From Responsibility to Response: Assessing National - Brookings
From Responsibility to Response: Assessing National - Brookings
From Responsibility to Response: Assessing National - Brookings
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CHAPTER 1 <strong>Assessing</strong> <strong>National</strong> Approaches <strong>to</strong> Internal Displacement: Findings from 15 Countries<br />
Secretary-General has noted these and other serious<br />
obstacles <strong>to</strong> securing durable solutions in the South:<br />
“Local security and land distribution are among the<br />
most urgent issues, but continued efforts are also required<br />
<strong>to</strong> develop options for both rural and urban livelihoods,<br />
expanding local services, and promoting inter-<br />
and intra-community reconciliation.” 107 In the absence<br />
of those conditions and in the context of continued<br />
inter-ethnic violence, a number of returnees have been<br />
displaced again. According <strong>to</strong> an IOM report in 2009,<br />
“failed returns” include 10 percent of IDP returnees (an<br />
estimated 185,000 people) who were such secondarily<br />
displaced persons. 108<br />
Planned reintegration schemes that were under discussion<br />
in 2009 between the United Nations and the<br />
government of Southern Sudan <strong>to</strong> cover travel costs<br />
and school construction <strong>to</strong> assist 500,000 IDP returnees<br />
by 2011 were criticized as falling well short of establishing<br />
durable solutions. 109 It is unclear whether<br />
this plan is related <strong>to</strong> the $25 million “emergency repatriation”<br />
program entitled “Come Home <strong>to</strong> Choose,”<br />
unveiled in mid-2010 by the humanitarian affairs and<br />
disaster management ministry of the government of<br />
Southern Sudan, under which 1.5 million Sudanese<br />
from the North would return <strong>to</strong> the South in time for<br />
the December 2010 referendum on secession from the<br />
North. The program had prompted concerns that the<br />
returns were politically motivated and would be neither<br />
voluntary nor durable, as aid organizations already had<br />
difficulty integrating existing returnees. 110<br />
107 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General<br />
on the Sudan, S/2009/61, 30 January 2009, para. 47, p. 9<br />
(www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep09.htm).<br />
108 IOM, IOM Tracking of Returns Project: Total Returns<br />
<strong>to</strong> Southern Sudan and Southern Kordofan, Post CPA <strong>to</strong><br />
December 2009, March 2010, p. 9 (www.iom.ch/jahia/.../<br />
docs/tracking_returns_annual_report_dec2009.pdf).<br />
109 Refugees International, South Sudan: Urgent Action<br />
Needed <strong>to</strong> Avert Collapse, 26 March 2009 (www.<br />
refugeesinternational.org).<br />
110 Refugees International, “Statement by Refugees<br />
International on the Government of Southern Sudan’s<br />
Mass Repatriation Plans,” 27 August 2010 (www.refugeesinternational.org);<br />
Agence France-Presse, “South<br />
148<br />
With the independence of South Sudan in July 2011,<br />
national responsibility for securing durable solutions<br />
<strong>to</strong> displacement has shifted fully <strong>to</strong> the government of<br />
South Sudan. Given the scale of the displacement and<br />
the centrality of the issue <strong>to</strong> the conflict, securing durable<br />
solutions for the millions of IDPs and refugees<br />
from South Sudan surely will be among the greatest<br />
challenges faced by this young country as well as among<br />
the main criteria by which its new government will be<br />
judged.<br />
In Darfur, conflict displaced 2.7 million people IDPs and<br />
300,000 refugees from 2003-09 and displacement continues,<br />
with 268,000 new IDPs in 2010 and ongoing displacement<br />
in 2011, though some returns also have taken<br />
place. Various efforts <strong>to</strong> halt the violence and resolve the<br />
conflict have been attempted but, <strong>to</strong> date, have failed <strong>to</strong><br />
secure a comprehensive and lasting peace agreement. In<br />
2006, the Darfur Peace Agreement was brokered after<br />
consultations with various armed groups. 111 However,<br />
only one of the various nonstate armed groups in<br />
Darfur—the Sudan Liberation Movement—signed<br />
the agreement with the government, and in 2011, the<br />
group’s leader, Minni Minnawi, retracted his support<br />
for the deal entirely. In 2009, the African Union and<br />
United Nations restarted peace talks for Darfur, which<br />
were hosted by the government of Qatar. Together<br />
with the government of Sudan, all the nonstate armed<br />
groups had a standing invitation <strong>to</strong> join the talks, but<br />
only the Liberation and Justice Movement (a recently<br />
formed amalgam of several armed factions) and, only<br />
sporadically, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM),<br />
a long-standing and militarily significant rebel group,<br />
participated in the talks. The return of refugees and<br />
Sudan Plans Return of 1.5 Million for Referendum,” 24<br />
August 2010 (www.nation.co.ke/News/africa/South%20<br />
Sudan%20plans%20return%20of%201.5%20million%20<br />
for%20referendum/-/1066/995754/-/dfd1qdz/-/); Hannah<br />
Entwisle, The End of the Road? A Review of UNHCR’s Role<br />
in the Return and Reintegration of Internally Displaced<br />
Populations, UNHCR, Evaluation Reports, 1 July 2010<br />
(www.unhcr.org/4c4989e89.html).<br />
111 See the full text of the peace agreements at UNDP Sudan<br />
(www.sd.undp.org/SudanPandA.htm).