Abstracts of the Psychonomic Society — Volume 14 — November ...
Abstracts of the Psychonomic Society — Volume 14 — November ...
Abstracts of the Psychonomic Society — Volume 14 — November ...
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Friday Morning Papers 8–<strong>14</strong><br />
trials, specific to <strong>the</strong> current task. Here, we explored whe<strong>the</strong>r an externally<br />
adjudicated reward–loss schedule linked to specific visual features<br />
modulates <strong>the</strong>se intertrial attentional biases. Somewhat surprisingly, <strong>the</strong><br />
DPE was entirely eliminated when this external reward–loss schedule<br />
was put in place. Instead, we observed a very strong within-trial attentional<br />
bias that was consistent with <strong>the</strong> reward schedule (attention moved<br />
toward rewarded features and away from penalized features) and totally<br />
amnesic <strong>of</strong> recent experience.<br />
8:40–8:55 (8)<br />
Task-Based Working Memory Guidance <strong>of</strong> Visual Attention. ZHE<br />
CHEN, University <strong>of</strong> Canterbury<strong>—</strong>Recent research has shown a close<br />
link between attention and working memory (WM), such that <strong>the</strong> content<br />
<strong>of</strong> WM facilitates <strong>the</strong> deployment <strong>of</strong> visual attention to stimuli that are<br />
identical or related to <strong>the</strong> object representations held in WM. So far,<br />
prior studies have focused on memory-based attentional guidance when<br />
<strong>the</strong> remembered item is a specific stimulus. The present study examined<br />
whe<strong>the</strong>r holding a specific task in memory would also influence participants’<br />
deployment <strong>of</strong> visual attention in favor <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> stimuli associated<br />
with <strong>the</strong> task in memory and whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> effect <strong>of</strong> WM was caused primarily<br />
by early attentional capture or by delayed attentional disengagement.<br />
The results support task-based WM guidance <strong>of</strong> visual attention.<br />
Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, participants showed evidence that was consistent with both<br />
early attentional capture and delayed attentional disengagement.<br />
9:00–9:15 (9)<br />
Cross-Modal Distraction by Auditory Oddball Stimuli: The Course<br />
and Aftermath <strong>of</strong> Novelty and Semantic Effects. FABRICE B. R.<br />
PARMENTIER, University <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Balearic Islands, & JACQUELINE<br />
TURNER & JANE V. ELSLEY, University <strong>of</strong> Plymouth<strong>—</strong>The unexpected<br />
occurrence <strong>of</strong> an oddball auditory stimulus (novel) among an<br />
o<strong>the</strong>rwise repeated stream <strong>of</strong> sounds (standards) is known to negatively<br />
affect participants’ performance in an unrelated visual task. Here, participants<br />
categorized <strong>the</strong> direction <strong>of</strong> visual arrows preceded by a taskirrelevant<br />
sound. Rare auditory novels consisted <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> words left or<br />
right, which were ei<strong>the</strong>r congruent or incongruent with <strong>the</strong> upcoming<br />
target. The data confirmed <strong>the</strong> slowing <strong>of</strong> response in <strong>the</strong> face <strong>of</strong> a novel<br />
(novelty distraction), as well as on incongruent trials, a fur<strong>the</strong>r delay due<br />
to cross-talk interference between distractor and target (semantic effect).<br />
The semantic effect, but not novelty distraction, increased with <strong>the</strong> time<br />
interval between distractor and target. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, <strong>the</strong> production <strong>of</strong><br />
a response on <strong>the</strong> first standard trial following a novel trial was slowed<br />
if that response required <strong>the</strong> activation <strong>of</strong> a recently inhibited network<br />
(postnovelty semantic effect).<br />
9:20–9:35 (10)<br />
Oculomotor Inhibition <strong>of</strong> Return. RAYMOND M. KLEIN & MAT-<br />
THEW HILCHEY, Dalhousie University, ANA CHICA, University <strong>of</strong><br />
Granada, JASON IVANOFF, Saint Mary’s University, & TRACY L.<br />
TAYLOR, Dalhousie University<strong>—</strong>Although inhibition <strong>of</strong> return (IOR)<br />
was first demonstrated as an aftermath <strong>of</strong> covert, exogenously controlled<br />
orienting (a shift <strong>of</strong> attention in <strong>the</strong> absence <strong>of</strong> an eye movement) having<br />
effects on <strong>the</strong> processing <strong>of</strong> nearby targets calling for a speeded manual<br />
detection response (also in <strong>the</strong> absence <strong>of</strong> an eye movement), it was recognized<br />
very early on that <strong>the</strong>re was a pr<strong>of</strong>ound relation between IOR<br />
and <strong>the</strong> oculomotor system. Research will be presented on <strong>the</strong> role <strong>of</strong><br />
oculomotor processes in causing IOR, on <strong>the</strong> different flavors <strong>of</strong> IOR<br />
that are generated when oculomotor processes are or are not inhibited,<br />
and on <strong>the</strong> effects <strong>of</strong> IOR on oculomotor behavior.<br />
Reasoning and Problem Solving<br />
Republic Ballroom, Friday Morning, 8:00–9:55<br />
Chaired by Sam Glucksberg, Princeton University<br />
8:00–8:15 (11)<br />
Implicit Generics Underlie Inferences From <strong>the</strong> General to <strong>the</strong> Particular.<br />
SANGEET KHEMLANI, SAM GLUCKSBERG, & SARAH-<br />
