Living on the Margins. Minorities in South Asia - EURAC
Living on the Margins. Minorities in South Asia - EURAC
Living on the Margins. Minorities in South Asia - EURAC
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Prepared <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> frame of EURASIANet project,<br />
funded by <strong>the</strong> Seventh Framework Programme<br />
of <strong>the</strong> European Commissi<strong>on</strong>
“<str<strong>on</strong>g>Liv<strong>in</strong>g</str<strong>on</strong>g> <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Marg<strong>in</strong>s</strong>. <strong>M<strong>in</strong>orities</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Asia</strong>”<br />
Edited by<br />
Rita Manchanda<br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Asia</strong>n Forum for Human Rights<br />
EURASIA-Net Partners<br />
Accademia Europea Bolzano/Europäische Akademie Bozen (<strong>EURAC</strong>) – Bolzano/Bozen,<br />
(Italy), Brunel University – West L<strong>on</strong>d<strong>on</strong> (UK), Johann Wolfgang Goe<strong>the</strong>-Universität –<br />
Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong> (Germany), Mahanirban Calcutta Research Group (India), <strong>South</strong><br />
<strong>Asia</strong>n Forum for Human Rights (Nepal), Democratic Commissi<strong>on</strong> of Human<br />
Development (Pakistan), University of Dhaka (Bangladesh)<br />
The research lead<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong>se results has received fund<strong>in</strong>g from <strong>the</strong> European Community‘s<br />
Seventh Framework Programme [FP7/2007-2013] under grant agreement n° 216072.<br />
Kathmandu, September 2009<br />
1
I - Introducti<strong>on</strong><br />
Rita Manchanda<br />
II - Religious & Social <strong>M<strong>in</strong>orities</strong><br />
Table of C<strong>on</strong>tents<br />
A L<strong>on</strong>g Term C<strong>on</strong>temporary View of <strong>the</strong> Muslim Situati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> India<br />
Javed Alam<br />
H<strong>in</strong>dus <strong>in</strong> a Polarized Political Envir<strong>on</strong>ment: Bangladesh’s M<strong>in</strong>ority<br />
Afsan Chowdhury<br />
Religious <strong>M<strong>in</strong>orities</strong> <strong>in</strong> Pakistan: Mapp<strong>in</strong>g S<strong>in</strong>d & Baluchistan<br />
Ishtiaq Hussa<strong>in</strong><br />
Strangers <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> House: <strong>M<strong>in</strong>orities</strong> <strong>in</strong> Pakistani Textbooks<br />
Rub<strong>in</strong>a Saigol<br />
Muslims <strong>in</strong> Sri Lanka: Political Choices of a M<strong>in</strong>ority<br />
Farzana Haniffa<br />
III - Ethno-Nati<strong>on</strong>alist Asserti<strong>on</strong><br />
Sri Lanka: Recent Shifts <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> M<strong>in</strong>ority Rights Debate<br />
Jayadeva Uyangoda<br />
Inclusi<strong>on</strong> and Accountability <strong>in</strong> a ‘New’ Democratic Nepal<br />
Mahendra Lawoti<br />
The Challenge of Nati<strong>on</strong>al M<strong>in</strong>ority Questi<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> Pakistan<br />
Shahid Fiaz<br />
IV - Indigenous Peoples’ Rights<br />
The Indigenous Peoples :Victims of <strong>the</strong> Politics of Denial<br />
Tapan Kumar Bose<br />
Tribal Land Alienati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> Maharashtra: Legality, Illegality and Praxis<br />
Pradip Prabhu<br />
Legality and Pragmatism<br />
Usha Ramanathan<br />
2
INTRODUCTION<br />
Rita Manchanda<br />
Majority-M<strong>in</strong>ority Discourses <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Asia</strong><br />
The f<strong>in</strong>al soluti<strong>on</strong>- Partiti<strong>on</strong> 1947, did not resolve <strong>the</strong> subc<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ent’s m<strong>in</strong>ority questi<strong>on</strong>. It<br />
produced a <strong>South</strong> <strong>Asia</strong>n state system of ethnic k<strong>in</strong> states where a majority <strong>in</strong> <strong>on</strong>e state<br />
was a m<strong>in</strong>ority across <strong>the</strong> border, entangl<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>ority questi<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> power<br />
<strong>in</strong>tricacies of <strong>in</strong>ter state relati<strong>on</strong>s and even cast<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>stituent members of a m<strong>in</strong>ority<br />
group as ‘proxy citizens’ of an enemy state. In <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>al imag<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>, <strong>the</strong> questi<strong>on</strong> of<br />
m<strong>in</strong>ority rights c<strong>on</strong>jured anxieties about <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegrity of <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong> state and true<br />
‘bel<strong>on</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g’- spl<strong>in</strong>ter<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to questi<strong>on</strong>s of nati<strong>on</strong>alism vs separatism, of who is a true<br />
citizen and who a ‘proxy citizen, of communalism vs secularism, of ‘special rights (read<br />
‘appeasement’) vs equal rights (read ‘majority’ sett<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> norm) and ‘<strong>in</strong>sider’ vs<br />
‘outsider’ politics.<br />
Some seven decades after <strong>in</strong>dependence, <strong>the</strong> states of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Asia</strong> are still grappl<strong>in</strong>g with<br />
myriad sub-nati<strong>on</strong>alities and religious communities, a profusi<strong>on</strong> of l<strong>in</strong>guistic, ethnic and<br />
caste groups – all jostl<strong>in</strong>g for recogniti<strong>on</strong> and resources. The identities of such groups,<br />
under col<strong>on</strong>ial adm<strong>in</strong>istrati<strong>on</strong>s, had been politicized, and dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> process of<br />
c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al reforms <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> transiti<strong>on</strong> to <strong>in</strong>dependence, such identities became more<br />
entrenched. Democracy as practiced <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>se post col<strong>on</strong>ial states has got articulated <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
official discourse of majority and m<strong>in</strong>orities ra<strong>the</strong>r than transcend<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> politics of<br />
numbers.<br />
Post <strong>in</strong>dependence as <strong>the</strong>se countries transformed <strong>the</strong>mselves <strong>in</strong>to modern states, <strong>the</strong><br />
challenge was to c<strong>on</strong>struct a state before <strong>the</strong> emergence of nati<strong>on</strong>, of seek<strong>in</strong>g to make a<br />
‘people’ c<strong>on</strong>gruent with territorial borders. It produced <strong>the</strong> ‘modern’ m<strong>in</strong>ority<br />
problematic. As Andreas Wimmer, com<strong>in</strong>g from <strong>the</strong> doma<strong>in</strong> of anthropology to political<br />
science, argues “nati<strong>on</strong>alist and ethnic politics are not just a by product of modern state<br />
formati<strong>on</strong> (built <strong>on</strong> democracy, citizenship and popular sovereignty) but that modern<br />
pr<strong>in</strong>ciples and <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>s of <strong>in</strong>clusi<strong>on</strong> (of <strong>the</strong> ‘true nati<strong>on</strong>’) are tied to ethnic and nati<strong>on</strong>al<br />
forms of exclusi<strong>on</strong>, produc<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> ‘<strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r’.” i Such especially is so <strong>in</strong> multi ethnic,<br />
multi religious and multi l<strong>in</strong>gual societies.<br />
In <strong>South</strong> <strong>Asia</strong> – a land of m<strong>in</strong>orities, <strong>the</strong> challenge of pluralism is truly formidable. More<br />
than 800 languages are spoken <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> regi<strong>on</strong> and <strong>on</strong>ly 66% of <strong>the</strong> populati<strong>on</strong> have access<br />
to educati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir mo<strong>the</strong>r t<strong>on</strong>gue. ii “The M<strong>in</strong>ority like everywhere is a fluid identity <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Asia</strong>,” as Tapan Bose rem<strong>in</strong>ds us “Its markers are language, culture, religi<strong>on</strong> and<br />
ethnicity. But <strong>the</strong> most important marker is <strong>the</strong> positi<strong>on</strong> of ‘n<strong>on</strong>-dom<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>’ or<br />
3
‘powerlessness’. The history of <strong>the</strong> last seven decades of state or nati<strong>on</strong> mak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong><br />
<strong>Asia</strong> proves <strong>the</strong> axiom - democracies create m<strong>in</strong>orities. Nati<strong>on</strong> and State are majoritarian<br />
c<strong>on</strong>cepts. These are also repositories of power. Access and c<strong>on</strong>trol over <strong>the</strong>se <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>s<br />
of power and <strong>the</strong> distance from <strong>the</strong>se sources of power or denial of access def<strong>in</strong>e <strong>the</strong><br />
majority and <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>ority.” iii<br />
The early c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al debates of <strong>the</strong> states of <strong>the</strong> regi<strong>on</strong>, had reflected an awareness of<br />
<strong>the</strong> importance of democratiz<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong> to such an extent that ‘m<strong>in</strong>ority’ as a category<br />
of powerlessness disappears and numbers loose <strong>the</strong>ir political value. However driven by<br />
<strong>the</strong> exigencies of state power c<strong>on</strong>solidati<strong>on</strong> and <strong>the</strong> paranoia of <strong>the</strong> Great Partiti<strong>on</strong>, <strong>the</strong><br />
found<strong>in</strong>g elite did not anchor m<strong>in</strong>ority rights <strong>in</strong> an expand<strong>in</strong>g democratic agenda that<br />
would have paved <strong>the</strong> way for equal rights for all peoples. Instead, state ideology and<br />
architecture, <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly veered towards c<strong>on</strong>stitut<strong>in</strong>g a majoritarianism. The states of <strong>the</strong><br />
regi<strong>on</strong> showed up <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ability of a hegem<strong>on</strong>ic collectivity to deal equitably. Sukumar<br />
Muralidharan <strong>in</strong> his essay Media Modernity and <strong>M<strong>in</strong>orities</strong>, takes us back to Ambedkar<br />
who, he rem<strong>in</strong>ds us, was not worried about a “communal majority” <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> numerical<br />
sense. “Its dom<strong>in</strong>ance was a matter of social power ra<strong>the</strong>r than numbers. Far from be<strong>in</strong>g<br />
someth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>tr<strong>in</strong>sic to <strong>the</strong> social group, <strong>the</strong> status of “m<strong>in</strong>orityism” arises from <strong>the</strong><br />
c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>gent features of <strong>the</strong> political power-shar<strong>in</strong>g c<strong>on</strong>tract.”<br />
No doubt, Nati<strong>on</strong>alism and Democracy did expand <strong>the</strong> public sphere and gave<br />
disadvantaged groups access. But nowhere is <strong>the</strong> state a neutral umpire hold<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
balance between different groups. Moreover, modern structures of governance of <strong>the</strong>se<br />
states proved to be centraliz<strong>in</strong>g, coercive, hegem<strong>on</strong>ic and exclusi<strong>on</strong>ary towards <strong>the</strong> n<strong>on</strong><br />
dom<strong>in</strong>ant religious, ethnic, l<strong>in</strong>guistic, regi<strong>on</strong>al and social (caste) m<strong>in</strong>orities. Admittedly,<br />
fundamental rights are promised <strong>in</strong> all <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>s, and with<strong>in</strong> some of <strong>the</strong><br />
c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>s are special community rights and aut<strong>on</strong>omies, territorial and n<strong>on</strong> territorial.<br />
But al<strong>on</strong>gside we have a public system that can be taken over by a dom<strong>in</strong>ant group,<br />
which is determ<strong>in</strong>ed to impose its values as <strong>the</strong> norm <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> name of ‘public order’, thus<br />
mak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> majority’s culture, values and op<strong>in</strong>i<strong>on</strong>s <strong>the</strong> norm. This is evident <strong>in</strong> not <strong>on</strong>ly<br />
democratically fragile regimes as Pakistan and Bangladesh but also <strong>the</strong> robust<br />
democracies of Sri Lanka and India. In this <strong>the</strong> role of <strong>the</strong> judiciary is crucial. Sahala Zia<br />
<strong>in</strong> her study of c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> back discrim<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> Pakistan notes <strong>the</strong> “grow<strong>in</strong>g emphasis<br />
<strong>on</strong> ‘protect<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> rights’ of <strong>the</strong> Muslim majority, ra<strong>the</strong>r than those of <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>orities. The<br />
judiciary’s <strong>in</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> has been to prevent a breach of peace by plac<strong>in</strong>g restricti<strong>on</strong>s <strong>on</strong><br />
m<strong>in</strong>ority groups so as to avert provok<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Muslim majority, ra<strong>the</strong>r than tak<strong>in</strong>g<br />
preventive or punitive acti<strong>on</strong> aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong>m”.<br />
The everyday experience of pers<strong>on</strong>s bel<strong>on</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g to m<strong>in</strong>ority communities and <strong>in</strong>digenous<br />
peoples is - <strong>the</strong> banality of discrim<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>, violence, <strong>in</strong>justice and <strong>in</strong>equality. The status of<br />
most m<strong>in</strong>orities <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> regi<strong>on</strong> is abject. In some cases as <strong>in</strong> Bangladesh, m<strong>in</strong>ority<br />
communities are poor because of <strong>the</strong>ir m<strong>in</strong>ority status. Its corollary, <strong>the</strong> discrim<strong>in</strong>atory<br />
work<strong>in</strong>gs of laws like <strong>the</strong> Enemy Property Act (1965) morphed <strong>in</strong>to Vested Property Act<br />
(1971). Accord<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>on</strong>e estimate 43% of all H<strong>in</strong>du families have been ‘legally’ affected<br />
by virtue of this act. iv Sheikh Has<strong>in</strong>a’s government withdrew it <strong>in</strong> 2001. Regard<strong>in</strong>g<br />
Pakistan, Ishtiaq Hussian <strong>in</strong>dicates that <strong>the</strong> number of people liv<strong>in</strong>g below <strong>the</strong> poverty<br />
4
l<strong>in</strong>e states has deepened from 17 percent <strong>in</strong> 1990s to 34 per cent <strong>in</strong> 2000, and <strong>the</strong><br />
m<strong>in</strong>orities make up a disproporti<strong>on</strong>ate majority. Similarly, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> case of India 13 percent<br />
Muslim populati<strong>on</strong>, if rural landlessness is an <strong>in</strong>dicator, Muslim landlessness is 51% as<br />
compared to 40% for H<strong>in</strong>dus. However as Javeed Alam po<strong>in</strong>ts out, <strong>the</strong>re is no evidence<br />
to suggest that <strong>the</strong> Indian state created poverty am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Muslims as <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> case of tribal<br />
and dispossessi<strong>on</strong>. “Muslim poverty is as much a result of <strong>the</strong> many <strong>in</strong>tersecti<strong>on</strong>s of<br />
feudalism and <strong>the</strong> depredati<strong>on</strong>s and predatory practices of British col<strong>on</strong>ial rule, as<br />
poverty <strong>in</strong> general.” N<strong>on</strong>e<strong>the</strong>less, <strong>the</strong> Sachar Committee Report has shown a very<br />
disturb<strong>in</strong>g c<strong>on</strong>gruence between Muslim habitati<strong>on</strong> and deprivati<strong>on</strong> of civic amenities,<br />
public works and development <strong>in</strong>frastructure.<br />
Democracy Deficit<br />
In <strong>South</strong> <strong>Asia</strong> follow <strong>the</strong> tracks of <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>ority rights questi<strong>on</strong> and it will lead us back to<br />
<strong>the</strong> “democracy deficit”, says Ranabir Samaddar, a prescient observer of <strong>the</strong> M<strong>in</strong>ority<br />
questi<strong>on</strong>. Recogniti<strong>on</strong> that m<strong>in</strong>ority (ethnic) groups are deficient as rights holders is<br />
unfortunately itself, a m<strong>in</strong>ority perspective. More comm<strong>on</strong>ly, scholarly analysis and<br />
practiti<strong>on</strong>ers understand<strong>in</strong>g, is oriented towards <strong>in</strong>terpret<strong>in</strong>g even socio ec<strong>on</strong>omic<br />
tensi<strong>on</strong>s through <strong>the</strong> official categories of majority –m<strong>in</strong>ority identities or worked<br />
through <strong>the</strong> discourse of ethnicity and ‘ethno-nati<strong>on</strong>alism’. Social scientist Yash Ghai<br />
succ<strong>in</strong>ctly captures <strong>the</strong> political c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>uum of an ethnically differentiated group<br />
becom<strong>in</strong>g a political category. An “ethnicity” is c<strong>on</strong>solidated “when <strong>the</strong>se (cultural,<br />
religious, l<strong>in</strong>guistic) markers cease to be mere means of social dist<strong>in</strong>cti<strong>on</strong> and become <strong>the</strong><br />
basis of political identity and claims to a specific role <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> political process or power,<br />
ethnic dist<strong>in</strong>cti<strong>on</strong> are transformed <strong>in</strong>to ethnicity.” v Ethnic movements often have at <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
core hardcore issues of social and ec<strong>on</strong>omic justice and of public participati<strong>on</strong> – but as <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> case of <strong>the</strong> case of Sri Lanka, not <strong>on</strong>ly do <strong>the</strong> protag<strong>on</strong>ists of <strong>the</strong> ethnic c<strong>on</strong>flict<br />
articulate it <strong>in</strong> terms of essentialist ethnicity and identity, but <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r m<strong>in</strong>ority Muslims,<br />
too, have come to put <strong>the</strong>mselves forward as an ethnicity.<br />
Indeed <strong>the</strong> histories of <strong>the</strong> struggle of <strong>the</strong> Tamil, Naga and Chittag<strong>on</strong>g Hill Tracts<br />
peoples, map narratives of how and when a group refuses to accept at a historical moment<br />
<strong>the</strong> identity of a m<strong>in</strong>ority and claims <strong>the</strong> status of a people, a nati<strong>on</strong>. In <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> of<br />
majority - m<strong>in</strong>ority identities is <strong>the</strong> discourse of power. Redistributi<strong>on</strong> of power lies at <strong>the</strong><br />
vertex of <strong>the</strong> relati<strong>on</strong> between <strong>the</strong> state and ‘nati<strong>on</strong>al’ m<strong>in</strong>orities.<br />
However, as Uyangoda <strong>in</strong> his analaysis of <strong>the</strong> chang<strong>in</strong>g terms of <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>ority rights<br />
discourse towards privileg<strong>in</strong>g group rights po<strong>in</strong>ts out, “<strong>the</strong> entrenchment of group rights<br />
through regi<strong>on</strong>al aut<strong>on</strong>omy would place at great risk <strong>in</strong>dividual civil and political rights<br />
with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> community.” Aut<strong>on</strong>omous arrangements are not necessarily enhanc<strong>in</strong>g of<br />
democracy. Particularly at risk are women as we have seen <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> work<strong>in</strong>gs of <strong>the</strong><br />
aut<strong>on</strong>omy of community pers<strong>on</strong>al law regimes. In additi<strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> logic of homelands is<br />
exclusi<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> ‘o<strong>the</strong>r’ i.e. <strong>the</strong> n<strong>on</strong> dom<strong>in</strong>ant m<strong>in</strong>orities.<br />
Complicat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>ority questi<strong>on</strong> is <strong>the</strong> media mediated c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> public<br />
discourse <strong>on</strong> security <strong>in</strong> which select m<strong>in</strong>orities are c<strong>on</strong>structed as ‘suspect’ communities.<br />
In particular, <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> march <strong>the</strong>se days are cultural and military doctr<strong>in</strong>es rooted <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
5
<strong>the</strong>ory of <strong>the</strong> ‘clash of civilizati<strong>on</strong>s’ and <strong>the</strong> ‘war <strong>on</strong> terror’ which have been extremely<br />
detrimental to <strong>the</strong> rights of m<strong>in</strong>orities. It is members of m<strong>in</strong>ority groups who are<br />
predom<strong>in</strong>antly targeted by Preventi<strong>on</strong> of Terrorism and o<strong>the</strong>r Emergency Regulati<strong>on</strong>s<br />
whe<strong>the</strong>r it is <strong>in</strong> India vi or <strong>in</strong> Sri Lanka. Moreover, <strong>the</strong> positi<strong>on</strong><strong>in</strong>g of ‘militarized’<br />
struggles for m<strong>in</strong>ority rights /ethno-nati<strong>on</strong>alist asserti<strong>on</strong> as ‘terrorism’, has de-legitimized<br />
<strong>the</strong> struggles, hollow<strong>in</strong>g out <strong>the</strong> socio-ec<strong>on</strong>omic and political grievances driv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>m.<br />
Fara Haniffa draws our attenti<strong>on</strong> to this aspect.<br />
Also, by locat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> state’s all out military acti<strong>on</strong> aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> civilian embedded<br />
<strong>in</strong>surgents, as part of <strong>the</strong> ‘war <strong>on</strong> terror’, as <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> case of Sri Lanka’s military offensive<br />
aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> Tamil <strong>in</strong>surgent group <strong>the</strong> LTTE, <strong>the</strong> state’s brutal violati<strong>on</strong>s of <strong>the</strong> human<br />
and humanitarian rights of its citizens, comes to be largely c<strong>on</strong>d<strong>on</strong>ed by <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al<br />
community. Even more <strong>in</strong>sidious is <strong>the</strong> dem<strong>on</strong>strati<strong>on</strong> effect of Sri Lanka’s military<br />
victory <strong>in</strong> resolv<strong>in</strong>g ethno-nati<strong>on</strong>alist c<strong>on</strong>flicts. Why negotiate, politically? It is a model<br />
that is be<strong>in</strong>g studied <strong>in</strong> India and Pakistan and does not augur well for <strong>the</strong> prospects of <strong>the</strong><br />
rights of m<strong>in</strong>orities.<br />
The m<strong>in</strong>ority questi<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Asia</strong> gets c<strong>on</strong>structed as a foreign policy questi<strong>on</strong>. As<br />
Afsan Chowdhury states “<strong>M<strong>in</strong>orities</strong> of today’s <strong>South</strong> <strong>Asia</strong> have become proxy citizen of<br />
<strong>the</strong> country where <strong>the</strong>y are a majority ra<strong>the</strong>r than full citizens of <strong>the</strong>ir own country of<br />
orig<strong>in</strong>. So H<strong>in</strong>dus <strong>in</strong> Pakistan and Bangladesh, <strong>the</strong> madhesis <strong>in</strong> Nepal and <strong>the</strong> Tamils <strong>in</strong><br />
Sri Lanka are not just m<strong>in</strong>orities but are looked up<strong>on</strong> as proxy Indians and imag<strong>in</strong>ed as a<br />
threat or an enemy, and this is based <strong>on</strong> that state’s relati<strong>on</strong>ship with India.<br />
Discrim<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong>m gets justified as part of <strong>the</strong> caretak<strong>in</strong>g exercise aga<strong>in</strong>st a<br />
nati<strong>on</strong>alist threat.” The found<strong>in</strong>g fa<strong>the</strong>rs of <strong>the</strong> k<strong>in</strong> state system of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Asia</strong> aware of<br />
<strong>the</strong> cross border m<strong>in</strong>ority –majority implicati<strong>on</strong>s, mooted <strong>the</strong> ‘hostage <strong>the</strong>ory’, vii i.e. ill<br />
treatment of m<strong>in</strong>ority <strong>in</strong> <strong>on</strong>e state would ricochet <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> cross border m<strong>in</strong>ority. The ripple<br />
effect is <strong>the</strong>re, and <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> case of Tamils <strong>in</strong> Sri Lanka, Indian state has acted. As regards<br />
<strong>the</strong> Muslim m<strong>in</strong>ority or H<strong>in</strong>du m<strong>in</strong>ority, Pakistan or India’s <strong>in</strong>terference would more<br />
likely to harm than benefit. N<strong>on</strong>e<strong>the</strong>less, <strong>the</strong> state level relati<strong>on</strong>ships am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>South</strong> <strong>Asia</strong>ns<br />
does <strong>in</strong>fluence how <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>orities are treated by <strong>the</strong> state power holders.<br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Asia</strong>’s majoritarian states<br />
Recogniti<strong>on</strong> of a m<strong>in</strong>ority group is a crucial prec<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong> for protect<strong>in</strong>g m<strong>in</strong>ority Rights.<br />
Internati<strong>on</strong>al C<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>s, Declarati<strong>on</strong>s and Instituti<strong>on</strong>al mechanisms – provide<br />
frameworks identify<strong>in</strong>g m<strong>in</strong>ority rights and entitlements. But <strong>the</strong>re is no c<strong>on</strong>sensual<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al def<strong>in</strong>iti<strong>on</strong> of who is or which group is <strong>the</strong> bearer of <strong>the</strong>se rights.<br />
C<strong>on</strong>sequently, states have <strong>in</strong>terpreted what c<strong>on</strong>stitutes a m<strong>in</strong>ority to suit <strong>the</strong>ir own<br />
politics. Pakistan recognizes <strong>on</strong>ly religious m<strong>in</strong>orities and not its S<strong>in</strong>d, Baluch or Pushto<br />
nati<strong>on</strong>alities and has created a new religious m<strong>in</strong>ority- Ahmadis. Bangladesh,<br />
c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>ally, does not recognise that it has l<strong>in</strong>guistic, religious or ethnic m<strong>in</strong>orities. Its<br />
ideological and structural orientati<strong>on</strong> is as a m<strong>on</strong>o-ethnic, m<strong>on</strong>o-l<strong>in</strong>guistic and m<strong>on</strong>o<br />
6
eligious state, thus mak<strong>in</strong>g m<strong>in</strong>orities of its H<strong>in</strong>du, n<strong>on</strong> Bangla speak<strong>in</strong>g and adivasi<br />
populati<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
Sri Lanka’s m<strong>in</strong>ority rights discourse does not <strong>in</strong>clude recogniti<strong>on</strong> of social (depressed<br />
caste) m<strong>in</strong>orities India does not list its Dalit populati<strong>on</strong> as a m<strong>in</strong>ority and state <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>s<br />
(e.g. judiciary) legitimize a homogenous H<strong>in</strong>du identity exclud<strong>in</strong>g multiple sects from <strong>the</strong><br />
religious m<strong>in</strong>ority category. C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>ally, <strong>the</strong>re is <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> of religious and<br />
l<strong>in</strong>guistic m<strong>in</strong>orities as a cultural category, sidestepp<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> issue of power and public<br />
participati<strong>on</strong>. Nepal (under <strong>the</strong> 1990 c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al system) denied its multi-religious<br />
character and <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>alizes exclusi<strong>on</strong> of its l<strong>in</strong>guistic and ethnic m<strong>in</strong>orities. Bhutan <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> pursuit of a ‘One Nati<strong>on</strong>, One People’ – Drupkaizati<strong>on</strong>’ policy pushed out a 120,000<br />
ethnic Nepali Lhotsampas, and rejects <strong>the</strong>ir claims to citizenship.<br />
A key criteri<strong>on</strong> is self identificati<strong>on</strong> as a m<strong>in</strong>ority (and <strong>the</strong> group’s right to determ<strong>in</strong>e who<br />
is a member of <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>ority). Several groups, as for example <strong>the</strong> Tamil community or <strong>the</strong><br />
Naga peoples of north east India, <strong>in</strong>digenous peoples of <strong>the</strong> CHT, Bangladesh - have<br />
repudiated identity as a m<strong>in</strong>ority (a subord<strong>in</strong>ate group) and claimed for <strong>the</strong>mselves<br />
identity (and rights) as a ‘nati<strong>on</strong>’, e.g. peoples of <strong>the</strong> ‘Jumma’ nati<strong>on</strong> CHT, and <strong>the</strong><br />
Mohajir as an ethno-nati<strong>on</strong>ality. N<strong>on</strong>e of <strong>the</strong>se peoples see <strong>the</strong>mselves as ‘ethnic<br />
communities’. Each claims to be a nati<strong>on</strong>. viii<br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Asia</strong>n states <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> political organizati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong>ir plural societies have experimented<br />
with different models from republic to c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al m<strong>on</strong>archy, from federal<br />
arrangements with special aut<strong>on</strong>omies to unitary state structures; from multi-party<br />
democracy to party less authoritarian and military governments; from secular to a<br />
<strong>the</strong>ocratic orientati<strong>on</strong>, and from a multicultural public sphere to a hegem<strong>on</strong>ic m<strong>on</strong>ocultural<br />
m<strong>on</strong>o ethnic <strong>on</strong>e.<br />
Whereas some polities like India, have articulated an elaborate framework of<br />
c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al guarantees for m<strong>in</strong>ority rights protecti<strong>on</strong> and degrees of federalism<br />
<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g asymmetric aut<strong>on</strong>omous structures for devolv<strong>in</strong>g power; <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> case of o<strong>the</strong>rs<br />
like Pakistan and Bangladesh, <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> itself is <strong>the</strong> source of discrim<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> and<br />
victimizati<strong>on</strong>. In <strong>the</strong> ‘old’ Nepal. Mahendra Lawoti argues that democracy as practiced<br />
by <strong>the</strong> upper caste hill elite (CHEM) that m<strong>on</strong>opolized power <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Cab<strong>in</strong>et, <strong>the</strong><br />
government and political parties, <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>alized <strong>the</strong> exclusi<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> ‘majority’ of <strong>the</strong><br />
populati<strong>on</strong> compris<strong>in</strong>g janajatis, backward castes and women. Overlay<strong>in</strong>g this was<br />
regi<strong>on</strong>al disadvantage and deprivati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> a highly centralized - Kathmandu centric –<br />
polity. The ‘new’ Nepal’s c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>, it is expected, will provide for greater <strong>in</strong>clusi<strong>on</strong><br />
and federal restructur<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
Sri Lanka’s unitary state had pursued a c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al path of accommodat<strong>in</strong>g m<strong>in</strong>ority<br />
rights –equal rights, some language rights and a limited degree of decentralizati<strong>on</strong> –<br />
aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> backdrop of <strong>the</strong> military c<strong>on</strong>flict. It challenged <strong>the</strong> terms of <strong>the</strong> liberal<br />
m<strong>in</strong>ority rights discourse effectively displaced <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>ority questi<strong>on</strong> with <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>al<br />
questi<strong>on</strong>, br<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> fore claims to ‘group rights’ as Uyangoda emphasises. The f<strong>in</strong>al<br />
soluti<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> end was a military resoluti<strong>on</strong>. That can <strong>on</strong>ly re<strong>in</strong>force <strong>the</strong> Sri Lanka state’s<br />
7
unitary ideology, centralized structure and S<strong>in</strong>hala-Buddhist hegem<strong>on</strong>y. Forebod<strong>in</strong>gs<br />
about <strong>the</strong> likely status of m<strong>in</strong>orities <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> post LTTE Sri Lanka are not likely to be<br />
allayed by Sri Lanka President Mah<strong>in</strong>da Rajapaksa’s statement immediately after <strong>the</strong><br />
physical elim<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> LTTE. “There are no m<strong>in</strong>ority communities <strong>in</strong> this country.<br />
There are <strong>on</strong>ly two communities, <strong>on</strong>e that loves <strong>the</strong> country and <strong>on</strong>e that does not”<br />
(Rajapaksa May 19, 2009) It presumes that <strong>the</strong> ‘nati<strong>on</strong>al’ questi<strong>on</strong> / m<strong>in</strong>ority questi<strong>on</strong><br />
can be decreed out of existence. Without a fundamental de-ethnicizati<strong>on</strong> or for that<br />
decommunalizati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> state and power shar<strong>in</strong>g arrangements, <strong>the</strong> politics of numbers<br />
will c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to haunt <strong>the</strong> states of south <strong>Asia</strong>.<br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Asia</strong>n states, <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> whole, have been extremely wary if not hostile to devolv<strong>in</strong>g<br />
power and most have evolved <strong>in</strong>to unitary states with at best adm<strong>in</strong>istrative<br />
decentralizati<strong>on</strong>. Even India which has evolved a quasi federal polity with a complex<br />
structure of special aut<strong>on</strong>omies, uses <strong>the</strong> nomenclature –centre: state relati<strong>on</strong>s. Whereas<br />
<strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al debates presage wide rang<strong>in</strong>g devoluti<strong>on</strong> of power, post partiti<strong>on</strong>,<br />
federalism came to be viewed as carry<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> seeds of secessi<strong>on</strong> and dis<strong>in</strong>tegrati<strong>on</strong>. ix<br />
Moreover, <strong>the</strong> Nehruvian ec<strong>on</strong>omic model under girded by centralized plann<strong>in</strong>g, was<br />
predicated central c<strong>on</strong>trol. The Indian c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> carries that unitary bias, e.g. after<br />
distribut<strong>in</strong>g legislative powers <strong>in</strong> three lists, not <strong>on</strong>ly are residual subjects left with <strong>the</strong><br />
Uni<strong>on</strong>, its will prevails <strong>on</strong> subjects <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>current list. Also, <strong>the</strong> Indian parliament<br />
keeps <strong>the</strong> right to change <strong>the</strong> boundaries of <strong>the</strong> states. India. The Indian Uni<strong>on</strong> is not<br />
founded <strong>on</strong> federat<strong>in</strong>g units choos<strong>in</strong>g to c<strong>on</strong>stitute a federal uni<strong>on</strong>.<br />
The fifty year old struggle of <strong>the</strong> Naga peoples for self rule <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> north east; Jammu<br />
Kashmir’s erosi<strong>on</strong> of c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>ally sancti<strong>on</strong>ed special aut<strong>on</strong>omy and <strong>the</strong> people’s<br />
alienati<strong>on</strong> and <strong>the</strong> Punjab <strong>in</strong>surgency that was rooted <strong>in</strong> issues of aut<strong>on</strong>omy and power<br />
shar<strong>in</strong>g -- are but three of <strong>the</strong> most significant c<strong>on</strong>flicts that testify to <strong>the</strong> Indian elite’s<br />
centraliz<strong>in</strong>g and majoritarian impulse. However, <strong>the</strong> l<strong>in</strong>guistic reorganizati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong><br />
Indian state system is a testim<strong>on</strong>y to its capacity for accommodat<strong>in</strong>g plural demands.<br />
All our states have a fundamental rights chapter <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> that provides for<br />
human freedoms that apply to all citizens, irrespective of race, place of birth, religi<strong>on</strong>,<br />
caste, creed, color or sex - subject to restricti<strong>on</strong>s of ‘public order’. Fundamental Rights, it<br />
needs to be recalled, primarily protect <strong>in</strong>dividuals from arbitrary state policies.<br />
Internati<strong>on</strong>al discourses <strong>on</strong> human rights and m<strong>in</strong>ority rights have been braided <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
‘nati<strong>on</strong> state’ build<strong>in</strong>g process of our post col<strong>on</strong>ial states. However, historical<br />
circumstances, <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>textual specificity of rul<strong>in</strong>g class ideology, and <strong>the</strong> overall<br />
exigencies of creat<strong>in</strong>g a coherent ‘nati<strong>on</strong> state’ <strong>in</strong> highly plural societies, has produced a<br />
regi<strong>on</strong> rife with ‘m<strong>in</strong>orities at risk’.<br />
8
Three Nati<strong>on</strong>al Models: M<strong>in</strong>ority Rights Protecti<strong>on</strong><br />
India: Limits of C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>alism<br />
“M<strong>in</strong>ority Rights discourse is m<strong>on</strong>opolised by Muslims. This may expla<strong>in</strong> why questi<strong>on</strong>s about m<strong>in</strong>orities are<br />
necessarily l<strong>in</strong>ked <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d with <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>ority problem dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> British days, which gave rise to<br />
‘communal politics’, separatism and f<strong>in</strong>ally partiti<strong>on</strong>. The Indian discourse <strong>on</strong> ‘m<strong>in</strong>orities’ as c<strong>on</strong>cept well as<br />
groups of people <strong>the</strong>refore gets def<strong>in</strong>ed and delimited by communalism versus secularism and nati<strong>on</strong>alism<br />
versus separatism. It is hardly ever placed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> perspective of ma<strong>in</strong>stream human rights movement which<br />
wants to ensure all rights for all people .”<br />
Iqbal Ansari, Read<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>on</strong> <strong>M<strong>in</strong>orities</strong> (1996) x<br />
India’s c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al guaranteed regime of equal rights based <strong>on</strong> comm<strong>on</strong> citizenship and<br />
n<strong>on</strong> discrim<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> is mediated by a complex web of special rights and protecti<strong>on</strong>s. There<br />
is statutory backed creati<strong>on</strong> of special territorial aut<strong>on</strong>omies provid<strong>in</strong>g for ‘self rule’<br />
(Jammu & Kashmir Art 370-371H); for social m<strong>in</strong>orities affirmative acti<strong>on</strong> provisi<strong>on</strong> of<br />
reservati<strong>on</strong>s for notified scheduled castes, hill tribes and backward classes (Part XVI,<br />
Article 15, 16, 330 & 332); for <strong>the</strong> l<strong>in</strong>guistic m<strong>in</strong>orities protecti<strong>on</strong> of language rights<br />
(Articles 29,347 & 350) and statehood for major l<strong>in</strong>guistic groups; and for <strong>the</strong> religious<br />
m<strong>in</strong>orities a system of legal pluralism with differentiated pers<strong>on</strong>al law regimes, rights to<br />
public management of religious and educati<strong>on</strong>al <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
However, such prescriptive policies of protecti<strong>on</strong> and ‘affirmative acti<strong>on</strong>’ have delivered<br />
not equality, but <strong>the</strong> demand for more and more groups seek<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> dividends that accrue<br />
to ethnic (and caste) politics by claim<strong>in</strong>g official recogniti<strong>on</strong> of ‘m<strong>in</strong>ority’ status e.g. <strong>the</strong><br />
OBC Gujjars <strong>in</strong> Rajasthan and Rajbhansis <strong>in</strong> Assam claim<strong>in</strong>g Scheduled Tribe status to<br />
tap designated special rights. Meanwhile, an unsympa<strong>the</strong>tic majority castigates such<br />
policies as “appeasement politics”.<br />
Also, India’s <strong>in</strong>novative experiments <strong>in</strong> evolv<strong>in</strong>g a range of ethnically delimited<br />
aut<strong>on</strong>omous ‘homelands’ (even experiment<strong>in</strong>g with shared sovereignty) have subsumed<br />
secessi<strong>on</strong>ist demands. But without any fundamental expansi<strong>on</strong> of democratic value <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>s at <strong>the</strong> Centre or <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> aut<strong>on</strong>omous unit, it <strong>in</strong>evitably has led to exclusi<strong>on</strong> of<br />
n<strong>on</strong> dom<strong>in</strong>ant ethnic groups, and <strong>the</strong> relentless reproducti<strong>on</strong> of more ethnicities and <strong>the</strong><br />
demand for o<strong>the</strong>r homelands. These aut<strong>on</strong>omy <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>s are more likely to re<strong>in</strong>force<br />
‘<strong>in</strong>sider outsider politics. The result is <strong>the</strong> North East scarred <strong>in</strong> a welter of c<strong>on</strong>flict l<strong>in</strong>es.<br />
As regards <strong>the</strong> schema of protecti<strong>on</strong> and special rights of religious m<strong>in</strong>orities, Gurpreet<br />
Mahajan, a scholar of m<strong>in</strong>ority rights, evaluat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> impact of <strong>the</strong>se provisi<strong>on</strong>s,<br />
succ<strong>in</strong>ctly observed, that it has assured <strong>the</strong> protecti<strong>on</strong> of cultural identity by<br />
“safeguard<strong>in</strong>g cultural aut<strong>on</strong>omy and promot<strong>in</strong>g cultural diversity”; where “it has failed<br />
is <strong>in</strong> promot<strong>in</strong>g equality, n<strong>on</strong>-discrim<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> and vitally, equity”. xi Such emphasis <strong>on</strong><br />
cultural identity has fostered a distorti<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> community’s politics. For example, <strong>the</strong><br />
elite of <strong>the</strong> Muslim community has got tied up <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> pursuit of identity politics, rais<strong>in</strong>g<br />
with <strong>the</strong> state demands center<strong>in</strong>g <strong>on</strong> issues c<strong>on</strong>cern<strong>in</strong>g religio-cultural orthodoxy, (i.e.<br />
religious holidays, pers<strong>on</strong>al law, bann<strong>in</strong>g books, etc.) ra<strong>the</strong>r than leverag<strong>in</strong>g equal<br />
opportunities <strong>in</strong> political representati<strong>on</strong>, access to development, educati<strong>on</strong> etc. That,<br />
argues Javeed Alam is giv<strong>in</strong>g way to <strong>the</strong> emergence of a ‘citizen politics’ that is<br />
participati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> democratic politics for realiz<strong>in</strong>g an egalitarian social ethos.<br />
9
Pakistan: C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> based discrim<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong><br />
At <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r end of <strong>the</strong> spectrum, <strong>in</strong> Pakistan, <strong>the</strong> C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> itself ends up<br />
discrim<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g aga<strong>in</strong>st religious m<strong>in</strong>orities as shown up by Sahala Zia <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> essay<br />
“Discrim<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> Pakistan Aga<strong>in</strong>st Religious <strong>M<strong>in</strong>orities</strong>: C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al Aspects”<br />
(Sage:forthcom<strong>in</strong>g). The <strong>in</strong>juncti<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Objectives Resoluti<strong>on</strong> that no law repugnant to<br />
Islam could be adopted, has paved <strong>the</strong> way for all <strong>the</strong> Islamic provisi<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>, i.e. from direct stipulati<strong>on</strong> of Head of State be<strong>in</strong>g a Muslim to <strong>in</strong>direct<br />
discrim<strong>in</strong>atory provisi<strong>on</strong>s via electoral oaths as well as <strong>the</strong> policy of separate electorates.<br />
General Musharraf <strong>in</strong> 2002 ended this political apar<strong>the</strong>id.<br />
The c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al scheme treats Muslims as a privileged majority while religious<br />
m<strong>in</strong>orities are promised <strong>on</strong>ly protecti<strong>on</strong>. Fundamental rights are guaranteed, even special<br />
protective provisi<strong>on</strong>s are stipulated, but <strong>the</strong>y become mean<strong>in</strong>gless <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> precedence<br />
given to <strong>the</strong> Islamic Provisi<strong>on</strong>s. The dual system of Federal Shariah Courts and Civil<br />
Courts, has created an ambiguity which is manipulated to <strong>the</strong> disadvantage of religious<br />
m<strong>in</strong>orities and women as evident <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> work<strong>in</strong>gs of <strong>the</strong> blasphemy laws and Hudood<br />
ord<strong>in</strong>ances <strong>in</strong>troduced under General Zia ul Haq. In <strong>the</strong> Federal Sharia Court, a supra<br />
c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al body, n<strong>on</strong> Muslims can nei<strong>the</strong>r be members nor n<strong>on</strong> Muslim lawyers<br />
appear before <strong>the</strong>se Courts; Hudood Ord<strong>in</strong>ance ousts <strong>the</strong> testim<strong>on</strong>y of n<strong>on</strong> Muslims<br />
aga<strong>in</strong>st a Muslim accused (and women half witness <strong>in</strong> law).<br />
Pakistan’s crisis of political legitimacy, <strong>in</strong>evitably, prompts a renewed push towards<br />
Islamizati<strong>on</strong>, especially when challenged by ethnic nati<strong>on</strong>alist asserti<strong>on</strong>s. Pakistan’s<br />
c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> does not recognize its ethno-nati<strong>on</strong>alist’ m<strong>in</strong>orities. In Pakistan, After <strong>the</strong><br />
found<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> state of Pakistan, or as political scientist Mohammad Waseem wryly<br />
describes it, “when <strong>the</strong> Pakistan movement came to <strong>the</strong> bounded territory of what became<br />
Pakistan”, <strong>the</strong> Muslim majority prov<strong>in</strong>ces of East Bengal, NWFP, S<strong>in</strong>d and Baluchistan<br />
became ethnic ‘m<strong>in</strong>ority’ prov<strong>in</strong>ces <strong>in</strong> what became a Punjab-Mohajir dom<strong>in</strong>ated<br />
bureaucratic and military oligarchy. Pakistan carries <strong>the</strong> legacy set <strong>in</strong> 1955 when various<br />
prov<strong>in</strong>ces of West Pakistan were <strong>in</strong>tegrated <strong>in</strong>to ‘One Unit’ to counter populous Bengali<br />
prov<strong>in</strong>ce of East Pakistan. The secessi<strong>on</strong> of Bangladesh, fur<strong>the</strong>r fuelled paranoia aga<strong>in</strong>st<br />
aut<strong>on</strong>omy. The 1973 Pakistan c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> does not recognize n<strong>on</strong> religious m<strong>in</strong>orities.<br />
More recently, Islamizati<strong>on</strong> (<strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly cast <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Sunni- Wahabi mode), and its<br />
various manifestati<strong>on</strong> such as Talibanizati<strong>on</strong>, have put pressure not <strong>on</strong>ly <strong>the</strong> religious<br />
m<strong>in</strong>orities but also <strong>the</strong> Muslim m<strong>in</strong>orities. xii Hussa<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> track<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> implicati<strong>on</strong>s of<br />
significant demographic changes- from <strong>the</strong> 1971 war to <strong>the</strong> Afghan refugee <strong>in</strong>flux,<br />
<strong>in</strong>sightfully suggests that “In Pakistan, <strong>the</strong> grow<strong>in</strong>g emphasis <strong>on</strong> ‘Muslimness’ has not<br />
<strong>on</strong>ly caused justifiable c<strong>on</strong>cern am<strong>on</strong>g n<strong>on</strong>-Muslims, but <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>tra-Muslim ideological<br />
divides have also become more acute as apparent <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> grow<strong>in</strong>g discovery of ‘enemies<br />
from with<strong>in</strong>’. This is translated <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> ris<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>cidence of Shia –Sunni violence.”<br />
Bangladesh: hegem<strong>on</strong>y of <strong>on</strong>e religi<strong>on</strong> and <strong>on</strong>e language.<br />
Bangladesh may have emerged from a struggle aga<strong>in</strong>st a situati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>in</strong>ternal col<strong>on</strong>ialism,<br />
a discrim<strong>in</strong>ated and disadvantaged ethnicity, but statehood is cast <strong>in</strong> a structure that is<br />
10
marked by <strong>the</strong> hegem<strong>on</strong>y of <strong>on</strong>e religi<strong>on</strong> and <strong>on</strong>e language. As Afsan Chowdhury <strong>in</strong><br />
H<strong>in</strong>dus <strong>in</strong> a Polarised Political Envir<strong>on</strong>ment states, “In Bangladesh m<strong>in</strong>orities <strong>in</strong> general<br />
and <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>du m<strong>in</strong>ority <strong>in</strong> particular, are not imag<strong>in</strong>ed as occupy<strong>in</strong>g a rightful and<br />
legitimate space with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> architecture of <strong>the</strong> majority’s imag<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>.”<br />
Although, <strong>the</strong> new state of Bangladesh emerged as a secular polity with a c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al<br />
embargo <strong>on</strong> religi<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> politics, amendments to <strong>the</strong> 1972 c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> saw <strong>the</strong><br />
displacement of <strong>the</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>ciple of ‘Secularity’ with ‘Absolute trust and faith <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Almighty Allah’. Tensi<strong>on</strong> between ‘Bengali nati<strong>on</strong>alism’ based <strong>on</strong> language and culture<br />
and ‘Bangladeshi nati<strong>on</strong>alism’ rooted <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> primacy of religi<strong>on</strong>, has resulted <strong>in</strong> a steady<br />
drift towards Islamic hegem<strong>on</strong>y. Both have had exclusi<strong>on</strong>ary c<strong>on</strong>sequences for its<br />
religious, l<strong>in</strong>guistic and ethnic m<strong>in</strong>orities.xiii<br />
The Bangladesh state declared itself as a unitary and culturally homogenous nati<strong>on</strong><br />
emphasiz<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> hegem<strong>on</strong>y of <strong>the</strong> Bengali nati<strong>on</strong>, thus exclud<strong>in</strong>g n<strong>on</strong> Bengali Chakmas,<br />
Marmar Tripuras and pla<strong>in</strong>s tribal ethnic communities that make up a little over 1% of<br />
<strong>the</strong> populati<strong>on</strong>. Subsequent amendments (Art 6) declared that <strong>the</strong> citizens of Bangladesh<br />
were to be known as Bengalees, turn<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> n<strong>on</strong> Bengali populati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong>to ethnic<br />
m<strong>in</strong>orities. Art 3 adopted Bengali as <strong>the</strong> state language turn<strong>in</strong>g n<strong>on</strong> Bengali speak<strong>in</strong>g<br />
populati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> urdu speak<strong>in</strong>g Biharis <strong>in</strong>to l<strong>in</strong>guistic m<strong>in</strong>orities. Art 2 made<br />
Islam <strong>the</strong> state religi<strong>on</strong> exclud<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>du, Buddhist, Christian and animist<br />
communities.<br />
Amena Mohs<strong>in</strong>, a scholar of Bangladesh nati<strong>on</strong>alism, <strong>in</strong> several of her writ<strong>in</strong>gs has<br />
mapped <strong>the</strong> processes by which <strong>the</strong> rights of Bangladesh’s m<strong>in</strong>orities and <strong>in</strong>digenous<br />
peoples have been derogated, argues that c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al provisi<strong>on</strong>s by implicati<strong>on</strong> have<br />
“become <strong>in</strong>struments of hegem<strong>on</strong>y and dom<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>” <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> hands of successive<br />
governments. xiv Today, after 25 years armed struggle <strong>the</strong>re is recogniti<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> special<br />
status of hill tribals of <strong>the</strong> CHT, but <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> does not provide any measure of<br />
recogniti<strong>on</strong> to <strong>the</strong> pla<strong>in</strong>s tribals, <strong>the</strong> Santhals, Garos and Haj<strong>on</strong>gs.<br />
M<strong>in</strong>ority Rights Challenged<br />
The essays <strong>in</strong> this volume go bey<strong>on</strong>d a mapp<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> status of m<strong>in</strong>orities <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Asia</strong><br />
and are positi<strong>on</strong>ed as sec<strong>on</strong>d generati<strong>on</strong> studies by authors who have been resp<strong>on</strong>sible for<br />
empirically and <strong>the</strong>oretically def<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> scholarly discourse <strong>on</strong> m<strong>in</strong>ority rights <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
regi<strong>on</strong>. Also, several of <strong>the</strong>se essays are authored by researchers who straddle <strong>the</strong> fields<br />
of activism and academia and <strong>the</strong>refore reach out to NGO activists as well as policy<br />
makers <strong>in</strong>terven<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> liv<strong>in</strong>g reality of m<strong>in</strong>ority communities <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> regi<strong>on</strong>.<br />
While most of <strong>the</strong>se essays are stand al<strong>on</strong>e - country focused essays, toge<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>y make a<br />
mosaic marked by <strong>the</strong> thread of comm<strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong>mes and perspective and cross border<br />
res<strong>on</strong>ances. They <strong>in</strong>vite comparative analyses and po<strong>in</strong>t towards <strong>the</strong> necessity of<br />
address<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>ority questi<strong>on</strong> regi<strong>on</strong>ally. The essays locate <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>ority predicament<br />
<strong>in</strong> modern state mak<strong>in</strong>g projects. “These states produce m<strong>in</strong>orities as an essential part of<br />
11
<strong>the</strong>ir c<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> process, s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> majority <strong>in</strong> produc<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> state also produces <strong>the</strong><br />
‘o<strong>the</strong>r’ or <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>orities”, posits Afsan Chowdhury.<br />
While <strong>the</strong> dom<strong>in</strong>ant trend <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> field of m<strong>in</strong>ority rights studies has been centred <strong>on</strong><br />
identity politics and ‘special rights’, several of <strong>the</strong> essays shift <strong>the</strong> emphasis towards <strong>the</strong><br />
expansi<strong>on</strong> of democratic politics, focus<strong>in</strong>g <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> empower<strong>in</strong>g movement towards what<br />
Javeed Alam calls ‘citizen politics’. Still o<strong>the</strong>rs like Afsan Chowdhury and Ishiaq<br />
Hussa<strong>in</strong> br<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> a political ec<strong>on</strong>omy approach draw<strong>in</strong>g attenti<strong>on</strong> to how socio-ec<strong>on</strong>omic<br />
c<strong>on</strong>flicts tend to be <strong>in</strong>terpreted politically. “Ethnic and communal differences are deemed<br />
political identity markers even when <strong>the</strong> same is <strong>the</strong> product of or descriptive of<br />
ec<strong>on</strong>omic denials by a powerful group or forms of class behavior”.<br />
The volume is organized around three broad but overlapp<strong>in</strong>g secti<strong>on</strong>s that focus <strong>on</strong><br />
religious and social m<strong>in</strong>orities, ethno-nati<strong>on</strong>al asserti<strong>on</strong> and <strong>in</strong>digenous peoples. What<br />
l<strong>in</strong>ks ‘m<strong>in</strong>ority’, ‘nati<strong>on</strong>’ and ‘<strong>in</strong>digenous peoples’ is <strong>the</strong>re positi<strong>on</strong> of n<strong>on</strong> dom<strong>in</strong>ance as<br />
a result of that identity. Moreover, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> liberal m<strong>in</strong>ority rights discourse, <strong>the</strong> holder of<br />
rights is an <strong>in</strong>dividual, whereas, rights discourse associated with ‘people’, ‘nati<strong>on</strong>’ or as<br />
‘<strong>in</strong>digenous peoples’ is articulated as group rights. Also as Jayadeva Uyangoda rem<strong>in</strong>ds<br />
us, <strong>the</strong>re a political journey when a group rejects ‘m<strong>in</strong>ority’ identity and claims<br />
recogniti<strong>on</strong>/ rights as a ‘nati<strong>on</strong>’<br />
Javeed Alam’s “A L<strong>on</strong>g-Term View of C<strong>on</strong>temporary Muslim Situati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> India” has <strong>the</strong><br />
edge of an <strong>in</strong>sider’s analysis without compromis<strong>in</strong>g <strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong>tellectual rigour, as he explores,<br />
with historical depth, <strong>the</strong> chang<strong>in</strong>g c<strong>on</strong>tours of Muslim c<strong>on</strong>sciousness and <strong>the</strong> trend<br />
towards a politics of democratic participati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> egalitarian politics. Alam’s posits a self<br />
avowedly c<strong>on</strong>tentious <strong>the</strong>sis of regi<strong>on</strong>ally differentiated Muslim communities mov<strong>in</strong>g<br />
away from <strong>the</strong> practice a politics of difference to ‘citizen politics’ <strong>in</strong> alliance with o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
similarly disadvantaged groups. “This is a matter of some importance <strong>in</strong> avoid<strong>in</strong>g<br />
absolutisati<strong>on</strong> of community politics”, he emphasizes. Under-gird<strong>in</strong>g this participati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> ‘secular’ politics of bourgeois equality is <strong>the</strong> emergence of a pan Muslim<br />
c<strong>on</strong>sciousness that is marked by recogniti<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> value of a ‘secular’ orientati<strong>on</strong>. This<br />
defence of ‘secularism’ is not without ambivalence and is reflected <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>tradicti<strong>on</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Muslim c<strong>on</strong>sciousness s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of Ram Janmabhoomi and <strong>the</strong> Babri<br />
Masjid c<strong>on</strong>troversy. “From <strong>the</strong> Muslim po<strong>in</strong>t of view, <strong>the</strong> ‘menac<strong>in</strong>g’ growth of Sangh<br />
Parivar organizati<strong>on</strong>s and <strong>the</strong> st<strong>in</strong>ts <strong>in</strong> power of Bharatiya Janata Party, have prompted<br />
Muslim organizati<strong>on</strong>s, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> communal <strong>on</strong>es like <strong>the</strong> Majlis <strong>in</strong> Hyderabad or <strong>the</strong><br />
League <strong>in</strong> Kerala, to <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly voice a defense of ‘secularism”.<br />
The catalytic moment for this agentive transformati<strong>on</strong> of Muslim c<strong>on</strong>sciousness, is V P<br />
S<strong>in</strong>gh’s exemplary act of sacrifice uphold<strong>in</strong>g Muslim dignity and <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>in</strong>alienable right to<br />
bel<strong>on</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> Indian nati<strong>on</strong>. Work<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> c<strong>on</strong>vergence with this was <strong>the</strong> dramatic Mandal<br />
moment and its socially fragment<strong>in</strong>g effect <strong>in</strong> polariz<strong>in</strong>g upper castes towards <strong>the</strong><br />
H<strong>in</strong>dutva forces. Alam argues that <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>juncti<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong>se developments was to give a<br />
pan Indian dimensi<strong>on</strong> to Muslim politics and <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> backdrop of menac<strong>in</strong>g trishuls, to<br />
explore, i.e. “how best can we align with <strong>the</strong> new secular trends or formati<strong>on</strong>s that were<br />
emerg<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> different parts of <strong>the</strong> country”.<br />
12
Rub<strong>in</strong>a Saigol br<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> role of <strong>the</strong> role played by <strong>the</strong> school text book <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>ternalizati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> official historical narrative of <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong> state and <strong>the</strong> place of<br />
m<strong>in</strong>orities. In Strangers <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> House: <strong>M<strong>in</strong>orities</strong> <strong>in</strong> Pakistani Textbooks Saigol posits<br />
that <strong>on</strong>e of <strong>the</strong> biggest problems <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>al tale is - ‘those who do not fit’ or ‘those<br />
who do not fit completely’ <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>al narrative. These are <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>orities –<br />
religious, ethno-nati<strong>on</strong>al – that “<strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong> can ei<strong>the</strong>r not acknowledge or claim <strong>on</strong>ly<br />
partially as <strong>the</strong>y are rem<strong>in</strong>ders of a c<strong>on</strong>necti<strong>on</strong> with <strong>the</strong> past that must be forgotten for <strong>the</strong><br />
sake of <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>’s purity”, argues Saigol.<br />
One way of deal<strong>in</strong>g with <strong>the</strong>se uncomfortable presences is to turn <strong>the</strong>m <strong>in</strong>to cameos,<br />
those who bel<strong>on</strong>g, <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>siders, are collapsed <strong>in</strong>to an imag<strong>in</strong>ed homogeneity of goodness,<br />
those who are <strong>the</strong> outsiders, are homogenized <strong>in</strong>to an evil or wicked <strong>on</strong>eness. It is <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
ubiquitous school text books that that narrative is implanted <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d’s eye - <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>du<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r as ‘racist and fundamentalist’; <strong>the</strong> Christian O<strong>the</strong>r as Trickster and Cheat; <strong>the</strong> Sikh<br />
O<strong>the</strong>r as ‘Knife-wield<strong>in</strong>g Butcher’, <strong>the</strong> Bengali O<strong>the</strong>r as Backstabb<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
Saigol revisits here extensive research <strong>on</strong> school text books, emphasiz<strong>in</strong>g and <strong>in</strong> some<br />
cases revis<strong>in</strong>g her <strong>the</strong>sis. For example till <strong>the</strong> 1980s textbook writers created Muslim<br />
heroes as mascul<strong>in</strong>e, active, potent and virile, while <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>du ‘o<strong>the</strong>r’ was fem<strong>in</strong>ized as<br />
timid and passive. After 2002, current textbooks c<strong>on</strong>struct <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>du ‘o<strong>the</strong>r’ as<br />
aggressive, mascul<strong>in</strong>e, active and potent, even though negative. Saigol’s essay draws our<br />
attenti<strong>on</strong> back to <strong>the</strong> role of prejudice and stereotypes, as a counterpo<strong>in</strong>t to <strong>the</strong> new<br />
emphasis <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> structural discrim<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> and disadvantag<strong>in</strong>g of m<strong>in</strong>ority communities<br />
terms of public voice, access to development <strong>in</strong>frastructure, employment etc.<br />
Afsan Chowdhury’s focus is “H<strong>in</strong>dus <strong>in</strong> a Polarised Political Envir<strong>on</strong>ment:<br />
Bangladesh’s M<strong>in</strong>ority”. He draws attenti<strong>on</strong> to c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>uity ra<strong>the</strong>r a break <strong>in</strong> Bangladesh’s<br />
policies and practices of manag<strong>in</strong>g m<strong>in</strong>ority relati<strong>on</strong>s, carry<strong>in</strong>g over from <strong>the</strong> East<br />
Pakistan phase when be<strong>in</strong>g H<strong>in</strong>du and India held <strong>the</strong> same mean<strong>in</strong>g, thus fus<strong>in</strong>g religious<br />
identity with a political <strong>on</strong>e. It created a “platform of vulnerability” that made <strong>the</strong><br />
H<strong>in</strong>du’s not <strong>on</strong>ly political but ec<strong>on</strong>omic targets. “The phenomen<strong>on</strong> of property grabb<strong>in</strong>g<br />
is built <strong>on</strong> an ec<strong>on</strong>omic opportunity generated by vulnerability”, he emphasized. Dur<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>the</strong> liberati<strong>on</strong> war phase H<strong>in</strong>dus were targeted, and <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s of repressi<strong>on</strong> of 1971,<br />
created opportunities to grab H<strong>in</strong>du property, bel<strong>on</strong>g<strong>in</strong>gs and bus<strong>in</strong>ess. This subsequently<br />
was ma<strong>in</strong>streamed at <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>al level after <strong>the</strong> war when <strong>the</strong> Pakistan Enemy Proverty<br />
Act (1965) was replaced by <strong>the</strong> Vested Property Act(1974). Br<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g a fresh political<br />
ec<strong>on</strong>omy dimensi<strong>on</strong> Chowdhury argues that “The material base for this new phase of<br />
communalism was <strong>in</strong>itiated by <strong>the</strong> acts committed by <strong>the</strong> Pakistanis <strong>in</strong> expell<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
H<strong>in</strong>dus <strong>in</strong> 1971 and creat<strong>in</strong>g a culture of social <strong>the</strong>ft which <strong>the</strong> appropriat<strong>in</strong>g<br />
Bangladeshis later embraced.” Communalism was an essential part of <strong>the</strong> process of<br />
socially and politically legitimiz<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> ec<strong>on</strong>omic crime of dispossess<strong>in</strong>g H<strong>in</strong>dus. At <strong>the</strong><br />
societal level, Muslims and H<strong>in</strong>dus are alienated from each o<strong>the</strong>r, for <strong>the</strong> state many<br />
H<strong>in</strong>dus have become n<strong>on</strong>-Bangladeshis, irrespective of whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>y live <strong>in</strong> Bangladesh.<br />
13
Chowdhury explores <strong>the</strong> dilemma of a H<strong>in</strong>du m<strong>in</strong>ority caught <strong>in</strong> a state system where it is<br />
majority across <strong>the</strong> border and <strong>the</strong> majority is a m<strong>in</strong>ority – a situati<strong>on</strong> with fraught with<br />
vulnerability as too with opportunity. It is <strong>the</strong> captured <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> quote ““A H<strong>in</strong>du is now a<br />
secret Indian because he will have a place to runaway should he need or want to. But<br />
India will not let <strong>the</strong> Muslim go <strong>the</strong>re.” The Indian state and society’s communal<br />
practices are an <strong>in</strong>tegral aspect of <strong>the</strong> religious m<strong>in</strong>ority questi<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> Bangladesh.<br />
Ishtiaq Hussa<strong>in</strong> essay <strong>on</strong> Religious <strong>M<strong>in</strong>orities</strong> <strong>in</strong> Pakistan: Mapp<strong>in</strong>g S<strong>in</strong>d & Baluchistan<br />
reflects <strong>the</strong> attitudes and c<strong>on</strong>cerns of organizati<strong>on</strong>s work<strong>in</strong>g for m<strong>in</strong>ority rights <strong>in</strong><br />
Pakistan and is anchored <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir asserti<strong>on</strong> of bel<strong>on</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g. The study picks up <strong>the</strong> secular<br />
thread <strong>in</strong> J<strong>in</strong>nah’s visi<strong>on</strong> of Pakistan and wistfully suggests that <strong>the</strong> change <strong>in</strong> Pakistan’s<br />
