From Responsibility to Response: Assessing National - Brookings
From Responsibility to Response: Assessing National - Brookings
From Responsibility to Response: Assessing National - Brookings
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Georgia <strong>From</strong> Solidarity <strong>to</strong> Solutions: The Government <strong>Response</strong> <strong>to</strong> Internal Displacement in Georgia<br />
person of the commission. 112 The resulting strategy<br />
designated the MRA as responsible for performing “the<br />
leading role, responsibility and coordination function<br />
for the elaboration of programs and moni<strong>to</strong>ring<br />
outcomes of their implementation” related <strong>to</strong> the State<br />
Strategy on IDPs. 113 In December 2008, the MRA’s responsibilities<br />
for the State Strategy were updated and<br />
elaborated <strong>to</strong> include developing a revised action plan<br />
for implementation of the strategy with an emphasis on<br />
its second goal, improving the living conditions of IDPs<br />
in their place of displacement. 114<br />
His<strong>to</strong>rically, however, the MRA has underperformed as<br />
the national institutional focal point for addressing internal<br />
displacement. In particular, the ministry has been<br />
constrained by weak institutional capacity and limited<br />
political leverage within the government. Indeed, until<br />
only very recently, the MRA could have been described<br />
as a “caretaker” ministry, focused mainly on care and<br />
maintenance issues—namely disbursing IDPs’ monthly<br />
allowance and supervising management of the collective<br />
centers—even more than a decade after displacement<br />
first occurred. In line with government policy emphasizing<br />
exclusively the right <strong>to</strong> return, MRA was inactive<br />
in advocating for more durable solutions for IDPs—for<br />
instance, improved shelter and socioeconomic conditions,<br />
enhanced self-reliance, and the possibility of local<br />
integration.<br />
At the same time, the MRA’s role as the focal point institution<br />
for IDPs was undermined by the strong and<br />
active role played until recently by the so-called Abkhaz<br />
government in exile. Following the mass displacement<br />
from Abkhazia in 1993–94, the government, including<br />
elected officials as well as administrative staff, that had<br />
112 Government of Georgia, Decree No. 80, On Establishing<br />
Government Commission for Elaborating the State Strategy<br />
for Internally Displaced Persons–Persecuted Persons, 23<br />
February 2006.<br />
113 Government of Georgia, State Strategy, Chapter VII.<br />
114 Government of Georgia, Decree No. 854, On Making<br />
Additions <strong>to</strong> Ordinance No. 47 as of 2 February 2007 on<br />
Approving State Strategy for Internally Displaced Persons, 4<br />
December 2008.<br />
203<br />
been in place in Abkhazia effectively was reconstituted,<br />
now based in Georgia proper. The Abkhaz government<br />
in exile was actively involved in supporting the statelevel<br />
response; in fact, each ministry or department of<br />
the central Georgian government allowed its counterpart<br />
from the government in exile <strong>to</strong> use its facilities.<br />
Activities in which the Abkhaz government in exile<br />
actively engaged included disbursing the monthly stipend<br />
<strong>to</strong> IDPs; facilitating family tracing; allocating<br />
shelter <strong>to</strong> IDPs; distributing humanitarian assistance;<br />
and providing health services and education, including<br />
through “exile” schools that reconstituted schools<br />
based on the children’s place of origin and even employed<br />
the same teacher. The Abkhaz government in<br />
exile also maintained its own military commissariat,<br />
tax authorities, police force, and so forth, 115 although<br />
some of these entities, including the police force in<br />
exile, were disbanded after the Rose Revolution of 2003.<br />
That parallel system of services had certain advantages<br />
in terms of preserving IDPs’ links <strong>to</strong> their community<br />
of origin as well as providing employment for displaced<br />
civil servants, including teachers, but especially after<br />
displacement became protracted, it did not facilitate<br />
IDPs’ integration in<strong>to</strong> the local communities in their<br />
place of displacement. The government in exile also<br />
exerted strong political influence, on both IDPs and the<br />
central government, advocating a hard line approach<br />
that emphasized return only, and until 2004, the central<br />
Georgian government officially recognized the exiled<br />
government of Abkhazia as the political representative<br />
of the displaced (see Benchmark 9b). In practice as<br />
well as perception, it supplanted the MRA in terms of<br />
several core responsibilities <strong>to</strong>ward IDPs and eclipsed<br />
the MRA in terms of leading the government response<br />
115 UN Commission on Human Rights, Report of the<br />
Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally<br />
Displaced Persons, Mr. Francis Deng—Addendum: Profiles<br />
in Displacement: Georgia, 2001, paras. 19, 53, 55; Julia<br />
Kharashvili, “Georgia: Coping by Organizing. Displaced<br />
Georgians from Abkhazia,” in Caught Between Borders:<br />
<strong>Response</strong> Strategies of the Internally Displaced, edited by<br />
Marc Vincent and Birgitte Refslund Sorensen (London:<br />
Plu<strong>to</strong> Press), pp. 234–35.