From Responsibility to Response: Assessing National - Brookings

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CHAPTER 1 Assessing National Approaches to Internal Displacement: Findings from 15 Countries its distribution requirement, however. The government’s ad hoc, inconsistent approach to managing the crisis—characterized by bureaucratic red tape and other procedural obstacles, such as conflicting directives from different authorities— inhibited the effective and timely distribution of international humanitarian aid. 20 Following strong external pressure, particularly from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the government eventually lifted restrictions on disaster relief teams from UN agencies, bilateral government agencies, and international NGOs, allowing access to the cycloneaffected area in the Irrawaddy Delta region. 21 As in Myanmar, in Sri Lanka the government has restricted international humanitarian assistance and created bureaucratic hurdles curtailing access and assistance. As discussed further in the extended case study, humanitarian access to and within the country, especially in the North, has often been restricted or even denied through administrative obstacles and the government’s outright ordering of the withdrawal of humanitarian agencies. 22 Senior government officials have gone as far as accusing UN and other international agencies of being supporters or sympathizers of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. IDPs have largely borne the brunt of the aid restrictions. 23 In addition, since 2006, humanitarian aid workers have increasingly become a target of violent attacks. 24 20 ICG, Burma/Myanmar after Nargis: Time to Normalise Aid Relations, Asia Report No. 161–20 October 2008, pp. 3–4 (www.crisisgroup.org). 21 Elizabeth Ferris and Lex Rieffel, “Cyclone Nargis: Catalyst for Change in Myanmar?,” Brookings Institution, 16 May 2008 (www.brookings.edu/opinions/2008/0516_ myanmar_ferris.aspx); ODI–Humanitarian Practice Network, Negotiating Humanitarian Access to Cyclone- Affected Areas of Myanmar: A Review, 31 December 2008 (www.odihpn.org). 22 See chapter 2 of this volume. 23 Amnesty International, Stop the War on Civilians in Sri Lanka: A Briefing on the Humanitarian Crisis and Lack of Human Rights Protection, 15 March 2009 (www.amnesty. org). 24 Center for Policy Alternatives, Trincomalee High Security Zone and Special Economic Zone, 7 September 2009 (http:// 172 The situation in Sudan has been one of the most complicated in the world in terms of both access and security for humanitarian workers. While the government has allowed international organizations to work in Sudan, it has limited their access in various ways, including by creating bureaucratic obstacles and failing to guarantee the security of humanitarian operations. The result has been increasing attacks on humanitarian aid workers, especially in Darfur, impeding the delivery of aid even as the humanitarian needs of IDPs and other affected populations increased. 25 In March 2007, the government of Sudan and the United Nations signed the Joint Communiqué on Facilitation of Humanitarian Activities in Darfur. In the communiqué, the Sudanese government reaffirmed “its commitment to continue to support, protect and facilitate all humanitarian operations in Darfur,” including by fast-tracking the documents that international nongovernmental organizations require to operate. 26 This so-called Moratorium on Restrictions was extended by President Omar al-Bashir to January 2010. 27 According to the UN, following President al-Bashir’s March 2009 indictment by the International Criminal Court for war crimes and crimes against humanity, government-imposed restrictions on aid in Darfur increased. On 4 March 2009, the court issued its first arrest warrant for al-Bashir, which coincided with a wave of international aid worker kidnappings in transcurrents.com/tc/Trincomalee_HSZ_SEZ.pdf). 25 See, for example, Overseas Development Institute, Humanitarian Issues in Darfur, Sudan, Humanitarian Policy Group Briefing Note, April 2004 (www.odi.org.uk); IDMC, Sudan: Slow IDP Return to South While Darfur Crisis Continues Unabated, August 2006 (www.internaldisplacement.org). 26 Joint Communiqué between the Government of Sudan and the United Nations on Facilitation of Humanitarian Activities in Darfur, 2007, para. 1 (http://ocha-gwapps1.unog.ch/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/ SNAA-7Q2554?OpenDocument). 27 UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator, “Darfur Humanitarian Profile No. 34,” 1 January 2009 (www. unsudanig.org).