c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> and policies towards a less tolerant, more discrim<strong>in</strong>atory, exclusi<strong>on</strong>ary and<br />
Islamic orientati<strong>on</strong>, was not <strong>in</strong>evitable, <strong>the</strong>re were o<strong>the</strong>r possibilities. “Like <strong>the</strong> Muslim<br />
League and o<strong>the</strong>r Islamic parties such as Jamaat-i-Islami (JI), <strong>the</strong> Indian Nati<strong>on</strong>al<br />
C<strong>on</strong>gress was arrayed aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>du Mahasabah and o<strong>the</strong>r such fundamentalist<br />
groups.” Carry<strong>in</strong>g fur<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> logic of <strong>the</strong> argument, Hussa<strong>in</strong> posits that “<strong>the</strong> weaken<strong>in</strong>g<br />
of modernist forces” <strong>in</strong> India saw <strong>the</strong> resurgence of rival forces <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> form of <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>du<br />
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and “<strong>in</strong> Pakistan <strong>the</strong> Islamicist forces”.<br />
The essay comb<strong>in</strong>es cameos of Pakistan’s Muslim and n<strong>on</strong> Muslim m<strong>in</strong>orities with a<br />
survey based analysis of <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>du and Christian communities <strong>in</strong> 10 districts of<br />
Baluchistan and S<strong>in</strong>d. While <strong>the</strong> official census claims <strong>the</strong> populati<strong>on</strong> of m<strong>in</strong>orities to be<br />
4% of <strong>the</strong> populati<strong>on</strong>, unofficial estimates place it at 8%. The essay captures <strong>the</strong><br />
hierarchy <strong>in</strong> discrim<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> and disadvantage - Ahmadis are well organized and affluent<br />
and able to counter <strong>the</strong> official and societal anger that imposes restricti<strong>on</strong>s <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
religious practices and social mobility; Christians face anger for political (especially after<br />
‘9/11’) reas<strong>on</strong>s, ec<strong>on</strong>omic pressure to grab church lands and social c<strong>on</strong>tempt, especially<br />
after <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>alizati<strong>on</strong> of (Christian run) educati<strong>on</strong>al <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>s and its c<strong>on</strong>sequences<br />
for lack of access of Christians to educati<strong>on</strong>; and H<strong>in</strong>dus are largely undereducated and<br />
under employed and suffer from stigmatizati<strong>on</strong> as fifth columnists, and lack of proper<br />
support networks to negotiate redress for grievances especially <strong>in</strong> feudal S<strong>in</strong>d.<br />
With Shahid Fiaz’s discursive essay, <strong>on</strong> “The Challenge of Nati<strong>on</strong>al M<strong>in</strong>ority Questi<strong>on</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong> Pakistan, we shift focus to ethno-nati<strong>on</strong>al asserti<strong>on</strong>. Fiaz a well known activist and<br />
<strong>in</strong>dependent researcher, argues that “<strong>the</strong> current resurgence of nati<strong>on</strong>al m<strong>in</strong>ority questi<strong>on</strong>,<br />
ethnic identity, and sectarian rivalries is closely l<strong>in</strong>ked to <strong>the</strong> nature of <strong>the</strong> Pakistani<br />
state.” His essay shows how <strong>the</strong> state apparatus, right from <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>cepti<strong>on</strong>, has been<br />
heavily weighted <strong>in</strong> favor of n<strong>on</strong>-elected <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>s and particular ethnic groups. In <strong>the</strong><br />
process prov<strong>in</strong>cial rights have been ignored and demands for regi<strong>on</strong>al aut<strong>on</strong>omy violently<br />
suppressed. The ‘secessi<strong>on</strong>’ of East Pakistan has produced <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> leadership a siege<br />
mentality, and Fiaz draws our attenti<strong>on</strong> to <strong>the</strong> propensity of state forces support<strong>in</strong>g<br />
Islamisati<strong>on</strong> and Islamist political groups as a counter to secular nati<strong>on</strong>alists. “Ir<strong>on</strong>ically,<br />
<strong>the</strong> Musharraf government openly negotiates with so-called ‘extremists terrorists’ <strong>in</strong><br />
North and <strong>South</strong> Waziristan <strong>in</strong> NWFP but refuses to talk to secular nati<strong>on</strong>alist <strong>in</strong><br />
Baluchistan”, Fiaz rem<strong>in</strong>ds us. He argues that secessi<strong>on</strong>ism is not part of <strong>the</strong> ‘nati<strong>on</strong>alist’<br />
agenda, but aut<strong>on</strong>omy and equal rights are, or at least till now.<br />
14
Jayadeva Uyangoda, for over a decade, has been analyz<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> chang<strong>in</strong>g c<strong>on</strong>tours of <strong>the</strong><br />
m<strong>in</strong>ority rights discourse <strong>in</strong> a c<strong>on</strong>text of civil war <strong>in</strong> Sri Lanka. In Sri Lanka: Recent<br />
Shifts <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> M<strong>in</strong>ority Rights Debate, he returns to make a reassessment, at a time when<br />
political negotiati<strong>on</strong>s around ‘<strong>in</strong>ternal self determ<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>’ have been displaced by armed<br />
c<strong>on</strong>flict, and <strong>the</strong> Sri Lankan state’s c<strong>on</strong>victi<strong>on</strong> that <strong>the</strong> LTTE can be militarily defeated<br />
and <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> process <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>ority questi<strong>on</strong> resolved or ra<strong>the</strong>r suppressed. Uyangoda<br />
reiterates his <strong>the</strong>sis that <strong>the</strong> ethnic c<strong>on</strong>flict had “brought <strong>the</strong> idea of group rights to <strong>the</strong><br />
centre of political struggles, waged by <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>ority communities.” They call for an<br />
approach that can grapple with <strong>the</strong> self-determ<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> rights of ethnic m<strong>in</strong>orities.”<br />
Through <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>flict and <strong>the</strong> failed peace processes, <strong>the</strong> ‘nati<strong>on</strong>alist perspective’ was <strong>in</strong><br />
collisi<strong>on</strong> with <strong>the</strong> liberal c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>alist approach that believed that a mix of<br />
fundamental rights, special language rights and a degree of power shar<strong>in</strong>g would be<br />
sufficient. Uyangoda argued “ For two and half decades, <strong>the</strong> military strength of <strong>the</strong><br />
Tamil secessi<strong>on</strong>ist campaign, <strong>the</strong> capacity of <strong>the</strong> Tamil society to endure a protracted<br />
civil war and <strong>the</strong> resolve of <strong>the</strong> Sri Lankan state to defeat <strong>the</strong> Tamil nati<strong>on</strong>alist<br />
<strong>in</strong>surgency have c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>ed <strong>the</strong> extent to which m<strong>in</strong>ority rights should be acknowledged,<br />
accommodated or resisted.” By 2008 Rajapaksa’s determ<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> to defeat ra<strong>the</strong>r than<br />
weaken <strong>the</strong> LTTE, transformed or ra<strong>the</strong>r narrowed <strong>the</strong> terms of <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>ority discourse.<br />
He presciently comments” <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> will<strong>in</strong>gness dem<strong>on</strong>strated by m<strong>in</strong>ority political groups,<br />
except <strong>the</strong> LTTE and TNA, to accept under <strong>the</strong> Rajapakse presidency, a political soluti<strong>on</strong><br />
to <strong>the</strong> ethnic c<strong>on</strong>flict that ensures a sec<strong>on</strong>dary status to ethnic m<strong>in</strong>orities” Sri Lanka’s<br />
m<strong>in</strong>ority rights discourse has been widened and <strong>the</strong>n narrowed down quite significantly,<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>text of <strong>the</strong> ethno-political civil war.”<br />
The essays also focuses <strong>on</strong> an alternate model of m<strong>in</strong>orities- <strong>the</strong> Muslims and <strong>the</strong> Up<br />
country Tamils - negotiat<strong>in</strong>g a political relati<strong>on</strong>ship with <strong>the</strong> state by show<strong>in</strong>g a<br />
pragmatic “flexibility <strong>in</strong> enter<strong>in</strong>g coaliti<strong>on</strong> alliances dur<strong>in</strong>g and after parliamentary<br />
electi<strong>on</strong>s.” Fara Haniffa <strong>in</strong>terrogates fur<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> doubtful advantage to <strong>the</strong> Muslim<br />
populati<strong>on</strong> of adopt<strong>in</strong>g a strategy l<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ir fate to nati<strong>on</strong>al parties <strong>in</strong> place of<br />
develop<strong>in</strong>g a Muslim political voice till <strong>the</strong> 1980s. The essay “Muslims <strong>in</strong> Sri Lanka:<br />
Political Choices of a Smaller M<strong>in</strong>ority”, is an analysis from with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> community, of<br />
<strong>the</strong> political choices that were dictated by <strong>the</strong> political disadvantage of be<strong>in</strong>g a spatially<br />
dispersed community with <strong>on</strong>ly a territorial c<strong>on</strong>centrati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> East. Complicat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
emergence of an aut<strong>on</strong>omous and unified Muslim politics, is <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>on</strong>ly 30% of <strong>the</strong><br />
Muslim populati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> country is from <strong>the</strong> North and East. The larger number of<br />
Muslims that reside outside <strong>the</strong> North and East see no real need for a Muslim political<br />
voice outside of <strong>the</strong> Eastern Prov<strong>in</strong>ce or of separate representati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> peace<br />
negotiati<strong>on</strong>s 2002-2006.<br />
Haniffa pejoratively describes Muslim collective as “Bit players <strong>in</strong> both (S<strong>in</strong>hala and<br />
Tamil) narratives, <strong>the</strong>y are seen as collaborat<strong>in</strong>g with whoever was <strong>in</strong> power, switch<strong>in</strong>g<br />
from <strong>on</strong>e nati<strong>on</strong>al party to ano<strong>the</strong>r <strong>in</strong> keep<strong>in</strong>g with political expediency and <strong>in</strong> denial of<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir ‘actual’ Tamil ethnicity.” The state has encouraged <strong>the</strong> development of an ec<strong>on</strong>omy<br />
of collusi<strong>on</strong>” states Haniffa, and an anti state movement that holds <strong>the</strong>m culpable for just<br />
15
such a collusi<strong>on</strong> and has systematically perpetrated acts of violence aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong>m. The<br />
state has not enabled realizati<strong>on</strong> of legitimate political rights of <strong>the</strong> Muslims as ev<strong>in</strong>ced <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> Muslim democratically elected authority be<strong>in</strong>g sidel<strong>in</strong>ed for favour<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Karuna<br />
facti<strong>on</strong>.<br />
Mahendra Lawoti <strong>in</strong> Inclusi<strong>on</strong> and Accountability <strong>in</strong> a New Democratic Nepal, retruns<br />
to his policy prescriptive approach <strong>in</strong> analyz<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>alized exclusi<strong>on</strong> that underlay<br />
Nepal’s Maoist c<strong>on</strong>flict. The new edge is that before him is <strong>the</strong> unfold<strong>in</strong>g process of <strong>the</strong><br />
c<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> of ‘Naya’ Nepal. Lawoti <strong>in</strong> suggest<strong>in</strong>g ‘guidel<strong>in</strong>es’ - for <strong>the</strong> directi<strong>on</strong> of<br />
future electoral and land reforms, <strong>the</strong> restructur<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> state al<strong>on</strong>g federal<br />
arrangements, and <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> of two tier representative <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>s enabl<strong>in</strong>g greater<br />
<strong>in</strong>clusi<strong>on</strong> - exhorts Nepal’s new leaders to learn from <strong>the</strong> problems Nepal witnessed <strong>in</strong><br />
its previous democratic practice <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1990s. He s<strong>in</strong>gles out centralizati<strong>on</strong> and exclusi<strong>on</strong><br />
as <strong>the</strong> two pr<strong>in</strong>ciple factors that braided with poverty and <strong>in</strong>equality to fuel <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>surgency and exacerbate ethnic tensi<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
Democracy as practiced s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> 1990s, through <strong>the</strong> FPTP electoral system and large<br />
undemocratic political parties, fur<strong>the</strong>r re<strong>in</strong>forced <strong>the</strong> absolute m<strong>on</strong>opoly of caste hill<br />
H<strong>in</strong>du elite males (CHHEM) to <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>uous exclusi<strong>on</strong> of <strong>in</strong>digenous nati<strong>on</strong>alities,<br />
Madhesi, Dalits and women. Also, <strong>the</strong> centralizati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> polity was facilitated and<br />
re<strong>in</strong>forced by <strong>the</strong> centraliz<strong>in</strong>g political culture. The society <strong>in</strong>gra<strong>in</strong>ed by <strong>the</strong> caste system<br />
and patriarchy ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong>-egalitarian values that favored certa<strong>in</strong> caste and gender<br />
groups. It was not a culture or structure of governance that made for accountability.<br />
The volume focuses <strong>on</strong> a subset <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> field of m<strong>in</strong>ority rights, that is, <strong>in</strong>digenous peoples.<br />
Tapan Bose <strong>in</strong> a macro analysis <strong>in</strong> “The Indigenous Peoples :Victims of <strong>the</strong> Politics of<br />
Denial” and Pradip Prabhu <strong>in</strong> a micro study <strong>on</strong> “Tribal Land Alienati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong><br />
Maharashtra: Legality, Illegality and Praxis” - engage with structures of<br />
epistemological and political disadvantage and discrim<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> that have rendered <strong>the</strong><br />
“tribal” communities so vulnerable <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir encounter with <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>stream . With<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al framework of rights, <strong>in</strong>digenous peoples are morally, if not legally,<br />
recognized as entitled to group rights and customary rights over land, as enshr<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
UN Declarati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007).<br />
However as Bose argues, “Governments of <strong>the</strong> <strong>Asia</strong>n regi<strong>on</strong> have taken advantage of <strong>the</strong><br />
c<strong>on</strong>fusi<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> UN def<strong>in</strong>iti<strong>on</strong>” (of <strong>in</strong>digenous peoples cast as ‘First Nati<strong>on</strong>s’ col<strong>on</strong>ized<br />
by overseas powers) “to exclude milli<strong>on</strong>s of tribal peoples of <strong>Asia</strong> and Africa from <strong>the</strong><br />
designati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>in</strong>digenous peoples.” Bose emphasizes a c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>uity between <strong>the</strong> col<strong>on</strong>ial<br />
and postcol<strong>on</strong>ial c<strong>on</strong>struct of <strong>the</strong> identity of ‘tribe’ with its pejorative c<strong>on</strong>notati<strong>on</strong>s. This<br />
was socially rooted <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> racist hegem<strong>on</strong>ic ideology propagated by col<strong>on</strong>ial academics<br />
and now by c<strong>on</strong>temporary <strong>Asia</strong>n <strong>on</strong>es. Its corollary is <strong>the</strong> col<strong>on</strong>ial-post col<strong>on</strong>ial<br />
c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>uity <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> politics of <strong>in</strong>ternal col<strong>on</strong>ialism. Bose argues that “<strong>the</strong> real reas<strong>on</strong> for<br />
exclud<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> tribal peoples of <strong>Asia</strong> is not lack of c<strong>on</strong>ceptual clarity, but a political <strong>on</strong>e.<br />
And <strong>the</strong>refore, it is a political debate, which needs to focus <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> reality of<br />
powerlessness of <strong>the</strong> tribal peoples and <strong>the</strong>ir struggle for justice.”<br />
16
Pradip Prabhu, a qu<strong>in</strong>tessential tribal rights scholar-activist, tracks <strong>the</strong> col<strong>on</strong>ial- post<br />
col<strong>on</strong>ial c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>uity <strong>in</strong> policies, structures and attitudes that have made for a lethal<br />
encounter <strong>in</strong> Maharashtra between <strong>the</strong> tribal communities (nearly 9%) and <strong>the</strong><br />
ma<strong>in</strong>stream people of <strong>on</strong>e of India’s most advanced <strong>in</strong>dustrial states. Draw<strong>in</strong>g up<strong>on</strong><br />
empirical studies, Prabhu develops a grim analysis of <strong>the</strong> impact of land reforms <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
traibal areas, designed to protect, willfully be<strong>in</strong>g used to legally loot tribals of <strong>the</strong>ir land<br />
and thus <strong>the</strong>ir existence. What gives <strong>the</strong> situati<strong>on</strong> an extra charge is that <strong>the</strong>se tribal areas<br />
of mass distress ( described as verg<strong>in</strong>g <strong>on</strong> tribal ethnocide) are close to Mumbai. Prabhu<br />
warns,“The vast chasm, divid<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> tribal people from <strong>the</strong> rest of <strong>the</strong> populati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong><br />
advanced <strong>in</strong>dustrialized state of Maharashtra, is <strong>the</strong> cumulative result of land alienati<strong>on</strong>,<br />
loss of forest habitat and displacement, which <strong>in</strong>dividually and c<strong>on</strong>jo<strong>in</strong>tly result <strong>in</strong><br />
impoverishment and c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to pose questi<strong>on</strong>s about <strong>the</strong> impact of land reforms <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
tribal areas of <strong>the</strong> state. 2<br />
C<strong>on</strong>clusi<strong>on</strong><br />
For <strong>the</strong> dom<strong>in</strong>ant (majority) groups, m<strong>in</strong>ority rights are seen as challeng<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> state. For<br />
<strong>the</strong> regi<strong>on</strong>’s m<strong>in</strong>ority communities, it has been a comm<strong>on</strong> experience of majoritarianism<br />
and <strong>the</strong>ir discrim<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> and disempowerment, result<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> submissive acquiescence to<br />
resistance or violent revolt. S<strong>in</strong>ce Indian, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka,<br />
Bhutan all have m<strong>in</strong>ority problems, that result <strong>in</strong> displacement, uproot<strong>in</strong>g and <strong>the</strong> creati<strong>on</strong><br />
of refugees, it is not <strong>the</strong> problem of a rogue state but comm<strong>on</strong> to <strong>the</strong> cluster of postcol<strong>on</strong>ial<br />
states that have emerged <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> regi<strong>on</strong>. Political liberalism anchored <strong>in</strong> equal<br />
rights has proved <strong>in</strong>sufficient to deliver equality and justice to m<strong>in</strong>ority groups.<br />
It should be added that <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> midst of new challenges that place m<strong>in</strong>orities at risk <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
regi<strong>on</strong>, <strong>the</strong>re also are more comfort<strong>in</strong>g w<strong>in</strong>ds of change. There is <strong>the</strong> positive shift <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
politics of some of <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>ority communities away from <strong>the</strong> politics of difference<br />
towards a politics centred <strong>on</strong> egalitarian claims, and comm<strong>on</strong> issues of democratic<br />
governance. Most important <strong>the</strong>re is a reach<strong>in</strong>g out to o<strong>the</strong>r oppressed groups and a<br />
tentative politics of alliances. Al<strong>on</strong>gside, <strong>the</strong>re is <strong>the</strong> grow<strong>in</strong>g recogniti<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> value of<br />
special ‘aut<strong>on</strong>omy’ arrangements for accommodati<strong>on</strong> of ‘special rights’, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g<br />
territorially focused aut<strong>on</strong>omies for spatially c<strong>on</strong>centrated m<strong>in</strong>orities. However, that trend<br />
has received a major setback with <strong>the</strong> military ‘soluti<strong>on</strong>’ to <strong>the</strong> Tamil nati<strong>on</strong>al questi<strong>on</strong>.<br />
i Andreas Wimmer Nati<strong>on</strong>alist Exclusi<strong>on</strong> and Ethnic C<strong>on</strong>flicts: shadows of modernity, Cambridge<br />
University Press, 2002<br />
ii UNDP HDR 2004<br />
iii Tapan Bose ‘Foreword’ <strong>in</strong> Rita Manchanda ‘ No N<strong>on</strong>sense Guide to M<strong>in</strong>ority Rights <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Asia</strong>’, New<br />
Delhi, Sage 2009; p<br />
iv A Barakat et al Deprivati<strong>on</strong> of H<strong>in</strong>du M<strong>in</strong>ority <strong>in</strong> Bangladesh, Pathak Shamabesh, Dhaka 2008<br />
v Yash Ghai ‘Ethnicity and Aut<strong>on</strong>omy: A Framework of Analysis “ <strong>in</strong> edited Aut<strong>on</strong>omy and Ethnicity:<br />
Negotiat<strong>in</strong>g Compet<strong>in</strong>g Claims <strong>in</strong> Multi-ethnic states Cambridge University Press 2000; p2<br />
vi A study carried out by <strong>the</strong> NGO "People's Tribunal" <strong>in</strong> 10 states <strong>in</strong> July 2004 found that 99.9 percent of<br />
those arrested under POTA were Muslims.<br />
vii Papiya Ghosh Papiya Ghosh Partiti<strong>on</strong> And The <strong>South</strong> <strong>Asia</strong> Diaspora: Extend<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Subc<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ent,<br />
Routledge, 2007<br />
17
viii The rights of ‘people’ and of m<strong>in</strong>orities under <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al law are different. People are a “nati<strong>on</strong>”<br />
without sovereignty. <strong>M<strong>in</strong>orities</strong> do not have <strong>the</strong> right to self-determ<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
ix Balveer Aurora and Douglas Verney eds Mutliple Identities <strong>in</strong> a S<strong>in</strong>gle State; Indian federalism <strong>in</strong> a<br />
Comparative Perspective, K<strong>on</strong>arak, New Delhi 1995<br />
x Iqbal Ansari ‘Introducti<strong>on</strong>’ <strong>in</strong> Iqbal Ansari edited Read<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>on</strong> <strong>M<strong>in</strong>orities</strong>: Perspectives and<br />
Documents” vol II, Institute of Objective Studies, New Delhi 1996;<br />
xi Gurpreet Mahajan Identities & Rihts: Aspects of Liberal Democracy <strong>in</strong> India , OUP, Delhi 1998<br />
xii see also Suroosh Irfani Pakistan Sectarian Violence: Between ‘Arabist Shift’ and Indo-Persian Culture”<br />
from Religious Radicalism and security <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Asia</strong>, <strong>Asia</strong> Pacific Centre for Security Studies, No 7,<br />
http://www.apcss.org/Publicati<strong>on</strong>s/Edited%20Volumes/ReligiousRadicalism/PagesfromReligiousRadicalis<br />
mandSecurity<strong>in</strong><strong>South</strong><strong>Asia</strong>ch7.pdf …accessed July 9, 2009<br />
xiii Saleem Samad Bangladesh: State of <strong>M<strong>in</strong>orities</strong> <strong>in</strong> Sumanta Banerjee edited Shr<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g Space: M<strong>in</strong>ority<br />
rights <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Asia</strong>, Kathmandu, SAFHR?Manohar 1999.<br />
xiv Amena Mohs<strong>in</strong> Ethnicity and C<strong>on</strong>flict: The Bangladesh Case <strong>in</strong> V Raghavan ed Comprehensive Security<br />
2003 pp331<br />
18
A L<strong>on</strong>g-Term View of C<strong>on</strong>temporary Muslim Situati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> India<br />
Javeed Alam ♣<br />
Oppressed Communities and ‘Citizen Politics’<br />
A deep change has begun to crystallize am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Muslim communities <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> recent<br />
period. S<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> submissi<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> Sachar Committee Report <strong>in</strong> December 2006, a<br />
discernible, unify<strong>in</strong>g thread of a positive k<strong>in</strong>d is beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g to shape <strong>the</strong> articulati<strong>on</strong> of<br />
political demands am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Muslims. Much of what is be<strong>in</strong>g talked about can be<br />
summarized as <strong>the</strong> politics of <strong>in</strong>clusi<strong>on</strong> as citizens. For <strong>the</strong> sake of c<strong>on</strong>venience, let us<br />
call it, citizen politics. A pr<strong>on</strong>ounced characteristic of citizen politics is that it is<br />
resistant to discrim<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> and is marked by a push towards an egalitarian social ethos.<br />
Citizenship, m<strong>in</strong>imally speak<strong>in</strong>g, is c<strong>on</strong>cerned with entrenched equal rights for all and<br />
it <strong>the</strong>refore becomes facilitative of egalitarian liv<strong>in</strong>g. This follows because a citizen,<br />
ideally, is c<strong>on</strong>stituted without reference to anyth<strong>in</strong>g that attaches to us as cultural<br />
(specifically <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> case of India of ritual – status) <strong>in</strong>heritance. Therefore, it needs to<br />
be noted <strong>in</strong> pass<strong>in</strong>g that citizen politics cannot be c<strong>on</strong>ducted except with<strong>in</strong> a secular<br />
framework.<br />
Democratic politics <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> last 15 – 20 years has so reshaped <strong>the</strong> issues of<br />
discrim<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>, disadvantage and marg<strong>in</strong>alizat<strong>on</strong>, that all those communities which<br />
had been left beh<strong>in</strong>d or str<strong>on</strong>gly felt that <strong>the</strong>y had, now are <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> forefr<strong>on</strong>t of<br />
struggles for an egalitarian social order. Democracy <strong>in</strong> India has primarily become –<br />
over and above <strong>the</strong> many o<strong>the</strong>r def<strong>in</strong>iti<strong>on</strong>s that mark out its terra<strong>in</strong> – <strong>the</strong> politics <strong>the</strong><br />
governed take recourse to, to ga<strong>in</strong> a voice, a foothold, a sign of status and a measure<br />
of effective power. Apart from <strong>the</strong> modern proletariat, <strong>the</strong> category of <strong>the</strong> governed<br />
<strong>in</strong> India has been largely made up of <strong>the</strong> Dalits and OBCs and <strong>the</strong> women am<strong>on</strong>g all<br />
of <strong>the</strong>se groups. The category of <strong>the</strong> governed more or less overlaps with those who<br />
were direct producers <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> pre-capitalist ec<strong>on</strong>omy. We must remember that am<strong>on</strong>g<br />
<strong>the</strong> producers women played an important role both <strong>in</strong> household producti<strong>on</strong> and<br />
agriculture. Regrettably, however, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> present day battle of <strong>the</strong> oppressed for<br />
equality, <strong>the</strong> leadership of <strong>the</strong> oppressed communities, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Muslims,<br />
has systematically excluded women from <strong>the</strong> struggle for equality and rights. This is<br />
an <strong>in</strong>firmity <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g expansi<strong>on</strong> of democracy <strong>in</strong> India.<br />
This broadly sets <strong>the</strong> terra<strong>in</strong> of what can be called <strong>the</strong> politics for bourgeois equality. i<br />
It is a battle be<strong>in</strong>g waged by all <strong>the</strong> oppressed communities and has two aspects. On<br />
<strong>the</strong> <strong>on</strong>e hand, <strong>the</strong>re is <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al formal equality which is a matter of<br />
declarati<strong>on</strong> (you declare every<strong>on</strong>e to be equal), and is someth<strong>in</strong>g passive, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> sense,<br />
that it does not necessarily change <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s. On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, <strong>the</strong>re is <strong>the</strong><br />
struggle for recogniti<strong>on</strong>, which is <strong>the</strong> active comp<strong>on</strong>ent of <strong>the</strong> process because it is<br />
based <strong>on</strong> reciprocity. That is, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> process of recogniz<strong>in</strong>g, at <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>imal, we<br />
remove <strong>the</strong> oppositi<strong>on</strong> between <strong>the</strong> self and ‘<strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r’ as someth<strong>in</strong>g necessarily<br />
present, and maximally, we make ‘<strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r’ c<strong>on</strong>stitutive of our own self. Toge<strong>the</strong>r<br />
♣ Javeed Alam’s essay: An earlier versi<strong>on</strong> was published <strong>in</strong> Ec<strong>on</strong>omic & Political Weekly vol<br />
43, no2, Jan12-18, 2008, pp 45-54<br />
19
<strong>the</strong>se make for an egalitarian society, however much materially based <strong>in</strong>equalities<br />
may c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to persist.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> last 20 years <strong>the</strong> Muslim communities are <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly jo<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g this politics. As<br />
this process has ga<strong>in</strong>ed momentum, an <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g development has taken place<br />
am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Muslim. Oppressed communities from am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Muslims who have<br />
jo<strong>in</strong>ed this battle for bourgeois equality have moved away from <strong>the</strong> Muslim elite who<br />
traditi<strong>on</strong>ally had provided <strong>the</strong>m leadership. This has widened <strong>the</strong> split between <strong>the</strong><br />
ord<strong>in</strong>ary Muslim masses and <strong>the</strong> established gentry. Muslim communities which are<br />
socially oppressed have sought alliances with those who are adjacent to <strong>the</strong>m <strong>in</strong> term<br />
of work and<br />
leisure. As a result, <strong>the</strong>y have been support<strong>in</strong>g different political parties of <strong>the</strong><br />
oppressed, particularly <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Indo-Gangetic belt, with resultant impact <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
decl<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g prospects of <strong>the</strong> C<strong>on</strong>gress Party.<br />
Follow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Sachar Report, <strong>the</strong>re is a new social churn<strong>in</strong>g. How it impacts up<strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
political equati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> ground, may be too early to tell. What is discernible is that<br />
you cannot talk about politics am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Muslims, without reference to what is<br />
happen<strong>in</strong>g am<strong>on</strong>g similar disadvantaged communities with<strong>in</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r religi<strong>on</strong>s. This is a<br />
matter of some importance <strong>in</strong> avoid<strong>in</strong>g absolutisati<strong>on</strong> of community politics. This is<br />
<strong>the</strong> positive good that democracy has d<strong>on</strong>e to India, whatever <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>in</strong>firmities of<br />
this politics.<br />
Dramatic Moment<br />
A curious feature of <strong>the</strong> social churn<strong>in</strong>g and <strong>the</strong> new k<strong>in</strong>d of politics emerg<strong>in</strong>g is that<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> case of most oppressed communities, it was a dramatic moment which brought<br />
this out <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> open as a discernible pattern. The dramatic event acts as a catalyst of<br />
what is a l<strong>on</strong>g term secular trend <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> mak<strong>in</strong>g with all its currents and diverse<br />
propensities and gets crystallised as a unified politics. In <strong>the</strong> case of <strong>the</strong> OBCs, it was<br />
not just <strong>the</strong> announcement of <strong>the</strong> implementati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> Mandal Commissi<strong>on</strong> Report,<br />
important though that was. What made it <strong>the</strong> dramatic moment was <strong>the</strong> k<strong>in</strong>d of<br />
reacti<strong>on</strong> and <strong>the</strong> expressi<strong>on</strong> it took. In particular, it was <strong>the</strong> l<strong>on</strong>g last<strong>in</strong>g vandalism by<br />
<strong>the</strong> upper caste youth who held <strong>the</strong> society to ransom, backed by <strong>the</strong> shrill support of<br />
<strong>the</strong> mass media and <strong>the</strong> back<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> bureaucracy. This polarized <strong>the</strong> society <strong>in</strong>to<br />
two warr<strong>in</strong>g camps. It was <strong>the</strong> moment which created a privilegensia with <strong>the</strong><br />
decompositi<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>sciousness of <strong>the</strong> middle class <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> fragmented<br />
c<strong>on</strong>sciousness of <strong>the</strong> upper castes, and <strong>the</strong>ir gravitati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> militant H<strong>in</strong>du rightw<strong>in</strong>g<br />
as a counter to <strong>the</strong> asserti<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> oppressed.<br />
Someth<strong>in</strong>g similar happened <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> case of <strong>the</strong> Muslims <strong>in</strong> India. The Ram Janma<br />
bhoomi movement made <strong>the</strong> Muslims bewildered, more so after <strong>the</strong> demoliti<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong><br />
Babri Masjid. The kill<strong>in</strong>gs, mayhem and anarchy <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> wake of Advani’s rath yatra,<br />
culm<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> massacre follow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> demoliti<strong>on</strong> with all its violent disorder, was<br />
someth<strong>in</strong>g India had never seen s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> partiti<strong>on</strong> kill<strong>in</strong>gs. Moreover, from this<br />
moment <strong>on</strong>, riots <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al sense ceased to occur <strong>in</strong> India. What came <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong>ir place are pogrom like kill<strong>in</strong>gs and cold-blooded massacres reach<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ir climax<br />
<strong>in</strong> Gujarat. To call <strong>the</strong>se riots, as many still do, is to surrender to <strong>the</strong> discursive<br />
strategy of h<strong>in</strong>dutva ideologues, of becom<strong>in</strong>g complicit <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> mak<strong>in</strong>g of a false and<br />
deceptive public percepti<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> current situati<strong>on</strong>. The mass kill<strong>in</strong>gs and <strong>the</strong> virulent<br />
propaganda aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> Muslims as a treacherous presence for <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>’s <strong>in</strong>tegrity<br />
20
created a situati<strong>on</strong> where Muslims were left w<strong>on</strong>der<strong>in</strong>g whe<strong>the</strong>r any body <strong>in</strong> India<br />
accepted <strong>the</strong>m as bel<strong>on</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> ‘nati<strong>on</strong>’.<br />
Paradoxically, it was this moment that brought about a radical change <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
orientati<strong>on</strong> and dispositi<strong>on</strong> of Muslims towards <strong>the</strong> Indian nati<strong>on</strong> and <strong>the</strong> politics<br />
with<strong>in</strong> it. A feature of this change is that it does not seem to be <strong>the</strong> culm<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> of l<strong>on</strong>g<br />
term tendencies or any structural changes but because of an exemplary act - V.P. S<strong>in</strong>gh<br />
giv<strong>in</strong>g up power and los<strong>in</strong>g his prime m<strong>in</strong>istership to protect <strong>the</strong> Babri Masjid. In <strong>the</strong><br />
eyes of Muslims it became an act of crucifixati<strong>on</strong>. The memory of it still operates <strong>in</strong> an<br />
exemplify<strong>in</strong>g fashi<strong>on</strong>, fill<strong>in</strong>g Muslims with a sense of w<strong>on</strong>der over his acti<strong>on</strong>. They had<br />
come to believe that <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> power games of electoral politics, communities, especially<br />
<strong>the</strong> Muslims, have always <strong>on</strong>ly been a calculati<strong>on</strong> for ga<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g power That everybody,<br />
<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Janata Party <strong>in</strong> 1977, had used <strong>the</strong>m to climb to power. Here, however,<br />
V.P. S<strong>in</strong>gh, and V P S<strong>in</strong>gh al<strong>on</strong>e, abdicated power for <strong>the</strong>ir h<strong>on</strong>our and dignity. He<br />
made <strong>the</strong>m feel that that with him <strong>the</strong>y could stand with dignity, as an <strong>in</strong>alienable part<br />
of <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
One could argue, quite c<strong>on</strong>ceivably, that <strong>the</strong> process of change may have been <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
mak<strong>in</strong>g for some time and compris<strong>in</strong>g many factors. Whatever <strong>the</strong> case, V P S<strong>in</strong>gh’s<br />
exemplary act worked as a catalyst, precipitat<strong>in</strong>g a shift <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> way <strong>the</strong>ir dispositi<strong>on</strong>s<br />
were aligned <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir c<strong>on</strong>sciousness. Questi<strong>on</strong>s of security, so carefully fostered by <strong>the</strong><br />
C<strong>on</strong>gress Party, got pushed back and c<strong>on</strong>cern with dignity (and h<strong>on</strong>our) ga<strong>in</strong>ed a<br />
relative ascendance. Muslims seemed to be learn<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>the</strong> questi<strong>on</strong>s of life, limb, and<br />
property, were not <strong>the</strong> <strong>on</strong>ly events that should decide <strong>the</strong>ir public lives. ii This<br />
development took place <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> background of <strong>the</strong> Mandal movement which fur<strong>the</strong>r<br />
re<strong>in</strong>forced <strong>the</strong> identificati<strong>on</strong> between this politics and <strong>the</strong> shift <strong>in</strong> c<strong>on</strong>sciousness with<strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> Muslim communities.<br />
All of this brought about a positive pan- Indian dimensi<strong>on</strong> to Muslim politics. At <strong>the</strong><br />
time, I was travel<strong>in</strong>g at that time from Shimla to Hyderabad to Calcutta and many o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
different places. Wherever I went, I encountered <strong>the</strong> same t<strong>on</strong>e and flavour <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
discussi<strong>on</strong>s and debates am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Muslims - how best can we align with <strong>the</strong> new<br />
secular trends or formati<strong>on</strong>s that were emerg<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> different parts of <strong>the</strong> country.<br />
The rapid spread of <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>dutva ideology, physically manifest <strong>in</strong> sadhu’s armed with<br />
trishuls, menac<strong>in</strong>gly march<strong>in</strong>g up and down <strong>the</strong> country, added to <strong>the</strong> urgency of <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
search for new secular allies. The all-India dimensi<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> Muslim political<br />
c<strong>on</strong>sciousness, which took shape <strong>the</strong>n, is crystalliz<strong>in</strong>g now with <strong>the</strong> dissem<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong><br />
f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> Sachar Report.<br />
Earlier, Muslim politics <strong>in</strong> India, largely, was regi<strong>on</strong> specific, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> sense that <strong>the</strong>re<br />
were dist<strong>in</strong>ct regi<strong>on</strong>al patterns. The regi<strong>on</strong>al specificity did not die out with V P S<strong>in</strong>gh’s<br />
exemplary act. It rema<strong>in</strong>ed a parallel current. Nor will it die out with <strong>the</strong> Sachar Report.<br />
All regi<strong>on</strong> specific currents rema<strong>in</strong> but are be<strong>in</strong>g subsumed under citizen politics.<br />
Regi<strong>on</strong> & Muslim Politics<br />
Some anthropologically <strong>in</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>ed political analysts have argued that <strong>the</strong>re is no such<br />
th<strong>in</strong>g as a Muslim community <strong>in</strong> India, because Muslims are scattered <strong>in</strong>to diverse<br />
ethno cultural and l<strong>in</strong>guistic regi<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> country and, sec<strong>on</strong>dly, because at a micro<br />
level, <strong>the</strong> surround<strong>in</strong>g H<strong>in</strong>du ethos has made imperceptible yet deep <strong>in</strong>roads am<strong>on</strong>g<br />
21
Muslims. There are three k<strong>in</strong>ds of writ<strong>in</strong>gs that emphasise directly or <strong>in</strong>ferentially <strong>the</strong><br />
multi-community nature of <strong>the</strong> Muslim populati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> India. One set of writers argues<br />
that this is due to <strong>the</strong> survival, as str<strong>on</strong>g and visible residues, of previous modes of<br />
liv<strong>in</strong>g habits, th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g patterns and worshipp<strong>in</strong>g styles am<strong>on</strong>g Muslims from times<br />
before <strong>the</strong>ir c<strong>on</strong>versi<strong>on</strong> to Islam. iii The sec<strong>on</strong>d group po<strong>in</strong>ts to <strong>the</strong> deep impact <strong>on</strong><br />
Muslims of <strong>the</strong> caste and ritual practices of <strong>the</strong> surround<strong>in</strong>g H<strong>in</strong>du milieu, which<br />
resulted <strong>in</strong> perceptible differences <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> outlook and behaviour of Muslims even<br />
across short distances. iv The third viewpo<strong>in</strong>t holds that <strong>the</strong> multi-community character<br />
is due to <strong>the</strong> implicati<strong>on</strong>s and c<strong>on</strong>sequences of be<strong>in</strong>g embedded <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> larger social<br />
structure and <strong>the</strong> demographic features of Indian society. v<br />
I disagree with this naïve applicati<strong>on</strong> of an anthropological categories which are<br />
notoriously oblivious of <strong>the</strong> underly<strong>in</strong>g political process vi . This is true not <strong>on</strong>ly of <strong>the</strong><br />
anthropological approach to <strong>the</strong> Muslim problem <strong>in</strong> India but also <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> case of<br />
various adivasi communities undergo<strong>in</strong>g processes social/and or political<br />
unificati<strong>on</strong>. vii Ethnic and o<strong>the</strong>r diversities, l<strong>in</strong>guistic differences and social<br />
differentiati<strong>on</strong> can all co-exist with grow<strong>in</strong>g political unificati<strong>on</strong> or an emergent sense<br />
of ‘community’. I argue that a pan – Indian Muslim community has begun to take<br />
shape.<br />
Earlier, however, to have talked of a pan-India Muslim politics was an over<br />
generalizati<strong>on</strong> for <strong>the</strong>re was an absence of a unify<strong>in</strong>g democratic strand <strong>in</strong>form<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
political debates am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Muslims or <strong>the</strong> demands raised by <strong>the</strong>m <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> different<br />
regi<strong>on</strong>s or sub-regi<strong>on</strong>s of India. The politics of Muslims <strong>in</strong> Hyderabad or <strong>the</strong><br />
Telengana regi<strong>on</strong> of Andhra Pradesh had little to do with what existed <strong>in</strong> Malabar or<br />
<strong>the</strong> nor<strong>the</strong>rn regi<strong>on</strong> of Kerala. Likewise what prevailed <strong>in</strong> Uttar Pradesh or Bihar had<br />
little c<strong>on</strong>necti<strong>on</strong> with <strong>the</strong> sou<strong>the</strong>rn regi<strong>on</strong>s. Bengal had its dist<strong>in</strong>ct pattern. Muslims <strong>in</strong><br />
each regi<strong>on</strong> had, and still have, <strong>the</strong>ir specific problems and <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir differentiated<br />
articulati<strong>on</strong>, <strong>the</strong> politics of <strong>the</strong>se regi<strong>on</strong>s had acquired a dist<strong>in</strong>ct flavour. Also, <strong>the</strong>re<br />
was very little actual c<strong>on</strong>tact between <strong>the</strong> leadership of <strong>the</strong> Muslims <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>se regi<strong>on</strong>s,<br />
although <strong>the</strong>y all knew <strong>on</strong>e ano<strong>the</strong>r and sympathized with each o<strong>the</strong>r’s politics.<br />
The regi<strong>on</strong>ally specific nature of Muslim politics is rooted <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> very nature of <strong>the</strong><br />
presence of Muslims as m<strong>in</strong>orities <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> various l<strong>in</strong>guistic – cultural communities of<br />
India; to put it ano<strong>the</strong>r way as <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>ority comp<strong>on</strong>ent of <strong>the</strong> different nati<strong>on</strong>alities (a<br />
term deeply suspect and disfavoured as usage) <strong>in</strong> India. There are two aspects of this<br />
difference. One, is that Muslims as a people, before Independence and up to <strong>the</strong> present,<br />
did not get culturally <strong>in</strong>tegrated with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir (l<strong>in</strong>guistically determ<strong>in</strong>ed) nati<strong>on</strong>ality<br />
groups.. The o<strong>the</strong>r aspect has to do with <strong>the</strong> differences <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> nature of <strong>the</strong> relati<strong>on</strong>ships<br />
between <strong>the</strong> Muslim m<strong>in</strong>ority and <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>ality of which it is a c<strong>on</strong>stituent part. For<br />
example, <strong>the</strong> nature of <strong>the</strong> relati<strong>on</strong>s between Muslim Bengalis and Bengali H<strong>in</strong>du as<br />
compared to those <strong>in</strong> Kerala or Tamil Nadu or those <strong>in</strong> U.P is bound to give rise to<br />
different flavours <strong>in</strong> Muslims politics <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> different regi<strong>on</strong>s<br />
Some of <strong>the</strong> regi<strong>on</strong> specific political formati<strong>on</strong>s have been parties of a communal<br />
nature, most prom<strong>in</strong>ently, <strong>the</strong> Muslim League <strong>in</strong> Kerala and <strong>the</strong> Ittahad ul Muslimeen <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> Hyderabad, Telangana regi<strong>on</strong> and <strong>on</strong> a smaller scale <strong>the</strong> Muslim League <strong>in</strong> Tamil<br />
Nadu. viii In <strong>the</strong>se sou<strong>the</strong>rn states <strong>the</strong>se communally oriented parties have become <strong>the</strong><br />
ma<strong>in</strong> electoral voice of <strong>the</strong> Muslims. Each of <strong>the</strong>se parties’ posseses dist<strong>in</strong>ct histories,<br />
c<strong>on</strong>text and a pattern of development.ix It is surpris<strong>in</strong>g that Muslim communal<br />
22
formati<strong>on</strong>s thrive <strong>in</strong> regi<strong>on</strong>s where H<strong>in</strong>du communalism does not have a str<strong>on</strong>g<br />
presence. Surpris<strong>in</strong>g, that is, because it is generally thought that <strong>on</strong>e form of<br />
communalism re<strong>in</strong>forces ano<strong>the</strong>r.x But where H<strong>in</strong>dutva forces are str<strong>on</strong>g and have been<br />
<strong>in</strong> power often, <strong>the</strong>re are no organised Muslim communal parties. However, this does<br />
not mean that <strong>the</strong>re is no Muslim communal c<strong>on</strong>sciousness <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>se regi<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
Historically, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> pre-<strong>in</strong>dependence period this was <strong>the</strong> regi<strong>on</strong> where <strong>the</strong> separatist<br />
politics of <strong>the</strong> Muslim League was <strong>the</strong> str<strong>on</strong>gest. This may probably be <strong>the</strong> reas<strong>on</strong> for<br />
<strong>the</strong> absence of Muslim communal parties, that is, <strong>the</strong> defensive fear of be<strong>in</strong>g l<strong>in</strong>ked to<br />
that separatist politics aga<strong>in</strong>. xi Also, <strong>the</strong> process of <strong>on</strong>e communalism re<strong>in</strong>forc<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
o<strong>the</strong>r is a more complex <strong>on</strong>e. For <strong>in</strong>stance, <strong>the</strong> government of India’s systematic anti<br />
women stand <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Shah Bano case worked <strong>in</strong> favour of H<strong>in</strong>dutva by giv<strong>in</strong>g a new<br />
voice to <strong>the</strong> most hidebound secti<strong>on</strong>s of <strong>the</strong> Muslim community.<br />
The regi<strong>on</strong> specificity character of Muslim politics makes Muslim communalism quite<br />
different from <strong>the</strong> militant H<strong>in</strong>du right w<strong>in</strong>g communalism. Unlike H<strong>in</strong>dutva as<br />
manifested <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> different organizati<strong>on</strong>s which band toge<strong>the</strong>r as Sangh Parivar,<br />
Muslim communalism nei<strong>the</strong>r has a s<strong>in</strong>gle all India ideology nor a s<strong>in</strong>gle m<strong>on</strong>olithic<br />
organizati<strong>on</strong> guided and led by someth<strong>in</strong>g like Rastriya Swayam Sevak Sangh (RSS). It<br />
is not <strong>on</strong>ly regi<strong>on</strong> specific but dispersed and without any identifiable foundati<strong>on</strong>s. It is<br />
based, <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>on</strong>e hand, <strong>on</strong> resentments, grievances and apprehensi<strong>on</strong> and <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r,<br />
<strong>on</strong> vague aspirati<strong>on</strong>s and hopes of gett<strong>in</strong>g a better deal from <strong>the</strong> government.<br />
Align<strong>in</strong>g with Secularism<br />
Muslim communalism and Muslim communal c<strong>on</strong>sciousness, it is worth remember<strong>in</strong>g,<br />
is not as extensive <strong>in</strong> its spread as <strong>the</strong> presence of Muslims <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> different regi<strong>on</strong>s of<br />
India. Moreover, <strong>the</strong>re has emerged an ambivalence or perhaps a c<strong>on</strong>tradicti<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Muslim c<strong>on</strong>sciousness s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of Ram Janmabhoomi and <strong>the</strong> Babri Masjid<br />
c<strong>on</strong>troversy.<br />
From <strong>the</strong> Muslim po<strong>in</strong>t of view, <strong>the</strong> ‘menac<strong>in</strong>g’ growth of Sangh Parivar organizati<strong>on</strong>s<br />
and <strong>the</strong> st<strong>in</strong>ts <strong>in</strong> power of Bharatiya Janata Party, have prompted Muslim organizati<strong>on</strong>s,<br />
<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> communal <strong>on</strong>es like <strong>the</strong> Majlis <strong>in</strong> Hyderabad or <strong>the</strong> League <strong>in</strong> Kerala, to<br />
<strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly voice a defense of ‘secularism’. There have been a number of ideological<br />
statements talk<strong>in</strong>g of secularism as a desirable ideology xii as well as c<strong>on</strong>stant appeals to<br />
voters to vote for <strong>the</strong> 'best proven’ secular candidate <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir c<strong>on</strong>stituency. Moreover,<br />
unlike before, Muslims are <strong>in</strong> alignment with different secular forces <strong>in</strong> different<br />
regi<strong>on</strong>s of India,. This is at <strong>the</strong> level of politics.<br />
However, <strong>on</strong> cultural and religious questi<strong>on</strong>s <strong>the</strong>y have shown an uncanny aff<strong>in</strong>ity with<br />
Muslim orthodoxy across <strong>the</strong> world, tak<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> streets <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> slightest provocati<strong>on</strong>,<br />
where <strong>in</strong> fact, <strong>the</strong>re was no cause for provocati<strong>on</strong>. This hypersensitivity shows a clear<br />
unease with <strong>the</strong> process of secularizati<strong>on</strong>. One can cite <strong>in</strong>numerable <strong>in</strong>stances from <strong>the</strong><br />
reacti<strong>on</strong>s to art, c<strong>in</strong>ema, and dress to dem<strong>on</strong>strate how str<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong> resistance can be to<br />
choices o<strong>the</strong>rs make which seem c<strong>on</strong>trary to what is taken to be Islamic sensibility or<br />
identity. This is an ambivalence which needs to be studied both <strong>in</strong> its <strong>the</strong>oretical and<br />
empirical manifestati<strong>on</strong>s more closely.<br />
23
N<strong>on</strong>e<strong>the</strong>less, this alignment with secularism as a political ideology as well as with <strong>the</strong><br />
secular forces has altered Muslim c<strong>on</strong>sciousness, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g those of <strong>the</strong> communal<br />
formati<strong>on</strong>s. There is no shrill communal voice am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Muslim organizati<strong>on</strong>s. They<br />
are communal to <strong>the</strong> extent of defend<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> issues and <strong>in</strong>terests close to <strong>the</strong><br />
community. Given this, <strong>the</strong>y have become or are becom<strong>in</strong>g ak<strong>in</strong> to communitarian<br />
organizati<strong>on</strong>s. This undoubtedly is a welcome development with l<strong>on</strong>g term democratic<br />
possibilities.<br />
Terrorist Violence<br />
But toge<strong>the</strong>r with this has emerged a very worrisome aspect, and disastrous for <strong>the</strong><br />
country as a whole. A very small secti<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> Muslim community, <strong>in</strong> fact m<strong>in</strong>iscule,<br />
has taken to terrorism of a want<strong>on</strong> k<strong>in</strong>d. And slowly this has acquired <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al<br />
l<strong>in</strong>ks. Terrorism am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Muslims <strong>in</strong> India is of post-Babri Masjid orig<strong>in</strong>s. The first<br />
recorded act of Muslim terrorist violence <strong>in</strong> India (leav<strong>in</strong>g aside <strong>the</strong> violence <strong>in</strong><br />
Kashmir, not because Kashmir is not part of India but because toge<strong>the</strong>r with North-east,<br />
it has a history of specificities which places it apart), took place <strong>on</strong> 6 th December 1993,<br />
to <strong>the</strong> day, a year after <strong>the</strong> demoliti<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> Babri Masjid. And it took place with crude<br />
bombs placed <strong>in</strong> some tra<strong>in</strong>s leav<strong>in</strong>g from Hyderabad. Some exploded but most did not<br />
because this was <strong>the</strong> job of young men who had hurriedly learnt to make bombs to<br />
observe <strong>the</strong> barsi (death anniversary).<br />
It is with this that <strong>the</strong> trans-boarder terrorists came to know that <strong>the</strong>re is a potential<br />
c<strong>on</strong>stituency which can be tapped <strong>in</strong>to. S<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong>n it has grown extensively and by now<br />
comprises many modules <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> country with clear trans border l<strong>in</strong>ks. Before this <strong>the</strong>re<br />
was no evidence that any Indian Muslim could be recruited by any of <strong>the</strong>se <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al<br />
networks. N<strong>on</strong>e<strong>the</strong>less, now it is a menace both to <strong>the</strong> Muslims and <strong>the</strong> country at large,<br />
irrespective of its orig<strong>in</strong>s, though <strong>the</strong>se orig<strong>in</strong>s are relevant <strong>in</strong> that <strong>the</strong>y give you <strong>the</strong> first<br />
causal l<strong>in</strong>ks.<br />
Riots: Be<strong>in</strong>g Unwanted<br />
Underly<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> regi<strong>on</strong>al specificity and dispersed character of Muslim c<strong>on</strong>sciousness,<br />
<strong>the</strong>re are emerg<strong>in</strong>g social and political processes that are impart<strong>in</strong>g a recognizable<br />
comm<strong>on</strong> feature to Muslim c<strong>on</strong>sciousness. They are act<strong>in</strong>g to keep Muslim<br />
communities away from <strong>the</strong> different democratic currents <strong>in</strong> Indian politics. The key<br />
element produc<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>se shifts has to do with <strong>the</strong> history and sociology of riots s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong><br />
early 1960s, and <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>cidence s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> 1980’s. This has produced, I<br />
believe, some sort of pan Indian unificati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> Muslim communities. Whatever <strong>the</strong><br />
differences between Muslims bel<strong>on</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g to different l<strong>in</strong>guistic-cultural communities and<br />
with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>se communities of vary<strong>in</strong>g occupati<strong>on</strong>s and skills, a c<strong>on</strong>sciousness born of<br />
comm<strong>on</strong> experience has emerged. It is of a negative k<strong>in</strong>d, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> sense of <strong>in</strong>still<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
feel<strong>in</strong>g of be<strong>in</strong>g ‘outsiders’ lack<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> b<strong>on</strong>ds of bel<strong>on</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g with o<strong>the</strong>r communities.<br />
Put ano<strong>the</strong>r way, Muslims have been feel<strong>in</strong>g as <strong>the</strong> unwanted ‘o<strong>the</strong>r’ <strong>in</strong> Indian society.<br />
This had g<strong>on</strong>e <strong>on</strong> from <strong>the</strong> 1960s till, what I have above termed as V.P. S<strong>in</strong>gh’s<br />
exemplary act of sacrific<strong>in</strong>g for <strong>the</strong> sake Muslims. It is a c<strong>on</strong>troversial <strong>the</strong>sis and not<br />
easy to establish <strong>in</strong> a c<strong>on</strong>clusive way.<br />
I argue, that what provides <strong>the</strong> basic impetus to <strong>the</strong> political unificati<strong>on</strong> of Muslims<br />
around a comm<strong>on</strong> discourse, of equal significance to <strong>the</strong>m, wherever <strong>the</strong>y may be <strong>in</strong><br />
India, is <strong>the</strong> regularity of riots and <strong>the</strong> pervasive percepti<strong>on</strong> of be<strong>in</strong>g discrim<strong>in</strong>ated<br />
24
aga<strong>in</strong>st and unwanted <strong>in</strong> society. This is not to say that <strong>the</strong> socio-political problems<br />
faced by Muslims or <strong>the</strong> demands <strong>the</strong>y raise <strong>in</strong> Kerala or Andhra Pradesh, are <strong>on</strong>e and<br />
<strong>the</strong> same. Yet <strong>the</strong>se differences tend to get subord<strong>in</strong>ated to <strong>the</strong> overwhelm<strong>in</strong>gly brutal<br />
fact of riots and <strong>the</strong> grow<strong>in</strong>g sense of be<strong>in</strong>g discrim<strong>in</strong>ated. Comm<strong>on</strong> suffer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong><br />
communal riots xiii br<strong>in</strong>gs Muslims toge<strong>the</strong>r just as ec<strong>on</strong>omic strangulati<strong>on</strong> unites<br />
tribals, or <strong>the</strong> evils of untouchability unites Dalits, or gender humiliati<strong>on</strong> unites<br />
women - all <strong>in</strong> comm<strong>on</strong> political acti<strong>on</strong> and generat<strong>in</strong>g a sense of b<strong>on</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
There is <strong>on</strong>e big difference, here. Communal carnage and butchery are much more<br />
prom<strong>in</strong>ent items <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> news media. Wherever <strong>the</strong>y may occur, <strong>the</strong>y immediately<br />
become a part of Muslim c<strong>on</strong>sciousness everywhere. The fact of carry<strong>in</strong>g a Muslim<br />
name is to <strong>in</strong>voluntarily share <strong>in</strong> this c<strong>on</strong>sciousness. Wherever I have travelled <strong>in</strong><br />
India s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> late 1970's, am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong> first questi<strong>on</strong>s Muslims have asked me are:<br />
"Are <strong>the</strong>re riots <strong>in</strong> your area?" “How safe are Muslims safe <strong>the</strong>re?" “Are <strong>the</strong>y well<br />
off?” “Do <strong>the</strong>y get jobs?"<br />
It is this shared percepti<strong>on</strong> that has given rise to <strong>the</strong> process of unificati<strong>on</strong> am<strong>on</strong>g<br />
Muslims and an <strong>in</strong>cipient sense of bel<strong>on</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g to a pan-Indian community. However,<br />
<strong>the</strong> absence of organizati<strong>on</strong>al uniformity and of a comm<strong>on</strong> ideological foundati<strong>on</strong> to<br />
Muslim (communal) politics has to a large extent hampered this process. Given that<br />
this comm<strong>on</strong> c<strong>on</strong>sciousness is rooted <strong>in</strong> a negative development, that is, <strong>the</strong> mak<strong>in</strong>g of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Muslims, as ‘<strong>the</strong> O<strong>the</strong>r’ of <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>, <strong>the</strong>re is need and circumstances that leave<br />
open <strong>the</strong> possibility of radical, democratic <strong>in</strong>terventi<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> mak<strong>in</strong>g of a new<br />
politics. xiv<br />
Shap<strong>in</strong>g of a ‘new’ Politics<br />
That possibility is now tak<strong>in</strong>g shape. What started with V P. S<strong>in</strong>gh is now<br />
crystalliz<strong>in</strong>g with <strong>the</strong> discussi<strong>on</strong>s and movements around <strong>the</strong> Sachar Report. A<br />
uniform thread of a democratic k<strong>in</strong>d is fast becom<strong>in</strong>g visible across different regi<strong>on</strong>s<br />
of <strong>the</strong> country. At <strong>the</strong> start of this essay, I argued that this was a positive development<br />
because it represents citizen politics. This citizen politics has three important values,<br />
viz. equality, recogniti<strong>on</strong> and equal rights and a set of demands like jobs, <strong>in</strong>come,<br />
educati<strong>on</strong>, health and hous<strong>in</strong>g. These precisely are <strong>the</strong> <strong>on</strong>es which have come to <strong>the</strong><br />
forefr<strong>on</strong>t of Muslim politics. These values and issues whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>in</strong> relati<strong>on</strong> to <strong>the</strong> Dalits or<br />
OBCs or Muslims are <strong>the</strong> stuff of secular politics and <strong>the</strong>se now provide a comm<strong>on</strong><br />
basis to <strong>the</strong> politics of <strong>the</strong> oppressed.<br />
One important comp<strong>on</strong>ent of secular politics, which is rarely talked about, has to do<br />
with everyday life. It br<strong>in</strong>gs to <strong>the</strong> forefr<strong>on</strong>t <strong>the</strong> daily rhythms of our mundane life. It<br />
does not mean that <strong>the</strong> sacred or <strong>the</strong> substantive <strong>in</strong> terms of our beliefs or commitments<br />
become unimportant, but ra<strong>the</strong>r that <strong>the</strong>y no l<strong>on</strong>ger occupy <strong>the</strong> fore-ground <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
political life of <strong>the</strong> ord<strong>in</strong>ary people. Instead, issues of every day life are privileged. This<br />
is what happened <strong>in</strong> 19 th century Europe and played a ra<strong>the</strong>r decisive role <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
secularizati<strong>on</strong> of politics, and eventually of society.<br />
I am not suggest<strong>in</strong>g a replay of what happened <strong>in</strong> Europe, but merely draw<strong>in</strong>g attenti<strong>on</strong><br />
to <strong>the</strong> importance of this development. By what route <strong>the</strong> secular will come to be a<br />
publicly acknowledged feature of our society is not go<strong>in</strong>g to be easy to predict. What<br />
however ought to be taken note of is <strong>the</strong> emergence of secular <strong>the</strong>mes <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> politics of<br />
25
<strong>the</strong> oppressed even while we recognize that this has not yet got stabilized and <strong>the</strong>re can<br />
be reversals given <strong>the</strong> prom<strong>in</strong>ent presence of right reacti<strong>on</strong>.<br />
Sachar Report<br />
The Sachar Report can be expected to streng<strong>the</strong>n this political trend, though its f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs<br />
are double edged and can be used by communal elements to re<strong>in</strong>force <strong>the</strong> communities’<br />
feel<strong>in</strong>g of discrim<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> and alienati<strong>on</strong> from <strong>the</strong> Indian state. xv The Report has<br />
established that <strong>the</strong> socio-ec<strong>on</strong>omic c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> Muslim communities is<br />
abysmally low, that it is just above that of <strong>the</strong> Dalits, and may be worse off than that<br />
of <strong>the</strong> OBCs. The questi<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> under representati<strong>on</strong> of Muslims <strong>in</strong> services and allied<br />
areas, <strong>the</strong>ir lagg<strong>in</strong>g beh<strong>in</strong>d <strong>in</strong> educati<strong>on</strong> and <strong>the</strong>ir poor access to health facilities is<br />
equally well established. Not that this evidence comes as a startl<strong>in</strong>g revelati<strong>on</strong>. Many<br />
of us who have been us<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Centre for <strong>the</strong> Study of Develop<strong>in</strong>g Societies’ survey<br />
data <strong>on</strong> class formati<strong>on</strong> with<strong>in</strong> different communities have written <strong>on</strong> similar l<strong>in</strong>es.<br />
What dist<strong>in</strong>guishes <strong>the</strong> f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs of this Committee is not just its exhaustive<br />
thoroughness, but <strong>the</strong> official stamp it carries. xvi<br />
Where <strong>the</strong> Report’s f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs break fresh ground is <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> revelati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong><br />
backwardness of all territorial areas where Muslims populati<strong>on</strong>s have a very sizeable<br />
presence. These have to do with provisi<strong>on</strong> of hous<strong>in</strong>g, tap water, schools, medical<br />
facilities, roads, and what <strong>the</strong> Sachar Report has called <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>frastructural variables.<br />
The access of Muslim children under Integrated Child Development Scheme (ICDS)<br />
is also low and so is <strong>the</strong> overall coverage. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to 2001 census, <strong>the</strong>re are 11<br />
