09-151.pdf

enforced. Ten paragraphs remained in force. Firstly, Paragraph 2 on
the position of the MDL remained effective, in spite of North Korea’s
numerous illegal border crossings and hostile acts within the DMZ. In
2004, the South Korean scholar Choi Cheol-Young wrote that Paragraph
2 was the most well-observed part of the agreement. Secondly, both
scholars argue that Paragraph 6 on the prohibition of hostile acts
within the DMZ was respected, but Jhe mentions occasional nonintentional
and incidental shooting incidents, most of which were
minor. However, the present study largely contradicts this view.
Thirdly, both Jhe and Choi write that Paragraph 13(b) regarding
the withdrawal of military forces from coastal waters under the control
of the other side and the jurisdiction of the UNC Commander over five
islands in the West Sea was observed. The only exception is that North
Korea, from December 1973 three months onwards, claimed that
waters around Paengnyông Island were the North’s (cf. pp. 274-5).
Fourthly, Jhe writes that Paragraph 17, stating that responsibility for
implementing the Armistice Agreement lies on the signatories, that is,
the Commanders of both sides, and their successors remained in force,
but cooperation to implement the agreement could not be expected.
Fifthly, Paragraph 25(a) on the position of the MAC Headquarters in
the vicinity of Panmunjom remained valid.
Sixthly, both sides’ consent to Paragraph 35, giving the MAC the
right to recommend to the Commanders of the opposing sides amendments
and additions to the agreement remained in force. Seventhly,
Paragraph 49 giving the NNSC the right to recommend to the MAC
amendments and additions to the agreement was still effective.
Eighthly, Paragraph 61, stating that amendments and additions to the
agreement could be made with the consent of Commanders of both
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