. The result is less a fixed

coalition than a set of practical alignments that shift as

circumstances change.‌

Photo By: ASEAN‌

A similar message came through in the regional meetings held this

year. At the ‌ASEAN Regional Forum‌ and in several ‌African Union‌

working-group sessions, participants focused less on drafting new

declarations and more on whether cooperation was reinforcing

domestic systems. Officials pointed to advances in ‌energy transition

work‌, upgrades to transport and logistics networks, and the

expansion of digital connectivity, which they noted had eased

pressure on national systems rather than created new dependencies.

Climate change emerged as an immediate concern in these

discussions, shaping officials' thinking about food security, mobility,

and public health. In this setting, the appeal of South–South

cooperation has been its usefulness, a way for governments to share

information, deconcentrate risk, and manage pressures that larger

powers have struggled to address consistently.‌

P 6 5 ‌

Cooperation Under Pressure:‌‌

What Endures and What Shifts‌

Some of the developments over the

past year have also exposed the limits of

this approach. Conflict in the Horn of

Africa and instability in parts of the

Sahel have slowed progress on planned

energy and transport links, and longrunning

border disputes in South Asia

continue to restrain efforts to establish

new corridors. Governments have

adjusted more cautiously as majorpower

competition has intensified.

Indonesia has revisited timelines for

some China-backed industrial projects,

and Zambia has treated its debt

negotiations as a balancing exercise

between Chinese and Western

expectations rather than a

straightforward alignment with either

side. In Western capitals, responses to

BRICS expansion and to new Southern

initiatives have combined interest with a

quieter unease about financing terms

and governance standards. These

constraints have not stopped

cooperation, but they underline that the

policy space governments have carved

out still sits within broader security,

debt, and geopolitical pressures that will

not shift quickly.‌

Whether this approach endures will

depend on how governments navigate

the pressures that continue to test it,

including rising debt, climate

disruptions, and sharper demands from

larger powers. The record over the past

year has been uneven. Some

governments have renegotiated loan

terms to ease fiscal strain, others have

shifted suppliers on energy and

infrastructure projects to diversify their

dependencies, and many have relied on

regional forums to coordinate responses

to shared shocks. These adjustments

differ across regions, but they point to

the same underlying pattern:

governments are using South–South

cooperation to manage pressure on

their own terms, even when the steps

they take are modest or uneven. The

adjustments remain incremental, but

together they point to the steady

consolidation of a more plural and

resilient order shaped by negotiation,

diversification, and accumulated

experience.‌

Photo By: Archdaily‌

79‌

P 6 6 ‌

Beyond‌ ‌

Values‌

The European Union’s

Geopolitical

Awakening and‌ ‌

its ‌“Pivot”‌ ‌to the Indo-

Pacific‌

By Gavin (Suyong) Wang

P 6 7 ‌


Photo By: Rinson Chory/Unsplash‌

Photo By: ISS‌

The term “Indo-Pacific” first appeared in the European Union’s (EU) discourse

in its Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy, launched in 2016,

followed by its Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) in 2021. The IPS is a multifaceted

geopolitical initiative aimed at strengthening the EU’s legitimacy and strategic

presence in the Indo-Pacific. Driven by the increasing strategic importance of

the Indo-Pacific as the geopolitical arena of great-power competition, the IPS

is a significant contributor to global economic growth and a crucial

manufacturing and innovation hub. The EU focuses on seven priorities:

sustainable and inclusive prosperity; green transition; ocean governance;

digital governance and partnerships; connectivity; security and defence; and

human rights. This article suggests that the overall design of the IPS is driven

by the EU’s emerging security concerns and long-term strategic ambitions to

shape power politics and international order, while grounded in normative

values, a view further confirmed by Europe’s stronger commitment at the

22nd Shangri-La Dialogue in 2025.

81‌

P 6 8 ‌

P 6 9 ‌

Global Gateway: A

Sustainable

Alternative to China’s

Belt and Road

The ‌Global Gateway‌ is the EU’s

flagship initiative to position itself

more competitively in global

infrastructure and connectivity,

especially in the Ind‌o-Pacific, where

developing countries are actively

conducting social and economic

transitions. The EU plans to mobilise

up to €300 billion from 2021 to 2027

for projects in digital infrastructure,

clean energy, public health,

education, transportation, and

research. Framed within the EU’s

Sustainable Development Goals‌, the

Global Gateway strategy seeks to

support the development agendas of

developing countries in the Indo-

Pacific through a mix of financial,

trade, investment, and normative

means. This strategy is embedded in

the ‌G7’s commitment‌ to offer a

value-oriented, highly transparent

standard for infrastructure

cooperation, aiming to counter the

rise of China’s ‌Belt and Road Initiative

(BRI) and ‌Global Development

Initiative‌(GDI) in the Global South.‌

Initiative

The Global Gateway is fundamentally

designed to provide a transparent,

rule-based alternative to China’s BRI,

which has expanded significantly

across Africa, Southeast Asia, and the

Pacific. Unlike the BRI’s state-driven,

debt-financed model, the EU

promotes a public-private partnership

framework that encourages private

investment through public-backed derisking

mechanisms. The EU’s

approach not only reduces reliance on

public funds but also ensures flexible,

transparent, and sustainabilityoriented

financing. In addition to

facilitating European business

expansion in emerging Indo-Pacific

markets, the Global Gateway functions

as a geopolitical instrument that

reinforces the EU’s strategic presence

in the Indo-Pacific.‌

Photo By: Carnegieendowment/Getty‌

Strategic Compass: Defining the EU’s Role in

Global Security and Defence‌

Beyond the EU’s traditional focus on homeland defence, the ‌Strategic

Compass‌, as adopted in 2022, also underscores the EU's goal of strengthening

its role in Indo-Pacific security and defence. The Compass positions the EU

between its pursuit of strategic autonomy and its dependence on the United

States (U.S.) and NATO. According to European Union officials, the Strategic

Compass is intended to ‌complement‌rather than replace NATO's defence role.‌

Photo By: alexeynovikov/Depositphotos

The Indo-Pacific has been frequently mentioned in the Strategic Compass, and

the EU’s security approach centres on building bilateral partnerships with likeminded

states rather than forming small, exclusive groupings, as the U.S. does.

The EU maintains a cautious distance from US-led anti-China coalitions but

openly acknowledges the U.S.’s leadership in regional security and the

interdependence of their joint efforts. Simultaneously, the EU explicitly

identified China as a key security consideration in its strategic engagement,

underscoring divergences in maritime governance norms: the EU views China’s

claims in the South China Sea as threats to the security of European trade

routes, which account for over one-third of its external trade.‌

83‌

P 7 0 ‌

Photo By: European Union‌

Economic Security Strategy: A Lesson From the

Pandemic and the Rising Geopolitical Conflicts‌

Following the COVID-19 pandemic, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and the increasingly

intensive rivalry between the U.S. and China, the EU recognises that it is urgent to

mitigate economic security threats in the uncertain geopolitical circumstances.

Meanwhile,‌ China‌ and‌ the U.S‌. have also demonstrated their readiness to leverage

economic interdependencies by dominating crucial industries on which the EU heavily

relies.‌‌

Following the Indo-Pacific Strategy, the EU ‌Economic Security Strategy‌ in 2023

underscores the region's strategic significance for supply chain resilience, industrial

security in key sectors, and research and development in emerging technologies. As

the region remains a vital manufacturing and innovation hub, the EU seeks to diversify

its markets by developing closer partnerships with both major and emerging regional

economies to reduce ‌“harmful dependencies”‌. This diversification is critical to

safeguarding the EU’s economic security within an increasingly fragile global trade

system.‌

P 7 1 ‌

Enhancing Europe’s Legitimacy and

Commitments to Indo-Pacific Affairs: European

Leadership Highlights at Shangri-La Dialogue 2025‌

Compared to the absence of China, Europe was strongly represented at the‌ 22nd

Shangri-La Dialogue‌ in Singapore in May 2025. The European presence in regional

security has been repeatedly emphasised during the summit, amid rising expectations

from the U.S. and small powers in the Indo-Pacific. ‌Beyond the consistent commitment

to enhancing regional presence, European leaders emphasised the importance of the

Europe-ASEAN coalition, grounded in their shared aspiration for strategic autonomy.

Analysts‌ point out that European representatives are attempting to build a “group of

autonomy” with Indo-Pacific states by stoking concerns that China poses a threat and

violates international law. This advocacy aligns with ASEAN values and has been

widely welcomed by states such as Singapore and the Philippines, showing their strong

interest in strengthening relations with the EU and its members.‌

Photo By: European Union‌

85‌

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Avoiding Marginalisation and

Embracing Geopolitics‌

At the 60th Munich Security Conference in Germany in

2024, former U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken

captured current international dynamics with his ‌remark‌,

“In today’s international politics, if you are not sitting at

the table, you are likely on the menu”. This phrase has

become increasingly common in the European

Commission’s discussions over the past few years. Terms

such as “geopolitical Europe” and “strategic autonomy”

feature prominently in EU political discourse, signalling a

growing acceptance that the EU must adapt to an

international environment defined by geopolitics.‌

‌

The EU’s pivot reflects an effort to avoid marginalisation

in the new geopolitical landscape. Strengthening ties

with key regional players allows the EU to expand its

influence beyond the European continent, while

leveraging its advantages as a normative and market

power to maintain a rule-based multilateral order amid

the intensifying strategic rivalry between the U.S. and

China.‌

‌

Geopolitics is undoubtedly a fundamental feature of the

EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategy. The accompanying policy

package aims to secure Europe a legitimate seat at the

Indo-Pacific “table” and to strengthen its voice in Indo-

Pacific affairs gradually. In other words, the EU’s emphasis

on “low politics” serves as a means rather than an

ultimate purpose. Although academic research ‌indicates‌

that the EU’s hard power in the region remains limited

and has not been fully recognised as a credible

geopolitical great power by Indo-Pacific actors, the

Union has nonetheless embraced an era of geopolitics

and its evolving geopolitical role.‌ ‌

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Photo By: Patrick T Fallon/Getty‌

Since Narendra Modi’s election in 2014, a flurry of state visits between the

subcontinent and Latin America has marked a shift in Indian foreign policy

and spurred interest in relations across the Pacific. China is a dominant

force in the region; however, Indian investment, with Australia as a

collaborator, has the potential to recalibrate the regional balance of

powers.

In 2023, Indian investment has reached approximately $40 billion, with

trade between the two regions increasing by 145% - mainly consisting of

value-added products such as automobiles, agrochemicals, auto-parts,

pharmaceuticals, textiles and refined petroleum. However, Latin American

trade with China is twelve times greater, totalling $480 billion. The Belt

and Road Initiative has twenty-two Latin American partner countries, and

the China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China

contribute significantly to the initiative's infrastructure and lending.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Luis Inácio de la Silva

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Photo: Eraldo Peres/AP Photo/picture alliance

Photo: David Stanley via Wikicommons

But India is looking to expand these

trade links, partly out of the material

necessity of a rapidly developing, highly

populated country, and partly out of

ideology. India’s foreign policy outlook

has traditionally been seen as ‘nonalignment’

during the Cold War era. It has

now evolved into ‘strategic autonomy’,

best understood as taking advantage of

as many different partnerships as

possible without committing to

alliances. Externally, for countries

seeking to diversify their economic

partners, India is seen as an

independent, democratic, and largely

neutral option amid rising geopolitical

tensions between the large powers.

Specifically, India has its eyes on critical

minerals, needed for renewables and

green technology. A trade agreement has

just been signed with Peru, and is almost

complete with Chile. India's newest

embassy in lithium-rich Bolivia, which has

the world’s largest reserves, may now be

an opening to the global market under the

newly elected, centre-right President

Rodrigo Paz. Chile also offers access to

other critical minerals, such as copper,

and crucially, port access connecting

Asia and the South American continent

across the Pacific Ocean. China

understands the importance of this

access and is building a port in Chancay,

north of Lima, Peru, which will cut

shipping time to Shanghai by a week.

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The same strategic opportunity exists for Australia and India. An Australian-backed

port on the Eastern side of the Pacific would provide a direct shipping route to India,

Australia, and South America.

The major impediment to trade between Australia and India, and between Australia

and Latin America, is geographic distance. The current shipping route between

Australia and South America stops in Panama - a direct route could cut down shipping

time by about ten days. It would also provide a link to India for the shipment of Bolivian,

Peruvian, and Chilean critical minerals, as well as crude exports from Brazil. The Port of

Darwin could also serve as a refuelling stop between the two regions, thereby

stimulating domestic economic growth. Moreover, a series of Australian-backed

strategic bridges or tunnels connecting trade to the Pacific can further counter

Chinese influence and connect the continents.

Beyond economic interests, it is in Australia’s interest to counter Chinese influence in

Latin America, as it is in the Asia-Pacific region. Between the threats of tariffs, the

unpredictability and internal turmoil of the United States, and the significant cuts to

USAID, the United States' decline will leave a vacuum in its external influence in the

region. Australia can capitalise on its positive international reputation to step up and

become an option for Latin American governments seeking development funding.

Latin American and Indian economies are complementary, and with Australia’s

influence, ties between the regions can become much closer. India and Australia can

leverage their status as middle powers to create new supply chains and to counter

Chinese economic and political influence. Latin America can capitalise on India’s

appetite for raw materials and Australia’s potential as a developed export market. This

is an opportune time for governments on all sides to leverage geopolitical unrest, and it

can be a window for Latin America to be brought closer to India and Australia’s orbit.

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Photo: White House‌

Exploring the Trump

administration’s Impact on

the United States’ Global

Standing‌

92‌

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by Shajara Khan

Photo: Mario Tama / Getty‌

The dismantling of government agencies, the delegitimisation of federal

departments, and instilling fear through warrantless detentions and mass

deportations to a jail in El Salvador are just some indicators that the United

States (U.S.), under the second Donald Trump administration, is reverting to a

primarily isolationist political ideology. Whether it is the mass deportation of

migrants undergoing the process to obtain permanent residency, or the

outright dismantling of health programs that were established and maintained

through U.S. funding (USAID), these decisions have prompted significant

concern regarding the broader social and humanitarian impacts of the Trump

administration’s policy direction.‌‌

This article explores how the Trump administration’s policy decisions have

influenced the U.S.’s relationships with other countries and the long-term

implications for its future global positioning.‌

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Photo: The Vidette‌

BACKGROUND

To understand the current Trump

administration, it is important to

remember that the slogans-turnedideologies

‘America First’ and ‘Make

America Great Again (MAGA)’ are not

new inventions by Donald Trump and his

team. This has brought on revivals of

socio-political ideologies from previous

U.S. presidential administrations, most

notably Ronald Reagan’s 1980 campaign

slogan “Let’s Make America Great Again”

It sought to create a more culturally

homogenous society through the

specific restriction of certain groups

deemed ‘undesirable’. For example,

Reagan famously coining the term

“welfare queen” to disparage single,

African-American mothers relying on

food stamps as a means of reducing

budget allocations for such subsidies.

The idea of an ethnically and culturally

homogenous society is not solely an

incidental concept for the U.S. Still, it

does cause some bewilderment for a

country long advertised as an ethnic

‘melting pot’.‌ ‌

In the 2011 paper ‘The cultural roots of

isolationism and internationalism in

American foreign policy, Professor Lane

Crothers from Illinois State University's

Politics and Government outlines the

paradox that, over the past 70 years,‌‌

internationalism is the default position of

American foreign policy… (but) there is no

cultural reason why the United States

need be internationalist.‌

Professor Crothers examines the roles

internationalism and isolationism have

played in shaping U.S. foreign policy, stating

that the notion that the U.S. moved away

from isolationist policies reduces the

nuance of constructing America’s

diplomatic history.‌‌

Crothers’s paper also highlights how the

idea of ‘exceptionalism’ lies at the root of

America’s global socio-cultural positioning,

working in tandem with broader

geopolitical interests. Crothers uses

historical records of Puritan English settler

colonialists seeking to establish their own

territory free from foreign influence as

evidence. Therefore, it should not come as

a surprise that the current administration is

employing the political methodologies

aimed at recreating an image of the US

based on self-sufficiency, whilst

maintaining the image of ultimate leader in

both strategic and diplomatic spheres.‌‌

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PROFESSOR LANE CROTHERS‌

Photo: Greg Nash‌

METHODOLOGY

To radically change its global reputation

in ways that align with the priorities of

Donald Trump and his allies, the Trump

administration’s political methodology is

framed around the cultural image of the

Anglo-Celtic Protestant demographic,

which has represented the

overwhelming majority of the U.S.

population since the country gained its

independence.‌ ‌

Project 2025 is an initiative that was

launched in 2022 by right-wing thinktank,

The Heritage Foundation. The

document is over 900 pages, detailing

the federal departments and programs

they aim to dismantle, with sweeping

revocations of policy measures that have

impacted the operations in both

domestic and international spheres.

‘Project 2025’ became a major debate

point during the 2024 presidential

campaign, with Trump denying

knowledge of the ‘handbook’. However,

Trump’s denial has been debunked, as

more websites are being created to

track which executive orders announced

by the Trump administration match up

with the goals mentoned in Project 2025.‌‌

Russell Vought, the author of Project 2025,

has also worked with Elon Musk’s

Department of Government Efficiency

(DOGE) — whose mission was to increase

government efficiency. However, this

resulted in the mass termination of federal

employees based on Musk’s heavily biased

assessments, and he is the representative

responsible for enacting Project 2025’s

goals. There is no precedent in the U.S. to

articulate the disruptions caused by the

Trump administration. Yet, this has not

stopped Trump from believing that the

direction he is steering America in is the

correct one.‌‌

WHAT IS ‌PROJECT ‌2025‌?‌

A 900-page policy blueprint by The‌

‌Heritage Foundation‌

Calls for dismantling key federal‌

‌departments‌

Replaces long-standing governance‌

‌norms‌

Directly linked to new Trump-era‌

‌executive orders‌

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The international community says

otherwise; a survey by the Pew Research

Centre collected responses from

participants in 24 countries and found

that, on average, Trump’s approval rating

has declined over the last year in more

than half of those countries. Going by

party affiliation, Trump’s approval has

remained favourable, and even

increased, among supporters of rightwing

parties in their own countries.