districts where <strong>the</strong> Muslim populati<strong>on</strong> is above 50 per cent and 38 where it is above<br />
25 per cent. About a third of <strong>the</strong> Muslim populati<strong>on</strong> lives <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>se areas. There are<br />
ano<strong>the</strong>r 182 districts where <strong>the</strong> Muslim populati<strong>on</strong> is between 10 to 25 per cent and<br />
about 47 per cent of Muslim populati<strong>on</strong> lives <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>se areas. Also, <strong>the</strong>re are a large<br />
number of small and medium sized towns with a sizeable Muslim populati<strong>on</strong>. All<br />
<strong>the</strong>se areas are poorly provided with urban <strong>in</strong>frastructure and o<strong>the</strong>r civic amenities.<br />
This is astound<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> case of <strong>the</strong> under representati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> Muslim <strong>in</strong> services and higher<br />
unemployment, it can be argued, that it may be due to <strong>the</strong> educati<strong>on</strong>al and social<br />
backwardness of <strong>the</strong> community; although <strong>the</strong> extent of political under representati<strong>on</strong><br />
cannot be accounted for by <strong>the</strong> degree of backwardness. But how does <strong>on</strong>e account<br />
for <strong>the</strong> sheer absence of physical <strong>in</strong>frastructure? The absence of physical<br />
<strong>in</strong>frastructure implies that Muslim areas are deliberately ignored <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> state provisi<strong>on</strong><br />
of public services of all k<strong>in</strong>d. xvii With regard to <strong>the</strong> deprivati<strong>on</strong> of physical<br />
<strong>in</strong>frastructure, <strong>the</strong> Committee’s f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs establish that densely populated Muslim<br />
areas are similar to tribal belts or village areas where Dalits reside. xviii A very high<br />
degree of deliberate neglect <strong>the</strong>refore becomes undeniable.<br />
This has led many to quite <strong>in</strong>nocently assert that all deprivati<strong>on</strong> and poverty<br />
am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Muslims is <strong>the</strong> mak<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> Indian state. A secti<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> communal<br />
m<strong>in</strong>ded leadership am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Muslims has jumped <strong>on</strong> this, to defame <strong>the</strong> Indian state.<br />
This view is distort<strong>in</strong>g. Certa<strong>in</strong>ly, <strong>the</strong> state is <strong>in</strong>volved, but <strong>in</strong> a different way, as we<br />
see below. The state did not create poverty am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Muslims like it did am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
tribal communities through massive displacements.<br />
26
Historical C<strong>on</strong>text: Mak<strong>in</strong>g of Poverty am<strong>on</strong>gst Muslims<br />
In understand<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> present plight of <strong>the</strong> ord<strong>in</strong>ary Muslims it is essential to take an<br />
analytical look at poverty am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong>m. This requires us to understand how c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s<br />
left beh<strong>in</strong>d by <strong>the</strong> pre-col<strong>on</strong>ial feudal rulers got affected by <strong>the</strong> work<strong>in</strong>g of col<strong>on</strong>ial<br />
ec<strong>on</strong>omy. In short, Indian poverty, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Muslims, is a creati<strong>on</strong> of a<br />
complex comb<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> of feudalism and col<strong>on</strong>ialism. Self aggrandizement <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> part<br />
of Muslim landlords <strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong>e hand; and changes <strong>in</strong>troduced by <strong>the</strong> British <strong>in</strong> patterns of<br />
revenue collecti<strong>on</strong> and measures regard<strong>in</strong>g compensati<strong>on</strong>, had made <strong>the</strong> Muslim<br />
peasantry as impoverished as <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>du peasants. This reality challenges <strong>the</strong> popular<br />
belief am<strong>on</strong>g rabble rouser Muslim leaders and H<strong>in</strong>dutva chauv<strong>in</strong>ists that that <strong>the</strong><br />
ord<strong>in</strong>ary Muslim had been a beneficiary dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> l<strong>on</strong>g periods of Muslim rule. xix<br />
Historically, <strong>the</strong> Muslim gentry and <strong>the</strong> rul<strong>in</strong>g classes from am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Muslims,<br />
treated <strong>the</strong> Muslim masses no differently than <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r subjects under <strong>the</strong>m – as<br />
beasts of burden, unworthy of respect or dignity. It is important to remember <strong>the</strong><br />
limits to <strong>the</strong> bro<strong>the</strong>rhood of faith <strong>in</strong> c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s of feudal rule. There is no evidence<br />
that <strong>in</strong> areas ruled by <strong>the</strong> Muslim k<strong>in</strong>gs, <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong> of Muslim masses <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
peasantry was any better. Take Telangana, till quite recently (1948) ruled by <strong>the</strong><br />
Nizams. If anyth<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s of <strong>the</strong> peasants <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g Muslim peasants was<br />
worse off , than <strong>in</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r parts of sou<strong>the</strong>rn India. The same is <strong>the</strong> case with<br />
Marthawada, also ruled by <strong>the</strong> Nizams. In U.P. or Bihar, <strong>the</strong>re were vast feudal estates<br />
under Muslim lords, but <strong>the</strong>re is no evidence to show that <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s of Muslim<br />
peasants were any better <strong>the</strong>re than where <strong>the</strong> Muslim peasants were under H<strong>in</strong>du<br />
feudal lords. When <strong>the</strong> British c<strong>on</strong>quered India from <strong>the</strong> Muslim rulers <strong>in</strong> 1757, <strong>the</strong>y<br />
found that <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong> of Muslim peasants was no better than that of <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>dus. xx<br />
Col<strong>on</strong>ialism impacted <strong>on</strong> this situati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> many ways but two of <strong>the</strong>m were<br />
significant, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> mak<strong>in</strong>g of poverty that India <strong>in</strong>herited after Independence. The<br />
impoverishment of <strong>the</strong> peasantry was <strong>the</strong> result of <strong>the</strong>se factors. By <strong>the</strong> time <strong>the</strong> first<br />
British c<strong>on</strong>quest of India was completed, <strong>the</strong> revenue policy of <strong>the</strong> new col<strong>on</strong>ial<br />
regime was well <strong>in</strong> place. It made for three major changes <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> revenue policy of <strong>the</strong><br />
Mughals perfected by Raja Todar Mal (itself based <strong>on</strong> Alaudd<strong>in</strong> Khilji’s policy). The<br />
English col<strong>on</strong>ial adm<strong>in</strong>istrati<strong>on</strong> changed <strong>the</strong> basis of levy<strong>in</strong>g revenue from <strong>the</strong> land<br />
cultivated to <strong>the</strong> land owned. That is, under <strong>the</strong> Mughal system, if <strong>the</strong> peasant had 100<br />
acres, but cultivated <strong>on</strong>ly 50 acres, revenue was calculated <strong>on</strong>ly for 50 acres. Under<br />
<strong>the</strong> col<strong>on</strong>ial system it was levied <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> entire 100 acres owned. Sec<strong>on</strong>dly, under <strong>the</strong><br />
pre-col<strong>on</strong>ial system, revenue was collected after <strong>the</strong> crop was harvested but <strong>the</strong><br />
British changed it to <strong>the</strong> f<strong>in</strong>ancial year. In effect, it meant before <strong>the</strong> crop was<br />
harvested, thus <strong>the</strong> peasant was forced to borrow to pay <strong>the</strong> revenue. xxi<br />
Toge<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>se measures not <strong>on</strong>ly doubled <strong>the</strong> amount of revenue levied but also<br />
added to <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terest burden of <strong>the</strong> peasant because he now had to borrow to pay <strong>the</strong><br />
revenue. Moreover, under <strong>the</strong> Mughals <strong>the</strong> state made c<strong>on</strong>cessi<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong> case of crop<br />
failure. The British disc<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued it. Additi<strong>on</strong>ally, part of <strong>the</strong> revenue collected by <strong>the</strong><br />
state earlier used to come back for land improvement and o<strong>the</strong>r welfare measures<br />
undertaken by <strong>the</strong> state for <strong>the</strong> society. The British used <strong>the</strong> entire revenue ei<strong>the</strong>r to<br />
f<strong>in</strong>ance fur<strong>the</strong>r c<strong>on</strong>quest of India or to repatriate <strong>the</strong> amount to Brita<strong>in</strong>. xxii<br />
27
The result was <strong>the</strong> impoverishment of <strong>the</strong> entire peasantry. On top of that was <strong>the</strong><br />
biggest fam<strong>in</strong>e India had experienced till <strong>the</strong>n. It affected each and every community<br />
equally, depend<strong>in</strong>g <strong>on</strong> who <strong>in</strong>habited which area. For <strong>the</strong> first time, landlessness<br />
followed <strong>on</strong> a very large scale. This was exacerbated by <strong>the</strong> drastic change <strong>in</strong>troduced<br />
by <strong>the</strong> British <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> land policy <strong>in</strong> India. In pre-British times <strong>the</strong>re was a l<strong>on</strong>g<br />
established c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>, that a n<strong>on</strong> peasant would not be allowed to alienate <strong>the</strong> land<br />
of <strong>the</strong> peasant, <strong>on</strong>ly a peasant could acquire <strong>the</strong> land of ano<strong>the</strong>r peasant. All this<br />
changed with <strong>the</strong> British. Any<strong>on</strong>e could buy land like any o<strong>the</strong>r commodity. With<br />
ris<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>debtedness large amounts of land passed <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> hands of m<strong>on</strong>ey lenders and<br />
traders who no l<strong>on</strong>ger were barred by <strong>the</strong> state from buy<strong>in</strong>g peasant lands.<br />
Historical research has not produced any evidence to suggest that <strong>the</strong>se changes <strong>in</strong><br />
revenue policy impacted different communities differently. What however impacted<br />
different communities differently was <strong>the</strong> <strong>on</strong>set of Industrial Revoluti<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> Brita<strong>in</strong>. It<br />
resulted <strong>in</strong> a process of de-<strong>in</strong>dustrialisati<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> a massive scale. India had a vast premodern<br />
manufactur<strong>in</strong>g sector so much so that Akbar had established a department<br />
called Mahkam e Kharkhana (Department of Factories). It is well known that India<br />
had a vast and flourish<strong>in</strong>g textile sector. There was also large scale manufactur<strong>in</strong>g of<br />
guns and armaments and its corollary, <strong>the</strong> spread of <strong>in</strong>numerable foundries.<br />
Manufacture of saltpeter was also quite extensive. Guilds of various k<strong>in</strong>ds existed for<br />
<strong>the</strong> manufacture of articles required by <strong>the</strong> courts , <strong>the</strong> numerous aristocrats and <strong>the</strong><br />
gentry. All <strong>the</strong>se were more or less completely destroyed by <strong>the</strong> forced imports of<br />
British <strong>in</strong>dustrial manufactured goods. xxiii<br />
It is true that <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> caste order and under its <strong>in</strong>fluence, different communities<br />
specialized <strong>in</strong> different k<strong>in</strong>ds of manufacture, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g Muslims <strong>in</strong> some sectors. But<br />
it was not <strong>the</strong> case <strong>the</strong>n that Muslims were overwhelm<strong>in</strong>g present <strong>in</strong> all of <strong>the</strong>se<br />
factories. There is no study to show that Muslims were especially badly affected.<br />
They went down toge<strong>the</strong>r with all <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rs creat<strong>in</strong>g a very large pool of <strong>the</strong><br />
unemployed. All of <strong>the</strong>se people were eventually thrown <strong>on</strong> to agriculture fur<strong>the</strong>r<br />
impoverish<strong>in</strong>g agriculture and <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> burden of <strong>the</strong> peasants.<br />
In our analysis of poverty (and deprivati<strong>on</strong>) <strong>the</strong> structure, <strong>in</strong> its c<strong>on</strong>ceptual sense, is<br />
generally under <strong>the</strong>orized. There is a need to pay more careful attenti<strong>on</strong> to this. The<br />
dynamics of what happens here is much deeper and <strong>the</strong> remedial acti<strong>on</strong>s also should<br />
attempt to alter <strong>the</strong> deeper forces emanat<strong>in</strong>g from <strong>the</strong> structure. The need to pay<br />
attenti<strong>on</strong> has ano<strong>the</strong>r angle. We <strong>the</strong>n can avoid a totaliz<strong>in</strong>g view of <strong>the</strong> community<br />
and adopt a disaggregated discursive strategy <strong>in</strong> talk<strong>in</strong>g about <strong>the</strong> problem. Politics so<br />
built will not allow communitarian c<strong>on</strong>cerns from becom<strong>in</strong>g communalism. We<br />
should rem<strong>in</strong>d ourselves that communalism is a result of <strong>in</strong>terventi<strong>on</strong>s from <strong>the</strong> above<br />
by <strong>the</strong> powerful with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> communities. After all, communalism is a power relati<strong>on</strong><br />
whichever way you tune its ideology. The Muslim League before partiti<strong>on</strong> and <strong>the</strong><br />
forces of H<strong>in</strong>dutva today, helped <strong>the</strong> hegem<strong>on</strong>ic elements <strong>in</strong> community to establish<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir c<strong>on</strong>trol over politics <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> name of <strong>the</strong> community. Love of Ram never became<br />
hatred of <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r, without <strong>in</strong>terventi<strong>on</strong> from above.<br />
Muslim poverty is as much a result of <strong>the</strong> many <strong>in</strong>tersecti<strong>on</strong>s of feudalism and <strong>the</strong><br />
depredati<strong>on</strong>s and predatory practices of British col<strong>on</strong>ial rule, as poverty <strong>in</strong> general.<br />
India after Independence <strong>in</strong>herits this situati<strong>on</strong>. The Indian state is <strong>in</strong> no way<br />
resp<strong>on</strong>sible for <strong>the</strong> Muslim poverty as is alleged by communal leaders out to make a<br />
28
quick political buck out of <strong>the</strong> f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs of Sachar Report. xxiv The state <strong>in</strong> India is<br />
resp<strong>on</strong>sible though for <strong>the</strong> manner <strong>in</strong> which it has treated poverty <strong>in</strong> general and <strong>in</strong><br />
be<strong>in</strong>g bl<strong>in</strong>d and <strong>in</strong>sensitive to <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued under-representati<strong>on</strong> of Muslim <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
services and o<strong>the</strong>r public bodies. In fact, <strong>in</strong> a number of sensitive areas of<br />
employment, <strong>the</strong>re has been a decl<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g trend, even evidence of secret directives from<br />
certa<strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>istries to be careful <strong>in</strong> recruit<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Muslims. Here <strong>the</strong> Indian state is<br />
culpable and ought to be held accountable.<br />
Caste Society’s Deep C<strong>on</strong>tempt<br />
In order to understand <strong>the</strong> dilemma of <strong>the</strong> Muslims, it is important to be perceptive of<br />
<strong>the</strong> fault l<strong>in</strong>es that create <strong>in</strong>sensitivities and cruelties <strong>in</strong> Indian society. Muslims are<br />
not <strong>the</strong> <strong>on</strong>ly people who have suffered neglect. The Dalits have also been <strong>the</strong> victims<br />
of hostile neglect, rout<strong>in</strong>e violence and sporadic kill<strong>in</strong>gs. Their presence is like that of<br />
a deadly virus that should be immediately removed or else it may cause fatal<br />
c<strong>on</strong>tam<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>s. It is by way of of susta<strong>in</strong>ed reservati<strong>on</strong>s for <strong>the</strong>m over an extended<br />
period of time, that <strong>the</strong> ord<strong>in</strong>ary people from am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Dalits have produced a<br />
stream <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> middle classes, which <strong>in</strong> turn has provided a reserve of energy for<br />
protracted struggles. And yet <strong>the</strong>y rema<strong>in</strong> at <strong>the</strong> bottom of <strong>the</strong> heap of <strong>the</strong> unwanted<br />
humanity <strong>in</strong> Indian society. The adivasis, <strong>in</strong> fact, <strong>in</strong> <strong>on</strong>e sense, have suffered <strong>the</strong> worst<br />
at <strong>the</strong> hands of <strong>the</strong> Indian state. They are <strong>the</strong> most numerous am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong> victims of <strong>the</strong><br />
massive displacement due to <strong>the</strong> developmental process and unnecessary gigantism<br />
that has become a part of it. Compensati<strong>on</strong> and rehabilitati<strong>on</strong> has been so pa<strong>the</strong>tic that<br />
Roy Burman <strong>on</strong>ce wrote, , “displacement—compensati<strong>on</strong>—displacement c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>uum”,<br />
mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>reby that you so rehabilitate people that <strong>the</strong>y so<strong>on</strong> get alienated both from<br />
land and <strong>in</strong>come and rema<strong>in</strong> part of <strong>the</strong> heap called poverty.<br />
I have <strong>on</strong>e explanati<strong>on</strong> why such has been <strong>the</strong> case, which may be speculative, but<br />
n<strong>on</strong>e<strong>the</strong>less, mean<strong>in</strong>gful. Caste society produces a c<strong>on</strong>sciousness, which has deep<br />
c<strong>on</strong>tempt, often unc<strong>on</strong>sciously, for those who are below you, all <strong>the</strong> poor and <strong>the</strong><br />
oppressed and <strong>the</strong> disregarded bel<strong>on</strong>g here. That is, it does not cause you pa<strong>in</strong> if <strong>the</strong>y<br />
rema<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> way <strong>the</strong>y are for as l<strong>on</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> future, as <strong>the</strong>y have been <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> past. Given<br />
this, <strong>the</strong>re cannot be <strong>the</strong> need for urgency or hurry. This c<strong>on</strong>sciousness will always try<br />
to prove that th<strong>in</strong>gs have got better, when <strong>the</strong>y have not.. xxv How else can we expla<strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> ra<strong>the</strong>r pr<strong>on</strong>ounced efficiency of <strong>the</strong> same pers<strong>on</strong>nel who can restore <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>frastructure and o<strong>the</strong>r physical assets <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> case of natural disasters but fail <strong>in</strong><br />
distribut<strong>in</strong>g food and relief to <strong>the</strong> poor <strong>in</strong> case of drought or fam<strong>in</strong>e? The attitude to<br />
<strong>the</strong> lowly, <strong>the</strong> people of degraded social status, where caste (seen as karma’s fruit<br />
here) historically, is genetic to c<strong>on</strong>sciousness, is <strong>on</strong>e of utter c<strong>on</strong>tempt and also<br />
<strong>the</strong>refore of c<strong>on</strong>descensi<strong>on</strong>. C<strong>on</strong>sciousness is a curious th<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong> terms of its structure.<br />
If it is predisposed to prejudice <strong>the</strong>n <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> experience of <strong>the</strong> ‘O<strong>the</strong>r’ it will always<br />
f<strong>in</strong>d someth<strong>in</strong>g or o<strong>the</strong>r to re<strong>in</strong>force <strong>the</strong> prejudice by screen<strong>in</strong>g out all else that may<br />
negate it. Prejudice always employs gate keepers who never allow any th<strong>in</strong>g to gate<br />
crash. C<strong>on</strong>sciousness <strong>in</strong> which caste is a genetic feature is ak<strong>in</strong> but not identical to <strong>the</strong><br />
c<strong>on</strong>sciousness <strong>in</strong> which patriarchy is a genetic comp<strong>on</strong>ent; you are blameless ,it is <strong>the</strong><br />
o<strong>the</strong>r who is always compla<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g. So we f<strong>in</strong>d <strong>the</strong> poor, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Muslim, who are<br />
always grumbl<strong>in</strong>g when <strong>the</strong> state is do<strong>in</strong>g so much for <strong>the</strong>m.<br />
Tak<strong>in</strong>g my speculative l<strong>in</strong>e of reas<strong>on</strong><strong>in</strong>g fur<strong>the</strong>r, I argue that much of what goes <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
name of affirmative acti<strong>on</strong> has failed to take off <strong>the</strong> ground. Adm<strong>in</strong>istrative<br />
29
negligence or failure has its roots, not <strong>in</strong> this or that technicality or lapse, but <strong>in</strong> this<br />
deep-rooted c<strong>on</strong>tempt for <strong>the</strong> ord<strong>in</strong>ary people.<br />
Look<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> State: Upliftment of Muslims<br />
Let me go back to col<strong>on</strong>ial times to highlight someth<strong>in</strong>g which has become so much a<br />
part of Muslim th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g and gives it a certa<strong>in</strong> sensitivity, even a hyper sensitivity at<br />
times. While <strong>the</strong> impoverishment of <strong>the</strong> peasantry, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Muslims, went <strong>on</strong>,<br />
<strong>the</strong> Muslim gentry and <strong>the</strong> salariat were do<strong>in</strong>g quite well <strong>in</strong> services and employment..<br />
Muslims did not experience any decl<strong>in</strong>e till <strong>the</strong> mid 1830s despite a very versatile and<br />
em<strong>in</strong>ent elite emerg<strong>in</strong>g from am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>du upper castes which eventually would<br />
usher <strong>in</strong> both <strong>the</strong> Indian renaissance and religious revival. But when <strong>the</strong> decl<strong>in</strong>e set <strong>in</strong><br />
it was rapid and steep. It happened with <strong>the</strong> adopti<strong>on</strong> of, what is famously known as,<br />
<strong>the</strong> Maculay M<strong>in</strong>ute. After a l<strong>on</strong>g debate <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> issue of Vernacular vs. English,<br />
Macaulay w<strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> debate and his M<strong>in</strong>ute was adopted <strong>in</strong> 1833—34 as <strong>the</strong> official<br />
language policy for <strong>the</strong> British Empire. In 1837 orders were issued for a shift from<br />
Persian, till <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> language of adm<strong>in</strong>istrati<strong>on</strong>, to English. After this <strong>the</strong> Muslim<br />
decl<strong>in</strong>e was rapid,. xxvi xxvii S<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong>n, <strong>the</strong> Muslims have held <strong>the</strong> government as<br />
resp<strong>on</strong>sible for <strong>the</strong>ir decl<strong>in</strong>e and lack of upward mobility.<br />
Muslims were proficient <strong>in</strong> Persian as many H<strong>in</strong>dus also were. But by 1830’s a<br />
sizeable number of H<strong>in</strong>dus had become proficient <strong>in</strong> English. Muslims had<br />
pr<strong>on</strong>ouncedly lagged beh<strong>in</strong>d. Many writers have said that Muslims were resistant to<br />
English because of <strong>the</strong>ir c<strong>on</strong>servatism and H<strong>in</strong>dus with <strong>the</strong>ir nose attuned to<br />
opportunity took to English and hogged it. To put <strong>the</strong> story <strong>on</strong> a different pitch, let me<br />
speculate aga<strong>in</strong>. When <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>dus had learnt Persian and Urdu <strong>the</strong>y did it out of<br />
necessity, because <strong>the</strong>re were opportunities <strong>in</strong> do<strong>in</strong>g so. When <strong>the</strong>y had to give up<br />
Persian and Urdu and take up English, <strong>the</strong>y were mov<strong>in</strong>g from <strong>on</strong>e foreign sett<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to<br />
ano<strong>the</strong>r foreign landscape, aga<strong>in</strong> full of opportunities. For H<strong>in</strong>dus it was a rati<strong>on</strong>al<br />
choice situati<strong>on</strong>. For Muslims, <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>trary, Urdu and Persian were regarded as<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir own languages and to give <strong>the</strong>m up for English was seen as giv<strong>in</strong>g up your<br />
mo<strong>the</strong>r t<strong>on</strong>gue for a foreign impositi<strong>on</strong>. For <strong>the</strong> Muslims, it was not a rati<strong>on</strong>al choice<br />
situati<strong>on</strong> but an emoti<strong>on</strong>al burden to decide about. Such a quandary always delays<br />
decisi<strong>on</strong>s, which it did till about 1860s. However, after 1860’s, <strong>the</strong>y made very rapid<br />
strides, <strong>on</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> reas<strong>on</strong>s for <strong>the</strong> decisi<strong>on</strong> became clear with <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terventi<strong>on</strong> of Sir<br />
Syed Ahmad Khan at <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>al level and many regi<strong>on</strong>al leaders like Syed Abdul<br />
Lateef <strong>in</strong> Bengal.<br />
Quite apart from small measures of self-help, Muslims leaned heavily <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> state to<br />
lift <strong>the</strong>m up. Sir Syed’s advice to <strong>the</strong>m to stay away from <strong>the</strong> emerg<strong>in</strong>g C<strong>on</strong>gress<br />
platform, <strong>in</strong> my read<strong>in</strong>g, was aimed at dissuad<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>m from gett<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong><br />
politics so that <strong>the</strong>y could c<strong>on</strong>centrate <strong>on</strong> ec<strong>on</strong>omic demands. The British read this,<br />
aga<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> my read<strong>in</strong>g, quite clearly. They c<strong>on</strong>veyed to <strong>the</strong> Muslim leadership that <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
demands be<strong>in</strong>g n<strong>on</strong>-political could be easily met whereas <strong>the</strong> C<strong>on</strong>gress demands<br />
be<strong>in</strong>g political could hardly be c<strong>on</strong>ceded. So it was better for <strong>the</strong> Muslims to stay<br />
away from <strong>the</strong> C<strong>on</strong>gress. This <strong>the</strong>n became <strong>on</strong>e plank <strong>in</strong>, what has come to be known<br />
as, <strong>the</strong> divide and rule policy.<br />
On Partiti<strong>on</strong>, <strong>the</strong> material and human resources that had been built up from 1860 to<br />
<strong>the</strong> time of Independence, got shifted to Pakistan, barr<strong>in</strong>g a regi<strong>on</strong> or two left <strong>in</strong> India.<br />
The elite am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Muslims who had fought for Pakistan, migrated to <strong>the</strong>ir realized<br />
30
“homeland” leav<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Muslim masses to fend for <strong>the</strong>mselves. S<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong>n, with<br />
m<strong>in</strong>or shifts of an <strong>in</strong>c<strong>on</strong>sequential nature, <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s of <strong>the</strong> Muslims have<br />
rema<strong>in</strong>ed as described <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Sachar report. As before, <strong>the</strong> Muslims aga<strong>in</strong> will have to<br />
lean <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> government. As a vulnerable community <strong>the</strong>y cannot, barr<strong>in</strong>g a small<br />
measure of self-help, overcome <strong>the</strong> many hurdles of <strong>the</strong> ec<strong>on</strong>omic and social<br />
structure, quite apart from <strong>the</strong> many prejudices and biases scattered with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>se<br />
structures. If <strong>the</strong> government is not forthcom<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong>ir communal leadership is wait<strong>in</strong>g<br />
to take charge.<br />
Widespread Backwardness, High Accomplishment<br />
I have often <strong>in</strong> this essay spoken of <strong>the</strong> ec<strong>on</strong>omic and social backwardness of <strong>the</strong><br />
Muslim, that <strong>the</strong>y are just above <strong>the</strong> dalits and generally below <strong>the</strong> OBC’s. Hav<strong>in</strong>g<br />
said that, it should also be emphasized that Muslims taken as a whole are unlike any<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r backward community. There is no o<strong>the</strong>r community <strong>in</strong> India with such a largescale<br />
presence of backwardness that also has such a big stratum of people with<br />
pr<strong>on</strong>ouncedly a high level of accomplishment as <strong>the</strong> Muslims of India. In <strong>the</strong> creative<br />
fields of art, literature, music and culture <strong>the</strong>y are sec<strong>on</strong>d to n<strong>on</strong>e <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> world; <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>tellectual world of science and humanities <strong>the</strong>y stand <strong>in</strong> equal measure to any o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
community <strong>in</strong> India; <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> professi<strong>on</strong>al world of doctors and lawyers <strong>the</strong>y have d<strong>on</strong>e<br />
excepti<strong>on</strong>ally well; such is <strong>the</strong> case <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> field of sports; and so <strong>on</strong>.. Suffice it to note<br />
, Muslims are a highly accomplished and successful people. These accomplishments<br />
of <strong>the</strong> Muslims are a highly visible feature of Indian social life, while <strong>the</strong> extent of<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir backwardness is a statistical feature.<br />
The two sides put toge<strong>the</strong>r, widespread backwardness and high accomplishment,<br />
makes Muslims a uniquely <strong>in</strong>comparable people. This specificity ought to be<br />
recognised by <strong>the</strong> democratic movement <strong>in</strong> India. When <strong>the</strong> Sangh Parivar talks of<br />
pander<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> Muslim, it is to this secti<strong>on</strong> of successful Muslims <strong>the</strong>y po<strong>in</strong>t to. It is<br />
easy to sway <strong>the</strong> communally m<strong>in</strong>ded and ignorant that such is <strong>the</strong> case. For <strong>the</strong><br />
democratic forces <strong>in</strong> India, it will be a most delicately balanced struggle. The<br />
communal-chauv<strong>in</strong>ists led by RSS & BJP are go<strong>in</strong>g to make a big issue of <strong>the</strong><br />
m<strong>in</strong>orityism of <strong>the</strong> secular forces and especially of <strong>the</strong> ‘pamper<strong>in</strong>g’ of <strong>the</strong> Muslims by<br />
<strong>the</strong> C<strong>on</strong>gress party. Their ma<strong>in</strong> c<strong>on</strong>tenti<strong>on</strong> will centre around <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>me of <strong>the</strong> threat<br />
to <strong>the</strong> unity and <strong>on</strong>eness of India.. Whenever <strong>the</strong> issue of positive discrim<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> for<br />
Muslims comes up, <strong>the</strong> alarm is raised that quotas for Muslims will lead to<br />
separatism, as <strong>the</strong>y did historically. The argument be<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>the</strong> Muslim elite has<br />
always had a separatist mentality. Whatever may be <strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> ‘separatist’ <strong>in</strong><br />
today’s c<strong>on</strong>text, it is <strong>the</strong> negative charge that <strong>the</strong> term carries, which is important.<br />
Politics of difference vs politics of citizenship<br />
This <strong>in</strong>volves an issue of some significance that needs to be carefully sorted out. It has<br />
to do with <strong>the</strong> nature of <strong>the</strong> difference <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> character of Muslim political demands<br />
today as dist<strong>in</strong>ct from those <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> days prior to Independence, start<strong>in</strong>g with <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>terventi<strong>on</strong> from Sir Syed Ahmad Khan <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> aftermath of <strong>the</strong> 1857 great rebelli<strong>on</strong>.<br />
Much of what we see of Muslim political demands <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> last few decades has to do<br />
with what is entailed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> politics of citizenship and <strong>the</strong>refore with egalitarianism<br />
and rights. This represents a sea change <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> way Muslims have placed <strong>the</strong>mselves<br />
<strong>in</strong> relati<strong>on</strong>s to <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong> currents <strong>in</strong> India’s political life as aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> pre<strong>in</strong>dependence<br />
period.<br />
31
Muslims, <strong>in</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r words have jo<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>the</strong> politics of empowerment, egalitarianism and<br />
<strong>the</strong> deepen<strong>in</strong>g of democracy. This is what I have referred to above as <strong>the</strong> politics of<br />
citizenship rights. This is not to argue that o<strong>the</strong>r trends do not exist <strong>in</strong> Muslim politics,<br />
like that of political Islam or terrorist activity. However, <strong>the</strong> trend menti<strong>on</strong>ed here, it<br />
seems to me, has <strong>the</strong> decisive edge. There is now a possibility of build<strong>in</strong>g alliances of<br />
<strong>the</strong> oppressed communities, which is already happen<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> ad hoc ways. The left<br />
democratic <strong>in</strong>terventi<strong>on</strong>s must help to cement <strong>the</strong>se. It should be obvious that politics<br />
based <strong>on</strong> communities, however oppressed, can never become class politics. But if<br />
through democratic alliances of <strong>the</strong> oppressed, it can acquire <strong>the</strong> t<strong>on</strong>e of radical<br />
democracy, <strong>the</strong>n it can come <strong>in</strong>to close alignment with Left democratic politics. That<br />
is <strong>on</strong>e important task for <strong>the</strong> radical forces.<br />
Therefore, it is very important to dist<strong>in</strong>guish <strong>the</strong> nature of Muslim politics today from<br />
that which dom<strong>in</strong>ated <strong>the</strong> pre <strong>in</strong>dependence era. This is all <strong>the</strong> more important<br />
because BJP and <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>dutva forces are rais<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> bogus debate that attenti<strong>on</strong> to <strong>the</strong><br />
recommendati<strong>on</strong>s of <strong>the</strong> Sachar Report will streng<strong>the</strong>n separatist trends and weaken<br />
nati<strong>on</strong>al unity. Noth<strong>in</strong>g can be more far fetched.<br />
This new politics, as should be obvious, is radically different from <strong>the</strong> pre<strong>in</strong>dependence<br />
trends with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Muslim politics. From Sir Syed Ahmad Khan to<br />
J<strong>in</strong>nah and <strong>the</strong> partiti<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> country, whatever <strong>the</strong> major differences <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> politics<br />
of Sir Syed and J<strong>in</strong>nah and <strong>the</strong> implicati<strong>on</strong> is that <strong>the</strong>re are many, <strong>on</strong>e feature runs as a<br />
comm<strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong>me. This has to do with <strong>the</strong> amount of mental energies that went <strong>in</strong>to<br />
show<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>the</strong> Muslims were different and that <strong>the</strong>ir politics had noth<strong>in</strong>g to do with<br />
that of <strong>the</strong> emerg<strong>in</strong>g Freedom Movement. In o<strong>the</strong>r words, <strong>the</strong> effort was to demarcate<br />
<strong>the</strong> Muslim communities as an ally of <strong>the</strong> British and to demand not <strong>on</strong>ly a share <strong>in</strong><br />
power, but a weighted reservati<strong>on</strong>, someth<strong>in</strong>g more than <strong>the</strong>ir proporti<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
populati<strong>on</strong>. All this was viewed as essential to neutralize <strong>the</strong> overwhelm<strong>in</strong>g<br />
prep<strong>on</strong>derance of <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>dus. This early separatism (i.e. keep<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Muslims separate<br />
as a people and not necessarily territorial divisi<strong>on</strong>) persisted <strong>in</strong> chang<strong>in</strong>g forms at<br />
different times and was <strong>the</strong> crux of pre-<strong>in</strong>dependence Muslim politics.<br />
To compare <strong>the</strong> politics of <strong>the</strong>se two different times is ridiculous. The change by now<br />
both <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>tent and form is quite evident and ra<strong>the</strong>r drastic. Except at <strong>the</strong> surface<br />
level, that is, ask<strong>in</strong>g for reservati<strong>on</strong>s and quotas and forms of affirmative acti<strong>on</strong>s,<br />
<strong>the</strong>re is noth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> comm<strong>on</strong> between <strong>the</strong> politics <strong>the</strong>n and now. Surface similarities are<br />
always mislead<strong>in</strong>g. Careful attenti<strong>on</strong> to detail should go <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> mak<strong>in</strong>g of our<br />
understand<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> current situati<strong>on</strong>. The BJP and <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>dutva forces are go<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
raise hell <strong>on</strong> any move to create special schemes for <strong>the</strong> welfare of Muslims or <strong>the</strong><br />
demands for reservati<strong>on</strong>s. Whatever streng<strong>the</strong>ns chauv<strong>in</strong>ism weakens democracy.<br />
And <strong>the</strong> weaken<strong>in</strong>g of democracy is not <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terests of <strong>the</strong> ord<strong>in</strong>ary people<br />
<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Muslims. So <strong>the</strong> leadership of <strong>the</strong> Muslim communities needs to give<br />
careful thought as to how <strong>the</strong>y formulate <strong>the</strong>ir demands. It should be obvious to <strong>the</strong>m<br />
that whatever <strong>the</strong> nature of <strong>the</strong> backwardness of Muslims, <strong>the</strong>y have not been<br />
marg<strong>in</strong>alized <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> country except, perhaps, <strong>in</strong> Gujarat.<br />
1<br />
i For a detailed discussi<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong>se issues see Javeed Alam, Who Wants Democracy? (New Delhi,<br />
Orient L<strong>on</strong>gman, Tracts for <strong>the</strong> Times 15, 2004)<br />
1<br />
32
ii Many of <strong>the</strong>se issues have discussed <strong>in</strong> Javeed Alam, “A M<strong>in</strong>ority Moves <strong>in</strong>to Ano<strong>the</strong>r Millennium,<br />
<strong>in</strong> Romila Thapar, (Ed.) India: Ano<strong>the</strong>r Millennium, New Delhi, Pengu<strong>in</strong>, 2001)<br />
iii For this viewpo<strong>in</strong>t see Mohammad Mujeeb, The Indian Muslims,(L<strong>on</strong>d<strong>on</strong>, Allen and Unw<strong>in</strong>, 1967),<br />
see esp. <strong>the</strong> "Introducti<strong>on</strong> ".<br />
iv For an elucidati<strong>on</strong> of this viewpo<strong>in</strong>t see <strong>the</strong> studies <strong>in</strong> Imtiaz Ahmed (Ed.) Caste And Social<br />
Straficati<strong>on</strong> Am<strong>on</strong>g The Muslims, (Dilhi, 1973)<br />
v For studies around this <strong>the</strong>me see Zafar Imam (Ed.) Muslims In India,(Delhi,1975). There are many<br />
more words <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong>se <strong>the</strong>mes but <strong>the</strong> <strong>on</strong>es noted above best represent such viewpo<strong>in</strong>ts. For as <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g<br />
historical overview see also Percival Spear, "The Positi<strong>on</strong>s of Muslims, Before and After Partiti<strong>on</strong>",<br />
op.cit.<br />
vi There e is ano<strong>the</strong>r debate <strong>on</strong> this issue with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marxist traditi<strong>on</strong>. On this see Irfan Habib,<br />
“Prob;em of <strong>the</strong> Muslim M<strong>in</strong>ority <strong>in</strong> India” <strong>in</strong> SocialScientist, June 1976 where Habib assumes, rightly<br />
I th<strong>in</strong>k but for reas<strong>on</strong>s I may disagree with, that someth<strong>in</strong>g of a pan-Indian community has already<br />
began to take shape. Suneet Chopra <strong>in</strong> his rejo<strong>in</strong>der under <strong>the</strong> same title <strong>in</strong> Social Scientist, September,<br />
1976 feels that <strong>the</strong> heterogeneity of factors will not allow such a sense of community to emerge.<br />
vii See my study <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> Jharkhand adivasis for an empirically based articulati<strong>on</strong> of this argument <strong>in</strong><br />
“The Category of ‘N<strong>on</strong>-Historic Nati<strong>on</strong> and Tribal Identity In Jharkhand”, <strong>in</strong> P.C. Chatterji, (Ed.), Self-<br />
Images, Identity and Nati<strong>on</strong>ality (Shimla, IIAS al<strong>on</strong>g with Allied Publishers, 1989).<br />
viii For Hyderabad see Javeed Alam,” Communalism am<strong>on</strong>g Muslims: The Majlis-e Ittehad ul-<br />
Muslimeen <strong>in</strong> Hyderabad” , <strong>in</strong> T.V.Sathyamurthy (Ed.) Regi<strong>on</strong>, Religi<strong>on</strong>, Caste, Gender, and Culture<br />
<strong>in</strong> C<strong>on</strong>temporary India (New Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1996). For an earlier period see<br />
Rasheedudd<strong>in</strong> Ahmad Khan, “Muslim Leadership and Electoral Politics <strong>in</strong> Hyderabad: A Pattern of<br />
M<strong>in</strong>ority Articulati<strong>on</strong>, (Ec<strong>on</strong>omic andPolitical weekly, 10 and 17 April 1971.<br />
ix As far as I am aware, <strong>the</strong>re is perhaps no study of Muslim communalism or of <strong>the</strong> Muslim League <strong>in</strong><br />
Kerala or Tamil Nadu.<br />
x I am not suggest<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>on</strong>e communalism does not re<strong>in</strong>force ano<strong>the</strong>r. It does, but <strong>the</strong> process<br />
is much more complex.. One can, perhaps study <strong>the</strong> process of mutual re<strong>in</strong>forcement by<br />
exam<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g how government of India’s anti-women stand <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Shah Bano case worked <strong>in</strong> favour<br />
of H<strong>in</strong>dutva forces by giv<strong>in</strong>g renewed voice to <strong>the</strong> most hide bound secti<strong>on</strong>s of <strong>the</strong> Muslim<br />
community.<br />
xi See Mushir ul Hasan, “Adjustment and Accommodati<strong>on</strong>: Indian Muslims after Parti<strong>on</strong>”, <strong>in</strong> K.N.<br />
Panniker , (Ed.), Communalism <strong>in</strong> India: History, Politics and Culture (Delhi, Manohar, 1991); see<br />
also Percival Spear, “The Positi<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> Muslims, Before and After Partiti<strong>on</strong>” <strong>in</strong> P.Mas<strong>on</strong>, (Ed.) India<br />
andCeyl<strong>on</strong>: unity and Diversity, (L<strong>on</strong>d<strong>on</strong>, OUP, 1967)<br />
xii Abdul Rahim Quereshi, Secretary, Muslim Pers<strong>on</strong>al Law Board, has written articles <strong>in</strong> Urdu<br />
defend<strong>in</strong>g that Palestian must rema<strong>in</strong> a secular state because <strong>the</strong>re is a sizeable m<strong>in</strong>ority of Christian<br />
<strong>the</strong>re who should be made to feel secure. This was <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>text of <strong>the</strong> tussle between <strong>the</strong> Hamas and<br />
<strong>the</strong> al Fateh <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> wake of <strong>the</strong> death of Yasser Arafat.<br />
xiii On riots see Ashghar Ali Eng<strong>in</strong>eer, (Ed.) Communal Riots <strong>in</strong> Post—Independent India, (Hyderabad,<br />
Sangam, 1984 and M.J.Akbar, Riots after Riots: Reports <strong>on</strong> Caste and Communal Violence <strong>in</strong> India,<br />
(New Delhi, Lotus Collecti<strong>on</strong> – Roti Books, 2003).<br />
xiv For very different k<strong>in</strong>d of discussi<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> dialectics of Muslim orientati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong> India see Mushirul<br />
Hasan, “In Search of Identity and Integrati<strong>on</strong>: Indian Muslims s<strong>in</strong>ce Independence”, Third World<br />
Quaterly, 10, 2 April 1988<br />
xv Am<strong>on</strong>g much very useful discussi<strong>on</strong>, see <strong>the</strong> Symposium On Sachar Committee Report <strong>in</strong> EPW, 10 –<br />
16 March 2007 compris<strong>in</strong>g five articles.<br />
xvi For an earlier situati<strong>on</strong> especially <strong>in</strong> relati<strong>on</strong> to <strong>the</strong> Gopal S<strong>in</strong>gh Report, see, am<strong>on</strong>g o<strong>the</strong>rs,<br />
Muthusamy Varaarajan, “<strong>M<strong>in</strong>orities</strong>: Basic Questi<strong>on</strong>s , Possible Answers, C<strong>on</strong>ference Papers, New<br />
Delhi, 19 December 1996, Rajiv Gandhi Institute For C<strong>on</strong>temporary Studies, RGICS Project No. 20,<br />
1997.<br />
xvii It is also reported <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Sachar Report that many areas of Muslim c<strong>on</strong>centrati<strong>on</strong> have been<br />
designated by Banks as “red z<strong>on</strong>es” or negative geographic z<strong>on</strong>es which means that <strong>the</strong> banks should<br />
be very cautious <strong>in</strong> grant<strong>in</strong>g loans <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>se are. What makes <strong>the</strong> banks declare <strong>the</strong>se areas as not credit<br />
worthy? There is no evidence, I am told by those well <strong>in</strong>formed, of any greater extent of n<strong>on</strong>—<br />
recovery of loans from <strong>the</strong> Muslim. In fact my experience of work <strong>in</strong> rural areas tells me that <strong>the</strong><br />
vulnerable are very afraid of not abid<strong>in</strong>g by c<strong>on</strong>tractual obligati<strong>on</strong>s whe<strong>the</strong>r with <strong>the</strong> official or n<strong>on</strong>—<br />
official agencies. By <strong>the</strong>ir very social locati<strong>on</strong> it is not easy for <strong>the</strong>m to defy unlike <strong>the</strong> powerful who<br />
can simply get away with whatever <strong>the</strong>y want to <strong>in</strong> our rule deficit society.<br />
33
xviii Indicators of development here are of an objective, quantitative k<strong>in</strong>d so <strong>the</strong> matter neglect or<br />
discrim<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> is qualitatively of a different k<strong>in</strong>d altoge<strong>the</strong>r. The po<strong>in</strong>t is: <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> selecti<strong>on</strong> of a candidate<br />
for a job, a subjective element of <strong>on</strong>e sort or ano<strong>the</strong>r is <strong>in</strong>volved. This requires not just a fair<br />
assessment of skills or merit but also prejudice, bias or simply <strong>the</strong> lack of sensitivity as <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> case of<br />
women even if we write off hostility. There just cannot be any subjectivity when it is <strong>the</strong> case of<br />
choos<strong>in</strong>g an alignment for a road or for provid<strong>in</strong>g a doctor or a teacher to a Primary Health Centre or a<br />
School and such o<strong>the</strong>r th<strong>in</strong>gs. When such is <strong>the</strong> case it is deliberate and <strong>in</strong>tenti<strong>on</strong>al <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> part of<br />
decisi<strong>on</strong> makers and ultimately reflects <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> nature of <strong>the</strong> state. Dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> terrorist blast <strong>in</strong><br />
Malega<strong>on</strong>, a town of a few lakhs with a majority of Muslim populati<strong>on</strong>, <strong>the</strong>re is not a s<strong>in</strong>gle<br />
government hospital. We are told that <strong>the</strong> Chief M<strong>in</strong>ister of <strong>the</strong> state, <strong>in</strong> his blissful ignorance, was<br />
shocked when he came to know that!<br />
xix The dedicated champi<strong>on</strong> of Muslim rights and well be<strong>in</strong>g Iqbal A. Ansari is <strong>on</strong>e of <strong>the</strong> few men<br />
who explicitly acknowledges this fact. He writes, “The facts are that <strong>the</strong> overwhelm<strong>in</strong>g majority of <strong>the</strong><br />
present day Muslims of India are of <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>digenous orig<strong>in</strong> and <strong>the</strong>y did not have any share <strong>in</strong> power<br />
even dur<strong>in</strong>g Medieval India, and <strong>the</strong>y did not undergo any socio—ec<strong>on</strong>omic upward mobility by <strong>the</strong><br />
virtue of <strong>the</strong>ir c<strong>on</strong>versi<strong>on</strong> to Islam. Their present backwardness can be traced to <strong>the</strong>ir occupati<strong>on</strong>al<br />
structure and social status that has rema<strong>in</strong>ed unchanged dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> period of about a thousand years.”<br />
See his “<strong>M<strong>in</strong>orities</strong> <strong>in</strong> India: The Muslim Case”, <strong>in</strong> <strong>M<strong>in</strong>orities</strong> <strong>in</strong> India, C<strong>on</strong>ference Papers, New Delhi,<br />
19 December 1996, Rajiv Gandhi Institute For C<strong>on</strong>temporary Studies, RGICS Project No. 20, 1997.<br />
xx See James Grant’s Analysis <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Fifth Report, 1812, edited by W.K. Firm<strong>in</strong>gar Historical<br />
<strong>in</strong>troducti<strong>on</strong> to <strong>the</strong> Bengal Porti<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> Fifth Report (1917), repr<strong>in</strong>t, Calcutta, 1962.<br />
xxi Amiya K. Bagchi, Political Ec<strong>on</strong>omy of Underdevelopment, (Cambridge, CUP, 1983); Indian<br />
editi<strong>on</strong> by Orient L<strong>on</strong>gman; see also Irfan Habib,”Col<strong>on</strong>isati<strong>on</strong> of Indian Ec<strong>on</strong>omy, 1757—1900,<br />
Social Scientist, March, 1975.<br />
xxii Amiya K. Bagchi, ibid. see also his “Reflecti<strong>on</strong>s <strong>on</strong> Patterns of Regi<strong>on</strong>al Growth <strong>in</strong> India Dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
Period of British Rule”, <strong>in</strong> Bengal Past and Present, Vol. XCV, Part 1, No. 180.<br />
xxiii Amiya K. Bagchi, “De-<strong>in</strong>dustrialisati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> India <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> N<strong>in</strong>eteenth Century: Some Theoretical<br />
Implicati<strong>on</strong>s”, Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 12, No. 2, 1976.<br />
xxiv There is noth<strong>in</strong>g written <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong>se l<strong>in</strong>es by any<strong>on</strong>e. But <strong>in</strong> a number of c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>s of Muslims that I<br />
had a chance to be present, this has not been an unusual refra<strong>in</strong>. A certa<strong>in</strong> leader went <strong>on</strong> to shame <strong>the</strong><br />
Indian democracy, call<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong> of Muslims a black spot <strong>on</strong> democracy <strong>in</strong> India. He had to be<br />
gently rem<strong>in</strong>ded that it is entirely because of democracy <strong>in</strong> India that someth<strong>in</strong>g like Sachar Report<br />
becomes possible and much else that is happen<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
xxv There are two k<strong>in</strong>ds of debates go<strong>in</strong>g today without <strong>the</strong> policy makers try<strong>in</strong>g to l<strong>in</strong>k <strong>the</strong>m or at least<br />
to see if <strong>the</strong>re is any c<strong>on</strong>necti<strong>on</strong> between <strong>the</strong> figures be<strong>in</strong>g cited. I mean <strong>the</strong> figures about poverty and<br />
those about malnutriti<strong>on</strong>. The figures about undernourished children at 47 per cent plus are about <strong>the</strong><br />
double of what <strong>the</strong> Plann<strong>in</strong>g Commissi<strong>on</strong> has given out for poverty. Now to me <strong>the</strong> questi<strong>on</strong> is, even a<br />
methodological <strong>on</strong>e, who <strong>the</strong>se 20 per cent and more children are and from what k<strong>in</strong>d of families. It is<br />
also a disturb<strong>in</strong>g fact that after <strong>the</strong> lactati<strong>on</strong> period, <strong>the</strong> number of <strong>the</strong> under nourished children slightly<br />
goes up. Now who <strong>the</strong> hell are <strong>the</strong>se parents, especially <strong>the</strong> mo<strong>the</strong>rs given <strong>the</strong> structure of our families,<br />
who give birth to under weight children and allow <strong>the</strong>m to rema<strong>in</strong> malnourished? If it is not poverty<br />
<strong>the</strong>n it has to be deliberate neglect or callousness. If we do not answer this questi<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> terms of poverty,<br />
<strong>the</strong>n we mak<strong>in</strong>g a very disturb<strong>in</strong>g comment <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> culture <strong>in</strong>form<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Indian family and <strong>the</strong> attitudes<br />
to child upbr<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
xxvi The classic work <strong>on</strong> this issue is W.W. Hunter, Indian Muslaman, available <strong>in</strong> many different<br />
pr<strong>in</strong>ts. Some very useful material has recently been reproduced <strong>in</strong> a reader friendly manner Najmul<br />
Karim, Dynamics of Bangladesh Society, (New Delhi, OUP, 1980, see also Amalendu De, “Roots of<br />
Separatism <strong>in</strong> 19 th . Century Bengal”, <strong>in</strong> Barun De (Ed.), Essays <strong>in</strong> H<strong>on</strong>our of Prof. S.C.Sarkar, (new<br />
Delhi, 1976).<br />
34
H<strong>in</strong>dus <strong>in</strong> a Polarised Political Envir<strong>on</strong>ment:<br />
Bangladesh's M<strong>in</strong>ority<br />
Afsan Chowdhury<br />
State Mak<strong>in</strong>g Project and <strong>M<strong>in</strong>orities</strong><br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Asia</strong>n states operate <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> basis of exclusivity frameworks operat<strong>in</strong>g through<br />
various equati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g m<strong>in</strong>ority- majority <strong>on</strong>es. The idea of state mak<strong>in</strong>g as a<br />
modernity project is still not an established idea <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> regi<strong>on</strong>. Socio-ec<strong>on</strong>omic c<strong>on</strong>flicts<br />
also are <strong>in</strong>terpreted politically. Ethnic and communal differences are deemed political<br />
identity markers even when <strong>the</strong> same is <strong>the</strong> product of or descriptive of ec<strong>on</strong>omic denials<br />
by a powerful group or forms of class behavior.<br />
For example, <strong>in</strong> feudal Bengal, dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> British rule, <strong>the</strong> relati<strong>on</strong>ship between <strong>the</strong><br />
m<strong>in</strong>ority H<strong>in</strong>du landlords and <strong>the</strong> dom<strong>in</strong>antly Muslim peasants was not articulated as an<br />
ec<strong>on</strong>omic <strong>in</strong>justice issue but basically as a communal and sociological c<strong>on</strong>flict. Pre<br />
partiti<strong>on</strong> politics– whe<strong>the</strong>r it was <strong>the</strong> two nati<strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong>ory that produced Pakistan or <strong>the</strong> <strong>on</strong>enati<strong>on</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong>ory that produced India- bel<strong>on</strong>ged to this group. It led to communal c<strong>on</strong>flicts<br />
and social divides across India and ultimately to <strong>the</strong> argumentative process of multiple<br />
state mak<strong>in</strong>g, lead<strong>in</strong>g to more subsequent c<strong>on</strong>flicts. 1<br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Asia</strong>n politics is <strong>the</strong> product of an endless number of identities piled up<strong>on</strong> each<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r with most l<strong>in</strong>ked to state mak<strong>in</strong>g projects. These states produce m<strong>in</strong>orities as an<br />
essential part of <strong>the</strong>ir c<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> process s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> majority <strong>in</strong> produc<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> state also<br />
produces <strong>the</strong> 'o<strong>the</strong>r' or <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>orities. It is argued that <strong>the</strong> disadvantaged<br />
majority/m<strong>in</strong>ority state of 'o<strong>the</strong>rhood' can be ended <strong>on</strong>ly by becom<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
majority/powerful <strong>in</strong> a freshly c<strong>on</strong>structed state. It has happened <strong>in</strong> Pakistan and<br />
Bangladesh and it c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to be pursued aggressively <strong>in</strong> c<strong>on</strong>flict z<strong>on</strong>es <strong>in</strong> India and Sri<br />
Lanka.<br />
The Bangladesh case needs expla<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g though m<strong>in</strong>orities face problems wherever <strong>the</strong>y<br />
are <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Asia</strong>. However <strong>in</strong> each country <strong>the</strong>y face problems which are by- products of<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir own history. 2<br />
Although Bengalis were <strong>the</strong> majority populati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> Pakistan, <strong>the</strong>y were socioec<strong>on</strong>omically<br />
marg<strong>in</strong>alized and treated as a political 'm<strong>in</strong>ority'. The H<strong>in</strong>dus were a<br />
m<strong>in</strong>ority with<strong>in</strong> this political m<strong>in</strong>ority situati<strong>on</strong>. So were <strong>the</strong> Biharis /Mohajirs who<br />
experienced marg<strong>in</strong>alizati<strong>on</strong> all over Pakistan. They were part of <strong>the</strong> religious majority<br />
but ethnically m<strong>in</strong>or and excluded from Pakistan's rul<strong>in</strong>g class structure.<br />
The dalits and o<strong>the</strong>r lower and backward castes of India are not an <strong>in</strong>significant m<strong>in</strong>ority<br />
<strong>in</strong> terms of numbers but c<strong>on</strong>stitute a functi<strong>on</strong>al m<strong>in</strong>ority, and like Bengalis <strong>in</strong> Pakistan,<br />
are people expelled from <strong>the</strong> state power centres because <strong>the</strong>y do not share <strong>the</strong> ethno-<br />
35
social identity of <strong>the</strong> rul<strong>in</strong>g class. In cases where possible, <strong>the</strong> functi<strong>on</strong>al or physical<br />
'm<strong>in</strong>orities' strive to c<strong>on</strong>struct a new state as happened <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> case of Bangladesh. In o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
cases, <strong>the</strong>y can agitate and hope for better days as <strong>in</strong> case of Indian dalits.<br />
The m<strong>in</strong>ority: proxy citizens of <strong>the</strong> enemy<br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Asia</strong>n states are each o<strong>the</strong>r's neighbors and share <strong>the</strong> same basic populati<strong>on</strong><br />
compositi<strong>on</strong>. As a result, m<strong>in</strong>orities of <strong>on</strong>e state and <strong>the</strong> majority next door are often <strong>the</strong><br />
same. The 'Great <strong>South</strong> <strong>Asia</strong>n M<strong>in</strong>ority' that is <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>dus are present <strong>in</strong> all <strong>South</strong> <strong>Asia</strong>n<br />
states while <strong>in</strong> India which is <strong>the</strong> largest state <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> regi<strong>on</strong>, it is <strong>the</strong> majority populati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
They have become <strong>the</strong> 'critical m<strong>in</strong>ority' outside <strong>the</strong> Indian state. In India, Muslims,<br />
meanwhile, have acquired <strong>the</strong> reverse identity as perceived c<strong>on</strong>testants of <strong>the</strong> Indian state<br />
because <strong>the</strong>ir religi<strong>on</strong>, and its attendant <strong>South</strong> <strong>Asia</strong>n politics, identifies <strong>the</strong>m with<br />
Pakistan, a Muslim majority state.<br />
<strong>M<strong>in</strong>orities</strong> of today's <strong>South</strong> <strong>Asia</strong> have become proxy citizen of <strong>the</strong> country where <strong>the</strong>y are<br />
a majority ra<strong>the</strong>r than full citizens of <strong>the</strong>ir own country of orig<strong>in</strong>. So H<strong>in</strong>dus <strong>in</strong> Pakistan<br />
and Bangladesh, <strong>the</strong> madhesis <strong>in</strong> Nepal and <strong>the</strong> Tamils <strong>in</strong> Sri Lanka are not just<br />
m<strong>in</strong>orities but are looked up<strong>on</strong> as proxy Indians and imag<strong>in</strong>ed as a threat or an enemy,<br />
and this is based <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> that state's relati<strong>on</strong>ship with India. Discrim<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong>m<br />
becomes justified as part of <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>alist threat caretak<strong>in</strong>g exercise. Similarly, Muslims<br />
<strong>in</strong> India have to struggle to prove <strong>the</strong>ir loyalty to India, <strong>the</strong>ir homeland, that <strong>the</strong>y are not<br />
pro-Pakistani or more, proxy citizens of <strong>the</strong> neighbor and enemy.<br />
The noti<strong>on</strong> of shared nati<strong>on</strong>hood <strong>in</strong> a state is weak <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Asia</strong>, unless it is about<br />
shar<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> enemy identity it seems. In Bangladesh m<strong>in</strong>orities <strong>in</strong> general and <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>du<br />
m<strong>in</strong>ority <strong>in</strong> particular, are not imag<strong>in</strong>ed as occupy<strong>in</strong>g a rightful and legitimate space<br />
with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> architecture of <strong>the</strong> majority's imag<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>. They are <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly<br />
pushed <strong>in</strong>to occupy<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> imag<strong>in</strong>ed 'superimposed' space of <strong>the</strong> super-neighbour India<br />
even as <strong>the</strong>y live <strong>in</strong> Bangladesh. This percepti<strong>on</strong> is <strong>in</strong>fluenced largely by Indo- Bangla<br />
relati<strong>on</strong>s, which is perpetually <strong>in</strong> a state of low <strong>in</strong>tensity hostility.<br />
The majority m<strong>in</strong>ority problem is not just <strong>on</strong>e of local geo-politics, but often takes <strong>on</strong> a<br />
religious hue. In India, <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>du majority's relati<strong>on</strong>ship with <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>orities - Muslims,<br />
Sikhs, Christians and <strong>the</strong> North-Easterners - i is a major matter of c<strong>on</strong>cern. In Pakistan,<br />
<strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>orities have been overwhelm<strong>in</strong>gly marg<strong>in</strong>alized which <strong>in</strong>cludes <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>ority Shia<br />
sect of Islam, <strong>the</strong> dissident Muslim Ahmediya sect, Christians and H<strong>in</strong>dus and o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
groups.<br />
In Sri Lanka <strong>the</strong> S<strong>in</strong>hala-Tamil ethnic c<strong>on</strong>flict which also is a m<strong>in</strong>ority- majority c<strong>on</strong>test<br />
as well as a Buddhist-n<strong>on</strong> Buddhist c<strong>on</strong>flict has generated a multi decade war. In Nepal,<br />
ethnic c<strong>on</strong>flict was partly streamed <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> Maoist <strong>in</strong>surgency which tapped <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong><br />
resentment of <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>digenous peoples and <strong>the</strong> madhesis of <strong>the</strong> terai lowlands aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong><br />
hill bahuns and chetris of <strong>the</strong> rul<strong>in</strong>g class. Subsequently, it has reared to <strong>the</strong> forefr<strong>on</strong>t <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> violent Madhesi street agitati<strong>on</strong>s. They have felt left out of <strong>the</strong> post m<strong>on</strong>archy<br />
36
political state mak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> a classic case of rec<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> of <strong>in</strong>tra-ethnic relati<strong>on</strong>ships and<br />
power shar<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
Meanwhile, <strong>in</strong> Bangladesh, <strong>on</strong>ly <strong>the</strong> Muslim Bengalis appear to have <strong>the</strong> right to claim to<br />
be elite leav<strong>in</strong>g out almost totally over 10 per centof <strong>the</strong> populati<strong>on</strong>. Given this situati<strong>on</strong><br />
across <strong>the</strong> regi<strong>on</strong>al map, it appears to be a problem not just of a particular state and its<br />
ideological practices but of <strong>the</strong> regi<strong>on</strong> and state formati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> general.<br />
The m<strong>in</strong>ority as an enemy: Bangladesh 1947- 1971<br />
Bangladesh is a product of a l<strong>on</strong>g series of ethno-religious c<strong>on</strong>flicts <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> regi<strong>on</strong> which<br />
have <strong>the</strong>ir foot pr<strong>in</strong>ts <strong>in</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r countries as well. While some of <strong>the</strong>se c<strong>on</strong>flicts are outright<br />
and open as was <strong>the</strong> case <strong>in</strong> Pakistan's relati<strong>on</strong>ship with East Pakistani Bengalis and its<br />
H<strong>in</strong>dus; some are more multiple as is <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> case of India. Nepal falls <strong>in</strong> between with its<br />
many ethno-religious equati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>terchangeable caste and class identities. In<br />
Sri Lanka, Tamils are largely identified with Indian/ H<strong>in</strong>du practices and <strong>the</strong> S<strong>in</strong>hala<br />
majority have a str<strong>on</strong>g Buddhist militant support base mak<strong>in</strong>g S<strong>in</strong>hala nati<strong>on</strong>alism and<br />
Buddhism c<strong>on</strong>tiguous.<br />
In Bangladesh/ East Pakistan, <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>dus were outsiders from <strong>the</strong> very birth of Pakistan<br />
<strong>in</strong> 1947, though <strong>the</strong> majority populati<strong>on</strong>, <strong>the</strong> Bengalis, <strong>the</strong>mselves were repressed. a state<br />
which came <strong>in</strong>to be<strong>in</strong>g for <strong>the</strong> protecti<strong>on</strong>ist benefit of <strong>the</strong> sub-c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ental Muslims who<br />
were a m<strong>in</strong>ority <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> sub-c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ental state, <strong>the</strong>re could be no space for H<strong>in</strong>dus, <strong>the</strong> old<br />
Indian majority, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> new country.<br />
