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Abstracts of the Psychonomic Society — Volume 14 — November ...

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Friday Morning Papers 8–<strong>14</strong><br />

trials, specific to <strong>the</strong> current task. Here, we explored whe<strong>the</strong>r an externally<br />

adjudicated reward–loss schedule linked to specific visual features<br />

modulates <strong>the</strong>se intertrial attentional biases. Somewhat surprisingly, <strong>the</strong><br />

DPE was entirely eliminated when this external reward–loss schedule<br />

was put in place. Instead, we observed a very strong within-trial attentional<br />

bias that was consistent with <strong>the</strong> reward schedule (attention moved<br />

toward rewarded features and away from penalized features) and totally<br />

amnesic <strong>of</strong> recent experience.<br />

8:40–8:55 (8)<br />

Task-Based Working Memory Guidance <strong>of</strong> Visual Attention. ZHE<br />

CHEN, University <strong>of</strong> Canterbury<strong>—</strong>Recent research has shown a close<br />

link between attention and working memory (WM), such that <strong>the</strong> content<br />

<strong>of</strong> WM facilitates <strong>the</strong> deployment <strong>of</strong> visual attention to stimuli that are<br />

identical or related to <strong>the</strong> object representations held in WM. So far,<br />

prior studies have focused on memory-based attentional guidance when<br />

<strong>the</strong> remembered item is a specific stimulus. The present study examined<br />

whe<strong>the</strong>r holding a specific task in memory would also influence participants’<br />

deployment <strong>of</strong> visual attention in favor <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> stimuli associated<br />

with <strong>the</strong> task in memory and whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> effect <strong>of</strong> WM was caused primarily<br />

by early attentional capture or by delayed attentional disengagement.<br />

The results support task-based WM guidance <strong>of</strong> visual attention.<br />

Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, participants showed evidence that was consistent with both<br />

early attentional capture and delayed attentional disengagement.<br />

9:00–9:15 (9)<br />

Cross-Modal Distraction by Auditory Oddball Stimuli: The Course<br />

and Aftermath <strong>of</strong> Novelty and Semantic Effects. FABRICE B. R.<br />

PARMENTIER, University <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Balearic Islands, & JACQUELINE<br />

TURNER & JANE V. ELSLEY, University <strong>of</strong> Plymouth<strong>—</strong>The unexpected<br />

occurrence <strong>of</strong> an oddball auditory stimulus (novel) among an<br />

o<strong>the</strong>rwise repeated stream <strong>of</strong> sounds (standards) is known to negatively<br />

affect participants’ performance in an unrelated visual task. Here, participants<br />

categorized <strong>the</strong> direction <strong>of</strong> visual arrows preceded by a taskirrelevant<br />

sound. Rare auditory novels consisted <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> words left or<br />

right, which were ei<strong>the</strong>r congruent or incongruent with <strong>the</strong> upcoming<br />

target. The data confirmed <strong>the</strong> slowing <strong>of</strong> response in <strong>the</strong> face <strong>of</strong> a novel<br />

(novelty distraction), as well as on incongruent trials, a fur<strong>the</strong>r delay due<br />

to cross-talk interference between distractor and target (semantic effect).<br />

The semantic effect, but not novelty distraction, increased with <strong>the</strong> time<br />

interval between distractor and target. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, <strong>the</strong> production <strong>of</strong><br />

a response on <strong>the</strong> first standard trial following a novel trial was slowed<br />

if that response required <strong>the</strong> activation <strong>of</strong> a recently inhibited network<br />

(postnovelty semantic effect).<br />

9:20–9:35 (10)<br />

Oculomotor Inhibition <strong>of</strong> Return. RAYMOND M. KLEIN & MAT-<br />

THEW HILCHEY, Dalhousie University, ANA CHICA, University <strong>of</strong><br />

Granada, JASON IVANOFF, Saint Mary’s University, & TRACY L.<br />

TAYLOR, Dalhousie University<strong>—</strong>Although inhibition <strong>of</strong> return (IOR)<br />

was first demonstrated as an aftermath <strong>of</strong> covert, exogenously controlled<br />

orienting (a shift <strong>of</strong> attention in <strong>the</strong> absence <strong>of</strong> an eye movement) having<br />

effects on <strong>the</strong> processing <strong>of</strong> nearby targets calling for a speeded manual<br />

detection response (also in <strong>the</strong> absence <strong>of</strong> an eye movement), it was recognized<br />

very early on that <strong>the</strong>re was a pr<strong>of</strong>ound relation between IOR<br />

and <strong>the</strong> oculomotor system. Research will be presented on <strong>the</strong> role <strong>of</strong><br />

oculomotor processes in causing IOR, on <strong>the</strong> different flavors <strong>of</strong> IOR<br />

that are generated when oculomotor processes are or are not inhibited,<br />

and on <strong>the</strong> effects <strong>of</strong> IOR on oculomotor behavior.<br />

Reasoning and Problem Solving<br />

Republic Ballroom, Friday Morning, 8:00–9:55<br />

Chaired by Sam Glucksberg, Princeton University<br />

8:00–8:15 (11)<br />

Implicit Generics Underlie Inferences From <strong>the</strong> General to <strong>the</strong> Particular.<br />

SANGEET KHEMLANI, SAM GLUCKSBERG, & SARAH-<br />

JANE LESLIE, Princeton University (read by Sam Glucksberg)<strong>—</strong> People<br />

