The Post-Digital Issue 2026

Utblick
magazine
the post-digital issue

contributors
No AI was used to create this issue. Made for humans by humans.
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editor/in/chief
SYLVIA BEZAKOVA
editor
MAX SLATER
writer
LENA-SOPHIE STEINERT
writer
SARA SEREGNI
editor
AMELIE FISCHER
editor
CELESTINE TAEVS-NAKAYA
writer
ELSA SEGERSTRÖM
writer
GIULIA CAVENAGHI
Utblick is
part of UF at
Göteborgs
Universitet
writer
ALEXANDER JEJLID
art direction
JOÃO GONÇALVES
writer
EETU JUVONEN
illustrations
MAITE ALLERBORN

table of
contents
Dear fellow social media user,
editor's
note
page 6-9
X, Tiktok and Election
Interference in the EU
## Elsa Segerström
page 10-13
Skinnytok, Tradwives and Ozempic
## Lena-Sophie Steinert
page 14-17
Is Everyone a Commentator?
Political Voice, Journalism and
Ethics in the Digital Age
## Eetu Juvonen
page 18-21
When Politics Goes Viral
## Sara Seregni
page 22-24
Politicians as Influencers: Right
Wing Success Online
## Sylvia Bezakova
page 25-27
Taxing Digital Dopamine
## Alexander Jejlid
page 28-29
Scrolling the World: What
Journalism Means in the Age of
Algorithm
## Giulia Cavenaghi
Nowadays, we don’t seem to go a day without using or
checking our social media accounts. Not only us ‘civilians’
use social media but also increasingly more politicians.
While the debate is ongoing worldwide on banning social
media for minors, online platforms are becoming increasingly
part of the political debate. While social media has been
around for a while, its use is becoming more controversial
in the political realm as we are seeing increased
restrictions being implemented.
We have decided to call this issue ‘the Post-Digital’ to
reflect the omnipresence of technology in our daily lives.
Particularly with the rise of generative AI emulating humanlike
features blurring the lines between what is human and
what is artificial, truly entering an era where algorithms
and engagement becomes a form of capital. Therefore, this
issue is dedicated to how social media has influenced the
role of politics as well as journalism. The articles range
from the influence of social media on politics and calls for
greater regulations to the role of algorithms, the ethical
implications of their reach, the phenomenon of tradwives,
right-wing success online as well as how political
communication may evolve in the post-digital age.
With this issue we hope to add our input into the ever
expanding discussion and critical reflection regarding the
influence of social media. Our goal is to provide you with
information and our insights into these important issues.
We hope to inspire critical dialogue for much needed
discussion regarding the seemingly symbiotic relationship
between social media and politics, as well as the way it has
transformed engagement with politics.
Wishing you happy scrolling!
Yours,
Sylvia Bezakova
Editor-in Chief
I would like to thank all the writers and editors who
contributed to this issue, and especially May and João for
their creation and design, this would not have been possible
without you.

Chinese interference in EU democratic
processes through social media
disinformation. In 2024, there
were several recorded examples of
Russian meddling in European
democratic processes, for example
Russian vote-buying in Moldova’s
EU referendum, and Russian disinformation
campaigns in Romania—an
EU member state.
One of the methods of foreign
meddling in elections, prevalent
on social media, is to boost or
suppress voter turnouts through,
for example, spreading information
that makes voters think that
their vote doesn’t matter. Other
methods are focused on undermining
the legitimacy of election results,
which deepens polarisation
using false narratives, conspiracies
and propaganda. In contrast to
more traditional methods of election
interference, such as vote buying
or ballot stuffing that usually require
weak democratic institutions
to work, these methods for election
interference can also function in
countries with strong democratic
institutions; being harder to withstand.
In the 2025 Electoral Integrity
Report, several social media
platforms are mentioned as
sources of electoral backsliding due
to disinformation campaigns. The
report does not mention TikTok
specifically, but highlights platforms
like Telegram; a similar platform
to TikTok. In 2025 TikTok was
the most popular social media app
worldwide, the number of users totalling
up to 1.99 billion. The
largest demographic on TikTok
is men, with men between the
ages of 25-34 making up 20%
of the users. Considering
that TikTok is the world's
most used social media platform,
and because of its young audience,
TikTok can be seen as an especially
suitable platform for misleading
content intended to diminish electoral
integrity.