In fact, <strong>in</strong> Pakistan, <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>dus were not even c<strong>on</strong>structed as a m<strong>in</strong>ority group but<br />
identified as an 'enemy 'group because Pakistan's pr<strong>in</strong>cipal enemy was India with a H<strong>in</strong>du<br />
majority populati<strong>on</strong>. Pakistan emerged as a c<strong>on</strong>testati<strong>on</strong> of what it saw as H<strong>in</strong>du<br />
dom<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> of India. H<strong>in</strong>du and India held <strong>the</strong> same mean<strong>in</strong>g to Pakistan and through this<br />
process <strong>the</strong> ethnic-religious and political identity was subsumed <strong>in</strong>to <strong>on</strong>e. This process<br />
not <strong>on</strong>ly denied <strong>the</strong>m any identity o<strong>the</strong>r than that given to <strong>the</strong>m by <strong>the</strong> state where <strong>the</strong>y<br />
resided. but also created a platform of vulnerability which c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued to have a l<strong>on</strong>g term<br />
impact c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> Bangladesh era. It seems that many of <strong>the</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>cipal positi<strong>on</strong>s<br />
and practices regard<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> management of m<strong>in</strong>ority relati<strong>on</strong>s did not change after 1971,<br />
that is, before becom<strong>in</strong>g an effective m<strong>in</strong>ority, <strong>the</strong>y were <strong>the</strong> enemy, bro<strong>the</strong>r to <strong>the</strong> hostile<br />
majority across <strong>the</strong> border. 3<br />
Between 1947 and 1971, some H<strong>in</strong>dus <strong>in</strong> East Pakistan became part of <strong>the</strong> n<strong>on</strong>-religious<br />
political movement, especially <strong>the</strong> Left which was secular <strong>in</strong> nature. They were not <strong>in</strong><br />
any leadership positi<strong>on</strong> except <strong>in</strong> communist parties. At that time, <strong>the</strong> situati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong><br />
Pakistan was not so bad that it <strong>in</strong>spired large scale migrati<strong>on</strong> at <strong>the</strong> cost of los<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
homeland. But many of <strong>the</strong> middle class did build up alternative homes and livelihoods <strong>in</strong><br />
India, recogniz<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ir limited opportunities and <strong>the</strong> possible threat to safety. India was a<br />
sanctuary home for those who could afford it.<br />
37
S<strong>in</strong>ce Bengalis <strong>in</strong> general were <strong>in</strong> c<strong>on</strong>flict with <strong>the</strong> Pakistani state, <strong>the</strong>re was a sense of<br />
shared denial which kept <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>tra-community c<strong>on</strong>flict under wraps <strong>in</strong> East Pakistan.<br />
Dur<strong>in</strong>g this period, <strong>the</strong>re were two major communal riots, <strong>in</strong> 1950 and 1964, both<br />
occurr<strong>in</strong>g across <strong>the</strong> regi<strong>on</strong> and felt <strong>in</strong> India and <strong>the</strong>n Pakistan. In East Pakistan, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
media and <strong>in</strong> literature, Urdu speak<strong>in</strong>g migrants were largely blamed ra<strong>the</strong>r than local<br />
Bengalis. 4<br />
However, H<strong>in</strong>du <strong>in</strong>tegrati<strong>on</strong> was very limited and although Bengali nati<strong>on</strong>alism reigned,<br />
it was not a c<strong>on</strong>struct free of religious identity seek<strong>in</strong>g. It should also be remembered that<br />
<strong>the</strong> secular Left movement was often led by H<strong>in</strong>dus who were 'anti-Muslim' or not fully<br />
secular. Even with<strong>in</strong> supposedly secular c<strong>on</strong>structs, under currents of communal divide<br />
were <strong>the</strong>re.<br />
The 1971 phase and H<strong>in</strong>dus<br />
If 1971 was <strong>the</strong> p<strong>in</strong>nacle of nati<strong>on</strong>alism <strong>in</strong> Bangladesh, it was also <strong>the</strong> period when <strong>the</strong><br />
nature of <strong>the</strong> state was def<strong>in</strong>ed often through <strong>the</strong> dynamics of vulnerability. H<strong>in</strong>dus were<br />
particularly targeted as enemies. Those who could, left Bangladesh to escape <strong>the</strong> pogrom<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir homeland.<br />
The appropriati<strong>on</strong> of H<strong>in</strong>du property was comm<strong>on</strong> and protect<strong>in</strong>g H<strong>in</strong>dus was<br />
c<strong>on</strong>sidered risky. H<strong>in</strong>dus were subjected to <strong>the</strong> highest level of loot<strong>in</strong>g and rape. Many<br />
H<strong>in</strong>dus left <strong>the</strong>ir property <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> hands of <strong>the</strong>ir neighbours. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to anecdotal<br />
<strong>in</strong>formati<strong>on</strong>, while some was returned much was not when <strong>the</strong>y returned from refugee<br />
hood <strong>in</strong> India. So loot<strong>in</strong>g – ec<strong>on</strong>omic crime-had a communal character because H<strong>in</strong>dus<br />
were c<strong>on</strong>sidered least able to resist.<br />
"As we moved towards <strong>the</strong> border, we made small bundles of our jewelry and would throw <strong>the</strong>m<br />
at people who would waylay us. These were people tak<strong>in</strong>g advantage of <strong>the</strong> situati<strong>on</strong>, not even<br />
professi<strong>on</strong>al crim<strong>in</strong>als <strong>in</strong> many cases. We just had no protecti<strong>on</strong> and <strong>the</strong>y were ready to take<br />
advantage of those without protecti<strong>on</strong> even <strong>in</strong> such times." [K S Das] 5<br />
Ano<strong>the</strong>r impact of <strong>the</strong> war phase was <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> trad<strong>in</strong>g and bus<strong>in</strong>ess activities of <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>du<br />
communities at <strong>the</strong> sub-nati<strong>on</strong>al level. The established norms, practices and<br />
entrenchments of sub-nati<strong>on</strong>al ec<strong>on</strong>omics was destroyed as refugee H<strong>in</strong>dus left <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
bus<strong>in</strong>ess establishments and network beh<strong>in</strong>d to seek sanctuary <strong>in</strong> India. Bus<strong>in</strong>ess <strong>in</strong><br />
general decl<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> 1971, but whatever was left was largely was taken over by <strong>the</strong><br />
Muslims.<br />
After <strong>the</strong> war was over, a new class came to power that had already established itself <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> bus<strong>in</strong>ess sectors, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>on</strong>ce dom<strong>in</strong>ated by H<strong>in</strong>dus. Property too was grabbed,<br />
<strong>in</strong> many cases, not <strong>on</strong>ly of H<strong>in</strong>dus and Biharis but also of Muslims who were less<br />
powerful. The new class of owners defended <strong>the</strong>ir bus<strong>in</strong>esses and resisted <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>dus<br />
who as a community were often <strong>the</strong> trad<strong>in</strong>g leaders. The Shahas, Baniks and o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
Bengali H<strong>in</strong>du trad<strong>in</strong>g class/caste communities began to reassess <strong>the</strong>ir positi<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> this<br />
new society and shift to o<strong>the</strong>r professi<strong>on</strong>s or. The material base for this new<br />
communalism was <strong>in</strong>itiated by <strong>the</strong> acts committed by <strong>the</strong> Pakistanis <strong>in</strong> expell<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
38
H<strong>in</strong>dus <strong>in</strong> 1971 and creat<strong>in</strong>g a culture of social <strong>the</strong>ft which <strong>the</strong> appropriat<strong>in</strong>g<br />
Bangladeshis later embraced.<br />
From 1972 to 1975: <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>du-India trap<br />
The H<strong>in</strong>dus were better accommodated at <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>al ra<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>the</strong> sub-nati<strong>on</strong>al level<br />
<strong>in</strong> Bangladesh, because at this level <strong>the</strong> state wanted to uphold an image that all<br />
communities were equal as regards Bangladesh nati<strong>on</strong>alism. Also, Indian public op<strong>in</strong>i<strong>on</strong><br />
still mattered as <strong>the</strong> new state depended <strong>on</strong> India for various k<strong>in</strong>d of support, and H<strong>in</strong>dus<br />
mattered <strong>in</strong> India. Thus H<strong>in</strong>dus fell <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>du-India trap. Given <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>siderable<br />
discomfort of <strong>the</strong> Bangla leadership over India's management of <strong>the</strong> war politics, this<br />
didn't streng<strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> positi<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>dus..<br />
Official India's attitude towards <strong>the</strong> 1971 Bangladesh war ranged from patr<strong>on</strong>iz<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
c<strong>on</strong>descend<strong>in</strong>g, to that of outright dislike of Bengalis/ Bangals/ Muslim Bengalis. In<br />
Bangladesh, most of <strong>the</strong> political groups recognized India's role <strong>in</strong> 1971 but resented its<br />
unilateral way of runn<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> war. Beneath <strong>the</strong> veneer of <strong>the</strong> new found friendship was a<br />
wide rang<strong>in</strong>g hostility, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g am<strong>on</strong>gst <strong>the</strong> Awami League (AL). Thus, Indo- Bangla<br />
relati<strong>on</strong>ship was a significant factor <strong>in</strong> determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g how <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>dus as 'Indian<br />
representatives' were treated <strong>in</strong> Bangladesh.<br />
Two factors <strong>in</strong>fluenced <strong>the</strong> political psychology of <strong>the</strong> period. One, that <strong>the</strong> Awami<br />
League government was supported by India whatever may be <strong>the</strong> private feel<strong>in</strong>gs of its<br />
leaders. This AL government was misrul<strong>in</strong>g. Therefore, India was support<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> misrule.<br />
Two, Indian goods overwhelmed <strong>the</strong> market as cheap supply chased high demand..<br />
Smuggl<strong>in</strong>g and black market was extensive and <strong>the</strong> Indian-AL alliance was blamed. Most<br />
smuggled good were Indian and most smugglers had l<strong>in</strong>ks to <strong>the</strong> new power group <strong>in</strong><br />
town, dependent <strong>on</strong> India for political legitimacy and even power. Moreover, <strong>the</strong> most<br />
repressive para-military force <strong>in</strong> town- <strong>the</strong> Rakkhi Bah<strong>in</strong>i- was tra<strong>in</strong>ed and mentored by<br />
Indians, fur<strong>the</strong>r bolster<strong>in</strong>g this negative percepti<strong>on</strong>. 6<br />
Though local H<strong>in</strong>dus had very little to do with <strong>the</strong> situati<strong>on</strong>, <strong>the</strong>y were blamed because<br />
H<strong>in</strong>dus and India had <strong>on</strong>ce aga<strong>in</strong> become <strong>in</strong>extricably l<strong>in</strong>ked toge<strong>the</strong>r through <strong>the</strong><br />
political and ec<strong>on</strong>omic management of <strong>the</strong> new state under <strong>the</strong> Awami League.<br />
Bangladesh C<strong>on</strong>gress Party: India's H<strong>in</strong>du party <strong>in</strong> Bangladesh ?<br />
Members of <strong>the</strong> Pakistan C<strong>on</strong>gress had played a significant role <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> first stage of<br />
c<strong>on</strong>struct<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Oppositi<strong>on</strong> to <strong>the</strong> central Pakistan right after 1947. C<strong>on</strong>gress MP Dhiren<br />
Dutta was <strong>the</strong> first to raise <strong>the</strong> Bangla language issue <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Pakistan Assembly <strong>in</strong> 1948<br />
and many H<strong>in</strong>dus were members of <strong>the</strong> leftist parties that supported <strong>the</strong> Bengali<br />
nati<strong>on</strong>alist movement. But over time <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>alist ma<strong>in</strong>stream found no space for <strong>the</strong><br />
C<strong>on</strong>gress Party as it never developed an agenda that had an across <strong>the</strong> board appeal. It<br />
was perceived as <strong>the</strong> East Bengal representati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> INC.<br />
39
As l<strong>on</strong>g as separate electorate existed under which Muslims and H<strong>in</strong>dus voted for <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
own candidates, <strong>the</strong>re was some visibility, but <strong>on</strong>ce that disappeared <strong>in</strong> 1955, <strong>the</strong><br />
C<strong>on</strong>gress Party <strong>in</strong> East Pakistan also ceased to be an effective presence. Of its members,<br />
many went away to India and some jo<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>the</strong> Awami League or turned communist.<br />
After 1972, when <strong>the</strong> C<strong>on</strong>gress tried to revive itself, it was perceived more as a loyalist<br />
Indian caucus, as it had d<strong>on</strong>e little to establish its <strong>in</strong>dependent status or participated as a<br />
party or group <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> critical stages of <strong>the</strong> Bangladesh nati<strong>on</strong>alist project. As it<br />
overwhelm<strong>in</strong>gly supported Awami League <strong>in</strong> all its acti<strong>on</strong>s, it nei<strong>the</strong>r created an<br />
<strong>in</strong>dependent space nor became a political party as such but ga<strong>in</strong>ed a reputati<strong>on</strong> as <strong>the</strong><br />
"H<strong>in</strong>du' arm of <strong>the</strong> Awami League.<br />
The situati<strong>on</strong> peaked <strong>in</strong> 1975 when Sk. Mujib-ur- Rahman c<strong>on</strong>sidered <strong>the</strong> found<strong>in</strong>g leader<br />
of Bangladesh established <strong>on</strong>e-party rule <strong>in</strong> Bangladesh by br<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g toge<strong>the</strong>r a coaliti<strong>on</strong><br />
compris<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong> Awami League, <strong>the</strong> C<strong>on</strong>gress party and <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>n pro-Soviet Communist<br />
Party which was also an Indian ally. The <strong>on</strong>e-party c<strong>on</strong>struct called BKSAL, was very<br />
unpopular. It was widely thought that <strong>the</strong> Indo-Soviet alliance was beh<strong>in</strong>d <strong>the</strong> birth of <strong>the</strong><br />
party. When <strong>on</strong>e-party rule fell <strong>in</strong> a bloody military putsch <strong>in</strong> August 1975, <strong>the</strong><br />
dem<strong>on</strong>izati<strong>on</strong> of India, <strong>the</strong> Awami League and H<strong>in</strong>dus began <strong>in</strong> earnest at a nati<strong>on</strong>al<br />
level so as to discredit <strong>the</strong> deposed political party and its patr<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
The worst victims of this process were <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>dus who were branded as representatives<br />
of <strong>the</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>cipal supporter of <strong>the</strong> <strong>on</strong>e party rule, India. And H<strong>in</strong>dus represented India, <strong>the</strong><br />
pr<strong>in</strong>cipal enemy. With ga<strong>in</strong>s <strong>in</strong> respectability made by <strong>the</strong> Islamists ow<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> failures<br />
<strong>in</strong> governance of <strong>the</strong> Awami League, <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>dus lost fur<strong>the</strong>r ground. Secularism became<br />
a hated c<strong>on</strong>cept as people misc<strong>on</strong>strued it to mean <strong>the</strong> refusal of <strong>the</strong> state to practice<br />
religi<strong>on</strong>. By extensi<strong>on</strong>, it came to be seen as a c<strong>on</strong>cept Indian would promote for <strong>the</strong><br />
benefit of <strong>the</strong> India friendly H<strong>in</strong>du populati<strong>on</strong> of Bangladesh.<br />
When <strong>the</strong> AL lost power <strong>in</strong> a military putsch, India described <strong>the</strong> situati<strong>on</strong> as a "hostile<br />
take over". The new rulers – <strong>the</strong> military - civil comb<strong>in</strong>e- easily c<strong>on</strong>structed <strong>the</strong>ir political<br />
dem<strong>on</strong>iz<strong>in</strong>g structure <strong>on</strong> popular percepti<strong>on</strong>s of hate which centred <strong>on</strong> India, Soviet<br />
Uni<strong>on</strong>, <strong>the</strong> Awami League and <strong>the</strong>ir various political w<strong>in</strong>gs. To this list was added <strong>the</strong><br />
community of H<strong>in</strong>dus as supporters of India and <strong>the</strong> AL. It opened <strong>the</strong> floodgates to<br />
H<strong>in</strong>du oppressi<strong>on</strong>, as <strong>the</strong> most vulnerable and c<strong>on</strong>venient community to repress <strong>in</strong><br />
Bangladesh.<br />
Property grabb<strong>in</strong>g as a wealth produc<strong>in</strong>g activity<br />
In a pi<strong>on</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g study <strong>on</strong> property grabb<strong>in</strong>g and community identity, Prof. Abul Barakat<br />
and his colleagues have shown that H<strong>in</strong>du property was systemically looted and by all <strong>the</strong><br />
powerful political parties. The key <strong>in</strong>strument was <strong>the</strong> Enemy Property Act which was<br />
passed by Pakistan after <strong>the</strong> 1965 war and after 1971 became known as <strong>the</strong> Vested<br />
Property Act. So great is <strong>the</strong> vested <strong>in</strong>terest of <strong>the</strong> grabbers, that no political party has<br />
shown any <strong>in</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> to dismantle this law. Today, even though <strong>the</strong> act is no l<strong>on</strong>ger <strong>in</strong><br />
force, many loopholes can be found to enable <strong>the</strong> grabb<strong>in</strong>g of H<strong>in</strong>du property to c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue<br />
regularly. 7<br />
40
This phenomen<strong>on</strong> is built <strong>on</strong> an ec<strong>on</strong>omic opportunity generated by vulnerability.<br />
Systematically, <strong>the</strong> state has socially, legally and ec<strong>on</strong>omically marg<strong>in</strong>alized <strong>the</strong><br />
m<strong>in</strong>orities. Tak<strong>in</strong>g advantage of H<strong>in</strong>du vulnerability has become so entrenched <strong>in</strong> social<br />
practices that it does not require state sancti<strong>on</strong>. At <strong>the</strong> societal level, Muslims and H<strong>in</strong>dus<br />
are alienated from each o<strong>the</strong>r while for <strong>the</strong> state many H<strong>in</strong>dus have become n<strong>on</strong>-<br />
Bangladeshis irrespective of whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>y live <strong>in</strong> Bangladesh or elsewhere.<br />
The sub-c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ental character of <strong>in</strong>ter-communal relati<strong>on</strong>ship may be rooted <strong>in</strong> both <strong>the</strong><br />
c<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> of nati<strong>on</strong> states as well as <strong>the</strong> changes <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> patterns of ec<strong>on</strong>omic sociology<br />
with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong> states. In Bangladesh two major factors have had l<strong>on</strong>g term effects. The<br />
1947 partiti<strong>on</strong> and state formati<strong>on</strong> process <strong>in</strong>troduced state c<strong>on</strong>d<strong>on</strong>ed formal<br />
appropriati<strong>on</strong> of property and resources of <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>orities <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> name of nati<strong>on</strong>alism and<br />
asset creati<strong>on</strong> for migrants from India. The migrants from India were <strong>the</strong> prime<br />
beneficiaries. This helped create an elite class that grew up <strong>on</strong> a culture of dem<strong>on</strong>iz<strong>in</strong>g as<br />
a necessary and c<strong>on</strong>venient method to <strong>in</strong>crease wealth. 8<br />
In order to susta<strong>in</strong> this appropriati<strong>on</strong> of property, it is necessary for <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>dus to rema<strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong>' outsider'. Assimilati<strong>on</strong> would be counter-productive as a multi-nati<strong>on</strong>al State is<br />
obligated to treat all fairly, especially <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>orities. Appropriati<strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong>refore makes<br />
communalism an essential part of legitimiz<strong>in</strong>g ec<strong>on</strong>omic crimes. By mak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>m an<br />
'enemy', <strong>the</strong>y are no l<strong>on</strong>ger a 'm<strong>in</strong>ority' and not eligible for protecti<strong>on</strong>.<br />
Politics of Departure<br />
"For us, <strong>the</strong> great loss is that of our leaders. The community has no <strong>on</strong>e to provide<br />
strength and support. Those who are left beh<strong>in</strong>d are not from <strong>the</strong> top of society. So<br />
H<strong>in</strong>dus <strong>in</strong> Bangladesh have become a m<strong>in</strong>ority as well as a weak community," said<br />
P<strong>in</strong>aki Das, a chartered accountant runn<strong>in</strong>g his own company <strong>in</strong> Dhaka. 9<br />
There are not too many achievers like P<strong>in</strong>aki Das. Although <strong>the</strong>re are graduates of<br />
medical and eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g colleges and o<strong>the</strong>r professi<strong>on</strong>al <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>s, many have ended up<br />
<strong>in</strong> India. Now admissi<strong>on</strong>s have become tough for H<strong>in</strong>dus. "We can't produce graduates<br />
to fill up <strong>the</strong> Indian medical system" assert adm<strong>in</strong>istrators when accused of<br />
discrim<strong>in</strong>atory policies. While no data exists <strong>on</strong> how many were denied admissi<strong>on</strong> or<br />
how many left for India, both assumpti<strong>on</strong>s are publicly accepted. Although technical<br />
educati<strong>on</strong> may not be at <strong>the</strong> same level of India, <strong>in</strong> Bangladesh <strong>the</strong> competiti<strong>on</strong> is less.<br />
Such graduates may not become high fliers but <strong>the</strong>y fill <strong>the</strong> ranks of <strong>the</strong> lesser official and<br />
private services which are not so attractive to <strong>the</strong> graduates of India's elite <strong>in</strong>stitutes.<br />
Prof Abul Barkat, <strong>in</strong> a data survey of departed H<strong>in</strong>dus, us<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> 1971 and 1991<br />
comparative data, argues that over 5 milli<strong>on</strong> H<strong>in</strong>dus are miss<strong>in</strong>g. The actual number of<br />
n<strong>on</strong>-Muslims <strong>in</strong> Bangladesh rema<strong>in</strong>s a subject of c<strong>on</strong>testati<strong>on</strong>. Religious and ethnic<br />
m<strong>in</strong>orities c<strong>on</strong>stitute close to 15 per cent of <strong>the</strong> populati<strong>on</strong> accord<strong>in</strong>g to unofficial<br />
estimates. Official statistics place <strong>the</strong> figure at 11.7 per cent. Ethnic communities have<br />
l<strong>on</strong>g <strong>in</strong>sisted that <strong>the</strong>ir numbers are underestimated <strong>in</strong> official census figures, to dim<strong>in</strong>ish<br />
41
<strong>the</strong>ir significance as a group and highlight <strong>the</strong>ir numerical m<strong>in</strong>ority status. For <strong>the</strong> most<br />
part m<strong>in</strong>orities are c<strong>on</strong>spicuous by <strong>the</strong>ir absence <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> public sphere, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> judiciary, <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> adm<strong>in</strong>istrati<strong>on</strong> as well as <strong>in</strong> academic <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>s, bus<strong>in</strong>ess and enterta<strong>in</strong>ment. 10<br />
But <strong>the</strong> arrow of communalism is drawn l<strong>on</strong>g before <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>dus depart from <strong>the</strong>ir orig<strong>in</strong>al<br />
home. There is a high level of denial by <strong>the</strong> establishment of repressi<strong>on</strong> aga<strong>in</strong>st H<strong>in</strong>dus.<br />
D<strong>in</strong>a M. Siddiqui, writ<strong>in</strong>g <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> situati<strong>on</strong> says, " In Bangladesh, Public discourse <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
'm<strong>in</strong>ority problem', tends to veer between ostrich like denial and a call to arms that verges<br />
<strong>on</strong> rhetorical excesses <strong>in</strong> moments of crisis. This 'excess' can be understood as a fall-out<br />
of <strong>the</strong> syndrome of misrecogniti<strong>on</strong>,… Silence, denial and a not so benign neglect are<br />
hallmarks of majoritarian resp<strong>on</strong>ses to reports of discrim<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> and violence faced by<br />
ethnic or religious m<strong>in</strong>orities. Ask any Muslim Bangladeshi about communalism, n<strong>in</strong>e<br />
times out of ten, s/he will tell you it doesn't exist, that communal riots happen <strong>in</strong> India,<br />
not <strong>in</strong> Bangladesh. Indeed, <strong>the</strong>re is a great deal of pride that <strong>the</strong> program aga<strong>in</strong>st Muslim<br />
<strong>in</strong> Gujarat <strong>in</strong> 2002 did not result <strong>in</strong> retaliatory violence aga<strong>in</strong>st H<strong>in</strong>dus <strong>in</strong> Bangladesh.<br />
Suffice it to say, <strong>the</strong> absence of 'riots' does not necessarily <strong>in</strong>dicate <strong>the</strong> absence of all<br />
forms of violence. Am<strong>on</strong>g o<strong>the</strong>r th<strong>in</strong>gs, riots require two relatively equal sides to battle it<br />
you". 11<br />
The reas<strong>on</strong>s for seek<strong>in</strong>g India are obvious - a steady career, peace of m<strong>in</strong>d and prospects<br />
for upward mobility (freed of state assented discrim<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>), <strong>in</strong> a high growth ec<strong>on</strong>omy.<br />
However, it unwitt<strong>in</strong>gly c<strong>on</strong>tributes to <strong>the</strong> producti<strong>on</strong> of dem<strong>on</strong>iz<strong>in</strong>g images for both<br />
communities. The H<strong>in</strong>dus migrate because <strong>the</strong>y feel alienated and <strong>the</strong> establishment feels<br />
justified <strong>in</strong> discrim<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong>m because of regular H<strong>in</strong>du migrati<strong>on</strong> to India.<br />
It is <strong>in</strong> this c<strong>on</strong>text that India as a recipient of migrati<strong>on</strong> and a refuge for H<strong>in</strong>dus<br />
re<strong>in</strong>forces its ambivalent identity as a provider of space where career opportunities and<br />
communalism rub shoulders. What makes this even more politically loaded is <strong>the</strong> varied<br />
treatment of different communities, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g India's own Muslim m<strong>in</strong>ority populati<strong>on</strong>,<br />
now officially acknowledged as an underdeveloped community.<br />
Departure has become a bearer of several mean<strong>in</strong>gs. Dom<strong>in</strong>antly, it <strong>in</strong>dicates <strong>the</strong><br />
migrati<strong>on</strong> of H<strong>in</strong>dus to India to escape a hostile envir<strong>on</strong>ment that doesn't offer safety or<br />
opportunities. The classes that have got most depleted are representatives of <strong>the</strong> middle<br />
and upper classes. It echoes <strong>the</strong> migrati<strong>on</strong> trends of 1947 when cross border mobility was<br />
<strong>in</strong>fluenced by <strong>the</strong> visi<strong>on</strong> of a l<strong>on</strong>g term better future as much as by <strong>the</strong> present and<br />
immediate past. Those who have not departed ei<strong>the</strong>r see no future for <strong>the</strong>mselves <strong>in</strong> India<br />
or can not afford <strong>the</strong> journey <strong>in</strong> a social or ec<strong>on</strong>omic sense. They are mostly <strong>the</strong> poor and<br />
<strong>the</strong> very poor. 12<br />
India is <strong>the</strong> recipient of <strong>the</strong> middle class H<strong>in</strong>dus. These are generally people who believe<br />
<strong>the</strong>y have <strong>the</strong> skills to make a transiti<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> ano<strong>the</strong>r country. Whatever frustrati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>the</strong>y<br />
encounter, are somewhat compensated by <strong>the</strong> greater comfort of bel<strong>on</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g, of identity<br />
c<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong>. They become <strong>the</strong> new members of <strong>the</strong> majority and often are hostile<br />
towards those who were <strong>the</strong> erstwhile majority <strong>in</strong> Bangladesh. India accepts <strong>the</strong>m partly<br />
42
ecause <strong>the</strong>y are not aspirants or competitors to <strong>the</strong> elite, while be<strong>in</strong>g part of <strong>the</strong> majority.<br />
Communalism and Migrati<strong>on</strong> Politics<br />
The categories of migrants flow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to India receive different recepti<strong>on</strong>s, illustrat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
ideological nature of space <strong>in</strong> migrati<strong>on</strong> politics of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Asia</strong>. The largest number of<br />
migrants to India are impoverished Muslims from Bangladesh who have little ec<strong>on</strong>omic<br />
space <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir country of orig<strong>in</strong> and not much more <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir reluctant host country.<br />
Compared to <strong>the</strong> impoverished H<strong>in</strong>dus <strong>the</strong>y naturally fare much worse , <strong>in</strong> an India<br />
which accepts H<strong>in</strong>du migrants but rejects Muslims. To <strong>the</strong> Indians <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>dus are<br />
refugees while <strong>the</strong> Muslims are illegal migrants, and <strong>in</strong> many eyes, <strong>the</strong> tormentor of<br />
H<strong>in</strong>dus <strong>in</strong> Bangladesh or k<strong>in</strong> to <strong>the</strong> half-Pakistani/ very reluctant Indian Muslim.<br />
The significance of <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>du factor is fur<strong>the</strong>r highlighted by look<strong>in</strong>g at India's policy of<br />
provid<strong>in</strong>g sanctuary to <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>digenous peoples dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Chittag<strong>on</strong>g Hill Tracts<br />
<strong>in</strong>surgency <strong>in</strong> Bangladesh from 1975 to 1995. The Chakma (Buddhist) refugees left for<br />
India fear<strong>in</strong>g death at <strong>the</strong> hands of <strong>the</strong> Bangladesh military and <strong>the</strong>ir supporters. They<br />
were allowed <strong>in</strong>side India but not allowed to become part of Indian society. Unlike <strong>the</strong><br />
H<strong>in</strong>du migrants <strong>the</strong>y lived <strong>in</strong> sequestered camps to ensure <strong>the</strong> temporary nature of <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
stay. India wanted <strong>the</strong>m to return. They were not allowed to assimilate. It was similar to<br />
<strong>the</strong> policy followed regard<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Bangladeshi refugees <strong>in</strong> 1971.<br />
India has chosen to assimilate a particular community, <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>dus of Bangladesh, but has<br />
resisted absorb<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> 'Indigenous People or Muslims'. This has clear political<br />
c<strong>on</strong>notati<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
Half-hearted Bangladeshis?<br />
For <strong>the</strong> dom<strong>in</strong>ant Bangladeshi Muslim imag<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>, H<strong>in</strong>dus are not ec<strong>on</strong>omic but<br />
political migrants. H<strong>in</strong>dus who can afford to do so, do send m<strong>on</strong>ey to India and that is <strong>the</strong><br />
dom<strong>in</strong>ant image of <strong>the</strong> potential H<strong>in</strong>du migrant <strong>in</strong> Muslim eyes. This imag<strong>in</strong>g, mostly<br />
true, also effaces his right to nati<strong>on</strong>hood with Muslims <strong>in</strong> Bangladesh which coupled with<br />
his religious identity makes him a lesser Bangladeshi and a would- be Indian.<br />
"A H<strong>in</strong>du is now a secret Indian because he will have a place to runaway should he need<br />
or want to. But India will not let <strong>the</strong> Muslim go <strong>the</strong>re. He will be pushed back. So if<br />
people take <strong>the</strong>ir property, it's just a matter of price because <strong>the</strong>y are leav<strong>in</strong>g anyway.<br />
They d<strong>on</strong>'t care what happens to Bangladesh," said Rezaur Rahman, a bus<strong>in</strong>essman who<br />
bought quality H<strong>in</strong>du owned land at low price. He says that <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>dus would not have<br />
been able to sell such land without his support and would have lost it had he not<br />
<strong>in</strong>tervened. This pattern is almost universal. 13<br />
H<strong>in</strong>dus, <strong>the</strong>refore have become half -hearted Bangladeshis. And <strong>the</strong> evidence po<strong>in</strong>ts to<br />
many members of <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>du middle class. However, what is left unstated is that this<br />
positi<strong>on</strong> is not a matter of choice for <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>dus. The occupati<strong>on</strong> of equal space by<br />
H<strong>in</strong>dus <strong>in</strong> this country even <strong>in</strong> 1972, was a very c<strong>on</strong>testable argument. Given <strong>the</strong> record,<br />
43
it would seem that Bangladeshi H<strong>in</strong>dus were never allowed to be part of <strong>the</strong> politicoec<strong>on</strong>omic<br />
space. They have also got <strong>the</strong> worst end of <strong>the</strong> fallout generated by <strong>the</strong> Indo-<br />
Bangla relati<strong>on</strong>ship case.<br />
Shafiq Rahman of <strong>the</strong> weekly newsmagaz<strong>in</strong>e, Probe says that <strong>the</strong>re is a double jeopardy<br />
situati<strong>on</strong> here. "A little threat from a powerful neighbour and <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>dus are will<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
leave for India. Many Muslims also receive such threats but <strong>the</strong>y fight back and stay <strong>on</strong>.<br />
It appears to be more of vulnerability than anyth<strong>in</strong>g else. That way India is both a<br />
bless<strong>in</strong>g and a curse. One can escape to India and that encourages social bullies who want<br />
<strong>the</strong>m to leave". 14<br />
In such a scenario, <strong>the</strong> poor have suffered most because <strong>the</strong>y d<strong>on</strong>'t have <strong>the</strong> resources to<br />
become professi<strong>on</strong>al and parley that <strong>in</strong>to a livelihood <strong>in</strong> India. They are treated <strong>the</strong> worst<br />
<strong>in</strong> Bangladesh. This populati<strong>on</strong> segment is outside <strong>the</strong> literary or political imag<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> of<br />
those who speak out aga<strong>in</strong>st communalism <strong>in</strong> Bangladesh.<br />
The noti<strong>on</strong> of 'desh' which translates <strong>in</strong>to mo<strong>the</strong>rland and village simultaneously, has<br />
become a c<strong>on</strong>tested noti<strong>on</strong> for many especially H<strong>in</strong>dus. For <strong>the</strong> poor, <strong>the</strong> country has<br />
little mean<strong>in</strong>g, for <strong>the</strong>y perceive nati<strong>on</strong>hood through <strong>the</strong>ir livelihood and community<br />
lenses. For <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>orities, <strong>the</strong> crisis has happened with state <strong>in</strong>dulgence and often<br />
encouragement. Simultaneously, it is seen as an issue with<strong>in</strong> he Indo-Bangla relati<strong>on</strong>s<br />
framework, which aga<strong>in</strong> is viewed partly through communal lenses.<br />
Electoral politics, numbers and c<strong>on</strong>flicts<br />
The situati<strong>on</strong> of H<strong>in</strong>dus <strong>in</strong> Bangladesh is entangled <strong>in</strong> entrenched popular percepti<strong>on</strong>s<br />
about vot<strong>in</strong>g patterns and <strong>the</strong> state of electoral representati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> Bangladesh politics.<br />
Traditi<strong>on</strong>ally, H<strong>in</strong>dus have supported <strong>the</strong> Awami League which is a political descendant<br />
of <strong>the</strong> pre- partiti<strong>on</strong> Bengal Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Muslim League that always had a str<strong>on</strong>g Bengali<br />
nati<strong>on</strong>alist stra<strong>in</strong>. After 1947, <strong>the</strong>ir ma<strong>in</strong> opp<strong>on</strong>ent was <strong>the</strong> central Pakistan rule which<br />
established a regime that ignored <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terests of Bengalis. This allowed Bengalis to<br />
c<strong>on</strong>struct a l<strong>in</strong>guistic-ethnic identity and <strong>the</strong> politics that emerged out of that created a<br />
comm<strong>on</strong> ethno- l<strong>in</strong>guistics identity for <strong>the</strong> moment. This was re<strong>in</strong>forced by <strong>the</strong><br />
flourish<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> Left <strong>in</strong> post-1947 politics. The Left adopted a large number of n<strong>on</strong>communal<br />
political positi<strong>on</strong>s. Between 1947 and 1971, India became a lesser enemy by<br />
<strong>the</strong> day as Pakistan became <strong>the</strong> Enemy, everyday to <strong>the</strong> East Pakistanis.<br />
Dur<strong>in</strong>g this period Bengali H<strong>in</strong>dus had more socio-political space but were never fully<br />
<strong>in</strong>tegrated <strong>in</strong>to Bengali Muslim dom<strong>in</strong>ated society. However, <strong>the</strong> platform for <strong>in</strong>tegrati<strong>on</strong><br />
was slowly grow<strong>in</strong>g. The events of 1971 and <strong>the</strong> dynamics of <strong>the</strong> situati<strong>on</strong> that emerged,<br />
more or less closed that open<strong>in</strong>g, and we see <strong>the</strong> emergence of H<strong>in</strong>dus as permanent<br />
outsiders. What is significant however is <strong>the</strong> number of H<strong>in</strong>dus that c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to live <strong>in</strong><br />
Bangladesh despite <strong>the</strong> n<strong>on</strong>-equitable social space and <strong>the</strong>ir political marg<strong>in</strong>alizati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
In absolute terms <strong>the</strong> proporti<strong>on</strong>ate presence <strong>in</strong> each c<strong>on</strong>stituency should reflect <strong>the</strong> clout<br />
of <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>ority voters. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Shamshul Aref<strong>in</strong>, author of a major work <strong>on</strong> electi<strong>on</strong><br />
44
arithmetic, 134 out of <strong>the</strong> 300 seats are identified as 'm<strong>in</strong>ority seats' mean<strong>in</strong>g where <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
votes act as decid<strong>in</strong>g factors <strong>in</strong> electi<strong>on</strong>s. Traditi<strong>on</strong>ally, H<strong>in</strong>du voters have been thought<br />
of as hardcore AL supporters. It was that percepti<strong>on</strong> which precipitated <strong>the</strong> worst<br />
example of electoral violence s<strong>in</strong>ce 1990. The Bangladesh Nati<strong>on</strong>al Party launched brutal<br />
revenge attacks after w<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> electi<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong> 2001. H<strong>in</strong>dus were simplified <strong>in</strong>to<br />
becom<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> face of <strong>the</strong> 'Enemy'. 15<br />
The c<strong>on</strong>venient enemy<br />
The H<strong>in</strong>dus were <strong>the</strong> most c<strong>on</strong>venient enemy. This enemy could not fight back. The<br />
BNP, hav<strong>in</strong>g w<strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> electi<strong>on</strong> aga<strong>in</strong>st several odds, now enjoyed a 'pay back' time. While<br />
no H<strong>in</strong>du had dared to repress a Muslim of any shape or size dur<strong>in</strong>g any rule, <strong>the</strong>y were<br />
targeted because <strong>the</strong>y are <strong>the</strong> most vulnerable community of <strong>the</strong> poor and have no<br />
nati<strong>on</strong>al support network despite be<strong>in</strong>g 10-12 per cent of <strong>the</strong> populati<strong>on</strong>. They were<br />
c<strong>on</strong>sidered as supporters of <strong>the</strong> BNP's political enemy, <strong>the</strong> Awami League. It was thought<br />
that s<strong>in</strong>ce all H<strong>in</strong>dus supported <strong>the</strong> AL, attack<strong>in</strong>g a H<strong>in</strong>du meant <strong>on</strong>e was certa<strong>in</strong> to hit an<br />
enemy. Moreover, H<strong>in</strong>dus were so vulnerable that <strong>the</strong>y could be attacked at will.<br />
Regard<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> electoral arithmetic two issues need clarificati<strong>on</strong>.. One, <strong>the</strong>re is an element<br />
of c<strong>on</strong>fusi<strong>on</strong> about AL's H<strong>in</strong>du vote bank. Out of <strong>the</strong>se seats AL w<strong>on</strong> 54 seats <strong>in</strong> 1991, 81<br />
seats <strong>in</strong> 1996, and 32 seats <strong>in</strong> 2001. On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, BNP got 46 seats <strong>in</strong> 1991, 20 seats<br />
<strong>in</strong> 1996, and <strong>the</strong> BNP led 4-party alliance w<strong>on</strong> 90 seats <strong>in</strong> 2001. In 2001, <strong>the</strong> BNP led<br />
alliance <strong>in</strong>cluded Jamaat-e-Islami, and <strong>the</strong> Islamic vote tilted <strong>the</strong> electoral victory towards<br />
this alliance. 16<br />
There are a large number of seats which are decided by a narrow marg<strong>in</strong>. Thus political<br />
analysts were able to look at vot<strong>in</strong>g patterns and party shares and predict that if <strong>the</strong> BNP<br />
jo<strong>in</strong>ed Jamaat <strong>the</strong>y would sweep to power because <strong>the</strong> w<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g vote difference <strong>in</strong> many<br />
c<strong>on</strong>stituencies was very low. This <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>the</strong> so-called m<strong>in</strong>ority seats.<br />
M<strong>in</strong>ority representati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>al politics<br />
In 1991 Nati<strong>on</strong>al Assembly, <strong>the</strong>re were 8 MPs from <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>orities <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g 3 from <strong>the</strong><br />
Chittag<strong>on</strong>g Hill Tracts. All were from <strong>the</strong> Awami League. In 1996, <strong>the</strong> number came<br />
down to 7 and with <strong>on</strong>e MP, Gautam Chakrabarty w<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g <strong>on</strong> a BNP ticket. In 2001 <strong>the</strong><br />
number came down fur<strong>the</strong>r to 6, with two w<strong>in</strong>ners from <strong>the</strong> BNP and ano<strong>the</strong>r, M<strong>on</strong>i<br />
Swapan Dewan, a member of <strong>the</strong> Chakma community from <strong>the</strong> Chittag<strong>on</strong>g Hill Tracts.<br />
Apart from <strong>the</strong> shr<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g number of m<strong>in</strong>orities <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> parliament, <strong>the</strong> AL can't be called<br />
<strong>the</strong> <strong>on</strong>ly favorite and <strong>the</strong> BNP is <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly eat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to m<strong>in</strong>ority votes. But <strong>the</strong> more<br />
fundamental questi<strong>on</strong> is - if <strong>the</strong>re are so many H<strong>in</strong>du seats, why are H<strong>in</strong>dus not<br />
nom<strong>in</strong>ated to run <strong>in</strong> those seats. It calls <strong>in</strong>to questi<strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> asserti<strong>on</strong> of analysts like<br />
Shamshul Aref<strong>in</strong> that <strong>the</strong>re are 134 m<strong>in</strong>ority seats. Moreover, as H<strong>in</strong>dus are around 10<br />
per cent of of <strong>the</strong> populati<strong>on</strong>, <strong>the</strong> number 134 out of 300, claimed as m<strong>in</strong>ority seats,<br />
seems disproporti<strong>on</strong>ate. Even allow<strong>in</strong>g for that, exist<strong>in</strong>g m<strong>in</strong>ority representati<strong>on</strong> is far<br />
below <strong>the</strong>ir demographic presence.<br />
45
However, <strong>the</strong> image of H<strong>in</strong>dus as voters of Awami League dom<strong>in</strong>ates <strong>the</strong> popular<br />
imag<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>. In fact, religious identity and nati<strong>on</strong>al identity plays a major role <strong>in</strong> electoral<br />
politics. BNP positi<strong>on</strong>s itself as a str<strong>on</strong>g anti-Indian party though this is largely rhetorical.<br />
Its tirade aga<strong>in</strong>st India is c<strong>on</strong>sidered a vote puller and generally has an impact <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> areas<br />
affected adversely by <strong>the</strong> Farakka Barrage, <strong>in</strong> particular, and <strong>the</strong> anti-Indian vote bank <strong>in</strong><br />
general. BNP plans apparently do not <strong>in</strong>clude many H<strong>in</strong>du votes. N<strong>on</strong>e<strong>the</strong>less, <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
H<strong>in</strong>du vote share has risen rapidly, as <strong>the</strong> AL vote share has obviously decl<strong>in</strong>ed.<br />
Awami League's Islamic crisis<br />
The Awami League certa<strong>in</strong>ly has an advantage when it comes to H<strong>in</strong>du vote seek<strong>in</strong>g. But<br />
AL too has taken <strong>the</strong> 'para-Islamic' l<strong>in</strong>e. It was cobbl<strong>in</strong>g toge<strong>the</strong>r an electoral alliance<br />
before <strong>the</strong> military supported civilian government took over. In March 2007, <strong>the</strong>y signed<br />
an agreement with Khilafat Majlish, a highly c<strong>on</strong>servative Islamist group with <strong>in</strong>fluence<br />
<strong>in</strong> pockets of <strong>the</strong> rural areas and <strong>the</strong> madarssah populati<strong>on</strong>. This agreement <strong>in</strong>cluded<br />
allow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> mullahs <strong>the</strong> right to issue a 'fatwa' or religious edict, a pr<strong>in</strong>cipal source of<br />
power and <strong>in</strong>come for <strong>the</strong> Islamic groups especially <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> rural areas. Fatwas are banned<br />
<strong>in</strong> Bangladesh as it c<strong>on</strong>travenes <strong>the</strong> sole right of <strong>the</strong> state to make laws. The agreement<br />
was criticized and after nati<strong>on</strong>al electi<strong>on</strong>s were postp<strong>on</strong>ed, <strong>the</strong> AL cancelled <strong>the</strong><br />
agreement, see<strong>in</strong>g its negative reacti<strong>on</strong>. However, <strong>the</strong> AL's anxiety about its 'Islamic<br />
image 'and be<strong>in</strong>g perceived as <strong>the</strong> traditi<strong>on</strong>al pro-Indian party, was clear.<br />
The H<strong>in</strong>du voters are deemed to have an '<strong>in</strong>fluence' much bigger than <strong>the</strong>ir demographic<br />
presence. Political parties play <strong>the</strong> patriotism card regularly and that has become, at least<br />
partly, l<strong>in</strong>ked with religi<strong>on</strong> and by extensi<strong>on</strong> 'H<strong>in</strong>du India'. No <strong>on</strong>e is sure if it actually<br />
plays a role. For example, <strong>the</strong> Jamaat-e- Islami as an openly anti-Indian party has a loyal<br />
support bank, but it has not <strong>in</strong>creased <strong>in</strong> any significant way <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> last three decades. In<br />
fact, <strong>the</strong>ir c<strong>on</strong>testants are drawn from madrassah pressure groups and <strong>the</strong> pirs - holy men-<br />
who have entered <strong>the</strong> electoral fray s<strong>in</strong>ce 1990. The Islamist parties toge<strong>the</strong>r c<strong>on</strong>trol<br />
about 25 seats <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 300 member parliament. All are out to grab <strong>the</strong> soul of <strong>the</strong> same<br />
men. 17<br />
Islamists and electi<strong>on</strong>s<br />
Jamaat-e-Islami is a Wahabi <strong>in</strong>spired pro-Pakistani- Saudi supported cluster. But <strong>the</strong> pirs<br />
are not endorsed by global Islamic orthodoxy though <strong>the</strong>y are also c<strong>on</strong>servative. Hence<br />
<strong>the</strong> JI and <strong>the</strong> pir backed parties fight each o<strong>the</strong>r. However, some members from with<strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> Jamaat and o<strong>the</strong>r Wahabi <strong>in</strong>spired parties have turned militant over <strong>the</strong> last decade.<br />
C<strong>on</strong>necti<strong>on</strong> with and participati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> activities of Pakistan based groups and by<br />
extensi<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan, have played a role <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> rise of this militancy. Jamaatul<br />
Mujahedeen Bangladesh (JMB) and Harakatul Jihad are two violent groups which have<br />
committed public violence and blood shedd<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g attack<strong>in</strong>g meet<strong>in</strong>gs of <strong>the</strong><br />
Awami league, <strong>the</strong> Communist party and o<strong>the</strong>r left of centre parties. Its members have<br />
admitted to kill<strong>in</strong>g and o<strong>the</strong>r violent acts. They are banned <strong>in</strong> Bangladesh. Several top<br />
leaders of <strong>the</strong>se parties have been hanged to death. They have not disappeared. 18<br />
46
Dur<strong>in</strong>g electi<strong>on</strong> time Sk. Has<strong>in</strong>a and Khaleda Zia compete with each o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>in</strong> appear<strong>in</strong>g<br />
as pious Muslims, evidently assum<strong>in</strong>g that be<strong>in</strong>g seen as 'pious Muslims' has some<br />
popular appeal. BNP has been openly anti-Indian hop<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>the</strong> associati<strong>on</strong> of India<br />
with AL <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> public m<strong>in</strong>d will translate <strong>in</strong>to more votes from <strong>the</strong> anti-Indians. However,<br />
<strong>the</strong>re is no evidence that this is so. AL has been try<strong>in</strong>g to develop a pro-Islamic image for<br />
some time fear<strong>in</strong>g that not hav<strong>in</strong>g that may have cost it votes. There is an element of<br />
mental denial <strong>in</strong> this. Nei<strong>the</strong>r party is will<strong>in</strong>g to c<strong>on</strong>sider that <strong>the</strong>y get voted out, <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
basis of <strong>the</strong>ir track record. Religi<strong>on</strong> appears to be a ra<strong>the</strong>r questi<strong>on</strong>able ploy to ga<strong>in</strong><br />
'patriotic' credentials.<br />
The H<strong>in</strong>du resp<strong>on</strong>se <strong>in</strong> Bangladesh<br />
There have been several studies <strong>in</strong>itiated by H<strong>in</strong>dus <strong>the</strong>mselves which are are rout<strong>in</strong>ely<br />
critical of <strong>the</strong> social situati<strong>on</strong> and state policy. Dr. Nimchandra Bhowmik has a d<strong>on</strong>e a<br />
detailed survey of <strong>the</strong> access of H<strong>in</strong>dus to <strong>the</strong> official apparatus and system, argu<strong>in</strong>g that<br />
<strong>the</strong>y are rout<strong>in</strong>ely denied promoti<strong>on</strong>s and sensitive post<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> adm<strong>in</strong>istrati<strong>on</strong>. He states,<br />
"Though <strong>the</strong>re are 55 Secretaries, two are <strong>the</strong>re from am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>orities. There are<br />
now 117 Additi<strong>on</strong>al Secretaries but n<strong>on</strong>e from <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>orities; 383 Jo<strong>in</strong>t Secretaries, but<br />
<strong>on</strong>ly 13 are religious m<strong>in</strong>orities. Am<strong>on</strong>g 80 judges at <strong>the</strong> Supreme Court, <strong>on</strong>ly 2 are<br />
m<strong>in</strong>orities. The percentage of m<strong>in</strong>orities at different organizati<strong>on</strong>s range from 3% to 6%.<br />
It's 3% <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Police department, and below 1% <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Army and <strong>the</strong> BDR. There are (sic)<br />
<strong>on</strong>ly 1 m<strong>in</strong>ority am<strong>on</strong>g 27 major generals and 2 m<strong>in</strong>orities' am<strong>on</strong>g 100 Brig. Generals of<br />
<strong>the</strong> army.' Bhowmik adds, "There are 46 full embassies of Bangladesh <strong>in</strong> different<br />
countries of <strong>the</strong> world. But <strong>the</strong>re is no m<strong>in</strong>ority ambassador <strong>in</strong> any of <strong>the</strong>m."<br />
Their limited presence <strong>in</strong> adm<strong>in</strong>istrati<strong>on</strong>, is particularly pa<strong>in</strong>ful for <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>orities because<br />
<strong>the</strong>y do much better at <strong>the</strong> public exams level compared to <strong>the</strong>ir populati<strong>on</strong> proporti<strong>on</strong>.<br />
Also, as Bhowmik po<strong>in</strong>ts out , "In <strong>the</strong> HSC exam<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> of 2002, 420 pers<strong>on</strong>s place <strong>on</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> talents list. Am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong>m m<strong>in</strong>orities are 73 that is 17% of <strong>the</strong> total number. In <strong>the</strong> HSC<br />
exam<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>s of 2003, 20 pers<strong>on</strong>s got GPA 5. 2 of <strong>the</strong>m are m<strong>in</strong>orities". 19<br />
Bangladesh H<strong>in</strong>du Bouddha Christian Oikkya Parishad (HBCOP) which is <strong>the</strong> jo<strong>in</strong>t<br />
platform of m<strong>in</strong>orities has protested <strong>the</strong> 5 th and <strong>the</strong> 8 th amendment of <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>,<br />
both of which weakened if not dismantled <strong>the</strong> secular character of <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>. The<br />
8 th amendment has declared Islam as <strong>the</strong> state religi<strong>on</strong>. HBCOP claims that 10 milli<strong>on</strong><br />
m<strong>in</strong>orities have departed from Bangladesh. 20<br />
The decl<strong>in</strong>e of <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>du populati<strong>on</strong> is probably a more reliable <strong>in</strong>dicator of <strong>the</strong> state of<br />
<strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>du m<strong>in</strong>d <strong>in</strong> Bangladesh. On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, migrati<strong>on</strong> data is nei<strong>the</strong>r easily<br />
available nor reliable. Muslim migrati<strong>on</strong> to India is a comm<strong>on</strong> feature and that accounts<br />
for a large percentage as well. One can be more c<strong>on</strong>fident about us<strong>in</strong>g this data as a trend<br />
<strong>in</strong>dicator ra<strong>the</strong>r than as an absolute statement of <strong>the</strong> situati<strong>on</strong>. What it does <strong>in</strong>dicate is <strong>the</strong><br />
impact of socio-ec<strong>on</strong>omic vulnerability where several imag<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>s are at work <strong>in</strong><br />
becom<strong>in</strong>g what rema<strong>in</strong>s a still fluid state of Bangladesh.<br />
47
Trends<br />
Producti<strong>on</strong> of communalism or m<strong>in</strong>ority repressi<strong>on</strong> is located <strong>in</strong> multiple realities and at<br />
several levels. At <strong>on</strong>e level, it is related to <strong>the</strong> various nati<strong>on</strong>alist movements that<br />
c<strong>on</strong>struct nati<strong>on</strong>alist positi<strong>on</strong>s and its end product - <strong>the</strong> state. To an extent this is<br />
<strong>in</strong>evitable given <strong>the</strong> political culture <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Asia</strong> and which relies almost entirely <strong>on</strong><br />
ethno-nati<strong>on</strong>alist identities to produce <strong>the</strong> politics that creates <strong>the</strong> State.<br />
For example, <strong>the</strong> Bangladesh nati<strong>on</strong>alist movement was dom<strong>in</strong>antly anti-Pakistani <strong>in</strong><br />
nature and did not have an anti-H<strong>in</strong>du or m<strong>in</strong>ority c<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong>. But <strong>the</strong> dynamics of <strong>the</strong><br />
situati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> 1971 generated high repressi<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>dus and created opportunities to<br />
grab H<strong>in</strong>du property, bel<strong>on</strong>g<strong>in</strong>gs and bus<strong>in</strong>ess and subsequently was ma<strong>in</strong>streamed at <strong>the</strong><br />
nati<strong>on</strong>al level after <strong>the</strong> war.<br />
But <strong>the</strong>re is ano<strong>the</strong>r factor is <strong>in</strong>fluential. No state is friendly with each o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Asia</strong><br />
and each m<strong>in</strong>ority has a counterpart populati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> ano<strong>the</strong>r state. This results <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>orities<br />
acquir<strong>in</strong>g a new mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> regi<strong>on</strong>. Thus <strong>the</strong> state level relati<strong>on</strong>ships am<strong>on</strong>gst south<br />
<strong>Asia</strong>ns determ<strong>in</strong>e how <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>orities are treated by <strong>the</strong> state power holders. So <strong>the</strong><br />
H<strong>in</strong>dus <strong>in</strong> Bangladesh, Muslims and North Easterners <strong>in</strong> India, all m<strong>in</strong>orities <strong>in</strong> Pakistan,<br />
Tamils <strong>in</strong> Sri Lanka, madhesis <strong>in</strong> Nepal - are all mistreated. <strong>M<strong>in</strong>orities</strong> <strong>in</strong> fact become<br />
proxy citizens of <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r country and become <strong>the</strong> Enemy. This also prevents <strong>the</strong>m from<br />
be<strong>in</strong>g treated as a m<strong>in</strong>ority. As a full or part 'enemy' populati<strong>on</strong>, <strong>the</strong>y have fewer rights.<br />
The issue of <strong>the</strong> socio-ec<strong>on</strong>omic vulnerability of m<strong>in</strong>ority groups is so c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>gent up<strong>on</strong><br />
various factors of statehood that it offers little by <strong>the</strong> way of relief for <strong>the</strong> beleaguered<br />
populati<strong>on</strong>s strewn across south <strong>Asia</strong>. As it affects all south <strong>Asia</strong> and is l<strong>in</strong>ked to <strong>the</strong><br />
management of foreign policy and <strong>in</strong>ternal resource ga<strong>the</strong>r<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g appropriati<strong>on</strong>,<br />
elim<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> of this phenomen<strong>on</strong> of marg<strong>in</strong>alizati<strong>on</strong>, dispossessi<strong>on</strong> and exclusi<strong>on</strong> is more<br />
complex than <strong>the</strong> ability of <strong>on</strong>e or two nati<strong>on</strong>s to address. S<strong>in</strong>ce Indian, Pakistan,<br />
Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bhutan all have m<strong>in</strong>ority problems that result <strong>in</strong> creat<strong>in</strong>g<br />
refugees, it is not <strong>the</strong> problem of a rogue state but comm<strong>on</strong> to <strong>the</strong> cluster of postcol<strong>on</strong>ial<br />
states that have emerged <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> regi<strong>on</strong> and <strong>the</strong>ir collective <strong>in</strong>ability to deal<br />
equally and equitable with all populati<strong>on</strong> groups of <strong>the</strong>ir respective States.<br />
Epilogue<br />
Return of <strong>the</strong> 'native' P<strong>in</strong>aki Das<br />
After many summers, P<strong>in</strong>aki Das has returned home to his native 'desh' <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Sylhet<br />
district of Bangladesh border<strong>in</strong>g <strong>on</strong> Assam. He has begun to support social activities <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> locality. He f<strong>in</strong>ds his relati<strong>on</strong>ship with his fellow villagers has improved<br />
dramatically. In fact, he has become a social leader, respected and loved <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> area. He<br />
has no desire to leave Bangladesh and go to India. He has found himself after so many<br />
years after return<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> village from where it all began. 21<br />
48
He has also gifted away whatever property he had left. There is little cause for c<strong>on</strong>flict<br />
now.<br />
1.Bangladesh 1971, Afsan Chowdhury. Published by Mowla Bro<strong>the</strong>rs, 2007, Page 80-100<br />
2'Can we get al<strong>on</strong>g?' An account of communal relati<strong>on</strong>ship <strong>in</strong> Bangladesh.' By Mohd. Rafi. Panjeree<br />
Publicati<strong>on</strong>s. December 2005. This is <strong>on</strong>e of <strong>the</strong> most comprehensive academic books <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> topic<br />
explor<strong>in</strong>g both <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>cidental and <strong>the</strong> foundati<strong>on</strong>al issues of <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>ority situati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> Bangladesh.<br />
3S<strong>on</strong>gkhaloghu Shomoshha Deshey Deshey (M<strong>in</strong>ority Problems <strong>in</strong> Various Countries), Dr. R.M. Debnath,<br />
Shahittica, Dhaka, July 2003, page 45-50. The Author deals with <strong>the</strong> problem of m<strong>in</strong>orities as a generic<br />
issue and <strong>the</strong>n explores <strong>the</strong> situati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> Bangladesh. Also <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g as its written from <strong>the</strong> perspective of a<br />
H<strong>in</strong>du <strong>in</strong> Bangladesh.<br />
4.Bangladesh 1971, Vol III, Afsan Chowdhury, Mowla Bro<strong>the</strong>rs, 2007.<br />
5. Interview of K.S. Das, with <strong>the</strong> author.<br />
6.Phantoms of Chittag<strong>on</strong>g, Maj. Gen. Suj<strong>on</strong> S<strong>in</strong>g Oban. This particular Indian officer set up <strong>the</strong> Mujib<br />
Bah<strong>in</strong>i, a para military force which was populated by young AL activists. The Indian government didn't<br />
c<strong>on</strong>sult <strong>the</strong> Mujibnagar/ Bangladesh exile government and many with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Indian establishment were also<br />
unhappy with <strong>the</strong> rise of this force as it appeared to be outside all k<strong>in</strong>ds of cha<strong>in</strong> of command. It even<br />
clashed with <strong>the</strong> Mukti Bah<strong>in</strong>i. Oban He was later <strong>in</strong>vited to set up <strong>the</strong> para-military Rakkhi Bah<strong>in</strong>i which<br />
became known as a highly repressive, extra –judicial force dur<strong>in</strong>g 1972-75. It <strong>in</strong>itiated <strong>the</strong> practice of extrajudicial<br />
kill<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> Bangladesh.<br />
7.Political Ec<strong>on</strong>omy of <strong>the</strong> Vested Property Act <strong>in</strong> Rural Bangladesh, Abul Barkat & O<strong>the</strong>rs. Published by<br />
Associati<strong>on</strong> of Land Reforms and Development. ALRD.2004. This is a landmark publicati<strong>on</strong> which<br />
exposed through evidence <strong>the</strong> scale of H<strong>in</strong>du property grabb<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Bangladesh and its impact <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
political and ec<strong>on</strong>omic m<strong>in</strong>d of Bangladesh.<br />
8. Bangladesh 1971, Vol I, Afsan Chowdhury, Mowla Bro<strong>the</strong>rs, 2007<br />
9. P<strong>in</strong>aki Das, Interview with <strong>the</strong> author.<br />
10. Prof. Abul Barkat has dealt with issues of migrati<strong>on</strong>, Islamic fundamentalism and militancy <strong>in</strong> a series<br />
of books and articles. This article was presented at <strong>the</strong> meet<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> Bangladesh Ec<strong>on</strong>omists Associati<strong>on</strong>,<br />
2005.<br />
11. 'Communaliz<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Crim<strong>in</strong>al or Crim<strong>in</strong>aliz<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Communal? Locat<strong>in</strong>g M<strong>in</strong>ority Politics <strong>in</strong><br />
Bangladesh" By D<strong>in</strong>a M. Siddiqi <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> book ' Violence and Democracy <strong>in</strong> India,' Edited by Amrita Basu<br />
and Srirupa Roy. Page 224<br />
12. "State and <strong>the</strong> M<strong>in</strong>ority Identity: The Case of H<strong>in</strong>dus <strong>in</strong> Bangladesh", Afsan Chowdhury. From <strong>the</strong><br />
book 'On <strong>the</strong> Marg<strong>in</strong>: Refugees, Migrants and <strong>M<strong>in</strong>orities</strong>, Edited by Chowdhury R. Abrar, Published by<br />
RMMRU, 2000, page 145<br />
13. Interview with <strong>the</strong> author<br />
14. Interview with <strong>the</strong> author<br />
15.Bangladesher Nirbach<strong>on</strong> 1970-2001 (Electi<strong>on</strong>s of Bangladesh 1970-2001), A.S.M. Shamsul Aref<strong>in</strong>,<br />
page 468. Published by Bangladesh Research and Publicati<strong>on</strong>s. July 2003.<br />
16. Ibid, 469<br />
17. The Daily Star. March 2006-07<br />
18. The Daily Star archives 200-7-8. Bangladeshi media extensively covered <strong>the</strong> topic dur<strong>in</strong>g this period<br />
and c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to do so. Barr<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Islamist and <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>n BNP government media, it had no media support.<br />
19. ' Problems and Prospects of <strong>M<strong>in</strong>orities</strong> <strong>in</strong> Bangladesh', Prof. N.C. Bhowmik, page 4. Orig<strong>in</strong>ally<br />
published <strong>in</strong> The Bangladesh Observer 2005. It has been later distributed as a pamphlet. ( communicati<strong>on</strong><br />
with <strong>the</strong> author)<br />
20. Undated leaflet of H<strong>in</strong>du-Bouddho Christan Oikko Praishad<br />
21. P<strong>in</strong>aki Das. C<strong>on</strong>versati<strong>on</strong> with <strong>the</strong> author<br />
49
Religious <strong>M<strong>in</strong>orities</strong> <strong>in</strong> Pakistan: Mapp<strong>in</strong>g S<strong>in</strong>dh & Baluchistan<br />
Ishtiaq Hussa<strong>in</strong> ⊕<br />
Introducti<strong>on</strong><br />
C<strong>on</strong>servative estimates based <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1998 official census <strong>in</strong>dicated that religious<br />
m<strong>in</strong>orities liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Pakistan make up nearly 4 percent of <strong>the</strong> populati<strong>on</strong> with H<strong>in</strong>dus and<br />
Christians form<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> largest ‘n<strong>on</strong> Muslim’ group followed by Ahmadis. However,<br />
more realistic and recent community based estimates suggest that <strong>the</strong> overall figure is<br />
likely to be twice that, represent<strong>in</strong>g more than 8 percent of <strong>the</strong> total populati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
The Pakistan state through discrim<strong>in</strong>atory laws has made religious m<strong>in</strong>orities sec<strong>on</strong>d<br />
class citizens, especially through <strong>the</strong> enactment of Islamic laws and <strong>in</strong> particular <strong>the</strong><br />
blasphemy laws. The found<strong>in</strong>g fa<strong>the</strong>r of Pakistan had termed religious m<strong>in</strong>ority groups as<br />
equal citizens of Pakistan but successive governments and <strong>the</strong> chang<strong>in</strong>g nature of <strong>the</strong><br />
power structure <strong>in</strong> Pakistan has underm<strong>in</strong>ed that visi<strong>on</strong>. Successive governments propped<br />
up by <strong>in</strong>secure and n<strong>on</strong> representative rul<strong>in</strong>g elite have sought legitimacy through <strong>the</strong><br />
promulgati<strong>on</strong> of Islamic penal codes, e.g. <strong>the</strong> Huddood laws, which have targeted<br />
vulnerable m<strong>in</strong>orities and women.<br />
Religious m<strong>in</strong>orities <strong>in</strong> Pakistan do not enjoy equitable participati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> local, regi<strong>on</strong>al and<br />