However, that alignment has not

necessarily translated into political

victories, as more voters have leaned

away from candidates who explicitly or

implicitly emulate Trump’s ideological

persona. This was especially the case in

the 2025 Australian federal election,

where former opposition leader Peter

Dutton relied on ‘Trump’s playbook’,

ultimately leading to his loss in his

electorate and a major loss for the

Australian Coalition.‌ ‌

Donald Trump’s foreign and domestic

policy measures are not unique. Many

political historians and journalists have

drawn parallels to other authoritarian

leaders that Trump emulates, namely

that his administration’s policy

decisions are reminiscent of policies

made during the rise of fascism in

Germany.‌ ‌

Trump himself may not be making these

decisions unilaterally, but the people

around him are fine with him being

adorned in that way.‌ ‌While political

analysts continue to debate on what

ideological label best represents the

president, a quote‌‌

from a 2022 article by‌‌

Tim Fernholz sums up‌‌

Trump’s perception‌‌

of policymaking:‌

The president is simply

repeating the last thing he

heard from an adviser,

lobbyist, or head of state.‌

Trump’s method is to simply agree with

the last statement that was made in a

room, because his true ideology is money

– he is a businessman, applying a profit

margin to the United States. It is why he

surrounds himself with people who have

attention-grabbing personalities, from

Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth,

whose previous job was a morning news

host at Fox News, to Press Secretary

Karoline Leavitt, who has received a

stream of criticism for her abject hostility

towards journalists, going so far as to

restrict the press from briefings in the

West Wing.‌‌

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As scandals continue to mount for the Trump administration on the

domestic front – such as the longest government shutdown in U.S. history

and the release of the Epstein Files, which highlight Trump’s personal

involvement – this has created a new environment for international

relations. Geopolitics now has to navigate around the Trump

administration’s foreign policy measures, especially with the decisions

made to target people in Venezuela arbitrarily under suspicion of drug

trafficking. While there is a case to be made that the Trump administration

resembles other countries that lean towards authoritarian ideology and

would isolate itself in the international community, the U.S. still holds

hegemony in global politics. Other countries that still maintain good

relations with the U.S. are having to learn in real time how to navigate

Trump-style diplomacy:‌

The geopolitical landscape is trying to keep pace with the frenetic

energy of the Trump administration’s foreign policies‌

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The Return of

Geoeconomics:‌‌

Albert Hirschman’s

World Reborn‌

By: Talha Haroon

2025 has marked an unprecedented

intensification of power-seeking activity,

from the weaponisation of U.S.

economic hegemony to the rise of new

Asian and Gulf power centres, and the

persistence of external conflicts; these

developments arguably herald a return

to geoeconomics. Although the concept

at its foundational level can be seen as

“the study of the interlinkages between

geopolitics and economics,”‌ it is by no

means a novel concept for our times: the

politicisation of interdependence and

economic coercion has preoccupied

great economic thinkers from John

Hicks to Von Neumann.‌ ‌

Some of the earliest systematic writing

on the subject can be traced to ‌Albert

Hirschman’s 1945 classic National Power

and the Structure of Foreign Trade‌, which

analysed how, during the interwar period,

“rent extraction” – the notion that

existing economic ties can be

strategically manipulated to secure

political advantage – underscored

political and economic relations

between countries. This worldview,

where hegemonic states “constantly

pursue asymmetrical economic

relationships to create dependence and

political dominance,” has inspired ‌two

main camps‌ in the geoeconomics

tradition: “Luttwakian and approaches

outside of that tradition”‌‌

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Designer: Astrid Hickey / Ruby Miller‌

Source: Institute for Advanced Study‌

Photo: Jocelyn Augustino‌

Edward Luttwak’s approach, and that of his adherents, is

firmly rooted in the neorealist tradition, foregrounding the

state as the principal actor in international economic

relations. Scholvin and Wigell‌, in particular, argue that

“geoeconomics transcends international relations (IR)

realism insofar as it recognises that geographical features

that are particular to places and spaces shape international

relations…not only distribution of power.” The focus on the

geographical dimensions of economic power is a central

feature of geoeconomics, where analysis “explain[s] and

predict[s] state power by reference to a host of geographic

factors‌ (territory, population, economic performance,

natural resources, military capabilities, etc.),” among other

spatially grounded determinants of power.

On the other hand, non-Luttwakian traditions position

geoeconomics along different conceptual trajectories, from

approaches that directly link to economic statecraft to

those in critical geography that trace the historical

reconfiguration of state space and the uneven geographies

of capitalism. However, across these intellectual paths, a

common thread lies in the Hirschmanian conception of

neorealist and network-centric geoeconomics: that

economic interdependence, whether spatial, strategic or

institutional, creates the requisite channels through which

states acquire economic leverage over one another.

Adopting this network-centric conception of

geoeconomics enables us to see how this logic has

structured events in 2025 by examining the modalities

through which states operationalise geoeconomic power.

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Modern Geoeconomic Statecraft

Contemporary geoeconomic statecraft operates through the manipulation of

strategic global networks – financial, technological, and resource-based, amongst

others – that structure the movement of money, goods, and information. This is partly

because traditional instruments of military coercion have become increasingly costly

and less effective among major powers. As Farrell and Newman observe in their

landmark work on weaponised interdependence, states that have a monopoly over

key “chokepoints” within economic networks possess a privileged capacity to

impose costs on others. This upholds Hirschman’s core insight in a contemporary light

where power in economic relations stems not simply from material capabilities, but

from the ability to shape the monetary levers of trade, finance, critical resources, and

deployment mechanisms.

In this regard, financial infrastructure remains the most consequential arena in which

the economic–security nexus is contested. As this year has demonstrated, the

dominance of the United States (U.S.) dollar and its centrality to global payment

systems have given Washington a capacity to transform financial interdependence

into an instrument of coercion. This has been most clearly evident in the inward turn

of the world’s largest economy, where secondary effects have magnified the

combined force of sanctions and tariffs. States and global financial institutions have

repositioned to avoid the possibility of losing access to dollar clearing. According to

the Bank for International Settlements’ 2025 Annual Economic Report, the dollar

continued to account for roughly 60% of global cross-border bank claims in early 2025

– evidence that, despite heightened geopolitical uncertainty and periodic doubts

about the resilience of U.S. financial governance, major international actors have in

practice maintained their reliance on dollar-denominated networks.

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While the Trump administration’s

"barrage of policy moves

threatening to undermine the

dollar’s global stature”

reverberated across global

markets earlier in the year,

prompting strategic portfolio

adjustments by foreign entities

“to reduce their dependence on

the dollar for trade, payments,

and investment”, the recent

return of flight-to-safety

behaviour in relation to the dollar

is a crucial by-product of the

traditionally perceived safety of

U.S. assets. Economic actors

understand that exclusion from

the dollar network threatens not

only trade finance and

investment flows, but also a

state’s broader ability to manage

crises, mobilise resources, and

maintain military readiness.

However, it is important to highlight that

geoeconomic power is not exercised solely through

financial channels. Another fundamental domain of

geoeconomic statecraft lies in strategic resources,

where network concentration creates distinct

vulnerabilities. Although the U.S.–China rivalry in 2025

has unfolded across multiple economic and political

arenas, their ‌deep interdependence in critical inputs

for strategic industries‌– ranging from 5G technologies

to artificial intelligence – has made control over

standards and supply chains one of the most sensitive

dimensions of their relationship, shaping how each

state projects power, gathers intelligence, and

secures strategic advantage. China’s long-standing

dominance in rare earths – ‌controlling over 70% of

global extraction and nearly 90% of processing

capacity‌ – positions it as a pivotal node within

contemporary geoeconomic competition. As a result,

Beijing’s decision this year to impose export controls

on rare-earth metals in response to U.S. tariffs,

explicitly framed countermeasures to escalating U.S.

semiconductor and AI restrictions, reflects an

intensification of this dynamic.‌‌

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While the 2010 embargo on Japan following the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute

showcased the extent to which China can weaponise its control over rare-earths, the

measures undertaken this year come on the back of a broader pattern of geoeconomic

coercion that encompasses Russia’s sanctions-evasion partnerships, BRICS’ resourcesharing

arrangements, and a global contest over supply-chain security. Taken together,

these developments underscore how key economic networks have been repositioned

as central levers of geoeconomic competition, reshaping how states interpret

dependency and emerging hierarchies across multiple domains.

The Soybean Saga‌

In addition to global finance and rare-earth

netw‌orks, agriculture forms a crucial component of

geoeconomic contestation. Nowhere is this more

clearly seen than in the contest over soybeans, a

commodity that has taken centre stage in the U.S.-

China geoeconomic rivalry. The soybean trade

embodies the ‌precariousness‌ of networked

interdependence: “China accounts for

approximately 60% of global soybean trade,” while

“soybeans represent almost 50% of U.S. agricultural

exports to China.” Crucially, network analysis by

Oliveira and Lengyel‌, employing betweenness

centrality – a metric that identifies actors

occupying pivotal intermediary positions – shows

that the U.S. maintains high centrality, effectively

bridging disparate regions of the global soybean

network, followed closely by China. This

concentration of influence creates structural risks

for other exporters, such as Brazil and Argentina,

whose attempts to secure domestic food security

often compel them to align with one of these

dominant actors. Argentina illustrates this dynamic

– “despite being a major soybean producer,” its

relatively low network centrality sharply limits its

capacity to shape global trade flows or negotiate

from a position of strategic autonomy.‌

Source: Asia Society‌

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These asymmetries, in turn, have generated distinct geopolitical

behaviour. Following the political instability of Argentina’s Milei

administration, the U.S. stepped in with a ‌$20 billion exchange-rate

stabilisation package‌ – support that helped consolidate Milei’s position

ahead of the mid-term elections. Although economic measures guide

this intervention, it is also, in part, an effort to safeguard soybean supply

and c‌ounterbalance Brazil’s deepening economic integration with China.

As Oliveira and Lengyel emphasise, “a country’s production volume

does not always correlate with its strategic importance on the global

trade network.” ‌According to Guan et al.‌, while China accounted for

60% of global seaborne soybean imports and the U.S. and Brazil

accounted for the bulk of production, the critical factors shaping

competitive advantage are the transportation modal mix (truck, rail,

barge, ocean, etc.) and landed-cost differences. Their total-landed-cost

modelling found that U.S. multimodal routes (combining truck, barge and

rail) enjoy significantly lower costs than Brazil’s predominantly truckbased

routes, thereby reinforcing U.S. logistical advantages and enabling

diversification if tariffs or supply-chain shifts disrupt access. Thus, when

viewed through the lens of global value chains (GVCs), a state’s

geographic and relational position within these flows – whether as a hub,

chokepoint, or intermediary – creates forms of geoeconomic power

that descriptive trade statistics alone cannot capture. In this respect, it

underscores Hirschman’s insight that asymmetric power emerges from

trade relationships with dominant actors, and economic networks

embed both capacity and vulnerability into global state relations.‌

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Source: Asia Society‌

Towards a New Geoeconomic Paradigm

The political and economic ruptures of 2025 underscore how the long arc of

globalisation – once celebrated for deepening economic interdependence among

major powers – has transformed interconnections into leverage. This has allowed

states not only to recalibrate their industrial strategies but also to broaden their

economic-security nexus to encompass domains previously assumed to be insulated

from geopolitics. In this context, an increasingly coherent “framework for

geoeconomics” can be viewed as essential for interpreting these transformations

moving forward. Scholars such as ‌Matteo Maggiori and Jesse Schreger, working

through Stanford’s Global Capital Allocation Project‌, have been at the forefront of

articulating this framework. Recent scholarship highlights several important extensions

to mainstream geoeconomics that illuminate the patterns observed in 2025. Beyond

the traditional Luttwakian and non-Luttwakian frameworks, ‌Babic et al‌. highlight that

the field is shifting from a singular focus on conflict towards a spectrum of

competition, cooperation, and coexistence; from state-centrism towards an

understanding that banks, firms, and multilateral institutions are now central actors; and

from a narrow security lens towards recognising multiple motives and diverse power

resources.‌‌

Source: ABC News‌

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Photo: Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR)‌

Based on this evolving identity of the field, three policy implications follow that are

likely to define 2026. First, geoeconomic fragmentation is likely to deepen, particularly

in frontier domains such as finance, AI, and digital infrastructure, as major powers

engage more aggressively in outbound investment screening and weaponise

standards-setting as instruments of influence. Second, middle powers caught between

the U.S. and China will face mounting pressure not only to navigate competing

frameworks of interdependence but also to develop their own autonomy within

politicised markets. This is particularly relevant for strategically valuable locations in

emerging markets, such as semiconductor manufacturing hubs (e.g., Taiwan, South

Korea), energy-transit states (e.g., Turkey, Brazil), and commodity exporters across the

Gulf and South America. Third, the strategic battlegrounds of the coming decade are

firmly lodged around digital infrastructure such as AI compute power and rare earths,

where network dependence and geographic constraints simultaneously create

opportunities for competitive advantage and exploitation.‌‌

Ultimately, while 2025 has brought an unprecedented degree of economic and

political unorthodoxy, the state of play suggests that next year’s geoeconomic contest

will not only deepen the push for control over spatial, material, and ideological

domains but also arguably reinforce the sense that the global economy is being pulled

in increasingly disconnected directions. At its core, these trajectories reflect a

distinctly Hirschmanian world, in which asymmetric power is the inevitable result of a

declining hegemon unwilling to support the international system and a rising power

unable to command it.

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Designer: Adak Pabek‌

Great Power Chessboard:

How the United States Seeks to Counter

China’s Latin American Reach

Photo: Hendrik Willem Van Loon/Wiikisource‌

1921 Cartoon depicting the Monroe Doctrine‌

By Alister Gibson‌

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Across Latin America, Chinese investment has reshaped the map of trade, from new

ports on the Pacific to mining projects deep in the Andes. Washington has realised this

trend and is now asserting its own influence. Now in Trump’s second term, Pentagon lead

strategist Elbridge Colby is steering a return of the United States (U.S.) security focus on

the Americas, a shift he calls ‘‌homeland first, hemisphere next.‌’ The plan signals a modern

revival of the Monroe Doctrine, aimed at containing Chinese and Russian influence and

restoring U.S. influence in its own backyard.‌

Washington’s draft strategy suggests a posture that turns inward. After decades of farflung

commitments in Europe, the Middle East and East Asia, the Pentagon is applying a

fresh emphasis on the Americas. The plan seeks to shape the region’s politics in its

favour, backing governments it sees as aligned and reliable partners, such as Milei in

Argentina, which in October secured a‌ USD $20 billion‌ financial rescue package, and‌

supporting‌ Rodrigo Paz, Bolivia’s newly elected, Western-friendly, pro-business

government. The shift also points to a harder line against adversarial regimes such as

Nicolás Maduro’s in Venezuela, which remains a target for an increase in diplomatic and

economic pressure. Within the language of ‘hemispheric stability,’ the new approach

seeks to rebuild a bloc of aligned governments across Latin America, before the U.S.

returns its attention to China’s influence in the Pacific.‌

The man tasked with articulating this policy shift to

minute detail is Elbridge Colby, the‌ Under Secretary of

Defence for Policy‌. He built his reputation as a China

hawk after helping design the 2018 defence strategy

that put deterring Beijing at the centre of American

planning. In 2025, he pressed for a partial halt to

weapons shipments‌ to Ukraine to conserve stocks

needed for a possible confrontation with China,

underscoring his focus on pacing threats and balancing

resource allocation. However, the new blueprint he

steers today points inward instead. Colby argues that

the U.S. must secure its own backyard first, fortify

supply lines and rebuild influence in the Western

Hemisphere before it can optimise effectiveness in any

Indo-Pacific crisis. Within this budding strategy

architecture, the shorthand for the renewed approach is

‘homeland first, hemisphere next.’‌

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Elbridge Colby‌

Photo: Monica King‌

Photo: Wikimedia Commons‌

The new strategy revives an old idea from Washington’s past. In the‌early nineteenth century‌,

the Monroe Doctrine warned outside powers away from Latin America. Today, the concept

returns, with China and Russia cast as the main interlopers; some analysts label the pairing the‌

DragonBear‌. The approach‌ emphasises active measures‌ to patrol sea lines, police illicit

narcotics flows and heap pressure on unfriendly governments. Early signals include a tougher

stance toward Venezuela and an attempt to‌ overthrow the Maduro regime‌. The spirit

resembles the 1904 expansion of the Monroe Doctrine under Theodore Roosevelt, which

asserted a right to intervene to protect American interests. The strategic aim now is to block

durable footholds created by Chinese investment, technology exchanges, and port purchases,

as well as Russian security ties and political details. At the same time, it is shoring up Latin

American partners who align with Washington’s leadership and political order in the

hemisphere.‌

The revival of the Monroe Doctrine has received mixed reactions across the region. Leaders

who remember the U.S.'s earlier dominance today call the new push interference and warn

that it appears neocolonial. Brazil’s Lula da Silva‌ maintains relations with China‌ and accepts

Chinese credit, markets and equipment. Arguing that his country needs investment and cannot

afford to be discriminatory about where it comes from. Venezuela’s Maduro leans on BRICS

partners and on Moscow for political and security backing, portraying U.S. pressure as proof

that his government defends Venezuelan sovereignty. Others read the room differently.

Panama has walked away from‌ prominent Chinese Belt and Road‌projects under U.S. pressure.

Mexico’s president, Claudia Sheinbaum, faced early pressure to take a tougher stance on drug

cartels. Still, she has‌resisted talk‌ of U.S. military intervention, insisting Mexico can handle its

own security on its own terms. Across Latin America, a common rhetorical position is upheld:

Latin America wants options, not strict bloc discipline. Most governments say they will

continue to trade with both powers and refuse to be forced into a single camp.‌

P 9 6 ‌

Some strategists say the pivot away from the world to focus inwards has logic.

America cannot do everything everywhere all at once, and focusing on its own

hemisphere promises clarity after years of drift. Yet, other strategists mention

notable downsides. In Europe, allies worry that the drawdown will put pressure on

their own budgets, as they take on greater responsibility for funding their own

security. Also, the steady flow of surveillance data, transport aircraft and training

missions that have underpinned NATO’s eastern flank could begin to thin.‌‌

Photo: Wikimedia Commons‌

Quad Leaders at 2024 Quad Summit‌‌

In Asia, partners in the U.S.-led alliance networks, such as the Quad and AUKUS, seek

firm proof that Washington still intends to deter Beijing in the Pacific. Any hint of

slack could give China and Russia an incentive to test where new boundaries lie.

Critics argue that modern security‌runs on connected theatres rather than exclusive

concentration on any single region. A retreat in one zone radiates into others, shifting

risk and encouraging opportunistic revanchism. The question hanging over the pivot

is whether saved resources outweigh the credibility it spends.‌

P 9 7 ‌

While Europe and Asia brace for reduced attention, Latin

America now finds itself once again at the forefront of U.S.

strategic ambition. Across the region, politics are entering a

time of political realignment. Old alliances are shifting as

Washington reasserts itself and Beijing’s grip on trade,

energy and technology endures across the continent. In

this climate, U.S. support is expected to boost

governments that share its outlook.‌

The White House is utilising financial aid and diplomatic favour to

strengthen friendly governments. Security cooperation and economic

deals will follow, rewarding partners that support Washington’s

leadership role in the region and tightening influence through banking

and security ties. The reaction is already visible.‌‌

Leaders on the left frame this as instruction, insisting their countries will not be drawn into

another era of American dependency. Across the region, two tendencies arise. One

gathers those pulled toward Washington by money, trade and protection, while the other

leans toward the looser networks of China and BRICS. Between them lie nations trying to

balance both poles for leverage. The coming years will reveal whether Latin America

settles into one camp or becomes the testing ground of a divided world.‌

P 9 8 ‌

South Asia’s‌ ‌

Quiet Reordering:

Regional

Cooperation

Beyond

Geopolitical

Rivalry‌

By: Praveena Gallage‌

South Asian Association for Regional Corporation (SAARC) shows ‌slow

development in comparison to the other regional organisations around the

world. Asia has been striving f‌or collective development and security for

decades, yet these efforts have produced limited results. Although India has

emerged as a global power in the twenty-first century, its rise has not

translated into growth for its smaller neighbours. India’s leadership, often

divisive and dominant, has weakened rather than strengthened regional unity,

even as it claims to be the foundation of South Asia’s cohesion. At the same

time, the region must contend with the expanding presence of China.

