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Theory and practice of human Rights and minority rights ... - EURAC

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employees from attending religious ceremonies. 30 Nevertheless, in general religious<br />

freedom could be <strong>practice</strong>d without discrimination <strong>and</strong> from the beginning 31 the<br />

governments <strong>of</strong> the republics annually subsidized the religious communities with<br />

large sums.<br />

A conflict did occur between the clergy <strong>and</strong> the regime, <strong>and</strong> was tw<strong>of</strong>old:<br />

On one h<strong>and</strong>, there was the inherent conflict between the general<br />

communist approach, which weakened the churches through l<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> educational<br />

reforms that limited the real property held by the Orthodox <strong>and</strong> Catholic churches<br />

<strong>and</strong> minimized religious influence by relegating religious lessons to voluntary<br />

education. 32 Article 3 <strong>of</strong> the Law on L<strong>and</strong> Reform <strong>and</strong> Settlement 33 e.g. stated that<br />

the “l<strong>and</strong> estates (over 10 ha) <strong>of</strong> churches, monasteries, religious institutions <strong>and</strong><br />

<strong>of</strong> all kinds <strong>of</strong> foundations, should be taken away from the present owner <strong>and</strong><br />

passed into the h<strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong> the State”. Article 8 allowed the maintenance <strong>of</strong> religious<br />

institutions (churches, monasteries, ecclesiastical authorities) <strong>of</strong> major importance<br />

or <strong>of</strong> major historical significance up to 30 hectares <strong>of</strong> arable l<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> up to 30<br />

hectares <strong>of</strong> forest out <strong>of</strong> their present holding.<br />

On the other h<strong>and</strong>, the Roman-Catholic <strong>and</strong> the Orthodox churches were<br />

driving forces in the national development <strong>of</strong> the Croatian <strong>and</strong> Serb nation. In<br />

general, nation building <strong>of</strong> Croats, (present-day) Bosniacs (former Muslims) <strong>and</strong><br />

Serbs was primarily based on religious affiliation. As the churches were also<br />

carriers <strong>of</strong> nationalism, they were doubly in conflict with the Yugoslav Communist<br />

Party, whose equalizing approach attempted to deal with the problem <strong>of</strong> national<br />

hatred. The Roman-Catholic clergy, due to its partial interpenetration with the<br />

Ustasha-Regime <strong>and</strong> its low support <strong>of</strong> the Partisans, was a particular thorn in the<br />

flesh <strong>of</strong> Tito’s regime. 34 Cooperation between the Orthodox clergy <strong>and</strong> the<br />

Partisans had been somewhat better during the war, <strong>and</strong> therefore so was their<br />

relationship in the post war period. The conflict between the Roman-Catholic<br />

Church (in particular in Croatia) <strong>and</strong> the regime appeared more frequently than it<br />

did with the other religious communities in the following decades.<br />

Nevertheless, the Slav Muslim clergy also came into conflict with the<br />

authorities. Several mosques were closed or alienated, competences in e.g.<br />

education <strong>and</strong> religious taxation were wrested from the religious leaders, <strong>and</strong><br />

religious publications as well as the education <strong>of</strong> religious teaching staff were<br />

restricted. 35 The communists also interfered in the Muslims’ religious traditions<br />

partly as there were certain elements, e.g. the veil for women, which had to be<br />

abolished. 36<br />

The Islamic Religious Community (IVZ – Islamska Vjerska Zajednica), led by<br />

the anti-communists, that were elected immediately after the war, was forced to<br />

replace its leadership due to the denial <strong>of</strong> financial support. 37 The first elected<br />

Reis-ul-Ulema resigned in 1947, <strong>and</strong> was replaced by a newly elected reliable<br />

religious <strong>of</strong>ficial, who adopted a non-confrontation course. As a result, the<br />

community was given the right to autonomy in internal affairs. 38 A supreme<br />

30<br />

H<strong>of</strong>fmann <strong>and</strong> Neal, op. cit. note 16, 95.<br />

31<br />

Ibid.<br />

32<br />

Ibid., 93.<br />

33<br />

Sluzbeni list FNRJ, Sl. l. 64/45; Zdenko Štambuk, The Legal Status <strong>of</strong> Religious<br />

Communities in Yugoslavia (Međunarodna Štampa – Interpress, Belgrade, 1967), 23.<br />

34<br />

H<strong>of</strong>fman <strong>and</strong> Neal, op. cit. note 16, 93- .<br />

35<br />

Francine Friedman, The Bosnian Muslims: Denial <strong>of</strong> a Nation (Westview Press, Boulder,<br />

1996), 150.<br />

36<br />

H<strong>of</strong>fmann <strong>and</strong> Neal, op. cit. note 16, 93.<br />

37<br />

Zachary T. Irwin, “The Islamic Revivial <strong>and</strong> the Muslims <strong>of</strong> Bosnia-Hercegovina”, XVII (4)<br />

East European Quarterly (1984), 440-458, at 440.<br />

38<br />

Ibid., 441.<br />

8

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