nati<strong>on</strong>al politics; suffer discrim<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> government employment and <strong>the</strong> general job<br />
market; and <strong>the</strong>y live <strong>in</strong> an overall envir<strong>on</strong>ment of <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>tolerance and religious<br />
extremism. In schools and colleges, history books spread hatred towards religious<br />
m<strong>in</strong>orities.<br />
Religious m<strong>in</strong>ority members are easy target for kidnappers as police rarely take <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
cases seriously; <strong>the</strong>y face hardships <strong>in</strong> recovery of credits and property; and politicians<br />
and government officials neglect <strong>the</strong> development needs of areas where <strong>the</strong>y are<br />
c<strong>on</strong>centrated. Moreover, given <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>orities <strong>in</strong> <strong>on</strong>e country are majority <strong>in</strong><br />
ano<strong>the</strong>r, if <strong>the</strong>re is violence aga<strong>in</strong>st Muslims <strong>in</strong> India, H<strong>in</strong>dus <strong>in</strong> Pakistan become a target.<br />
More recently, <strong>the</strong> Christian community is fac<strong>in</strong>g violent backlash at <strong>the</strong> hands of<br />
hardl<strong>in</strong>ers after America’s attack <strong>on</strong> Afghanistan.. Christians face anger for political and<br />
ec<strong>on</strong>omic reas<strong>on</strong>s compounded by factors rooted <strong>in</strong> ‘land grabb<strong>in</strong>g’ or racism. Ahmadis<br />
are well organized and affluent, but official and societal anger puts many restricti<strong>on</strong>s <strong>on</strong><br />
⊕ This chapter is adapted from <strong>the</strong> Report “Religious <strong>M<strong>in</strong>orities</strong> <strong>in</strong> Pakistan” by <strong>the</strong> Centre for Peace and<br />
Development and <strong>South</strong> <strong>Asia</strong> Forum for Human Rights. It is part of a European Commissi<strong>on</strong> funded three<br />
year project <strong>on</strong> “Ma<strong>in</strong>stream<strong>in</strong>g M<strong>in</strong>ority Rights <strong>in</strong> Pakistan’s S<strong>in</strong>dh and Baluchistan”. I wish to<br />
acknowledge <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>tributi<strong>on</strong> of Shahid Fiaz, Nasurullah Barech, Manfoosa Ali, Asim Zubair <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
development of <strong>the</strong> study. Also, menti<strong>on</strong> should be made of <strong>the</strong> enumerators who filled <strong>the</strong> questi<strong>on</strong>naires<br />
for <strong>the</strong> Survey and Focus Group discussi<strong>on</strong>s. And above a grateful thanks to those who participated <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Survey.<br />
50
<strong>the</strong>ir social and religious mobility and <strong>the</strong>ir organizati<strong>on</strong>. As regards <strong>the</strong> smaller<br />
communities – <strong>the</strong> Bahais, Buddhists Ismailis and Parsis – <strong>the</strong>ir general level of<br />
ec<strong>on</strong>omic self sufficiency and cosmopolitan c<strong>on</strong>tacts ensure <strong>the</strong>ir security aga<strong>in</strong>st<br />
majoritarian backlash. The small size of <strong>the</strong> Sikh community and <strong>the</strong>ir dispersal gives<br />
<strong>the</strong>m a sort of ‘<strong>in</strong>visibility’ and <strong>the</strong> comm<strong>on</strong> Muslim view of <strong>the</strong>m be<strong>in</strong>g ‘anti H<strong>in</strong>du’<br />
allows <strong>the</strong>m a bit more space.<br />
It is <strong>the</strong> estimated 4 milli<strong>on</strong> H<strong>in</strong>dus, largely undereducated and under employed, who<br />
may be <strong>in</strong> need of most support <strong>in</strong> Pakistan, because <strong>the</strong>y suffer from stigmatizati<strong>on</strong> and a<br />
lack of proper support networks. H<strong>in</strong>dus suffer due to <strong>the</strong> Indo-Pakistan discord and over<br />
<strong>the</strong> decades <strong>the</strong>y have been seen as fifth columnists. The feudal nature of S<strong>in</strong>di society,<br />
where <strong>the</strong> majority of <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>du populati<strong>on</strong> lives, <strong>the</strong> collaborative relati<strong>on</strong>ship of <strong>the</strong><br />
majoritarian Muslim S<strong>in</strong>di elite with <strong>the</strong> local adm<strong>in</strong>istrati<strong>on</strong>, precludes <strong>the</strong> possibility of<br />
any redress for H<strong>in</strong>du grievances.<br />
The paper is structured <strong>in</strong> three parts. While <strong>the</strong> first captures <strong>the</strong> micro profiles of be<strong>in</strong>g<br />
‘n<strong>on</strong> Muslim’ m<strong>in</strong>orities <strong>in</strong> Pakistan; <strong>the</strong> sec<strong>on</strong>d analyses <strong>the</strong> legal and political narrative<br />
of discrim<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> and marg<strong>in</strong>alizati<strong>on</strong> and <strong>the</strong> third draws up<strong>on</strong> a field based mapp<strong>in</strong>g<br />
study of <strong>the</strong> demography and status of religious m<strong>in</strong>orities, largely Christians and H<strong>in</strong>dus,<br />
<strong>in</strong> 10 districts of Balochistan and S<strong>in</strong>d. 1 The Survey focused <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> extent of <strong>the</strong><br />
enjoyment of a whole range of rights enshr<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al covenants and<br />
guaranteed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> and legal system <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> country. It addressed <strong>the</strong>ir rights as<br />
a community and as <strong>in</strong>dividual citizens. Also, it exam<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>the</strong> work<strong>in</strong>gs of structures and<br />
mechanisms that <strong>in</strong>flict <strong>in</strong>justice, discrim<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> and marg<strong>in</strong>alizati<strong>on</strong> of religious<br />
m<strong>in</strong>orities.<br />
Profil<strong>in</strong>g <strong>M<strong>in</strong>orities</strong> <strong>in</strong> Pakistan<br />
Pakistan’s populati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> 2008 is estimated to be 163.3 milli<strong>on</strong>s. In <strong>the</strong> last available<br />
census 1998, <strong>the</strong> populati<strong>on</strong> was 137 milli<strong>on</strong>. Muslims accounted 96.16% while n<strong>on</strong>-<br />
Muslims (religious m<strong>in</strong>orities) 3.84% of <strong>the</strong> populati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
Percentage Populati<strong>on</strong> by Religi<strong>on</strong><br />
Muslim Christian H<strong>in</strong>du<br />
(Jati) Qadiani<br />
Scheduled<br />
Caste<br />
O<strong>the</strong>rs<br />
All Areas 96.16 1.69 1.40 0.35 0.33 0.06<br />
Rural 96.49 1.10 1.80 0.18 0.34 0.08<br />
Urban 95.51 2.82 1.22 0.34 0.06 0.04<br />
Source: 1998 Census Report of Pakistan, Pakistan Census Organizati<strong>on</strong><br />
1 ‘Mapp<strong>in</strong>g <strong>M<strong>in</strong>orities</strong> <strong>in</strong> Baluchistan and S<strong>in</strong>d: A Survey”, Centre for Peace and Development,<br />
Baluchistan and <strong>the</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Asia</strong> Forum for Human Rights 2008.<br />
51
In <strong>the</strong> 1981 census, out of a total populati<strong>on</strong> of 84.3 milli<strong>on</strong>, Muslims accounted for<br />
81.4m Christians 1.3m, H<strong>in</strong>dus 1.3m, Ahmadis 0.1m The decades of <strong>the</strong> 1980s and<br />
1990s saw a spurt <strong>in</strong> overall populati<strong>on</strong> growth, largely because of <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>flux of milli<strong>on</strong>s<br />
of Afghan and some Iranian refugees, as well as de-emphasis <strong>on</strong> family plann<strong>in</strong>g. In<br />
1990, total populati<strong>on</strong> of m<strong>in</strong>orities were 3.1 per cent or an aggregate figure of 3.7m,<br />
compris<strong>in</strong>g an estimated 1,8m Christians, 1,7m H<strong>in</strong>dus; 9,462 Parsis; 3,564 Buddhists;<br />
and 2,898 Sikhs, while <strong>the</strong> ‘o<strong>the</strong>rs’ collectively were estimated to be 13,640. In two<br />
years, total pop of m<strong>in</strong>orities stood at 4.2 m with Christians at about 2.0m and H<strong>in</strong>dus at<br />
2.0m. 2 . The census of 1998 showed <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>orities near<strong>in</strong>g 11–13 milli<strong>on</strong>. Ahmadis,<br />
Christians and H<strong>in</strong>dus claim to have a populati<strong>on</strong> of 4 milli<strong>on</strong> each.<br />
Given <strong>the</strong> disadvantages and stigmatizati<strong>on</strong>, communities do not like to be identified as<br />
m<strong>in</strong>orities so <strong>the</strong> above-menti<strong>on</strong>ed figures may be an under-estimate, as some people<br />
may prefer not to identify <strong>the</strong>ir ethnic or religious background. There is generally no<br />
populati<strong>on</strong> figure available for Pakistan’s smaller m<strong>in</strong>ority communities. More recent<br />
estimates place <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>ority populati<strong>on</strong> at 7-10 percent of <strong>the</strong> total. Pakistani m<strong>in</strong>orities<br />
c<strong>on</strong>sist of Ahmadis, Bahais, Buddhists, Christians, H<strong>in</strong>dus, Ja<strong>in</strong>s, Kalasha (of Chitral),<br />
Parsis and Sikhs. Except for <strong>the</strong> Ahmadis, <strong>the</strong>y all accept be<strong>in</strong>g n<strong>on</strong>-Muslim. With<strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong>se communities <strong>the</strong>re are caste, class and denom<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>-based divisi<strong>on</strong>s; as well as<br />
ethnic, gender, rural and urban dist<strong>in</strong>cti<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
Christians<br />
Christians are <strong>the</strong> largest religious m<strong>in</strong>ority community <strong>in</strong> Pakistan and while 1998<br />
census places <strong>the</strong>m at 1.6% of populati<strong>on</strong>, <strong>the</strong> current figure is much higher. On <strong>the</strong> basis<br />
of <strong>the</strong> Catholic Church's record of births, and <strong>the</strong> members of <strong>the</strong> Protestant Church, it is<br />
closer to 2.5 to 3 percent. Cities like Peshawar, and areas of Bahawalpur, Hyderabad,<br />
Rawalp<strong>in</strong>di and Quetta, have a sizeable number of Christians engaged <strong>in</strong> various<br />
professi<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> service sector. There are c<strong>on</strong>verts, descendants of c<strong>on</strong>verts, Anglo-<br />
Indians/-Pakistanis, and Western missi<strong>on</strong>aries. The church organizati<strong>on</strong> is very similar to<br />
that <strong>in</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>South</strong> <strong>Asia</strong>n countries with a def<strong>in</strong>ite Pakistani cultural and l<strong>in</strong>guistic<br />
embodiment.<br />
The post-partiti<strong>on</strong> changes <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> ec<strong>on</strong>omy al<strong>on</strong>g with <strong>the</strong> posit<strong>in</strong>g of a Pakistani identity<br />
based <strong>on</strong> Islamic uniformity, have added to an anti-Christian sentiment and <strong>the</strong><br />
disadvantag<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> Christian community. For example, many Christians <strong>in</strong> Punjab<br />
bel<strong>on</strong>ged orig<strong>in</strong>ally to <strong>the</strong> farm<strong>in</strong>g communities but after <strong>in</strong>dependence, large numbers<br />
became landless, work<strong>in</strong>g as sweepers which fur<strong>the</strong>r stigmatized <strong>the</strong>m.<br />
There has been a historical traditi<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> Christians, <strong>in</strong> particular, and o<strong>the</strong>r n<strong>on</strong>-<br />
Muslim communities <strong>in</strong> general, be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> social betterment of <strong>the</strong><br />
communities now liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Pakistan through <strong>the</strong>ir educati<strong>on</strong>al <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>s established<br />
dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> British era. Their nati<strong>on</strong>alizati<strong>on</strong> under Bhutto not <strong>on</strong>ly removed <strong>the</strong>se prized<br />
<strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>s and crimped <strong>the</strong>ir chances to move up <strong>the</strong> socio-ec<strong>on</strong>omic ladder, but<br />
Pakistani society also forgot <strong>the</strong> educati<strong>on</strong>al, social and welfare c<strong>on</strong>tributi<strong>on</strong>s that had<br />
been made by <strong>the</strong> Christian (and o<strong>the</strong>r communities) to <strong>the</strong> country as a whole.<br />
2 Government of Pakistan, Pakistan Year Book 1994–5<br />
52
Although a large number of foreign missi<strong>on</strong> workers visit Pakistan, its tortuous<br />
procedures for obta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g resident and work visas, has ensured that <strong>the</strong> churches are<br />
<strong>in</strong>digenously led. The absence of any c<strong>on</strong>fessed strategy of evangelism vis a vis <strong>the</strong><br />
overwhelm<strong>in</strong>g Muslim majority would seem to m<strong>in</strong>imize opportunities for foreigners to<br />
be useful. However, foreign church funds do susta<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> social service projects which<br />
help many poor Pakistani Christians who o<strong>the</strong>rwise f<strong>in</strong>d little outreach from <strong>the</strong> Pakistan<br />
churches. Many services to <strong>the</strong> Christian poor, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g drug educati<strong>on</strong> and<br />
rehabilitati<strong>on</strong> programs, <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>s for <strong>the</strong> handicapped and food programs are susta<strong>in</strong>ed<br />
by outside fund<strong>in</strong>g. This promotes residual gratitude toward foreign Christians and<br />
highlights <strong>the</strong> leadership limits of <strong>the</strong> local officials<br />
For <strong>the</strong> native Christian churches, <strong>the</strong>ir real estate is a huge resource as well as <strong>the</strong> source<br />
of <strong>the</strong>ir problems. The church spires that dom<strong>in</strong>ate Pakistan’s major cities are legacies of<br />
British rule when large tracts of prime real estate <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Raj cant<strong>on</strong>ment areas -- now <strong>the</strong><br />
downtowns of Karachi, Lahore, Quetta and P<strong>in</strong>di – were dedicated to ca<strong>the</strong>dral and<br />
parish uses. After <strong>in</strong>dependence <strong>in</strong> 1947 most of this real estate passed to <strong>the</strong> native<br />
Christian churches. The upkeep of <strong>the</strong>se old build<strong>in</strong>gs and <strong>the</strong> need to fend off Muslims<br />
and dissident Christians who want <strong>the</strong> land preoccupy <strong>the</strong> country’s Protestant and<br />
Catholic hierarchies 3 .<br />
Most pastors believe <strong>the</strong> best way to keep Christian-Muslim relati<strong>on</strong>s calm is to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><br />
a low profile <strong>in</strong> terms of evangelism and hunker down to protect <strong>the</strong> real estate from<br />
vultures without and with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> community. Their strategy is to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> good relati<strong>on</strong>s<br />
with <strong>the</strong> Muslim power brokers and hope that <strong>the</strong> Christian poor will rema<strong>in</strong> faithful.<br />
Studies by <strong>the</strong> Christian Study Centre (CSC) <strong>in</strong> Rawalp<strong>in</strong>di, reveal that Christians and<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r n<strong>on</strong>-Muslims, do not occupy higher positi<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> civil services or armed forces,<br />
thus mak<strong>in</strong>g for a sense of <strong>in</strong>equality. This lack of trust <strong>on</strong>ly fur<strong>the</strong>r disempowers a vast<br />
secti<strong>on</strong> of competent Pakistanis. While Christians may be disliked and discrim<strong>in</strong>ated<br />
aga<strong>in</strong>st, <strong>the</strong>re have been no serious anti-Christian riots <strong>in</strong> Pakistan. However, follow<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>the</strong> US-led war <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan, <strong>the</strong>re has been a rise <strong>in</strong> attacks <strong>on</strong> Christian churches,<br />
schools and hospitals. These are often attributed to groups like <strong>the</strong> Jammat Islami,<br />
<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> attacks <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> Christian school <strong>in</strong> Murree and <strong>the</strong> chapel <strong>in</strong> Taxila Hospital<br />
<strong>in</strong> early August 2002. Christian women, though less than H<strong>in</strong>du women, are vulnerable.<br />
The rape of seven Christian women <strong>on</strong> a bus return<strong>in</strong>g from <strong>the</strong>ir factory outside Lahore<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> summer of 2000 was widely deplored <strong>in</strong> Pakistan 4 .<br />
H<strong>in</strong>dus<br />
H<strong>in</strong>dus are equivalent <strong>in</strong> number to <strong>the</strong> Christians, account<strong>in</strong>g for nearly 4milli<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong><br />
populati<strong>on</strong>. They are divided <strong>in</strong>to several castes and fur<strong>the</strong>r <strong>in</strong>tersected by ethnic<br />
diversity.<br />
After <strong>the</strong> Partiti<strong>on</strong> of India, H<strong>in</strong>dus had a much smaller numerical presence <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> newly<br />
created state of Pakistan, In August 1947, at <strong>the</strong> end of British Raj, <strong>the</strong> populati<strong>on</strong><br />
percentage of H<strong>in</strong>dus <strong>in</strong> what became Pakistan was between 15-20 percent. However, by<br />
3 “Pakistan’s Christian M<strong>in</strong>ority” Gene R Prest<strong>on</strong><br />
4 See “The Daily D<strong>in</strong> (Karachi)” 7 June 2000<br />
53
<strong>the</strong> 1998 Census, caste H<strong>in</strong>dus c<strong>on</strong>stituted about 1.6 percent of <strong>the</strong> total populati<strong>on</strong>, and<br />
about 6.5% of <strong>the</strong> populati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> S<strong>in</strong>d prov<strong>in</strong>ce. The Pakistan census enumerates Schedule<br />
Castes separately They make up 0.25% of nati<strong>on</strong>al populati<strong>on</strong>. Pakistan has <strong>the</strong> fifth<br />
largest populati<strong>on</strong> of native H<strong>in</strong>dus. Over 65 percent of <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>du populati<strong>on</strong> is young.<br />
Prov<strong>in</strong>ce H<strong>in</strong>du Populati<strong>on</strong> %age<br />
S<strong>in</strong>d 2,280,842 93.34<br />
Punjab 116,410 4.76<br />
NWFP 7,016 0.29<br />
Baluchistan 39,146 1.6<br />
Islamabad 200 0.01<br />
Total 2,443,614 100<br />
Districts host<strong>in</strong>g a majority H<strong>in</strong>du populati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> S<strong>in</strong>d are Tharparkar (370,014) and<br />
Khairpur (43,616); <strong>in</strong> Punjab are Rahim Yar Khar (75,400) and Rajan Pur (11,400); <strong>in</strong><br />
Balochistan are Sibi and Naseerabad; and <strong>in</strong> NWFP are Peshawar (1100) and Manshera<br />
(1000). H<strong>in</strong>dus are most c<strong>on</strong>centrated <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> S<strong>in</strong>d prov<strong>in</strong>ce of sou<strong>the</strong>ast Pakistan.<br />
Before partiti<strong>on</strong>, most H<strong>in</strong>dus <strong>in</strong> today’s Pakistan were urban, highly educated and<br />
ec<strong>on</strong>omically advantaged. Most middle and upper-class Pakistani H<strong>in</strong>dus immigrated to<br />
India after <strong>the</strong> 1947 partiti<strong>on</strong>. Those who rema<strong>in</strong>ed tended to be poorer and rural. Lack<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>the</strong> resources to organize politically (large numbers are b<strong>on</strong>ded labor), H<strong>in</strong>dus have<br />
rema<strong>in</strong>ed politically and ec<strong>on</strong>omically marg<strong>in</strong>alized <strong>in</strong> Pakistan.<br />
H<strong>in</strong>dus as a m<strong>in</strong>ority <strong>in</strong> Pakistan have few privileges, rights and protecti<strong>on</strong>s. Cultural<br />
marg<strong>in</strong>alizati<strong>on</strong>, discrim<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>, ec<strong>on</strong>omic hardships and religious persecuti<strong>on</strong> have<br />
driven many H<strong>in</strong>dus to c<strong>on</strong>vert to Islam and Christianity. As H<strong>in</strong>dus are not "People of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Book" like Christians, de facto <strong>the</strong>y have been given fewer rights by <strong>the</strong> Muslim<br />
majority than <strong>the</strong> country's Christians. Of course de jure H<strong>in</strong>dus have equal rights under<br />
<strong>the</strong> law.<br />
Pakistani H<strong>in</strong>dus suffer due to <strong>the</strong><br />
communalizati<strong>on</strong> of Indo-Pakistani<br />
politics and <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>in</strong>terstate rivalries. The<br />
desecrati<strong>on</strong> of H<strong>in</strong>du temples dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
Indo-Pakistani wars of 1947–8, 1965,<br />
1971, and aga<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> December 1992,<br />
follow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> destructi<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> Baburi<br />
Mosque <strong>in</strong> India are <strong>in</strong>extricably l<strong>in</strong>ked<br />
with <strong>the</strong> rise <strong>in</strong> communal hatred.<br />
The community is generally depressed,<br />
under-educated and under-employed. The<br />
feudal nature of S<strong>in</strong>di society and its<br />
collaborative relati<strong>on</strong>ship with <strong>the</strong> local<br />
adm<strong>in</strong>istrati<strong>on</strong> precludes <strong>the</strong> possibility of<br />
H<strong>in</strong>dus <strong>in</strong> S<strong>in</strong>d at Risk<br />
Pakistan H<strong>in</strong>du Council, states H<strong>in</strong>dus <strong>in</strong> S<strong>in</strong>d<br />
are <strong>in</strong>secure because of <strong>the</strong> ris<strong>in</strong>g number of<br />
kidnapp<strong>in</strong>gs and murders.<br />
Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Nisar Khuhro of <strong>the</strong> Pakistan<br />
People’s Party, more and more of <strong>the</strong>m are be<strong>in</strong>g<br />
kidnapped for ransom.<br />
On March 2, <strong>the</strong> BBC reported <strong>the</strong> disappearance<br />
of Garish Kumar from Umerkot. His fa<strong>the</strong>r, a<br />
local trader, says nobody <strong>in</strong> authority is <strong>in</strong>terested<br />
<strong>in</strong> tak<strong>in</strong>g up <strong>the</strong> case because <strong>the</strong> victim was a<br />
H<strong>in</strong>du.<br />
H<strong>in</strong>du women <strong>in</strong> particular are vulnerable to<br />
kidnapp<strong>in</strong>gs and forcible c<strong>on</strong>versi<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
Irfan Hussa<strong>in</strong> ‘Open Seas<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> <strong>M<strong>in</strong>orities</strong>’<br />
Dawn June 2 2007<br />
54
any redress for H<strong>in</strong>du grievances. The landless peasants, nomads and Dalits am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
H<strong>in</strong>dus suffer from multiple deprivati<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
The Pakistan H<strong>in</strong>du Panchayat and <strong>the</strong> Pakistani H<strong>in</strong>du Welfare Associati<strong>on</strong> are <strong>the</strong><br />
primary civic organizati<strong>on</strong>s that represent and organize H<strong>in</strong>du communities <strong>on</strong> social,<br />
ec<strong>on</strong>omic, religious and political issues S<strong>in</strong>ce 1998, <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>dus have dem<strong>on</strong>strated a<br />
degree of political mobilizati<strong>on</strong> to protect <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>in</strong>terests. As <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>du populati<strong>on</strong> ga<strong>in</strong>s<br />
c<strong>on</strong>fidence <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir political organizati<strong>on</strong>s and if <strong>the</strong>y c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to build alliances with<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r m<strong>in</strong>orities, <strong>the</strong>ir c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong> may improve 5 . Some ma<strong>in</strong>stream Pakistani parties,<br />
<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> S<strong>in</strong>d Democratic Party and <strong>in</strong>dividual Muslim <strong>in</strong>tellectuals have expressed<br />
support for H<strong>in</strong>du aspirati<strong>on</strong>s. H<strong>in</strong>dus still rema<strong>in</strong> at risk for <strong>in</strong>tercommunal violence.<br />
However, political alliances with o<strong>the</strong>r communities and secularly oriented parties may<br />
alleviate this danger. The stability of S<strong>in</strong>d could depend <strong>on</strong> such alliances, as <strong>the</strong>y may be<br />
necessary to meet <strong>the</strong> desperate resource needs of many ethnic groups.<br />
Ahmadis: Qadianis<br />
Accord<strong>in</strong>g to 1998 Census, Ahmadis account for 0.22% of <strong>the</strong> populati<strong>on</strong> and are divided<br />
<strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> Lahori and Qadiani groups. Both <strong>the</strong> leadership, <strong>the</strong> L<strong>on</strong>d<strong>on</strong>-based and <strong>the</strong> native<br />
elite of <strong>the</strong> movement are predom<strong>in</strong>antly Punjabi, with smaller communities <strong>in</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
prov<strong>in</strong>ces. After <strong>the</strong>ir designati<strong>on</strong> as a n<strong>on</strong>-Muslim m<strong>in</strong>ority, many moved to Europe and<br />
elsewhere, although <strong>the</strong>ir cultural, family and language l<strong>in</strong>ks with <strong>the</strong> Punjab rema<strong>in</strong><br />
str<strong>on</strong>g. Most of <strong>the</strong>ir propagati<strong>on</strong> activities have shifted to <strong>the</strong> West. Their televisi<strong>on</strong><br />
programmes, largely beamed from L<strong>on</strong>d<strong>on</strong>, <strong>in</strong> English, German, Urdu and o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
languages, generally centre <strong>on</strong> religious issues, with Urdu programmes <strong>on</strong> “Muslim<br />
Televisi<strong>on</strong> Ahmadiyya” focus<strong>in</strong>g <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> teach<strong>in</strong>gs of <strong>the</strong> leader, Mirza Tahir Ahmad.<br />
Their publicati<strong>on</strong>s view <strong>the</strong>ir designati<strong>on</strong> as a m<strong>in</strong>ority as politically motivated. However,<br />
<strong>the</strong>y do not dispute <strong>the</strong> claim of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, <strong>the</strong> founder of <strong>the</strong> movement, to<br />
be <strong>the</strong> Messiah/Mahdi or Mehdi-i-Mauood (<strong>the</strong> promised prophet).<br />
Founded <strong>in</strong> 1889, <strong>the</strong> movement <strong>in</strong>itially rema<strong>in</strong>ed c<strong>on</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ed to <strong>the</strong> Punjab and some of its<br />
leaders, like Sir Zafrullah Khan, played a very important role <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> freedom movement<br />
and went <strong>on</strong> to dist<strong>in</strong>guish himself as Pakistan’s first Foreign M<strong>in</strong>ister. However, after<br />
Bhutto’s anti Ahmadi legislati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> 1974 6 declar<strong>in</strong>g a n<strong>on</strong> Muslim m<strong>in</strong>ority, Zia <strong>in</strong> 1984<br />
proscribed Ahmadi’s ability’s to profess <strong>the</strong>ir (Muslim) identity, visibly c<strong>on</strong>gregate or<br />
publicly express <strong>the</strong>ir faith.<br />
Sikhs, Parsis, Bahais & Kalash<br />
The Sikhs are mostly Punjabis with smaller traditi<strong>on</strong>al communities <strong>in</strong> Karachi and<br />
NWFP. There are a few Sikhs <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> tribal areas that are bil<strong>in</strong>gual and have a close<br />
5 Interview Diary, Focus Group Discussi<strong>on</strong>s<br />
6 1973 C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> Article 260 Clause C [b] “n<strong>on</strong>-Muslim” means a pers<strong>on</strong> who is not a Muslim and<br />
<strong>in</strong>cludes a pers<strong>on</strong> bel<strong>on</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> Christian, H<strong>in</strong>du, Sikh, Buddhist or Parsi community, a pers<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong><br />
Qadiani group or Lahori group (who will call <strong>the</strong>mselves “Ahmadis” or by any o<strong>the</strong>r name), or a Baha’i,<br />
and a pers<strong>on</strong> bel<strong>on</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g to any of <strong>the</strong> scheduled castes.’<br />
55
elati<strong>on</strong>ship with Sikhs <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan. Dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Taliban’s ascendancy, many Afghani<br />
Sikhs migrated abroad, with just a small number com<strong>in</strong>g to Pakistan. The Sikhs rema<strong>in</strong><br />
reas<strong>on</strong>ably secure compared with o<strong>the</strong>r religious communities, as most popular<br />
resentment is reserved for Christians and H<strong>in</strong>dus.<br />
Parsis are strictly an urban and entrepreneurial community based <strong>in</strong> Karachi and Lahore,<br />
with a few families <strong>in</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r major cities. Due to <strong>the</strong>ir str<strong>on</strong>g commercial l<strong>in</strong>ks, <strong>the</strong> n<strong>on</strong>evangelical<br />
nature of <strong>the</strong>ir faith and a steady outward migrati<strong>on</strong> to North America, <strong>the</strong><br />
Parsis rema<strong>in</strong> ‘less visible’ <strong>in</strong> Pakistan, and <strong>the</strong>re are no reports of harassment or anger<br />
specifically directed aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong>m. Some Parsis, like Bahram Avari, Bapsi Sidhwa, <strong>the</strong><br />
D<strong>in</strong>shaws, <strong>the</strong> Markers and <strong>the</strong> well-known columnist, Ardeshir Cowasjee, are nati<strong>on</strong>al<br />
role models.<br />
The Bahais are, <strong>in</strong> general, c<strong>on</strong>verts and middle-class urbanites who publish magaz<strong>in</strong>es<br />
and books but keep a very low profile. The Bahai religi<strong>on</strong> began <strong>in</strong> Iran (Persia) <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
n<strong>in</strong>eteenth century before spread<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>South</strong> <strong>Asia</strong>. So far <strong>the</strong>y have escaped any<br />
collective anger from o<strong>the</strong>r majority communities due to <strong>the</strong>ir small number and limited<br />
activities.<br />
The Kalasha of Chitral are an old community, folklore has it, of Greek orig<strong>in</strong>. In <strong>the</strong> past<br />
<strong>the</strong>y ruled Chitral, although now <strong>the</strong>y live <strong>in</strong> three small, land-locked hamlets and are<br />
extremely poor. S<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> late n<strong>in</strong>eteenth century, Kalasha (locally called ‘Kafirs’), have<br />
been under great pressure to c<strong>on</strong>vert to Islam. They are divided by <strong>the</strong> Durand L<strong>in</strong>e<br />
demarcat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Pakistan-Afghan border. In <strong>the</strong> 1890s, Amir Abdur Rahman, <strong>the</strong><br />
religious K<strong>in</strong>g of Kabul, forcibly c<strong>on</strong>verted many of <strong>the</strong> Afghan Kalasha to Islam. Some<br />
of <strong>the</strong>m sought protecti<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> Pakistani side of <strong>the</strong> L<strong>in</strong>e. They are estimate to number<br />
a bare 3,000. Their isolated, mounta<strong>in</strong>ous regi<strong>on</strong> and way of life has protected <strong>the</strong>m from<br />
outside <strong>in</strong>fluences. However, <strong>the</strong> tourist attracti<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong>ir valleys <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>du Kush,<br />
have drawn attenti<strong>on</strong> to <strong>the</strong>se small communities. Even more unsettl<strong>in</strong>g has been <strong>the</strong><br />
impact of Islamic activism s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> 1970s, emphasized <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> uniform school syllabus<br />
and <strong>the</strong> emphasis <strong>on</strong> Urdu and Arabic <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> official schools. The unique religio-cultural<br />
identity of <strong>the</strong> Kalasha is under pressure.<br />
Some estimates place <strong>the</strong> number of Pakistanis bel<strong>on</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g to m<strong>in</strong>ority communities at 10–<br />
13 milli<strong>on</strong>, with Christians, H<strong>in</strong>dus and Sikhs am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong> most prom<strong>in</strong>ent. It should be<br />
remembered that this number does not <strong>in</strong>clude several Muslim denom<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>s, which do<br />
not wish to be identified as m<strong>in</strong>orities. These <strong>in</strong>clude Shias, am<strong>on</strong>g who are Ismailis, and<br />
Zikris – Muslim communities that are deeply disturbed by Sunni demands that <strong>the</strong>y be<br />
designated as m<strong>in</strong>orities. Moreover, <strong>the</strong> Ahmadis – officially declared a ‘m<strong>in</strong>ority’–<br />
refuse to be categorized as n<strong>on</strong>-Muslims.<br />
It should be remembered that <strong>in</strong> what became Pakistan, <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>orities have a l<strong>on</strong>g history<br />
of residence, and some were present before Islam was <strong>in</strong>troduced to <strong>the</strong> regi<strong>on</strong>. They<br />
opted for Pakistan and <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> process Bahais, Christians, H<strong>in</strong>dus, Parsis, Sikhs and o<strong>the</strong>rs,<br />
all experienced partiti<strong>on</strong> and suffer<strong>in</strong>g, al<strong>on</strong>g with <strong>the</strong> Muslim community. <strong>M<strong>in</strong>orities</strong><br />
have stood by o<strong>the</strong>r citizens <strong>in</strong> defense of Pakistan, <strong>the</strong>ir homeland, yet have received<br />
56
<strong>on</strong>ly <strong>in</strong>security and deprivati<strong>on</strong> from successive governments and certa<strong>in</strong> elements of <strong>the</strong><br />
majority community. All <strong>the</strong> way from <strong>the</strong> Objectives Resoluti<strong>on</strong> to more recent times,<br />
regimes have opportunistically pandered to a policy of segregati<strong>on</strong> between Muslims and<br />
n<strong>on</strong>-Muslims and, sadly, this segregati<strong>on</strong> has become multi-dimensi<strong>on</strong>al 7 .<br />
“Equal Citizenship for All <strong>in</strong> Pakistan”: Found<strong>in</strong>g Fa<strong>the</strong>r’s Democratic Visi<strong>on</strong><br />
In <strong>the</strong> 1930s and 1940s, <strong>the</strong> demand for a separate Muslim state emerged as a focal po<strong>in</strong>t<br />
for c<strong>on</strong>verg<strong>in</strong>g socioec<strong>on</strong>omic forces. For <strong>the</strong> emerg<strong>in</strong>g Muslim elite <strong>in</strong> British India,<br />
Pakistan symbolized a cohesive, b<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g force, enabl<strong>in</strong>g disparate Muslim communities<br />
to break free of <strong>the</strong> permanent b<strong>on</strong>dage to an overpower<strong>in</strong>g majority 8 . To <strong>the</strong> landless<br />
peasants, it represented a utopia, and for o<strong>the</strong>rs it held <strong>the</strong> promise of a trans-regi<strong>on</strong>al<br />
Muslim identity <strong>in</strong> a revivalist sense 9 .<br />
J<strong>in</strong>nah and his modernist Muslim colleagues envisi<strong>on</strong>ed Pakistan as a progressive,<br />
democratic and tolerant society, which, while reta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g Muslim majority, would give<br />
equal rights to its n<strong>on</strong>-Muslim citizens. The basis of this tolerant society was to be <strong>the</strong><br />
separati<strong>on</strong> of religi<strong>on</strong> and state as articulated <strong>in</strong> his speech to <strong>the</strong> first C<strong>on</strong>stituent<br />
Assembly of Pakistan <strong>in</strong> On 11 August 1947. J<strong>in</strong>nah said: ‘… You are free; you are free<br />
to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any o<strong>the</strong>r places of<br />
worship <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> State of Pakistan. You may bel<strong>on</strong>g to any religi<strong>on</strong> or caste or creed – that<br />
has noth<strong>in</strong>g to do with <strong>the</strong> bus<strong>in</strong>ess of <strong>the</strong> State … We are start<strong>in</strong>g with this fundamental<br />
pr<strong>in</strong>ciple: that we are all citizens and equal citizens of <strong>on</strong>e State. Now, I th<strong>in</strong>k we should<br />
keep that <strong>in</strong> fr<strong>on</strong>t of us as our ideal and you will f<strong>in</strong>d that <strong>in</strong> course of time H<strong>in</strong>dus would<br />
cease to be H<strong>in</strong>dus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not so <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> religious sense<br />
because that is <strong>the</strong> pers<strong>on</strong>al faith of each <strong>in</strong>dividual, but <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> political sense as citizens<br />
of <strong>the</strong> state.’<br />
Support<strong>in</strong>g this ‘secular’ orientati<strong>on</strong>, it is relevant to recall that several Muslim religiopolitical<br />
parties <strong>in</strong> India had rejected <strong>the</strong> idea of Pakistan as ana<strong>the</strong>ma because secular<br />
and ‘Westernized’ Muslims were field<strong>in</strong>g it. Subsequently, <strong>the</strong> majority of Indian<br />
Muslims voted for <strong>the</strong> J<strong>in</strong>nah-led Muslim League. However, over <strong>the</strong> succeed<strong>in</strong>g<br />
decades, especially <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1970s and 1980s, <strong>the</strong> Pakistani state, underwent a major shift<br />
that underm<strong>in</strong>ed equal rights and equal opportunities to its Muslim and n<strong>on</strong>-Muslim<br />
citizens.<br />
7<br />
Moghal, D., ‘The status of n<strong>on</strong>-Muslims <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Islamic Republic of Pakistan: a c<strong>on</strong>fused identity’,<br />
Religious <strong>M<strong>in</strong>orities</strong> <strong>in</strong> Pakistan: Struggle for Identity, Rawalp<strong>in</strong>di, Christian Study Centre, 1996<br />
8<br />
Malik, I.H., Islam, Nati<strong>on</strong>alism and <strong>the</strong> West: Issues of Identity <strong>in</strong> Pakistan, Oxford, St Ant<strong>on</strong>y’s-<br />
Macmillan, 1999<br />
.<br />
9<br />
Hashmi, T.I., Pakistan as a Peasant Utopia, Denver, Westview, 1992; Jalal, A., The Sole Spokesman:<br />
J<strong>in</strong>nah, <strong>the</strong> Muslim League and <strong>the</strong> Demand for Pakistan, Cambridge, CUP, 1985.<br />
57
Mohammad Ali J<strong>in</strong>nah. Excerpts of Interview July 14, 1947, New Delhi<br />
Q. Could you as governor-general make a brief statement <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>orities problems?<br />
A. At present I am <strong>on</strong>ly governor-general designate. We will assume for a moment that <strong>on</strong> August 15 I shall be<br />
really <strong>the</strong> governor-general of Pakistan. On that assumpti<strong>on</strong>, let me tell you that I shall not depart from what I<br />
said repeatedly with regard to <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>orities. Every time I spoke about <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>orities I meant what I said and<br />
what I said I meant. <strong>M<strong>in</strong>orities</strong> to whichever community <strong>the</strong>y may bel<strong>on</strong>g will be safeguarded. Their religi<strong>on</strong><br />
or faith or belief will be secure. There will be no <strong>in</strong>terference of any k<strong>in</strong>d with <strong>the</strong>ir freedom of worship. They<br />
will have <strong>the</strong>ir protecti<strong>on</strong> with regard to <strong>the</strong>ir religi<strong>on</strong>, faith, <strong>the</strong>ir life, <strong>the</strong>ir culture. They will be, <strong>in</strong> all<br />
respects, <strong>the</strong> citizens of Pakistan without any dist<strong>in</strong>cti<strong>on</strong> of caste or creed. The will have <strong>the</strong>ir rights and<br />
privileges and no doubt al<strong>on</strong>g with this goes <strong>the</strong> obligati<strong>on</strong>s of citizenship. Therefore, <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>orities have <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
resp<strong>on</strong>sibilities also, and <strong>the</strong>y will play <strong>the</strong>ir part <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> affairs of this state. As l<strong>on</strong>g as <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>orities are loyal<br />
to <strong>the</strong> state and owe true allegiance, and as l<strong>on</strong>g as I have any power, <strong>the</strong>y need have no apprehensi<strong>on</strong> of any<br />
k<strong>in</strong>d.<br />
Q. What are your comments <strong>on</strong> recent statements and speeches of certa<strong>in</strong> C<strong>on</strong>gress leaders to <strong>the</strong> effect that if<br />
H<strong>in</strong>dus <strong>in</strong> Pakistan are treated badly <strong>the</strong>y will treat Muslims <strong>in</strong> H<strong>in</strong>dustan worse?<br />
A. I hope <strong>the</strong>y will get over this madness and follow <strong>the</strong> l<strong>in</strong>e I am suggest<strong>in</strong>g. It is no use pick<strong>in</strong>g up <strong>the</strong><br />
statements of this man here or that man <strong>the</strong>re. You must remember that <strong>in</strong> every country <strong>the</strong>re are crooks,<br />
cranks, and what I call mad people.<br />
Q. Would you like m<strong>in</strong>orities to stay <strong>in</strong> Pakistan or would you like an exchange of populati<strong>on</strong>?<br />
A. As far as I can speak for Pakistan, I say that <strong>the</strong>re is no reas<strong>on</strong> for any apprehensi<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> part of <strong>the</strong><br />
m<strong>in</strong>orities <strong>in</strong> Pakistan. It is for <strong>the</strong>m to decide what <strong>the</strong>y should do. All I can say is that <strong>the</strong>re is no reas<strong>on</strong> for<br />
any apprehensi<strong>on</strong> so far as I can speak about Pakistan. It is for <strong>the</strong>m to decide. I cannot order <strong>the</strong>m.<br />
Q. Will Pakistan be a secular or <strong>the</strong>ocratic state?<br />
A. You are ask<strong>in</strong>g me a questi<strong>on</strong> that is absurd. I do not know what a <strong>the</strong>ocratic state means.<br />
A corresp<strong>on</strong>dent suggested that a <strong>the</strong>ocratic state meant a state where <strong>on</strong>ly people of a particular religi<strong>on</strong>, for<br />
example Muslims, could be full citizens and n<strong>on</strong>-Muslims would not be full citizens.<br />
A. Then it seems to me that what I have already said is like throw<strong>in</strong>g water <strong>on</strong> a ducks's back. When you talk<br />
of democracy I am afraid you have not studied Islam. We learned democracy thirteen centuries ago.<br />
`Source: “J<strong>in</strong>nah’s Speeches and Statements” published by Oxford University Press<br />
Scholarly op<strong>in</strong>i<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> this change <strong>in</strong> Pakistani official and societal attitudes varies. One<br />
group argues that <strong>the</strong> demand for Pakistan had h<strong>in</strong>ged <strong>on</strong> Muslim majority prov<strong>in</strong>ces and<br />
used Islamic symbols for mobilizati<strong>on</strong>, thus predicat<strong>in</strong>g a Muslim majoritarian bias.<br />
Therefore, despite <strong>the</strong> Muslim League’s assurances to m<strong>in</strong>orities, <strong>the</strong> party’s Muslim<br />
credentials were pr<strong>on</strong>ounced both dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> col<strong>on</strong>ial and nati<strong>on</strong>al periods. O<strong>the</strong>rs<br />
scholars root it <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> endur<strong>in</strong>g c<strong>on</strong>test between <strong>the</strong> religious and <strong>the</strong> liberal positi<strong>on</strong>s<br />
regard<strong>in</strong>g nati<strong>on</strong>alism. Like <strong>the</strong> Muslim League and o<strong>the</strong>r Islamic parties such as Jamaati-Islami<br />
(JI), <strong>the</strong> Indian Nati<strong>on</strong>al C<strong>on</strong>gress was arrayed aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>du Mahasabah and<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r such fundamentalist groups. The weaken<strong>in</strong>g of modernist forces from <strong>in</strong>ertia,<br />
exhausti<strong>on</strong> or disarray, allowed <strong>the</strong>se rival forces to achieve power. As with <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>du<br />
58
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) <strong>in</strong> India, <strong>the</strong> Islamicist forces <strong>in</strong> Pakistan have rewritten<br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Asia</strong>n history to suit <strong>the</strong>ir religious views.<br />
A third group of scholars expla<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> rise of unilateralism over pluralism as be<strong>in</strong>g due to<br />
ec<strong>on</strong>omic and political reas<strong>on</strong>s. The masses’ c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued ec<strong>on</strong>omic and political<br />
disempowerment has encouraged <strong>the</strong> emergence of counter forces which are propos<strong>in</strong>g<br />
an alternative to <strong>the</strong> ‘Westernized’ paradigms. Still o<strong>the</strong>rs locate <strong>the</strong> roots of xenophobia<br />
as embedded <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> nature and aspirati<strong>on</strong>s of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Asia</strong>’s middle classes, for whom<br />
regi<strong>on</strong>al and sectarian identificati<strong>on</strong>s rema<strong>in</strong> paramount. There are some who emphasise<br />
<strong>the</strong> role of <strong>in</strong>dividuals like Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Zia ul-Haq, am<strong>on</strong>g o<strong>the</strong>rs, who<br />
coopted and encouraged obscurantist forces – to seek legitimacy or mobilize a political<br />
c<strong>on</strong>stituency. F<strong>in</strong>ally, <strong>the</strong> globalists see political Islam re-emerg<strong>in</strong>g as <strong>the</strong> rally<strong>in</strong>g po<strong>in</strong>t<br />
to counter <strong>the</strong> overpower<strong>in</strong>g forces of Westernism.<br />
Our basic positi<strong>on</strong> is that <strong>the</strong>re is noth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>evitable about Pakistan’s shift from a<br />
J<strong>in</strong>nahist to a more Jihadi (Islamic fundamentalist) course. As we shall detail later,<br />
op<strong>in</strong>i<strong>on</strong> surveys <strong>in</strong>dicate that most people <strong>in</strong> Pakistan still believe <strong>in</strong> tolerance and<br />
coexistence and would like to revert to <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>al dream 10 . However, <strong>in</strong>ter community<br />
relati<strong>on</strong>ships have been severely distorted by <strong>the</strong> acrim<strong>on</strong>ious Indo-Pakistani relati<strong>on</strong>ship.<br />
While Muslim anger has been directed aga<strong>in</strong>st H<strong>in</strong>dus <strong>in</strong> Pakistan; <strong>in</strong> India, H<strong>in</strong>du<br />
fundamentalists treat Muslims as scapegoats or regard <strong>the</strong>m as traitors.<br />
In this exclusi<strong>on</strong>ary process of nati<strong>on</strong>alism(s), o<strong>the</strong>r communities have been deeply<br />
affected, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g Christians <strong>in</strong> both countries, and Ahmadis and Shias <strong>in</strong> Pakistan. This<br />
c<strong>on</strong>cept of majoritarianism is fallacious, as both Islam and H<strong>in</strong>duism are not m<strong>on</strong>olithic.<br />
In Pakistan, <strong>the</strong> grow<strong>in</strong>g emphasis <strong>on</strong> ‘Muslimness’ has not <strong>on</strong>ly caused justifiable<br />
c<strong>on</strong>cern am<strong>on</strong>g n<strong>on</strong>-Muslims, but <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>tra-Muslim ideological divides have also become<br />
more acute as apparent <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> grow<strong>in</strong>g discovery of ‘enemies from with<strong>in</strong>’. This is<br />
translated <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> ris<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>cidence of Shia –Sunni violence.<br />
J<strong>in</strong>nah’s Visi<strong>on</strong> Vanishes<br />
J<strong>in</strong>nah had envisi<strong>on</strong>ed Pakistan as a tolerant and egalitarian society, where state and<br />
religi<strong>on</strong> would be separated. However, his visi<strong>on</strong> of c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al politics was thwarted<br />
by a grow<strong>in</strong>g accent <strong>on</strong> adm<strong>in</strong>istrati<strong>on</strong> ra<strong>the</strong>r than governance. The regi<strong>on</strong>al disparities<br />
between East and West Pakistan were used to delay <strong>the</strong> fram<strong>in</strong>g of a C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>. In <strong>the</strong><br />
meantime, <strong>the</strong> Indian Act of 1935 and <strong>the</strong> Independence Act of 1947 rema<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>the</strong><br />
c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al guidel<strong>in</strong>es for <strong>the</strong> regimes. These documents, dat<strong>in</strong>g from <strong>the</strong> Raj, despite<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir <strong>in</strong>herent communitarian def<strong>in</strong>iti<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g, separate electorates, were generally<br />
secular. They stipulated a limited franchise, based <strong>on</strong> age, educati<strong>on</strong>, land hold<strong>in</strong>g and tax<br />
payment.<br />
For Pakistan to have its own political identity, it needed its own C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> ra<strong>the</strong>r than<br />
c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g with imperial traditi<strong>on</strong>s and rules. Moreover, Pakistan elite wanted to look<br />
different from ‘secular’ India, to c<strong>on</strong>struct a pr<strong>on</strong>ounced Muslim identity. Subsequently,<br />
10 ‘Fifty Years: Fifty Questi<strong>on</strong>s’, Herald, Karachi, January 1997<br />
59
many regimes would use <strong>the</strong> Islamic factor, not <strong>on</strong>ly for nati<strong>on</strong>-build<strong>in</strong>g purposes but<br />
also for legitimiz<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ir policies. Al<strong>on</strong>gside <strong>the</strong>se political c<strong>on</strong>vulsi<strong>on</strong>s, <strong>the</strong><br />
adm<strong>in</strong>istrative and ec<strong>on</strong>omic structures rema<strong>in</strong>ed static. In short, <strong>the</strong> state and society<br />
failed to achieve <strong>in</strong>terdependence.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> 1950s, land reforms were <strong>in</strong>troduced <strong>in</strong> a partisan manner, implemented <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
eastern w<strong>in</strong>g; whereas feudal West Pakistan rema<strong>in</strong>ed untouched. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s<br />
land reforms <strong>in</strong> 1972 were cosmetic as landowners were advised <strong>in</strong> advance to distribute<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir properties am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ir families. Most of <strong>the</strong> politicians <strong>in</strong> Pakistan’s Assemblies<br />
come from feudal families. These feudal families have vast trans-regi<strong>on</strong>al and transethnic<br />
matrim<strong>on</strong>ial l<strong>in</strong>ks; and <strong>the</strong>ir l<strong>in</strong>ks with <strong>the</strong> professi<strong>on</strong>al classes fur<strong>the</strong>r guarantee<br />
<strong>the</strong> protecti<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong>ir class-based <strong>in</strong>terests. Significantly, <strong>the</strong> religious ulama or clerics,<br />
despite <strong>the</strong>ir lower middle-class or peasant orig<strong>in</strong>s, have not campaigned for <strong>the</strong><br />
eradicati<strong>on</strong> of feudalism. In rural S<strong>in</strong>d, he<strong>in</strong>ous practices such as ‘h<strong>on</strong>or kill<strong>in</strong>gs’,<br />
marriages with Qur’an (mock marriages) are prevalent. In <strong>the</strong> NWFP, <strong>the</strong> tribal system<br />
has been shaken up due to migrati<strong>on</strong> and socio-ec<strong>on</strong>omic development <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> regi<strong>on</strong>.<br />
With<strong>in</strong> Balochistan, especially <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Bugti and Marri areas, it rema<strong>in</strong>s ascendant. In<br />
Balochistan <strong>the</strong> chiefta<strong>in</strong>s like <strong>the</strong> S<strong>in</strong>di waderas (big landowners) exercise absolute<br />
c<strong>on</strong>trol.<br />
The clerics <strong>in</strong> Pushtun society have a higher status than those <strong>in</strong> Balochistan, although <strong>in</strong><br />
rural S<strong>in</strong>d, <strong>the</strong> Syeds (holy people) and <strong>the</strong> Sufi orders (piri-muridi), attached to <strong>the</strong><br />
shr<strong>in</strong>es of early Sufis command greater allegiance am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong> people. A Syed or Pir<br />
Wadera is more powerful than an ord<strong>in</strong>ary Wadera. Despite <strong>the</strong> chauv<strong>in</strong>ist and powerbased<br />
structures underly<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>se systems, <strong>the</strong>y have generally offered protecti<strong>on</strong> to n<strong>on</strong>-<br />
Muslim m<strong>in</strong>orities. The n<strong>on</strong> Muslim m<strong>in</strong>orities – however affluent – do not enjoy equal<br />
social status 11 .<br />
Partiti<strong>on</strong> and Demographic Changes<br />
The partiti<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> Indian sub-c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ent <strong>in</strong>to India and Pakistan <strong>in</strong> August 1947 resulted<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>on</strong>e of <strong>the</strong> largest and most rapid migrati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong> human history with an estimated 14.5<br />
milli<strong>on</strong> people migrat<strong>in</strong>g with<strong>in</strong> four years..Pakistani Punjab saw 19.7% of its populati<strong>on</strong><br />
leave. By 1951 25.5% of its populati<strong>on</strong> was from across <strong>the</strong> border. In Indian Punjab,<br />
40.4% of <strong>the</strong> populati<strong>on</strong> left and <strong>in</strong> 1951 18.8% of <strong>the</strong> populati<strong>on</strong> were migrants. 12 . The<br />
percentage of Muslims fell from 32 percent <strong>in</strong> 1931 to 1.8 percent by 1951 <strong>in</strong> districts<br />
that were to end up <strong>in</strong> Indian Punjab. Similarly, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> districts that became part of<br />
Pakistani Punjab, <strong>the</strong> percentage of H<strong>in</strong>dus and Sikhs fell from 22 percent to 0.16% 13 .<br />
Partiti<strong>on</strong> left Punjabis divided by <strong>the</strong> Indo-Pakistani border - Muslims fled east Punjab<br />
after kill<strong>in</strong>gs and mass expulsi<strong>on</strong>s; and H<strong>in</strong>dus and Sikhs fled kill<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> west Punjab.<br />
11 For <strong>the</strong> politics of feudal elitism and <strong>the</strong> official reluctance to implement land reforms and agricultural<br />
tax, see Hussa<strong>in</strong>, A., Elite Politics <strong>in</strong> an Ideological State, L<strong>on</strong>d<strong>on</strong>, Daws<strong>on</strong>, 1979; see also Masud, M.,<br />
Hari Report: Note of Dissent, Karachi, 1948.<br />
12 “The Big March: Migratory Flows After <strong>the</strong> Partiti<strong>on</strong> of India”, Harvard Kennedy School<br />
13 “The Partiti<strong>on</strong> of India : Demographic C<strong>on</strong>sequences”, Prashant, Asim and Atif<br />
60
Christians ma<strong>in</strong>ly c<strong>on</strong>centrated <strong>in</strong> undivided Punjab, which, religiously, was <strong>the</strong> most<br />
plural of all <strong>the</strong> British prov<strong>in</strong>ces, were also seriously affected. As far as <strong>the</strong> 565 pr<strong>in</strong>cely<br />
states were c<strong>on</strong>cerned, <strong>the</strong>ir plural societies were <strong>in</strong>itially protected, but with India and<br />
Pakistan’s desire for <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>in</strong>tegrati<strong>on</strong>, voluntary as well as forced populati<strong>on</strong> transfers<br />
followed. In particular, many Muslims from <strong>the</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>cely states of Jammu and Kashmir,<br />
Junagardh and Hyderabad moved to Pakistan, whereas Bahawalpur and o<strong>the</strong>r such<br />
predom<strong>in</strong>antly Muslim states saw an outflow of H<strong>in</strong>dus to India 14 .<br />
Follow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> 1970 civil war between East and West Pakistan and and <strong>the</strong> emergence of<br />
<strong>the</strong> new state of Bangladesh led to more trans-regi<strong>on</strong>al migrati<strong>on</strong>. In 1979, follow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
Iranian Revoluti<strong>on</strong> and <strong>the</strong> Soviet <strong>in</strong>vasi<strong>on</strong> of Afghanistan, refugees from <strong>the</strong>se two<br />
neighbor<strong>in</strong>g countries added to Pakistan’s populati<strong>on</strong>. 15 . All this has resulted <strong>in</strong> radical<br />
demographic changes that have fed <strong>in</strong>to already highly competitive and volatile <strong>in</strong>tercommunity<br />
relati<strong>on</strong>ships.<br />
Tricks of C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>s<br />
In 1949, a year after J<strong>in</strong>nah’s death, Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister Liaquat Ali Khan <strong>in</strong>troduced <strong>the</strong><br />
Objectives Resoluti<strong>on</strong>. This document tried to placate <strong>the</strong> Muslim clerics and equally<br />
tried to establish Pakistani nati<strong>on</strong>hood <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>ciple of religious c<strong>on</strong>formity.<br />
Accord<strong>in</strong>gly, <strong>the</strong> rules and regulati<strong>on</strong>s were to be framed <strong>in</strong> c<strong>on</strong>s<strong>on</strong>ance with Islam,<br />
allow<strong>in</strong>g a greater role for <strong>the</strong> ulama, who felt emboldened by this greater recogniti<strong>on</strong>.<br />
The ulama’s sectarianism came <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> open <strong>in</strong> 1953. They wanted <strong>the</strong> regime to declare<br />
Ahmadis a n<strong>on</strong>-Muslim m<strong>in</strong>ority and remove Pakistan’s first Foreign M<strong>in</strong>ister, Sir<br />
Zafrullah Khan, an Ahmadi.. The violence led to <strong>the</strong> impositi<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> first martial law <strong>in</strong><br />
Lahore and <strong>the</strong> arrest of several religio-political leaders, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g Syed Abul Ala<br />
Maudoodi, <strong>the</strong> founder of <strong>the</strong> Jammat Islami. He was tried and sentenced to death<br />
(eventually commuted). This was <strong>the</strong> first time that <strong>the</strong> religio-political parties had<br />
pressurized <strong>the</strong> regime <strong>in</strong> Karachi to play arbiter <strong>on</strong> religious affairs. The regime resisted<br />
but <strong>the</strong> ulama found a comm<strong>on</strong> ally<strong>in</strong>g po<strong>in</strong>t that <strong>the</strong>y would more effectively use 20<br />
years later. Maudoodi’s trial exposed serious <strong>in</strong>tra-Muslim differences with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> ulama<br />
over <strong>the</strong> def<strong>in</strong>iti<strong>on</strong> of a Muslim 16 .<br />
O<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terim legislati<strong>on</strong> of 1947 and <strong>the</strong> Objectives Resoluti<strong>on</strong> of 1949,<br />
Pakistan has had four C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>s s<strong>in</strong>ce its <strong>in</strong>dependence. Viewed from <strong>the</strong> framework<br />
of a m<strong>in</strong>ority rights lens, Pakistan’s successive c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>s represent a steady movement<br />
towards <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>alizati<strong>on</strong> of exclusi<strong>on</strong> and segregati<strong>on</strong> of m<strong>in</strong>orities. This has<br />
legitimized wider socio-ec<strong>on</strong>omic segregati<strong>on</strong> of m<strong>in</strong>orities and o<strong>the</strong>r underprivileged<br />
groups such as women.<br />
14 Kudaisya, G & Y<strong>on</strong>g Tan, T. The Aftermath of Partiti<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Asia</strong>, L<strong>on</strong>d<strong>on</strong>: Routledge (2000)<br />
15 Qadeer, MA. Lahore: Urban Development <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Third World, Lahore, Vanguard Books Limited (1983).<br />
16 For details <strong>on</strong> c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al developments and <strong>the</strong> religious riots <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> early years, see Afzal, M.R.,<br />
Pakistan: History and Politics, 1947–1971, Karachi, OUP, 2001; B<strong>in</strong>der, L., Religi<strong>on</strong> and Politics <strong>in</strong><br />
Pakistan, Los Angeles, 1961; Nasr, S.V.R., Mawdudi “Mak<strong>in</strong>g of Islamic Revoluti<strong>on</strong>”, New York, OUP,<br />
1996<br />
61
The 1956 C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> largely reflected <strong>the</strong> spirit of <strong>the</strong> Objectives Resoluti<strong>on</strong> and<br />
officially declared Pakistan an ‘Islamic Republic’.Ayub Khan’s 1962 C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong><br />
reta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>the</strong> Objectives Resoluti<strong>on</strong> as <strong>the</strong> Preamble but dropped <strong>the</strong> word ‘Islamic’ from<br />
<strong>the</strong> country’s title. His successor General Yahya Khan, offered a legal framework order –<br />
an <strong>in</strong>terim c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al arrangement that did not segregate m<strong>in</strong>orities, nor did it coopt<br />
<strong>the</strong> religious groups.<br />
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s 1973 C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> was s<strong>in</strong>gular <strong>in</strong> that it was adopted by elected<br />
representatives, thus reflect<strong>in</strong>g op<strong>in</strong>i<strong>on</strong>s across <strong>the</strong> country. The Objectives Resoluti<strong>on</strong>,<br />
<strong>on</strong>ce aga<strong>in</strong>, became <strong>the</strong> Preamble of <strong>the</strong> C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>, Islam became <strong>the</strong> state religi<strong>on</strong> and<br />
<strong>the</strong> occupants of <strong>the</strong> two highest offices <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> country – <strong>the</strong> President and Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister<br />
– were required to be Muslim. The religio-political elements such as <strong>the</strong> JI and JUI called<br />
for more Islamic clauses to be <strong>in</strong>serted <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>. Bhutto himself <strong>in</strong>itiated <strong>the</strong><br />
process of <strong>in</strong>troduc<strong>in</strong>g Islamiz<strong>in</strong>g amendments to <strong>the</strong> C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>, which was<br />
c<strong>on</strong>solidated by Zia. Bhutto’s anti-Ahmadi legislati<strong>on</strong> c<strong>on</strong>verted <strong>the</strong> Nati<strong>on</strong>al Assembly –<br />
a political <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> – <strong>in</strong>to a forum which def<strong>in</strong>ed a community’s creed and religious<br />
profile.<br />
Zia ul Haq C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al Amendments<br />
The Eighth Amendment (1985) to <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> changed <strong>the</strong> entire spectrum of policies<br />
and attitudes towards m<strong>in</strong>orities and women. Zia’s own religiosity, his effort to woo<br />
religious parties like <strong>the</strong> JI and JUI, and his strategy to counter <strong>the</strong> revoluti<strong>on</strong>ary impact<br />
from neighbor<strong>in</strong>g Iran all underwrote <strong>the</strong>se amendments. Under Zia ul Haq a militaryclerical<br />
nexus was <strong>in</strong>stalled <strong>in</strong> Pakistan. Zia favored Sunnis over Shias and scripturalists<br />
over <strong>the</strong> syncretists. The <strong>in</strong>troducti<strong>on</strong> of ushr, zakat and o<strong>the</strong>r Islamic taxes provoked<br />
protest from Shia groups, with <strong>the</strong> regime agree<strong>in</strong>g to some official c<strong>on</strong>cessi<strong>on</strong>s. Zia<br />
posed as <strong>the</strong> Amir ul Mom<strong>in</strong>een (leader of <strong>the</strong> faithful), with <strong>the</strong> help of a pliant media<br />
c<strong>on</strong>trolled by his generals.<br />
Zia established <strong>the</strong> Federal Sharia Courts and superimposed its verdicts <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> country’s<br />
elected <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>s, br<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g all exist<strong>in</strong>g laws <strong>in</strong> l<strong>in</strong>e with <strong>the</strong> ‘Injuncti<strong>on</strong>s of Islam’. By<br />
br<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Art 260 which specified who was a Muslim and a n<strong>on</strong> Muslim, <strong>the</strong> state<br />
def<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>the</strong> religi<strong>on</strong>s of its citizens, <strong>in</strong> additi<strong>on</strong> to offer<strong>in</strong>g an exclusi<strong>on</strong>ary def<strong>in</strong>iti<strong>on</strong> of<br />
Islam. The sec<strong>on</strong>d amendment (1974) had declared <strong>the</strong> Ahmadis a n<strong>on</strong>-Muslim m<strong>in</strong>ority,<br />
Zia’s Ord<strong>in</strong>ance XX 1984 prohibited any Ahmadi from identify<strong>in</strong>g as a Muslim and<br />
mak<strong>in</strong>g it a punishable offence. Many Ahmadis were tried and c<strong>on</strong>victed for call<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>the</strong>mselves Muslims or us<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> word ‘mosque’ for <strong>the</strong>ir place of worship.<br />
Anti-blasphemy Code and Legal Exclusi<strong>on</strong><br />
The Zia regime’s various amendments and additi<strong>on</strong>s to <strong>the</strong> Penal Code resulted <strong>in</strong> severe<br />
socio-legal discrim<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> aga<strong>in</strong>st m<strong>in</strong>orities. The blasphemy laws established a unilateral<br />
system <strong>in</strong> which any male Muslim can <strong>in</strong>stitute litigati<strong>on</strong>. The law prohibits women and<br />
m<strong>in</strong>orities from <strong>in</strong>itiat<strong>in</strong>g blasphemy cases. The Zia law of evidence (Qano<strong>on</strong>-i-<br />
Shihadah) – equat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> evidence of two women or two n<strong>on</strong>-Muslims to that of a s<strong>in</strong>gle<br />
male Muslim – fur<strong>the</strong>r disempowers n<strong>on</strong>-Muslims and women, while mak<strong>in</strong>g it easier for<br />
Muslim men to pursue legal proceed<strong>in</strong>gs aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> accused party. The 1885 Blasphemy<br />
62
Laws of <strong>the</strong> Raj were <strong>in</strong>troduced to outlaw <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>flam<strong>in</strong>g of religious hatred. These laws<br />
became part of <strong>the</strong> Pakistan Penal Code as Secti<strong>on</strong> 295. Pakistan, under Zia added two<br />
new clauses, B – which br<strong>in</strong>gs with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> punitive ambit of <strong>the</strong> law ‘defilement’<br />
derogatory use of <strong>the</strong> Holy Qur’an and C –which widens ‘<strong>in</strong>tenti<strong>on</strong>’ to <strong>in</strong>clude<br />
“imputati<strong>on</strong>, <strong>in</strong>nuendo, or <strong>in</strong>s<strong>in</strong>uati<strong>on</strong>, directly or <strong>in</strong>directly”; and <strong>the</strong> death penalty.<br />
In February 1994, <strong>the</strong> Chief Justice led Pakistan Law Commissi<strong>on</strong> found that <strong>the</strong> antiblasphemy<br />
clause was be<strong>in</strong>g frequently misused by <strong>the</strong> police and recommended its<br />
review by <strong>the</strong> Islamic Ideology Council. Benazir Bhutto’s government agreed but<br />
follow<strong>in</strong>g nati<strong>on</strong>wide dem<strong>on</strong>strati<strong>on</strong>s, <strong>the</strong> PPP regime backtracked. Musharraf’s regime<br />
also failed to remove <strong>the</strong>m because f <strong>the</strong> outcry of fundamentalists.<br />
The anti-blasphemy code has been used aga<strong>in</strong>st both Muslims and n<strong>on</strong>-Muslims.<br />
Accord<strong>in</strong>g to some reports, <strong>the</strong>re are more Muslims <strong>in</strong> jail accused of blasphemy than<br />
n<strong>on</strong>-Muslims 17 . In August 2002, Rukhsana Bunayad, became <strong>the</strong> first ever Muslim<br />
woman to be arraigned <strong>on</strong> a charge of blasphem<strong>in</strong>g aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> Qur’an <strong>in</strong> a public<br />
meet<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Mianwali.<br />
The Qisas and Diyat Ord<strong>in</strong>ance brought <strong>in</strong> by Zia – Sharia laws regard<strong>in</strong>g murder and<br />
blood m<strong>on</strong>ey – have been part of <strong>the</strong> Penal Code s<strong>in</strong>ce 1990. Qisas and diyat are age-old<br />
