From Responsibility to Response: Assessing National - Brookings

More documents

Recommendations

Info

CHAPTER 2 Case Studies: Georgia, Kenya, Afghanistan and Sri Lanka infrastructure, such as community utilities and institutions destroyed during the post-election violence. 132 On 5 May 2008, the government launched Operation Rudi Nyumbani to close all camps and facilitate the return of IDPs to predisplacement areas. In August 2008, the government launched Operation Ujirani Mwema (Operation Good Neighborliness) to promote reconciliation and reintegration of returnees. That was followed by Operation Tujenge Pamoja (Operation Build Together), aimed at reconstructing the destroyed houses and supporting recovery of livelihoods for people who had returned to their farms. The government reconstructed twenty-two destroyed or vandalized schools and put up thirty-two new police stations and 200 patrol bases to enhance security in the regions most affected by violence and displacement. The heavy police presence has produced positive results, as witnessed during the peaceful referendum in August 2010. 133 The government and the Early Recovery and Shelter Clusters, with support from the African Development Bank, the UN Central Emergency Response Fund and development partners have constructed over 19,000 houses. 134 132 OCHA Kenya, Humanitarian Update, vol. 3-48. 2008-2010 (http://ochaonline.un.org/Kenya/reports/ UNOCHAHumanitarianUpdates). 133 South Consulting, KNDR Quarterly Review Report, October 2010 (www.kenyadialogue.org). On the flip side, the heavy security deployment aggravated resentment and feelings of subjugation among local communities, who complained that the government had “poured” hundreds of police officers into communities to protect non-locals. See South Consulting, Quarterly Review Report ,Oct 2010 134 Members of the Shelter Cluster who have collaborated with MOSSP to support shelter reconstruction include Habitat for Humanity, International Organization for Migration, Goal Ireland, Kenya Red Cross Society, Danish Refugee Council and the Catholic Church; interviews in Nairobi and the Rift Valley, October and November 2010 and February and April 2011. 250 The MoSSP, with funding from the African Development Bank, is running a four-year project to offer fertilizers and farm inputs to returnees. It is also running a four-year project, with UNDP support, on sustainable livelihoods, 135 including animal restocking, farm inputs, fishing and construction of fish ponds, vocational training and establishment of District Business Solution Centers for information gathering, capacity building and coordination of business initiatives in violenceaffected regions. Government officials in their official and personal capacity have supported efforts to restore normalcy. For instance, individual politicians spearheaded peace activities such as Operation Karibu Nyumbani (Operation Welcome Back Home) in 2008. 136 Similarly, media houses and NGOs have facilitated reconciliation programs, peace meetings and conflict management training workshops. 137 The government established two commissions, the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission and the National Cohesion and Integration Commission in July and September 2009 respectively, to promote healing and national cohesion. To fight impunity for perpetrators of political violence, in 2009 the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights initiated drafting of the Hate Speech Bill 138 and in March 2010 the International Criminal Court (ICC) began investigations into the Kenya situation. The ICC intervened after it became apparent that the government was unwilling to fight impunity, particularly among senior politicians. Impunity is a major cause of political 135 Interviews with MoSSP and a program officer at UNDP, February 2011. 136 “Close Camps, Say Rift Valley MPs,” Daily Nation, 22 February 2009. 137 For review of efforts to promote peace and address root causes, see Agenda 2 and Agenda 4 sections of successive status of implementation reports by South Consulting (www.kenyadialogue.org). 138 The draft was incorporated into the National Cohesion and Integration Act, which established the National Cohesion and Integration Commission.