Trapped between these two powers, South Asian states have long struggled

to assert independence. Recognising these challenges, several have now

begun to move away from SAARC in search of alternative paths for

cooperation and growth.‌

P 9 9 ‌


The Promise of Regional Unity‌

Photo By: Hulton Archive/Getty Images‌

The South Asian region was left

without an organized regional

corporation during the trend of

advanced European integration. The

wave of regionalism “had a profound

impact on South Asian countries,

prompting many to think deeply

about the prospect and necessity of

regional cooperation.” That

reflection culminated in the creation

of the SAARC in 1985.‌

The SAARC countries had heavily

suffered under colonisation for

decades and did not wish to be

trapped under another power. These

states strongly aimed at preserving

their sovereignty, security, and

development. The discussions were

to promote mutual assistance in

economic, social, cultural, technical,

and scientific fields through selfreliance

as mentioned in their charter.

Leaders such as Sirimavo

Bandaranaike captured this spirit

through her approach of “friendship

with all but angry with none.” Thus,

the region’s aim of development as a

united bloc and the objective to

preserve its sovereignty emerged.‌

P 1 0 0 ‌

Trapped between Giants‌

India, the largest and most influential

state in South Asia, despite promoting

ideas such as Akhand Bharat, unity in

diversity, and the Neighbourhood First

Policy, has often created more division

than cooperation. Its relations with

neighbouring countries remain troubled

by territorial disputes with Pakistan,

water sharing and border issues with

Bangladesh, and maritime and fishing

tensions with Sri Lanka. ‌

At the fifth SAARC Summit, Pakistan

and Bangladesh proposed including

political and security issues within the

organization’s discussions, recognising

that these areas were essential for

genuine cooperation. India opposed

this proposal, fearing external

involvement in its regional behaviour.

As explained in Analyzing the

Stagnation of South Asian Regional

Cooperation: A Neo Functionalist

Perspective, since its inception SAARC

has carefully avoided sensitive areas

such as politics, security, and the

economy. Coincidentally, these were

the areas that the region wanted to

improve the most through unity. Thus,

by avoiding the very issues that divided

its members, SAARC undermined its

own purpose, rendering both unity and

regional development impossible.‌

Photo By: Xinhua News Agency/Getty Images‌

On the other hand, the region cannot

deny the influence of China over the

region. It has established several

pathways to reach out to the SAARC

region in such a way that SAARC cannot

escape. China has taken smaller states

within the region such as Sri Lanka and

Pakistan under its influence through its

debt trap diplomacy. China extends

large infrastructure loans that later

become difficult to repay, increasing

strategic dependency. Under the

Rajapaksa administration, Sri Lanka

borrowed heavily from China for

projects such as Hambantota Port and

Colombo Port City, which generated

limited returns and eventually forced

the government to lease Hambantota to

China on a long term basis. ‌

Photo By: Port City Colombo‌

P 1 0 1 ‌

Pakistan faces similar pressure through the China Pakistan Economic Corridor, where

escalating loan obligations have intensified concerns that repayment challenges could

translate into deeper Chinese influence over national decision-making. Beyond this,

China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the String of Pearls strategy have firmly positioned

Beijing along the Indian Ocean through port access and maritime infrastructure. The

development of Gwadar Port in Pakistan further strengthens China’s strategic sea lanes,

allowing it to maintain long term leverage over regional trade and security routes. ‌

Observing these it can be understood that, SAARC countries’ attempt to achieve

development by evoking unity against dominance failed as their policies themselves

became the primary hurdles to their objectives.‌

Photo By: Tharaka Basnayaka/NurPhoto Getty Images‌

Escape beyond SAARC‌

1. Sri Lanka‌

Sri Lanka’s foremost challenge today is to strengthen its fragile economy while preserving

national sovereignty. As World Bank Division Director David Sislen observed, “while Sri

Lanka’s recent economic progress is encouraging, the recovery is uneven and

incomplete.” The country’s priorities now include improving the business environment,

reforming taxation and labor systems, promoting trade and investment, and attracting

transparent and sustainable foreign partnerships.‌

It is impressive to see that the current government in Sri Lanka seeks solutions through a

balanced foreign policy while stressing non-alignment, avoiding over dependance to any

power bloc. The President has made it clear that Sri Lanka does not wish to be

“sandwiched between China and India,” calling both nations “valued friends” while

stressing the need to safeguard national sovereignty. Unlike earlier administrations the

current leadership seeks constructive cooperation with multiple partners. Sri Lanka’s

current priority is to expand its economy and reduce economic interdependence. Sri

Lanka’s economic priorities focus on maintaining fiscal balance through fair taxation,

efficient public spending, and deep structural reforms aimed at labor modernization,

improved trade, and land administration. The government also seeks to attract

transparent, non-debt-based investments by ensuring policy consistency and a

supportive environment for private sector growth. In order to achieve this, Sri Lanka seeks

to develop stronger relationships.‌

P 1 0 2 ‌

Anura Kumara Dissanayake, as President of Sri Lanka, has emphasized a strong

commitment to enhancing relations and cooperation within the Bay of Bengal Initiative

for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC). The BIMSTEC

association acts as a bridge between South Asia and South East Asia with less political

baggage, broader regional reach for trade and better prospects for regional

connectivity & maritime/sea-trade leverage than SAARC. Furthermore, the president

highlights the importance of strengthening the relationships with Gulf countries. Under

the leadership of Anura Kumara Dissanayake, Sri Lanka signed a formal “Reciprocal

Promotion and Protection of Investments” agreement with the United Arab Emirates

(UAE) in February 2025. For the first time, under President Anura Kumara Dissanayake,

Sri Lanka is expanding defense cooperation with Japan, including the transfer of UAVs

and joint naval exercises despite the fact that China is its long-time security partner.‌

The case of Kachchativu Island has again aroused tensions regarding Sri Lanka’s

sovereignty. Indian politicians have publicly stated their claim on Kachchitiv island. So

far Sri Lanka has not requested support from China regarding the matter. This would be

a huge chance for Colombo to demonstrate strength and strategic independence by

reducing reliance on global powers.‌

2. Bangaladesh‌

Bangladesh’s foreign policy has entered a phase of diversification marked by gradual

“de-Indianisation” and a pursuit of strategic autonomy. The president stated that the

country is expanding its relationships with its “Reaching out to everybody” foreign

policy. While maintaining constructive relations with India despite unresolved issues

such as the Teesta River dispute, Bangladesh has expanded its diplomatic

engagements through SAARC, BIMSTEC, the Climate Vulnerable Forum, the D-8, and

the Indian Ocean Rim Association. Yet, India seems upset with Bangladesh’s growing

relationships with China, Pakistan, and Turkey. Bangladesh's effort to reduce reliance on

Indian trade in favour of new strategic alignments with Beijing reflects a cautious yet

China-leaning orientation. However, the Observer Research Foundation warns that this

shift may evolve “from balance to realignment,” creating a new dependency on China.

The cancellation of Indian cooperation programmes and domestic controversies over

the treatment of the Hindu minority have further strained ties with New Delhi.‌

P 1 0 3 ‌

3. Pakistan‌

Pakistan still maintains strong relationships with China against India.

Because of its ongoing conflicts with India Pakistan often has to engage with

China to strengthen its military corporations. However, in 2025 Pakistan

signed a defence pact with Saudi Arabia called Strategic Mutual Defence

Agreement. But it is time for Pakistan to consider more on expanding

relationships beyond the stagnation between India and China.‌

To conclude, SAARC’s attempt to create unity in the region has mostly

failed, and it is now time for its member states to seek stronger alliances

beyond South Asia for their development. Although SAARC was founded

with the idea that countries sharing similar interests could progress through

cooperation, internal political tensions and long-standing rivalries have

prevented this goal from being achieved. As a result, the region has become

slow and unable to move forward collectively. Countries such as Sri Lanka

and Bangladesh have already begun to look outside the region for economic

and strategic partnerships, partly to avoid the stagnation created by India–

Pakistan tensions and the wider influence of China. This shift shows that

South Asian states increasingly recognise the need to diversify their

alliances in order to secure their future growth.

Photo By: Qasim Nagori/Unsplash‌

P 1 0 4 ‌

3.‌

Institutions‌ ‌ ‌

Under‌

P 1 0 5 ‌

Pressure‌ ‌

‌

119‌

P 1 0 6 ‌

Freedom

By

Academic

Melissa Dib‌

Pressure

Under

P 1 0 7 ‌

Designer: Ruby Miller‌

By TheVirginianPilot‌

Academic freedom is ‌defined‌ as “the

human right to acquire, develop, transmit,

apply, and engage with a diversity of

knowledge and ideas through research,

teaching, learning, and discourse.” In

recent years, it has been regarded as an

emerging human right, grounded in the

right to science (‌Article 15‌) of the

International Convention on Economic,

Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). The

work of educating future generations

depends on an environment where they

can freely exchange ideas, challenge

theories, debate controversial topics,

and share perspectives. Institutions are

focused on prohibiting poor ethics and

cheating rather than proactively

protecting staff and students and

enforcing ethical habits. This means that

academic freedom is a concept that can

also be ‌taken for granted‌. ‌

On 28 May 2020, the United Nations (UN)

General Assembly adopted ‌Resolution

74/275‌, establishing 9 September as the

International Day to Protect Education

from Attack‌. This landmark resolution

emphasised the critical importance of

safeguarding education, particularly in

times of conflict. The aims were to raise

awareness and inspire action that

protects both education and the

provision of support‌ for teachers,

students, and education communities in

conflict zones. Throughout 2025,

numerous governments have removed

academic autonomy, resulting in suffering

for university researchers. This spans

across multiple nations, including the

United States‌, ‌Australia‌, and the ‌United

Kingdom‌.‌

P 1 0 8 ‌

By TheNationalLawReview‌

By ReasonMagazine‌

Under the second Trump

administration, federal budget research

grants have been cut by over ‌$1.1 billion‌.

Wealthier institutions risk harsher

consequences under the

administration’s tiered tax regime for

university endowment income. This

could see rates increase by up to 21%,

despite the flat rate previously being

only ‌1.4%‌. One high-profile case that

emerged this year was the revocation

of Harvard University’s Student and

Exchange Visitor Program (‌SEVP‌)

certification, which temporarily barred

it from enrolling international students.

In May, a judge put a halt to this

decision, labelling it as “‌blatant‌

violation‌" of the law and free speech

rights.‌‌

By ABCNews‌

By ReasonMagazine‌

Similarly, in Australia, international

student visa fees were increased from

AUD ‌$710 to $1600‌, and a cap of

270,000‌tertiary students was

implemented. Canada quickly followed

with a cap on student permits and

restrictions on working eligibility, while,

since January 2024, the UK has ‌banned‌

dependents‌, resulting in a 6.2%

decrease in granted visas. While

Australia attempts to protect academic

freedom, there remains no formal

definition. Academic freedom is clearly

under threat, as seen across the world,

with universities transitioning to

commercial enterprises working to

generate income to support “‌core‌

activities‌.‌‌

P 1 0 9 ‌

By SouthChinaMorningPost‌

In the UK, meetings were held with ministers and

university vice-chancellors to discuss plans to improve

the sector's ‌resilience‌ against international threats.

Chinese authorities began placing pressure on the UK

researchers. Ministers in the UK have raised concerns to

counterparts in Beijing, and the Office for Students has

recently “issued new guidance to help universities protect

the freedom of their ‌staff and students‌”. The UK has made

it clear that infringements on academic freedoms will not

be tolerated, and Chinese officials have since apologised

to the affected academics and supported the research.‌‌

P 1 1 0 ‌

It is important that universities review their policies and reporting regimes to uphold

the principles of academic freedom and the integrity of their staff and students.

Opportunities to achieve this may include, but are not limited to, the following:‌

1.Clear policies on academic freedom‌

Policies should include a commitment to non-interference

in research and to protecting minority groups in universities.

This should be reflected in student and staff guidelines.‌‌

2.Protection pipelines‌

By TheNewYorker‌

Universities should assess risks for general research and

sensitive fieldwork, and provide advice to scholars who may

need to relocate. Additional protection and academic

freedom clauses should also be added to partnership

agreements to uphold the integrity of academia.‌‌

3.Document and escalate threats‌‌

Universities should ensure that records and registers remain

up to date and include information on funding and

partnerships. Universities should prioritise training and

education to help staff identify external pressures. It is also

important to be trained in accordance with relevant

legislation to ensure the human rights of those involved are

upheld. Academic freedom involves keeping evidence in

public view for transparency; therefore, ‘‌protecting scholars‌’

freedom to inquire protects the public's freedom to know’.‌‌

As international climates change, the importance of institutional‌‌

research and integrity, as well as academic freedom, will continue‌‌

to be debated in the coming years. Examples from the United‌‌

States, Australia, and the United Kingdom show that funding cuts,‌‌

political interference, and international intimidation can erode it. Universities across the

globe must take a stance in supporting their researchers, staff, and students. By embedding

policies such as the above within their institutional frameworks, universities can support

relevant stakeholders to ensure academic freedom thrives in a complex global environment.‌‌

P 1 1 1 ‌

The Death of the Press

Vest: The Failure of

Journalistic Institutions‌ ‌

By Maya Haggs‌

The Death of the Press Vest‌

The press-vest, a bulky piece of gear, prevents

a journalist from easy movement. When used

correctly, it is intended to signal neutrality to

armed forces and grant safety to reporters in

conflict zones. Instead, and increasingly, it

marks the journalist. The ‌International Institute‌

for Democracy and Electoral Assistance ‌(IDEA)

reports that in 2025, civil liberties experienced

broad regression, with the steepest declines

occurring in the Freedom of the Press index.

This article traces how violence against

journalists, the collapse of economic support

for independent media, and the widening gap

between reporting and truth have undermined

the legitimacy and capacity of journalistic

institutions.‌

Designer: Astrid Hickey‌

Source: AFP‌

P 1 1 2 ‌

A t r o c i t i e s C o m m i t t e d A g a i n s t J o u r n a l i s t s i n 2 0 2 5

The atrocities committed in Palestine and Sudan

reveal a broader international landscape that denies

protection to journalists. More reporters have died in

Gaza since 2023 than in both world wars, as well as

Vietnam and Afghanistan combined. States

experiencing severe deterioration in press freedom

are often facing political breakdown and war. This

creates a troubling dichotomy, wherein reporting on

the most atrocious and violent acts is targeted and

silenced, leading to the underrepresentation of

information where public attention is needed most.‌

Source: Anadolu via Getty Images‌

Palestine

Nowhere is the destruction of independent reporting more visible than in Gaza. In 2025,

Palestine remained ranked at 163 in terms of press freedom (as reported by the Rapid

Support Forces (‘RSF’)), which places it among the most dangerous locations for journalists.

252 journalists have been killed since October 2023. Newsrooms have been destroyed and

equipment damaged as an Israeli blockade restricts movement within the Gaza Strip. By

mid-November 2025, the Committee to Protect Journalists had recorded 11 attacks by

Israeli settlers affecting over 23 Palestinian and international journalists. Seventeen of

those journalists reported wearing vests marked “Press” or carrying clear insignia.

Offenders are indiscriminate concerning nationality and subject matter. On 19 October

2025, while covering an assault on Palestinian farmers, American Journalist Jasper

Nathaniel was attacked by settlers, who smashed the window of his car and stoned him

(CPJ, 2025). Jasper Nathaniel’s calls identifying himself as “press” were ignored. On 8

November 2025, press reporting on Palestinian farmers who were harvesting olives in Beita

were targeted by armed settlers. Al Jazeera reporter Mohammed Alatrash was forced to

leap into a valley while stones struck around him. His leg was fractured, and his camera was

destroyed. His camera operator required treatment, and a Reuters reporter suffered

severe blows to the head and chest.

P 1 1 3 ‌

Sudan‌

The civil war raging in Sudan presents a different but equally devastating environment.

The military c‌oup in late October 2021 led to the reintroduction of censorship and

information control. After fighting broke out in April 2023 between the Army, under

General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the Rapid Support Forces, under General Hemetti,

attacks against journalists increased, leading many to flee to neighbouring states. In El-

Fasher, Darfur, reporters remain trapped under siege and endure the same hunger and

bombardment as the civilians around them. The RSF, a force that evolved from the

Janjaweed militias accused of earlier atrocities, encircled the city in May 2024.

Satellite images show earth barriers closing in on almost the entire perimeter. For more

than 16 months, international aid has failed to reach the city: convoys are blocked or

attacked. A small military airdrop in late September 2025 supplied only limited food

and medicine. Journalists interviewed by phone described isolation from aid and

constant shelling; others faced sexual violence and arbitrary detention for their

reporting.‌

Source: CNN‌

P 1 1 4 ‌

Economic Decline Fastracks to Disinformation‌

The deterioration in journalistic institutions also stems from economic forces that have

weakened the media’s democratic function. Declining quality and shrinking resources

limit outlets' capacity to challenge misinformation. When facts are misrepresented

intentionally, lives become expendable because conflict is obscured and ‌violence

goes unnoticed‌. This narrows public awareness and limits activism. It also reduces

support from foreign governments, particularly when a smaller or less powerful

p‌opulation is under assault from an asymmetrically dominant power.‌‌

The media economy has been destabilised by decades of funding cuts. International

assistance that supported independent reporting has been rapidly withdrawn. The

suspension of US Agency for International Development (USAID) funding in March

2025 led to a financial crisis for hundreds of international outlets. In Ukraine, where nine

out of ten outlets rely on international subsidies and where USAID is the primary donor,

several local media outlets have ceased operations. An independent investigative

media outlet, Slidstvo.Info, based in the Ukrainian capital Kyiv, has reportedly lost

eighty per cent of its budget. The current danger lies with funders who may attempt to

influence editorial decisions. These sources of funding may come from non-state

backers who seek to influence and shape reporting in ways that sow dissent or unrest

within populations.

Furthermore, independent media outlets within Ukraine operate as a safeguard

against Russian misinformation. Lapses in funding create an environment teetering on

the brink of informational fracture. Already, social media platforms such as Telegram

or Twitter disseminate news to the vast majority of Ukrainians. Russian propaganda

disseminated on these sites is unregulated and lacks the fact-checking requirements

of more traditional media.

The RSF has noted that without stable financial conditions, no free press can survive.

When media outlets face economic pressure, they become vulnerable to oligarchic

and political influence, and journalists lose the means to resist those who trade in

propaganda.

P 1 1 5 ‌

The Chasm Between Reporting and Reality‌

Funding cuts strike a media system already undermined by the dominance of major

technology companies. Platforms such as Google, Apple, Facebook, and Amazon capture

the advertising revenue that once sustained journalism. Global spending on social-media

advertising reached more than 247 billion USD in 2024 (World Advertising Research

Centre, 2024). These platforms circulate manipulated and misleading content,

accelerating the spread of disinformation.‌

Internal p‌ressures further strain press integrity. Journalists quickly learn the boundaries of

what they can and cannot say when working for concentrated media outlets. Some

people get shot, others are involved in shootings, or are unfortunate bystanders. The

language used to report on violence and terror is not incidental. Slow, gentle creeps of

j‌ournalistic malpractice slowly form the backbone of intense dehumanisation. Institutions

once focused on verifying their own work have turned fact-checking into a means of

policing public discourse. This shift invites accusations of bias and diminishes journalism’s

ability to sustain democratic debate.‌

Taken together, these developments show how political violence and economic fragility

have weakened journalistic institutions. Journalists continue to risk their lives to amplify

voices that would otherwise be silenced. The shallowing significance of press vests that

should protect reporters is symptomatic of the dilution of global commitments to press

freedoms. Now, more than ever, it is vital to safeguard journalistic institutions against

further erosion.‌ ‌

Source: UNESCO‌

P 1 1 6 ‌

G l o b a l V o i c e s

Multilateralism

B y I n d i g o A t k i n s o n

Source: Manuel Elías/UN Photo

P 1 1 7 ‌

Designer: Emilie Everingham

If you are lucky, at 3:30 am, when jetlag has decided it is not your turn to sleep, you

will find yourself in Geneva, sitting by the window of an old hotel. Of course, there’s

no air conditioning, and your roommate is asleep, so you must be very quiet, but

you will feel very lucky.