An investigation done by
Global Witness also showed that
TikTok’s algorithm served three
times as much far-right content to
new, politically balanced, users
compared to all political content.
TikTok’s algorithm works in a way
that it recommends new content
based on, for example, what posts
you like or comment on. But the
specific mechanisms of TikTok algorithm
are unclear even to those
who work with it. However, by
users it has been described as both
powerful and addictive. Even without
faulting TikTok’s own algorithm
for deliberately pushing far
right content, the algorithm is designed
to push content that gets
high engagement, which could give
it an unintentional preference for
far right content over other types of
political content. This has been observed
on other social media platforms
as well.
Around the beginning of
2025 the European Parliament set
up a special committee with a mission
to strengthen EU democracy.
Although this committee don’t
look at social media’s interference
on election integrity specifically,
the European Parliament has taken
steps to protect the union from
electoral interference on social media
through, for example,
the Digital Services Act that
obliges social media companies to
act against political disinformation,
as well as the New transparency
rules for political advertising
that forbids actors outside the
EU to buy political advertisements
within three months of an EU election.
During the first round of the
Romanian 2024 election the far
right populist pro-Russian candidate
Călin Georgescu won a shock
victory in part due to his sudden
popularity on TikTok. The election’s
results, however, were later
annulled due to allegations of campaign
fraud and interference. This
led Romanian authorities to request
the EU investigate TikTok’s
role in the election results, as there
was a great surge of TikTok accounts
in favour of the right wing
candidate before the election. Nevertheless,
Romania is not the only
instance of electoral interference
in European elections. In the Polish
elections, TikTok’s algorithm was
found to push right wing content to
users. When Germany had an election
in February 2025, the Russian
ambassador was summoned after
accusations of targeted disinformation
campaigns close to the election,
where the far right party Alternative
für Deutschland made a
shock incline in influence, becoming
the second-biggest political
party in parliament. In the Czech
Republic, with the populist right
wing candidate being in the lead
ahead of the election, an investigation
found that 16 of the largest
websites spreading disinformation
generated more content than all
Czech traditional media outlets
combined.
In 2024 the European Commission
opened formal proceedings
against TikTok with the aim of
investigating how TikTok’s algorithm
can contribute to disinformation,
and how that is connected
with the use of political advertising
on the platform. The investigation
would also assess how TikTok complies
with the Digital Services Act.
On the 5th November 2025, the European
commission ordered Tik-
Tok to preserve data regarding national
elections in the EU and how
this affected disinformation between
the 24th November 2024 until
the 31st of March 2025. Later, in
May 2025 the European Commission
found that TikTok was not
compliant with the Digital Services
Act when it came to transparency
about the content of the advertisements,
targeted uses, and who paid
for the ads. The European Commission
highlighted that advertising
transparency is crucial in detecting,
for example, election interference.
The findings by the Commission
were followed by a threat of the EU
fining TikTok for up to 6% of the
platform’s annual revenue. However,
in December 2025 the European
Commission accepted Tik-
Tok’s commitment to improve advertisement
transparency, revoking
the fine.
Similar to how foreign powers
can use weak institutional systems
to interfere in elections, such
as Russian vote-buying in Moldova,
social media can now be seen as a
similar democratic weak point. The
large use and influence of social
media in combination with little
regulation and transparency allows
for foreign influence to spread
disinformation. In the EU context
this technique has been used to encourage
already popular right wing
candidates, that are friendly towards
Russia and/or unfriendly towards
the EU, in a way that may
compromise electoral integrity
even in strong democracies in the EU like Germany. The fact that two of
the cases in 2024 of Russian election interference were linked to the EU
should be taken seriously by the EU as a sign that the EU is being targeted
specifically.
