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MHL ARTICLE 81 - New York State Unified Court System

MHL ARTICLE 81 - New York State Unified Court System

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alleging that there was information or allegations therein that affected their property rights and<br />

that they were therefore entitled to full and specific notice, an opportunity to be heard and an<br />

opportunity to confront their accusers in court. AIP’s counsel refused to turn it over, both to<br />

protect his rights in the Art <strong>81</strong> proceedings as well an his rights in the long resolved matrimonial<br />

proceeding that the wife sought to reopen. While court states that it has a policy of NOT<br />

automatically turning over the petition in such circumstances, it did so in this case because it was<br />

clear that the ex-wife and son already had all of the information in the petition, having been the<br />

petitioners in a prior Article <strong>81</strong> proceeding that had to be discontinued because the AIP was<br />

living out of <strong>State</strong>.<br />

(iii) Withdrawal of Petition<br />

Matter of Marie H., 42 A.D.3d 782; 839 N.Y.S.2d 857 (3rd., Dept 2007)<br />

A pro se petitioner obtained counsel after the proceeding had begun. Subsequently the newly<br />

obtained attorney, in open court with the petitioner present, stipulated to withdraw the petition. The<br />

petitioner then moved pro se to vacate the stipulation alleging collusion between the <strong>Court</strong> Evaluator<br />

and the AIP’s granddaughter. Finding no such collusion, the trial court denied the motion and the<br />

petitioner appealed. On appeal, the court found no evidence of the collusion and affirmed.<br />

C. Jurisdiction and Venue<br />

Harvey v. Chemung County, ____F. Supp. 3d___; 2012 US Dist LEXIS 29831 (WDNY 2012)<br />

Plaintiff, in an action in Federal District <strong>Court</strong> alleged that NYS Supreme <strong>Court</strong> wrongly determined<br />

that she was unqualified to serve as her husband's guardian and had thereby violated both her and<br />

his civil rights. The District <strong>Court</strong> held that it lacked jurisdiction because relief could be predicated<br />

only upon a decision that the <strong>State</strong> <strong>Court</strong> was wrong and that such a finding would in effect be<br />

deciding an appeal of the judgment in the <strong>State</strong> <strong>Court</strong> guardianship proceeding which would be<br />

prohibited under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.<br />

nd<br />

Matter of Theodore T. v. Charles T., 78 A.D.3d 955; 912 N.Y.S. 2d 72 (2 Dept., 2010)<br />

Noting that “[t]he petitioner bears the ultimate burden of establishing that the court has personal<br />

jurisdiction over the respondent,” and that “[t]he method of service provided for in an order to show<br />

cause is jurisdictional in nature and must be strictly complied with,” the Appellate Division affirmed<br />

so much of the Supreme <strong>Court</strong>’s order in which it dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction due<br />

to the petitioner’s use of a method of service which was not expressly authorized in the order to<br />

show cause. However, the Appellate Division remitted the matter back to the Supreme <strong>Court</strong>, noting<br />

that the court had failed to explain any of the factors upon which it had relied in ordering that the<br />

petitioner pay the fees generated by the court evaluator and by the AIP’s court-appointed counsel.<br />

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