On a personal level, it is utterly surreal that you, some random girl from a mid-sized

regional town, have spent the day listening to world leaders present competing

visions for AI innovation and regulation. Up close, these leaders are very human.

Some have slight rumples in their suits; one of them even had something in their

teeth. Now and then, they speak with such conviction that you get a shiver down

your spine. But more often than not, they’re pretty ordinary, which is refreshingly

human.

Source: Vassil/Wikipedia

P 1 1 8 ‌

I was so lucky as to be jet-lagged in Geneva, contemplating these so-called United

Nations (UN). Through my work with Global Voices, I was supporting an incredible

delegation of young Australians to attend the 2025 AI for Good conference. Global

Voices is a youth-led, not-for-profit organisation that sends young Australians to

international conferences as part of a policy fellowship. There is always a little bit

of constructive delusion when running this organisation: who says a few young

Aussies can’t go into the most important international decision-making fora to

understand how international headwinds impact the domestic policy landscape?

That is, it has always been surreal to be a young Australian attending, for example,

the IMF Annual Meetings or the Climate COPs. For all the parochial tendencies of

our island home, Team Australia shows up and gets to work throughout our

international institutions. Global Voices offers a unique opportunity to see the

multilateral system in action. Whether it’s shadowing the Australian negotiating

team at COP or meeting the President of the World Bank, beyond policy, we have

the privilege of learning up close during our bilateral meetings.

However, lately it has been surreal not because we’re learning about how our

international institutions function, but because we’re witnessing them struggle to

function.

Source: Global Voices/Instagram

P 1 1 9 ‌

Source: National Security Archive/ResearchGate

Not long after I was in Geneva, Donald

Trump got stuck on an escalator at the

UN General Assembly and soon after

declared, “What is the purpose of the

United Nations…all they seem to do is

write a really strongly worded letter.” We

might point out the tragicomic irony that,

under his administration, USAID lost 83%

of its $62 billion budget, thereby

strangling the ability of many UNaffiliated

programs to fulfil their

purposes. However, it isn’t just Trump

who disdains the UN. Many of his

ideological opponents also think the UN,

for all its bright ideas, is at its best

impotent and, at its worst, an arena for

global hegemons to advance their

national interests at the expense of

smaller nations. For example, the use of

the Security Council's veto power has

long been contentious.

In 2005, Costa Rica, Jordan,

Liechtenstein, Singapore and

Switzerland (collectively known as the

Small 5) advocated that permanent

members refrain from exercising their

veto power, especially in cases of

genocide, war crimes or crimes against

humanity.

Nonetheless, there is a lot of noise right

now that extends beyond the historical

calls for a more just system.

Geopolitical tensions are multiplying,

and efforts to reach an agreement,

even on the highest priorities, are

collapsing. After decades of relative

peace and prosperity, it is very difficult

to give a cogent argument in response

to the pressing question: why should

we still believe in multilateralism?

P 1 2 0 ‌

The case for multilateralism often begins by highlighting the mutual benefits of nations

engaging with one another. Of course, it is difficult. But without cooperation, all parties

would be worse off. In 1865, in one of the earliest acts of multilateral cooperation, 20

nations gathered to discuss how to make the booming international telegraphy industry

more efficient. Just before the conference, several of the signatories were at war, but all

still signed the treaty. They built on the mutual desire to make telecommunications

cheaper and more efficient and walked away with the first instance of harmonised

regulations, tariffs, and technology. They began the International Telecommunications

Union (ITU), which exists to this day.

Some things are done better in concert.

International collective action becomes particularly difficult when negotiating the

maintenance and provision of a public good, such as global peace. A similar spirit of hope

and cooperation might animate multilateral institutions’ efforts to work toward global

peace, but where mutual benefit is less clearly defined, progress is slow.

Source: ITU/Genève Internationale

P 1 2 1 ‌

Perhaps the most famous example of multilateralism, the

United Nations, began its true development with the

Declaration of St James’s Palace in 1941. To quote:

‘The only true basis of enduring peace is the willing

cooperation of free peoples in a world in which, relieved of

the menace of aggression, all may enjoy economic and

social security … We intend to work together, and with other

free peoples, both in war and peace, to this end.’

Despite that, when this was written, the allies saw no easy

path to victory, and the enormity of the Second World War’s

horrors had not yet become known. A persuasive argument

for multilateralism is currently taking shape: multilateralism

may be imperfect and difficult, but it is better than the

alternative. In a world ordered by the pursuit of narrowminded

national interest and the logic of domination, all of

us are made worse off. Most existentially, it only takes one

leader of one nation to drop nuclear weapons that will end,

or radically redefine, the course of humanity. Working in

concert through multilateral institutions is hard; however, the

alternative is far worse. Particularly for middle-sized powers

like Australia, international institutions help to guarantee our

peace and prosperity.

Cooperation in the international arena is difficult but

existentially important. In that case, young Australians are

given every opportunity, including through programs like

Global Voices, to practise cooperation and learn the

institutional language necessary to navigate international

relations. We must cultivate the ability to disagree agreeably

and maintain channels of dialogue as a matter of existential

importance.

Source: St James’s Palace Part 2/Jane Austen’s London

P 1 2 2 ‌


Beyond the “no better alternative” argument, the history of the ITU contains a

positive vision for international cooperation. In cooperating, we collectively

construct something new. Before 1865, there was no standard for

telecommunications. The present global flow of information has been built on

20 countries coming together in peace and in war to create a more efficient

economic system. When nations come together and agree to something as

important as the Millennium Development Goals, we create a new world in

which hundreds of millions of people are lifted out of poverty. When nations

come together and agree to limit warming to 1.5 degrees below pre-industrial

averages at the Paris Climate COP, we limit the projected temperature

increases from 3.5 degrees to 2.5 degrees by the end of the century. Of course,

poverty still exists, and the consequences of climate change are increasingly

existential. On all of our most pressing collective action projects, our

multilateral institutions have not created a perfect world, and there is much

more work to be done.

P 1 2 3 ‌

Arendt offers a parable in her 1960 essay “Action and

the ‘Pursuit of Happiness’” in which an inveterate

gambler is warned not to play a crooked wheel and

replies, “but there is no other wheel in town.” Like the

gambler in her parable, all of us were born into a web

of relationality. The wheel is crooked. We did not ask

to enter a world of unfair systems and faltering

international institutions. But there is no other wheel

in town. The rise of populism is, in many ways, an

angry response to the injustice and perceived failings

of our institutions. But in remembering that it is

through cooperation that we can create something

new, we can commit to reforming what comes next

for multilateralism. We are going to play with the

crooked wheel regardless; why not focus on

strengthening our institutions rather than tearing

them down?

The curiosity about how Australia fits into the

international order and the commitment to becoming

leaders that rise to the moment are genuinely

humbling. It is the voices of young people that give

me hope that the future leaders flowing through our

multinational system are up to the task of stewarding

the one planet we all must share. This is the hope I

turn to when it is late at night in Geneva, when I am

jetlagged and sitting quietly by the window, reflecting

on the state of the United Nations.


P 1 2 4 ‌

YOUTH

HOW

ARE

MOVEMENTS

THE

CHALLENGING

STATUS QUO

POLITICAL

A skull and crossbones with a jaunty straw

hat. This is the flag of the Straw Hat Pirates

from the iconic series One Piece, which

entered political discourse this year as a new

wave of anti-government protests swept the

world. From the streets of Lima to the centre

of Place du 13 Mai in Madagascar, and further

even to the gates of Nepal’s parliament in

Kathmandu, hundreds of thousands of youth

protestors, dubbing themselves ‘Gen Z’,

rallied around this flag. The show’s

iconography has been ‌enthusiastically

adopted‌ by protesters who have resonated

with its depiction of a similar struggle: a young

band of pirates fighting a corrupt, tyrannical

political oligarchy.‌ ‌

Yet the flag’s presence is significant

not just for its thematic resonance; it

symbolises a global movement of

young people willing to mobilise

against stagnant political institutions

to protect their future.‌‌

By Nathan Pahljina

P 1 2 5 ‌


By NoNextQuestions/Instagram‌

Despite being sparked by specific

regional grievances, their protests

were underscored by a common

disillusionment with entrenched

political elites and rampant

corruption that they believe is

plaguing their governments. As more

protests appeared around the world,

youth protestors were able to interact

with and support each other online,

adopt strategies and messaging, and,

in some cases, provide ‌financial aid to

those impacted‌. The mass protests

that swept the world in the early

weeks of September can therefore be

seen not as a singular, organised

movement, but rather the mass

awakening of an unashamedly

politically active generation.‌ ‌

Gen Z, referring to those born roughly

between 1996 & 2010, is the first

generation to grow up entirely in the

internet age. Advancements in

communication and the expansion of

social media have democratised the

dissemination of information, allowing

young people to ‌engage‌ with social

injustices in real time, share their own

experiences, and find solidarity with

other young people across the world.

They are also coming of age at a time

of increasing inequality, economic

uncertainty, whilst governments and

institutions designed to ensure the

well-being of the people are ‌seen to

be failing‌. So, when Gen Z-led antigovernment

movements appeared

across Asia in August and then across

the globe in September, in a massive

display of cross-border mobilisation,

it did not come as a surprise.‌ ‌

In late August, anger against an increase

in government salaries led to ‌mass

protests‌ in Jakarta, which escalated

across Indonesia, ‌after a delivery driver

was struck and killed by a police

vehicle. The message of their

movement spread rapidly throughout

the region, with similar protests igniting

in the Philippines and Nepal against

government overreach and corruption,

drawing ‌direct inspiration‌ from the

example of Indonesian protestors.‌ ‌

In Nepal, young people mobilised in

response to a draconian social media

ban imposed after viral TikToks gained

traction by highlighting the lavish

lifestyle of so-called political ‌‘nepo

kids’‌. In a nation where youth

unemployment forces many to seek

often dangerous work abroad, images

of wealth were evidence to many

young people of the corruption at the

heart of their political institutions. The

sheer force and scale of the protests,

which produced dramatic images of

the parliament building set alight,

ultimately led to the resignation of the

country’s prime minister, KP Sharma

Oli, and the appointment‌ of former

Supreme Court chief justice Sushila

Karki‌as the nation’s interim leader.‌‌

P 1 2 6 ‌

The relative success of the Nepalese Gen Z

movement was cited days later by ‌Malagasy

youth protestors‌ who organised first against

frequent power and water outages in the

nation’s capital, Antananarivo, and then

demanded a complete overhaul of its

government. ‘Gen Z Madagascar’, a leaderless

collective of Malagasy youth, gained hundreds

of thousands of followers on Facebook and

Instagram, whilst actively engaging with

Nepalese Gen Z protestors on gaming

community platform Discord to gather

information and strategic advice. The group

received ‌support from the nation’s elite

military unit‌, CAPSAT, over the following days,

leading to the ousting of President Andry

Rajoelina and the dissolution of his parliament.‌‌

Similar movements also appeared in Morocco

and Peru, with organisers citing continued

failings of their nation's leaders to address the

serious problems facing youth. In ‌Morocco‌,

protests organised by a collective known as

‘Gen Z 212’ (referring to the country’s area

code) were driven by the government’s

decision to invest billions in new arenas for the

2030 World Cup despite deteriorating public

health and education systems. Likewise,

Peruvians marched under the banner of

‘Generation Z’ to demand the resignation of

President Dina Boluarte, whose history of

corruption allegations and refusal to address

key issues such as youth unemployment and

rising crime had left her with the ‌lowest

approval rating of any sitting world leader‌, at

just 2%. Protestors subsequently defied a

state of emergency‌ imposed by interim

President José Jerí to voice grievances with

the ‌negligent and ineffective laws‌ passed by

his congress, contributing to the nation’s

soaring crime rates.‌ ‌

By AfricaIsACountry‌

By TheNation‌

By TheConversation‌

P 1 2 7 ‌

By TIME‌

By AlJazeera‌

Global protest networks are not a new

phenomenon. Contemporary examples such

as the Arab Spring of 2011 and the Black Lives

Matter movement in 2020 were also primarily

organised and driven by young people. The

ability for people to share ideas across

borders has become an existential threat to

institutions that refuse to meet the needs of

their citizens, especially in nations with large

youth demographics that view widening

inequality, economic uncertainty, and overt

nepotism as direct attacks on their futures. ‌

Despite being sparked by specific, localised

grievances, these protests were the

outpouring of years of simmering anger as

young people can increasingly identify a

divide between government promises and

what they are actually experiencing. In every

case, Gen Z seeks to confront systemic

failures in their nations that elevate the lives

of an ageing, corrupt political elite whilst

repressing opportunities for young people.

Their movement should be a wake-up call for

governments worldwide. Suppose they

continue to ignore the needs of younger

generations by supporting policies that

worsen financial inequality, environmental

degradation, and limit opportunity. In that

case, they are isolating not only a large part of

their population but also an increasingly

politically active electorate willing and able

to mobilise against them.‌‌

P 1 2 8 ‌

This year was not only a historic example of youth mobilisation, but it may prove to be a

turning point in how young people view and interact with their political institutions. ‌In

Madagascar, those under 24 represent ‌more than half‌ of the population. South Asia, which

includes Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Nepal, is home to over ‌30% of the

world’s adolescent population‌ (340 million). The Philippines has a ‌median age of 26‌, whilst in

Peru, those aged 15 to 29 are the ‌single largest voting bloc‌, accounting for 25% of the total

population. These populations hold enormous political power and will be responsible for

shaping their nations' futures. As a result, they are more than willing to hold their governments

accountable if they are perceived as corrupt, ineffective, or unsustainable. The speed and

force of the Gen Z movement this year represent an inherent challenge to the existing political

order. It was a demonstration of a population waking up to the injustices that have become

commonplace and deciding to take meaningful action by exercising their rights on a massive

scale.‌‌

The challenge in the wake of their movement will be to focus their burgeoning political power

on the continued quest for good governance, whether through the appointment of new

leaders willing to stand against entrenched corruption or by working with existing leaders to

pursue reform. In any case, the message is clear; if institutions around the world continue to

ignore the attitudes, demands and values of the youth populations they are meant to serve,

they will have to face the ire of a generation that refuses to stay quiet. The Strawhat Jolly Roger

may continue to fly for years to come.‌ ‌

P 1 2 9 ‌

By ABCNews‌

Seas:

Drifting

Security

Asia-Pacific

is Heading

Governance

Fragmentation

Toward

By Shivagha Sindhamani

Pathak‌

As the global centre of gravity tilts toward the Asia-

Pacific, the region has become a live testing ground for

what the future of global security governance may look

like. The South China Sea, a maritime artery carrying

more than ‌US$5 trillion‌ in annual trade and home to

overlapping sovereignty claims, has emerged as the

clearest barometer of these shifts. It is here that the

tensions between international law, regional

institutions, and major-power rivalry converge most

sharply.‌

Using ‌Saz-Carranza et al.’s (2023) scenario governance

model, Drifting and Shifting, this analysis examines how

the Asia-Pacific is heading toward a "Drifting Future”,

one in which institutions persist in form but weaken in

effect, and where governance becomes reactive,

fragmented and increasingly shaped by power

dynamics rather than rules. While limited signs of

shifting, flexible, short-term cooperation appear in

mechanisms such as the ongoing (ASEAN) Association

of Southeast Asian Nations–China Code of Conduct

(COC) negotiations, these tendencies remain too

narrow to offset deeper structural forces driving

fragmentation.‌


P 1 3 0 ‌

The Drifting Scenario: A

Framework for Forecasting‌

The Drifting scenario describes a future in which multilateral

institutions struggle to enforce norms, collective action

weakens, and competition between major powers becomes

the dominant organising force. In the Asia-Pacific, three

converging trends are steering the region firmly toward this

future:‌

1.The weakening authority of the United Nations‌

‌Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)‌

2.ASEAN’s structural fragmentation and consensus-bound‌

‌paralysis‌

3.Deepening U.S.–China strategic rivalry‌

Together, these dynamics suggest that the region’s

governance trajectory will be defined less by institutional

processes and more by the interplay of national interests

and strategic leverage.‌

P 1 3 1 ‌

Weakening Maritime

Law: UNCLOS in

Decline‌

The South China Sea disputes reveal the

limits of global maritime governance

under UNCLOS. While UNCLOS defines

maritime zones such as the 12-nauticalmile

territorial seas and the 200-

nautical-mile exclusive economic zones,

its dispute-settlement system ultimately

depends on voluntary state compliance.

It lacks any meaningful enforcement

mechanism, especially against major

powers.‌

The 2016 arbitral ruling between the

Republic of the Philippines and the

People’s Republic of China, which

invalidated China's “nine-dash line”

claim and held Beijing in violation of the

Philippines’ sovereign waters,

dramatically exposed the weakness of

enforcement mechanisms. China

rejected the ruling outright, and

UNCLOS lacked any mechanisms to

impose consequences for noncompliance.

This moment signals how

legal authority without coercive

capacity cannot shape state behaviour.‌‌

As long as powerful states can

selectively interpret maritime law,

UNCLOS risks becoming a framework

upheld in rhetoric but unevenly applied

in practice.‌

A governance system that relies on

rules respected only ‌when convenient

is emblematic of the Drifting Future.‌

Looking ahead, Beijing’s continued

militarisation in the South China Sea,

increasing frequency of coercive

encounters with Southeast Asian

vessels, and tightening control over

maritime zones suggest that UNCLOS’s

practical influence will continue to

erode.‌

P 1 3 2 ‌

ASEAN’s Paralysis: A Regional

Institution Under Strain‌

If UNCLOS is structurally weak, ASEAN is politically divided. Its consensus-driven

“ASEAN Way”, built on non-interference, informality, and a reluctance to confront

major powers, has become a liability in a region where members’ strategic interests

increasingly diverge. The 2016 ASEAN Summit in Laos underscored these fractures:

Manila sought a communiqué that reflected its arbitration victory, but Cambodia and

Laos, both deeply tied to Chinese financing, blocked any reference to the ruling. Their

refusal to name China revealed how national interests, shaped by economic

dependence, can override ASEAN’s collective stance.‌

By AsiaLink‌

These strategic splits are embedded in the region’s geopolitical landscape. Cambodia

and Laos rely heavily on Chinese investment and political backing, while Vietnam and

the Philippines increasingly lean toward the United States amid maritime pressures.

Meanwhile, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore continue to hedge, seeking balance

without overt alignment. This diversity of orientations makes consensus on the South

China Sea extremely difficult. As long as unanimity remains the decision-making norm,

ASEAN will continue to project symbolic unity without real capacity for collective

action. Looking ahead, it is likely to remain a forum for diplomatic engagement rather

than an effective governance mechanism. Without reform to its consensus-driven

processes, a prospect that seems unlikely in the current climate, ASEAN’s ability to

shape regional outcomes will remain limited.‌

By Council on Foreign Relations‌

P 1 3 3 ‌

Great-Power Rivalry: The Geopolitical

Engine of Drifting‌

Strategic competition

between the United

States and China is

transforming Asia-Pacific

governance more

profoundly than any

institutional weakness.

