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on August 28, the US repeated its demands from August 25 but also<br />

declared that it would accept a division of the Panmunjom area if the<br />

KPA could guarantee that its four checkpoints in the South would be<br />

dissolved (there were no UNC checkpoints in the North). The demand<br />

to punish those responsible for the axe murder was repeated, but the<br />

North Korean view was that this had been included in the excuse. 244<br />

On August 29, the UNC accepted the proposal from August 25.<br />

On September 6, both sides agreed to reorganize the Panmunjom area<br />

after six meetings had been held by the MAC Secretariat from August<br />

31; the UNC and KPA forces would be divided. According to the<br />

report by Major General Lage Wernstedt, Head of the Swedish NNSC<br />

delegation, from September 1976 the Commission played an important<br />

role by “supervising” all six meetings held by the MAC Secretariat<br />

between August 31 and September 6. Supervision was carried out by<br />

members outside the meeting room. All meetings were held in a<br />

comparatively free atmosphere and the usual propaganda elements<br />

were completely absent. The only exception was the September 1<br />

meeting when tension rose within a limited area and “reinforce-<br />

306th MAC meeting held on October 17, 1970 (cf. p. 241). Following serious<br />

gang fights between guard forces on October 9 and 12, 1970, injuring many, the<br />

UNC at the meeting made a proposal to divide the JSA. The number of guards<br />

should follow the provisions of the Armistice Agreement: guards should not wear<br />

weapons, non-essential guard posts should be removed, contacts or talks between<br />

guards should not be permitted, visitors and workers on both sides should be<br />

prohibited on meeting days and guards should be separated by the MDL. North<br />

Korea refused the proposal replying that it would be sufficient just to take<br />

measures to guarantee security and order in the JSA: “What is required for the<br />

removal of tension in the JSA... is not a new agreement but strict adherence to the<br />

Armistice Agreement.” From Lee, op. cit., 2001(a), p. 70: op. cit., 2004, pp. 111-112.<br />

244_ Downs, op. cit., p. 156; Försvarets Läromedelscentral, op. cit., p. 38; Hong, op.<br />

cit., 2003, pp. 69-70; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1993, pp. 195-6; Lee,<br />

ibid., 2004, p. 107. Original quotation marks. “Assurance” and “regret” are quoted<br />

from Lee, ibid., 2004. “Positive step” is quoted from Hong, ibid., 2003, p. 70.<br />

North-South Dialogue and Tension during the 1970s<br />

307

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