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From Responsibility to Response: Assessing National - Brookings

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CHAPTER 1 <strong>Assessing</strong> <strong>National</strong> Approaches <strong>to</strong> Internal Displacement: Findings from 15 Countries<br />

Secretary-General has noted these and other serious<br />

obstacles <strong>to</strong> securing durable solutions in the South:<br />

“Local security and land distribution are among the<br />

most urgent issues, but continued efforts are also required<br />

<strong>to</strong> develop options for both rural and urban livelihoods,<br />

expanding local services, and promoting inter-<br />

and intra-community reconciliation.” 107 In the absence<br />

of those conditions and in the context of continued<br />

inter-ethnic violence, a number of returnees have been<br />

displaced again. According <strong>to</strong> an IOM report in 2009,<br />

“failed returns” include 10 percent of IDP returnees (an<br />

estimated 185,000 people) who were such secondarily<br />

displaced persons. 108<br />

Planned reintegration schemes that were under discussion<br />

in 2009 between the United Nations and the<br />

government of Southern Sudan <strong>to</strong> cover travel costs<br />

and school construction <strong>to</strong> assist 500,000 IDP returnees<br />

by 2011 were criticized as falling well short of establishing<br />

durable solutions. 109 It is unclear whether<br />

this plan is related <strong>to</strong> the $25 million “emergency repatriation”<br />

program entitled “Come Home <strong>to</strong> Choose,”<br />

unveiled in mid-2010 by the humanitarian affairs and<br />

disaster management ministry of the government of<br />

Southern Sudan, under which 1.5 million Sudanese<br />

from the North would return <strong>to</strong> the South in time for<br />

the December 2010 referendum on secession from the<br />

North. The program had prompted concerns that the<br />

returns were politically motivated and would be neither<br />

voluntary nor durable, as aid organizations already had<br />

difficulty integrating existing returnees. 110<br />

107 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General<br />

on the Sudan, S/2009/61, 30 January 2009, para. 47, p. 9<br />

(www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep09.htm).<br />

108 IOM, IOM Tracking of Returns Project: Total Returns<br />

<strong>to</strong> Southern Sudan and Southern Kordofan, Post CPA <strong>to</strong><br />

December 2009, March 2010, p. 9 (www.iom.ch/jahia/.../<br />

docs/tracking_returns_annual_report_dec2009.pdf).<br />

109 Refugees International, South Sudan: Urgent Action<br />

Needed <strong>to</strong> Avert Collapse, 26 March 2009 (www.<br />

refugeesinternational.org).<br />

110 Refugees International, “Statement by Refugees<br />

International on the Government of Southern Sudan’s<br />

Mass Repatriation Plans,” 27 August 2010 (www.refugeesinternational.org);<br />

Agence France-Presse, “South<br />

148<br />

With the independence of South Sudan in July 2011,<br />

national responsibility for securing durable solutions<br />

<strong>to</strong> displacement has shifted fully <strong>to</strong> the government of<br />

South Sudan. Given the scale of the displacement and<br />

the centrality of the issue <strong>to</strong> the conflict, securing durable<br />

solutions for the millions of IDPs and refugees<br />

from South Sudan surely will be among the greatest<br />

challenges faced by this young country as well as among<br />

the main criteria by which its new government will be<br />

judged.<br />

In Darfur, conflict displaced 2.7 million people IDPs and<br />

300,000 refugees from 2003-09 and displacement continues,<br />

with 268,000 new IDPs in 2010 and ongoing displacement<br />

in 2011, though some returns also have taken<br />

place. Various efforts <strong>to</strong> halt the violence and resolve the<br />

conflict have been attempted but, <strong>to</strong> date, have failed <strong>to</strong><br />

secure a comprehensive and lasting peace agreement. In<br />

2006, the Darfur Peace Agreement was brokered after<br />

consultations with various armed groups. 111 However,<br />

only one of the various nonstate armed groups in<br />

Darfur—the Sudan Liberation Movement—signed<br />

the agreement with the government, and in 2011, the<br />

group’s leader, Minni Minnawi, retracted his support<br />

for the deal entirely. In 2009, the African Union and<br />

United Nations restarted peace talks for Darfur, which<br />

were hosted by the government of Qatar. Together<br />

with the government of Sudan, all the nonstate armed<br />

groups had a standing invitation <strong>to</strong> join the talks, but<br />

only the Liberation and Justice Movement (a recently<br />

formed amalgam of several armed factions) and, only<br />

sporadically, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM),<br />

a long-standing and militarily significant rebel group,<br />

participated in the talks. The return of refugees and<br />

Sudan Plans Return of 1.5 Million for Referendum,” 24<br />

August 2010 (www.nation.co.ke/News/africa/South%20<br />

Sudan%20plans%20return%20of%201.5%20million%20<br />

for%20referendum/-/1066/995754/-/dfd1qdz/-/); Hannah<br />

Entwisle, The End of the Road? A Review of UNHCR’s Role<br />

in the Return and Reintegration of Internally Displaced<br />

Populations, UNHCR, Evaluation Reports, 1 July 2010<br />

(www.unhcr.org/4c4989e89.html).<br />

111 See the full text of the peace agreements at UNDP Sudan<br />

(www.sd.undp.org/SudanPandA.htm).

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