Both powers increasingly

bypass multilateral

mechanisms in favour of

bilateral or multilateral

approaches.‌

China’s approach to the South

China Sea has shifted over the

past decade from stability

management to sovereignty

defence. The construction and

militarisation of artificial islands,

the reinforcement of naval and

coastguard presence, and the

tightening of administrative

control reflect a long-term

strategy to secure territorial

claims and safeguard vital

resource pathways. With

energy imports exceeding 10

million barrels per day since

2019 and major reserves

estimated under the South

China Sea, the strategic

incentives are powerful. As long

as China can assert authority

through presence and

capability, its behaviour is

unlikely to be restrained by

multilateral rules or norms.‌

The United States, in response,

frames the South China Sea as a

core theatre for upholding a

“free and open Indo-Pacific.” To

this end, it has increasingly

relied on flexible partnerships—

such as AUKUS and the Quad—

while also reinforcing alliances

with Japan, Australia, and the

Philippines.

These

arrangements are designed to

deter Chinese assertiveness but

operate outside formal regional

institutional structures. This

marks a shift from institutional

to strategic governance. Rather

than strengthening multilateral

bodies, the U.S is seen to be

increasingly shaping the

regional order through exclusive

coalitions and military

partnerships. This dynamic is

central to the Drifting Future:

governance becomes a byproduct

of competition rather

than cooperation.‌

By NewYorkTimes‌

By CNN‌

P 1 3 4 ‌

Shifting in the Shadows:

Limited Cooperation

Through the COC‌

The ongoing ASEAN-China Code of

Conduct negotiations represent a rare

form of adaptive cooperation in an

otherwise fragmented environment. Yet,

even here, the limits are stark. China’s

demand for a non-binding language,

unanimous ASEAN consent, and a

preference for bilateral dispute

resolution has turned negotiations into a

strategic exercise. Two decades of

negotiations, beginning with the 2002

Declaration, followed by incremental

measures and the 2018 Single Draft

Negotiating Text, have not prevented

maritime incidents or reduced coercive

activity. Tensions in 2025, including

dangerous manoeuvres around

Scarborough Shoal, underscore the gap

between diplomatic progress and

operational reality. The COC

exemplifies the Shifting scenario: useful

for communication, but arguably

insufficient for governance.‌

By ASEANTechSec‌

A Fragmented Future‌

Taken together, the weakening of

UNCLOS, ASEAN’s paralysis, and the

intensifying U.S.–China rivalry point

toward a maritime governance

environment defined by reactive, rather

than preventive, approaches;

arrangements that are state-centric and

issue-specific; the emergence of

minilateral blocs over formal regional

institutions; rules that exist without

consistent enforcement; and persistent

strategic contestation. This, in essence,

captures the contours of a Drifting

Future.‌

The Asia-Pacific is becoming a

laboratory for what global governance

looks like when institutions cannot keep

pace with geopolitical change. If

multilateralism continues to weaken,

security management will depend

increasingly on deterrence, flexible

partnerships, and strategic cooperation

rather than on binding rules. The

challenge for regional states and global

governance more broadly will be to

develop hybrid models of collaboration

that are resilient in the current era of

uncertainty. Without innovation,

fragmentation may become the new

normal in Asia’s maritime domain.‌

P 1 3 5 ‌

The Resurgence

of Conflict in

Africa

By Daniella Byishimo

Source: Toverview

In 2000, The Economist magazine ran a now-infamous

cover branding Africa as “hopeless.” As offensive and

condescending as this cover was for reducing a vast,

diverse continent to a single narrative of failure, over a

decade later, the magazine ran another cover with the title

“Africa rising”, and in 2013, it finally described Africa as “a

hopeful continent”. This shift in perspective followed a

period of rapid economic growth across the continent,

and by 2011, “six of the world’s ten fastest-growing

economies were African.”

However, the hope that Africa now possesses is

increasingly being threatened by the resurgence of

conflict across the continent. The wave of violence

sweeping Africa in 2025 — from Ethiopia to Mali, and from

Sudan to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) —

echoes the pessimistic sentiment expressed by The

Economist in 2000. This raises critical questions about

why, after a prolonged period of rapid change, parts of the

continent are now experiencing renewed instability.

Designer: Emilie Everingham

P 1 3 6 ‌

R e c e n t T r e n d s i n C o n f l i c t

For the first time since the 1990s, the African region has become increasingly

unstable. This is despite sustained regional and international efforts to promote

peace. The persistence of conflicts on the continent can be attributed to longstanding

disputes and to changing political, social, and economic dynamics as the

continent modernises. Between 2020 and 2025, existing conflicts in Africa intensified.

In Sudan, power struggles between the national army (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid

Support Forces (RSF) have led to renewed civil war, displacing millions. Similarly,

Ethiopia continues to face insurgencies in the Oromia and Amhara regions. The DRC

has experienced ongoing violence since the 1990s, driven by armed groups such as

M23, which has recently captured the strategic cities of Goma and Bukavu.

The Sahel region has also seen the resurgence of a strengthened jihadist insurgency,

exacerbating existing insecurity in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. Beyond these cases,

instability persists in Northern Mozambique, Northern Nigeria, Chad, Somalia, and the

Central African Republic. Across the continent, from Chad to the DRC, Ethiopia to

Mali, Africa now hosts millions of refugees and displaced persons, a situation that

continues to intensify humanitarian crises and regional insecurity.

Source: Jérôme Tubiana/MSF

P 1 3 7 ‌

C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n a n d

P e a c e I n i t i a t i v e s

Source: Corentin Fohlen/Divergence

African-led efforts to resolve conflicts and secure peace have often fallen short,

exposing the fragility of regional institutions. International bodies, for their part,

have also offered limited meaningful support. In general, conflict-ridden states

often lack the capacity, legitimacy, and resources at the domestic level to broker

durable peace agreements or to enforce law and order. Across the African

continent, this is evident even in states that are not inherently fragile. At the heart

of Africa’s challenges, ranging from governance to conflict, lies the weakness of

domestic institutions. A popular narrative used to excuse Africa’s shortcomings

in conflict resolution claims that traditional African perspectives have not been

sufficiently integrated into peace processes. Such narratives are largely

unhelpful and reinforce the deeply flawed notion that the modern state cannot

function in Africa. After all, how can customary mechanisms realistically help the

DRC negotiate with global mining giants like Glencore over conflict minerals?

P 1 3 8 ‌

Source: Mohamed Nureldin Abdallah/Reuters

Enduring conflicts across Africa are often rooted in poor governance

and fragile institutions, driving a wave of democratic backsliding and

entrenching authoritarian rule across much of the continent. In Sudan,

for instance, national dialogue efforts have repeatedly collapsed, with

both government and rebel forces refusing to compromise. The United

States has accused each side of committing war crimes, while the

breakdown of political institutions has left little political will to bring

the conflict to an end. Gold also plays a pivotal role in Sudan’s civil war,

warranting particular attention. Control over the country’s prolific gold

reserves has become both a key objective and a vital source of revenue

for the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces

(RSF), shaping the conflict's trajectory. Weak regulation of gold

extraction has enabled military elites and armed groups to exploit gold

for personal enrichment, fuelling a cycle of rent-seeking that further

entrenches their power and finances their war efforts. Ultimately, the

struggle over gold control symbolises deeper institutional weaknesses:

a lack of state oversight, fractured governance, and the entanglement of

economic interests with armed conflict.

P 1 3 9 ‌

Regionally, organisations such as the

African Union (AU) and the Economic

Community of West African States

(ECOWAS) have produced mixed

results. The AU, with its elaborate

peace architecture, faces criticism

for slow responses, political

fragmentation, and dependency on

donor funding. Despite imposing

sanctions or suspending membership

after unconstitutional changes of

government, the Peace and Security

Council (PSC) has not deterred

subsequent military coups, as seen in

Chad, Guinea, Mali, Sudan, Niger, and

Gabon. Selective enforcement and

lack of solidarity among member

states undermine the AU’s coherence

and legitimacy, leaving many crises

unresolved.

International peacekeeping and

mediation efforts, spearheaded

largely by the United Nations (UN),

have faced mounting criticism and

setbacks. The UN mission in Mali

(MINUSMA), despite its substantial

personnel and resources, was

ultimately asked to withdraw by the

government, with claims that its

presence exacerbated tensions

rather than protected civilians.

Similar frustrations surround the UN

mission in the Democratic Republic

of Congo (MONUSCO), which has

failed to resolve violence or restore

authority in eastern regions,

prompting calls for accelerated

withdrawal. Dependence on

international actors for funding and

logistical support leaves African

initiatives vulnerable to donor

priorities and politicisation.

Source: Sia Kambou/Agence France Press

153

P 1 4 0 ‌

T h e W a y F o r w a r d

Of great importance is strong political will, improved governance,

and a willingness to move beyond military-first responses towards

inclusive conflict prevention. Institutional weaknesses and

repeated failures have undermined African-led peace initiatives,

whilst international efforts have achieved limited success. It is

critical for the African Union to assert its agency, establishing

diplomatic approaches that unite regional bodies and

governments behind credible, joint peace-making initiatives.

Strengthening strategic coordination among the AU, state, and

non-state actors is critical to Africa’s progress. An efficient and

effective AU can be the voice for many Africans in weak and

smaller states struggling with political fragmentation. Above all, a

powerful AU can transform Africa’s image by ensuring that the

continent is well represented in international dialogues and

negotiations. To echo the words of Kenya’s president William Ruto,

the exclusion of Africa from permanent membership on the UN

Security Council is unfair, as decisions on global peace and

security are made without consulting the region that has the

“highest cost of instability.”

Source: Clipartmax

P 1 4 1 ‌

Marks the

2025

80th UN's

By Charlie Stephenson

Anniversary

The United Nations (UN) at 80 - Struggles,

Success, and Imperative for Reform‌

Post-World War II, the world reflected on the first half of the 20th century: 75 million

lives lost in just six years, and 15 million twenty-seven years prior. In the shadows of

the atomic bomb, a new chapter began, one in which the United Nations (UN) was

born. The Charter placed the burden on “we the peoples”‌ ‌to prevent the scourge of

war. Since the establishment of the UN, the world has settled into what is often called

the ‘Long Peace.’ Yet, countless people have died at the hands of conflict under the

watch of the UN. This article will briefly examine 80 years of peacekeeping, including

where it has gone wrong, where it has succeeded, and how the UN can be better for

the next generation.‌‌


P 1 4 2 ‌

UN Peacekeeping‌

Since 1948, UN peacekeepers have been

deployed in around 71 different missions.

There have certainly been large, welldocumented

failures. Perhaps the best

example is Rwanda, where a mass slaughter

of the Tutsi ethnic group resulted in

800,000 deaths in around 100 days. Despite

early warnings and knowledge of an

impending genocide, the UN peacekeeping

mission in Rwanda was significantly underresourced

and had a limited mandate that

was not focused on preventing violence.

Despite calls for additional troops and

extended authority, mission leader General

Romeo Dallaire was denied by the UN

Security Council (UNSC) and was forced to

remain passive. Similar examples exist in

Bosnia and Somalia, among others, where

UN peacekeeping missions have been

hamstrung by poor funding, insufficient

training, and limited authority.‌‌

Why do these failures occur? Political

scientist Saadia Touval argues it is because

the UN struggles to mediate, explaining that

‘it has little real political leverage’. Indeed,

mediation has remained a challenging task

for the UN, even in missions where worse

violence is prevented; political stability

often cannot be achieved. For example, in

Mali, following a coup d’etat and

subsequent rebellion. Here, the UN

established a mission with a specific

mandate for mediation between the

groups, helping facilitate the Algiers Peace

Agreement (2015).‌ ‌

...However, attacks by armed groups

limited the ability of UN envoys to

engage in dialogue, threatened

personnel safety, and diverted resources

from political initiatives. Frequent

ceasefire violations and insecurity

reduce trust in the UN’s neutrality and

authority.‌‌

Further, peacekeepers can only

reactively aim to protect the ‘blue

helmets’, thereby remaining neutral.

However, the reality of modern civil wars

has made this principle a dangerous trap.

UN forces have been widely seen as

ineffective, often allowing attackers to

seize the strategic initiative, which has

led to events such as those in Sierra

Leone in 2000, where 400 UN

peacekeepers were detained and

stripped of their weapons.‌‌

P 1 4 3 ‌

Is the Reputation Fair?‌‌

The ‌Danish Institute of International Studies conducted research that highlights an‌

important distinction in evaluating UN peacekeeping: success depends on the criteria‌

used to measure it. For example, if success is measured by ‘peace 2 years after the end‌

of civil war’, the success rate is roughly 50%. However,‌ ‌when success is measured by‌

the ‘proportion of peacekeeping operation deployment months without ongoing war’,‌

the number jumps to 80%. When measured by ‘reduced risk of relapse into conflict’,‌

the success rate is 94%, highlighting that the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping‌

depends largely on how outcomes are interpreted and perceived.‌‌

Perception plays a key role in Barbara Walter's view, Professor of International Affairs,‌

who argues that in the West, the UN receives too much criticism. For example, in the‌

United States (US), the UN is seen as necessary: 79% believe the US should remain a‌

UN member, yet only 32% of Americans believe the UN is doing a poor job. This is‌

amplified in the last decade by the rhetoric of political figures. Recently, President‌

Donald Trump, in his 2025 address to the General Assembly, stated the UN simply ‌

“wrote strongly worded letters” and went on to claim ‘the UN is supposed to stop‌

invasions, not create them’.‌ ‌

However, it is important to note that, compared to peacekeeping efforts run by

nations, the UN does a significantly better job. A study by Doyle examined 16 cases

that were UN- or US-led and found that whilst 7 out of 8 UN-led missions resulted in

‘sustained peace’, only 4 out of 8 US-led missions achieved the same outcome. These

empirical findings show that, relatively speaking, the UN does not‌‌

perform as poorly in peacekeeping missions as non-UN missions.‌‌

By ABCNews‌

By TEDTalks‌

P 1 4 4 ‌

Dire Reform: The Barriers

of the UNSC‌ ‌

Although some argue the UN receives too

much criticism for its peacekeeping

missions, the reality is that operations

would be significantly more effective

without the key barrier: the UN Security

Council. Former UN Secretary General, Kofi

Annan, claimed that ‘no reform of the UN

would be complete without the reform of

the Security Council’. This is because

mandates, budgets, and the authorisation of

force all run through the Council. Yet, the

veto power of the permanent five states

routinely prevents missions from receiving

the resources or strategic clarity they

require.‌ ‌

By‌ ‌WesternSydneyUniversity‌

By CanadianPress‌

This is not simply a theoretical

governance flaw; it has had direct

operational consequences. In Rwanda,

Dallaire’s requests for reinforcements

and a stronger mandate were blocked

by Council members unwilling to

intervene; in Syria, repeated Russian and

Chinese vetoes have prevented unified

action; and in Mali, delays and political

bargaining over mandate wording left

peacekeepers constrained while armed

groups escalated attacks. Consequently,

many propose reforms aimed at

reducing, constraining, or procedurally

tempering the use of vetoes in situations

of mass atrocity or grave threats to

peace.‌‌

P 1 4 5 ‌

By‌ ‌Council of Foreign Relations‌

The French-Mexican initiative for

voluntary veto restraint in cases of

genocide and large-scale war crimes,

though not universally adopted,

represents a practical attempt to prevent

political stalemate during crises where

rapid action is vital. Another approach is

mandating greater consultation with

troop-contributing countries before

mandates are finalised, ensuring that

missions are not designed by states that

do not bear the operational risks.

Expanding assessed contributions for

peacekeeping, depoliticising the

appointment of Special Representatives,

and introducing independent technical

reviews of mandates have likewise been

proposed to ensure missions are driven by

conditions on the ground rather than the

preferences of the permanent 5.

Ultimately, without structural reform of the

Security Council’s decision-making

process, peacekeeping missions will‌‌

...continue to operate with inadequate

mandates,‌‌insufficient protection

capabilities, and inconsistent political

backing, problems that no amount of

field-level reform can fully overcome.‌

Ultimately, 80 years on, the UN strives

for the right reasons and works towards

the goals its founders had dreamed of in

1945. Whilst real progress is being made

and should not be overlooked,

peacekeep‌ing operations are

continually hindered by the complex

nature of their function, by constant

shifts on the ground, and, most

significantly, by the dysfunctional

system that is the UN Security Council.

Without meaningful Security Council

reform, the UN’s peacekeeping

aspirations will remain forever outpaced

by the demands of the world it seeks to

protect.‌‌

P 1 4 6 ‌

4.‌

Planetary‌ ‌

P 1 4 7 ‌

Diplomacy‌

P 1 4 8 ‌

Climate

Governance‌

&‌

the ICJ’s Advisory

Opinion on‌

Climate

Change

By iStock photo‌

By: Tisha Shah

Photo: ‌Climate law‌

P 1 4 9 ‌

Designer: Hajrah Nasir‌

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued a historic Advisory Opinion of 23 July

2025 on the obligations of States with respect to climate change, marking a resounding

win for Pacific youth after years of persistent advocacy. The Advisory Opinion

introduces the most stringent climate obligations under international law to date. It

represents a powerful legal evolution in response to increasingly catastrophic global

consequences of climate change, particularly for vulnerable nations such as Small

Island Developing States (SIDS).‌

Origins‌

The journey to The Hague itself is a

marvel of climate diplomacy.

