MHL ARTICLE 81 - New York State Unified Court System
MHL ARTICLE 81 - New York State Unified Court System
MHL ARTICLE 81 - New York State Unified Court System
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Matter of Heckl, 44 A.D.3d 110; 840 N.Y.S.2d 516 (4th Dept., 2007)<br />
The <strong>Court</strong> held that an AIP who refused to be interviewed by the <strong>Court</strong> Evaluator although<br />
specifically ordered to do so by the court could not be held in contempt for her refusal to speak<br />
because there was no disobedience of a lawful and unequivocal mandate of the court by a party to<br />
the proceeding as required by Judicairy § 753 [A] [3]. The court held that although the AIP was the<br />
subject of the proceeding, she was not a respondent and therefore is not a party to the proceeding.*<br />
Thus, the provisions of Judiciary Law § 753 (A) (3) permitting the court to punish a party for the<br />
disobedience of a lawful mandate did not apply to the AIP and that in any event, even assuming that<br />
the AIP was a party to the proceeding, the lawful mandate of the court ordering that the <strong>Court</strong><br />
Evaluator meet with the AIP immediately was directed at the <strong>Court</strong> Evaluator, not the AIP.<br />
Furthermore, "[c]ivil contempt has as its aim the vindication of a private party to litigation and any<br />
sanction imposed upon the contemptor is designed to compensate the injured private party for the<br />
loss of or interference with the benefits of the mandate" and the <strong>Court</strong> Evaluator, is not a party to the<br />
proceeding.<br />
* This seems to be an unusual construction of the statute since an AIP is a party for the purpose of<br />
taking an appeal.<br />
S. Annual Reports/<strong>Court</strong> Examiners<br />
Matter of Albert K. (D’Angelo), 96 AD3d 750: 946 N.Y.S. 2d 186 4262 (2nd Dept. 2012)<br />
The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision to: (a) impose a surcharge against the<br />
guardian, (b) deny the guardian’s commission and attorney fees, and (c) direct the Guardian to<br />
personally pay the <strong>Court</strong> Examiner’s fee at an amount in excess if the statutory guidelines set forth<br />
in 22 NYCRR 806.17(c) but reversed the trial’s court decision to deny the Public Administrator’s<br />
application for the guardian to also pay 9% interest on the sums surcharged. The “covert self<br />
dealing” engaged in by this guardian included: the guardian appointing and paying his own wife to<br />
serve as the geriatric care manager, that care manager continuing to provide and manage home health<br />
aides while the IP was in a nursing home without prior court approval, preparing a Will for the IP<br />
naming himself as executor, which will was witnessed by his own wife and mother, and bequeathing<br />
the IPs entire $3 million estate to a trust for which he would serve as trustee. The court also held that<br />
the <strong>Court</strong> Examiner's fees in excess of the statutory guideline schedule was justified by the<br />
“extraordinary circumstance” of the covert nature of the guardians’s self dealing.<br />
United <strong>State</strong>s Fire Insurance Company, etc. v. Camille A. Raia, et al, 95 A.D.3d 420; 942<br />
N.Y.S.2d 542 (2nd Dept. 2012)<br />
In an action by the bonding company against the <strong>Court</strong> Examiner for legal malpractice and breach<br />
of fiduciary duty for failing to discover a guardians’s misappropriation of the IP’s funds, the<br />
Appellate Division Second Department affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the Complaint on two<br />
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