From Responsibility to Response: Assessing National - Brookings
From Responsibility to Response: Assessing National - Brookings
From Responsibility to Response: Assessing National - Brookings
You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles
YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.
Benchmark 2 Raise <strong>National</strong> Awareness of the Problem of Displacement<br />
ernment office charged with coordinating assistance <strong>to</strong><br />
IDPs, the Ministry of Social Affairs, lacked visibility as<br />
well as the funds and capacity <strong>to</strong> respond <strong>to</strong> the needs<br />
of IDPs. Financial and institutional capacity remains a<br />
constraint for the committee.<br />
<strong>National</strong> authorities in Myanmar do not recognize the<br />
existence of conflict-induced internal displacement and<br />
hence do not acknowledge their responsibility <strong>to</strong> address<br />
it. However, displacement due <strong>to</strong> natural disasters,<br />
while initially ignored by the government after devastating<br />
Cyclone Nargis in 2008, has been acknowledged as<br />
an issue in a government plan developed with regional<br />
and international partners, the Post-Nargis Recovery<br />
and Preparedness Plan.<br />
The vice president of the government of Southern Sudan<br />
(GoSS) admitted during the visit of the Representative<br />
of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced<br />
Persons (RSG) in 2005 that there was a lack of sensitivity<br />
<strong>to</strong> IDPs’ rights among military, police, and administrative<br />
structures within the GoSS. He acknowledged<br />
that more advocacy was needed on behalf of the human<br />
rights of IDPs. 20 Information about any subsequent government<br />
efforts <strong>to</strong> rectify these issues was not available,<br />
but the government’s Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs<br />
and Disaster Management implemented an “emergency<br />
repatriation” program with the slogan “Come Home <strong>to</strong><br />
Choose” <strong>to</strong> assist 1.5 million Southern Sudanese returning<br />
from the North and Egypt in time for the January<br />
2011 referendum on secession from the North. 21 Given<br />
20 UN Commission on Human Rights, Report of the<br />
Representative of the Secretary-General on the Human<br />
Rights of Internally displaced Persons, Walter Kälin:<br />
Addendum: Mission <strong>to</strong> the Sudan, E/CN.4/2006/71/Add.6,<br />
13 February 2006, para. 57 (www2.ohchr.org/english/<br />
issues/idp/visits.htm).<br />
21 Refugees International, “Statement by Refugees<br />
International on the Government of Southern Sudan’s<br />
Mass Repatriation Plans,” 27 August 2010 (www.refugeesinternational.org/press-room/press-release/governmentsouthern-sudan%E2%80%99s-mass-repatriation);<br />
BBC,<br />
“South Sudan Plans Mass Return ahead of Referendum,”<br />
24 August 2010 (www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11073919);<br />
Hannah Entwisle, The End of the Road? A<br />
37<br />
reservations expressed by international ac<strong>to</strong>rs and lack<br />
of funding, the GoSS revised the program, launching its<br />
Accelerated Returns and Reintegration Initiative in late<br />
Oc<strong>to</strong>ber 2010. The revised program foresaw a longer<br />
period for return and a <strong>to</strong>tal of about half a million returnees<br />
before the January 2011 referendum. 22 Returns<br />
were fewer in number than the government had anticipated,<br />
however, and there was evidence that a lack of information<br />
has hindered IDPs’ return and reintegration<br />
in the South. For example, as the Internal Displacement<br />
Moni<strong>to</strong>ring Centre (IDMC) reported in May 2011:<br />
“Neither the GoSS nor state governments have formulated<br />
or publicised a clear policy on who is entitled <strong>to</strong><br />
land where, forcing people <strong>to</strong> try <strong>to</strong> keep their options<br />
open.” IDMC explains further:<br />
The GoSS has provided little or no information<br />
<strong>to</strong> IDPs on what they can expect upon<br />
returning. Several returnees <strong>to</strong>ld IDMC that no<br />
information was made available <strong>to</strong> them before<br />
they decided <strong>to</strong> return <strong>to</strong> their homes in the<br />
south. They emphasised that they were invited<br />
<strong>to</strong> return by their governments and so expected<br />
<strong>to</strong> be either able <strong>to</strong> return <strong>to</strong> their land or given<br />
alternative land on which <strong>to</strong> settle. 23<br />
The results of the lack of policy and communication<br />
have been seen on the ground. According <strong>to</strong> some humanitarian<br />
agencies, adequate information was “not<br />
systematically made available <strong>to</strong> IDPs [in Khar<strong>to</strong>um]<br />
about organised or spontaneous returns.” In November<br />
and December 2010, only 120,000 Southern Sudanese<br />
returned from Khar<strong>to</strong>um <strong>to</strong> the South. Many IDPs on<br />
the move from Khar<strong>to</strong>um have not yet made it <strong>to</strong> their<br />
villages; they are instead displaced in areas around their<br />
villages. Some returnees, such as the 16,000 displaced in<br />
Review of UNHCR’s Role in the Return and Reintegration<br />
of Internally Displaced Populations, UNHCR, Evaluation<br />
Reports, 1 July 2010 (www.unhcr.org/4c4989e89.html).<br />
22 IDMC, NRC, “Briefing paper on Southern Sudan: IDPs<br />
return <strong>to</strong> face slow land allocation, and no shelter, basic<br />
services or livelihoods,” 30 May 2011, p. 1 (www.internaldisplacement.org/briefing/south-sudan)<br />
23 Ibid., p. 2.