Around the world there are several actions that are being taken
against TikTok and other social media platforms with the expressed motive
to protect minors from harmful side effects of social media use; at
the same time, not as much is done when it comes to protecting electoral
integrity and democracy, something that is ultimately a larger concern.
Considering TikTok’s widespread use and young audience, allowing its
involvement in election interference in the EU to remain uninvestigated
and unregulated could enable foreign powers to increasingly exploit this
democratic weakness. Furthermore, with the development of generative
AI having the possibility of making disinformation campaigns even more
powerful and convincing, the electoral integrity of individual EU member
states, and the very democratic tradition the union is founded upon could
be further threatened.

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by Lena-Sophie Steinert
On the Interplay of Social
Media, Beauty Standards, and
the Rise of the Far Right
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No matter which social media platform you open these days,
it has become near impossible to not be bombarded with
beauty ideals thought to have been left in the past. After
years of preaching body positivity, it seems we have turned
our backs on the progress made and regressed to an inescapable
obsession with thinness. Behind a facade of
health and wellness hides the idea that a woman’s worth is unequivocally
tied to her weight. And while it’s not per se unusual for beauty ideals to
evolve in cyclical patterns, these shifts don’t take place in a vacuum. Instead,
they reflect broader political and cultural notions - for example, regressions
to right-wing conservatism. A world where these very developments
can currently be observed in broad daylight - most prominently in
the United States - thus begs the question of how all of this is related. How
do beauty standards, social media trends, and far-right ideology interact
with and amplify one another?
What Doesn’t Kill You Keeps You Starving
The contemporary social media world features many different
niches that suggest a shift in values. So-called 'skinnytok' (a play on
‘skinny’ and ‘TikTok’) is a side of social media that idolises extreme thinness
and promotes disordered eating behaviours. Content ranges from
seemingly harmless what-I-eat-in-a-day videos featuring bodychecks to
specific 'advice' such as drinking excessive amounts of water to suppress
natural hunger cues. Present on all social media platforms, but most
prominent on TikTok, skinnytok creates the illusion that achieving a certain
body type is purely a matter of willpower and that attaining this ideal
is something every woman should be striving towards. The revived trend
is also accompanied by medications like Ozempic, a drug meant to treat
diabetes, that has risen to exponential popularity as a tool to rapidly lose
weight. Even though this use of the drug has not been approved by the FDA
(Food and Drug Administration), about 1 in 8 adults in the U.S. have taken
Ozempic or a similar drug (i.e. a GLP-1 agonist) at some point in their lives,
according to a representative poll published in November 2025. Out of
these, about 40% reported taking them primarily to lose weight (as opposed
to treating diabetes). Additionally, 22% of people who have not
taken Ozempic say they would be interested in doing so in order to lose
weight. Without insurance (or a diabetes diagnosis), the common dosage
will come to almost 1000 USD per month. But next to financial strain and
physical side effects, Ozempic poses another issue - it makes thinness

engagement during
election campaigns
For most members of Gen Z,
scrolling through TikTok, commenting
on an Instagram Reel, or
reposting a meme may feel like an
ordinary activity, something not related
to politics. Yet, through this algorithm-driven
exposure, political
engagement begins. Social media
has become one of the most powerful
political tools in modern politics,
reshaping how politicians
campaign, communicate, and connect
with voters, especially from
younger generations. Platforms
like TikTok, Facebook, Twitter (now
X), and Instagram have created a
new political reality where visibility,
relatability, and virality often
matter more than traditional debates
or formal, lengthy policy
speeches.
The influence of social media lies in
its ability to capture attention. Informal
and short content spreads
quickly and reaches much wider
audiences than those who actively
follow traditional political news. As
a result, election campaigns are no
longer limited to televised debates
or campaign rallies, but they now
also reach social media users’ personal
feeds, blending political messages
with entertainment, one
scroll at a time. Social media has become
an inevitable part of our everyday
lives, enabling us to stay in
touch with acquaintances, search
for information, stay up-to-date on
worldwide events, share opinions
through comments and posts with
strangers, share content, and much
more. The political shift of social
media has the potential to shape
public opinion, mobilise voters,
and influence electoral outcomes.