tribal traditi<strong>on</strong>s, which allow revenge or payment of blood m<strong>on</strong>ey. These ord<strong>in</strong>ances have<br />
severely hampered m<strong>in</strong>orities’ and women’s ability to obta<strong>in</strong> equal rights and due justice,<br />
especially <strong>in</strong> adverse situati<strong>on</strong>s. First, both women and m<strong>in</strong>orities are completely<br />
disadvantaged as witnesses given <strong>the</strong> law of evidence. Sec<strong>on</strong>d, <strong>the</strong> ord<strong>in</strong>ances offer a<br />
parallel system of private justice where any k<strong>in</strong>d of miscarriage of justice is possible. For<br />
example, <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>sumpti<strong>on</strong> of alcohol was banned <strong>in</strong> Pakistan under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto <strong>in</strong><br />
1976 but n<strong>on</strong>-Muslims were allowed to c<strong>on</strong>sume, manufacture and purchase it via<br />
permits. However, this system has led to corrupti<strong>on</strong> and discrim<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>. While <strong>the</strong><br />
Muslim religious elements denigrated n<strong>on</strong>-Muslims for immoral practices, corrupt<br />
officials encouraged some n<strong>on</strong>-Muslims to run illicit sales. This lowered <strong>the</strong> self-esteem<br />
of Christians, especially, as <strong>the</strong> prohibiti<strong>on</strong> law has led to a k<strong>in</strong>d of ‘moral degradati<strong>on</strong>’<br />
of <strong>the</strong> community and has undoubtedly crim<strong>in</strong>alized certa<strong>in</strong> secti<strong>on</strong>s of <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
communities.<br />
Political Separatism<br />
Significantly, people <strong>in</strong> Pakistan have usually voted for <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>stream n<strong>on</strong> religiopolitical<br />
parties. Also, Pakistanis, generally have not sought separate electorates. It was<br />
Zia who divided Pakistanis <strong>in</strong>to Muslim and n<strong>on</strong>-Muslim voters. In 1984, Art 51 was<br />
amended (Clause 4A) and <strong>the</strong> segregati<strong>on</strong>ist regime of separate electorates for m<strong>in</strong>orities<br />
was established. In o<strong>the</strong>r words, n<strong>on</strong>-Muslims would have <strong>the</strong>ir own c<strong>on</strong>stituencies and<br />
separate representatives. Despite liv<strong>in</strong>g side by side with Muslims, <strong>the</strong>y would not share<br />
<strong>the</strong> same vot<strong>in</strong>g rights and c<strong>on</strong>stituencies. Their c<strong>on</strong>stituency may be shared with people<br />
<strong>the</strong>y have never met or who live hundreds of miles away. Similarly, <strong>the</strong>ir representative<br />
17 Bennett, J., ‘Religi<strong>on</strong> and democracy <strong>in</strong> Pakistan: <strong>the</strong> rights of women and m<strong>in</strong>orities’, SDPI Paper<br />
63
Christian & H<strong>in</strong>du Votes Impact 50 Nati<strong>on</strong>al Assembly Seats<br />
N<strong>on</strong>-Muslim m<strong>in</strong>orities can make a difference <strong>in</strong> no less than 50 Nati<strong>on</strong>al Assembly seats, says<br />
a study by Christian organizati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> 1993 electi<strong>on</strong>s. The basis of <strong>the</strong> study is <strong>the</strong> difference<br />
between <strong>the</strong> votes polled by <strong>the</strong> w<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g and los<strong>in</strong>g candidates, which <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>se seats was far less<br />
than <strong>the</strong> number of <strong>the</strong> registered n<strong>on</strong>-Muslim voters <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>stituency.<br />
The study shows that <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>dus populati<strong>on</strong> is so c<strong>on</strong>centrated <strong>in</strong> Sanghar, Tharparkar and<br />
Mirpur Khas that <strong>the</strong>y could tilt <strong>the</strong> balance <strong>in</strong> three to five seats, and make a difference <strong>in</strong><br />
Jacobabad, Hyderabad, Khairpur, Ghotki, Bad<strong>in</strong> and Karachi with <strong>the</strong> help of Christians and<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r communities.<br />
Christian vot<strong>in</strong>g populati<strong>on</strong> can <strong>in</strong>fluence electi<strong>on</strong> results <strong>in</strong> at least 35 Nati<strong>on</strong>al Assembly<br />
c<strong>on</strong>stituencies <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Punjab and <strong>on</strong>e <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> NWFP. There are five such c<strong>on</strong>stituencies <strong>in</strong><br />
Lahore, four each <strong>in</strong> Faisalabad and Sheikhupura, three each <strong>in</strong> Kasur, Sialkot and Gujranwala<br />
and two each <strong>in</strong> Sargodha, Okara and Sahiwal districts. In <strong>the</strong> NWFP <strong>the</strong>y can decisively<br />
<strong>in</strong>fluence <strong>the</strong> results <strong>in</strong> Chitral c<strong>on</strong>stituency.<br />
Almost all electi<strong>on</strong>s held s<strong>in</strong>ce 1985 show that n<strong>on</strong>-Muslim voters could have made a big<br />
difference. The PPP w<strong>on</strong> from Faisalabad-VI by a marg<strong>in</strong> of <strong>on</strong>ly 159 votes. The number of<br />
n<strong>on</strong>-Muslim votes <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> area was 11,065. Similarly, <strong>the</strong> PML w<strong>on</strong> from Sialkot-III by 391<br />
votes. The Christian voters <strong>the</strong>re numbered 12,568.<br />
Source Mahmood Zaman “<strong>M<strong>in</strong>orities</strong> upbeat <strong>on</strong> jo<strong>in</strong>t electorate” Dawn January 19, 2002<br />
may be a total stranger to <strong>the</strong>m. Moreover, <strong>the</strong> Muslim representatives, even if <strong>the</strong>y live<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> same town, would have no c<strong>on</strong>cern for <strong>the</strong>m.<br />
Zia’s Presidential Order specified 10 seats <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Nati<strong>on</strong>al Assembly for n<strong>on</strong>-Muslims<br />
(four for Christians; four for H<strong>in</strong>dus; <strong>on</strong>e for Sikhs and Parsis toge<strong>the</strong>r; and <strong>on</strong>e for<br />
Ahmadis) and similarly <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> four Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Assemblies (e.g.. <strong>in</strong> S<strong>in</strong>d, n<strong>in</strong>e seats were<br />
reserved for n<strong>on</strong>-Muslims; five for H<strong>in</strong>dus; two for Christians; <strong>on</strong>e for Sikhs; and <strong>on</strong>e for<br />
Ahmadis; <strong>in</strong> Balochistan, <strong>on</strong>e seat was reserved for Christians, and <strong>on</strong>e for H<strong>in</strong>dus, Sikhs<br />
and Parsis comb<strong>in</strong>ed).<br />
The system of separate electorates put <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>ority leadership <strong>in</strong> a dilemma. If <strong>the</strong>y chose<br />
n<strong>on</strong>-participati<strong>on</strong>, <strong>the</strong>y would be totally disenfranchised, whereas participati<strong>on</strong> would be<br />
seen as support<strong>in</strong>g enforced segregati<strong>on</strong>. Before <strong>the</strong> 1993 electi<strong>on</strong>s, a m<strong>in</strong>ority candidate<br />
for <strong>the</strong> Punjab Assembly, Naeem Shakir, had g<strong>on</strong>e to Court. The Supreme Court <strong>in</strong>itially<br />
allowed Muslim and n<strong>on</strong>-Muslim voters to cast <strong>the</strong>ir votes <strong>in</strong>terchangeably across <strong>the</strong><br />
religious boundaries <strong>in</strong> his c<strong>on</strong>stituency. However, a larger bench of <strong>the</strong> Supreme <strong>in</strong><br />
October 1993 reversed its earlier verdict. Naeem Shakir was disallowed from c<strong>on</strong>test<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
64
The forced segregati<strong>on</strong> resulted <strong>in</strong> representatives from <strong>the</strong> majority community ignor<strong>in</strong>g<br />
development schemes <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> areas <strong>in</strong>habited by m<strong>in</strong>orities s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong>y did not fall with<strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong>ir c<strong>on</strong>stituencies. In <strong>the</strong> same way, most of <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>orities, who were already poor,<br />
could not reach <strong>the</strong>ir representatives, ei<strong>the</strong>r because <strong>the</strong>y did not know <strong>the</strong>m or had no<br />
means of c<strong>on</strong>tact<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>m.<br />
Over <strong>the</strong> last two decades, many civic groups Muslim and n<strong>on</strong> Muslim have demanded<br />
<strong>the</strong> annulment of this harmful and immensely discrim<strong>in</strong>atory policy. 18 It was <strong>on</strong>ly after<br />
<strong>the</strong> US acti<strong>on</strong> aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> Taliban, and US pressure <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> government for reforms, that<br />
President Pervez Musharraf, <strong>in</strong> early January 2002, abolished <strong>the</strong> separate electorates, as<br />
well as <strong>the</strong> reserved seats for m<strong>in</strong>orities. Musharraf also removed <strong>the</strong> statement regard<strong>in</strong>g<br />
reaffirmati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> f<strong>in</strong>ality of prophet hood <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> voter’s registrati<strong>on</strong> form, which had<br />
seriously affected <strong>the</strong> Ahmadis. However, with<strong>in</strong> m<strong>on</strong>ths <strong>the</strong> regime was obliged to<br />
resc<strong>in</strong>d its decisi<strong>on</strong> and restored <strong>the</strong> practice <strong>in</strong> May 2002.<br />
Musharraf had <strong>in</strong>creased <strong>the</strong> overall number of seats <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Nati<strong>on</strong>al and Prov<strong>in</strong>cial<br />
Assemblies, and also those reserved for women and m<strong>in</strong>orities. However, meager<br />
ec<strong>on</strong>omic resources and a and a lack of organizati<strong>on</strong>al means have made it nigh<br />
impossible for m<strong>in</strong>ority candidates to c<strong>on</strong>test electi<strong>on</strong>s <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir own.<br />
Majoritarian Pakistan<br />
Zia ushered <strong>in</strong> a socio-political ethos <strong>in</strong> which noti<strong>on</strong> of Pakistan as a sovereign country<br />
was declared an ideological c<strong>on</strong>struct, rooted <strong>in</strong> Islam, which simply added to prevalent<br />
ambiguities about its nati<strong>on</strong>al identity. In additi<strong>on</strong> to civic and social costs, Pakistan<br />
experienced an ec<strong>on</strong>omic downturn because of a hostile attitude towards <strong>in</strong>vestments and<br />
some ec<strong>on</strong>omic practices scared of potential <strong>in</strong>vestors<br />
Politically, rulers have browbeaten <strong>the</strong>ir opp<strong>on</strong>ents us<strong>in</strong>g Sharia. For example, Sharif ’s<br />
supporters aligned with <strong>the</strong> religio political parties, and used Islam and Sharia to<br />
embarrass Benazir Bhutto, denounc<strong>in</strong>g a woman’s leadership of a predom<strong>in</strong>antly Muslim<br />
country. Us<strong>in</strong>g religious populism, Sharif’s supporters demanded <strong>the</strong> implementati<strong>on</strong> of<br />
Sharia laws. In <strong>the</strong> end it was a discomfited Sharif who as Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister, was obliged to<br />
fulfill <strong>the</strong> demand of his coaliti<strong>on</strong> partners to impose Sharia laws <strong>in</strong> every sphere. For<br />
example, religious legislators demanded <strong>the</strong> end to riba (<strong>in</strong>terest <strong>on</strong> loans and sav<strong>in</strong>gs)<br />
and o<strong>the</strong>r radical changes, which deeply unnerved him. To pre-empt grow<strong>in</strong>g pressure<br />
from <strong>the</strong> religious parties, a watered-down versi<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> Sharia Bill was pushed through<br />
by Sharif’s Muslim League government <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Nati<strong>on</strong>al Assembly.<br />
The new legislati<strong>on</strong> re<strong>in</strong>forced <strong>the</strong> Objectives Resoluti<strong>on</strong> and <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r Islamic clauses <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> 1973 C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>, fur<strong>the</strong>r Islamiciz<strong>in</strong>g Pakistan. It required <strong>the</strong> government to<br />
Islamicize <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>al judicial, educati<strong>on</strong>al and ec<strong>on</strong>omic system. Such provisi<strong>on</strong>s<br />
simply ignored <strong>the</strong> plurality of Pakistan and displayed a disregard for n<strong>on</strong>-Muslims’<br />
aspirati<strong>on</strong>s. The exclusi<strong>on</strong> of m<strong>in</strong>orities from socio ec<strong>on</strong>omic life, higher positi<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
civil and military sectors had been <strong>the</strong> everyday experience of discrim<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> and racism<br />
18 .Saleem, A., Pakistan Aur Aqlieeta<strong>in</strong> (Pakistan and m<strong>in</strong>orities,) Karachi, 2000<br />
65
across <strong>the</strong> country. Now, Pakistan’s officially <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>alized discrim<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>, added<br />
ano<strong>the</strong>r dimensi<strong>on</strong> to <strong>the</strong> marg<strong>in</strong>alizati<strong>on</strong> of m<strong>in</strong>orities and women.<br />
The emphasis <strong>on</strong> exclusi<strong>on</strong>ary nati<strong>on</strong>hood as portrayed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> various forms of<br />
c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al arrangements from <strong>the</strong> Objectives Resoluti<strong>on</strong> to Zia’s amendments has<br />
entrenched m<strong>in</strong>orities’ feel<strong>in</strong>gs of <strong>in</strong>equality. As <strong>the</strong> Centre for Legal Aid, Assistance and<br />
Settlement (CLAAS) stated: ‘Laws are not <strong>on</strong>ly a reflecti<strong>on</strong> of society’s attitudes to any<br />
given issue; <strong>the</strong>y can change <strong>the</strong> prevail<strong>in</strong>g attitudes. Good laws can help foster tolerance;<br />
bad laws can fire hate. Attitudes <strong>on</strong>ce set <strong>in</strong>to moti<strong>on</strong> are hard to br<strong>in</strong>g to rest. The<br />
Blasphemy Law has very rapidly <strong>in</strong>cited hate and its misuse c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues with impunity.’<br />
(1999)<br />
Backlash: M<strong>in</strong>oritiy as Scapegoat<br />
In recent years, western policies <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Muslim world have been seen as <strong>in</strong>herently anti-<br />
Muslim and based <strong>on</strong> double standards. The tragic human suffer<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan,<br />
Bosnia, Iraq and Palest<strong>in</strong>e, and <strong>the</strong> denigrati<strong>on</strong> of Islam <strong>in</strong> some quarters follow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
attacks <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> World Trade Center (September 2001), <strong>in</strong>furiated many, especially,<br />
Muslims. The massacre of worshippers <strong>in</strong> Bahawalpur <strong>on</strong> 28 October 2001 and <strong>the</strong><br />
grenade attacks <strong>on</strong> a church <strong>in</strong> Islamabad <strong>on</strong> 17 March 2002, followed by similar attacks<br />
<strong>in</strong> Murree and Taxila, were l<strong>in</strong>ked with <strong>the</strong> fury of some Muslims towards <strong>the</strong> West, with<br />
Pakistani Christians used as a scapegoat. Fur<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>the</strong> frequent fissures and tensi<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong><br />
Indo-Pakistani relati<strong>on</strong>s add to anti-H<strong>in</strong>du feel<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Pakistan, mak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> community<br />
feel <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly <strong>in</strong>secure.<br />
Physical attacks, social stigmatizati<strong>on</strong>, psychological <strong>in</strong>security, forced c<strong>on</strong>versi<strong>on</strong>s and<br />
c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al degradati<strong>on</strong> characterize <strong>the</strong> positi<strong>on</strong> of religious m<strong>in</strong>orities <strong>in</strong><br />
Pakistan. Recent anti-Shia attacks also show a grow<strong>in</strong>g sectarian <strong>in</strong>tolerance towards<br />
Muslim ‘m<strong>in</strong>orities’. On 20 February 2002, five members of a Shia family <strong>in</strong><br />
Chichawatni, near Multan, were murdered by Sunni militants. Six days later, 12 Shia<br />
worshippers were gunned down <strong>in</strong> Rawalp<strong>in</strong>di <strong>in</strong> a mosque, while several o<strong>the</strong>rs were<br />
critically <strong>in</strong>jured.<br />
Pakistan is undergo<strong>in</strong>g a process of fragmentati<strong>on</strong> and exclusi<strong>on</strong> al<strong>on</strong>g seem<strong>in</strong>gly<br />
religious fault-l<strong>in</strong>e, but a deeper analysis may well show that <strong>in</strong> fact <strong>the</strong> feuds may not be<br />
religious, but rooted <strong>in</strong> ec<strong>on</strong>omic and o<strong>the</strong>r factors. A small number of militants have<br />
been able exploit <strong>the</strong> politco-ec<strong>on</strong>omic frustrati<strong>on</strong>s of <strong>the</strong> rest, and <strong>the</strong>se ga<strong>the</strong>r<br />
momentum with<strong>in</strong> a n<strong>on</strong>-democratic system. Moreover, <strong>the</strong> politics of disempowerment<br />
and <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al or regi<strong>on</strong>al geo-political factors fur<strong>the</strong>r fuel this backlash. This is<br />
exacerbated by prevail<strong>in</strong>g prejudices stemm<strong>in</strong>g from ignorance about o<strong>the</strong>r religious<br />
traditi<strong>on</strong>s and by stereotypes of Christians, H<strong>in</strong>dus, Kalasha, Shias and o<strong>the</strong>rs. The<br />
religious bigots <strong>in</strong>flame hatred through <strong>the</strong> mosques and <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> streets, aga<strong>in</strong>st n<strong>on</strong>-<br />
Muslim m<strong>in</strong>orities as well as aga<strong>in</strong>st (Shia) Ismailis, Twelvers and Zikris. 19<br />
19 Accord<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> M<strong>in</strong>ority Rights Group’s annual report, Pakistan has risen by eight places to occupy<br />
eighth positi<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> MRG’s rank<strong>in</strong>g of countries where m<strong>in</strong>orities are at risk.<br />
66
Survey F<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g<br />
70% of <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>ority populati<strong>on</strong> is below 25 years of age with nearly 45% below 18<br />
years [1- 5yrs:17%; 6-17yrs : 28%; 18-25 yrs: 22% and 25-60yrs : 30%] ⊕<br />
Out of <strong>the</strong> 5244 family members above 18 years of age, 49 percent are illiterate<br />
(males 38%:female 56%).<br />
21.4% have are matriculate or have higher qualificati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
97% resp<strong>on</strong>dents state <strong>the</strong>y have complete freedom <strong>in</strong> perform<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ir religious<br />
rituals and prayers.<br />
73% say people of o<strong>the</strong>r religi<strong>on</strong>s do participate <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir religious festivals<br />
Some 68% of resp<strong>on</strong>dents say <strong>the</strong>y own properties <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> districts where <strong>the</strong>y live and<br />
9% percent own property <strong>in</strong> additi<strong>on</strong>al districts.<br />
97% males and 86% female members of m<strong>in</strong>orities have registered <strong>the</strong>ir votes<br />
93 % of <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>ority populati<strong>on</strong> participates <strong>in</strong> cast<strong>in</strong>g votes.<br />
39.45 % resp<strong>on</strong>dents say that <strong>the</strong>y are discrim<strong>in</strong>ated <strong>in</strong> educati<strong>on</strong>al <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>s<br />
30% of <strong>the</strong> resp<strong>on</strong>dents say that <strong>the</strong>y are discrim<strong>in</strong>ated <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> basis of religi<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> job<br />
market.<br />
20.% cite workplace as places where <strong>the</strong>y face discrim<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> basis of religi<strong>on</strong>.<br />
30% of resp<strong>on</strong>dents cite hospitals as places where <strong>the</strong>y face discrim<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong><br />
4% cite government departments<br />
⊕ figures rounded<br />
Mapp<strong>in</strong>g of Religious <strong>M<strong>in</strong>orities</strong> <strong>in</strong> S<strong>in</strong>d & Baluchistan 20<br />
Survey focused largely <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> Christian and H<strong>in</strong>du m<strong>in</strong>orities which were c<strong>on</strong>centrated <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong>se 10 districts. Mapp<strong>in</strong>g was structured around two comp<strong>on</strong>ents, 40 Focus Group<br />
Discussi<strong>on</strong>s followed by Survey Questi<strong>on</strong>naire adm<strong>in</strong>istered to1000 resp<strong>on</strong>dents<br />
Teach<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> schools is heavily oriented towards Islamiciz<strong>in</strong>g pupils. For example, 20<br />
extra marks are given to any candidate for admissi<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong>to schools and higher <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>s<br />
for memoriz<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Qur’an. Even pris<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong>mates receive a remissi<strong>on</strong> for learn<strong>in</strong>g or<br />
memoriz<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Qur’an. The lack of a proper educati<strong>on</strong>al system and a holistic syllabus<br />
20 Bauchistan districts of Noshki, Bolan, Nasserabad, Jaffarabad and Sibi; S<strong>in</strong>d districts are Umarkot,<br />
Mirpurkhas, Sanghar, Tharparkat and Bad<strong>in</strong>.<br />
67
that takes Pakistan’s plural traditi<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong>to account has <strong>on</strong>ly added to a great sense of<br />
loss 21 .<br />
Based <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1998 census, Pakistan’s Nati<strong>on</strong>al Council for Justice and Peace (NCJP) <strong>in</strong> a<br />
study ( 2001) of literacy profile of m<strong>in</strong>orities’ found that <strong>the</strong> average literacy rate am<strong>on</strong>g<br />
Christians <strong>in</strong> Punjab, is 34 per cent, compared to <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>al average of nearly 47per<br />
cent. The average literacy rate am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Jati (upper caste) H<strong>in</strong>dus is 34 percent,<br />
scheduled castes (Dalits) 19 percent, and o<strong>the</strong>rs (<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g Parsis, Buddhists, Sikhs and<br />
nomads) is 17 per cent, respectively. For Ahmadis, it is slightly higher than <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>al<br />
average of 51.67 per cent. Similarly, <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r socio-ec<strong>on</strong>omic <strong>in</strong>dicators, m<strong>in</strong>orities<br />
were mostly found lagg<strong>in</strong>g beh<strong>in</strong>d 22 .<br />
Fur<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>the</strong> ec<strong>on</strong>omic marg<strong>in</strong>alizati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>orities’, that is, <strong>the</strong>ir c<strong>on</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ement to<br />
menial, low-paid and low-status work, especially for Christians and H<strong>in</strong>dus – has<br />
seriously dim<strong>in</strong>ished <strong>the</strong>ir self-esteem, besides c<strong>on</strong>solidat<strong>in</strong>g ethno-religious stereotypes.<br />
With a few excepti<strong>on</strong>s, most Christians (male and female) work as street sweepers and<br />
suffer from discrim<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>. The rural H<strong>in</strong>dus are mostly poor and lack organizati<strong>on</strong>, and<br />
are vulnerable to feudal and police oppressi<strong>on</strong>.<br />
There are <strong>in</strong>flammatory posters <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> streets aga<strong>in</strong>st m<strong>in</strong>orities; for example, <strong>the</strong>re are<br />
anti-Ahmadi statements outside mosques, and signs outside hair sal<strong>on</strong>s and water<br />
purificati<strong>on</strong> plants prohibit<strong>in</strong>g n<strong>on</strong>-Muslims’ entry 23 . Fur<strong>the</strong>r, frequent graffiti betray <strong>the</strong><br />
str<strong>on</strong>g anti-m<strong>in</strong>ority prejudices of secti<strong>on</strong>s of society. In <strong>the</strong> Federal M<strong>in</strong>istry of<br />
Religious and <strong>M<strong>in</strong>orities</strong> Affairs – <strong>the</strong> <strong>on</strong>ly <strong>on</strong>e am<strong>on</strong>g 40 m<strong>in</strong>istries to deal specifically<br />
with m<strong>in</strong>orities – <strong>the</strong>re is an <strong>in</strong>scripti<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong> hall: ‘Of course, Islam is <strong>the</strong> best<br />
religi<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> eyes of GOD’. To Muslims, this may be right given its Qur’anic c<strong>on</strong>text,<br />
but stat<strong>in</strong>g this <strong>in</strong> a nati<strong>on</strong>al m<strong>in</strong>istry deal<strong>in</strong>g with n<strong>on</strong>-Muslims, shows a misplaced<br />
emphasis <strong>on</strong> uniformity.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> media, <strong>the</strong> mas<strong>the</strong>ads of Pakistan’s Urdu newspapers and magaz<strong>in</strong>es rout<strong>in</strong>ely<br />
carry a verse from <strong>the</strong> Qur’an, while <strong>the</strong> teach<strong>in</strong>gs or beliefs of o<strong>the</strong>r religi<strong>on</strong>s are not<br />
displayed at all. Some of <strong>the</strong> English press and some Urdu newspapers and magaz<strong>in</strong>es<br />
generally play a resp<strong>on</strong>sible role while report<strong>in</strong>g <strong>on</strong> plural issues, but communal elements<br />
popularize anti-m<strong>in</strong>ority myths, especially dur<strong>in</strong>g a local or regi<strong>on</strong>al crisis. Radio and<br />
televisi<strong>on</strong> offer programmes <strong>on</strong> Islam but make no organized effort to raise awareness of<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r religi<strong>on</strong>s or of <strong>the</strong> need for pluralism.<br />
Also, <strong>the</strong>re have been <strong>in</strong>stances when <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>citement of religious hatred has been used to<br />
acquire properties bel<strong>on</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g to m<strong>in</strong>orities. Mob attacks have taken place and cases of<br />
blasphemy have been lodged aga<strong>in</strong>st n<strong>on</strong>-Muslims. In <strong>the</strong> early 1990s, <strong>the</strong> case of<br />
21 When asked about a new educati<strong>on</strong>al curriculum to create a greater sense of respect and shar<strong>in</strong>g of plural<br />
traditi<strong>on</strong>s, asenior official <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> M<strong>in</strong>istry of Religious and M<strong>in</strong>ority Affairs was <strong>in</strong>different. Instead, he<br />
asked <strong>the</strong> author to visit <strong>the</strong> M<strong>in</strong>istry of Educati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> each of <strong>the</strong> four prov<strong>in</strong>ces as ‘it did not come with<strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> purview of this M<strong>in</strong>istry’.<br />
22 NCJP, Human Rights M<strong>on</strong>itor – 2001, Lahore, NCJP, 2001<br />
23 Nati<strong>on</strong>al Commissi<strong>on</strong> for Justice and Peace (NCJP), Human Rights M<strong>on</strong>itor – 1999, Lahore, NCJP, 2000<br />
68
Salamat Masih of Gujranwala, and o<strong>the</strong>rs, made headl<strong>in</strong>es. One of <strong>the</strong> accused had to<br />
seek exile, while two o<strong>the</strong>rs were murdered <strong>on</strong> court premises.<br />
Land and property alienati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> n<strong>on</strong> Muslims has been aided and abetted by <strong>the</strong><br />
policies of <strong>the</strong> Evacuee Property Trust, which s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> early 1950’s adm<strong>in</strong>istered and<br />
allocated properties to immigrants. These properties bel<strong>on</strong>ged to n<strong>on</strong>-Muslims who left<br />
for India dur<strong>in</strong>g partiti<strong>on</strong>. Various landown<strong>in</strong>g groups seek out prime properties hous<strong>in</strong>g<br />
temples and churches, and use religi<strong>on</strong> as a ploy to dislodge <strong>the</strong> owners. The recent anti-<br />
Christian disturbances <strong>in</strong> Faisalabad, Gujranwala and Khanewal were l<strong>in</strong>ked with such<br />
‘land mafia’ groups.<br />
C<strong>on</strong>clusi<strong>on</strong><br />
The policies and acti<strong>on</strong>s of n<strong>on</strong> representative regimes and <strong>the</strong> difficult <strong>in</strong>ter state<br />
relati<strong>on</strong>s have worsened <strong>in</strong>tercommunity relati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Asia</strong>. Moreover, <strong>the</strong> forces of<br />
politico-religious populism and extremism are encouraged by poverty and<br />
disillusi<strong>on</strong>ment over <strong>the</strong> failure of democratic governance and development. As admitted<br />
by <strong>the</strong> government <strong>in</strong> 2001, every third Pakistani is liv<strong>in</strong>g below <strong>the</strong> poverty l<strong>in</strong>e. From<br />
17 percent <strong>in</strong> 1990s, <strong>the</strong> number liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> poverty has deepened to 34 per cent by 2000.<br />
The most vulnerable are <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>orities. It is argued that <strong>the</strong> situati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>orities’ of<br />
abject poverty, discrim<strong>in</strong>atory lack of development <strong>in</strong>frastructure, high rate of<br />
unemployment, <strong>the</strong> emphasis <strong>on</strong> religious uniformity are all l<strong>in</strong>ked to official policy of<br />
populist appeasement has reduced milli<strong>on</strong>s of people <strong>in</strong> Pakistan to feel<strong>in</strong>g like sec<strong>on</strong>d<br />
and even third class citizens. In 1992, cod<strong>in</strong>g religious affiliati<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>al identity<br />
cards was nearly c<strong>on</strong>ceded, and was withdrawn <strong>on</strong>ly after str<strong>on</strong>g protest from civic<br />
groups. However, <strong>the</strong> reiterati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> khatam-i-nubawwat (<strong>the</strong> f<strong>in</strong>ality of <strong>the</strong><br />
Prophethood) is formally <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>alized <strong>on</strong> passport applicati<strong>on</strong>s and voter registrati<strong>on</strong><br />
forms. This reaffirmati<strong>on</strong> is supplemented with <strong>the</strong> rejecti<strong>on</strong> of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as<br />
a ‘false claimant’ to <strong>the</strong> successi<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> Prophet. It has de-facto disenfranchised<br />
Ahmadi community as well raised obstacles <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir acquir<strong>in</strong>g passports.<br />
Ahmadis and Christians are <strong>the</strong> communities that have most regularly documented cases<br />
of discrim<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> and oppressi<strong>on</strong>, both at <strong>the</strong> official and societal levels. While each<br />
m<strong>in</strong>ority community may have its own respective safety networks, <strong>the</strong> Christians <strong>in</strong> this<br />
sense seem to be better organized, with church-based and secular organizati<strong>on</strong>s emerg<strong>in</strong>g<br />
to focus <strong>on</strong> human rights. The rural nature of most of <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>du communities has<br />
precluded such <strong>in</strong>itiatives. On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, Parsis and Ismailis (<strong>the</strong> latter not<br />
characterized as a m<strong>in</strong>ority) are <strong>the</strong> most organized and well-knit communities. The<br />
Ahmadis are well-organized and affluent, yet official and societal anger puts many<br />
restricti<strong>on</strong>s <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir social and religious mobility, and <strong>the</strong>ir organizati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
The reality of Pakistan is that it is a multi-ethnic, multi religious country. Pakistani<br />
nati<strong>on</strong>alism must symbolize <strong>the</strong> plural realities of society ra<strong>the</strong>r than demand<strong>in</strong>g or<br />
impos<strong>in</strong>g a unitary nati<strong>on</strong>hood. We argue, that <strong>the</strong> overwhelm<strong>in</strong>g majority of <strong>the</strong><br />
populati<strong>on</strong> of our country rema<strong>in</strong>s tolerant and <strong>in</strong> favor of giv<strong>in</strong>g equal rights to<br />
69
m<strong>in</strong>orities and women. This was ev<strong>in</strong>ced <strong>in</strong> a major nati<strong>on</strong>al survey undertaken <strong>in</strong> 1997,<br />
which showed that 74 per cent of <strong>the</strong> people supported a ban <strong>on</strong> sectarian groups; 81 per<br />
cent demanded a stop to hate-<strong>in</strong>cit<strong>in</strong>g khutbas (serm<strong>on</strong>s) <strong>in</strong> mosques; 67 per cent rejected<br />
<strong>the</strong> Taliban-style restricti<strong>on</strong>s <strong>on</strong> women; 59 per cent wanted to give women <strong>the</strong> right to<br />
divorce; 63 per cent believed <strong>in</strong> giv<strong>in</strong>g equal weight to <strong>the</strong> evidence of women and men;<br />
74 per cent favored family plann<strong>in</strong>g; and 74 per cent supported jo<strong>in</strong>t electorates 24 .<br />
Bibliography<br />
An<strong>on</strong>., Summary of <strong>the</strong> Cases Instituted aga<strong>in</strong>st Ahmadis <strong>in</strong> Pakistan (from April 1981 to<br />
July 23, 2001), mimeo, n.d.<br />
Akhtar, S., Tehreek-I-Pakistan Kay Gumnan Kirdaar, Rawalp<strong>in</strong>di,Christian Study<br />
Centre, 1997.<br />
Centre for Legal Aid Assistance and Settlement (CLAAS), Progress Report for <strong>the</strong> Year<br />
2000, Lahore, CLAAS, 2000.<br />
CLAAS, Cases Aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>M<strong>in</strong>orities</strong> 2000, Lahore, CLAAS, 2001.<br />
CLAAS, Some Victims of Allegedly Defil<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Holy Quran 295B and <strong>the</strong> Holy Prophet<br />
(PBUH) 295C, Lahore, CLAAS, 2000<br />
Durrrani, T., My Feudal Lord, L<strong>on</strong>d<strong>on</strong>, Corgi, 1995.<br />
French, P., Liberty or Death?, L<strong>on</strong>d<strong>on</strong>, Flam<strong>in</strong>go, 1998.<br />
Human Rights Commissi<strong>on</strong> of Pakistan (HRCP), State of Human Rights <strong>in</strong> Pakistan,<br />
2000, Lahore, HRCP, 2001.<br />
HRCP, State of Human Rights <strong>in</strong> Pakistan, 1997-2007<br />
Jalal, A., The Sole Spokesman: J<strong>in</strong>nah, <strong>the</strong> Muslim League and <strong>the</strong> Demand for Pakistan,<br />
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985.<br />
Kenoyer, M., Ancient Cities of <strong>the</strong> Indus Valley Civilizati<strong>on</strong>, Karachi, Oxford University<br />
Press, 1998.<br />
Mahbub ul–Haq Human Development Centre, Human Development <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Asia</strong>, 2001,<br />
Karachi, Oxford University Press, 2000 - 2003<br />
Malai, N.A., Asalathul Zakar<strong>in</strong>, Turbat, 1994.<br />
24 ‘What do Pakistanis really want?’ Herald (Karachi), January 1997<br />
70
Malik, I.H., Islam Nati<strong>on</strong>alism and <strong>the</strong> West: Issues of Identity <strong>in</strong> Pakistan, Oxford, St<br />
Ant<strong>on</strong>y’s-Macmillan, 1999.<br />
Malik, I.H., State and Civil Society <strong>in</strong> Pakistan: Politics of Authority Ideology and<br />
Ethnicity, Oxford, St Ant<strong>on</strong>y’s-Macmillan, 1997.<br />
Malik, I.H., U.S.–<strong>South</strong> <strong>Asia</strong> Relati<strong>on</strong>s, 1784–1940: A Historical Perspective, Islamabad,<br />
Area Study Centre, 1988.<br />
Mughal, D. and Jivan, J. (eds), Religious <strong>M<strong>in</strong>orities</strong> <strong>in</strong> Pakistan:Struggle for Identity,<br />
Rawalp<strong>in</strong>di, Christian Study Centre, 1996.<br />
Mujeeb-ur-Rahman, Persecuti<strong>on</strong> of Ahmadis <strong>in</strong> Pakistan, Maple, Islamic Internati<strong>on</strong>al<br />
Publicati<strong>on</strong>s, 1993.<br />
Nati<strong>on</strong>al Commissi<strong>on</strong> for Justice and Peace (NCJP), Human Rights M<strong>on</strong>itor – 199 to<br />
2006, Lahore, NCJP, 1998.<br />
Nazir-Ali, M., Pakistani Christians, mimeo, Rochester, Bishopscourt, 21 October 1991.<br />
Qaisarqandi, A.M., Zikri Mazhab Aur Islam, Karachi, Khattam-INabuwwat, 1978.<br />
Roberts<strong>on</strong>, G.S., The Kafirs of <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>du-Kush, Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1986<br />
(repr<strong>in</strong>t).<br />
Roberts<strong>on</strong>, G.S., Chitral: The Story of a M<strong>in</strong>or Siege, Karachi, Oxford University Press,<br />
1977 (repr<strong>in</strong>t).<br />
Saleem, A., Pakistan Aur Aqlieeta<strong>in</strong>, Karachi, Daniyal, 2000.<br />
Siss<strong>on</strong>, R. and Rose, L., War and Secessi<strong>on</strong>: Pakistan, India, and <strong>the</strong> Creati<strong>on</strong> of<br />
Bangladesh, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1990.<br />
Syed, A.H., The Discourse and Politics of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Bas<strong>in</strong>gstoke, Macmillan,<br />
1992.<br />
Talbot, I., Pakistan: A Modern History, L<strong>on</strong>d<strong>on</strong>, Hurst and Co., 1998.<br />
Talbot, I., Freedom’s Cry: The Popular Dimensi<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Pakistan Movement and <strong>the</strong><br />
Partiti<strong>on</strong> Experience <strong>in</strong> North-west India, Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1996.<br />
Titus, P. (ed.), Marg<strong>in</strong>ality and Modernity: Ethnicity and Change <strong>in</strong> Post-Col<strong>on</strong>ial<br />
Balochistan, Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1996.<br />
Wheeler, R.E.M., Five Thousand Years: An Archaeological Outl<strong>in</strong>e, L<strong>on</strong>d<strong>on</strong>, Christopher<br />
Johns<strong>on</strong> (Publishers) Ltd, 1950.<br />
71
Wolpert, S., Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan, Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1994.<br />
Zir<strong>in</strong>g, L., The Ayub Khan Era: Politics <strong>in</strong> Pakistan, 1958–1969, Syracuse, Syracuse<br />
University Press, 1971.<br />
See also: Dawn, D<strong>in</strong>, Friday Times, Guardian, Herald, Jang, Jihd-i-Haq, Mirror, Nawai-Waqt,<br />
News, Newsl<strong>in</strong>e, Ux-o-Aeena, and various reports by Amnesty Internati<strong>on</strong>al and<br />
Human Rights<br />
72
Strangers <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> House<br />
<strong>M<strong>in</strong>orities</strong> <strong>in</strong> Pakistani Textbooks<br />
Rub<strong>in</strong>a Saigol ♣<br />
Collectively Remember<strong>in</strong>g, Forgett<strong>in</strong>g Toge<strong>the</strong>r<br />
Historical narratives are a part of <strong>the</strong> process of nati<strong>on</strong> build<strong>in</strong>g and state formati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
They c<strong>on</strong>struct nati<strong>on</strong>al memory and determ<strong>in</strong>e what we collectively choose to remember<br />
and what we are required to forget as we tell <strong>the</strong> tale of our collective com<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to be<strong>in</strong>g<br />
as a nati<strong>on</strong> and as a state. Carefully crafted nati<strong>on</strong>al stories of suffer<strong>in</strong>g, loss, death, pride<br />
and martyrdom enable a diverse and heterogeneous group of people to feel an imag<strong>in</strong>ed<br />
sense of <strong>on</strong>eness called nati<strong>on</strong>al identity. This identity is manufactured by exclusi<strong>on</strong>s<br />
(forgett<strong>in</strong>g, elid<strong>in</strong>g, overlook<strong>in</strong>g) those who do not bel<strong>on</strong>g, and <strong>in</strong>clusi<strong>on</strong>s (remember<strong>in</strong>g,<br />
glorify<strong>in</strong>g and claim<strong>in</strong>g) those who do bel<strong>on</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong> as it is officially def<strong>in</strong>ed,<br />
agreed and stamped and approved. Those who form an <strong>in</strong>tegral part of <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>, <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>siders, are collapsed <strong>in</strong>to an imag<strong>in</strong>ed homogeneity of goodness, while those who are<br />
external to <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>’s, forever challenged and precarious, self-def<strong>in</strong>iti<strong>on</strong>- <strong>the</strong> outsiders,<br />
are also homogenized <strong>in</strong>to an evil or wicked <strong>on</strong>eness.<br />
Nati<strong>on</strong>s, and particularly newly formed states, reiterate <strong>the</strong> story of <strong>the</strong>ir com<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to<br />
be<strong>in</strong>g, lest <strong>the</strong> carefully woven tale is forgotten. The wounds <strong>in</strong>flicted by <strong>the</strong> evil<br />
outsiders, <strong>the</strong> perpetual enemies, are relived so that future generati<strong>on</strong>s do not forget <strong>the</strong><br />
blood spilled and <strong>the</strong> sacrifice given that nurtured <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>fant tree at its birth. Similarly,<br />
<strong>the</strong> heroic deeds, real or c<strong>on</strong>jured , of those who spilled <strong>the</strong>ir blood are remembered,<br />
reiterated, repeated, retold, embellished and re-written as often as <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>’s actual<br />
existence is challenged or threatened by enemies with<strong>in</strong> and enemies without.<br />
There are many forms of writ<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> legends and folktales of <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong> for nati<strong>on</strong>al<br />
memory. There are c<strong>in</strong>ematic representati<strong>on</strong>s, televisi<strong>on</strong> serials, nati<strong>on</strong>alist poetry and<br />
s<strong>on</strong>gs, nati<strong>on</strong>al day parades and tower<strong>in</strong>g m<strong>on</strong>uments that all recount <strong>the</strong> ‘great history of<br />
<strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong> and state’ for posterity. However, <strong>the</strong> most effective, far-reach<strong>in</strong>g and reliable<br />
method of ensur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>uity of nati<strong>on</strong>alist legends and myths is through <strong>the</strong><br />
omnipresent, ubiquitous and easy to acquire and grasp textbook – <strong>the</strong> textbook enables<br />
<strong>the</strong> future generati<strong>on</strong> to remember itself, its history and its glory with an ease rarely<br />
available to o<strong>the</strong>r forms of public talk<strong>in</strong>g. It is cheap, often compulsory, available<br />
everywhere and <strong>the</strong>re is always <strong>the</strong> teacher, <strong>the</strong> school, <strong>the</strong> textbook board and <strong>the</strong><br />
m<strong>in</strong>istry of educati<strong>on</strong> to ensure that <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>al story is told, reiterated, revised,<br />
remembered and spewed out faithfully <strong>on</strong> an exam<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> paper. The latter method<br />
♣ This paper is a shortened versi<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> article ‘Enemies With<strong>in</strong> and Enemies Without: Representati<strong>on</strong><br />
of <strong>the</strong> O<strong>the</strong>r <strong>in</strong> Textbooks’. In Futures: The Journal of Policy, Plann<strong>in</strong>g and Futures. ‘Futures Bey<strong>on</strong>d<br />
Nati<strong>on</strong>alism’. Vol. 37. No. 9, pp. 1005-1035.November 2005. Imtiaz Ahmad (Ed) Elsevier.<br />
73
ensures that it is fully absorbed and <strong>in</strong>ternalized. The entire system built around <strong>the</strong><br />
textbook is designed to ensure that it works – that it reproduces <strong>the</strong> myths of <strong>the</strong> state and<br />
legends of <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
One of <strong>the</strong> biggest problems <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>al tale is - ‘those who do not fit’ or ‘those who<br />
do not fit completely’ <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>al narrative. These are <strong>the</strong> blemishes and sta<strong>in</strong>s <strong>on</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>al fabric that rupture its smooth surface, ta<strong>in</strong>t its pure weave and become<br />
uncomfortable rem<strong>in</strong>ders that all is not great and w<strong>on</strong>derful <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> story of <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
Ei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>se ‘spots’ have to be removed to ‘clean’ <strong>the</strong> carefully designed fabric, or <strong>the</strong>se<br />
‘o<strong>the</strong>rs’, <strong>the</strong>se <strong>in</strong>trusive outsiders that do not bel<strong>on</strong>g, have to be covered up, c<strong>on</strong>cealed<br />
and forgotten. They have to be re-written or written out of history. These are <strong>the</strong><br />
m<strong>in</strong>orities that <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong> can ei<strong>the</strong>r not acknowledge or claim <strong>on</strong>ly partially as <strong>the</strong>y are<br />
rem<strong>in</strong>ders of a c<strong>on</strong>necti<strong>on</strong> with <strong>the</strong> past that must be forgotten for <strong>the</strong> sake of <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>’s<br />
purity. They are also rem<strong>in</strong>ders of <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>’s c<strong>on</strong>necti<strong>on</strong>s to many ‘o<strong>the</strong>rs’, to many<br />
outsiders who do not bel<strong>on</strong>g. They are unhappy rem<strong>in</strong>ders that <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong> is not quite as<br />
pure as it would like to be – that it is mixed, that it has a multiplicity of ‘o<strong>the</strong>rs’,ei<strong>the</strong>r<br />
religious, l<strong>in</strong>guistic or ethnic that rupture its o<strong>the</strong>rwise m<strong>on</strong>ot<strong>on</strong>ous and un<strong>in</strong>terrupted tale<br />
of <strong>on</strong>eness and glory.<br />
A Tale of Two Nati<strong>on</strong>s<br />
Pakistan’s tale of <strong>the</strong> two nati<strong>on</strong>s is riddled with sta<strong>in</strong>s and spots that do not fit <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong><br />
neat nati<strong>on</strong>al design. The story of <strong>the</strong> Pakistani nati<strong>on</strong>, built <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> epic idea of two<br />
eternally opposed groups, forever enemies and permanently separated by history,<br />
experience and memory, is fractured by <strong>the</strong> presence of too many ‘o<strong>the</strong>rs’. Inside <strong>the</strong><br />
territory of <strong>the</strong> pure, resid<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> very heart of <strong>the</strong> land of <strong>the</strong> pure, are groups of<br />
people bel<strong>on</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g to o<strong>the</strong>r religi<strong>on</strong>s – Christians, H<strong>in</strong>dus, Parsis – all those who <strong>in</strong>terrupt<br />
<strong>the</strong> tale of religious <strong>on</strong>eness crafted with so much pa<strong>in</strong>stak<strong>in</strong>g effort. Additi<strong>on</strong>ally, <strong>the</strong>re<br />
are Sikhs lurk<strong>in</strong>g <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> borders, and Jews some distance away who also figure <strong>in</strong> <strong>on</strong>e or<br />
ano<strong>the</strong>r way <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> story of <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
To make matters worse for <strong>the</strong> sp<strong>in</strong>ners of <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>al tale, <strong>the</strong>re are/were l<strong>in</strong>guistic and<br />
ethnic m<strong>in</strong>orities – those Bengalis sitt<strong>in</strong>g <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> golden jute, those S<strong>in</strong>dhis with <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
access to <strong>the</strong> riches of <strong>the</strong> sea <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> south, those Balochis sitt<strong>in</strong>g <strong>on</strong> those fabulous riches<br />
deep with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> land and those Pakhto<strong>on</strong>s hold<strong>in</strong>g forth <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> mounta<strong>in</strong>s of <strong>the</strong> north.<br />
The Punjabi, Muslim, Sunni, Hanafi (preferably male) – <strong>the</strong> arch prototype Pakistani – is<br />
beleaguered by <strong>the</strong>se many o<strong>the</strong>rs <strong>on</strong> all sides. He must subjugate <strong>the</strong>m, br<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>m <strong>in</strong>to<br />
l<strong>in</strong>e, erase <strong>the</strong>m and, if noth<strong>in</strong>g else works, write <strong>the</strong>m out of HIS-story so that HE can<br />
live happily forever <strong>in</strong> his fairyland of <strong>the</strong> five rivers, his Punjab, know<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>the</strong> world<br />
is HIS oyster.<br />
The most effective tool of <strong>the</strong> powerful – <strong>the</strong> powerful of any nati<strong>on</strong>, ethnicity or religi<strong>on</strong><br />
– is <strong>the</strong> word and <strong>the</strong> image, that help forge that ultimate weap<strong>on</strong> – <strong>the</strong> textbook and <strong>in</strong><br />
particular <strong>the</strong> social studies history textbook. Through its words and images, <strong>the</strong><br />
textbook silences and speaks, hides and reveals, tells and refuses to tell <strong>the</strong> story of <strong>the</strong><br />
nati<strong>on</strong>, its o<strong>the</strong>rs, its enemies, its outsiders and most especially – <strong>the</strong> outsiders with<strong>in</strong>. It<br />
74
is <strong>the</strong>se outsiders with<strong>in</strong>, <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>orities that <strong>in</strong>tercept <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>al story <strong>in</strong> so many places<br />
that are most difficult to def<strong>in</strong>e or not def<strong>in</strong>e, erase, silence or make <strong>in</strong>visible.<br />
One way that <strong>in</strong>genious weavers of <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>al tale use to deal with <strong>the</strong>se uncomfortable<br />
presences is to turn <strong>the</strong>m <strong>in</strong>to cameos – <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>herently evil H<strong>in</strong>du, <strong>the</strong> trickster and cheat<br />
Englishman, <strong>the</strong> knife-wield<strong>in</strong>g, butcher<strong>in</strong>g Sikh, <strong>the</strong> m<strong>on</strong>eylender Jew and <strong>the</strong> backstabb<strong>in</strong>g<br />
Bengali.<br />
Inherently Evil: The H<strong>in</strong>du O<strong>the</strong>r<br />
The H<strong>in</strong>du ‘o<strong>the</strong>r’, is represented as racist and fundamentalist. One sub-head<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> a book<br />
<strong>on</strong> Civics is ‘H<strong>in</strong>du Revivalism and Fundamentalism’. The <strong>in</strong>tenti<strong>on</strong>s of <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>du o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
are described <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g way:<br />
The H<strong>in</strong>dus had become very ambitious dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> 19 th century. They were dream<strong>in</strong>g of<br />
mak<strong>in</strong>g this vast sub-c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ent a H<strong>in</strong>du land by driv<strong>in</strong>g out <strong>the</strong> British rulers and<br />
exterm<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Muslims whom <strong>the</strong>y called Malichchas or dirty people. It was <strong>the</strong><br />
same k<strong>in</strong>d of racialism and race-hatred that is found <strong>in</strong> all aggressive peoples and nati<strong>on</strong>s,<br />
like <strong>the</strong> ancient Aryans who called <strong>the</strong> n<strong>on</strong>-Aryans as Dasyus or black-dem<strong>on</strong>s, or like<br />
Americans and Europeans who call <strong>the</strong> n<strong>on</strong>-white peoples of <strong>the</strong> world as ‘gooks’, etc. 1<br />
One fails to see how <strong>the</strong> author discovered that all <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>dus had become ambitious<br />
dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> 19 th century, and how did he have access to what <strong>the</strong>y were dream<strong>in</strong>g about.<br />
N<strong>on</strong>e<strong>the</strong>less, <strong>the</strong>se asserti<strong>on</strong>s are made <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> text al<strong>on</strong>g with <strong>the</strong> claim that <strong>the</strong> same k<strong>in</strong>d<br />
of racialism and race-hatred is found am<strong>on</strong>g all aggressive peoples and nati<strong>on</strong>s. The<br />
examples given are <strong>the</strong> Aryans, Americans and Europeans. Here all <strong>the</strong> perceived<br />
‘o<strong>the</strong>rs’ are lumped toge<strong>the</strong>r and provided with <strong>the</strong> attribute of aggressi<strong>on</strong> that allegedly<br />
‘all of <strong>the</strong>m’ possess as a natural trait. S<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> ‘o<strong>the</strong>r’ is<br />
simultaneously a c<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> Self as <strong>the</strong> absence of all that <strong>the</strong> ‘o<strong>the</strong>r’ represents,<br />
it is implied that Muslims are not aggressive or ambitious and do not have expansi<strong>on</strong>ist<br />
dreams. The history of <strong>the</strong> sub-c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ent gives <strong>the</strong> lie to such a suggesti<strong>on</strong>, but <strong>the</strong>n what<br />
is often miss<strong>in</strong>g from this k<strong>in</strong>d of history is History itself.<br />
There is a subtle but discernible shift <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> gendered nature of <strong>the</strong> discourse of <strong>the</strong> self<br />
and o<strong>the</strong>r. In my earlier study of <strong>the</strong> textbooks of <strong>the</strong> Ayub Khan, Zulfikar Bhutto and<br />
Zia-ul-Haq eras, I argued that textbook writers tend to create <strong>the</strong> Muslim heroes <strong>in</strong> highly<br />
mascul<strong>in</strong>e, active, potent and virile terms, while c<strong>on</strong>struct<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>du ‘o<strong>the</strong>r’ <strong>in</strong><br />
fem<strong>in</strong>ized terms such as weak, unable to fight, timid and passive. 2 While this is still <strong>the</strong><br />
case <strong>in</strong> many textbooks which glorify Muslim c<strong>on</strong>quest and warriors, <strong>the</strong>re is a<br />
perceptible tendency <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> current textbooks to c<strong>on</strong>struct <strong>the</strong> ‘o<strong>the</strong>rs’ of Muslims <strong>in</strong><br />
terms that are aggressive, mascul<strong>in</strong>e, active and potent, even though negative. When<br />
Muslim c<strong>on</strong>quest, glory and imperial pursuit are discussed, <strong>the</strong> mascul<strong>in</strong>ist discourse<br />
becomes celebratory. The heroes of <strong>the</strong> Muslims are great, str<strong>on</strong>g, brave and valiant.<br />
However, when <strong>the</strong> ‘o<strong>the</strong>r’ is discussed <strong>in</strong> active and mascul<strong>in</strong>e terms, <strong>the</strong> discourse<br />
shifts to a different moral ground. In <strong>the</strong> case of n<strong>on</strong>-Muslims, <strong>the</strong> desire for war is<br />
1 Mazhar-ul-Haq, Civics of Pakistan, p. 5.<br />
2 Rub<strong>in</strong>a Saigol, Knowledge and Identity.<br />
75
aggressiveness and H<strong>in</strong>dus are aggressive, ambitious, hostile, war-m<strong>on</strong>gerers and antipeace.<br />
The Muslim Self takes <strong>on</strong> fem<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>e postures vis a vis hostile ‘o<strong>the</strong>rs’ who have<br />
evil designs aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong>m.<br />
However, occasi<strong>on</strong>ally <strong>the</strong> ultra mascul<strong>in</strong>e Muslim image as c<strong>on</strong>queror, <strong>in</strong>vader and<br />
warrior appears <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> social studies textbooks written <strong>in</strong> 2002 but produced under <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>fluence and curriculum guidel<strong>in</strong>es of <strong>the</strong> era of General Zia. The curriculum prepared<br />
by <strong>the</strong> Nati<strong>on</strong>al Curriculum Committee, M<strong>in</strong>istry of Educati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> 1984 requires that <strong>the</strong><br />
spread of Islam and Mohd. B<strong>in</strong> Qasim’s <strong>in</strong>vasi<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong> India be taught to students. 3 Under<br />
‘Affective Objectives’ <strong>the</strong> curriculum <strong>in</strong>cludes ‘aspirati<strong>on</strong>s for Jehad’, love and regard<br />
for Islamic values, and am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>cepts to be given to students, <strong>the</strong> curriculum<br />
<strong>in</strong>cludes martyrdom, valour and <strong>the</strong> idea of a cann<strong>on</strong>. 4 The activities suggested for<br />
students <strong>in</strong>clude draw<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> picture of a cann<strong>on</strong>, trac<strong>in</strong>g Mohd. B<strong>in</strong> Qasim’s c<strong>on</strong>quest<br />
route and discuss<strong>in</strong>g Islam’s advent <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> sub-c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ent. The follow<strong>in</strong>g passage from<br />
<strong>the</strong> social studies textbook for Class VI illustrates how <strong>the</strong> curriculum of 1984 is realized<br />
<strong>in</strong> a textbook of 2002:<br />
In <strong>the</strong> middle of <strong>the</strong> city of Dabel <strong>the</strong>re was a H<strong>in</strong>du temple. There was a flag hoisted <strong>on</strong><br />
top of it. The H<strong>in</strong>dus believed that as l<strong>on</strong>g as <strong>the</strong> flag kept fly<strong>in</strong>g, nobody could harm<br />
<strong>the</strong>m. Mohd. B<strong>in</strong> Qasim found out about this belief. The Muslims began to catapult<br />
st<strong>on</strong>es at <strong>the</strong> temple and at <strong>the</strong> flag, ultimately mak<strong>in</strong>g it fall to <strong>the</strong> ground. The whole<br />
city became tumultuous and <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>dus lost heart. Some Muslims clambered up <strong>the</strong><br />
walls of <strong>the</strong> temple and forced open <strong>the</strong> door. Qasim’s army entered <strong>the</strong> city and after<br />
c<strong>on</strong>quer<strong>in</strong>g it, announced peace. The Muslims treated <strong>the</strong> vanquished so well that many<br />
H<strong>in</strong>dus c<strong>on</strong>verted to Islam. 5<br />
This descripti<strong>on</strong> of break<strong>in</strong>g down <strong>the</strong> barriers of <strong>the</strong> sacred space of <strong>the</strong> ‘o<strong>the</strong>r’ and<br />
mak<strong>in</strong>g a forcible entry to take over is typical of several o<strong>the</strong>r depicti<strong>on</strong>s that appeared <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> textbooks of <strong>the</strong> era of General Zia. A very similar account of <strong>the</strong> forced and violent<br />
entry of Mahmud of Ghazni <strong>in</strong>to a H<strong>in</strong>du temple, al<strong>on</strong>g with <strong>the</strong> defeated and begg<strong>in</strong>g<br />
postures of H<strong>in</strong>dus, appears <strong>in</strong> a Class V textbook produced <strong>in</strong> 1987. 6 The scene <strong>in</strong> this<br />
story starts with <strong>the</strong> idea of a flag hoisted atop a temple and <strong>the</strong> belief that as l<strong>on</strong>g as it<br />
keeps fly<strong>in</strong>g nobody could harm <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>dus. This descripti<strong>on</strong> is ak<strong>in</strong> to <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>tenance<br />
of virg<strong>in</strong>ity and its public announcement. The next image is <strong>on</strong>e of Muslims catapult<strong>in</strong>g<br />
st<strong>on</strong>es at <strong>the</strong> temple and <strong>the</strong> flag mak<strong>in</strong>g it fall down, and <strong>the</strong>n clamber<strong>in</strong>g up <strong>the</strong> walls of<br />
<strong>the</strong> temple and forc<strong>in</strong>g open <strong>the</strong> door. The c<strong>on</strong>notati<strong>on</strong> of rape by Muslims and <strong>the</strong> loss<br />
of H<strong>in</strong>du ‘virg<strong>in</strong>ity’ is unmistakable. Sacred and protected space is violated by force and<br />
<strong>the</strong>n desecrated. A number of descripti<strong>on</strong>s of c<strong>on</strong>quest and victory bear resemblance to<br />
rape. However, immediately after this triumph of <strong>the</strong> Mascul<strong>in</strong>e Muslim Self, <strong>the</strong> posture<br />
of peace is assumed. The fem<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>e side re-emerges and <strong>the</strong> k<strong>in</strong>d treatment of <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>dus<br />
is announced. The sudden shift from a violent act aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>dus, to <strong>the</strong><br />
announcement of peace and good treatment is not expla<strong>in</strong>ed. One fails to understand<br />
how such a scenario could have led to peace and such good treatment that many H<strong>in</strong>dus<br />
3<br />
Social Studies Curriculum, Nati<strong>on</strong>al Curriculum Committee, Nati<strong>on</strong>al Bureau of Curriculum and<br />
Textbooks, Islmabad, 1984. p. 16.<br />
4<br />
Ibid. p. 16.<br />
5<br />
Social Studies Textbook for Class VI, Punjab Textbook Board, March 2002, Lahore, p. 63.<br />
6<br />
See Rub<strong>in</strong>a Saigol’s Knowledge and Identity, p. 231.<br />
76
voluntarily embraced Islam. The great deal that has been left unsaid, <strong>the</strong> gaps left open <strong>in</strong><br />
this compressed account would expla<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> puzzl<strong>in</strong>g shifts. However, compressi<strong>on</strong><br />
serves to create <strong>the</strong> impressi<strong>on</strong> that despite excessive aggressi<strong>on</strong>, <strong>the</strong> Muslims were<br />
basically peace lov<strong>in</strong>g and <strong>the</strong> moral Self is retrieved. We need to remember that <strong>in</strong> most<br />
stories told to children, aggressi<strong>on</strong> is attributed to <strong>the</strong> ‘o<strong>the</strong>rs’ and peace to <strong>the</strong> self. Page<br />
72 of <strong>the</strong> social studies book, produced <strong>in</strong> 2002, highlights <strong>the</strong> idea of Jehad aga<strong>in</strong>st<br />
foreign rule, recommended <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1984 curriculum guidel<strong>in</strong>es.<br />
Ano<strong>the</strong>r c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>uity that <strong>on</strong>e notices from <strong>the</strong> textbook of <strong>the</strong> era of General Zia is <strong>the</strong><br />
c<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> of H<strong>in</strong>du/Muslim polar oppositi<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> descripti<strong>on</strong> of architecture. The<br />
social studies textbook for Class V produced <strong>in</strong> 1988 c<strong>on</strong>trasts a Muslim mosque with<br />
H<strong>in</strong>du temples <strong>in</strong> a manner which shows <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>du temple as dark, narrow and enclosed<br />
and <strong>the</strong> Muslim sacred space as open, well-lit and clean. 7 In my work <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> Zia era<br />
textbooks, I argued that <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>trast<strong>in</strong>g descripti<strong>on</strong> of sacred space is gendered <strong>in</strong> that<br />
H<strong>in</strong>du sacred space has associati<strong>on</strong>s with fem<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>ity (narrow, dark and mysterious,<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternal), while <strong>the</strong> Muslim space represents mascul<strong>in</strong>e power (open, well-lit, spacious,<br />
wide, external). In <strong>the</strong> Class VI social studies textbook produced <strong>in</strong> 2002, similar images<br />
are transferred <strong>on</strong> to wider secular and profane spaces. This is how <strong>the</strong> Class VI textbook<br />
describes ‘Muslim C<strong>on</strong>tributi<strong>on</strong>s to <strong>the</strong> Architecture of <strong>the</strong> Sub-C<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ent’:<br />
The Muslims made valuable c<strong>on</strong>tributi<strong>on</strong>s to <strong>the</strong> architecture of <strong>the</strong> sub-c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ent. Prior<br />
to <strong>the</strong> advent of <strong>the</strong> Muslims, <strong>the</strong> people of <strong>the</strong> sub-c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ent resided <strong>in</strong> narrow,<br />
c<strong>on</strong>gested and dark houses. The architecture of <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>dus exhibited narrowness,<br />
labyr<strong>in</strong>th<strong>in</strong>e complicati<strong>on</strong>s, layer up<strong>on</strong> layer of complexity and c<strong>on</strong>ical shaped structures.<br />
The architectural ref<strong>in</strong>ement of <strong>the</strong> Muslims exhibited openness, vast spaces and external<br />
glory. They built open, airy and grand structures. 8<br />
The associati<strong>on</strong> of narrowness, c<strong>on</strong>gesti<strong>on</strong> and darkness, which <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> earlier discourse<br />
was associated with H<strong>in</strong>du sacred space, is now transferred to <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>du home. The<br />
image of ‘labyr<strong>in</strong>th<strong>in</strong>e complicati<strong>on</strong>s, layer up<strong>on</strong> layer of complexity’ seems designed to<br />
suggest that <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>dus were somehow ‘not straight and simple’ and that <strong>the</strong>re were<br />
deeper, darker layers <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir psyche that suggest ‘someth<strong>in</strong>g crooked’ or ‘mysterious’.<br />
This descripti<strong>on</strong> fits <strong>in</strong> with <strong>the</strong> noti<strong>on</strong> that H<strong>in</strong>dus are devious. The Muslim c<strong>on</strong>tributi<strong>on</strong><br />
is def<strong>in</strong>ed as ‘architectural ref<strong>in</strong>ement’ exhibit<strong>in</strong>g openness (read h<strong>on</strong>esty), vast spaces<br />
and external glory (read imperial dom<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>). The word ‘open’ is used aga<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> last<br />
sentence to underscore <strong>the</strong> idea that Muslims are somehow more h<strong>on</strong>est and transparent<br />
than <strong>the</strong> more ‘opaque’ H<strong>in</strong>dus. S<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> discourse is written with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> two nati<strong>on</strong><br />
differentiati<strong>on</strong>, <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>dus represent all that is denied and repressed with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Muslim<br />
Self.<br />
The caste system is provided as yet ano<strong>the</strong>r proof of <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>du ‘o<strong>the</strong>r’ as an unjust and<br />
uncivilized creature. What is omitted from <strong>the</strong> discourse is <strong>the</strong> fact that Muslim Pakistani<br />
society too is torn by a form of caste system and biradari system, despite <strong>the</strong> claims of<br />
Muslim equality. What is silenced here is <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>in</strong> so-called ‘equal’ Pakistani<br />
society, <strong>the</strong> small H<strong>in</strong>du m<strong>in</strong>ority liv<strong>in</strong>g ma<strong>in</strong>ly <strong>in</strong> S<strong>in</strong>dh, and <strong>in</strong> particular <strong>the</strong> Hari<br />
7 See Rub<strong>in</strong>a Saigol’s Knowledge and Identity, p. 235.<br />
8 Social Studies Textbook for Class VI, Punjab Textbook Board, p. 67.<br />
77
community, is subject to <strong>the</strong> most <strong>in</strong>human treatment by Muslim landlords. All H<strong>in</strong>dus<br />
are reduced to <strong>the</strong> stereotype of ‘The H<strong>in</strong>du’ whose loyalties to <strong>the</strong> Muslim state are<br />
always suspect as he is ideologically placed across <strong>the</strong> border <strong>in</strong> India while his body<br />
resides <strong>in</strong> Pakistan. He <strong>the</strong>refore has to c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ually prove, aver and reassert his loyalty to<br />
<strong>the</strong> Muslim-def<strong>in</strong>ed state.<br />
Trickster and Cheat: The Christian O<strong>the</strong>r<br />
Pakistan’s largest m<strong>in</strong>ority group c<strong>on</strong>sists of Christians who are ideologically perceived<br />
to be a part of <strong>the</strong> ‘Christian nati<strong>on</strong>’ across <strong>the</strong> globe. Ever s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> era of General Ziaul-Haq’s<br />
Islamizati<strong>on</strong>, and even more so s<strong>in</strong>ce 9/11, <strong>the</strong> Christians have to c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ually<br />
prove <strong>the</strong>ir loyalties to <strong>the</strong> Islamic state. Most social studies and history textbooks barely<br />