Benchmark 12 Cooperation with International and Regional Organizations Darfur. 28 Immediately after the warrant was issued, the Sudanese government revoked the operating licenses of thirteen INGOs and disbanded three national NGOs in Darfur, 29 accusing them of spying for the court and passing on information about crimes committed in Darfur. 30 Some 40 percent of the total aid workers in northern Sudan—which had managed over half of the total humanitarian aid delivered to northern Sudan, including the eastern states and the Three Areas—were directly affected by the expulsions. 31 The expulsion threatened to severely obstruct the delivery of health services to 1.5 million people, water and sanitation to 1.16 million and food aid to 1.1 million people—many of them IDPs. In June 2009, three of the expelled NGOs—CARE, Mercy Corps, Save the Children and the expelled development firm, Planning and Development Collaborative International (PADCO) resumed operations in Darfur by registering under different names and logos. The announcement by UN Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator John Holmes that the NGOs had been allowed to “return” to Darfur sparked a sharply negative response from the Sudanese government, which asserted that Sudan was hosting new NGOs with new names and logos, not allowing the expelled organizations to return. 32 Since then there 28 “Darfur One Year after NGOs Expelled,” Radio Netherlands Worldwide, 4 March 2010 (www.rnw.nl/internationaljustice/article/darfur-one -year-after-ngos-expelled). 29 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan, S/2009/211, 17 April 2009, para. 50. 30 “Sudan Expels NGOs, Defies Hague Court,” Mail and Guardian, 5 March 2009 (www.mg.co.za/article/2009-03- 05-sudan-expels-ngos-defies-hague-court); “Darfur One Year after NGOs Expelled,” Radio Netherlands Worldwide. 31 Humanitarian Policy Group, ALNAP, “Where to Now? Agency Expulsions in Sudan: Consequences and Next Steps,” 26 March 2009 (www.odi.org.uk); IRIN, “Sudan: Expulsions Leave Gaps in Three Areas, Eastern Region,” 31 March 2009 (www.irinnews.org/Report. aspx?ReportId=83708). 32 BBC, “Sudan ‘Allows Aid Agencies Back,’” 12 June 2009 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8096214.stm); Michael Kleinman, “Tough Choices for Agencies Expelled from Darfur,” Humanitarian Practice Network, Overseas Development Initiative, 6 May 2009 (www.odihpn.org/ 173 have been spikes in attacks on humanitarian workers in Darfur. Darfur has been a dangerous operating environment not only for humanitarian actors, but also for other UN personnel. As of June 2011, ninety UN– African Union Mission in Darfur personnel had been killed since the mission began in 2008. 33 While historically the government of Yemen has blocked access to displaced populations and impeded the work of humanitarian organizations during the conflict, following the February 2010 cease-fire agreement for the north of the country, it began to permit international agencies more access to facilitate the delivery of aid, albeit with limitations. The government reportedly was worried that aid would fall into rebel hands. 34 Aid agencies granted access to conflict-affected regions have faced significant insecurity, which has consistently undermined and at times required them to suspend their activities. 35 Renewed armed conflict in late 2010 rendered humanitarian access very challenging, with UN reporting severe access restrictions in the governorates of Sa’ada and Al Jawf in the north, particularly for international staff. 36 Ongoing hostilities and access restrictions, in addition to attacks on international NGO personnel and assets, were also reported in 2011 in the northern governorates report.asp?id=2998); VOA News, “Sudan Denies Some Expelled NGOs Returning,” 11 June 2009 (www1.voanews. com/english/news/a-13-2009-06-11-voa52-68802962. html); ENews, “Sudan Denies Expelled Aid Groups Allowed to Return,” 14 June 2009 (www.enews.ma/sudandenies_i133254_1.html). 33 UN African Union Mission in Darfur, “UNAMID Facts and Figures” (www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/ unamid/facts.shtml). 34 Human Rights Watch, “All Quiet on the Northern Front?” March 2010, p. 51 (www.hrw.org/en/reports/2010/04/07/ all-quiet-northern-front-0). 35 IDMC, Yemen: Constrained Response to Protection Needs of IDPs and Returnees, July 2009, p. 113 (www.internaldisplacement.org). 36 See, for example, OCHA, Yemen: 2011 Humanitarian Response Plan (http://reliefweb.int).
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The Brookings Institution - London
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From Responsibility to Response: As
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CONTENTS Acronyms .................
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ACRONYMS AIHRC Afghanistan Independ
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FOREWORD It is with great pleasure
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Given the large num
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It is a central tenet of internatio
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legislation relevant to IDPs. Still
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amend existing ones, in line with t
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Background and Aims of the Study In
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displacement persists for several y
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operationalizing the responsibiliti
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Therefore, it is not surprising tha
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Azerbaijani, Chinese, French, Portu
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National Initiatives In Iraq, IOM p
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of the country. 62 In addition, six
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in French and Spanish depending on
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serves only to supplant and absolve
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CHAPTER 1 Assessing National Approa
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Benchmark 1 Benchmark 1 Prevent Dis
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Benchmark 1 Prevent Displacement an
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Benchmark 2 Raise National Awarenes
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Conclusion Benchmark 2 Raise Nation
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Benchmark 3 Data Collection on Inte
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—Current location and location of
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its registration rolls intra-urban
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and profiling of three types of IDP
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the government of Afghanistan under
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Benchmark 4 Training on the Rights
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actions of DRC authorities and nong
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the provision of technical support
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Justice, National Cohesion and Cons
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February 2010; one outcome of the t
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Benchmark 5 Ensure a Legal Framewor
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Conclusion Benchmark 5 Ensure a Leg
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Benchmark 6 Develop a National Poli
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Benchmark 7 Designate an Institutio
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not necessarily influence such chan
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Institutional mandate and responsib
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this body include preparing “stra
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lead state agency may turn to other
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a division of functions being made
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Benchmark 8 Benchmark 8 Support NHR
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Benchmark 8 Support NHRIs to Integr
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Benchmark 9 Facilitate IDPs’ Part
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The process of participation is gen
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Georgia represents an especially in
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about the national policy. 16 Sudan
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Georgia From Solidarity to Solution
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Kenya National Response to Internal
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Afghanistan Internal Displacement i
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Sri Lanka Gaps in the Government Re
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Domestic Financing Foreign financin
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This study seeks to shed light on h
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CHAPTER 3 Translating National Resp
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For each country case study, the ex
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5 6 Ensure a Legal Framework for Up
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9 9 a) Facilitate IDPs’ Participa
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12 Cooperate with International Com
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The Brookings Institution - London
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