Because social media is
deeply embedded in everyday life, it
has become a source of information
for many citizens worldwide.
However, this constant exposure to
social media platforms, entertainment,
and an infinite amount of information
available online also has
a dark side. While it is easier and
quicker to gain information and
catch up with the latest news, false
information has been disseminated
rapidly. As of October 2025,
6.04 billion individuals worldwide
were internet users, making up
73.2% of the global population.
With billions of users online, the
political consequences of digital
manipulation are extremely significant
and can potentially affect
voting outcomes. The rapid spread
of misinformation, fake news, and,
more recently, the creation of fake
images or videos with Generative
Artificial Intelligence (GenAI), has
made it more difficult to distinguish
credible sources from misleading
ones. Moreover, this environment
creates the ideal conditions
for the weaponisation of social
media, through which political
actors, governments, and businesses
can exploit algorithms to influence
public opinion (often negatively
and in order to incite violence)
and impact political outcomes.
The average person spends
around 2 to 2.5 hours daily on social
media worldwide. With such significant
numbers, it is no surprise
that politicians use social media
strategies to reach out to a greater
number of individuals in order to
gain visibility and widespread support.
Through social media, political
actors can interact directly with
individuals and increase political
engagement by understanding how
public opinion reacts to political
communication strategies. By
analysing likes, shares, and comments,
campaigns gain instant
feedback on public reaction and
can adjust their strategies accordingly.
Therefore, this gives political
candidates “an unprecedented ability
to shape their citizens’ perception
of reality” through digital political
engagement.
These strategies are particularly
effective among younger voters.
Research on Generation Z (individuals
born between 1997 and
2012) has shown a strong preference
for visually engaging content,
viral trends, and humour. These
characteristics capture Gen Z’s attention,
and values such as authenticity,
diversity, inclusion, and sustainability
play a significant role in
how young people perceive political
figures. To remain relevant, political
actors exploit algorithms to
implement their political advertising.
They adapt their communication
styles, strategically using humour,
trends, and a more personal
tone to appear more approachable
and trustworthy online. In order to
increase visibility and attract
younger generations, political figures
must have an effective social
media strategy that propels their
campaign.
In this way, the connection
between political actors and citizens
is closer than before, as seen in
the political strategies that candidates
adopt during their electoral
campaigns. Social media is now

Politicians
Influencers?
as
Across Europe, the support for farright
parties is growing amongst
young voters, which many believe
to be due to their political infiltration
on social media. While political
actors in general have started to
use social media as part of their
campaigning, right-wing parties
have been most successful in using
these platforms in creating engagement
with their posts as well as
gaining traction and views. Androniciuc,
a political expert calls
social media “a key battleground” in
online campaigning which rightwing
parties have realized before
any others. So why did right-wing
parties start using social media and
how have they managed to turn it
into a successful strategy?
Social media presents an opportunity
for populist parties to
spread their content as mainstream
media usually provides
more exposure for traditional parties.
Populist parties were often
seen as off-limits and therefore received
less screen time compared
to other parties on traditional news
media outlets. However, with the
advent of the internet, right-wing
parties saw an opportunity to
speak directly to the audience. For
instance, the French far-right party,
formerly known as Front National,
was the first political party in
France to have its own website in
1996. This developed further with
social media, which presented an
even better possibility to address
the public and gain more exposure
while taking communication with
the public into their own hands. On
Instagram, right but also left-wing
parties have higher following numbers
compared to centrist parties,
which did not see the need to have
a strong social media presence due
to their exposure on mainstream
media platforms. The question is:
will it pay off?
By 2018 the Spanish far right
party VOX had reached more followers
than any other political
party in Spain. VOX also has the
most followers on Instagram, surpassing
one million followers on
the app. One reason for this success
is that VOX recognized the importance
of social media platforms
early on and hired specialists to
manage its social media presence
from the start. Right-wing parties
across Europe appear to be more
successful in using social media as
a tool which is reflected in the follower
numbers of various political
parties. In Scandinavia, right-wing
parties like Fremskrittspartiet or
Sverigedemokraterna have higher
follower numbers than any other
right-wing success online
by Sylvia Bezakova
party. In Sweden the
Sverigedemokraterna has 191k followers
compared to the highest following
number of a left-wing party
(Vänsterpartiet) being 86.9k followers.
