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From Responsibility to Response: Assessing National - Brookings

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Georgia <strong>From</strong> Solidarity <strong>to</strong> Solutions: The Government <strong>Response</strong> <strong>to</strong> Internal Displacement in Georgia<br />

person of the commission. 112 The resulting strategy<br />

designated the MRA as responsible for performing “the<br />

leading role, responsibility and coordination function<br />

for the elaboration of programs and moni<strong>to</strong>ring<br />

outcomes of their implementation” related <strong>to</strong> the State<br />

Strategy on IDPs. 113 In December 2008, the MRA’s responsibilities<br />

for the State Strategy were updated and<br />

elaborated <strong>to</strong> include developing a revised action plan<br />

for implementation of the strategy with an emphasis on<br />

its second goal, improving the living conditions of IDPs<br />

in their place of displacement. 114<br />

His<strong>to</strong>rically, however, the MRA has underperformed as<br />

the national institutional focal point for addressing internal<br />

displacement. In particular, the ministry has been<br />

constrained by weak institutional capacity and limited<br />

political leverage within the government. Indeed, until<br />

only very recently, the MRA could have been described<br />

as a “caretaker” ministry, focused mainly on care and<br />

maintenance issues—namely disbursing IDPs’ monthly<br />

allowance and supervising management of the collective<br />

centers—even more than a decade after displacement<br />

first occurred. In line with government policy emphasizing<br />

exclusively the right <strong>to</strong> return, MRA was inactive<br />

in advocating for more durable solutions for IDPs—for<br />

instance, improved shelter and socioeconomic conditions,<br />

enhanced self-reliance, and the possibility of local<br />

integration.<br />

At the same time, the MRA’s role as the focal point institution<br />

for IDPs was undermined by the strong and<br />

active role played until recently by the so-called Abkhaz<br />

government in exile. Following the mass displacement<br />

from Abkhazia in 1993–94, the government, including<br />

elected officials as well as administrative staff, that had<br />

112 Government of Georgia, Decree No. 80, On Establishing<br />

Government Commission for Elaborating the State Strategy<br />

for Internally Displaced Persons–Persecuted Persons, 23<br />

February 2006.<br />

113 Government of Georgia, State Strategy, Chapter VII.<br />

114 Government of Georgia, Decree No. 854, On Making<br />

Additions <strong>to</strong> Ordinance No. 47 as of 2 February 2007 on<br />

Approving State Strategy for Internally Displaced Persons, 4<br />

December 2008.<br />

203<br />

been in place in Abkhazia effectively was reconstituted,<br />

now based in Georgia proper. The Abkhaz government<br />

in exile was actively involved in supporting the statelevel<br />

response; in fact, each ministry or department of<br />

the central Georgian government allowed its counterpart<br />

from the government in exile <strong>to</strong> use its facilities.<br />

Activities in which the Abkhaz government in exile<br />

actively engaged included disbursing the monthly stipend<br />

<strong>to</strong> IDPs; facilitating family tracing; allocating<br />

shelter <strong>to</strong> IDPs; distributing humanitarian assistance;<br />

and providing health services and education, including<br />

through “exile” schools that reconstituted schools<br />

based on the children’s place of origin and even employed<br />

the same teacher. The Abkhaz government in<br />

exile also maintained its own military commissariat,<br />

tax authorities, police force, and so forth, 115 although<br />

some of these entities, including the police force in<br />

exile, were disbanded after the Rose Revolution of 2003.<br />

That parallel system of services had certain advantages<br />

in terms of preserving IDPs’ links <strong>to</strong> their community<br />

of origin as well as providing employment for displaced<br />

civil servants, including teachers, but especially after<br />

displacement became protracted, it did not facilitate<br />

IDPs’ integration in<strong>to</strong> the local communities in their<br />

place of displacement. The government in exile also<br />

exerted strong political influence, on both IDPs and the<br />

central government, advocating a hard line approach<br />

that emphasized return only, and until 2004, the central<br />

Georgian government officially recognized the exiled<br />

government of Abkhazia as the political representative<br />

of the displaced (see Benchmark 9b). In practice as<br />

well as perception, it supplanted the MRA in terms of<br />

several core responsibilities <strong>to</strong>ward IDPs and eclipsed<br />

the MRA in terms of leading the government response<br />

115 UN Commission on Human Rights, Report of the<br />

Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally<br />

Displaced Persons, Mr. Francis Deng—Addendum: Profiles<br />

in Displacement: Georgia, 2001, paras. 19, 53, 55; Julia<br />

Kharashvili, “Georgia: Coping by Organizing. Displaced<br />

Georgians from Abkhazia,” in Caught Between Borders:<br />

<strong>Response</strong> Strategies of the Internally Displaced, edited by<br />

Marc Vincent and Birgitte Refslund Sorensen (London:<br />

Plu<strong>to</strong> Press), pp. 234–35.

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