Sunday Morning Paper 330 attention management, as well as older subjects’ ability to quicken <strong>the</strong>ir collision decisions when encouraged to. Preliminary results suggest that both older and middle-aged subjects could respond adaptively and strategically to varying task demands. In addition, older pilots exhibit smaller age effects than do older nonpilots in several aspects <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir performance. 11:40–11:55 (330) Task Switching: Switching Within and Between Response Dimensions. KAREN MORTIER & GORDON D. LOGAN, Vanderbilt University (sponsored by Gordon D. Logan)<strong>—</strong>In cued task switching, <strong>the</strong> cue indicates which task to perform. However, this cue indicates at least two processes that need to be executed. On <strong>the</strong> one hand, it indicates which 50 dimension <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> target needs to be processed (attentional processes), and on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, <strong>the</strong> dimension in which <strong>the</strong> response needs to be selected (response selection). Three experiments were conducted to investigate <strong>the</strong> contribution <strong>of</strong> response selection in task switching costs. In one condition, participants switched between different target dimensions and different response dimensions. In <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r condition, participants had to switch between different target dimensions while keeping <strong>the</strong> dimension <strong>of</strong> response selection <strong>the</strong> same. Switch costs were found to be substantially reduced when <strong>the</strong> response dimension remained <strong>the</strong> same. This indicates that switch costs are related to switching between responses from different dimensions. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, <strong>the</strong>se findings imply that one can prepare for response selection before <strong>the</strong> actual stimulus display is presented.
Posters 1001–1008 Thursday Evening POSTER SESSION I Thursday Evening Hynes Convention Center, Ballrooms A, B, and C Viewing 4:00–7:00, Author Present 5:30–7:00 • Reasoning/PRoblem solving • (1001) Individual Differences in Fluid Reasoning on a Complex Recent Probes Task. ERIC G. FREEDMAN, MICHAEL D. McMANAMAN, & NEZAR KHATIB, University <strong>of</strong> Michigan, Flint<strong>—</strong>In a modified Sternberg task, participants received two memory sets (both ranging from 3 to 6 letters). A visual cue presented ei<strong>the</strong>r 1 sec before or 1 sec after <strong>the</strong> sets indicated which set was relevant for a particular trial. Positive, negative (nonrecent), and several types <strong>of</strong> recent probes were employed. Although individuals with low fluid reasoning (measured with items adapted from <strong>the</strong> Raven Progressive Matrices) had lower overall accuracy, <strong>the</strong>ir accuracy was relatively lower than <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r groups for recent negative probes when <strong>the</strong> current sets were postcued. Also, when cued after <strong>the</strong> memory sets, low fluid reasoners showed a relatively greater decrease in accuracy as <strong>the</strong> set size increased. Finally, postcuing <strong>the</strong> sets resulted in a relatively greater increase in reaction time as <strong>the</strong> memory set size increased. Thus, low fluid reasoning appears to be linked to greater difficulty reducing <strong>the</strong> effects <strong>of</strong> proactive interference <strong>of</strong> irrelevant information as task demands increase. (1002) Conditional Probability Computation in Conditional Reasoning. JOHN BEST, Eastern Illinois University<strong>—</strong>Several researchers (e.g., Evans & Over, 2004; Oaksford, Chater, & Larkin, 2000) have suggested that conditional, “if P, <strong>the</strong>n Q” reasoning may be accomplished by a system that converts such statements to conditional probabilities, P(Q/P), which are <strong>the</strong>n computed. Under that interpretation, people should be differentially sensitive to <strong>the</strong> variables that actually influence conditional probability, and <strong>the</strong>y should be relatively insensitive to variables that only appear to influence conditional probability. But are <strong>the</strong>y? When college students were given opportunities to solve four “Mastermind problems” (deductive puzzles based on <strong>the</strong> logical deduction game), in which <strong>the</strong> conditional probability <strong>of</strong> particular conclusions was manipulated independently <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> results <strong>of</strong> a much simpler “covariation heuristic,” <strong>the</strong> inconsequential surface manipulation was much more influential on <strong>the</strong> likelihood <strong>of</strong> subjects’ deductions than was <strong>the</strong> actual conditional probability. The outcomes <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> study raise some questions for <strong>the</strong> operation <strong>of</strong> dual-process <strong>the</strong>ories <strong>of</strong> reasoning. (1003) Chronic Intrinsic Motivation Qualifies <strong>the</strong> Effect <strong>of</strong> Situational Extrinsic Incentives on Problem Solving. DANIEL A. DeCARO & JOSEPH G. JOHNSON, Miami University (sponsored by Robin D. Thomas)<strong>—</strong>Although <strong>the</strong> impact <strong>of</strong> intrinsic and extrinsic motivation on a variety <strong>of</strong> cognitive skills is well-documented, <strong>the</strong> relationship between <strong>the</strong>se motives remains hotly contested. Some argue that extrinsic incentives, such as <strong>the</strong> imposition <strong>of</strong> performance-contingent monetary rewards, and coercion hurt performance by undermining intrinsic motivation (e.g., Deci et al., 1999), whereas o<strong>the</strong>rs argue that <strong>the</strong>se are innocuous if not optimal motivators (e.g., Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001). We investigated <strong>the</strong> impact <strong>of</strong> individuals’ chronic versus situational motivation during problem solving to help qualify and explain <strong>the</strong> undermining effect. In Study 1, individuals with chronic intrinsic orientation did not lose situational intrinsic motivation in response to peer coercion; only nonchronics suffered. Studies 2 and 3 replicated this effect for monetary rewards, additionally showing that monetary reward is innocuous to situational intrinsic motivation unless explicitly used as a coercive device. Chronic motivational states should be considered when incentives are used to study cognitive performance. (1004) Multiscale Dynamics <strong>of</strong> New Cognitive Structure. REBECCA BON- CODDO & JAMES A. DIXON, University <strong>of</strong> Connecticut<strong>—</strong>Recently, <strong>the</strong>ories <strong>of</strong> embodied and dynamical cognition have proposed that 51 cognitive structure is created through actions. Previous work showed that children spontaneously discover new representations while solving a series <strong>of</strong> gear-system problems (Boncoddo, Dixon, & Kelley, in press). In <strong>the</strong> present study, we manipulated participants’ understanding <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> simple physics <strong>of</strong> gear systems before having <strong>the</strong>m solve <strong>the</strong> gearsystem problems. Forty-five preschoolers were randomly assigned to an experimental condition in which <strong>the</strong>y listened to stories that described <strong>the</strong> simple physics <strong>of</strong> gear systems (i.e., gears have teeth that push on each o<strong>the</strong>r) or to a control condition in which <strong>the</strong>y heard analogous stories that contained no information about <strong>the</strong> relevant physics. Motiontracking data were obtained as <strong>the</strong> children solved <strong>the</strong> problems. Using methods from nonlinear dynamics, we show that <strong>the</strong> experimental stories affected <strong>the</strong> long-scale dynamic organization, and that <strong>the</strong>se differences propagate across scales. (1005) Improving Public Health Messages: Acting on Emotions. INES MEIER & JESSE W. WHITLOW, JR., Rutgers University, Camden (sponsored by Jesse W. Whitlow, Jr.)<strong>—</strong>Research has shown that <strong>the</strong> emotional content <strong>of</strong> a public service message influences how <strong>the</strong> message is processed, but little attention has been paid to how <strong>the</strong> emotion elicited by a message influences what actions are taken by <strong>the</strong> message recipient. We asked whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> emotional tone <strong>of</strong> a message enhances actions consistent with <strong>the</strong> emotion and suppresses actions inconsistent with it. Implications <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> findings for crafting health messages are discussed. (1006) Counterfactual Reasoning in Text and Images. ALEXANDRA Y. CHAMBERS & RUSSELL REVLIN, University <strong>of</strong> California, Santa Barbara (sponsored by Russell Revlin)<strong>—</strong>The present study uses a counterfactual reasoning task to examine how people revise <strong>the</strong>ir beliefs. Students read fictional narratives that described groups <strong>of</strong> individuals. Each narrative was followed by three statements that agreed with <strong>the</strong> story: a general premise about a group and two particular premises about an individual. The fourth statement was a counterfactual assumption that participants had to accept as true even though it contradicted <strong>the</strong> given information. To reconcile this novel information, students retained ei<strong>the</strong>r (1) <strong>the</strong> group condition specified in <strong>the</strong> general premise or (2) <strong>the</strong> individual’s characteristics specified in <strong>the</strong> particular premises. Overall, participants reliably preferred to retain <strong>the</strong> general premise and reject <strong>the</strong> particular ones. However, <strong>the</strong> format in which <strong>the</strong>se problems were framed influenced <strong>the</strong> decision strategy. When <strong>the</strong> statements were illustrated with pictures, <strong>the</strong>y increased <strong>the</strong> students’ commitment to <strong>the</strong> general statement, which resulted in a substantial increase in retaining <strong>the</strong> generalities. (1007) The Role <strong>of</strong> Visual Imagery in Deductive Relational Reasoning. JOEL CHAN & JOEL A. HAGAMAN, University <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Ozarks<strong>—</strong>One view <strong>of</strong> deductive relational reasoning holds that individuals reason by constructing and inspecting models <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> possibilities consistent with a problem’s premises. Recent work (Knauff & Johnson-Laird, 2002; Knauff et al., 2003) has suggested that <strong>the</strong>se models are distinct from visual images, in that <strong>the</strong>y are abstract and do not necessarily include object visual information (e.g., color, shape), but may be identified with abstract spatial representations (e.g., spatial images). Consistent with <strong>the</strong>se notions, we found that reasoning with linear syllogisms was significantly slowed with problems containing primarily object visual information (i.e., cleaner/dirtier) relative to problems containing primarily spatial (above/below) or no (better/worse) visual information. Analysis <strong>of</strong> general and spatial working memory measures (O-span and arrow-span, respectively) and reasoning accuracy provided converging evidence for <strong>the</strong> separability and differential effects <strong>of</strong> object and spatial processing during relational reasoning. (1008) A Dual-Process Approach to Age-Associated Changes in Reasoning Performance. JAMIE PROWSE TURNER & VALERIE A. THOMP- SON, University <strong>of</strong> Saskatchewan<strong>—</strong>Complex reasoning ability declines with age (e.g., Evans, 2003; Gilinsky & Judd, 1994; Salthouse, 2005).
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