A similar pattern is observed in
Austria and France where the Reassemblement
National has
roughly 297k followers, with the
second largest being Macron's
party Renaissance with 112k followers.
The only exception is Germany
where Die Linke (574k) surpasses
Alternative für Deutschland (395k)
in follower numbers.
Research groups have identified
an increasing bias on platforms
such as X and TikTok, where
alt-right content has algorithmic
advantages. These actors also tend
to engage more on social media
compared to other parties, increasing
the likelihood that their content
is shared and becomes more
visible.
Recent electoral results
highlight how a strong social media
presence can attract young vot-

ers. In the 2025 parliamentary elections in Germany,
the far-right party AfD gained support, with a surge of
young voters from 7 to 21%. In France, Rassemblement
National gained more than 10% of young voters in the
last European parliament elections in 2024. Their candidate,
Jordan Bardella, has a substantial presence on
social media platforms, such as TikTok, with content
that mostly centers around his personal life. According
to a former communication strategist, Bardella underwent
media training to prepare him for his current political
role. He has since managed to attract a large audience
despite rarely expressing clear political opinions
and instead maintained an ambiguous political
persona. Whether this approach will be an effective
long-term media strategy remains uncertain, particularly
if voters start demanding clearer opinions from
right-wing politicians.
Similarly, Maximilian Krah, a member of AfD,
used TikTok to reach millions of views. However, due
to the extreme nature of his content, his account got
restricted. In response, the AfD has been adapting the
French strategy of appearing more moderate, trying to
hide their extremist views and promoting political figures
such as Ulrich Siegmund, a leading candidate for
a faction in Germany with a considerable TikTok presence.
Right-wing parties often exhibit a more aggressive
social media strategy, and several have been accused
of spreading disinformation. There appears to
be little constraint on what right-wing parties will say
or share on social media as political correctness is not
a concern, and such behavior rarely results in meaningful
consequences. However, when they do occur,
they can be quickly overcome and do not involve any
meaningful consequences.
For instance, the Sweden Democrats have been
accused of operating troll farms against other politicians.
The party denied any wrongdoing and instead
launched counterattacks against other politicians
with no real consequences following. These tactics appear
to be effective as increasingly more journalists report
self-censoring themselves due to the perceived
threats.
Many politicians have avoided platforms such
as TikTok due to privacy concerns with the app being
prohibited on work-related devices and restricted
within politically sensitive spaces. However, abstaining
from these platforms allows right-wing parties to
gain traction and spread their messages unopposed.
Nevertheless, a strong social media presence does not
automatically translate into electoral success. But the
number of people using social media to access political
information is likely to increase and online platforms
will continue to get more influential and potentially
impact voting behavior. Consequently, politicians will
either have to adapt or accept diminishing visibility.
Why are right-wing parties
so successful online? Several factors
help explain their advantage.
First, they recognized the importance
of social media early on and
were the first to start using online
platforms. Second, they have been
more successful in producing engagement
with their content and
therefore increasing visibility
among social media users. Third,
while other parties have been careful
with using social media, rightwing
parties have immediately
adopted strategies aimed at maximizing
reach and exposure. As observed
in France, parties are training
politicians to produce content
online that avoids expressing clear
ideological opinions, allowing
them to connect with a wider audience.
This tactic developed after the
expression of extremist views
failed, as in the case of Maximilian
Krah. Fake news is also easier to
spread on social media, since communication
with the public remains
unfiltered, without any third
actors (usually mainstream media
and news outlets) involved. As Di
Rista said in The People Who Turn
Lies Into Reality, “the harsh truth of
our new social media-dominated
news cycles is that if it trends, it’s
true”. Finally, many politicians believed
that people would ultimately
trust the experts. However, as seen
in the current media landscape social
media has become one of the
most powerful forces shaping how
people consume news and those
who fail to adapt risk losing vital
visibility..
taxing
When European states began taxing
tobacco, they did not do so because
cigarettes suddenly became
immoral. They acted because the
evidence became impossible to ignore:
smoking was not merely an
digital
dopamine?
by Alexander Jejlid
individual habit but a systemic
public health problem, engineered
and amplified by an industry
whose profits depended on addiction.