Kenya National Response to Internal Displacement: Achievements, Challenges and Lessons from Kenya violence and displacement in Kenya. 139 Lethargy in holding perpetrators accountable contrasted sharply with public demand for accountability, particularly once the country stabilized, as shown in figure 2-3 below. Under the framework of Agenda 4 of the National Accord, the government has been undertaking legal and institutional reforms and rolling out programs to address the root causes of violence and displacement. These include measures to implement land reforms; to fight poverty, inequality, regional imbalances and unemployment, particularly among the youth; and to promote national unity and transparency and accountability. 140 Despite such positive actions, an unknown number of IDPs remain in at least twenty transit camps and camplike self-help groups. 141 The majority are unable to 139 Susan Mueller, “The Political Economy of Kenya’s Crisis,” Journal of Eastern African Studies, vol. 2, no. 2 (2008), pp. 185–210. 140 For progress made in each of these areas, see the Agenda 4 section of monitoring and evaluation review reports, South Consulting Review Reports, 2008-2010, dialoguekenya. org 141 Statistics from the MoSSP show that by end of May 2011 there were only eight transit camps with a total of 158 households remaining in one district in the Rift Valley. However, a spot check by the author in late May 2011 revealed that there were many more camps in at least six districts, and some of the camps on the government list do not exist on the ground. 251 re-establish sustainable livelihoods or occupy houses reconstructed for them. The Kenya National Commission on Human Rights and some members of the Protection Cluster criticized Operation Rudi Nyumbani as untimely and “a failure,” arguing that return should have Figure 2-3. What is the best way to prevent future violence in your community? Feb-2010 Nov-2009 Dec-2008 1% 7% Source: South Consulting data, on file with author 19% 16% 37% ■ Prosecute those responsible ■ Promote national unity 47% been preceded by or done concurrently with confidence-building measures and peace-building activities in return areas. 142 The push factors employed by the government to spur movement out of camps (including use of force), 143 along with lack of information, lack of incentives to return , 144 disconnection of water supplies, and the end of general food distribution and promises of compensation once IDPs were back on their farms, induced involuntary return and were inconsistent with 142 Mushtaq Najum, “Doubly Displaced,” IPS News, 28 June 2008 (http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=43007); KHRC, Tale of Force, Lies and Threats: Operation Rudi Nyumbani in Perspective (Nairobi: KHRC, 2008) 143 For instance, police beat up IDPs and forcibly closed Endebess Camp in TransNzoia, while two IDPs protesting the resettlement program were shot dead by police officers at Nakuru Show Ground Camp. OCHA Kenya, Kenya Humanitarian Update, vol. 19, May 2008. 144 The government offered monetary incentives to encourage people to return home, paying Ksh (Kenyan shillings) 10,000 (approximately $127) to those who agreed to ‘go back home’ Jacqueline Klopp and Nuur Mohamud Sheekh, “Can the Guiding Principles Make a Difference in Kenya?” Forced Migration Review, Tenth Anniversary of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (2008).
Page 1 and 2:
The Brookings Institution - London
Page 3 and 4:
From Responsibility to Response: As
Page 5 and 6:
CONTENTS Acronyms .................
Page 7 and 8:
ACRONYMS AIHRC Afghanistan Independ
Page 9 and 10:
FOREWORD It is with great pleasure
Page 11 and 12:
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Given the large num
Page 13 and 14:
It is a central tenet of internatio
Page 15 and 16:
legislation relevant to IDPs. Still
Page 17 and 18:
amend existing ones, in line with t
Page 19 and 20:
Background and Aims of the Study In
Page 21 and 22:
displacement persists for several y
Page 23 and 24:
operationalizing the responsibiliti
Page 25 and 26:
Therefore, it is not surprising tha
Page 27 and 28:
Azerbaijani, Chinese, French, Portu
Page 29 and 30:
National Initiatives In Iraq, IOM p
Page 31 and 32:
of the country. 62 In addition, six
Page 33 and 34:
in French and Spanish depending on
Page 35 and 36:
serves only to supplant and absolve
Page 37 and 38:
CHAPTER 1 Assessing National Approa
Page 39 and 40:
Benchmark 1 Benchmark 1 Prevent Dis
Page 41 and 42:
Benchmark 1 Prevent Displacement an
Page 43 and 44:
Page 45 and 46:
Page 47 and 48:
Page 49 and 50:
Benchmark 2 Raise National Awarenes
Page 51 and 52:
Page 53 and 54:
Page 55 and 56:
Page 57 and 58:
Page 59 and 60:
Conclusion Benchmark 2 Raise Nation
Page 61 and 62:
Benchmark 3 Data Collection on Inte
Page 63 and 64:
—Current location and location of
Page 65 and 66:
its registration rolls intra-urban
Page 67 and 68:
and profiling of three types of IDP
Page 69 and 70:
the government of Afghanistan under
Page 71 and 72:
Benchmark 4 Training on the Rights
Page 73 and 74:
actions of DRC authorities and nong
Page 75 and 76:
the provision of technical support
Page 77 and 78:
Justice, National Cohesion and Cons
Page 79 and 80:
February 2010; one outcome of the t
Page 81 and 82:
Benchmark 5 Ensure a Legal Framewor
Page 83 and 84:
Page 85 and 86:
Page 87 and 88:
Page 89 and 90:
Page 91 and 92:
Conclusion Benchmark 5 Ensure a Leg
Page 93 and 94:
Benchmark 6 Develop a National Poli
Page 95 and 96:
Page 97 and 98:
Page 99 and 100:
Page 101 and 102:
Page 103 and 104:
Page 105 and 106:
Benchmark 7 Designate an Institutio
Page 107 and 108:
not necessarily influence such chan
Page 109 and 110:
Institutional mandate and responsib
Page 111 and 112:
this body include preparing “stra
Page 113 and 114:
lead state agency may turn to other
Page 115 and 116:
a division of functions being made
Page 117 and 118:
Benchmark 8 Benchmark 8 Support NHR
Page 119 and 120:
Benchmark 8 Support NHRIs to Integr
Page 121 and 122:
Page 123 and 124:
Page 125 and 126:
Page 127 and 128:
Page 129 and 130:
Page 131 and 132:
Benchmark 9 Facilitate IDPs’ Part
Page 133 and 134:
The process of participation is gen
Page 135 and 136:
Georgia represents an especially in
Page 137 and 138:
about the national policy. 16 Sudan
Page 139 and 140:
and reinforce durable solutions. 27
Page 141 and 142:
was 12 million, or 62 percent of th
Page 143 and 144:
displacement. 52 In the run-up to t
Page 145 and 146:
vote is by no means consistent (for
Page 147 and 148:
Benchmark 10 Establish the Conditio
Page 149 and 150:
Page 151 and 152:
Page 153 and 154:
Page 155 and 156:
Page 157 and 158:
Page 159 and 160:
Page 161 and 162:
Page 163 and 164:
Page 165 and 166:
Page 167 and 168:
Page 169 and 170:
Page 171 and 172:
Page 173 and 174:
Page 175 and 176:
Page 177 and 178:
Benchmark 11 Allocate Adequate Reso
Page 179 and 180:
also ordered the National Council f
Page 181 and 182:
In Sri Lanka, 16 it is difficult to
Page 183 and 184:
Conclusion As indicated in the intr
Page 185 and 186:
Benchmark 12 Cooperation with Inter
Page 187 and 188:
Page 189 and 190:
Page 191 and 192:
Page 193 and 194:
North Darfur, Sudan/ A woman collec
Page 195 and 196:
CHAPTER 2 Case Studies Georgia, Ken
Page 197 and 198:
Georgia From Solidarity to Solution
Page 199 and 200:
Page 201 and 202:
Page 203 and 204:
Page 205 and 206:
Page 207 and 208:
Page 209 and 210:
Page 211 and 212:
Page 213 and 214:
Page 215 and 216:
Page 217 and 218: Georgia From Solidarity to Solution
Page 249 and 250: Kenya National Response to Internal
Page 267: Kenya National Response to Internal
Page 277 and 278: Afghanistan Internal Displacement i
Page 299 and 300: Sri Lanka Gaps in the Government Re
Page 315 and 316: Domestic Financing Foreign financin
Page 319 and 320:
This study seeks to shed light on h
Page 321 and 322:
CHAPTER 3 Translating National Resp
Page 323 and 324:
Page 325 and 326:
Page 327 and 328:
Page 329 and 330:
Page 331 and 332:
Page 333 and 334:
Page 335 and 336:
Page 337 and 338:
Page 339 and 340:
For each country case study, the ex
Page 341 and 342:
5 6 Ensure a Legal Framework for Up
Page 343 and 344:
9 9 a) Facilitate IDPs’ Participa
Page 345 and 346:
12 Cooperate with International Com
Page 347:
The Brookings Institution - London
show all

From Responsibility to Response: Assessing National - Brookings

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?