Transatlantic Armaments Cooperation - Federation of American ...
Transatlantic Armaments Cooperation - Federation of American ...
Transatlantic Armaments Cooperation - Federation of American ...
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INTRODUCTION<br />
“An unidentified problem has an infinite number <strong>of</strong> solutions.”<br />
— Robert H. Humphrey<br />
The ability to perceive change, appreciate its implications, and then to chart an appropriate course<br />
are the marks <strong>of</strong> visionary government. Anti-trust legislation in the era <strong>of</strong> Teddy Roosevelt, the<br />
Marshall Plan, and Nixon’s rapprochement with China are several examples <strong>of</strong> such vision at the<br />
national level. U.S. relations with Europe at the close <strong>of</strong> the 20 th Century are in a dynamic phase,<br />
calling attention to the component parts <strong>of</strong> that relationship. <strong>Transatlantic</strong> cooperative arms development<br />
is not a new idea, but its rationale and the context in which it is engaged have changed,<br />
prompting the need to reassess its place in U.S. acquisition policy.<br />
The contextual changes for transatlantic cooperation are the rapid economic development <strong>of</strong><br />
postwar Europe, the continent’s quickening pace <strong>of</strong> consolidation, the loss <strong>of</strong> a common threat,<br />
the cultural and political tensions across the Atlantic, unprecedented technical innovation, and<br />
increased emphasis on fighting in a coalition environment.<br />
Despite the compelling reasons for transatlantic armaments cooperation in both the Cold War and<br />
post-Cold War eras, very little has been realized. The reasons for that lack <strong>of</strong> success are varied<br />
and some are also changing over time. Protection <strong>of</strong> technology, industrial interests, and political<br />
alignments are considerations that are always evolving. Some obstacles to cooperation are more<br />
mundane, however. The U.S. DoD lacks an organizational culture that is supportive <strong>of</strong> cooperative<br />
programs. There is also a corresponding lack <strong>of</strong> knowledge among the implementing management<br />
and workforce and so they tend to avoid these programs.<br />
What is needed is a broad view that provides all involved with an appreciation <strong>of</strong> the salient<br />
differences that set transatlantic cooperative programs apart, their history, why such cooperation<br />
is important, and how and why it is changing. Members <strong>of</strong> the acquisition workforce also need<br />
the practical details that relate to the management <strong>of</strong> a cooperative program. The correct approach,<br />
therefore, is one that addresses both mechanics and the larger context.<br />
Part I (Chapters 1 and 2) covers U.S. policies and procedures for cooperative programs. These<br />
chapters discuss differences between U.S.-only programs and cooperative programs. Three<br />
categories <strong>of</strong> differences are covered: harmonization <strong>of</strong> requirements, MOU development, and<br />
security procedures. A discussion <strong>of</strong> what program managers (PMs) need to know is provided in<br />
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