Spearheaded by youth coalitions and

activists in the Pacific, particularly

the Pacific Islands Students Fighting

Climate Change (PISFCC), the

movement sought to use scientific

evidence and storytelling to build

momentum and attention for the

cause.‌

Drawing on Pasifika traditions like

talanoa and storian, advocates

shared their spiritual, historical, and

cultural connections to the

environment. Through these stories,

the demonstration of the

environmental, sociocultural, and

economic consequences of climate

change garnered significant

international media and geopolitical

support.‌

Source:

Climate law‌

Source: Climate Law‌

P 1 5 0 ‌

After securing the backing of the Vanuatu Government,

bolstered in part by the continued advocacy of the

Honourable Minister for Climate Change, Ralph Regenvanu,

the proposal for an Advisory Opinion was brought to the

United Nations General Assembly. Adopted by consensus

and co-sponsored by over 130 nations, the resolution was

the first ever unanimously requested Advisory Opinion in

UN history.‌‌

The submission and subsequent hearing process before

the ICJ became a space for vulnerable states and

marginalised communities to share their lived realities,

stories of loss, resilience, displacement, and cultural

erasure globally, primarily from nations that have done little

to contribute to the scale of the crises. This mode of

multidimensional climate diplomacy, driven by individuals,

organisations and states, draws “moral strength from lived

vulnerability but couples it with procedural fluency and

institutional leverage.”‌

Photo:Geof Wilson/Flickr

P 1 5 1 ‌

Outcomes‌

The Advisory Opinion of 23 July 2025 clarified that the corpus of law governing

obligations related to climate change encompasses nearly all international

agreements and treaties, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the

UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and customary international law. Most

notably, the Court held that 1.5 degrees Celsius is the primary legally binding target

under the Paris Agreement for limiting increases in global temperature, a much

stricter target than the current 1.5-2 degree range proposed under the Paris

Agreement.‌

By explicitly rejecting arguments that climate change action is wholly regulated by

the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Kyoto Protocol and the

Paris Agreement, the Court has significantly expanded the scope and depth of

considerations for States when developing climate policy. The finding also

bolsters the mandate of international adjudicative bodies, such as the

International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and the United Nations Human Rights

Committee (UNHRC), to hear climate-related matters.‌

Photo: Euro News‌

P 1 5 2 ‌

Some bodies had already begun to exercise a broader jurisdiction. For example, in 2023, the

UNHCR found Australia had violated Torres Strait Islander’s human rights through continued

negligence and severely delayed climate inaction. The comprehensiveness of an advisory

opinion further broadens the scope of potentially available claims under these bodies,

including the number of relevant parties with standing.‌‌

The Court’s finding that states can be held liable for internationally wrongful acts under

climate change law also opens up various domestic, international, and geopolitical pathways

to access climate justice for affected nations. This specific mention of internationally

wrongful acts supports this example: fossil fuel subsidies for production and licenses will put

large exporters, such as Russia and Saudi Arabia, in the hot seat for potential climate

litigation if such acts were to continue.‌ ‌

States could also leverage the Advisory Opinion as a form of soft power in regional and

multilateral negotiations. For example, the duty to cooperate in good faith, as outlined by the

ICJ, could be used to bolster transparency and accountability in negotiations ong climate

change. This is particularly significant in bodies where systemic power imbalances exist,

such as the UN Security Council.‌

However, the ICJ Advisory is not without its limitations. While it represents a historic win for

climate justice and significantly advances legal interpretation of climate change, an advisory

opinion primarily operates as an advisory mechanism. This means that its impact will depend

on its adoption into domestic and international legislation and case law. The ICJ has laid out

the legal mechanisms, but the political and institutional wheels must begin to turn to enable

their effective implementation.‌ ‌

P‌h‌o‌t‌o‌:‌‌T‌h‌e‌‌L‌a‌w‌y‌e‌r‌

Photo:‌ ‌Energy‌

P 1 5 3 ‌

Open Avenues

and Concern for

Further‌

Development‌

While the Advisory Opinion marked a significant shift in international

currents of climate change action, the tides continue to ebb and flow.‌

At COP30, fossil fuel lobbyists outnumbered every country’s

delegation but Brazil, holding 60% more passes to the Conference

than the 10 most climate-vulnerable nations combined. In other

multilateral forums, such as the International Maritime Organisation,

delays in adopting net-zero frameworks continue to disillusion

critically vulnerable nations, such as Tuvalu and the Marshall Islands,

which are already experiencing irreversible environmental harm and

sea-level Geopolitical rise.‌and economic tensions continue to shape climate

policy platforms for large-scale polluters. The United States’

withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, abandonment of significant

climate finance commitments, and refusal to send a formal

delegation to COP reflect continued disengagement from

international climate negotiations, despite its historic and continued

role as one of the world’s largest emitters. Throughout the history of

climate change negotiations, climate mitigation and adaptation

efforts have been pitted against economic development and

growth. Large fossil fuel exporting nations, like Australia, remain

unwavering in their approval and subsidisation of oil, gas and mining

projects, which have now been scientifically proven to contribute to

climate-related deaths worldwide directly.‌‌

Photo:‌ ‌Truthout‌

P 1 5 4 ‌

For nations like those in the Pacific, which possess limited

economic resources and geopolitical capital but are the

most immediately and critically affected by such acts, this

fight becomes increasingly demoralising. Negotiating blocs,

such as the Alliance of Small Island States and SIDS, and

tools such as the Warsaw Loss and Damage Mechanism, are

more critical than ever to protect vulnerable interests and

shield against the already detrimental effects of climate

change in certain communities.‌ ‌

And yet, hope, resilience, and a deep care for preservation

of the environment remain deeply embedded in climate

advocacy efforts around the world. These values,

embodied and lived by those same youth in the Pacific who

brought the Advisory Opinion to the world stage, continue

to drive new avenues for creative, meaningful, and

ambitious climate action.‌ ‌

P 1 5 5 ‌

Photo: Asia and the Pacific‌

P‌h‌o‌t‌o‌:‌‌T‌h‌e‌‌Gu‌a‌r‌ d‌i‌a‌n‌

Photo: Global Voices‌

P‌h‌o‌t‌o‌:‌‌B‌.‌H‌.‌R‌‌Ce‌ n‌t‌r‌e‌

In this vein, rates of climate litigation against governments and private companies to

increase accountability continue to rise, totalling 3,099 cases across 55 national

jurisdictions and 24 international or regional legal bodies. Global annual capacity for

renewable energy has expanded by 50% as of 2023, with China leading the

development of renewable energy technology and clean energy manufacturing.

Advocacy groups and coalitions continue to assemble around the world, sharing

climate stories and building knowledge and capacity across sectors and

demographics. All wins for climate justice, regardless of their size, continue to

inspire and spark new lines of work and unrelenting advocacy to protect the rights

and livelihoods of vulnerable communities and future generations.‌

The Advisory Opinion reflects not merely an endpoint, but the beginning of

continued legal evolution, political pressure, and the mobilisation of grassroots

communities and organisations in the face of one of humanity’s greatest

environmental, security, and health challenges.‌‌

P 1 5 6 ‌

Crisis of

A

Consent?

Hegemony, Climate

Injustice, and the Future of

Multilateralism‌ ‌

Photo: Jake Mason/Instagram‌

B y Ta n i s h a L a m i c h h a n e

P 1 5 7 ‌

Designer: Claudia Miranda-Veloso‌

The thirtieth UN Climate Change Conference of

the Parties (COP30) held in Belém, Brazil, arrives

at a moment of acute geopolitical

fragmentation and climate urgency.

Alongside the United States' second withdrawal

from the Paris Agreement in early 2025, this

conference coincides with intensifying climate

impacts and repeated failures to raise ambition

in line with limiting warming to 1.5 °C. As

reported by Human Rights Watch in 2021 and

CIVICUS in 2024, host governments, the UAE,

Egypt, and Azerbaijan, have also restricted

public protest, civil society access, and were

criticised for fossil-fuel lobbying at the

conference.

These dynamics have compounded a broader

crisis in the very credibility of the international

climate regime and the institution of

multilateralism. Crucially, COP30 has also

emerged as a critical site to scrutinise whether

climate multilateralism, shaped by norms of

cooperation yet long constrained by structural

power asymmetries, can meaningfully advance

collective climate action in this moment of

urgency.‌‌

Photo: New York Times‌

Photos: UN Climate Change/ Flicker‌ ‌

P 1 5 8 ‌

Photo: Reuters‌

Multilateralism, as conceptualised by Ruggie, in

its ideal form, depends on the institutional

coordination of three or more parties working

together based on “generalised principles” of

sovereign equality, indivisibility, and diffuse

reciprocity, which accord similar treatment to

all states, where impartiality and the ability to

develop strong outcomes grant multilateral

institutions legitimacy and stability. In reality,

however, the multilateral regime is driven by

“structural power”, which entails coconstitutive

relations among structural

positions that produce actors’ capacities to

influence circumstances.‌

As such, it is also marked by “structural

inequalities” rooted in interdependence across

economic, political, or security domains, which

constrain the ability of vulnerable nations to

make assertive demands in climate

negotiations due to fear of reprisals in domains

in which they are entangled with powerful

nations. Major emitters like the U.S., China, and

EU members, who account for half of the

world’s GDP, fund climate initiatives and

possess scientific expertise, yielding

significantly more negotiating power and

enabling them to shape institutional

mechanisms for negotiations.‌‌

Given these constraints, how is consent

produced and sustained within climate

negotiations?‌

Photo: Reuters‌

P 1 5 9 ‌

Photo: Shutterstock‌

Photo: DevPolicy Blog‌

From a neo-Gramscian understanding of power,

sociologist David Ciplet argues that consent in

multilateralism is not just produced through

coercive domination, but also through

“hegemony,” or the legitimisation of rule through

the management of consent, in which powerful

states incorporate weaker states into

multilateral agreements in ways that reproduce

and normalise global hierarchies. Within this

notion, the consent of weaker states in climate

negotiations is influenced through material

concessions, such as finance commitments,

technology transfers, or preferential policy

outcomes; norm alignment, where states

negotiate the terms of legitimate consent within

asymmetrical power relations; and structural

conditioning. Weak institutional and economic

capacity, along with unfavourable positions in

the global economy, limit what low-income

states can influence.‌ ‌

The potential of norm alignment suggests that,

although embedded in hierarchies, climate

multilateralism can be a dynamic space where

materially constrained and structurally

disadvantaged states continue to shape

norms, articulate demands, and push for

institutional reforms. The Paris Agreement of

2015 is often heralded as the apogee of

multilateralism, with 195 countries signing a

legally binding treaty that pledged to “hold the

increase in the global temperature below 2°C

above pre-industrial levels” and to pursue

efforts “to limit the temperature increase to

1.5°C above pre-industrial levels.”‌

P 1 6 0 ‌

The Agreement also set goals to periodically

assess collective progress and mobilise

finance to assist “developing countries to

mitigate climate change, strengthen

resilience, and enhance abilities to adapt to

climate impacts,” and regularly update and

submit their climate action plans, or

“Nationally Determined Contributions”

(NDCs), every five years, with increased

ambition in each new plan. Here, the

advocacy of the Alliance of Small Island

States (AOSIS), a coalition of 44 small island

and low-lying coastal countries, reflected the

potential of multilateralism to foster solutions

to climate change by granting smaller states

the standing they do not possess structurally.‌

Key provisions of the Paris agreement,

including Article 9 addressing the specific

financial needs of SIDS for simplified

procedures and enhanced support for

adaptation. The final ambition, stating

“holding the increase in the global average

temperature to well below 2°C above preindustrial

levels and to pursue efforts to limit

the temperature increase to 1.5°C”, came

directly from demands made by AOSIS.‌‌

But how far can vulnerable states

push within hegemonic structures

before their demands are diluted?‌

P 1 6 1 ‌

Political scientist and scholar Carola Betzold

argues that small nations employ “borrowing

power,” or the ability to draw on external

sources of power, by strategically leveraging

norms, coalitions, and procedural mechanisms

in negotiations. In 2015, for instance, AOSIS

spearheaded the High Ambition Coalition, an

informal and diverse group that united both

developed and developing nations around the

ambitious 1.5 °C goal ahead of the summit. Yet,

while the final agreement recognised demands

for dedicated and grant-based adaptation

finance, it did not guarantee exclusive or

prioritised access, which were also part of

AOSIS’ key demands. A hegemonic

compromise here met some demands of

vulnerable nations to secure their consent, but

the final agreements represented the interests

of major emitters, impeding ambitious climate

agendas.‌

A major case of hegemonic cooptation is seen

through the persistence of climate injustice in

many multilateral negotiations in the past few

COPs, especially in the “Loss and Damage”

(L&D) agenda in climate negotiations, referred to

as “the actual and/or potential manifestation of

impacts associated with climate change in

developing countries that negatively affect

human and natural systems.”‌

Climate injustice in multilateralism, whether

procedural (lack of representation) or outcomebased

(results skewed in favour of major

emitters), is not just a crisis of multilateral

legitimacy but also its efficacy. The most

vulnerable are also those most impacted and

who contributed the least to climate change. As

such, the ability of multilateralism to solve

climate problems is inextricably linked to

resolving justice issues. This agenda

encompasses both economic losses (damaged

infrastructure, lost income) and non-economic

losses (loss of life, culture, biodiversity) caused

by sudden-onset events like hurricanes and

slow-onset processes such as sea-level rise.‌‌

Photo: UN Climate Change/ Flicker‌ ‌

P 1 6 2 ‌

In the Paris Agreement, Article 8 stated that

L&D “does not involve or provide a basis for

any liability or compensation” claims,

foreclosing legal accountability and remedies

for climate harms while recognising L&D as a

distinct issue. While COP27 marked a

landmark in establishing the L&D fund,

reflecting how vulnerable nations yielded

results within an unequal system, financial

mechanisms were set on a non-binding

principle without the mention of liability. At

COP28, parties finally addressed liability issues

by defining that the fund is not associated with

liability or compensation, and the donor

countries could commit to making early

contributions. However, the mechanism was

explicitly made non-liability-based and

voluntary, and remains inadequately funded.

It is within this context that AOSIS issued a

message to the COP30 presidency in June

2025: it would not join a consensus at COP30

that undermined its survival, demanding

restored priority for L&D, scaled-up

concessional finance aligned with the New

Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG), and

guaranteed access for SIDS. The most

pertinent and tangible result on L&D so far has

been that COP30 issued its first USD 250

million call for proposals from the Fund for

Responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD). As

stated by Ana Toni, the CEO of COP30:

Photo: AP Photos‌

“This is a COP of implementation. Today, we

have big news on that front. Loss and Damage,

which was only recently established at COP28,

has started working. They’ve put out a $250

million call for proposals, showing the speed at

which this fund — created less than two years

ago — is already moving into implementation.”

P 1 6 3 ‌

Photo: The New York Times‌

Photo: UN Climage Change/ Flickr‌

However, acknowledgements of justice and the needs of vulnerable nations are paired with

institutional architectures that allow major emitters to reframe liability in ways that avoid

transformative change. In that case, multilateralism will continue to subordinate justice to hegemonic

interests, constraining its equity and its effectiveness. The presence of fossil fuel interests, for instance,

remains a structural feature of COPs, continuing trends from COP28 and COP29, where industry

lobbies exercise significant agenda-setting influence, impeding negotiations that might deliver

structural change.

COP30 stands as a microcosm of the broader struggle over the future of multilateralism, revealing

both the potential and the limits of multilateral climate governance. It underscores the continued

relevance of multilateralism as a forum where vulnerable states can leverage norms, coalitions, and

moral authority to secure gains otherwise inaccessible, as well as its shortcomings, which illustrate that

hegemonic dynamics may continue to constrain justice, ambition, and implementation. The test of

climate multilateralism is not merely whether agreements can be reached, but whether COP30 and

its successors can overcome these deeply entrenched structural constraints in negotiations.

P 1 6 4 ‌

Photo: Aerial Abstract Photos‌

Beyond‌

Economics:‌ ‌

Evaluating the EU’s Trade and

Sustainable Development Chapters‌

By Jimena Laguna

Pineda & Sophie

Bottero‌

P 1 6 5 ‌


In the last two decades, the European Union (EU) has adopted an increasingly

assertive and ambitious approach to trade. This evolution is reflected in the

inclusion of progressive and widely commended Trade and Sustainable

Development (TSD) chapters in recent free trade agreements (FTAs), such as

those with South Korea, New Zealand, and Mercosur. These chapters illustrate

how sustainable governance and environmental challenges are increasingly

shaping diplomacy and global cooperation. This article examines the

development, implementation, and challenges of TSD chapters in EU FTAs,

analysing the extent to which these far-reaching TSD provisions constitute

effective, credible, and enforceable commitments within the framework of EU

trade policy.

FTAs represent the most economically significant component of

EU trade policy and serve as a crucial legally binding instrument

through which the EU advances its external policy objectives.

The Lisbon Treaty granted the European Parliament greater

influence in trade policy-making, advocating for the inclusion of

labour and human rights standards in EU external trade policy.

Photo: CVCE Website‌

P 1 6 6 ‌

The EU’s long-standing aspiration to act as a

global climate leader, together with the World

Trade Organisation’s (WTO) limited capacity

to address environmental and labour

concerns, has encouraged the EU to rely on

its bilateral trade agreements to advance and

enforce TSD commitments. As one of the

world’s largest trading blocs, the EU has been

described as employing a ‘carrot approach’,

using access to its vast internal market as an

incentive for partners to adopt higher

environmental and labour standards.

The Trade and TSD chapters have become a

defining feature of this ‘value-driven

approach to trade’, marking the

institutionalisation of sustainability within the

EU’s external economic policy framework.

These chapters have become an integral part

of the EU’s new-generation trade agreement,

ensuring that economic growth goes hand in

hand with higher labour standards, making

trade policy not only about interests but also

about values.

P 1 6 7 ‌

Photo: CNN‌‌

Photo: The Korea Herald‌

Photo: The Korea TImes‌

Photo: Korea.net‌

The EU–Korea FTA in 2011 marked the EU’s first integration of sustainable objectives into a trade deal

through its pioneering TSD Chapter 13, which established binding environmental and labour

commitments. The EU later filed a complaint against South Korea under Article 13.4.3 concerning its failure

to make ‘‌continued and sustained efforts‌’ to ratify the International Labour Organisation (ILO). While the

EU’s concerns were ultimately dismissed, South Korea subsequently ratified three of the four outstanding

conventions. This outcome reinforces the Commission’s preference for a dialogue-based, soft approach

in TSD chapters: one that achieves tangible change and strengthens its normative influence in global trade

through persuasion and argumentation rather than coercion.‌

In 2015, the EU issued a new trade policy strategy titled ‘‌Trade for All‌’ based on effectiveness (delivering the

benefits from trade equitably), transparency (engaging with meaningful, informed stakeholders) and values

(upholding the right to regulate, including promoting and better integrating the EU economy in global value

chains). However, critics argue that, in practice, the trade policy can never satisfy all stakeholders, given their

opposing and often clashing interests. Furthermore, the Trade for All strategy does not include concrete

commitments to transparency, and an additional challenge arises from the difficulty of defining what

constitutes ‘European values.’ As a result, the EU’s increasingly ambitious sustainability rhetoric frequently

encounters practical limitations during implementation, raising doubts about its institutional capacity and

political will to translate normative aspirations into enforceable outcomes and highlighting the broader

challenge of moving from a technocratic narrative to meaningful democratic oversight.‌

P 1 6 8 ‌

Despite the EU’s assertive and progressive rhetoric, inconsistencies have emerged regarding TSD

chapters. For instance, the original purpose of the TSD chapter in the EU-New Zealand FTA was to

mitigate the negative spillover effects of trade liberalisation, which can entail environmental, social, or

human rights costs. Yet, the EU’s own ex-ante Sustainable Impact Assessment found that the FTA is

likely to slightly increase greenhouse gas emissions due to higher trade volumes, particularly in the

dairy and agricultural sectors. This reveals a tension within the agreement: although it projects a

progressive image, its environmental goals appear to be constrained in practice.‌‌

Photo: Mercosur.intl‌

Photo:‌ ‌EEAS‌

The EU also aims to avoid a race to the

bottom, that is, the lowering of standards to

attract financial investment, as stated in the

TSD chapter of the ‌EU-Mercosur‌ FTA.

However, in seeking to translate abstract

principles into concrete measures, the EU

faces difficulties in developing a common

position on labour and environmental

standards, given that social and

environmental policies remain within the

competence of the ‌Member States‌. As a

result, it tends to adopt a soft approach,

which often leads to the watering down of

sustainability provisions and raises questions

about the extent to which these

communicative or symbolic measures

translate into ‌practical effects‌.‌‌

P 1 6 9 ‌

Photo: AP Photos‌

Another shortcoming of the TSD framework

concerns the role and effectiveness of

Domestic Advisory Groups, which are

intended to provide a ‘balanced’

representation of business organisations, trade

unions, environmental groups and other

stakeholders. The EU has faced criticism for

allegedly using these groups to legitimise its

policies and counterbalance opposition (p.12).

In response, a new TSD Action Plan was

introduced in 2022, outlining measures to

strengthen their role and improve overall

implementation of TSD chapters (p. 2).‌ ‌

Photo: Reuters‌

‌A central reform was the incorporation of

trade sanctions as a last resort for violations of

fundamental ILO principles and for ‘any act or

omission which materially defeats the object

and purpose of the Paris Agreement’ (‌EU-NZ

FTA, Chapter 19, Article 19.6‌), provisions now

reflected in the EU–New Zealand FTA.