menti<strong>on</strong> even <strong>the</strong> existence of Pakistani Christians, an erasure and a silence that solidifies<br />
<strong>the</strong> tenuous noti<strong>on</strong> of an <strong>in</strong>ternally unified nati<strong>on</strong>. However, suddenly and from nowhere,<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> social studies textbook for Class VII which focuses <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> crusades, a generous<br />
number of pages are allotted to Christianity and Christendom. In most o<strong>the</strong>r cases,<br />
Christians enter <strong>the</strong> textbook scene <strong>on</strong>ly as ‘The English’ or ‘The British’, terms reserved<br />
to represent <strong>the</strong> cruelties of col<strong>on</strong>ialism and imperialism.<br />
The Christian and English ‘o<strong>the</strong>r’ also plays a significant role because of <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terlock<strong>in</strong>g<br />
history of British imperialism and Indian and Pakistani nati<strong>on</strong>alism. The English seem to<br />
stand for Christianity as well as <strong>the</strong> West <strong>in</strong> general. In <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>text of <strong>the</strong> Indian struggle<br />
for <strong>in</strong>dependence, <strong>the</strong> ‘o<strong>the</strong>r’ is referred to ei<strong>the</strong>r as ‘<strong>the</strong> English’ or ‘<strong>the</strong> British’, <strong>the</strong><br />
latter term be<strong>in</strong>g usually reserved for <strong>the</strong> discussi<strong>on</strong> of imperialism. In <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>text of <strong>the</strong><br />
crusades, <strong>the</strong> reference is c<strong>on</strong>sistently to Christians as <strong>the</strong> ‘o<strong>the</strong>r’. In <strong>the</strong> case of <strong>the</strong><br />
freedom movement, <strong>the</strong> religious identity of <strong>the</strong> third <strong>in</strong>terlocutor <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> English-H<strong>in</strong>du-<br />
Muslim triad is not paramount. Ra<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>al identity of Englishness is <strong>the</strong><br />
preferred mode of speak<strong>in</strong>g about <strong>the</strong> English, <strong>in</strong> sharp c<strong>on</strong>trast to <strong>the</strong> preferred mode of<br />
speak<strong>in</strong>g about <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>dus <strong>on</strong>ly <strong>in</strong> religious terms. For textbook writers, <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>dus and<br />
Muslims c<strong>on</strong>stituted religious communities while <strong>the</strong> British were a secular force. This<br />
representati<strong>on</strong> c<strong>on</strong>trasts with <strong>the</strong> preferred form used by Indian textbook writers to refer<br />
to <strong>the</strong> C<strong>on</strong>gress as secular and <strong>the</strong> Muslim League as communal. 9<br />
In nearly all <strong>the</strong> references to <strong>the</strong> English or British with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>text of <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>dependence movement, <strong>the</strong> English appear as c<strong>on</strong>spirators, tricksters and cheats. 10<br />
Cruelty is also attributed to <strong>the</strong>m, especially when referr<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> Jallianwala Bagh and<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>in</strong>cidents of massacre, but <strong>the</strong>ir primary characteristic appears to be cleverness,<br />
trickery and a propensity towards c<strong>on</strong>spir<strong>in</strong>g. For example <strong>the</strong> Class VI social studies<br />
textbook states that ‘after c<strong>on</strong>quer<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong> English treated <strong>the</strong> local populati<strong>on</strong> with great<br />
cruelty. They murdered thousands of men, women and children with cruel aband<strong>on</strong>.<br />
9 Krishna Kumar <strong>in</strong> his Prejudice and Pride states that Indian textbooks are written with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> b<strong>in</strong>ary of<br />
secular versus communal identity and struggle, p. 207. The Indian textbooks oppose secular nati<strong>on</strong>alism to<br />
communalism. The Pakistani textbooks, as I have argued <strong>in</strong> my book Knowledge and Identity are<br />
overwhelm<strong>in</strong>gly with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> two nati<strong>on</strong> b<strong>in</strong>ary which is based <strong>on</strong> oppos<strong>in</strong>g religious identities. However,<br />
<strong>the</strong> English are seldom, if ever, referred to as Christians while discuss<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> freedom struggle.<br />
10 See for example <strong>the</strong> social studies textbook for Class VI, Punjab Textbook Board, p. 75-77.<br />
78
They destroyed <strong>the</strong> property of <strong>the</strong> local people. They exiled <strong>the</strong> last Mughal K<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
Rango<strong>on</strong>’. 11 In this descripti<strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> English are cruel, murderous and uncivilized as <strong>the</strong>y<br />
murdered women and children with cruel aband<strong>on</strong>. The British argument about <strong>the</strong><br />
uncivilized and savage natives is turned up<strong>on</strong> its head to show lack of civilizati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong><br />
rulers. The story of <strong>the</strong> cruelty of <strong>the</strong> British ‘o<strong>the</strong>r’ recurs <strong>in</strong> several textbooks, partly to<br />
justify <strong>in</strong>dependence and partly as a rebuttal of <strong>the</strong> charge of Muslim cruelty and lack of<br />
civilizati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
The Christian ‘o<strong>the</strong>r’ is presented <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g way <strong>in</strong> social studies textbooks:<br />
The people of Africa requested <strong>the</strong> Muslims to <strong>in</strong>vade <strong>the</strong>ir lands to save <strong>the</strong>m from <strong>the</strong><br />
tyranny of <strong>the</strong>ir Christian rulers who extorted taxes from <strong>the</strong>m. 12<br />
The Christian rulers are not <strong>on</strong>ly tyrannical, but <strong>the</strong>y extort taxes from <strong>the</strong>ir subjects. The<br />
excluded piece of knowledge is that Muslims also extracted taxes from Muslims as well<br />
as Jaziya (religious tax) from n<strong>on</strong>-Muslims. The depicti<strong>on</strong> of tyrannical Christian rulers<br />
requires a c<strong>on</strong>trast with <strong>the</strong> self, which is provided <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g way:<br />
History has no parallel to <strong>the</strong> extremely k<strong>in</strong>d treatment of <strong>the</strong> Christians by <strong>the</strong> Muslims.<br />
Still <strong>the</strong> Christian k<strong>in</strong>gdoms of Europe were c<strong>on</strong>stantly try<strong>in</strong>g to ga<strong>in</strong> c<strong>on</strong>trol of<br />
Jerusalem. This was <strong>the</strong> cause of <strong>the</strong> Crusades. 13<br />
The self is c<strong>on</strong>structed as k<strong>in</strong>d as opposed to <strong>the</strong> tyrannical ‘o<strong>the</strong>r’. The cause of <strong>the</strong><br />
crusades is quickly attributed to <strong>the</strong> militarist and expansi<strong>on</strong>ist designs of <strong>the</strong> ‘o<strong>the</strong>r’. No<br />
historical, political, ec<strong>on</strong>omic or social explanati<strong>on</strong> is attempted, nor <strong>the</strong> complex<br />
dynamics of <strong>the</strong> crusades are provided. One s<strong>in</strong>gular cause is attributed to <strong>the</strong> prol<strong>on</strong>ged<br />
c<strong>on</strong>flict. One form of <strong>the</strong> reproducti<strong>on</strong> of ideology, and with it identity, is<br />
oversimplificati<strong>on</strong> –<strong>the</strong> removal of all complexity by reduc<strong>in</strong>g c<strong>on</strong>flict to Them and Us<br />
categories. The aim of this pedagogy is not <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>culcati<strong>on</strong> of understand<strong>in</strong>g or<br />
<strong>in</strong>tellectual reflecti<strong>on</strong>, but <strong>the</strong> creati<strong>on</strong> of religious identity.<br />
The Christian ‘o<strong>the</strong>r’ is also a liar and cheat. In spite of <strong>the</strong> k<strong>in</strong>d treatment of <strong>the</strong><br />
Christians by Muslim rulers, <strong>the</strong> former had <strong>in</strong>explicable proclivities toward ly<strong>in</strong>g. As<br />
<strong>the</strong> textbook historian states:<br />
Some of <strong>the</strong> Christian pilgrims to Jerusalem fabricated many false stories of suffer<strong>in</strong>g. If<br />
<strong>the</strong>y were robbed <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> way, <strong>the</strong>y said it were (sic) <strong>the</strong> Muslims who robbed <strong>the</strong>m. 14<br />
Tales of suffer<strong>in</strong>g under Muslims are mere fabricati<strong>on</strong> and Muslims are of course<br />
<strong>in</strong>capable of robb<strong>in</strong>g. The textbook historian <strong>the</strong>n bemoans <strong>the</strong> fact that all <strong>the</strong> Christian<br />
countries united aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> Muslims and sent large armies to attack <strong>the</strong>m and justified it<br />
by say<strong>in</strong>g that Jesus Christ allowed it. “The Pope was caught <strong>in</strong> a religious frenzy” says<br />
<strong>the</strong> textbook. The Christian ‘o<strong>the</strong>r’ thus also had tendencies toward needless “religious<br />
11<br />
Social Studies Textbook for Class VI, p. 77.<br />
12<br />
Ibid. p. 21.<br />
13<br />
Ibid. p. 25.<br />
14<br />
Ibid. p. 26.<br />
79
frenzy”. The major absence <strong>in</strong> this tale of <strong>the</strong> two nati<strong>on</strong>s is that Pakistan’s n<strong>on</strong> Muslim<br />
m<strong>in</strong>ority has suffered a great deal of oppressi<strong>on</strong> at <strong>the</strong> hands of <strong>the</strong> state which has used<br />
<strong>the</strong> Blasphemy Law to systematically target Christians and many of <strong>the</strong>m have become<br />
its victims <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g an eleven year old child, Salamat Masih. Christian churches have<br />
been burned <strong>in</strong> Islamabad, Bahawalpur and Christian organizati<strong>on</strong>s such as Idara-e-Amno-Insaf<br />
<strong>in</strong> Karachi was attaked and seven workers were killed <strong>in</strong> cold blood. The nati<strong>on</strong><br />
writes its tale <strong>in</strong> blood – <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> pages of history texts and <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> bodies of its n<strong>on</strong>-<br />
Muslims citizens.<br />
The Greedy Usurer: The Jewish O<strong>the</strong>r<br />
The Jewish ‘o<strong>the</strong>r’ of <strong>the</strong> Muslim self does not figure very prom<strong>in</strong>ently <strong>in</strong> middle and<br />
sec<strong>on</strong>dary level textbooks. This omissi<strong>on</strong> is noteworthy because anti-semitic sentiments<br />
are widespread <strong>in</strong> Pakistan where people overwhelm<strong>in</strong>gly support <strong>the</strong> Palest<strong>in</strong>ian cause.<br />
One possible reas<strong>on</strong> for this relative silence with<strong>in</strong> textbooks may be because of <strong>the</strong><br />
physical distance between Jews and Pakistani Muslims. There are hardly any Jews liv<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>in</strong> Pakistan who could pose a direct threat to <strong>the</strong> Pakistani self. Although <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>du<br />
m<strong>in</strong>ority <strong>in</strong> Pakistan is also m<strong>in</strong>iscule, <strong>the</strong> geographical c<strong>on</strong>tiguity of India reflects <strong>the</strong><br />
proximity of this threat. And, as already stated, <strong>the</strong> story of <strong>the</strong> two permanently <strong>in</strong>imical<br />
nati<strong>on</strong>s is a H<strong>in</strong>du Muslim story. While vary<strong>in</strong>g ‘o<strong>the</strong>rs’ may enter <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> of<br />
Muslim Pakistan, it is primarily <strong>the</strong> blood sta<strong>in</strong>ed severance from <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>du ‘o<strong>the</strong>r’ that<br />
<strong>in</strong>cites memories of pa<strong>in</strong> and sorrow.<br />
However, as <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> case of Indian and H<strong>in</strong>du, no dist<strong>in</strong>cti<strong>on</strong> is made between Jews and<br />
Zi<strong>on</strong>ists. When <strong>the</strong> Jews do appear <strong>in</strong> textbooks <strong>the</strong>y are almost always as Zi<strong>on</strong>ists, and<br />
<strong>the</strong>re is no c<strong>on</strong>cept of a n<strong>on</strong>-Zi<strong>on</strong>ist Jewish pers<strong>on</strong>. Pakistan’s official foreign policy is<br />
anti-Israel, and at times <strong>the</strong> impressi<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong>e gets from public discourse is that all Jews are<br />
perceived as Israelis. All Israelis are to be c<strong>on</strong>demned as all of <strong>the</strong>m are cruel, wicked<br />
and imperialists. F<strong>in</strong>e dist<strong>in</strong>cti<strong>on</strong>s between Jews, Israelis and Zi<strong>on</strong>ists are seldom made<br />
<strong>in</strong> public discourse or textbook representati<strong>on</strong>s. There is generally scant menti<strong>on</strong> of Jews<br />
except while discuss<strong>in</strong>g Pakistan’s foreign policy or <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> process of c<strong>on</strong>struct<strong>in</strong>g a pan-<br />
Islamic identity.<br />
Whenever <strong>the</strong> Jews do appear <strong>in</strong> textbooks, <strong>the</strong>y almost always play <strong>the</strong> role of Shylock –<br />
<strong>the</strong> greedy, bloodthirsty usurer. They are forced <strong>in</strong>to a s<strong>in</strong>gular and narrow identity of <strong>the</strong><br />
m<strong>on</strong>eylender who charged very high rates of <strong>in</strong>terest and destroyed <strong>the</strong> lives of people.<br />
The H<strong>in</strong>du m<strong>on</strong>eylender (referred to as baniya <strong>in</strong> Pakistan) and <strong>the</strong> Muslim m<strong>on</strong>eylenders<br />
do not figure highly <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> curricular discourse. The stereotype of <strong>the</strong> tight-fisted and<br />
parsim<strong>on</strong>ious Jew obliterates <strong>the</strong> possibility of a poor or destitute Jewish pers<strong>on</strong>. Such a<br />
creature, it is assumed, does not exist. A generous, magnanimous, friendly or largehearted<br />
Jewish pers<strong>on</strong> is also unth<strong>in</strong>kable s<strong>in</strong>ce textbook categories are not pr<strong>on</strong>e to<br />
deal<strong>in</strong>g with complex categories.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> Jewish ‘o<strong>the</strong>r’ <strong>on</strong>ce aga<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>re is c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>uity from <strong>the</strong> textbooks<br />
of <strong>the</strong> earlier eras, which go as far back as <strong>the</strong> time of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. A social<br />
studies textbook for Class VI produced <strong>in</strong> 1975 c<strong>on</strong>trasts <strong>the</strong> time before Islam and after<br />
80
its advent as dark/immoral/bad time versus good/moral and enlightened time of Islam. 15<br />
After mak<strong>in</strong>g a series of anti-Christian statements <strong>in</strong> which Christianity is presented as a<br />
source of corrupti<strong>on</strong> and evil, <strong>the</strong> textbook historian turns towards <strong>the</strong> Jews and <strong>on</strong>e of<br />
<strong>the</strong> first sentences is about how rich trade had made <strong>the</strong>m. This envy is followed by<br />
accusati<strong>on</strong>s of how <strong>the</strong>y corrupted <strong>the</strong>ir faith and misled and deceived <strong>the</strong> Holy Prophet<br />
of Islam. The social studies textbook for Class VII, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> course of a discussi<strong>on</strong> about<br />
‘Islamic Society’, has this to say of <strong>the</strong> Jews:<br />
Some Jewish tribes also lived <strong>in</strong> Arabia. They lent m<strong>on</strong>ey to workers and peasants <strong>on</strong><br />
high rates of <strong>in</strong>terest and usurped <strong>the</strong>ir earn<strong>in</strong>gs. They held <strong>the</strong> whole society <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
tight grip because of <strong>the</strong> ever <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g compound <strong>in</strong>terest…In short <strong>the</strong>re was no<br />
sympathy for humanity. People were selfish and cruel. The rich lived <strong>in</strong> luxury and<br />
nobody bo<strong>the</strong>red about <strong>the</strong> needy or those <strong>in</strong> suffer<strong>in</strong>g. 16<br />
The Jews are thus primarily m<strong>on</strong>eylenders who have no sympathy for humanity and are<br />
selfish and cruel. The alleged Jewish tendency to accumulate wealth is c<strong>on</strong>trasted <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
subsequent pages by assert<strong>in</strong>g that Islam prescribes a just distributi<strong>on</strong> of wealth and<br />
car<strong>in</strong>g for <strong>the</strong> poor and needy. 17 This k<strong>in</strong>d of c<strong>on</strong>trast of <strong>the</strong> self and o<strong>the</strong>r is designed to<br />
create both religious communities as mutually exclusive categories that are morally<br />
opposed.<br />
The Knife-wield<strong>in</strong>g Butcher: The Sikh O<strong>the</strong>r<br />
The Sikhs c<strong>on</strong>stitute ano<strong>the</strong>r m<strong>in</strong>ority <strong>in</strong> India where H<strong>in</strong>dus form <strong>the</strong> majority religious<br />
community. The Sikhs are, <strong>the</strong>refore, not a str<strong>on</strong>g or direct threat to Pakistan. On <strong>the</strong><br />
c<strong>on</strong>trary, Pakistan tacitly supports <strong>the</strong> occasi<strong>on</strong>al rumbl<strong>in</strong>gs of anti-state feel<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong><br />
Eastern Punjab. However, when <strong>the</strong> Sikhs do make an occasi<strong>on</strong>al appearance, <strong>the</strong>y are<br />
dressed <strong>in</strong> militant attire, wield<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Kirpan (sword-like knife, dagger) as butcher<strong>in</strong>g,<br />
murder<strong>in</strong>g and maraud<strong>in</strong>g hordes. The stereotype of <strong>the</strong> ‘martial race’ is c<strong>on</strong>jured up <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> representati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> Sikhs, who appear as those who challenged Muslim rule.<br />
Usually two occasi<strong>on</strong>s are reserved for <strong>the</strong> appearance of Sikhs <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> stage of textbook<br />
dramas. One is <strong>the</strong>ir takeover of <strong>the</strong> Punjab after <strong>the</strong> decl<strong>in</strong>e of <strong>the</strong> Mughal empire, and<br />
<strong>the</strong> sec<strong>on</strong>d is at <strong>the</strong> time of partiti<strong>on</strong> when <strong>the</strong>y appear as looters, marauders and killers.<br />
At o<strong>the</strong>r times, <strong>the</strong> Sikhs simply disappear <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> mist of ‘history’ ly<strong>in</strong>g somewhere<br />
wait<strong>in</strong>g to be ‘discovered’ as actors <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> historical drama by some less forgetful<br />
textbook writer. Their functi<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> politics of textbook writ<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Pakistan seems to be<br />
to underscore <strong>the</strong> suffer<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong>flicted up<strong>on</strong> hapless Muslims who sacrificed for <strong>the</strong> Land<br />
of <strong>the</strong> Pure. Their <strong>on</strong>ly role is that of <strong>the</strong> villa<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> shadows who appears suddenly<br />
from nowhere to kill <strong>the</strong> hero of <strong>the</strong> drama, <strong>the</strong> besieged Muslim.<br />
The first type of appearance of <strong>the</strong> Sikhs, as <strong>in</strong>vaders of <strong>the</strong> Punjab, is exemplified by a<br />
social studies textbook written for Class IV <strong>in</strong> 1998. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to this representati<strong>on</strong>:<br />
15<br />
Rub<strong>in</strong>a Saigol, Knowledge and Identity, pp. 225-226.<br />
16<br />
Social Studies for Class VII, Punjab Textbook Board, Lahore, January 2002, p. 13.<br />
17<br />
Ibid. p. 18.<br />
81
After <strong>the</strong> death of emperor Aurangzeb <strong>in</strong> 1707, <strong>the</strong> Mughal dynasty became weak and<br />
mut<strong>in</strong>ies began <strong>in</strong> several prov<strong>in</strong>ces. When <strong>the</strong> government of <strong>the</strong> Punjab became weak,<br />
<strong>the</strong> Sikhs began to <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>in</strong>fluence and started plunder<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> larger cities of <strong>the</strong><br />
Punjab. Lahore and Multan were plundered and looted several times by <strong>the</strong> Sikhs who<br />
murdered <strong>the</strong> people and unleashed terror and violence up<strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong>m. F<strong>in</strong>ally, <strong>the</strong> Sikh ruler<br />
Ranjit S<strong>in</strong>gh established his hold over <strong>the</strong> Punjab and <strong>the</strong> Sikhs and <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>dus toge<strong>the</strong>r<br />
committed many atrocities and cruelties up<strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> Muslims. They particularly desecrated<br />
Muslim holy places and shr<strong>in</strong>es. 18<br />
When <strong>the</strong> hero of <strong>the</strong> textbook story, <strong>the</strong> Muslim assailed from all sides, becomes weak,<br />
<strong>the</strong> Sikh butcher enters <strong>the</strong> stage as plunderer, looter and murderer. The Muslim takes <strong>on</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> fem<strong>in</strong>ized posture of suffer<strong>in</strong>g as atrocities and cruelties are committed up<strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> self<br />
by highly mascul<strong>in</strong>e ‘o<strong>the</strong>rs’ who jo<strong>in</strong> hands to <strong>in</strong>flict misery up<strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> defenceless self.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> story of <strong>the</strong> ‘<strong>in</strong>dependence movement’, <strong>the</strong> British collude with <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>dus aga<strong>in</strong>st<br />
<strong>the</strong> Muslim who is besieged from all sides. In <strong>the</strong> story of <strong>the</strong> decl<strong>in</strong>e of a Muslim<br />
empire, <strong>the</strong> Sikhs collude with <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>dus aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> Muslims. The ‘o<strong>the</strong>rs’ of <strong>the</strong> self<br />
seem to <strong>in</strong>variably collude <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>spiracy aga<strong>in</strong>st Muslims. As all political, social and<br />
historical dynamics are written out of <strong>the</strong> story of blood and violence, <strong>the</strong> reader is left<br />
with no clue as to <strong>the</strong> causes of <strong>the</strong> alleged ‘collusi<strong>on</strong>’. The impressi<strong>on</strong> that is left <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
young m<strong>in</strong>ds is that it is <strong>the</strong> nature of <strong>the</strong> beast to shed blood. The projecti<strong>on</strong> of all<br />
violent tendencies <strong>on</strong> to <strong>the</strong> ‘o<strong>the</strong>r’, serves to cleanse <strong>the</strong> moral self of any aggressive<br />
propensities.<br />
The sec<strong>on</strong>d appearance of <strong>the</strong> murder<strong>in</strong>g, knife-wield<strong>in</strong>g Sikh around <strong>the</strong> time of<br />
partiti<strong>on</strong> can be viewed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g depicti<strong>on</strong> taken from <strong>the</strong> Pakistan Studies<br />
textbook for Classes IX and X produced <strong>in</strong> March 2002:<br />
When <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>dus and Sikhs realized that Pakistan is be<strong>in</strong>g established, <strong>the</strong>y started riots<br />
<strong>in</strong> parts of <strong>the</strong> Punjab. As a result hundreds of thousands of Muslims were wounded and<br />
murdered. In this difficult time, <strong>the</strong> Muslims of <strong>the</strong> Punjab did not let go of fortitude and<br />
strength and welcomed <strong>the</strong> refugees from Indian territory and were generous to <strong>the</strong>m.<br />
They proved that Muslims always help each o<strong>the</strong>r. 19<br />
In <strong>the</strong> gory tale of wound<strong>in</strong>g and murder<strong>in</strong>g at partiti<strong>on</strong>, <strong>the</strong> story of kill<strong>in</strong>g and<br />
murder<strong>in</strong>g by Muslims is a silence <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> text. It has been recorded by many noted<br />
scholars, that dur<strong>in</strong>g partiti<strong>on</strong> violence, rape and murder were committed by all religious<br />
communities aga<strong>in</strong>st all o<strong>the</strong>rs. 20 The idea of <strong>the</strong> textbook storyteller is to underl<strong>in</strong>e <strong>the</strong><br />
sacrifice and suffer<strong>in</strong>g of Muslims <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> blood-drenched drama of <strong>the</strong> creati<strong>on</strong> of state<br />
and nati<strong>on</strong>. The wounds are reiterated lest we forget how our blood was spilt for <strong>the</strong><br />
homeland. This k<strong>in</strong>d of reiterati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>in</strong>jury is a nati<strong>on</strong>alist remember<strong>in</strong>g, as it adds<br />
poignancy and urgency to <strong>the</strong> tale of <strong>the</strong> mak<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>. The Sikhs perform <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
‘historical’ role as those who shed our <strong>in</strong>nocent blood as we departed <strong>on</strong> our way to <strong>the</strong><br />
homeland.<br />
18 Social Studies Textbook for Class IV, 1998. Punjab Textbook Board. p. 82.<br />
19 Pakistan Studies Textbook for Classes IX and X, Punjab Textbook Board, p. 32.<br />
20 See Ritu Men<strong>on</strong> and Kamla Bhas<strong>in</strong>’s Borders and Boundaries and Urvashi Butalia’s The O<strong>the</strong>r Side of<br />
Silence, for details of <strong>the</strong> k<strong>in</strong>ds of atrocities committed by all sides aga<strong>in</strong>st all sides <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> formati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong><br />
nati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
82
Deprived of any o<strong>the</strong>r knowledge of <strong>the</strong> Sikhs, as <strong>in</strong>deed of H<strong>in</strong>dus, Christians or Jews,<br />
<strong>the</strong> student is left with a <strong>on</strong>e-dimensi<strong>on</strong>al picture of <strong>the</strong> ‘o<strong>the</strong>r’, <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>herently evil H<strong>in</strong>du,<br />
<strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>spiratorial Christian, <strong>the</strong> usurious Jew and <strong>the</strong> butcher<strong>in</strong>g Sikh. The Muslim<br />
represents <strong>the</strong> absence of all that is attributed to <strong>the</strong>se various, shift<strong>in</strong>g and multiple<br />
‘o<strong>the</strong>rs’. The appeal of Shylock as <strong>in</strong> ‘when you prick us, do we not bleed’, is not<br />
allowed to <strong>the</strong>se ‘o<strong>the</strong>rs’. They do not suffer, bleed or sacrifice, <strong>on</strong>ly we do. They do not<br />
have any noble moral <strong>in</strong>tenti<strong>on</strong>s, generosity, k<strong>in</strong>dness, justice, fairness or forgiveness –<br />
<strong>on</strong>ly we do. We do not have any cruel, murderous, imperial or c<strong>on</strong>quer<strong>in</strong>g impulse – <strong>on</strong>ly<br />
<strong>the</strong>y do. In this manipulati<strong>on</strong> of knowledge, textbook tellers of tales, c<strong>on</strong>struct our<br />
fractured, broken and denuded identities rooted <strong>in</strong> ‘o<strong>the</strong>rness’, ‘difference’ and<br />
alienati<strong>on</strong>. Our comm<strong>on</strong> or shared past experience with o<strong>the</strong>rs is written out of <strong>the</strong> tale of<br />
<strong>the</strong> two nati<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
The Back-Stabber: The Bengali O<strong>the</strong>r<br />
The nati<strong>on</strong>al narrative is <strong>in</strong>terrupted at many po<strong>in</strong>ts by ‘o<strong>the</strong>rs’ resid<strong>in</strong>g with<strong>in</strong> its<br />
territory and push<strong>in</strong>g at its seem<strong>in</strong>gly <strong>in</strong>violate boundaries. The stranger <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> house<br />
comprises <strong>the</strong> religious, parochial, prov<strong>in</strong>cial and regi<strong>on</strong>al m<strong>in</strong>orities who have never<br />
been fully <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> shift<strong>in</strong>g self. At times, <strong>the</strong>se dangerously close ‘o<strong>the</strong>rs’ have<br />
been rudely catapulted out of <strong>the</strong> def<strong>in</strong>iti<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>al Muslim self, for example,<br />
when <strong>the</strong> Qadianis were declared n<strong>on</strong>-Muslims <strong>in</strong> 1974. At o<strong>the</strong>r times, <strong>the</strong>se parts of <strong>the</strong><br />
self have violently ruptured through <strong>the</strong> layers of repressi<strong>on</strong> built around <strong>the</strong>m and<br />
broken away, as <strong>the</strong> East Pakistanis did <strong>in</strong> 1971. A nati<strong>on</strong> def<strong>in</strong>ed as Muslim has never<br />
been at ease with <strong>the</strong> n<strong>on</strong>-Muslims resid<strong>in</strong>g with<strong>in</strong> its territorial boundaries, as <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
loyalties are forever suspect. While <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>al self may be engaged <strong>in</strong> a perpetual war<br />
of self-def<strong>in</strong>iti<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> relati<strong>on</strong> to <strong>the</strong> many <strong>in</strong>imical and hostile external ‘o<strong>the</strong>rs’, it is also at<br />
war with itself. Its boundaries, both ideological and physical, keep shift<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> renewed<br />
efforts to def<strong>in</strong>e and re-def<strong>in</strong>e itself. Pakistan perhaps has <strong>the</strong> unique dist<strong>in</strong>cti<strong>on</strong> of be<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>the</strong> <strong>on</strong>ly country from which <strong>the</strong> majority seceded <strong>in</strong> 1971 and formed a separate<br />
homeland.<br />
When <strong>the</strong> quarrel is with a H<strong>in</strong>du, Christian or Jewish ‘o<strong>the</strong>r’, religious justificati<strong>on</strong>s are<br />
easily <strong>in</strong>voked <strong>in</strong> support of <strong>the</strong> besieged self. When <strong>the</strong> quarrel is with fellow Muslims,<br />
not <strong>on</strong>ly does <strong>the</strong> story of <strong>the</strong> two nati<strong>on</strong>s become transparently ficti<strong>on</strong>al, <strong>the</strong> religious<br />
basis of holy war cannot be <strong>in</strong>voked. Bangladesh becomes a gap<strong>in</strong>g hole <strong>in</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>al<br />
memory. The <strong>on</strong>ly way to speak about it is through silence. This ‘o<strong>the</strong>r’ is a part of <strong>the</strong><br />
self, is not really an o<strong>the</strong>r. It is not really <strong>the</strong> self. The <strong>on</strong>ly way to def<strong>in</strong>e it is to not<br />
def<strong>in</strong>e it. A self so c<strong>on</strong>stra<strong>in</strong>ed and c<strong>on</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ed with<strong>in</strong> a religious self-def<strong>in</strong>iti<strong>on</strong>, has no<br />
language with which to speak of o<strong>the</strong>r def<strong>in</strong>iti<strong>on</strong>s based <strong>on</strong> language or ethnicity. They<br />
can <strong>on</strong>ly be erased from c<strong>on</strong>sciousness.<br />
This is precisely what <strong>the</strong> textbooks do – <strong>the</strong>y erase Bangladesh by not tell<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> tale.<br />
There are many ways of not tell<strong>in</strong>g. One of <strong>the</strong>se is to tell a different story, to speak half<br />
<strong>the</strong> truth. The story of Bangladesh is silenced between half truths, and full lies. If ever<br />
83
speech is used to create silences, it happens <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> case of Bangladesh. One l<strong>in</strong>ers and<br />
short phrases <strong>on</strong> Bangladesh at <strong>the</strong> end of chapters cover up oceans of unspoken horrors.<br />
The compulsi<strong>on</strong> to not remember requires <strong>the</strong> expenditure of energy <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> different<br />
story. Here is how <strong>the</strong> untold story of Bangladesh appears <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Civics textbook for<br />
Class IX and X produced <strong>in</strong> 2001:<br />
Certa<strong>in</strong> political elements began to propagate that nati<strong>on</strong> depends <strong>on</strong> language and<br />
ethnicity <strong>in</strong>stead of religi<strong>on</strong>. This led to an <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> prov<strong>in</strong>cial prejudices. Shaikh<br />
Mujib-ur-Rehman took full advantage and started tell<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> people that <strong>the</strong> people of<br />
West Pakistan were exploit<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>m. He had <strong>the</strong> support of India and o<strong>the</strong>r enemies of<br />
Pakistan to break Pakistan up <strong>in</strong>to pieces. He started to sow hatred <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> hearts of <strong>the</strong><br />
Bengalis. The Bengalis were <strong>in</strong>fluenced by this propaganda and as a result <strong>the</strong> Awami<br />
League w<strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> electi<strong>on</strong> overwhelm<strong>in</strong>gly. Mujib started to propagate a c<strong>on</strong>federati<strong>on</strong> and<br />
said that East Pakistanis can <strong>on</strong>ly develop under his 6 po<strong>in</strong>t formula. This was an evil<br />
design dressed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> garb of prov<strong>in</strong>cial aut<strong>on</strong>omy. The Awami Leaguers and <strong>the</strong> socalled<br />
Mukti Bah<strong>in</strong>i began <strong>the</strong> mass murder of n<strong>on</strong>-Bengalis. They destroyed public<br />
property. In this storm of murder and loot<strong>in</strong>g, nobody’s life and property was safe. At<br />
every step <strong>the</strong> law of <strong>the</strong> land was violated. Bangladeshi flags were flown all over <strong>the</strong><br />
land. F<strong>in</strong>ally <strong>in</strong> order to overcome this revolt, <strong>the</strong> Pakistan army was given authority.<br />
India started to pass statements to <strong>in</strong>cite <strong>the</strong> Bengalis aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> Pakistan army. India<br />
c<strong>on</strong>v<strong>in</strong>ced <strong>the</strong>m that <strong>the</strong> Pakistani army is <strong>in</strong>flict<strong>in</strong>g cruelty up<strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong>m. F<strong>in</strong>ally Mujib-ur-<br />
Rehman was arrested and India, which was fully part of <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>spiracy by Mujib, made a<br />
great noise over this arrest. India used <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>surgents and miscreants and started a<br />
pois<strong>on</strong>ous campaign aga<strong>in</strong>st Pakistan all over <strong>the</strong> world. When India saw that it is<br />
achiev<strong>in</strong>g its nefarious designs, it attacked Pakistan. The Pakistan army fought with full<br />
courage for <strong>the</strong> sake of <strong>the</strong> pure land, <strong>the</strong>y sacrificed <strong>the</strong>ir lives. If <strong>the</strong>y had been allowed<br />
to go <strong>on</strong> fight<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong> enemy would never have succeeded, but because of <strong>in</strong>competent<br />
leadership <strong>in</strong> Pakistan, <strong>the</strong>y had to surrender. So, f<strong>in</strong>ally East Pakistan became separate<br />
from Pakistan due to treas<strong>on</strong> of Awami League, and Indian aggressi<strong>on</strong>. The whole<br />
Pakistani nati<strong>on</strong> was tormented and writh<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> pa<strong>in</strong> of this deep wound. 21<br />
The entire episode of <strong>the</strong> formati<strong>on</strong> of Bangladesh is relegated to <strong>the</strong> dark and <strong>in</strong>sidious<br />
realms of c<strong>on</strong>spiracy. The Bengalis ‘stabbed us <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> back’ by jo<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g hands with India.<br />
They committed <strong>the</strong> murder of n<strong>on</strong>-Bengalis, <strong>the</strong>y looted and <strong>the</strong>y destroyed property.<br />
The Bengalis started <strong>the</strong> violence and were resp<strong>on</strong>sible, al<strong>on</strong>g with c<strong>on</strong>niv<strong>in</strong>g and<br />
schem<strong>in</strong>g India, for <strong>the</strong> deeply wound<strong>in</strong>g break of Pakistan <strong>in</strong> 1971. There is a great deal<br />
of silenc<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> this story. Why were <strong>the</strong> Bengalis so easily misled and c<strong>on</strong>v<strong>in</strong>ced by<br />
India’s propaganda? Why did <strong>the</strong>y start kill<strong>in</strong>g n<strong>on</strong>-Bengalis? Why did <strong>the</strong>y believe that<br />
<strong>the</strong> Pakistan army was committ<strong>in</strong>g atrocities up<strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong>m? N<strong>on</strong>e of <strong>the</strong>se questi<strong>on</strong>s are<br />
answered. The brevity and compressi<strong>on</strong> used here to describe events that have a l<strong>on</strong>g<br />
history and background <strong>in</strong> Pakistani politics and ec<strong>on</strong>omics, forestalls any critical<br />
th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g about what parted us. What is absent here is also <strong>the</strong> role of <strong>the</strong> Pakistani<br />
military, which receives plaudits for its exploits but no disapprobati<strong>on</strong> or c<strong>on</strong>demnati<strong>on</strong><br />
of its well-known acts. In tell<strong>in</strong>g half <strong>the</strong> story, <strong>the</strong> textbook historians fail to menti<strong>on</strong><br />
that <strong>the</strong> Awami League of East Pakistan had w<strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1970 electi<strong>on</strong> overwhelm<strong>in</strong>gly but<br />
<strong>the</strong> elite establishment of West Pakistan refused to transfer power to a duly elected party.<br />
This failure was at <strong>the</strong> center of <strong>the</strong> crisis of 1971. The myth of <strong>the</strong> moral and upright<br />
self would fall apart if <strong>the</strong> real story were to be told <strong>in</strong>stead of half truths and full lies.<br />
21 Civics for Class IX and X, Punjab Textbook Board, Lahore, March 2001, pp. 112-114.<br />
84
The Self <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> O<strong>the</strong>r: Shared Pasts and O<strong>the</strong>r Stories<br />
In spite of attempts by <strong>the</strong> state to re-order <strong>the</strong> unacceptable past, fragments of that<br />
forgotten past sneak <strong>in</strong>to collective memory and create disturbance. The repressed<br />
‘o<strong>the</strong>rs’ <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>al self are ruthlessly crushed by <strong>the</strong> state, which names <strong>the</strong>m<br />
‘traitors’, ‘anti-nati<strong>on</strong>als’ and outsiders. These outsiders reside with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> territory of <strong>the</strong><br />
state – <strong>the</strong>y are <strong>the</strong> strangers with<strong>in</strong>. They represent an uncomfortable c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>uity with <strong>the</strong><br />
past and refuse to be welded <strong>in</strong>to acoherent and homogenized new wholeness. These are<br />
<strong>the</strong> regi<strong>on</strong>al and ethnic entities that participate less <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> power of <strong>the</strong> Centre, and<br />
remember <strong>the</strong>ir c<strong>on</strong>necti<strong>on</strong>s to earlier bel<strong>on</strong>g<strong>in</strong>gs, l<strong>on</strong>g before <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>-state ever<br />
emerged. They hold <strong>on</strong> to <strong>the</strong>ir languages, <strong>the</strong>ir unique cultural expressi<strong>on</strong>s, and <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
own political and social vocabularies. They resist <strong>the</strong> Centre’s pressures to forcibly weld<br />
<strong>the</strong>m <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> new imag<strong>in</strong>ary of <strong>the</strong> state/nati<strong>on</strong>. And <strong>the</strong>y are duly punished, as <strong>the</strong><br />
militaries of <strong>the</strong> state appear with full force to make <strong>the</strong>m forget forever who <strong>the</strong>y <strong>on</strong>ce<br />
were and who <strong>the</strong>y wanted to be.<br />
But <strong>in</strong> a dialectical way, <strong>the</strong> very <strong>in</strong>struments of power used to make <strong>the</strong>m forget, become<br />
tools which help <strong>the</strong>m remember. The more <strong>the</strong> Indians tried to cl<strong>in</strong>g to what was<br />
becom<strong>in</strong>g Pakistan and drift<strong>in</strong>g away, <strong>the</strong> more str<strong>on</strong>gly did <strong>the</strong> new entity assert its<br />
<strong>in</strong>dependence and broke all ties, not <strong>on</strong>ly political and ec<strong>on</strong>omic, but cultural, social and<br />
emoti<strong>on</strong>al. The more violent and angry its break, <strong>the</strong> more vociferously Pakistan enacted<br />
and re-enacted its separati<strong>on</strong>. In <strong>the</strong> same way, <strong>the</strong> more <strong>the</strong> Pakistani military tried to<br />
hold <strong>on</strong> to East Pakistan, drench<strong>in</strong>g every home <strong>the</strong>re <strong>in</strong> blood and semen, <strong>in</strong>trud<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to<br />
every space where noth<strong>in</strong>g but hate prevailed for it, <strong>the</strong> more angrily did <strong>the</strong> Bengalis<br />
push it out, never to let it <strong>in</strong> aga<strong>in</strong>. Harsh memories <strong>on</strong> all sides, made harsher with every<br />
pass<strong>in</strong>g year, created many tales of blood and gore, tales that eventually found <strong>the</strong>ir way<br />
<strong>on</strong>ly partially and <strong>in</strong> sanitized form <strong>in</strong>to history textbooks as officially sancti<strong>on</strong>ed truth.<br />
Each sorrow <strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong>e side was a triumph <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r, every loss <strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong>e side was a symbol<br />
of victory <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r. Some stories are silenced as <strong>the</strong>y disrupt <strong>the</strong> official truth, o<strong>the</strong>rs<br />
f<strong>in</strong>d <strong>the</strong>ir way <strong>in</strong>to obscure accounts that do not see <strong>the</strong> light of day. But ly<strong>in</strong>g deep<br />
somewhere <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>scious and unc<strong>on</strong>scious memories of ord<strong>in</strong>ary people, are tales not<br />
told <strong>in</strong> textbooks. These are poignant tales of love across <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>’s divides, stories of<br />
friendship and b<strong>on</strong>ds bey<strong>on</strong>d <strong>the</strong> borders, narratives of comm<strong>on</strong> hopes and dreams shared<br />
with <strong>the</strong> O<strong>the</strong>r.<br />
85
Muslims <strong>in</strong> Sri Lanka:<br />
Political Choices of a Smaller M<strong>in</strong>ority<br />
Farzana Haniffa<br />
Introducti<strong>on</strong><br />
The Muslims of Sri Lanka are currently 8.9% of <strong>the</strong> populati<strong>on</strong>. And <strong>in</strong> a country whose<br />
nati<strong>on</strong> build<strong>in</strong>g project c<strong>on</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ed itself to <strong>the</strong> image of <strong>the</strong> S<strong>in</strong>hala nati<strong>on</strong>, and where its<br />
protracted, over three decade l<strong>on</strong>g c<strong>on</strong>flict has been historically cast as <strong>on</strong>e between <strong>the</strong><br />
majority S<strong>in</strong>halese and <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>ority Tamils, narrative accounts of <strong>the</strong> country and <strong>the</strong><br />
c<strong>on</strong>flict often do not represent or grapple with <strong>the</strong> presence of this o<strong>the</strong>r m<strong>in</strong>ority o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
than through a cursory reference to <strong>the</strong>ir presence. However, <strong>the</strong> questi<strong>on</strong> of Sri Lanka’s<br />
plural polity is not <strong>on</strong>e that is emerg<strong>in</strong>g <strong>on</strong>ly at this late stage <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>flict. It had<br />
troubled <strong>the</strong> col<strong>on</strong>ial masters at <strong>the</strong> dawn of modern era, when modern forms of<br />
governance were be<strong>in</strong>g c<strong>on</strong>sidered as suitable for <strong>the</strong> col<strong>on</strong>ised as well. In fact, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
process of manag<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> affairs of state <strong>in</strong> Sri Lanka, <strong>the</strong> British, ra<strong>the</strong>r early <strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
adm<strong>in</strong>istrati<strong>on</strong> made provisi<strong>on</strong> for communal representati<strong>on</strong>. All <strong>in</strong>vestigati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong>to<br />
possible adm<strong>in</strong>istrative structures for <strong>the</strong> country, <strong>the</strong> Colebrook – Camer<strong>on</strong> reforms, <strong>the</strong><br />
Mann<strong>in</strong>g reforms, <strong>the</strong> D<strong>on</strong>oughmour reforms and f<strong>in</strong>ally <strong>the</strong> Soulbury reforms,<br />
acknowledged <strong>the</strong> complexity of <strong>the</strong> ethnic picture, and all, with <strong>the</strong> excepti<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong><br />
D<strong>on</strong>oughmour c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>, reluctantly accepted some form of “communal” or ethnicity<br />
based representati<strong>on</strong> for <strong>the</strong> country. i However, <strong>the</strong> trend towards liberal government <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> col<strong>on</strong>ial metropolis were reflected <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> col<strong>on</strong>y as a reluctance to foster communal<br />
sentiment and <strong>the</strong>re was a move away from <strong>the</strong> customary communal representati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> d<strong>on</strong>oughmour c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> of 1931. Uyangoda <strong>in</strong> his writ<strong>in</strong>gs explores <strong>the</strong> manner <strong>in</strong><br />
which this legacy, of liberal late col<strong>on</strong>ial reluctance to communalise <strong>the</strong> adm<strong>in</strong>istrati<strong>on</strong>,<br />
meshed well with <strong>the</strong> majoritarian impulses of <strong>the</strong> S<strong>in</strong>hala elite. ii<br />
C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>alism and m<strong>in</strong>ority rights <strong>in</strong> Sri Lanka are marked by m<strong>in</strong>ority anxieties<br />
regard<strong>in</strong>g majority dom<strong>in</strong>ance through representative democracy, and <strong>the</strong> majority<br />
community’s absolute lack of sympathy or sensitivity to such anxieties. iii The asserti<strong>on</strong> of<br />
S<strong>in</strong>hala nati<strong>on</strong>alism, was seen by and large as <strong>the</strong> <strong>on</strong>ly susta<strong>in</strong>ed critical local resp<strong>on</strong>se to<br />
col<strong>on</strong>ialism. S<strong>in</strong>hala nati<strong>on</strong>alist ideology has l<strong>on</strong>g seen itself as <strong>the</strong> flag bearers of a post -<br />
col<strong>on</strong>ial <strong>in</strong>digenous c<strong>on</strong>sciousness. Underp<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g this c<strong>on</strong>sciousness is <strong>the</strong> dual<br />
preoccupati<strong>on</strong> that <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>orities colluded with <strong>the</strong> col<strong>on</strong>ial state, and that majority<br />
entitlement had an ethical basis endorsed as it was by representative democracy.<br />
The c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> at <strong>in</strong>dependence, that is, <strong>the</strong> Soulbury c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>, had several m<strong>in</strong>ority<br />
rights guarantees. These <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong>structi<strong>on</strong>s to delimitati<strong>on</strong> commissi<strong>on</strong>s to be m<strong>in</strong>dful<br />
of adequate m<strong>in</strong>ority representati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> delimitati<strong>on</strong> of electoral districts, and <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>juncti<strong>on</strong> forbidd<strong>in</strong>g discrim<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> religious or ethnic grounds. iv However, state<br />
mak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> aftermath of <strong>in</strong>dependence was d<strong>on</strong>e very much <strong>in</strong> l<strong>in</strong>e with a S<strong>in</strong>hala<br />
nati<strong>on</strong>alist agenda, and <strong>the</strong> marg<strong>in</strong>alisati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>orities who were seen to have<br />
benefited under <strong>the</strong> col<strong>on</strong>ial adm<strong>in</strong>istrati<strong>on</strong>, was very much a part of this ideology.<br />
86
In <strong>the</strong> two c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>-mak<strong>in</strong>g exercises that <strong>the</strong> Sri Lankan state engaged <strong>in</strong>, after<br />
<strong>in</strong>dependence, both progressively did away with <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>ority rights guarantees <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>s. The first did away with Secti<strong>on</strong> 29(2) and <strong>the</strong> sec<strong>on</strong>d with <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>structi<strong>on</strong>s<br />
to delimitati<strong>on</strong> commissi<strong>on</strong>s to be m<strong>in</strong>dful of m<strong>in</strong>ority representati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
This paper is c<strong>on</strong>cerned with <strong>the</strong> Muslim community’s resp<strong>on</strong>se to this process of<br />
m<strong>in</strong>ority marg<strong>in</strong>alisati<strong>on</strong>. As many writers have po<strong>in</strong>ted out, <strong>the</strong> formidable political<br />
disadvantages that <strong>the</strong> Muslims as a collective have faced <strong>in</strong> Sri Lanka, have dictated<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir political choices. v For <strong>in</strong>stance, Muslims are less than 10% of <strong>the</strong> populati<strong>on</strong> of Sri<br />
Lanka and are widely dispersed <strong>in</strong> different parts of <strong>the</strong> island. The <strong>on</strong>ly two significant<br />
populati<strong>on</strong> c<strong>on</strong>centrati<strong>on</strong>s are <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Ampara district of <strong>the</strong> Eastern Prov<strong>in</strong>ce and <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Colombo district of <strong>the</strong> western prov<strong>in</strong>ce. As such, muster<strong>in</strong>g a significant vote base that<br />
was Muslim <strong>on</strong>ly is difficult, and assured <strong>on</strong>ly <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> East.<br />
Politics by Muslims<br />
While <strong>the</strong> Tamil leadership reacted str<strong>on</strong>gly to <strong>the</strong> S<strong>in</strong>halese refusal to guarantee m<strong>in</strong>ority<br />
rights c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>ally, Muslim leaders of <strong>the</strong> time adopted a different approach of<br />
work<strong>in</strong>g with <strong>the</strong> respective ‘nati<strong>on</strong>al’ political parties that c<strong>on</strong>trolled <strong>the</strong> state. They<br />
resorted to l<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ir fate to <strong>the</strong> relati<strong>on</strong>ships that Muslim parliamentarians were able<br />
to forge with <strong>the</strong> respective nati<strong>on</strong>al parties of which <strong>the</strong>y were a part. This strategy has<br />
been critiqued <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> narratives of S<strong>in</strong>hala nati<strong>on</strong>alist entitlement as well as <strong>the</strong> discourse<br />
of Tamil nati<strong>on</strong>alist self-determ<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> struggle. Muslims, bit players <strong>in</strong> both narratives,<br />
are seen as collaborat<strong>in</strong>g with whoever was <strong>in</strong> power, switch<strong>in</strong>g from <strong>on</strong>e nati<strong>on</strong>al party<br />
to ano<strong>the</strong>r <strong>in</strong> keep<strong>in</strong>g with political expediency and <strong>in</strong> denial of <strong>the</strong>ir ‘actual’ Tamil<br />
ethnicity. vi Curiously, scholarship <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> issue, too, has not addressed <strong>the</strong> questi<strong>on</strong> of<br />
Muslim political engagement from a Muslim perspective and seriously <strong>in</strong>terrogated what<br />
benefits, if any, accrued to Muslims <strong>in</strong> this choice to suspend a Muslim political voice. vii<br />
Muslim Politics at Independence: Strategy of Ethnic Bl<strong>in</strong>dness<br />
Muslim political choices <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> face of <strong>the</strong> refusal of a predom<strong>in</strong>antly S<strong>in</strong>hala state to<br />
c<strong>on</strong>sider m<strong>in</strong>ority rights, has been to render <strong>the</strong>ir dist<strong>in</strong>ct religio-ethnic identity <strong>in</strong>visible<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> political realm. Such a positi<strong>on</strong> meshed well with liberal claims that ‘we are all<br />
<strong>on</strong>e’, but <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> emergent ethnically polarized c<strong>on</strong>text, exacerbated by <strong>the</strong> electoral<br />
reforms of 1987, it resulted <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>creased political marg<strong>in</strong>alisati<strong>on</strong> of Muslim <strong>in</strong>terests.<br />
Many Muslim MPs of a previous era, embrac<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>ciple of ethnic bl<strong>in</strong>dness,<br />
c<strong>on</strong>tested seats and w<strong>on</strong> from mostly multi ethnic c<strong>on</strong>stituencies. There were many such<br />
pers<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g T.B.Jayah and Dr. M.C.M Kaleel, but <strong>the</strong> most significant example of<br />
such an engagement is <strong>the</strong> highly respected former M.P for Balangoda, M.L.M.<br />
Aboosally. He had <strong>the</strong> dist<strong>in</strong>cti<strong>on</strong> of defeat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> entrenched Kandyan S<strong>in</strong>hala<br />
aristocrats, <strong>the</strong> Ratwattes. viii<br />
These Muslim MPs, given <strong>the</strong>ir political dependence <strong>on</strong> c<strong>on</strong>stituencies o<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>the</strong><br />
Muslim vote, did not th<strong>in</strong>k of <strong>the</strong>mselves as Muslim MPs represent<strong>in</strong>g Muslim c<strong>on</strong>cerns.<br />
87
They rarely highlighted <strong>the</strong>ir ‘Muslimness’ or emphasised Muslim issues. Later, <strong>the</strong>y<br />
were criticised for not pay<strong>in</strong>g adequate attenti<strong>on</strong> to Muslim community c<strong>on</strong>cerns.<br />
Muslims of this era were caught <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> b<strong>in</strong>d of not hav<strong>in</strong>g Muslim specific political<br />
representati<strong>on</strong>, but of hav<strong>in</strong>g to resort to Muslim MPs to speak <strong>on</strong> behalf of Muslim<br />
c<strong>on</strong>cerns based <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir ethnic affiliati<strong>on</strong>. Such acti<strong>on</strong>s were ultimately of no political<br />
benefit to <strong>the</strong> MPs <strong>the</strong>mselves. Little attenti<strong>on</strong> has been paid by scholars to this particular<br />
c<strong>on</strong>undrum faced by Muslims. In <strong>the</strong> ethnicisati<strong>on</strong> of politics, Muslims lost out as group<br />
that was <strong>the</strong> last to ethnicise its own politics. Little surprise <strong>the</strong>n that <strong>the</strong> Muslim MPs—<br />
represent<strong>in</strong>g c<strong>on</strong>stituencies that were not necessarily Muslim-- were ill equipped to<br />
address <strong>the</strong> urgent security c<strong>on</strong>cerns of Muslims <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> North and East that emerged with<br />
<strong>the</strong> escalati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>flict. While arguably <strong>the</strong> material c<strong>on</strong>sequences of such a<br />
marg<strong>in</strong>alisati<strong>on</strong> were negligible <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>South</strong>, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> North and East <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>sequences<br />
were dire.<br />
Two o<strong>the</strong>r political figures from <strong>the</strong> Muslim community that have ga<strong>in</strong>ed an important<br />
place <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> history of Muslim political engagement with <strong>the</strong> state are Badiuddeen<br />
Mahmood and Razik Fareed. In <strong>the</strong> meagre references to Muslim politics <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> histories<br />
of Sri Lanka’s post col<strong>on</strong>ial state, great prom<strong>in</strong>ence is given to <strong>the</strong>se two Muslim figures<br />
as represent<strong>in</strong>g Muslims’ chosen strategy of political engagement.<br />
Fareed hailed from a wealthy Colombo Muslim family and entered politics <strong>in</strong> 1930. He is<br />
famous for vociferously advocat<strong>in</strong>g a ‘stand<strong>in</strong>g by <strong>the</strong> majority’ positi<strong>on</strong> for Muslims,<br />
and <strong>in</strong> particular, of support<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>alizati<strong>on</strong> of S<strong>in</strong>hala as <strong>the</strong> country’s <strong>on</strong>ly<br />
nati<strong>on</strong>al language, and back<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> dom<strong>in</strong>i<strong>on</strong> status bill regardless of its <strong>in</strong>adequate<br />
m<strong>in</strong>ority safeguards. As member of <strong>the</strong> educati<strong>on</strong> committee of <strong>the</strong> government of 1936,<br />
Fareed encountered Tamil oppositi<strong>on</strong> to <strong>the</strong> promoti<strong>on</strong> of Muslims as teachers <strong>in</strong> Tamil<br />
language schools serv<strong>in</strong>g Muslim communities. Fareed, born and raised <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> south, <strong>in</strong> a<br />
S<strong>in</strong>hala majority area, spoke all three languages, was most comfortable <strong>in</strong> English and<br />
felt no special aff<strong>in</strong>ity for <strong>the</strong> Tamil language. Also, encounter<strong>in</strong>g at a very early stage <strong>in</strong><br />
his political career, what he c<strong>on</strong>strued as anti-Muslim and caste based sectarianism<br />
am<strong>on</strong>gst Tamils, Fareed thought it far more politic for Muslims to cast <strong>the</strong>ir lot with <strong>the</strong><br />
S<strong>in</strong>halese. Am<strong>on</strong>gst <strong>the</strong> sou<strong>the</strong>rn Muslims’ stereotypes of ‘<strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rs’ – <strong>the</strong> S<strong>in</strong>halese are<br />
seen as genial and easy go<strong>in</strong>g, and <strong>the</strong> Tamils as <strong>in</strong>dustrious, crafty and manipulative.<br />
Such sentiments also seem to have had a part <strong>in</strong> motivat<strong>in</strong>g Fareed’s political choices.<br />
Perhaps, given that <strong>the</strong> wrath of <strong>the</strong> genial S<strong>in</strong>halese when aroused was quite ferocious—<br />
as Muslims of Fareed’s generati<strong>on</strong> experienced <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1915 anti Muslim riots -- Fareed<br />
thought it more politic for Muslims to cast <strong>the</strong>ir lot with <strong>the</strong> S<strong>in</strong>halese.<br />
Although Fareed, supported <strong>the</strong> S<strong>in</strong>hala majority, he was arguably <strong>on</strong>e of <strong>the</strong> more<br />
“communal” m<strong>in</strong>ded of <strong>the</strong> Muslim representatives <strong>in</strong> parliament. Fareed’s political<br />
career is marked by attempts to <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>alize ‘Muslim’ as an adm<strong>in</strong>istrative category<br />
with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> state and <strong>the</strong>reby to have <strong>the</strong>ir cultural practices recognized and legitimized<br />
<strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>ally. Fareed’s political achievements for <strong>the</strong> community were to ga<strong>in</strong><br />
c<strong>on</strong>cessi<strong>on</strong>s for Muslims like leave for Friday prayers and <strong>the</strong> recogniti<strong>on</strong> of Meelad-un-<br />
Nabi, <strong>the</strong> Prophet Mohamed’s birthday as a nati<strong>on</strong>al holiday. Dur<strong>in</strong>g his time schools<br />
with a majority of Muslim students were <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>alized as Muslim schools with special<br />
88
calendars, syllabi and uniforms. Fareed’s acti<strong>on</strong>s greatly c<strong>on</strong>tributed to <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>alizati<strong>on</strong> of a particular Muslim identity. However Fareed’s politics, were not<br />
those that garnered much status for him with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> various governments of which he was<br />
a part. Indeed o<strong>the</strong>r than as a member of <strong>the</strong> three m<strong>on</strong>th l<strong>on</strong>g care- taker cab<strong>in</strong>et<br />
follow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> assass<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> of Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, he held no<br />
important positi<strong>on</strong>s with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> governments.<br />
Fareed as a prom<strong>in</strong>ent Muslim figure is seen as exemplary of Muslim political choices as<br />
well as political ga<strong>in</strong>s. His emphasis <strong>on</strong> ga<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g recogniti<strong>on</strong> from <strong>the</strong> fledgl<strong>in</strong>g state for<br />
Muslim religious and cultural practices, and hav<strong>in</strong>g m<strong>in</strong>imal say <strong>in</strong> questi<strong>on</strong>s of<br />
governance are seen as emblematic of politics by Muslims. However, this was hardly <strong>the</strong><br />
case. Too much has been made of positi<strong>on</strong>s favoured by him and too little analysis has<br />
been d<strong>on</strong>e of his m<strong>in</strong>imal political clout. There were many different positi<strong>on</strong>s and<br />
op<strong>in</strong>i<strong>on</strong>s am<strong>on</strong>g Muslims regard<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> major issues of that time, and Fareed represented<br />
<strong>on</strong>ly <strong>on</strong>e of <strong>the</strong>se.<br />
The Badiudeen Mahmood, an <strong>in</strong>fluential figure <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP)<br />
is ano<strong>the</strong>r important figure <strong>in</strong> Muslim politics. A friend and close c<strong>on</strong>fidante of S.W.R.D.<br />
Bandaranaike, Mahmood was founder secretary of <strong>the</strong> SLFP and after <strong>the</strong> death of<br />
Bandaranaike, was appo<strong>in</strong>ted member of <strong>the</strong> cab<strong>in</strong>et of two SLFP governments under<br />
Bandaranike’s widow, Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike. Mahmood represents yet ano<strong>the</strong>r<br />
way <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong> Muslim leadership attempted to address <strong>the</strong>ir political marg<strong>in</strong>alizati<strong>on</strong><br />
with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Sri Lankan polity. Unc<strong>on</strong>stra<strong>in</strong>ed by any need to w<strong>in</strong> at electi<strong>on</strong>s—Mahmood<br />
was twice an appo<strong>in</strong>ted member-- Mahmood had a very autocratic approach to <strong>the</strong><br />
Muslim community and his plans for it. He identified <strong>the</strong> dist<strong>in</strong>ct educati<strong>on</strong>al<br />
disadvantages of <strong>the</strong> Muslim populati<strong>on</strong>, and focused <strong>on</strong> policies to get redress, and to<br />
that end Mahmood <strong>in</strong>fluenced first, <strong>the</strong> Educati<strong>on</strong> M<strong>in</strong>ister Wijayananda Dahanayake and<br />
later, tak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> portfolio of Educati<strong>on</strong> himself, did much to <strong>in</strong>fluence <strong>the</strong><br />
development of Muslim educati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
At <strong>the</strong> political level, Mahmood was committed to <strong>the</strong> success of his party and<br />
manipulated Muslim vote banks to assure <strong>the</strong> SLFP’s victory <strong>in</strong> at least <strong>on</strong>e <strong>in</strong>stance. He<br />
did so by mobiliz<strong>in</strong>g large segments of <strong>the</strong> Muslim vernacular <strong>in</strong>telligentsia around ideas<br />
of Islamic Socialism. Form<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> ‘Islamic Socialist Fr<strong>on</strong>t’ (ISF), Mahmood successfully<br />
mobilized a generati<strong>on</strong> of educated Muslim youth, giv<strong>in</strong>g voice to Muslim op<strong>in</strong>i<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong><br />
vital nati<strong>on</strong>al issues for several years. Mahmood did this while <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> oppositi<strong>on</strong> and<br />
ensured <strong>the</strong> shift of a substantial Muslim vote from <strong>the</strong> United Nati<strong>on</strong>al Party (UNP) that<br />
<strong>the</strong> Muslim trader elite was traditi<strong>on</strong>ally loyal to, to <strong>the</strong> SLFP. And after <strong>the</strong> SLFP<br />
victory of 1972, when <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> was redrafted and Sri Lanka declared a republic,<br />
Mahmood organized a mammoth celebrati<strong>on</strong> of Muslims welcom<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> government’s<br />
<strong>in</strong>itiative. This was <strong>the</strong> same c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> that did away with secti<strong>on</strong> 29 of <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>dependence c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> and was boycotted by <strong>the</strong> Tamil leadership. After <strong>the</strong> electi<strong>on</strong><br />
and ano<strong>the</strong>r cab<strong>in</strong>et appo<strong>in</strong>tment for himself, Mahmood lost <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> ISF. It had<br />
served its purpose as far as he was c<strong>on</strong>cerned and <strong>the</strong>re was no more use for it. The years<br />
of mobilizati<strong>on</strong> and organiz<strong>in</strong>g <strong>on</strong> ideas of Islamic Socialism and Muslims’ political<br />
place <strong>in</strong> Sri Lanka were to no avail. This was a cause of great resentment am<strong>on</strong>gst a<br />
89
generati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> Muslim <strong>in</strong>telligentsia. ix Mahmood’s treatment of <strong>the</strong> ISF is <strong>in</strong>dicative of<br />
<strong>the</strong> anti democratic nature of <strong>the</strong> Muslim leaders’ engagement with <strong>the</strong> community <strong>the</strong>y<br />
claimed to represent.<br />
Fareed and Mahmood, given <strong>the</strong>ir nati<strong>on</strong>al stature, have become emblematic of Muslim<br />
engagement with <strong>the</strong> state. However, <strong>the</strong> special circumstances of <strong>the</strong>ir prom<strong>in</strong>ence,<br />
where Mahmood was important because of his place <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> SLFP and his close ties with<br />
<strong>the</strong> Bandaranaike family, and Fareed because of his stature as part of an elite<br />
philanthropic family, did more than a little to <strong>in</strong>fluence <strong>the</strong>ir particular paths. This aspect<br />
of Muslim politics, where Muslim political leaders held <strong>the</strong> communities captive has not<br />
been adequately understood or appreciated by scholars of Muslim politics. These elisi<strong>on</strong>s<br />
speak to <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>adequacy of studies undertaken <strong>in</strong>to Muslim politics <strong>in</strong> Sri Lanka. Very<br />
significantly nei<strong>the</strong>r Fareed nor Mahmood were elected by <strong>the</strong> Muslims that <strong>the</strong>y claimed<br />
to speak <strong>on</strong> behalf of.<br />
The much more pedestrian political careers of Kaleel, Aboosally, M.H.Mohamed and <strong>the</strong><br />
like, arguably are more typical of <strong>the</strong> place of Muslim political power with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> state. x It<br />
is a story of m<strong>in</strong>imal pers<strong>on</strong>al clout and a dependence <strong>on</strong> good relati<strong>on</strong>s with <strong>the</strong> party<br />
leadership and a politics that embraced <strong>the</strong> plural nature of <strong>the</strong> Sri Lankan polity. . xi ..<br />
However, <strong>the</strong>re was little overall ga<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> sphere of Muslim political power. There<br />