Regulation and taxation followed
once it became clear that
leaving responsibility solely to the
consumer was both ineffective and
unjust.
Today we find ourselves facing
a structurally similar challenge,
though it unfolds in minds
and not lungs.
Social media platforms have
built an economy around attention
and emotional activation. Their
products are free at the point of use,
but costly in ways that are increasingly
difficult to dismiss. Rising levels
of anxiety, depression, sleep deprivation,
political polarisation,
and compulsive media consumption
are no longer fringe concerns.
The question is no longer whether
these systems shape behaviour, but
how, and whether society should

Platforms do not merely reflect
political debate; they actively
shape it. By amplifying emotionally
charged content, privileging outrage
over nuance, and rewarding
polarisation with visibility, algorithmic
systems influence what citizens
see, share, and believe.
As several EU member states
head toward general elections in
2026, concerns about social media
propaganda are no longer hypothetical.
Disinformation campaigns,
microtargeted political advertising,
and algorithmic amplification
of divisive narratives have
already played documented roles in
elections across Europe and becontinue
to treat that influence as
an acceptable side effect of innovation.
From tobacco smoke to
algorithmic hooks
The analogy to tobacco is instructive.
Cigarette companies optimised
for nicotine delivery long
before the public understood its addictive
properties. Social media
companies optimize for engagement
long before users can meaningfully
consent to the consequences
of algorithmic design. In
both cases the harm is not accidental.
Instead it is structurally embedded
in the business model.
Taxation played a key role in
shifting the tobacco landscape. It
discouraged overconsumption,
funded public health initiatives,
and perhaps most importantly signalled
that society recognised a collective
harm requiring collective
response. Tobacco taxes did not ban
cigarettes outright, they made
harmful design choices more expensive.
A similar logic could apply to
digital platforms. Rather than
framing social media harm as a
moral failure of users, claiming
they don’t care enough about their
health, or even democracy. We
might instead ask why entire systems
are designed to maximise
compulsive use in the first place.
Rutger Bregman and the
politics of design
In a recent interview in swedish paper
Dagens Nyheter, Rutger Bregman
argued that we should tax “digital
dopamine” in much the same
way we tax tobacco. The Dutch historian
and writer who became famous
in 2019 when he claimed that
the rich not paying their fair taxes
was a major, perhaps the biggest, issue
in the battle against wealth inequality.
This he stated in a panel at
the yearly WEF conference in
Davos, right in the heart of the beast
he has dedicated his life to combat.
The phrase tax dopamine
lite tobacco is deliberately provocative.
What Bregman is pointing to is
a political choice: discouraging
platforms that are engineered to
trigger reward loops to operate as
such in the future.
Bregman’s intervention is
useful precisely because it reframes
the issue. Instead of debating content
moderation or personal responsibility
alone, he focuses on incentives.
If social media companies
profit from designs that undermine
mental health and democratic discourse,
why should those designs
remain untaxed?
The power of the idea lies in
its simplicity. Tax what causes
harm. Reward what does not. In doing
so, shift innovation away from
extracting ever more attention and
toward forms of digital interaction
that are genuinely beneficial.
This is not a call to abandon
technology, nor to romanticise a
pre-digital past. It is a call to recognise
that design is never neutral,
and that markets left to optimise
for engagement will rarely optimise
for wellbeing. Everybody
knows how capitalism work.
Algorithms, elections,
and the European public
sphere
yond. The question is not whether
social media will influence these
elections, but how deeply, and in
whose interests.