However, these enforcement mechanisms

have been criticised for remaining

conceptually vague. In the absence of clear

guidance on what constitutes a breach, such

sanctions risk operating more as symbolic

assertions of hard power than as ‌credible

mechanisms of accountability‌. As a result,

these reforms may serve more to reinforce

the EU’s image as a global leader in

sustainable trade than to impose the political

costs required for strict and consistent

enforcement.‌

Photo: European Union‌

P 1 7 0 ‌

Some observers argue that further double

standards are embedded in these

agreements. For example, under the ‌EU-

Mercosur‌ FTA, pharmaceutical companies

will see increased exports to Mercosur,

including pesticides banned in Europe due to

their harmful ingredients. This not only

endangers the health of people and

ecosystems in Mercosur, but also indirectly

affects European populations, as pesticides

may return via Mercosur agricultural imports.

Another example is the EU’s strategy to

secure access to critical raw materials, such as

lithium, which are essential for battery

production and the transition to electric

vehicles, despite the significant

environmental damage caused by their

extraction in Mercosur. These cases suggest a

certain inconsistency between the EU’s

discourse and its commercial practices, as

economic and strategic interests can at times

take precedence over environmental

commitments. By externalising these impacts,

the EU may risk weakening its position as a

normative global leader in sustainable trade.‌

Photo: Reuters‌

Photo: Reuters‌

To further add complexity, ‌some authors‌question the Commission’s implicit neoliberal assumption

that trade is the engine of economic growth and that economic growth strategies are the solution to

social or ecological crises. Academics challenge whether it is possible to reconcile the current

neoliberal trade policy with the preservation of ecological and social diversity. This raises the

question of the extent to which sustainability is being used to legitimise trade policy.‌

P 1 7 1 ‌

In conclusion, the EU has adopted an ambitious approach incorporating TSD chapters

in its latest FTAs. In line with the EU’s values, these chapters represent the Union’s

efforts to promote higher environmental and social standards while simultaneously

projecting global leadership and reinforcing its normative power, as exemplified by

agreements with South Korea, New Zealand, and Mercosur. Through the lens of

planetary diplomacy, the TSD chapters in these agreements illustrate the EU’s efforts

to reshape diplomacy and security by incorporating sustainability concerns and goals.‌‌

However, after more than a decade, the EU’s efforts remain slightly shadowed by

persistent contradictions between ambition and practice, tensions between rhetoric

and implementation, and their limited scope in practical terms. In this sense, the EU’s

sustainability agenda, although essential in our modern world, risks appearing more

performative than transformative: an assertive, carefully curated self-representation

designed to reaffirm its global relevance amid growing uncertainty about its

international standing.‌

Photo: Le Monde‌

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Anthropo,‌

End ‌Scene.‌

Do Rare Earth Minerals Back Indigeneity

into a Corner in Greenland?‌ ‌

P 1 7 3 ‌

b y N y x J o y ‌


Photo: Poseidon Expeditions‌

Rare is rare. No? As an experiment, I tasked students in a Critical Approaches to

Development class to divide themselves into two groups: state and indigenous leaders.

On the whiteboard in capital letters was the age-old buzzword, DEVELOPMENT. Markers

at the ready, a Machiavellian cloud hung over the state’s side of the board, with

technology as the overarching theme; conversely, the indigenous leaders put the

environment at the forefront of their word association. Inviting itself to the room was this

clash, demonstrating what may be blanketed in times of extraction in the name of

innovation. Such is the case in Greenland, snowed in with layers of rare-earth minerals,

whose doors are being knocked on from all corners of the world. Worth far more than any

words in passing is now the ability to take heed. With ice rapidly melting in Greenland and

roughly ‌90% of the population‌ being Inuit families, the ability to keep this above all must

be considered, for if not, we risk losing the harmony that breathes life into generations

under the pretence of an inherently extractive economy.‌‌

P 1 74 ‌

One cannot justify taking someone's home

without first reducing their relationship to the

place from dynamic to static, and their

ecological knowledge from science to

superstition. The Greenland Ice Sheet covers

approximately 80% of the island's landmass,

with roughly 90% of the population being of

Inuit descent. Naaja Nathanielsen, Greenland's

Minister of Minerals, says that Greenland "[has]

full control and access over our natural

resources, which is not what you see typically

for Indigenous people." Still, Denmark currently

provides roughly ‌$600 million annually‌ to

Greenland, accounting for over half the island's

budget. Greenlandic politician Naaja

Nathanielsen frames the recent surge in global

attention as an opportunity to finance

autonomy on Greenlandic terms and build

institutions that serve Greenlandic priorities.‌‌

Photo:‌ ‌Jacques Descloitres/NASA‌‌

P 1 7 5 ‌

Photo: Secret Atlas‌

Photo: Artic Circle‌

With no wish to be American, in the

words of Nathanielsen, China, as the

world’s most prominent rare earth

supplier, also enters the picture. When

asked about the possibility of turning to

China in an interview with the ‌Financial

Times,‌ Nathanielsen was direct.

Greenland wants to build partnerships

with Europe and the United States, she

explained, but the island will have to

look elsewhere if those countries remain

reluctant to make real investments. The

Arctic's remoteness and harsh

conditions make every infrastructure

investment exponentially more costly

than comparable projects elsewhere.‌ ‌

Photo: Christian Klindt Soelbeck/Reuters‌

P 1 7 6 ‌

In realist talks where geopolitical strategy

supersedes all other forms of logic, the

cautionary tales play out before us, often

stemming from not listening to those within.

Indigenous peoples’ knowledge systems are

inextricably linked with humanity in ways that

conventional governance is not; ‌Achim

Steiner‌, Administrator of the United Nations

Development Program (UNDP), notes that the

diversity of ideas and creative solutions of

indigenous peoples needs to be part of this

leadership, given their inextricable link to the

improved management of the planet’s naturebased

assets.‌

Photo: Vogue Mexico y Latin-America‌

Photo: UN/Flickr‌

Photo: Greenland by Topas‌

P 1 7 7 ‌

In ‌Introduction: Climate Change and Indigenous Peoples of the USA‌, Daniel Wildcat

asks: “Can you imagine a world where nature is understood as full of relatives not

resources, where inalienable rights are balanced with inalienable responsibilities and

where wealth itself is measured not by resource ownership and control, but by the

number of good relationships we maintain in the complex and diverse life-systems of

this blue green planet?” From a theoretical perspective, much can be said about how

foreign investment can be inherently problematic for indigenous communities, as the

extractive nature of such projects values profit over preservation. Greenland even

became part of the European Economic Community (EEC) when the Danish Kingdom

joined the alliance in 1973‌, despite the majority of the Greenlandic population

opposing it,raisings further questions about whether investments can reproduce

colonial relations in the development sector as well.‌

So where do we begin? The Legend of

Sedna is a tale where answers may lie. In

‘‌The Inuit Way’,‌ the legend of Sedna

contextualises nature and how it is,

without a doubt, the last bastion, and the

first reason. By treating the sea with care,

Sedna bestows communities with

bounty as long as they understand their

roles as nurturers rather than takers. At

the same time, Nathanielsen supported

economic advancement at the EIT Raw

Materials Summit in Brussels, suggesting

that it is possible to hone in on an

indigenous ecology that can coexist with

industrialisation. However, this may

seem too optimistic to some.

Nathanielsen frames this as a question of

translating values into instruments that

actually de-risk development for a

country that cannot independently fund

major mining operations.‌ ‌

Nauja Bianco‌, writing for Arctic Today

from her position on the International

Working Group for Indigenous Affairs

board, argues that extraction cannot

proceed as business as usual; the United

Nations 2024 panel on critical energy

transition minerals laid out seven guiding

principles rooted in UNDRIP, centring

Free, Prior and Informed Consent as nonnegotiable

rather than procedural. Her

analysis, drawn from this year's United

Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous

Issues, warns that anything less than

genuine partnership becomes history

repeating itself under greener language.

Both recognise that consent without

capital leaves Greenland dependent on

Danish subsidies, while capital without

consent simply replicates colonial

extraction under greener branding.‌

‌

Photo: Aningaaq Rosing Carlsen/UnSplash‌ ‌

P 1 7 8 ‌

Photo: Hakai Magazine‌

In the context of the Anthropocene, ‌Amartya Sen‌, in ‘The Next Frontier’ by the UNDP,

was quoted, emphasising “the quandary of unsustainability may be our predicament,

but the task of solving it is ours as well. The nature of the problem, its fuller

appreciation and the ways and means of solving it all belong to us as a whole. If there is

a subject that requires collaboration and non-divisive commitments, this surely is it.

But to make this possible and effective, we need a vision of humanity not as patients

whose interests have to be looked after, but as agents who can do effective things—

both individually and jointly.”‌ ‌

Amartya Sen's formulation refuses the convenient fiction that experts can solve the

environmental crisis while the rest of humanity waits for instructions. Linda Tuhiwai

Smith's scholarship traces how colonialism operated not merely through territorial

occupation but through systematic disconnection. Mining in Greenland carries those

costs in contexts where the relationship between people and land has been sustained

across generations, not through management plans but through lived practice and

knowledge systems that recognise what gets lost when you treat extraction as

inevitable and environmental damage as the price of doing business. When we

reposition ourselves towards addressing epistemological violence before what may

seem like exciting projects, our answers on the whiteboard can begin to value what is

truly rare.‌

P 1 7 9 ‌

CLIMATE

MIGRATION‌

RESHAPING‌

GLOBAL BORDERS‌

By Caleb Murphy‌

Between 10 and 21 November 2025, the world gathered in Bélem, Brazil, for COP30 to

debate the most pressing issues related to the climate crisis, including its

disproportionate impact on vulnerable states. With global sea levels having risen more

than 10 centimetres since 1992, according to NASA, and shifting weather patterns in the

Sahel resulting in prolonged droughts, climate change is already forcing communities

across the developing world to migrate in search of safety and stability.‌

However, does this movement inevitably lead to conflict? As climate-induced

displacement increases pressure on borders and diplomatic relationships, it is critical

to consider both the risks and opportunities that arise. Tuvalu and Bangladesh, two of

the world's most climate-vulnerable states, face a high risk of natural disasters and

flooding, forcing many to migrate to neighbouring countries such as Australia and India.

Using these two case studies, this article will highlight the different approaches and

explore how climate migration can impact international relations in the future.‌‌


P 1 8 0 ‌

MIGRATION IN OCEANIA‌

When climate change and geopolitical interests align, they can draw states into

closer partnership. The Falepili Union between Australia and Tuvalu demonstrates

harmony through its three pillars and the Falepili principle.‌‌

The three pillars are climate cooperation, mobility, and, most controversially, security.

Climate cooperation is cemented through Australia's declaration of a partnership with

Tuvalu to help Tuvaluans remain safely in their communities, support long-term adaptive

measures, and uphold Australia's commitment to Tuvaluan sovereignty, even in

unprecedented circumstances where rising sea levels could harm its territory. This

commitment is a significant diplomatic win for the small island state, which has long sought

to preserve its recognised statehood through constitutional amendments and advocacy

within regional groupings such as the Pacific Island Forums.‌‌

Notably, this agreement is historic because of its explicit,

open climate mobility program, under which Australia

agrees to take in 280 Tuvalans each year. While the number

may not sound like much, it represents 2.5% of Tuvalu’s

population, equivalent to 675,000 Australians migrating

every year. Inclusivity is a key feature of this program, since

it includes older people and people with physical

disabilities. This new program goes beyond previous visa

agreements that targeted the working-age population by

allowing all Tuvaluans to migrate with dignity.‌

HUMAN

MOBILITY‌

FALEPILI UNION

TREATY‌

CLIMATE

COOPERATION‌

SHARED

SECURITY‌

Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong and Tuvalu

Foreign Minister Paulson signing the Falepili Union

explanatory memorandum in May 2024.‌

Photo: X / SenatorWong‌

P 1 8 1 ‌

Since this discussion focuses on geopolitics, the third pillar of security cooperation

cannot be overlooked. Under the treaty, Australia commits to assisting Tuvalu in the

event of a "major natural disaster, health pandemic or military aggression". It, however,

also includes a clause that compels Tuvalu to seek mutual agreement with Australia

before entering into any security partnership with a third party. This clause is widely

seen as a response to China's 2022 strategic partnership agreement with Samoa and as

a broader effort to limit the superpower's rising influence in the region. The veto has

also stirred controversy within Tuvalu, with the opposition leader in 2022 warning that it

was "dangerous" to Tuvalu's survival. Critics also described the agreement as neocolonial

in serving Australia's security interests at the cost of Tuvalu's freedom.‌‌

Photo: AI Generated‌

Despite the condemnation, the agreement received both political and popular

support, with 1 out of 3 Tuvaluans applying for a visa when applications first opened.

Furthermore, an explanation memorandum between Tuvalu and Australia states that

the treaty's purpose is not to limit support for Tuvalu's "economic and development

interests." As Tuvalu searches for guarantees and support amid the threat of climate

change, and Australia integrates itself further into the Pacific through new agreements,

this treaty demonstrates the level of cooperation that can help address climate

migration.‌ ‌

P 1 8 2 ‌

Photo: geocurrents.info/‌

MIGRATION IN SOUTH ASIA‌

On the other side of the coin, some nations risk rising geopolitical tensions due to the

pressure that climate-induced migration places on them. Bangladeshi climate

migrants to India demonstrate how ungoverned migration can strain ties and risk

stability.‌‌

Bangladesh, like Tuvalu, is uniquely climate-vulnerable. It has low-lying terrain, a high

risk of storms and cyclones, and approximately 44 million people living along its

coastal belt. However, it is important to consider how climate change is a threat

multiplier for migrations. Consequently, it worsens other pressures that drive

migration, such as resource scarcity, unemployment, and poverty. While climate

mobility has historically occurred from rural to urban centres within Bangladesh, 2.5

million Bangladeshi migrants have crossed the 4,000-kilometre border into India in

recent years.‌ ‌

BANGLADESH'S

CLIMATE VULNERABILITY

44 million people in coastal areas‌

High storm & cyclone exposure‌

Low-lying delta region‌

Climate change as a “threat‌

‌multiplier”

P 1 8 3 ‌

For instance, Bangladeshis are moving to the neighbouring Indian state‌‌

of Assam to the northeast. According to the Asian Development Bank, it is‌‌

the world's largest international migration movement. However, ethnic‌‌

and religious tensions flared, even as far back as 2012, when clashes‌‌

over the construction of a mosque led to the deaths of 100 people. This incident led to people

in Assam publicly demonstrating against Bangladeshi migrants, calling for their identification

and deportation. Locals resent these undocumented migrants for competition over jobs and

resources, fueling tensions between these communities. As a result of this sentiment, India has

created a border fence, which has seen some Bangladeshi’s killed by border guards, but will

likely be ineffective in stemming future climate-induced movements due to the difficult terrain.‌‌

Instead of leading to closer cooperation, this cross-border

migration is worsening tensions between India and

Bangladesh. Indian policies, such as the border fence,

enhanced India's image as a “bullying big brother” for the

Bangladeshi’s. At the same time, for India, these migrants

fueled the rising anti-immigration and anti-Islamic sentiment.

Moreover, this problem is expected to worsen as climate

change intensifies. Currently, it is predicted that Bangladesh

will have 13.3 million climate migrants by 2050.‌‌

Due to a lack of legal frameworks governing this form of

migration, Bangladeshi migrants are at risk of human trafficking

and exploitation, further fueling organised crime. These

migrant communities also risk becoming radicalised and

potentially joining terrorist organisations. While this is

expected to primarily happen internally within cities, these

groups will likely recruit from desperate climate refugees

across vulnerable communities. As a result, this issue can

further endanger regional stability and degrade the bilateral

relationship between India and Bangladesh.‌ ‌

Assam‌

Photo: OnePixelStudio \ Dreamstime.com‌ Photo: DFID / Rafiqur Rahman Raqu‌ Photo: Aklima Parvin / Fabeha Monir‌

P 1 8 4 ‌

Resource

Diplomacy‌

Australia, the

Lithium Triangle,

and the Future of

Resource

Diplomacy‌

Shaun McMahon‌

Source: Mining Magazine‌

Designer: Hajarah Nasir‌

P 1 8 6 ‌

A New Era for

Lithium

Geopolitics

As global technologies electrify and markets embrace the lucrative opportunities

presented by ‘green energies’, lithium has rapidly ascended from a niche industrial

input to a ubiquitous critical mineral. Australia is currently the world’s biggest producer

of lithium, and the ‘Lithium Triangle’ in South America – a region spanning Argentina,

Bolivia, and Chile – has the world’s richest known reserves. Although both regions

dominate global supply, a range of geological, political, and economic factors means

they are better positioned to operate as partners than as resource rivals.

Australia’s endowment of recoverable

critical minerals includes large quantities of

hard-rock spodumene lithium. Across the

Pacific, the Lithium Triangle hosts vast

brine-based reserves that remain largely

underdeveloped. This geographic and

geological split creates space for both to

play distinct and complementary roles.

Their potential partnership is further

shaped by global pressures: soaring

demand for EV batteries, heightened

geopolitical competition, and mounting

efforts by the United States (U.S.), the

European Union (EU), and Japan to

diversify away from China’s overwhelming

dominance in lithium processing. The

recent U.S.–Australia critical minerals deal

underscores Australia’s status as a trusted

supplier and opens the possibility for

Canberra to act as a diplomatic bridge in

emerging supply chains, while expanding

Australia’s own production.

Framed this way, Australia and the

Lithium Triangle should not be seen as

competitors, but as partners capable

of contributing to more diversified,

resilient, non-China-centric lithium

supply chains. Political shifts in

Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile make this

an especially opportune moment to

develop ties and accelerate progress

on shared projects.

200‌

P 1 8 7 ‌

Source: Chemisty World

From Competition

to Complementarity:

Understanding the

Two Systems

Australia and the Lithium Triangle have fundamentally different geological

endowments. Australia’s abundance of hard-rock spodumene allows relatively rapid

extraction, consistent output, and strong energy yields. Despite these benefits,

Australia has virtually no local processing industry and relies heavily on shipping raw

material to China for processing. The Lithium Triangle, in contrast, holds immense

brine-based reserves with far longer resource life. However, these deposits are slower

to develop, highly water-intensive, and increasingly dependent on technologies such

as direct lithium extraction (DLE).

Rather than encouraging rivalry, these differences create complementarity. Australia

provides short-to medium-term reliability and helps meet immediate global demand.

The Lithium Triangle holds the long-term reserve depth needed to sustain the energy

transition for decades. While Australia cannot match the sheer scale of South

American reserves, it brings governance stability, strong regulatory settings, and

established investment frameworks, all of which appeal to Western firms seeking

certainty.

Together, these strengths create the basis for a multi-pillar partnership in which mining,

refining, technology transfer, ESG standards, and investment capital circulate across

the Pacific rather than competing head-to-head.

201‌

Source: Innovation News

P 1 8 8 ‌

Supply-Chain

Diversification and the

Geopolitics of

Critical Materials

The case for partnership sits within a broader geopolitical

landscape. China dominates almost every stage of the lithium

supply chain: roughly 70% of global processing, 75% of cathode

manufacturing, and over 80% of battery cell production.