JANE LESLIE, Princeton University (read by Sam Glucksberg)<strong>—</strong> People<br />
2<br />
readily assent to generic assertions, such as dogs have tails, ducks lay<br />
eggs, and ticks carry Lyme disease, even though <strong>the</strong> numbers <strong>of</strong> category<br />
members that display <strong>the</strong> relevant property in each <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se cases vary<br />
widely. Virtually all normal dogs have tails, a minority <strong>of</strong> ducks lay eggs,<br />
and only a tiny minority <strong>of</strong> ticks actually carry Lyme disease. To what<br />
extent do people attribute a property <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> generic category to an arbitrary<br />
member <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> kind? People were given examples <strong>of</strong> a kind<strong>—</strong>for<br />
example, Jumpy is a tick. They were <strong>the</strong>n asked whe<strong>the</strong>r Jumpy carries<br />
Lyme disease. People were prone to judge that Jumpy carried <strong>the</strong> disease,<br />
even though <strong>the</strong> underlying generic about ticks and Lyme disease<br />
had not been made explicit. We conclude that agreement with a generic<br />
disposes people to infer, by default, that a given member <strong>of</strong> a kind has<br />
<strong>the</strong> relevant property.<br />
8:20–8:35 (12)<br />
Assessing <strong>the</strong> Belief Bias Effect With ROCs: It’s a Response Bias<br />
Effect. CHAD DUBE & CAREN M. ROTELLO, University <strong>of</strong> Massachusetts,<br />
Amherst, & EVAN HEIT, University <strong>of</strong> California, Merced<br />
(read by Caren M. Rotello)<strong>—</strong>A belief bias effect in syllogistic reasoning<br />
(Evans, Barston, & Pollard, 1983) is observed when subjects accept<br />
more valid than invalid arguments, accept more believable than<br />
unbelievable conclusions, and show greater overall accuracy judging<br />
arguments with unbelievable conclusions. The effect is measured with<br />
a contrast <strong>of</strong> contrasts, comparing <strong>the</strong> acceptance rates for valid and<br />
invalid arguments with believable and unbelievable conclusions. This<br />
measure entails <strong>the</strong> assumption <strong>of</strong> a threshold model, which predicts<br />
linear receiver operating characteristics (ROCs). In three experiments,<br />
subjects made valid/invalid responses to syllogisms, followed by confidence<br />
ratings that allowed <strong>the</strong> construction <strong>of</strong> empirical ROCs. The form<br />
<strong>of</strong> those ROCs is inconsistent with <strong>the</strong> predictions <strong>of</strong> Klauer, Musch, and<br />
Naumer’s (2000) multinomial model <strong>of</strong> belief bias. More appropriate,<br />
signal-detection-based measures <strong>of</strong> decision accuracy and response bias<br />
demonstrate that <strong>the</strong> belief bias effect is simply a response bias effect;<br />
unjustified use <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> contrast-<strong>of</strong>-contrast measure produces <strong>the</strong> apparent<br />
accuracy difference.<br />
8:40–8:55 (13)<br />
The Origins <strong>of</strong> Insight in Resting-State Brain Activity. JOHN<br />
KOUNIOS, Drexel University, & MARK BEEMAN, Northwestern<br />
University<strong>—</strong>People can solve problems in more than one way. Two general<br />
strategies involve (1) methodical, conscious search <strong>of</strong> problem-state<br />
transformations and (2) sudden insight, with abrupt emergence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
solution into consciousness. This study elucidated <strong>the</strong> influence <strong>of</strong> initial<br />
resting brain state on subjects’ subsequent strategy choices. High-density<br />
electroencephalograms (EEGs) were recorded from subjects at rest who<br />
were subsequently directed to solve a series <strong>of</strong> anagrams. Subjects were<br />
divided into two groups on <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> proportion <strong>of</strong> anagram solutions<br />
derived with self-reported insight versus search. Reaction time and<br />
accuracy results were consistent with insight different cognitive problemsolving<br />
strategies used for solving anagrams with insight versus without<br />
insight. Spectral analyses yielded group differences in resting-state<br />
EEG, supporting hypo<strong>the</strong>ses concerning insight-related attentional diffusion<br />
and right-lateralized hemispheric asymmetry. These results reveal<br />
a relationship between resting-state brain activity and problem-solving<br />
strategy and, more generally, a dependence <strong>of</strong> event-related neural computations<br />
on <strong>the</strong> preceding resting state.<br />
9:00–9:15 (<strong>14</strong>)<br />
Strategy Selection and Executive Function: Study in Arithmetic Problem<br />
Solving. PATRICK LEMAIRE & MIREILLE LECACHEUR, CNRS<br />
and University <strong>of</strong> Provence<strong>—</strong>One hundred twenty participants ranging in<br />
age from 20 to 90 years were asked to do computational estimation tasks<br />
on two-digit multiplication problems (e.g., give approximate answers to<br />
38 3 74). On each problem, participants were asked to choose <strong>the</strong> best <strong>of</strong><br />
two strategies, rounding down (doing 30 3 70 5 2,100) or rounding up<br />
(doing 40 3 80 5 3,200). Participants’ executive functions were assessed<br />
with Stroop, Wisconsin Card Sorting, Trail Making, and Excluded Letter<br />
Fluency tests. The most important results showed (1) age-related changes<br />
in measures <strong>of</strong> executive functions and <strong>of</strong> skills involved in selecting