Calls to pause regulation in
the name of competitiveness, as
some European policymakers (the
heaviest name would probably be
Mario Draghi) have suggested in relation
to AI governance, risk missing
the point. The problem is not
that Europe regulates too much, but
that it has yet to fully confront the
political economy of platforms
whose profitability depends on behavioural
manipulation at scale.
Taxing dopamine-oriented
design would not solve electoral interference
overnight. But it would
acknowledge a fundamental truth:
when democratic discourse is mediated
by systems optimised for engagement
rather than deliberation,
democracy itself becomes a secondary
concern.
A public health crisis
hiding in plain sight
Taken together, these dynamics increasingly
resemble a public health
crisis. Young people particularly
bear the brunt of constant algorithmic
exposure, with growing evidence
linking heavy social media
use to mental health struggles. Yet
the burden of managing this exposure
is placed almost entirely on individuals
and families, rather than
on the industries that profit from it.
Public health frameworks
offer a different way of thinking.
They shift focus from blame to prevention,
from individual choice to
structural conditions. They recognise
that environments shape behaviour,
and that policy has a role
in shaping environments.
Taxing digital dopamine
would be one such intervention. It
would not criminalise use or stifle
speech. Instead it would make certain
forms of exploitative designs,
like aggressive notifications, emotionally
manipulative ranking systems,
economically less attractive.
As well as amplifying the legitimacy
of the concerns raised over
the SoMe platforms roles in political
discourse. The question is what
kind of digital society Europe
wants to build. One that races to
match Silicon Valley’s metrics of
growth and engagement? Or one
that treats mental health, democratic
resilience, and human attention
as finite resources worth protecting?
Just as tobacco taxes marked
a turning point in how societies understood
smoking, a serious discussion
about taxing digital dopamine
could mark a turning point in how
we understand technology.

by Giulia
Cavenaghi
what
journalism
means in
the age of
algorithm
“Knowledge is power,” wrote Sir
Francis Bacon, and later echoed in
Hobbes´ Leviathan. But in today’s
media landscape, staying informed
can feel more draining
than empowering. Keeping up
with the news often resembles a
chore, one that may evoke distress,
anxiety, and a sense of powerlessness
in a context of economic,
social, and political uncertainty.
We have never had so much
access to information: where once
one had to pick up a newspaper or
tune in to the radio or television at
newscast time, today information
is only a click away, with a variety
of digital tools offering what
seems like an infinite stream of
While social media is notorious
for its downsides, it has allowed
for a broader spectrum of voices. Innews.
Through social media platforms,
a few minutes of scrolling
can expose users to the latest
breaking events, sensational political
remarks, and global crises. This
is often shaped by a defined algorithm,
with news being delivered
through emotionally charged
headlines. In this environment,
journalism, in the sense of the practice
of producing and verifying
news about the world, faces a fundamental
challenge: while information
is everywhere, its capacity
to foster understanding, context,
and critical reflection seems increasingly
fragile.
The social media
algorithm: a feed built
for you
It has become worryingly evident
how deeply social media algorithms
have altered how users encounter
and understand news. In
recent years, the literature has
studied how social media greatly
affects our lives. First, concerns
center on the risk of being trapped
in a feed tailored to you, through
the so-called filter bubbles and
echo chambers, where the algorithm
repeatedly exposes users to
information and opinions from
like-minded sources, thereby reinforcing
pre-existing beliefs and
identities.
Another pressing issue is the
spread of disinformation. In journalism,
accuracy is a foundational
principle. But in digital content
ecosystems, speed often takes
precedence, especially during urgent
crises. The pressure to publish
quickly and to resonate emotionally
with audiences can lead to
oversimplified narratives, unverified
claims, or partisan framing.
These dynamics become
even more concerning when considering
the role of social media in
political polarisation. Recent research
has developed innovative
methods to study social media algorithms
without requiring direct
cooperation from platforms. One
study conducted by researchers at
Stanford found that exposure to
posts expressing extreme political
views can increase hostility toward
opposing groups, a finding that is
particularly worrying in a political
climate already marked by deep divisions.
A concrete example of this
distorted information environment
can be seen on the platform
now known as X, owned by Elon
Musk. Presenting himself as a defender
of free speech, Musk has significantly
reshaped the relationship
between social media and information.