In addition to its dominance across global lithium production,

China holds major stakes in both Australian projects (e.g.,

Pilbara Minerals, Greenbushes) and South American brine

fields, including Chile’s SQM, multiple Argentine ventures, and

Bolivia’s early partnerships.

This concentration reinforces why diversification is now a

central policy objective for Western economies. Large volumes

of lithium carbonate and hydroxide are refined far from

extraction sites, deepening dependencies and making supply

chains vulnerable to political shocks.

Source: Dialogue Earth

P 1 8 9 ‌

Western Push

for Diversification

In addition to the U.S.–Australia critical minerals partnership, several major policy

initiatives are steering global investment toward more secure suppliers. These

include the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act, the EU Critical Raw Materials Act, and

concerted efforts by Japan and South Korea to identify dependable long-term

partners. Together, these frameworks incentivise cooperation rather than

competition between Australia and the Lithium Triangle, since both are needed to

meet rising demand while reducing systemic reliance on China.

As the U.S. and other Western powers scramble to secure consistent

sources of lithium and other critical minerals, Australia’s credibility as a

trusted, allied producer positions it as a central node in these

diversification efforts. The trust–critical minerals financing partnership

is not only designed to increase its production but also to help allies

shape ethical, transparent, and resilient supply networks. This opens

space for Canberra to engage in diplomacy and deepen ties with

Buenos Aires, La Paz, and Santiago around shared interests in clean

energy, mining governance, and supply-chain visibility.

Source: Verdict

P 1 9 0 ‌

Politics in the

Lithium Traingle:

New Openness,

Persistent

Constraints

Argentina remains broadly open to foreign investment under the Milei government,

continuing its long-standing investor-friendly posture. With a stable regulatory

environment for mining firms, Argentina presents the clearest immediate

opportunities for Australian partnership – building on the Allkem–Livent precedent.

Nonetheless, infrastructure deficits, exchange-rate volatility, and local watergovernance

disputes remain significant obstacles.

Chile continues to follow a slow but steady state-guided model. The Boric

government’s “National Lithium Strategy” seeks to grow private investment while

strengthening state participation. Although reform is gradual, Chile remains the

region’s most technologically advanced and institutionally stable producer, making it

well-suited to collaborative refining ventures with Australia. High environmental

standards and predictable regulation also attract Western partners. While the

upcoming election between Jeanette Jara and José Antonio Kast introduces some

uncertainty, Chile’s institutional strength means drastic shifts are unlikely.

Source: The Economist

Bolivia holds the world’s largest identified lithium resources, but has negligible

commercial output. The election of President Rodrigo Paz signals a political reset:

renewed openness to diversified investment, efforts to balance earlier China-leaning

agreements and an ambition to turn lithium into a development engine. Significant

hurdles persist, including community consent, strong state control over the sector,

and uncertainty around DLE scalability. Even so, the shift creates an opening for quiet

Australian engagement and technical cooperation.

P 1 9 1 ‌

Source: AP News

The

Partnership Model:

How Australia

Can Contribute

A credible partnership model must integrate geopolitics, domestic political

conditions, and industrial capacity, enabling Australia to contribute through

technology, standards, and trusted relationships. Australia can support the

Lithium Triangle in refining, chemical conversion, and DLE research, areas where

it has growing capabilities and where South American producers seek greater

independence from Chinese technologies.

Australian governance experience is valuable in areas such as water

stewardship, Indigenous consultation, and environmental compliance. Joint

work on transparent, high-ESG supply chains aligns with the demands of

automakers across the U.S., the EU, Japan, and South Korea.

Australia’s cooperation with the U.S. provides a platform for engaging Argentina,

Chile, and eventually Bolivia in Western-aligned mineral supply chains. This

could include trilateral dialogues, technical training programs or shared

certification systems.

Australian mining companies and public financing bodies can partner with South

American governments and private firms. Such arrangements help reduce

China’s ability to dominate individual markets by offering credible alternative

investment models, with examples already emerging through business

chambers such as the Australia-Latin American Business Council (ALABC).

Source: BBC

Source: PV

P 1 9 2 ‌

Source: Innovation

A Moment

of Alignment

As the world accelerates towards decarbonisation, lithium’s strategic importance will

continue to rise. Australia and the Lithium Triangle are uniquely positioned to

underpin a more diversified, resilient, and ethically governed supply chain. With new

political openings – particularly in Bolivia – and strong Western demand for aligned

suppliers, the opportunity for deeper resource diplomacy between Australia and the

Lithium Triangle is present. Given leadership and a willingness to collaborate,

Australia and its cross-Pacific partners are primed to create a supply chain that

supports global energy transition goals without replicating extractive, insecure, or

geopolitically brittle models.

Source: AlbeMarle

Source: BHRC

Source: National Geo

P 1 9 3 ‌

STEWARDS OF THE

OCEAN‌‌

‌PACIFIC LEADERSHIP IN GLOBAL

CLIMATE JUSTICE‌‌

By: Anaya Sarma‌ ‌

Photo: Conservation International


P 1 9 4 ‌

Photo: Pacific Islands Forum‌

Across the world, Pacific Island nations

are often portrayed as the frontline

victims of climate change; small,

remote states struggling against rising

seas, intensifying cyclones, and

environmental degradation. Yet this

narrative is incomplete and sometimes

misrepresented. The countries of

Oceania are not merely bearing the

brunt of the planetary crisis; they have

emerged as influential moral and

political leaders shaping global climate

governance.‌

Their advocacy has become especially visible in 2025, a year in which Pacific states have

redoubled their efforts to steer international attention toward climate justice, equitable

adaptation, and the urgent need for systemic change. In doing so, they have advanced

visionary proposals for international climate action and demonstrated that the fight for

climate justice is inseparable from struggles for decolonisation, cultural survival, and

sovereignty. From the formal establishment of the Pacific Resilience Facility (PRF) at the

Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) in September to their push for climate-resilient fisheries at the

3rd United Nations Ocean Conference, Pacific governments have demonstrated stronger

ambition and resolution.‌

P 1 9 5 ‌

P 1 9 6 ‌

Photo: Matthew Abbott/NY Times‌

Climate Change as a Colonial Legacy‌

For many Pacific scholars and activists, climate change is not simply an ecological issue

but the continuation of a colonial trajectory. Extractive industries, militarisation, and

geopolitical interference have shaped the vulnerabilities that Pacific states now

confront.‌‌

Foreign powers have long treated the Pacific as a site of resource extraction and

strategic experimentation, from phosphate mining in Banaba to Cold War nuclear

testing in Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, and French Polynesia. These practices eroded

local livelihoods, displaced communities, and degraded ecosystems, laying the

groundwork for the present climate crisis.‌

The climate emergency strikes as both a physical and political threat. It poses a real

challenge that brings around important questions about the pacific lands, oceans, and

futures. Understanding this history has been key to shaping the region’s strong and

principled approach to diplomacy.‌

From Anti-Nuclear Resistance to Climate

Leadership‌

Pacific leadership in environmental justice has deep roots. The anti-nuclear movement

of the 1970s to 1990s was one of the earliest expressions of regional solidarity against

external exploitation. Communities resisted U.S., British, and French testing programs

that exposed Indigenous populations to radiation and long-term health consequences.

Their activism eventually contributed to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty

(1985), a landmark agreement that asserted regional agency in the face of superpower

interests.‌

Photo: Guy Jackson‌

P 1 9 7 ‌

This legacy of mobilisation continues today. Pacific understandings of climate justice

are grounded in Indigenous worldviews that emphasise relationality, guardianship of

place, and intergenerational responsibility. Climate advocacy in the region is not only

about emission reductions but about safeguarding identity, autonomy, and the right of

communities to determine their own futures.‌

Photo: Climate Action Network‌

Shaping Global Climate Diplomacy‌

In international climate negotiations, Pacific leaders have repeatedly punched above their

weight. The PIF has been instrumental in amplifying voices on shared regional issues. Pacific

negotiators were central to the successful push for limiting global warming to 1.5°C in the

Paris Agreement, a benchmark that has since become the moral compass of international

climate policy. Nearly a decade later, Pacific delegates, together with the Alliance of Small

Island States (AOSIS), continued to underscore the imperative of limiting global warming

and called for urgent, equitable climate action at COP30.‌

ndividual states and leaders have also played outsized roles:‌

Vanuatu, along with youth activists, spearheaded the campaign for an advisory opinion

from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on states' obligations regarding climate

change. The initiative, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2023, represents a major

milestone in using international law to hold major emitters accountable.‌

Fiji, during its COP23 presidency, foregrounded the talanoa dialogue, an Indigenous,

relational method of negotiation that fosters empathy, storytelling, and consensus. It

provided a refreshing alternative to adversarial diplomatic practices and has since

been embraced in multiple climate governance spaces.‌

Tuvalu, facing the possibility of territorial inundation, has emphasised the legal and

cultural continuity of statehood regardless of sea-level rise. Its advocacy has reshaped

debates about sovereignty and the international legal order in a warming world.‌‌

These initiatives reveal how Pacific leaders infuse diplomacy with deeply held cultural

values, storytelling, kinship with the ocean, and collective responsibility, while

simultaneously engaging with global institutions in sophisticated and strategic ways.‌

P 1 9 8 ‌

Deep-Sea Mining: The New Frontier of

Resistance‌

Environmental threats in the Pacific are not limited to climate change. The emerging

deep-sea mining industry has become the latest arena in which Pacific states are

defending their oceanic heritage. Corporate and state actors have pushed to exploit

mineral-rich seabeds, particularly in the Clarion-Clipperton Zone, a vast area bordering

the jurisdictions of several Pacific states.‌

Many Pacific leaders, civil society groups, and Indigenous communities have called for a

moratorium or outright ban on deep-sea mining, citing cultural, ecological, and economic

risks. Drawing parallels to earlier eras of colonial extraction, they argue that untested

mining technologies could devastate fragile marine ecosystems central to Pacific identity

and subsistence.‌

Nations such as Fiji, Samoa, and Vanuatu have taken firm positions against premature

exploitation, advocating instead for precaution, transparency, and Indigenous

consultation. Their collective stance has influenced global discourse at the International

Seabed Authority.‌

P 1 9 9 ‌

Photo: ASPI‌

Climate Justice as Cultural Survival‌

Underlying these diplomatic achievements is a foundational truth: environmental protection

is inseparable from cultural survival. The land and the ocean are not resources but living

relations. Environmental degradation threatens ceremonial practices, ancestral burial

grounds, food systems, navigation traditions, and the intergenerational transmission of

knowledge.‌‌

However, while the region continues to champion ambitious climate action and security

cooperation, many of its appeals go unanswered, with major powers making slow or

insufficient commitments. For example, whether it be the disappointing outcome of ‌COP29‌

or the ongoing security dilemma between the United States (U.S.) and China, the Pacific

serves as a geostrategic arena of competition.‌ ‌

Therefore, Pacific approaches to climate justice emphasise not only technical adaptation

measures but the safeguarding of Indigenous lifeways. This perspective challenges

dominant global frameworks that often reduce climate change to emissions metrics or

economic losses. Instead, Pacific leaders argue for justice that is historical, relational, and

deeply human.‌

Conclusion‌

Pacific Island countries embody moral clarity, solidarity, and resilience in a world looking for

ethical leadership on climate change. With a long history of resisting external dominance,

they envision a future rooted in cultural continuity and ecological stewardship. Pacific

peoples are reshaping international climate action and serving as a reminder that

decolonisation and environmental justice are inextricably linked.‌

P 2 0 0 ‌

By Kenneth Jim

Joseph M. Jimeno‌

Philippines–UAE

Relations in 2025:‌‌

Entering a New Age of

Diplomacy

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Photo: Climate Change Commission‌

The year 2025 brought a shift in Philippines–UAE relations. After decades of cooperation

shaped mostly by labour mobility and trade, the relationship began taking on a wider mix

of priorities. New work emerged in digital governance, climate policy, and institutional

reform. This shift, what officials increasingly describe as a “new age of diplomacy,”

reflects how both states are adapting their relationship to a more complex landscape of

climate cooperation, economic transformation, and geopolitical change.‌

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Climate Cooperation After COP28:‌‌

From Commitments to Action‌

The UAE’s prominent climate diplomacy following its COP28 presidency translated into

concrete bilateral cooperation with the Philippines in 2025. The most consequential

development was the US$15-billion renewable energy agreement between the Philippine

Department of Energy and Abu Dhabi’s Masdar.‌ ‌Signed during Abu Dhabi Sustainability

Week, the partnership aims to deliver up to 1 GW of solar, wind, and battery storage

capacity by 2030, scaling further by 2035. Philippine officials highlighted the agreement’s

potential to support national energy security and accelerate the transition toward a 35%

renewable energy share by 2030.‌

Climate cooperation expanded into environmental rehabilitation. At the World

Government Summit, Erth Zayed Philanthropies and Clean Rivers committed

US$20 million to the rehabilitation of the Pasig River. The effort includes wastereduction

initiatives, riverbank restoration, and support for nearby communities,

representing one of the UAE’s most substantial environmental engagements in

the region. Both governments also participated in nature-based initiatives, treeplanting

programs, and COP28 legacy projects. These climate actions reflect a

convergence of Philippine development needs and the UAE’s ambition to

export sustainability solutions globally.‌

Photo: Abu Dhabi PE‌

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Economic Diplomacy: CEPA and Deepening Investments‌

A central milestone of 2025 was the

conclusion of the Comprehensive

Economic Partnership Agreement (‘CEPA’),

the Philippines’ first free trade deal with

the Middle East. CEPA aims to remove

barriers, widen market access, and

accelerate investment flows in agriculture,

manufacturing, logistics, and digital

services. Early projections estimate a

multi-billion-dollar economic boost for

both sides, with the UAE expecting

increased exports to the Philippines and

Manila anticipating expanded entry for

electronics, food products, machinery,

and professional services.‌

Commercial momentum was visible even

before CEPA’s finalisation. Non-oil trade

reached US$940 million in 2024 and

continued to increase the following year,

with the UAE remaining the Philippines’

leading export destination in the Arab

region. Regular business exchanges helped

sustain this momentum. Meetings

involving UAE Minister of Foreign Trade

Thani Al-Zeyoudi and the Philippine

Business Council in Dubai added further

support.‌‌

At the same time, a 17-company trade

mission from Dubai explored

opportunities in hospitality, agriculture,

and energy. Strategic investment

cooperation also advanced. Following

President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s

meetings in Abu Dhabi in late 2024,

both governments operationalised the

Investment Promotion and Protection

Agreement. A coordination platform

was set up between the UAE Ministry

of Investment and the Maharlika

Investment Fund to study possible

investment opportunities in sectors

such as infrastructure, renewable

energy, logistics, and digital projects.

These efforts align with the Philippines’

move toward a development model

anchored on investment

growth.Together, CEPA, sovereign fund

cooperation, and intensified business

engagements signalled an emerging

economic partnership with long-term

structural depth.‌

Photo: POC File‌

President Ferdinand R.

Marcos Jr. (left) meeting with

United Arab Emirates

President, His Highness

Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed

Al Nahyan during the former's

official visit in UAE in

November 2024.‌

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Labour and Diaspora Diplomacy: Welfare, Governance, and Civic

Participation‌

With more than one million Filipinos residing in the UAE, with two-thirds in Dubai and the

Northern Emirates, the diaspora remains the human anchor of bilateral relations. In 2025,

both governments renewed their focus on migrant welfare and labor governance. A highlevel

Joint Committee Meeting between the Department of Migrant Workers (DMW) and

the UAE Ministry of Human Resources advanced reforms in ethical recruitment, protection

mechanisms, and digitalisation. The two sides agreed to launch an online Post-Arrival

Orientation Seminar for Filipino domestic workers and to develop a centralised digital

processing platform aligned with the TADBEER system. The meeting also produced

commitments to strengthen safeguards against contract substitution and unlicensed

recruiters, supported by enhanced bilateral reporting mechanisms.‌

These reforms align with the UAE’s updated domestic worker regulations, which mandate

insurance, standardised contracts, and licensed service centres, changes Manila views as

key to protecting household service workers, who remain among the most vulnerable

segments of the Filipino community. 2025 also saw stronger civic participation among

Filipino expatriates. Political participation also increased. The pilot launch of online

overseas voting helped raise turnout in the April–May midterm elections. Digital

registration, mobile voting stations, and community partnerships made the process easier

and encouraged more Filipinos in the UAE to take part.‌

Photo: The Filipino Times‌

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Digital and Smart-Government Cooperation‌

Digital cooperation emerged as an increasingly crucial diplomatic pillar. At the

World Government Summit, the Philippine Department of Budget and

Management and the UAE Ministry of Cabinet Affairs signed an MoU covering e-

governance, public-sector innovation, performance management, and digital

service delivery. For the Philippines, the UAE’s maturity in digital government

offers a model for bureaucratic modernisation.‌

Digital infrastructure collaboration also progressed. A 2023 MoU on data-centre

development advanced in 2025, targeting up to 500 MW of capacity to support

the Philippines’ expanding digital economy. Emirati firms expressed interest in

cloud services and cybersecurity, areas central to the Philippines’ long-term

digital strategy.‌

High-level exchanges throughout the year reinforced this momentum. President

Marcos Jr.’s engagements with UAE leaders in late 2024 helped open discussions

on artificial intelligence, satellite and space-related work, and sectors expected

to play a larger role in the coming decade. Filipino and Emirati startup

communities also began exploring areas of collaboration through platforms such

as Dubai Internet City and Hub71. These developments signal that digital

diplomacy, once peripheral, is becoming a structural feature of Philippines-UAE

relations.

Photo: WAM‌

The UAE and the Philippines Trade Talks‌

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Photo: Abu Dhabi PE‌

View Ahead:

Consolidating a Future-

Focused Partnership‌

By the end of 2025, the partnership

had broadened and become more

organised. Cooperation extended

across economic reform, labour

protection, climate action, and digital

modernisation. The task for 2026 and

onward is to convert these gains into

arrangements and institutions that can

support long-term collaboration.

Climate cooperation must move

decisively from planning to execution.

The success of the Masdar renewable

energy roadmap and the Pasig River

rehabilitation will shape perceptions

of the UAE as a development partner

and test the Philippines’ readiness for

large-scale green projects. A priority

will be effective CEPA

implementation. Translating tariff

reductions, services liberalisation, and

investment protections into real

economic activity will determine

whether CEPA fulfils its promise or

remains largely symbolic.‌

Sustained migrant protection will require

consistent enforcement of new

regulations, close monitoring of TADBEER

processes, and continuous digital

upgrades. These steps are essential to

ensuring that labour reforms deliver lasting

improvements.‌

Finally, deepening digital cooperation, i.e.,

expanding data infrastructure, advancing AI

partnerships, and engaging in smart-city

exchanges, will be essential to embedding

the partnership’s innovation agenda into

long-term institutional frameworks.

Ultimately, the “new age of diplomacy” is

defined by ambition and diversification.

What began as a relationship centred on

labour mobility is now evolving into a

future-focused partnership driven by

technology, sustainability, and economic

transformation. As demonstrated in 2025,

both countries increasingly view bilateral

cooperation as a strategic tool for shaping

resilience and shared prosperity in the

decade ahead.‌

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By Studio Sjoerd van Leeuwen‌

I S S U E N O . 7 | 2 0 2 5 ‌

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theyoungdiplomats.com‌

@ydsociety‌

Year in Review 2025: Shifting Grounds — A Year of Flux

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Year in Review 2025: Shifting Grounds — A Year of Flux

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