2<br />

readily assent to generic assertions, such as dogs have tails, ducks lay<br />

eggs, and ticks carry Lyme disease, even though <strong>the</strong> numbers <strong>of</strong> category<br />

members that display <strong>the</strong> relevant property in each <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se cases vary<br />

widely. Virtually all normal dogs have tails, a minority <strong>of</strong> ducks lay eggs,<br />

and only a tiny minority <strong>of</strong> ticks actually carry Lyme disease. To what<br />

extent do people attribute a property <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> generic category to an arbitrary<br />

member <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> kind? People were given examples <strong>of</strong> a kind<strong>—</strong>for<br />

example, Jumpy is a tick. They were <strong>the</strong>n asked whe<strong>the</strong>r Jumpy carries<br />

Lyme disease. People were prone to judge that Jumpy carried <strong>the</strong> disease,<br />

even though <strong>the</strong> underlying generic about ticks and Lyme disease<br />

had not been made explicit. We conclude that agreement with a generic<br />

disposes people to infer, by default, that a given member <strong>of</strong> a kind has<br />

<strong>the</strong> relevant property.<br />

8:20–8:35 (12)<br />

Assessing <strong>the</strong> Belief Bias Effect With ROCs: It’s a Response Bias<br />

Effect. CHAD DUBE & CAREN M. ROTELLO, University <strong>of</strong> Massachusetts,<br />

Amherst, & EVAN HEIT, University <strong>of</strong> California, Merced<br />

(read by Caren M. Rotello)<strong>—</strong>A belief bias effect in syllogistic reasoning<br />

(Evans, Barston, & Pollard, 1983) is observed when subjects accept<br />

more valid than invalid arguments, accept more believable than<br />

unbelievable conclusions, and show greater overall accuracy judging<br />

arguments with unbelievable conclusions. The effect is measured with<br />

a contrast <strong>of</strong> contrasts, comparing <strong>the</strong> acceptance rates for valid and<br />

invalid arguments with believable and unbelievable conclusions. This<br />

measure entails <strong>the</strong> assumption <strong>of</strong> a threshold model, which predicts<br />

linear receiver operating characteristics (ROCs). In three experiments,<br />

subjects made valid/invalid responses to syllogisms, followed by confidence<br />

ratings that allowed <strong>the</strong> construction <strong>of</strong> empirical ROCs. The form<br />

<strong>of</strong> those ROCs is inconsistent with <strong>the</strong> predictions <strong>of</strong> Klauer, Musch, and<br />

Naumer’s (2000) multinomial model <strong>of</strong> belief bias. More appropriate,<br />

signal-detection-based measures <strong>of</strong> decision accuracy and response bias<br />

demonstrate that <strong>the</strong> belief bias effect is simply a response bias effect;<br />

unjustified use <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> contrast-<strong>of</strong>-contrast measure produces <strong>the</strong> apparent<br />

accuracy difference.<br />

8:40–8:55 (13)<br />

The Origins <strong>of</strong> Insight in Resting-State Brain Activity. JOHN<br />

KOUNIOS, Drexel University, & MARK BEEMAN, Northwestern<br />

University<strong>—</strong>People can solve problems in more than one way. Two general<br />

strategies involve (1) methodical, conscious search <strong>of</strong> problem-state<br />

transformations and (2) sudden insight, with abrupt emergence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />

solution into consciousness. This study elucidated <strong>the</strong> influence <strong>of</strong> initial<br />

resting brain state on subjects’ subsequent strategy choices. High-density<br />

electroencephalograms (EEGs) were recorded from subjects at rest who<br />

were subsequently directed to solve a series <strong>of</strong> anagrams. Subjects were<br />

divided into two groups on <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> proportion <strong>of</strong> anagram solutions<br />

derived with self-reported insight versus search. Reaction time and<br />

accuracy results were consistent with insight different cognitive problemsolving<br />

strategies used for solving anagrams with insight versus without<br />

insight. Spectral analyses yielded group differences in resting-state<br />

EEG, supporting hypo<strong>the</strong>ses concerning insight-related attentional diffusion<br />

and right-lateralized hemispheric asymmetry. These results reveal<br />

a relationship between resting-state brain activity and problem-solving<br />

strategy and, more generally, a dependence <strong>of</strong> event-related neural computations<br />

on <strong>the</strong> preceding resting state.<br />

9:00–9:15 (<strong>14</strong>)<br />

Strategy Selection and Executive Function: Study in Arithmetic Problem<br />

Solving. PATRICK LEMAIRE & MIREILLE LECACHEUR, CNRS<br />

and University <strong>of</strong> Provence<strong>—</strong>One hundred twenty participants ranging in<br />

age from 20 to 90 years were asked to do computational estimation tasks<br />

on two-digit multiplication problems (e.g., give approximate answers to<br />

38 3 74). On each problem, participants were asked to choose <strong>the</strong> best <strong>of</strong><br />

two strategies, rounding down (doing 30 3 70 5 2,100) or rounding up<br />

(doing 40 3 80 5 3,200). Participants’ executive functions were assessed<br />

with Stroop, Wisconsin Card Sorting, Trail Making, and Excluded Letter<br />

Fluency tests. The most important results showed (1) age-related changes<br />

in measures <strong>of</strong> executive functions and <strong>of</strong> skills involved in selecting

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