He frequently attacks
traditional media on his personal
account, positioning mainstream
journalism as untrustworthy while
framing his platform as the last
outpost of free expression. Notably,
the Stanford experiment was conducted
on X itself. In the study, researchers
exposed one group of
users to slightly more divisive content,
including posts supporting
undemocratic practices, partisan
violence, opposition to bipartisan
consensus, and biased interpretations
of politicised facts. After just
one week, participants were asked
to evaluate their feelings toward
political opponents. The results
showed an increase in polarisation
comparable to the level of polarisation
observed in the United States
over the four decades leading up to
2020. In a single week.
This polarisation emerges
through a combination of platform
design, algorithmic curation, and
human behaviour. Divisive content
tends to generate higher engagement
and is therefore granted
greater visibility, regardless of its
accuracy. At the same time, users
are more likely to seek out and interact
with news that align with
their preexisting political views,
further reinforcing ideological divides.
Rethinking how we stay
informed
formation is easier to reach, and
those with passion or expertise can
share their knowledge with a wide
audience. In this way, public discourse
on topical issues is no longer
shaped only by traditional media,
which have historically had the
power to control narratives. This is
especially relevant considering
that many traditional media outlets
openly side with political parties
and promote specific narratives,
a pattern evident not only in
newspapers but also in television.
In Italy, a clear example is Mediaset,
founded in the late 1970s by Silvio
Berlusconi, who would become
Prime Minister in 1994. His media
ownership did not merely support
his political career but became a
central tool in it, blurring the
boundary between journalism, political
communication, and entertainment.
Nevertheless the risks of social
media spreading disinformation
cannot be ignored. So how can
we ensure a form of information
that is as accessible as social media,
yet is fact-checked like traditional
journalism? How can news be produced
in a way that resists outrage,
avoids emotional manipulation,
and seeks understanding rather
than deepening division?
While these challenges may
seem structural, some journalists
are already experimenting with
new ways of rebuilding trust. In
Italy, a notable example of journalistic
reinvention is Francesco
Costa, a 38-year-old journalist who
is now the editor-in-chief of the online
newspaper Il Post. An expert on
US politics, Costa began his career
as a blogger covering the 2008 U.S.
presidential election. His projects,
including newsletters and podcasts,
began independently and are
now part of the newspaper´s offering.
He is widely regarded as shaping
a more modern, engaged role for
journalism in Italian society. Much
of Costa’s success can be attributed
to his distinctive style: clear and
straightforward language, the use
of new formats, such as newsletters,
podcasts, and YouTube videos,
that cover a broad thematic range,
spanning from Italian to US politics,
and historical events. His content
combines depth with accessibility,
offering context both in an
informative and engaging way. His
work feels dedicated and engaged:
he travels, speaks with people, and
produces reporting that is personal
without ever being self-centered,
with a style that makes consuming
news feel like watching a documentary,
blending context with real stories
from real people. This approach
is evident in his four published
books, all of which have sold
in impressive numbers, which is
particularly notable in Italy, a country
that ranked third-to-last in Europe
in a 2024 Eurostat survey for
the share of people who have read
books in the past year. The ultimate
goal is to make audiences feel genuinely
informed rather than overwhelmed.
Importantly, Costa is the
editor in chief of a newspaper,
which gives him the accountability
and editorial credibility that many
social media figures, activists, or
opinion-driven commentators
may lack.
Journalism has power because
information has power: not
only to inform people about the
world, but to shape how they understand
it and act within it. As
noted in the New Yorker profile,
Costa sees his work as an effort to
build, even on a small scale, a community
that reflects the kind of attentive
and conscientious civil society
he believes journalism can
help foster. Perhaps this, ultimately,
should be journalism’s goal:
not merely to transmit facts, but to
inspire engagement, empower critical
thinking, and encourage people
to form ideas, voice opinions, and
participate in shaping the world
around them. Not by screaming or
fuelling divisions, but rather by
guiding readers toward reflection
and informed debate.