were few that could publicly speak <strong>on</strong> behalf of Muslims <strong>in</strong> government, and n<strong>on</strong>e who<br />
could claim to represent a Muslim mandate dur<strong>in</strong>g this time.<br />
“Muslim” Politics <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> C<strong>on</strong>text of <strong>the</strong> Ethnic C<strong>on</strong>flict<br />
The proporti<strong>on</strong>al representati<strong>on</strong> system <strong>in</strong>troduced with <strong>the</strong> new c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> 1978 did<br />
away with what little political power <strong>the</strong>se MPs with <strong>the</strong>ir multiethnic c<strong>on</strong>stituencies had<br />
c<strong>on</strong>solidated. It brought about an era of <strong>the</strong> small ethnic parties. Thereafter any party that<br />
<strong>in</strong>itially could muster 12% of <strong>the</strong> vote of a district and later just 5% of that vote was<br />
eligible to be c<strong>on</strong>sidered for a seat from <strong>the</strong> district. xii Additi<strong>on</strong>ally, voters were called<br />
up<strong>on</strong> to <strong>in</strong>dicate <strong>the</strong>ir preference from <strong>the</strong> respective political parties’ list of names.<br />
Therefore, nom<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> to <strong>the</strong> list from <strong>the</strong> party, and additi<strong>on</strong>ally, muster<strong>in</strong>g preferential<br />
votes from <strong>the</strong> entire district, was a challenge that <strong>in</strong>dividual politicians had to face and<br />
<strong>the</strong>refore, <strong>the</strong> competiti<strong>on</strong> am<strong>on</strong>gst <strong>in</strong>dividual MPs from <strong>the</strong> same district became ra<strong>the</strong>r<br />
fierce. Those with erstwhile success, <strong>in</strong> selected areas, like Aboosally <strong>in</strong> Ratnapura,<br />
speedily lost <strong>the</strong>ir seats. Political leaders argue that <strong>the</strong> proporti<strong>on</strong>al representati<strong>on</strong><br />
system exacerbated ethnic tensi<strong>on</strong>s as politicians were compelled to appeal to a larger<br />
c<strong>on</strong>stituency and w<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir preference by any means possible. xiii Ethnicity, <strong>the</strong>n was <strong>the</strong><br />
most readily available platform <strong>on</strong> which to mobilize masses.<br />
The Eastern prov<strong>in</strong>ce has traditi<strong>on</strong>ally been <strong>the</strong> home of Muslim and Tamil villages often<br />
situated next to <strong>on</strong>e ano<strong>the</strong>r or of Muslim villages surrounded by Tamils. Historically,<br />
accord<strong>in</strong>g to local residents, Tamil Muslim coexistence <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Eastern prov<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>in</strong>cluded<br />
<strong>in</strong>cidents of sporadic localized altercati<strong>on</strong>s between <strong>the</strong> two communities. These were<br />
ma<strong>in</strong>ly specific to <strong>the</strong> neighbour<strong>in</strong>g villages am<strong>on</strong>g whom <strong>the</strong>y took place and would<br />
90
generally end with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> course of <strong>the</strong> day due to <strong>the</strong> need for amicable <strong>in</strong>teracti<strong>on</strong> for<br />
daily bus<strong>in</strong>ess. However <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> mid to late 1980s <strong>the</strong> polarizati<strong>on</strong> between communities<br />
became more marked with <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>volvement of outside elements.<strong>the</strong> Indian Peace Keep<strong>in</strong>g<br />
Force (IPKF), <strong>the</strong> Sri Lankan Armed Forces, and Tamil militants and later, Muslim<br />
“home guards” armed by <strong>the</strong> state were all <strong>in</strong>strumental <strong>in</strong> manipulat<strong>in</strong>g ethnic<br />
differences and exacerbat<strong>in</strong>g enmity between <strong>the</strong> two communities.<br />
The Tamil Muslim Riots <strong>in</strong> Batticaloa <strong>in</strong> 1985 were allegedly orchestrated by <strong>the</strong> state <strong>in</strong><br />
a manner similar to <strong>the</strong> events of July 1983. xiv ,<strong>the</strong> 8 day siege of Kattankudi by <strong>the</strong> LTTE<br />
<strong>in</strong> 1987, <strong>the</strong> IPKF bomb<strong>in</strong>g of Ottamavadi, <strong>the</strong> massacres of Muslim at prayer by <strong>the</strong><br />
LTTE <strong>in</strong> Kattankudi and Eravur (1990), <strong>the</strong> disappearance of <strong>the</strong> Haj pilgrims from<br />
Kurukkal Madam <strong>the</strong> same year are all pivotal moments for Muslims <strong>in</strong> recount<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
victimizati<strong>on</strong> due to <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>flict. Additi<strong>on</strong>ally <strong>in</strong>habitants of 33 Muslim villages <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Batticaloa district were displaced dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>flict. Most of <strong>the</strong>se people moved to <strong>the</strong><br />
densely populated town of Kattankudi fur<strong>the</strong>r swell<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> populati<strong>on</strong> of that town. The<br />
1990 expulsi<strong>on</strong> of Muslim <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> North by <strong>the</strong> LTTE and <strong>the</strong> result<strong>in</strong>g 16 year<br />
displacement of <strong>the</strong> Nor<strong>the</strong>rn Muslims have often been attributed, <strong>in</strong> discussi<strong>on</strong>s, to <strong>the</strong><br />
disturbances <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> East. Certa<strong>in</strong> small scale reprisal kill<strong>in</strong>gs of Tamils by Muslims <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
aftermath of militant attacks have also been recorded. These were largely by Muslim<br />
Home Guards with overt and cover support from <strong>the</strong> Special Task Force (STF). Later<br />
<strong>the</strong>se Home Guards were systematically hunted down and killed by <strong>the</strong> LTTE. Fur<strong>the</strong>r,<br />
Muslims <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> East are accused of questi<strong>on</strong>able land acquisiti<strong>on</strong>s and are perceived as<br />
tak<strong>in</strong>g advantage of Tamil misfortune. Muslim purchas<strong>in</strong>g of paddy land from Tamil<br />
absentee landlords, buy<strong>in</strong>g up Tamil owned shops, <strong>the</strong> creep<strong>in</strong>g spread of Muslim<br />
villages <strong>in</strong>to Tamil villages is part of <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>temporary reality of <strong>the</strong> Eastern prov<strong>in</strong>ce.<br />
Any illegality <strong>in</strong> this process is not yet established, however Tamil and specifically LTTE<br />
resentment of this process has been recorded, xv and Muslims are seen to have <strong>in</strong>directly<br />
benefited from <strong>the</strong> depleti<strong>on</strong> suffered by Tamil society. xvi<br />
The Sri Lanka Muslim C<strong>on</strong>gress (SLMC) emerged <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>text of <strong>the</strong> escalati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong><br />
c<strong>on</strong>flict between <strong>the</strong> S<strong>in</strong>hala state and Tamil militant groups, <strong>the</strong> exacerbati<strong>on</strong> of ethnic<br />
tensi<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Eastern Prov<strong>in</strong>ce and <strong>the</strong> state aided enmity between <strong>the</strong> Muslims and <strong>the</strong><br />
Tamils. In <strong>the</strong> 1980s <strong>the</strong> Muslim MPs <strong>in</strong> parliament struggled to articulate Muslim issues,<br />
and given <strong>the</strong> polarizati<strong>on</strong> between <strong>the</strong> Tamil and Muslim communities <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> East <strong>the</strong><br />
time was ripe for <strong>the</strong> emergence of a Muslim identified party represent<strong>in</strong>g Muslim<br />
<strong>in</strong>terests. Therefore, we see <strong>the</strong> emergence of <strong>the</strong> SLMC with a publicly stated Muslim<br />
political agenda and a powerful base <strong>in</strong> Amparai and Batticaloa districts <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Eastern<br />
Prov<strong>in</strong>ce.<br />
While <strong>the</strong> SLMC under <strong>the</strong> leadership of its founder M.H.M Ashraff was successful <strong>in</strong><br />
giv<strong>in</strong>g voice to Muslim aspirati<strong>on</strong>s of <strong>the</strong> North and East, after his death <strong>the</strong> party has<br />
been plagued with difficulties. For <strong>in</strong>stance, <strong>the</strong>re was a significant split <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> party after<br />
his death with his wife, Ferial Ashraff tak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> leadership of <strong>the</strong> Nati<strong>on</strong>al Unity<br />
Alliance that Ashraff had formulated before his death. Previously an umbrella body of<br />
which <strong>the</strong> SLMC was a part, today <strong>the</strong> NUA functi<strong>on</strong>s as a Muslim led Nati<strong>on</strong>al party <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> Eastern Prov<strong>in</strong>ce. More recently, <strong>the</strong>re have been fur<strong>the</strong>r schisms <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> party with M.<br />
91
Athaullah, Rishard Bathiuddeen, and several o<strong>the</strong>rs leav<strong>in</strong>g to formulate <strong>the</strong>ir own<br />
breakaway parties. Fur<strong>the</strong>r, while <strong>the</strong> proporti<strong>on</strong>al representati<strong>on</strong> system allows for<br />
m<strong>in</strong>ority representati<strong>on</strong>, and makes m<strong>in</strong>ority seats crucial for <strong>the</strong> formati<strong>on</strong> of a majority<br />
government, <strong>in</strong> practice <strong>the</strong>re is much that is d<strong>on</strong>e to underm<strong>in</strong>e m<strong>in</strong>ority strength. For<br />
<strong>in</strong>stance, <strong>the</strong> practice of MPs cross<strong>in</strong>g over from <strong>the</strong> various parties is comm<strong>on</strong>. xvii<br />
The nati<strong>on</strong>al parties have no compuncti<strong>on</strong>s about ‘“acquir<strong>in</strong>g” additi<strong>on</strong>al seats from <strong>the</strong><br />
m<strong>in</strong>ority parties by solicit<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>dividual crossovers. And party representatives, especially<br />
though not <strong>on</strong>ly from <strong>the</strong> Muslim parties, have been <strong>on</strong>ly too will<strong>in</strong>g to be bought over.<br />
While <strong>the</strong>re are provisi<strong>on</strong>s for parties to go to courts to expel such MPs and <strong>the</strong>reby<br />
deprive <strong>the</strong>m of <strong>the</strong>ir seats, <strong>the</strong> courts have no history of grant<strong>in</strong>g judgments <strong>in</strong> favour of<br />
<strong>the</strong> compla<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g parties. Therefore, <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>ority parties, especially <strong>the</strong> SLMC has seen<br />
extremely damag<strong>in</strong>g crossovers <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> recent past that has challenged <strong>the</strong> party’s structure<br />
and discipl<strong>in</strong>e, and also fuelled questi<strong>on</strong>s about Muslim political competence by <strong>the</strong> state<br />
and <strong>the</strong> LTTE. And <strong>the</strong> SLMC’s reference to itself as <strong>the</strong> Sole Representative of <strong>the</strong><br />
Muslims of <strong>the</strong> North and East has failed to impress ei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> breakaway facti<strong>on</strong>s or <strong>the</strong><br />
larger Muslim community. xviii<br />
The SLMC’s failure to hold <strong>the</strong> party toge<strong>the</strong>r has been attributed to Rauf Hakeem’s<br />
reportedly authoritarian leadership style. Additi<strong>on</strong>ally <strong>the</strong> Nor<strong>the</strong>rn Muslim positi<strong>on</strong> as<br />
understood by <strong>the</strong> SLMC has been critiqued by many Nor<strong>the</strong>rn Muslims who<br />
experienced <strong>the</strong> expulsi<strong>on</strong>. The SLMC positi<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> a soluti<strong>on</strong> to <strong>the</strong> ethnic c<strong>on</strong>flict has<br />
l<strong>on</strong>g been Eastern Prov<strong>in</strong>ce centric and based <strong>on</strong> Tamil Muslim enmity, and a n<strong>on</strong><br />
c<strong>on</strong>tiguous adm<strong>in</strong>istrative area based mostly <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>South</strong> East. Such an arrangement,<br />
does not address <strong>the</strong> specific c<strong>on</strong>cerns of <strong>the</strong> Nor<strong>the</strong>rn Muslims expelled by <strong>the</strong> LTTE <strong>in</strong><br />
1990. The Nor<strong>the</strong>rn Muslims do not c<strong>on</strong>sider <strong>the</strong> Tamil people as a whole to be <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
enemies and hold <strong>on</strong>ly <strong>the</strong> LTTE resp<strong>on</strong>sible. In <strong>the</strong> East <strong>the</strong> dist<strong>in</strong>cti<strong>on</strong> is not that clear.<br />
Fru<strong>the</strong>r, given <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> Muslims of <strong>the</strong> nor<strong>the</strong>rn prov<strong>in</strong>ce are <strong>on</strong>ly 5% of <strong>the</strong><br />
populati<strong>on</strong> and live dispersed <strong>in</strong> small communities through out <strong>the</strong> prov<strong>in</strong>ce with <strong>on</strong>ly<br />
<strong>on</strong>e significant area of c<strong>on</strong>centrati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> Musali <strong>in</strong> Mannar, such highly ethnicised<br />
soluti<strong>on</strong>s will not be able to guarantee Muslim safety and security. They understand that<br />
it is a pattern of coexistence that will be beneficial to <strong>the</strong>m. xix<br />
Fur<strong>the</strong>r complicat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> emergence of an aut<strong>on</strong>omous and unified Muslim politics, is <strong>the</strong><br />
fact that <strong>on</strong>ly 30% of <strong>the</strong> Muslim populati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> country is from <strong>the</strong> North and East.<br />
The larger number of Muslims that reside outside <strong>the</strong> North and East see no real need for<br />
a Muslim political voice outside of <strong>the</strong> Eastern Prov<strong>in</strong>ce. Sou<strong>the</strong>rn Muslim politicians, <strong>in</strong><br />
particular, resent <strong>the</strong> SLMC’s attempts to reformulate itself as a nati<strong>on</strong>al party. They<br />
c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to practice <strong>the</strong> system of rest<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ir trust <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir allegiance to <strong>the</strong> leadership<br />
of <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>al parties and do not necessarily support <strong>the</strong> SLMC’s call for separate<br />
Muslim representati<strong>on</strong> at <strong>the</strong> peace negotiati<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
Today, <strong>the</strong> SLMC, toge<strong>the</strong>r with its breakaway facti<strong>on</strong>s are struggl<strong>in</strong>g to assert <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
claim to articulate Muslim political needs. They compete fiercely am<strong>on</strong>gst <strong>on</strong>e ano<strong>the</strong>r<br />
and <strong>the</strong>ir pers<strong>on</strong>al enmities are str<strong>on</strong>g while <strong>the</strong>re is little discernable difference <strong>on</strong> issues.<br />
92
Unfortunately <strong>the</strong>ir facti<strong>on</strong>alism plays <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> hands of <strong>the</strong> state and <strong>the</strong> LTTE’s l<strong>on</strong>g<br />
entrenched stereotyp<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> Muslims as be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> political disarray.<br />
As many have argued, and I have illustrated elsewhere, xx historically Sri Lanka does not<br />
have a culture of recogniz<strong>in</strong>g m<strong>in</strong>ority rights. The S<strong>in</strong>hala state, supported by certa<strong>in</strong><br />
Muslim political actors from <strong>the</strong> south, and <strong>in</strong> keep<strong>in</strong>g with a l<strong>on</strong>g history of Muslim<br />
political absence c<strong>on</strong>siders it presumptuous of Muslims to claim a seat at <strong>the</strong> negotiat<strong>in</strong>g<br />
table. They are called up<strong>on</strong> to trust <strong>the</strong> state to look after <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>in</strong>terests. But <strong>the</strong> state has<br />
no history of do<strong>in</strong>g so.<br />
Additi<strong>on</strong>ally, Tamil nati<strong>on</strong>alism has a particular place for Muslims <strong>in</strong> its narrative of<br />
emergence. Sri Lankan Muslims are largely Tamil speak<strong>in</strong>g and Tamil nati<strong>on</strong>alists<br />
generally see Muslims as fellow ethnics that refused <strong>the</strong>ir ‘Tamilness’ for narrow<br />
political ends. xxi They see Muslims as traitors to <strong>the</strong> Tamil cause. For Muslims, militant<br />
Tamil nati<strong>on</strong>alism has meant a c<strong>on</strong>stant threat of violence <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> East, an underm<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g of<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir livelihood activities and steadily deteriorat<strong>in</strong>g relati<strong>on</strong>s with neighbor<strong>in</strong>g Tamil<br />
communities. Muslims c<strong>on</strong>sider <strong>the</strong> oft brought out c<strong>on</strong>cept of <strong>the</strong> ‘Tamil speak<strong>in</strong>g<br />
peoples’ a ruse by which Tamil nati<strong>on</strong>alists have tried to benefit from <strong>the</strong> advantage of<br />
Muslim numbers. However, Tamil nati<strong>on</strong>alism has had little real <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>corporat<strong>in</strong>g<br />
Muslim representati<strong>on</strong> or <strong>in</strong> address<strong>in</strong>g Muslim specific c<strong>on</strong>cerns. The LTTE’s act of<br />
ethnic cleans<strong>in</strong>g – <strong>the</strong> group systematically expelled all Muslims from <strong>the</strong> Nor<strong>the</strong>rn<br />
Prov<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>in</strong> October 1990—forever sealed <strong>the</strong> enmity, as far as <strong>the</strong> Muslims were<br />
c<strong>on</strong>cerned, between <strong>the</strong>m and <strong>the</strong> Tamil speak<strong>in</strong>g Tamil people.<br />
In 2004 <strong>the</strong> Peace Secretariat for Muslims (PSM) was formulated <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> basis of a<br />
Memorandum of Understand<strong>in</strong>g between <strong>the</strong> SLMC and <strong>the</strong> Nati<strong>on</strong>al Unity Alliance. Its<br />
role was to build a c<strong>on</strong>sensus between <strong>the</strong> various political and civil society actors with<strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> community and to provide an <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al base from which <strong>the</strong> Muslim positi<strong>on</strong> or<br />
positi<strong>on</strong>s could be articulated. Although created with massive d<strong>on</strong>or support <strong>the</strong> success<br />
of <strong>the</strong> PSM with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> community itself was negligible. More than four years after its<br />
establishment, <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> rema<strong>in</strong>ed a body run ma<strong>in</strong>ly by <strong>the</strong> SLMC and <strong>the</strong> NUA. It<br />
has c<strong>on</strong>centrated its energies <strong>on</strong> develop<strong>in</strong>g regi<strong>on</strong>al l<strong>in</strong>kages and <strong>the</strong> ability to provide<br />
technical support to Muslim delegati<strong>on</strong>s travel<strong>in</strong>g abroad. The <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> struggles to<br />
ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> its legitimacy am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong> community. .<br />
The Situati<strong>on</strong> Today<br />
The Rajapaksa regime gambled <strong>on</strong> br<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g about its victory through an appeal to <strong>the</strong><br />
ethnic S<strong>in</strong>hala majority. The comb<strong>in</strong>ed m<strong>in</strong>ority vote of <strong>the</strong> Muslims and Tamil<br />
communities should have guaranteed a victory for UNP (United Nati<strong>on</strong>al Party) and its<br />
candidate Ranil Wickremas<strong>in</strong>ghe, who was perceived to be pro peace and pro federalist.<br />
Instead, President Mah<strong>in</strong>da Rajapaksa, came to power <strong>in</strong> November 2005 <strong>in</strong> an electi<strong>on</strong><br />
which <strong>the</strong> LTTE compelled Tamil citizens of <strong>the</strong> North and East to boycott. The<br />
victorious coaliti<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong>cluded a party of Buddhist M<strong>on</strong>ks (JHU) and <strong>the</strong> ostensibly left<br />
lean<strong>in</strong>g but S<strong>in</strong>hala nati<strong>on</strong>alist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP). The coaliti<strong>on</strong> also<br />
<strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>the</strong> traditi<strong>on</strong>al Sri Lankan left, l<strong>on</strong>g time allies of <strong>the</strong> SLFP. Some progressive<br />
93
forces hoped that <strong>the</strong> Rajapaksa regime would usher peace with justice, that <strong>the</strong> UNP had<br />
not been successful <strong>in</strong> do<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
S<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> presidential electi<strong>on</strong>s of November 2005 <strong>the</strong> country has experienced a drastic<br />
turnaround as <strong>the</strong> new regime adopted a dist<strong>in</strong>ct orientati<strong>on</strong> towards resolv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>flict<br />
through military means. Public support for a negotiated settlement decl<strong>in</strong>ed and <strong>the</strong>re was<br />
a steady deteriorati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>s of governance and law and order. Whereas, all<br />
regimes <strong>in</strong> power s<strong>in</strong>ce 1994, had publicly accepted that Tamil grievances were<br />
legitimate, and that power shar<strong>in</strong>g under a federalist mode was to be <strong>the</strong> soluti<strong>on</strong> to <strong>the</strong><br />
c<strong>on</strong>flict, <strong>the</strong> Rajapaksa regime successfully projected <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>flict not as an ethnic<br />
c<strong>on</strong>flict but as a terrorist problem to be dealt with <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> style of <strong>the</strong> US led “War <strong>on</strong><br />
Terror.” Earlier, <strong>the</strong>se sentiments had been publicly expressed by <strong>the</strong> JVP and <strong>the</strong> JHU.<br />
However, what were c<strong>on</strong>sidered fr<strong>in</strong>ge ideas by progressive forces <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> country were<br />
rendered ma<strong>in</strong>stream by <strong>the</strong> Rajapaksa regime. Moreover, support for <strong>the</strong> war went hand<br />
<strong>in</strong> hand with str<strong>on</strong>g anti m<strong>in</strong>ority sentiments that justified <strong>the</strong> target<strong>in</strong>g of all Tamils as<br />
possible terrorists and marg<strong>in</strong>alized o<strong>the</strong>r m<strong>in</strong>orities like <strong>the</strong> Muslims <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> ec<strong>on</strong>omic<br />
and political sphere.<br />
The ceasefire was abrogated <strong>in</strong> January 2008. The escalati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> war meant <strong>the</strong><br />
escalati<strong>on</strong> of human rights abuses and impunity as has been evident <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>tense c<strong>on</strong>flict<br />
situati<strong>on</strong>s throughout Sri Lanka’s post col<strong>on</strong>ial history. The current Sri Lankan regime<br />
c<strong>on</strong>ducts itself <strong>in</strong> violati<strong>on</strong> of all <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al human rights norms <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> name of fight<strong>in</strong>g<br />
terrorism. It pays lip service to <strong>the</strong> need to deal with <strong>the</strong> political dimensi<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong><br />
problem, but its treatment of <strong>the</strong> All Party Representatives Committee, c<strong>on</strong>vened to<br />
formulate proposals for a political soluti<strong>on</strong>, has rendered that process false. After nearly<br />
two years of deliberati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>the</strong> APRC produced a disappo<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g two page document<br />
recommend<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> ‘proper implementati<strong>on</strong>’ of <strong>the</strong> 13 th amendment.<br />
The 13 th amendment to <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> brought <strong>in</strong>to force <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> aftermath of <strong>the</strong> Indo-<br />
Lanka accord of 1987, has l<strong>on</strong>g been c<strong>on</strong>sidered an unsuccessful attempt at <strong>the</strong><br />
devoluti<strong>on</strong> of power with <strong>the</strong> centre ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g its c<strong>on</strong>trol despite <strong>the</strong> creati<strong>on</strong> of a<br />
prov<strong>in</strong>cial adm<strong>in</strong>istrative structure. In <strong>the</strong> process of devoluti<strong>on</strong> certa<strong>in</strong> powers were put<br />
<strong>on</strong> a c<strong>on</strong>current list with <strong>the</strong> center reserv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> right to <strong>in</strong>tervene. Many see it as an<br />
added burden <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> state f<strong>in</strong>ances with little real benefit to <strong>the</strong> people. The resurfac<strong>in</strong>g of<br />
<strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>imalist 13 th amendment is an <strong>in</strong>sult to Tamil nati<strong>on</strong>alist th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g. Thirteenth<br />
Amendment. Under <strong>the</strong> current regime, it rema<strong>in</strong>s <strong>the</strong> <strong>on</strong>ly permitted discussi<strong>on</strong> opti<strong>on</strong><br />
<strong>on</strong> power shar<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
The defense secretary and powerful members of <strong>the</strong> government coaliti<strong>on</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> that<br />
<strong>the</strong> problem is a terrorist problem and not a political problem. The war has been fought<br />
with little regard to human rights norms, and <strong>the</strong> law and order situati<strong>on</strong> has steadily<br />
deteriorated <strong>in</strong> keep<strong>in</strong>g with <strong>the</strong> systematic terror tactics adopted by <strong>the</strong> state. In <strong>the</strong><br />
deeply entrenched culture of impunity for human rights violati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong> Sri lanka, <strong>the</strong><br />
m<strong>in</strong>orities have become even more vulnerable targets.<br />
94
M<strong>in</strong>ority rights have no purchase with <strong>the</strong> Rajapaksa regime. Many of those powerful <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> regime have g<strong>on</strong>e <strong>on</strong> record mak<strong>in</strong>g anti m<strong>in</strong>ority sentiments. Army Commander<br />
Sarath F<strong>on</strong>seka has stated openly that “ <strong>the</strong> country bel<strong>on</strong>gs to <strong>the</strong> S<strong>in</strong>halese” xxii and<br />
m<strong>in</strong>orities should know <strong>the</strong>ir place. Champaka Ranawaka, member of <strong>the</strong> JHU and a<br />
powerful cab<strong>in</strong>et m<strong>in</strong>ister has called all those o<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>the</strong> S<strong>in</strong>halese “visitors” to <strong>the</strong><br />
country. xxiii The Military and <strong>the</strong> JHU are enormously powerful with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> current regime<br />
Eastern Prov<strong>in</strong>ce ‘Liberated’<br />
In early 2008 <strong>the</strong> government entered <strong>in</strong>to a military operati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Eastern Prov<strong>in</strong>ce,<br />
took over <strong>the</strong> previously LTTE c<strong>on</strong>trolled area of Vakarai and declared a military victory<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Eastern Prov<strong>in</strong>ce. The process itself was more a publicity stunt than a victory,<br />
Batticaloa residents claim that <strong>the</strong>re was no significant LTTE military presence <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Vakarai area, that <strong>the</strong> government forces fired over people’s homes, schools and markets,<br />
displac<strong>in</strong>g thousands. Hav<strong>in</strong>g “liberated” <strong>the</strong> Eastern Prov<strong>in</strong>ce, local government<br />
electi<strong>on</strong>s were held. xxiv The United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA), <strong>the</strong> govern<strong>in</strong>g<br />
coaliti<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> an alliance with <strong>the</strong> TMVP w<strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> Eastern Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Council electi<strong>on</strong>s and<br />
<strong>the</strong> leader of <strong>the</strong> Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Council is currently <strong>the</strong> head of <strong>the</strong> TMVP, a former LTTE<br />
cadre and child soldier Pillayan or Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan as he is known today.<br />
The Muslim parties too w<strong>on</strong> a c<strong>on</strong>siderable amount of seats <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> prov<strong>in</strong>cial council<br />
electi<strong>on</strong>s. The government had struck parallel deals with <strong>the</strong> TMVP and <strong>the</strong> Muslim<br />
parties with <strong>the</strong> promise of <strong>the</strong> chief m<strong>in</strong>ister positi<strong>on</strong> for <strong>the</strong> w<strong>in</strong>ner. Although <strong>the</strong><br />
Muslim parties claim to have w<strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> largest number of seats <strong>the</strong> government gave <strong>the</strong><br />
positi<strong>on</strong> to Pillayan and placated <strong>the</strong> Muslim Hisbullah with <strong>the</strong> positi<strong>on</strong> of prov<strong>in</strong>cial<br />
health m<strong>in</strong>ister. The state has also demarcated certa<strong>in</strong> secti<strong>on</strong>s of <strong>the</strong> newly liberated area<br />
as high security z<strong>on</strong>es and resettled people <strong>in</strong> areas different from those from which <strong>the</strong>y<br />
fled. The government currently has plans for ec<strong>on</strong>omic development z<strong>on</strong>es for those<br />
areas. The government is also engaged <strong>in</strong> massive <strong>in</strong>fra structure development projects <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> regi<strong>on</strong>. The regi<strong>on</strong> rema<strong>in</strong>s unstable with ethnic tensi<strong>on</strong>s mount<strong>in</strong>g and kill<strong>in</strong>gs tak<strong>in</strong>g<br />
place <strong>on</strong> a daily basis.<br />
Muslim community leaders that were <strong>in</strong>terviewed recently claimed that <strong>the</strong>re is a JHU<br />
driven campaign to underm<strong>in</strong>e Muslims’ ec<strong>on</strong>omic activity <strong>in</strong> Colombo and <strong>the</strong><br />
government has openly set <strong>in</strong> moti<strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> S<strong>in</strong>halisati<strong>on</strong> process of <strong>the</strong> East. Under such a<br />
dispensati<strong>on</strong> bas<strong>in</strong>g <strong>on</strong>e’s arguments <strong>on</strong> human rights norms and call<strong>in</strong>g for preservati<strong>on</strong><br />
of m<strong>in</strong>ority rights have no hopes of success.<br />
The SLMC under <strong>the</strong> current regime has c<strong>on</strong>sistently aligned itself with <strong>the</strong> UNP (o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
than for a brief period where it jo<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>the</strong> government allegedly under pressure from<br />
Presidential sibl<strong>in</strong>g and advisor Basil Rajapaksa.) The party left <strong>the</strong> government to vote<br />
with <strong>the</strong> UNP dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> budget debate of 2007, and seems to be plac<strong>in</strong>g its bets <strong>on</strong> an<br />
electi<strong>on</strong> victory for <strong>the</strong> UNP. However, <strong>the</strong> UNP itself is <strong>in</strong> disarray and any such victory<br />
will require some serious reform of its own <strong>in</strong>ternal problems. For <strong>the</strong> Eastern Prov<strong>in</strong>ce<br />
electi<strong>on</strong>s <strong>the</strong> SLMC had three of its members resign <strong>the</strong>ir parliament seats and c<strong>on</strong>test as<br />
UNP candidates. Rauf Hakeem, leader of <strong>the</strong> SLMC was <strong>the</strong> UNP candidate for <strong>the</strong> Chief<br />
m<strong>in</strong>ister positi<strong>on</strong>. Unfortunately <strong>the</strong> UNP did not make an adequate show<strong>in</strong>g. The UNP<br />
95
w<strong>on</strong> 15 seats while <strong>the</strong> UPFA w<strong>on</strong> 18. The UNP also w<strong>on</strong> a greater number of seats <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> Tr<strong>in</strong>comalee district where Rauf Hakeem w<strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> largest number of preferential<br />
votes. xxv Ofcourse <strong>the</strong> electi<strong>on</strong> itself was c<strong>on</strong>sidered highly flawed, but <strong>the</strong> fact rema<strong>in</strong>s<br />
that <strong>the</strong> SLMC’s gamble aga<strong>in</strong> failed to pay off. However, <strong>the</strong> SLMC has c<strong>on</strong>sistently<br />
ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed its positi<strong>on</strong> as a UNP ally.<br />
The All Ceyl<strong>on</strong> Muslim C<strong>on</strong>gress that currently c<strong>on</strong>sists of a secti<strong>on</strong> of powerful Muslim<br />
MPs outside of <strong>the</strong> SLMC and <strong>the</strong> NUA is close to <strong>the</strong> regime and seems will<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
support <strong>the</strong> regime for certa<strong>in</strong> compromised ga<strong>in</strong>s for <strong>the</strong> Muslim community. Both<br />
Risharth Bathiyuddeen and Hisbulla are members of <strong>the</strong> party and ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> good<br />
relati<strong>on</strong>s with <strong>the</strong> regime. While <strong>the</strong>y seem to be work<strong>in</strong>g with a strategy of engagement<br />
different from <strong>the</strong> SLMC’s positi<strong>on</strong> of oppositi<strong>on</strong>, <strong>the</strong> political ga<strong>in</strong>s from such an<br />
engagement are still to be seen.<br />
Muslims <strong>the</strong>n, rema<strong>in</strong> caught with<strong>in</strong> a state system that has historically d<strong>on</strong>e little to grant<br />
<strong>the</strong>m legitimate political rights, but <strong>in</strong>stead, has encouraged an ec<strong>on</strong>omy of collusi<strong>on</strong>; and<br />
an anti state movement that holds <strong>the</strong>m culpable for just such a collusi<strong>on</strong> and has<br />
systematically perpetrated acts of violence aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong>m. Today Muslim political parties<br />
c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to struggle aga<strong>in</strong>st a system loaded aga<strong>in</strong>st m<strong>in</strong>ority political representati<strong>on</strong> or<br />
m<strong>in</strong>ority political power <strong>in</strong> general. Muslims <strong>the</strong>refore have much to ga<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> any<br />
reorganizati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> state <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> aftermath of <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>flict. Muslim political<br />
representatives have much to do <strong>in</strong> any lead up to such a reorganizati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> state.<br />
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Accomodati<strong>on</strong>. Journal Institute of Muslim M<strong>in</strong>ority Affairs 11:88-99.<br />
McGilvray, Dennis and Mirak Raheem. 2007. Muslim Perspectives <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> Sri Lankan<br />
C<strong>on</strong>flict. Policy Studies 41. East-West Center, Wash<strong>in</strong>gt<strong>on</strong>.<br />
96
Sam<strong>in</strong>athan, D. 2005. "Tamil Perspectives from <strong>the</strong> East," <strong>in</strong> Deal<strong>in</strong>g with Diversity: Sri<br />
Lankan Discourses <strong>on</strong> Peace and C<strong>on</strong>flict. Edited by G. Frerks and B. Klem, pp. 113-<br />
129. The Hague: Cl<strong>in</strong>gendael Institute.<br />
i While <strong>the</strong> debate <strong>on</strong> whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> British, or <strong>the</strong> two o<strong>the</strong>r col<strong>on</strong>ial powers that were <strong>in</strong> Sri Lanka prior to<br />
<strong>the</strong> British, created <strong>the</strong> ethnic/racial/religious categorizati<strong>on</strong>s through <strong>the</strong>ir structures of governmentality,<br />
still rema<strong>in</strong>s to be resolved, <strong>the</strong> fact rema<strong>in</strong>s that differences of various sorts were potentially ripe for<br />
political exploitati<strong>on</strong> at <strong>the</strong> time of <strong>in</strong>dependence.<br />
ii Jayadeva Uyangoda (2001), Questi<strong>on</strong>s of Sri Lanka’s M<strong>in</strong>ority Rights, Colombo, Internati<strong>on</strong>al Centre for<br />
Ethnic Studies, p29<br />
iii Ibid.<br />
iv Secti<strong>on</strong> 29(2) (b) and (c) of <strong>the</strong> Soulbury C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> provided that no law enacted by Parliament could<br />
(b) make pers<strong>on</strong>s of any community or religi<strong>on</strong> liable to disabilities or restricti<strong>on</strong>s to which pers<strong>on</strong>s of o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
communities or religi<strong>on</strong>s are not made liable; or (c) c<strong>on</strong>fer <strong>on</strong> pers<strong>on</strong>s of any community or religi<strong>on</strong> any<br />
privilege or advantage which is not c<strong>on</strong>ferred <strong>on</strong> pers<strong>on</strong>s of o<strong>the</strong>r communities or religi<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
v K M De Silva, (1998) Reap<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Whirlw<strong>in</strong>d: Ethnic C<strong>on</strong>flict, Ethnic Politics <strong>in</strong> Sri Lanka, New Delhi,<br />
Pengu<strong>in</strong><br />
vi Muslims, a largely Tamil speak<strong>in</strong>g community <strong>in</strong> Sri Lanka have l<strong>on</strong>g resisted <strong>the</strong> Tamil ethnic label.<br />
The orig<strong>in</strong>s of <strong>the</strong> resistance can be traced to British col<strong>on</strong>ial mach<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>s regard<strong>in</strong>g native representati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
The British decisi<strong>on</strong> to create a Muslim seat <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Legislative Council effectively <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>alized Tamil<br />
Muslim difference <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> country.<br />
vii The writers who have attempted an engagement, but have reproduced <strong>the</strong> same categories of Muslim<br />
collusi<strong>on</strong> without attempt<strong>in</strong>g an alternative read<strong>in</strong>g however are many. For <strong>the</strong> most susta<strong>in</strong>ed engagements<br />
<strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> subject see<br />
Ali, A. 1986. Politics of Survival: Past Strategies and Present Predicament of <strong>the</strong> Muslim Community <strong>in</strong> Sri<br />
Lanka. Journal of <strong>the</strong> Institute of Muslim M<strong>in</strong>ority Affairs 7:147-170.,<br />
Mahroof, M. M. 1990. Muslims <strong>in</strong> Sri Lanka: <strong>the</strong> L<strong>on</strong>g Road to Accomodati<strong>on</strong>. Journal Institute of Muslim<br />
M<strong>in</strong>ority Affairs 11:88-99.,and<br />
Ismail, Q. 1995. "Unmoor<strong>in</strong>g Identity: The Ant<strong>in</strong>omies of Muslim Self Representati<strong>on</strong>," <strong>in</strong> Unmak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
Nati<strong>on</strong>. Edited by P.Jeganathan and Q. Ismail. Colombo: Social Scientists' Associati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
viii See K.M. de Silva. Also, based <strong>on</strong> author’s <strong>in</strong>terview with M.L.M Aboosally <strong>in</strong> May 2005, shortly<br />
before his death <strong>in</strong> December that year.<br />
ix For a l<strong>on</strong>ger discussi<strong>on</strong> of Mahmood, see my dissertati<strong>on</strong> chapter M<strong>in</strong>ority Politics <strong>in</strong><br />
Haniffa, F. F. 2007. In Search of an Ethical Self <strong>in</strong> a Beleagured C<strong>on</strong>text: Middle Class Muslims <strong>in</strong><br />
C<strong>on</strong>temporary Sri Lanka, Columbia University.<br />
x A.C.S. Hameed, as foreign m<strong>in</strong>ister and diplomat, and stalwart of <strong>the</strong> UNP was a powerful m<strong>in</strong>ister <strong>in</strong> his<br />
time but quantify<strong>in</strong>g his power as of particular benefit to Muslims is ra<strong>the</strong>r difficult. He is remembered for<br />
his skilled diplomacy outside <strong>the</strong> country, <strong>in</strong> c<strong>on</strong>necti<strong>on</strong> with <strong>the</strong> LTTE as well as with regards to keep<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>the</strong> UNP toge<strong>the</strong>r dur<strong>in</strong>g difficult times.<br />
xi The post of Foreign M<strong>in</strong>ister was held by A.C.S Hameed, dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> middle east oil boom and <strong>in</strong>fluenced<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir c<strong>on</strong>sequent generosity with development aid.<br />
xii In fact, members of <strong>the</strong> SLMC believe that it was Ashraff who persuaded President Premadasa to revise<br />
<strong>the</strong> requirement of 12% of votes to 5%.<br />
xiii Aboosally, a l<strong>on</strong>g stand<strong>in</strong>g MP for Balangoda, lost his seat when <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>stituency became <strong>the</strong> whole of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Ratnapura district.<br />
xiv See Rajan Hoole<br />
xv Haniffa, F. 2005. P-TOMS or The Post Tsunami Operati<strong>on</strong>al Management Structure: a wakeup call to <strong>the</strong><br />
Muslim Leadership. L<strong>in</strong>es 4.<br />
xvi Sam<strong>in</strong>athan, D. 2005. "Tamil Perspectives from <strong>the</strong> East," <strong>in</strong> Deal<strong>in</strong>g with Diversity: Sri Lankan<br />
Discourses <strong>on</strong> Peace and C<strong>on</strong>flict. Edited by G. Frerks and B. Klem, pp. 113-129. The Hague: Cl<strong>in</strong>gendael<br />
Institute.<br />
97
xvii After <strong>the</strong> general electi<strong>on</strong>s of 2004,where <strong>the</strong> SLMC aligned with <strong>the</strong> los<strong>in</strong>g nati<strong>on</strong>al party, <strong>the</strong> UNP, it<br />
was compelled to sit <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> oppositi<strong>on</strong>. It prompted several of its members to cross over to <strong>the</strong> UPFA or <strong>the</strong><br />
rul<strong>in</strong>g coaliti<strong>on</strong>.<br />
xviii See <strong>the</strong> SLMC document “Resoluti<strong>on</strong> to <strong>the</strong> C<strong>on</strong>flict <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Nor<strong>the</strong>rn and Eastern Prov<strong>in</strong>ce: The Muslim<br />
Dimensi<strong>on</strong> (no date). P6.<br />
xix In <strong>the</strong> current political c<strong>on</strong>text <strong>the</strong> SLMC positi<strong>on</strong> regard<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Nor<strong>the</strong>rn Muslims has shifted to an<br />
extent and <strong>the</strong> party seems will<strong>in</strong>g to c<strong>on</strong>sider <strong>the</strong> specific c<strong>on</strong>cerns of Nor<strong>the</strong>rn Muslims. The Peace<br />
Secretariat for Muslims, c<strong>on</strong>stituted up<strong>on</strong> an MOU between <strong>the</strong> SLMC and <strong>the</strong> Nati<strong>on</strong>al Unity Alliance<br />
recently c<strong>on</strong>ducted c<strong>on</strong>sultati<strong>on</strong>s regard<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> specific c<strong>on</strong>cerns of <strong>the</strong> displaced Nor<strong>the</strong>rn Muslim<br />
populati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> Puttalam. Also, Risharth Bathiyu<strong>the</strong>en, a Nor<strong>the</strong>rn Muslims, has been recently appo<strong>in</strong>ted <strong>the</strong><br />
leader of <strong>the</strong> All Ceyl<strong>on</strong> Muslim C<strong>on</strong>gress a party c<strong>on</strong>stituted of former members of <strong>the</strong> SLMC. And if <strong>the</strong><br />
SLMC is to rema<strong>in</strong> legitimate am<strong>on</strong>g Nor<strong>the</strong>rn Muslims, <strong>the</strong> party needs to address <strong>the</strong> specific c<strong>on</strong>cerns of<br />
<strong>the</strong> community.<br />
xx Haniffa, F. Human Rights and <strong>the</strong> Muslim M<strong>in</strong>ority: Some Reflecti<strong>on</strong>s. www.l<strong>in</strong>es-magaz<strong>in</strong>e.org. August<br />
2005.<br />
xxi The British <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>alized Muslim Tamil difference through creat<strong>in</strong>g both a Tamil seat and later a<br />
Muslim seat <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Legislative Council. The Tamil member protested, say<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>the</strong> Muslims, as ethnic<br />
Tamils did not need additi<strong>on</strong>al representati<strong>on</strong>, Muslims <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand vociferously argued aga<strong>in</strong>st this<br />
positi<strong>on</strong> claim<strong>in</strong>g descent from Arabs and a separate ethnic history.<br />
xxii See Izeth Husse<strong>in</strong> “ Sarath F<strong>on</strong>seka’s statement reeks of S<strong>in</strong>hala Trumphalism”<br />
http://transcurrents.com/tc/2008/11/post_76.html<br />
xxiii The statement was made <strong>on</strong> a TV talk show as well as <strong>in</strong> an <strong>in</strong>terview “Hard Talk” <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Daily Mirror<br />
of October 16 th 2008. Fur<strong>the</strong>r JHU spokespers<strong>on</strong> when c<strong>on</strong>tacted for comment reiterated <strong>the</strong> positi<strong>on</strong> and<br />
called it historical fact and saw no problems with <strong>the</strong> statement. Infact it reflects what <strong>the</strong> local history<br />
books teach S<strong>in</strong>hala medium students about m<strong>in</strong>orities. See<br />
http://www.lankadissent.com/en/<strong>in</strong>dex.php?opti<strong>on</strong>=com_c<strong>on</strong>tent&view=article&id=2312:muslims-agitateaga<strong>in</strong>st-m<strong>in</strong>ister-ranawaka&catid=1:latest-news&Itemid=50<br />
xxiv The electi<strong>on</strong> itself, endorsed by foreign electi<strong>on</strong> m<strong>on</strong>itors was c<strong>on</strong>sidered by many local groups as<br />
flawed, and as c<strong>on</strong>ducted under c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s of millitarisati<strong>on</strong> am<strong>on</strong>g a terrorised populat<strong>on</strong>,<br />
xxv Eastern Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Council Electi<strong>on</strong> Results. Accessed from Lankapuvath news agency at<br />
http://www.lankapuvath.lk/<strong>in</strong>dex.php?opti<strong>on</strong>=com_c<strong>on</strong>tent&task=view&id=842&Itemid=89<br />
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Sri Lanka: Recent Shifts <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> M<strong>in</strong>ority Rights Debate<br />
Jayadeva Uyangoda<br />
Introducti<strong>on</strong><br />
This paper surveys some key shifts <strong>in</strong> recent debates and politics <strong>on</strong> m<strong>in</strong>ority rights <strong>in</strong> Sri<br />
Lanka. The basic argument of <strong>the</strong> paper is that <strong>the</strong> ethnic c<strong>on</strong>flict has provided a c<strong>on</strong>text<br />
as well as an impetus for <strong>the</strong> re-articulati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>ority rights discourse <strong>in</strong> Sri Lanka.<br />
It first brought <strong>the</strong> idea of group rights to <strong>the</strong> centre of political struggles, waged by <strong>the</strong><br />
m<strong>in</strong>ority communities. The group rights claim made by <strong>the</strong> North-Eastern Tamils has<br />
precipitated similar asserti<strong>on</strong> of rights am<strong>on</strong>g o<strong>the</strong>r m<strong>in</strong>orities, Muslims and Upcountry<br />
Tamils. The ethnic c<strong>on</strong>flict has also produced a m<strong>in</strong>or paradox. Despite <strong>the</strong> shift towards<br />
greater salience of group rights, <strong>the</strong> liberal c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>alist and human rights discourses<br />
c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to def<strong>in</strong>e <strong>the</strong> terms of <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>stream approaches to m<strong>in</strong>ority of rights, view<strong>in</strong>g<br />
group rights claims by m<strong>in</strong>orities with both suspici<strong>on</strong> and hostility. Then, <strong>the</strong><br />
c<strong>on</strong>sequences of <strong>the</strong> ethno-political civil war, as this paper shows, have paradoxically led<br />
to <strong>the</strong> underm<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> legitimacy of a key group rights claim, <strong>the</strong> self-determ<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong><br />
right as asserted by militant Tamil nati<strong>on</strong>alists. Thus <strong>the</strong> impact of <strong>the</strong> ethnic c<strong>on</strong>flict, <strong>the</strong><br />
civil war and <strong>the</strong> failed peace processes is crucial to <strong>the</strong> understand<strong>in</strong>g of Sri Lanka’s<br />
m<strong>in</strong>ority rights debates and <strong>the</strong> politics of m<strong>in</strong>ority rights. This paper exam<strong>in</strong>es <strong>the</strong>se<br />
processes <strong>in</strong> relati<strong>on</strong> to <strong>the</strong> three ma<strong>in</strong> ‘m<strong>in</strong>ority’ communities <strong>in</strong> Sri Lanka – Tamils <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> Nor<strong>the</strong>rn and Eastern prov<strong>in</strong>ces, Muslims and Tamils of ‘recent Indian orig<strong>in</strong>’<br />
It needs to be noted at <strong>the</strong> outset that <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>cept ‘m<strong>in</strong>ority’ is somewhat c<strong>on</strong>tested <strong>in</strong> Sri<br />
Lanka. Politically c<strong>on</strong>scious Tamils of <strong>the</strong> Nor<strong>the</strong>rn and Eastern prov<strong>in</strong>ces would not<br />
view <strong>the</strong>ir community as a m<strong>in</strong>ority, but as a ‘nati<strong>on</strong>’ or at least a ‘nati<strong>on</strong>ality.’ They<br />
would c<strong>on</strong>sider <strong>the</strong>mselves be<strong>in</strong>g described as members of a ‘m<strong>in</strong>ority’ as politically<br />
offensive and unacceptable because it immediately places <strong>the</strong> Tamil community <strong>in</strong> a<br />
structure of hierarchy <strong>in</strong> relati<strong>on</strong> to <strong>the</strong> ‘majority’ community of <strong>the</strong> S<strong>in</strong>halese. This<br />
c<strong>on</strong>ceptual disjuncture emanates from <strong>the</strong> specific experience of majority-m<strong>in</strong>ority<br />
politics <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> post-col<strong>on</strong>ial Sri Lanka <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong> political class of <strong>the</strong> majority<br />
community had claimed and ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed a hegem<strong>on</strong>ic c<strong>on</strong>trol of state power.<br />
In fact, post-col<strong>on</strong>ial S<strong>in</strong>halese nati<strong>on</strong>alism does not have a c<strong>on</strong>cept of <strong>in</strong>ter-group<br />
equality. It bases itself <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>on</strong>tology of <strong>in</strong>equality. It means that <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> understand<strong>in</strong>g<br />
of S<strong>in</strong>halese nati<strong>on</strong>alism, <strong>the</strong> liberal noti<strong>on</strong> of equality <strong>in</strong> practice favours religious and<br />
ethnic m<strong>in</strong>orities who are supposed to have been ‘privileged’ over <strong>the</strong> majority<br />
community dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> col<strong>on</strong>ial rule. i Meanwhile, <strong>the</strong> ‘m<strong>in</strong>ority’ communities c<strong>on</strong>sider<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir be<strong>in</strong>g classified as m<strong>in</strong>orities as a discrim<strong>in</strong>atory and disabl<strong>in</strong>g practice. This<br />
c<strong>on</strong>text is fur<strong>the</strong>r characterised by <strong>the</strong> absence <strong>in</strong> Sri Lanka’s public policy or<br />
c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al scheme of arrangements for affirmative acti<strong>on</strong> for ethnic or social<br />
m<strong>in</strong>orities. Quite <strong>in</strong>trigu<strong>in</strong>gly, even after twenty five years of an ethnic- separatist civil<br />
war, Sri Lanka does not yet have equal opportunity legislati<strong>on</strong>. The <strong>on</strong>e attempt made for<br />
99
an equal opportunity law <strong>in</strong> 1996-1997, had to be aband<strong>on</strong>ed by <strong>the</strong> government <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
face of resistance by <strong>the</strong> S<strong>in</strong>halese nati<strong>on</strong>alist groups. The argument put forward by <strong>the</strong>m<br />
was that equal opportunity legislati<strong>on</strong> would have favoured <strong>the</strong> ethnic and religious<br />
m<strong>in</strong>orities while be<strong>in</strong>g discrim<strong>in</strong>atory aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> majority S<strong>in</strong>halese-Buddhist<br />
community. Thus, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> public discourse as well as <strong>the</strong> political practice, ‘m<strong>in</strong>ority’ has<br />
not been a neutral analytical or descriptive c<strong>on</strong>cept. It is a category that has legitimised<br />
group discrim<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> and <strong>in</strong> turn evoked resistance.<br />
The C<strong>on</strong>text<br />
Sri Lanka’s post-col<strong>on</strong>ial political structure has had a dist<strong>in</strong>ctly ‘ethnic’ character. The<br />
framework of governance shaped accord<strong>in</strong>g to c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al parliamentary democracy<br />
has enabled <strong>on</strong>e community that is <strong>in</strong> numerical majority, to acquire and ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> a near<br />
exclusive m<strong>on</strong>opoly over state power. This is a classic example of ‘majoritarian<br />
democracy’ <strong>in</strong> both <strong>the</strong>ory and practice. It has produced a civil war at <strong>the</strong> heart of which<br />
is <strong>the</strong> questi<strong>on</strong> of shar<strong>in</strong>g state power between <strong>the</strong> majority ethnic community and <strong>the</strong><br />
o<strong>the</strong>r ethnic communities. In <strong>the</strong> period preced<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> war, Tamil politics was shaped by<br />
what was viewed at <strong>the</strong> time as ‘m<strong>in</strong>ority grievances’, which <strong>in</strong>cluded discrim<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> areas of language rights, access to land and public resources and access to structures<br />
of governance. The war that began <strong>in</strong> early 1980s progressed under new c<strong>on</strong>ceptual<br />
foundati<strong>on</strong>s of <strong>the</strong> Tamil political project, mak<strong>in</strong>g a decisive shift from a framework of<br />
‘m<strong>in</strong>ority grievances’ to a paradigm of ‘nati<strong>on</strong>al aspirati<strong>on</strong>s.’ This transiti<strong>on</strong> of Tamil<br />
politics <strong>in</strong> relati<strong>on</strong> to <strong>the</strong> Sri Lankan state, has re-located majority-m<strong>in</strong>ority politics <strong>in</strong> Sri<br />
Lanka <strong>in</strong> a process of state formati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> a period of civil war. The prol<strong>on</strong>ged civil war<br />
with its devastat<strong>in</strong>g political, human and social c<strong>on</strong>sequences has brought forward new<br />
issues c<strong>on</strong>cern<strong>in</strong>g m<strong>in</strong>ority rights. The orig<strong>in</strong>al issues that def<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>the</strong> grievances<br />
discourse of m<strong>in</strong>ority politics are now displaced by <strong>the</strong> dynamics of a protracted civil<br />
war. Am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong> issues that have dom<strong>in</strong>ated <strong>the</strong> politics of Tamil m<strong>in</strong>ority rights dur<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>the</strong> past two and half decades have been <strong>the</strong> questi<strong>on</strong> of nati<strong>on</strong>al self-determ<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>, <strong>the</strong><br />
strategies to end <strong>the</strong> civil war, <strong>the</strong> nature of <strong>the</strong> post-civil state, and <strong>the</strong> choice between<br />
regi<strong>on</strong>al aut<strong>on</strong>omy and secessi<strong>on</strong>.<br />
Never<strong>the</strong>less, Sri Lanka’s ma<strong>in</strong>stream c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>alist perspective <strong>on</strong> m<strong>in</strong>ority rights<br />
c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues with some reluctance to change. It revolves around two approaches. The first is<br />
<strong>the</strong> idea that <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al entrenchment of <strong>the</strong> fundamental rights of all citizens,<br />
while guarantee<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> language rights of <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong> ethnic m<strong>in</strong>orities, would be adequate<br />
to address m<strong>in</strong>ority grievances. The sec<strong>on</strong>d approach accommodates to a limited degree<br />
<strong>the</strong> claims of group rights of <strong>the</strong> ethnic m<strong>in</strong>orities. It accepts devoluti<strong>on</strong> of power as a<br />
political measure necessary to meet <strong>the</strong> Tamil and Muslim demand for regi<strong>on</strong>al<br />
aut<strong>on</strong>omy. The ethnic c<strong>on</strong>flict has exposed <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>adequacy of both <strong>the</strong>se approaches to<br />
grapple with <strong>the</strong> new issues of m<strong>in</strong>ority rights that have emerged <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> backdrop of a<br />
protracted <strong>in</strong>ternal war.<br />
With regard to <strong>the</strong> first perspective, Sri Lanka’s C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> has a chapter <strong>on</strong><br />
fundamental rights with a n<strong>on</strong>-discrim<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> clause. It claims to ensure that “no citizen<br />
shall be discrim<strong>in</strong>ated aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> grounds of race, religi<strong>on</strong>, language, caste, sex,<br />
100
political op<strong>in</strong>i<strong>on</strong>, place of birth or any <strong>on</strong>e of such grounds.” ii The 1978 C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> also<br />
has fairly liberal provisi<strong>on</strong>s for m<strong>in</strong>ority language rights. While S<strong>in</strong>halese, <strong>the</strong> language<br />
of <strong>the</strong> majority, is <strong>the</strong> “Official Language of Sri Lanka,” S<strong>in</strong>halese and Tamil are<br />
“Nati<strong>on</strong>al Languages.” iii Any pers<strong>on</strong> is also entitled to be educated through <strong>the</strong> medium<br />
of ei<strong>the</strong>r of <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>al languages, subjected to a few procedural restricti<strong>on</strong>s. Despite<br />
<strong>the</strong>se c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al guarantees, citizens bel<strong>on</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>ority communities seem not<br />
to seek judicial redress for repeated rights violati<strong>on</strong>s that would come under <strong>the</strong> n<strong>on</strong>discrim<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong><br />
clause as well as <strong>the</strong> language rights provisi<strong>on</strong>s. There are two reas<strong>on</strong>s that<br />
expla<strong>in</strong> this situati<strong>on</strong>. First, it is exceed<strong>in</strong>gly difficult to prove before a court of law <strong>the</strong><br />
legal requirement of <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>tent of discrim<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> basis of race, religi<strong>on</strong> or language.<br />
Sec<strong>on</strong>dly, Sri Lanka’s higher judiciary does not have a str<strong>on</strong>g record of protect<strong>in</strong>g<br />
m<strong>in</strong>ority rights.<br />
There is also enabl<strong>in</strong>g legislati<strong>on</strong> to give effect to <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al provisi<strong>on</strong>s <strong>on</strong><br />
language rights. An Official Languages Commissi<strong>on</strong> was set up <strong>in</strong> 1991 to provide<br />
<strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al support for <strong>the</strong> proper and effective implementati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> language<br />
legislati<strong>on</strong>. However, experience so far suggests that mere c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>alizati<strong>on</strong> of<br />
language rights is not sufficient to h<strong>on</strong>our and protect m<strong>in</strong>ority rights. Studies <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
implementati<strong>on</strong> of Tamil language provisi<strong>on</strong>s show that most of <strong>the</strong> government<br />
departments, which are run primarily by S<strong>in</strong>halese officials at all levels of resp<strong>on</strong>sibility,<br />
do not have resources, pers<strong>on</strong>nel or <strong>the</strong> commitment to transact <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Tamil language<br />
with Tamil or Muslim citizens. Meanwhile, <strong>the</strong> Official Languages Commissi<strong>on</strong> has little<br />
or no authority to enforce <strong>the</strong> official languages law, except mak<strong>in</strong>g recommendati<strong>on</strong>s to<br />
<strong>the</strong> government. Even when recommendati<strong>on</strong>s are made, <strong>the</strong> governments have taken<br />
little or no acti<strong>on</strong> to acknowledge and implement <strong>the</strong>m. iv As Shanmugaratnam has<br />
po<strong>in</strong>ted out, at <strong>the</strong> heart of this <strong>in</strong>ability of governments to give effect to <strong>the</strong> official<br />
languages law is <strong>the</strong> majoritarian communal character of <strong>the</strong> post-col<strong>on</strong>ial Sri Lankan<br />
state. De-communalisati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> state is an essential prec<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong> for <strong>the</strong> protecti<strong>on</strong> of<br />
m<strong>in</strong>ority rights through legislati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
The approach of accommodat<strong>in</strong>g m<strong>in</strong>ority demands for political rights through <strong>the</strong><br />
devoluti<strong>on</strong> of power has a record of disappo<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g outcomes that has had grave<br />
implicati<strong>on</strong>s. The devoluti<strong>on</strong> process that began <strong>in</strong> 1987 <strong>in</strong>itially was meant to provide a<br />
framework of regi<strong>on</strong>al aut<strong>on</strong>omy to <strong>the</strong> Tamil community, amidst a secessi<strong>on</strong>ist war<br />
carried out by a host of militant Tamil nati<strong>on</strong>alist groups. Later, Muslim claims for<br />
aut<strong>on</strong>omy were also <strong>in</strong>corporated <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> devoluti<strong>on</strong> discourse. Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Councils for<br />
devoluti<strong>on</strong>, as opposed to decentralizati<strong>on</strong> of power, were <strong>the</strong> first <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al<br />
framework which <strong>the</strong> S<strong>in</strong>halese rul<strong>in</strong>g elites established <strong>in</strong> resp<strong>on</strong>se to <strong>the</strong> selfdeterm<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong><br />
claims of <strong>the</strong> Tamil m<strong>in</strong>ority. Two previous attempts made <strong>in</strong> 1957 and<br />
1966 to <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>alise Tamil demand for regi<strong>on</strong>al aut<strong>on</strong>omy had failed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> face of<br />
S<strong>in</strong>halese nati<strong>on</strong>alist oppositi<strong>on</strong>.<br />
Meanwhile, <strong>the</strong> devoluti<strong>on</strong> of power established <strong>in</strong> 1987 through <strong>the</strong> 13 th Amendment to<br />
<strong>the</strong> C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> has not worked <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Nor<strong>the</strong>rn and Eastern prov<strong>in</strong>ces where it was<br />
needed most. The crippl<strong>in</strong>g of devoluti<strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong>re occurred as a result of <strong>the</strong> dissoluti<strong>on</strong> by<br />
<strong>the</strong> central government of <strong>the</strong> elected Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Council <strong>in</strong> 1990, when <strong>the</strong> prov<strong>in</strong>cial<br />
101
adm<strong>in</strong>istrati<strong>on</strong> headed by <strong>the</strong> Eelam People’s Revoluti<strong>on</strong>ary Fr<strong>on</strong>t (EPRLF) declared<br />
unilateral <strong>in</strong>dependence. v That prompted <strong>the</strong> central government to run <strong>the</strong> prov<strong>in</strong>cial<br />
adm<strong>in</strong>istrati<strong>on</strong> through a Governor who was appo<strong>in</strong>ted by <strong>the</strong> President. However, recent<br />
changes <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> military balance <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Eastern Prov<strong>in</strong>ce have given rise to a new<br />
development c<strong>on</strong>cern<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> prov<strong>in</strong>cial council. After <strong>the</strong> government under President<br />
Mah<strong>in</strong>da Reajapakse managed to push <strong>the</strong> LTTE out of <strong>the</strong> Eastern Prov<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>in</strong> 2007, <strong>the</strong><br />
electi<strong>on</strong> to <strong>the</strong> Eastern Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Council was held. The Supreme Court decisi<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> 2006<br />
to de-merge <strong>the</strong> two prov<strong>in</strong>ces has been <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> backdrop of <strong>the</strong>se new developments. At<br />
<strong>the</strong> prov<strong>in</strong>cial council electi<strong>on</strong>, <strong>the</strong> Thamil Makkal Viduthalai Puligal (TMVP), a<br />
breakaway facti<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> LTTE, w<strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> majority. The TMVP’s victory was made<br />
possible by its alliance with <strong>the</strong> United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA), <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>al<br />
rul<strong>in</strong>g coaliti<strong>on</strong> headed by President Rajapakse. Aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> backdrop of c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g civil<br />
war, <strong>the</strong> deep divisi<strong>on</strong>s with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Tamil polity and <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g refusal by <strong>the</strong> LTTE to<br />
reach an aut<strong>on</strong>omy arrangement with governments <strong>in</strong> Colombo have provided an<br />
opportunity for <strong>the</strong> Mah<strong>in</strong>da Rajapakse adm<strong>in</strong>istrati<strong>on</strong> to alter <strong>the</strong> parameters with<strong>in</strong><br />
which a political soluti<strong>on</strong> to <strong>the</strong> ethnic c<strong>on</strong>flict could be worked out. This development<br />
will be discussed <strong>in</strong> some detail later <strong>in</strong> this chapter.<br />
The po<strong>in</strong>t that needs to be made aga<strong>in</strong>st this background is <strong>the</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g - Sri Lanka’s<br />
ethnic c<strong>on</strong>flict has brought <strong>the</strong> possibility and <strong>the</strong> necessity of group rights to <strong>the</strong> centre<br />
of <strong>the</strong> political struggle, although m<strong>in</strong>ority rights are not usually understood <strong>in</strong> a language<br />
of group rights. Meanwhile, many of <strong>the</strong> group rights issues that emerged through <strong>the</strong><br />
protracted ethnic c<strong>on</strong>flict call for an approach that can grapple with <strong>the</strong> self-determ<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong><br />
rights of ethnic m<strong>in</strong>orities. They <strong>in</strong>clude representati<strong>on</strong> rights, security rights, recogniti<strong>on</strong><br />
rights, development rights and governance rights. vi These rights are <strong>in</strong> turn l<strong>in</strong>ked to <strong>the</strong><br />
questi<strong>on</strong> of how state power is shared am<strong>on</strong>g different ethnic communities and how <strong>the</strong><br />
state <strong>in</strong> its structural compositi<strong>on</strong> should reflect <strong>the</strong> ethnic diversity of <strong>the</strong> polity.<br />
In this c<strong>on</strong>text, an important questi<strong>on</strong> that warrants explorati<strong>on</strong> is: what has <strong>the</strong> civil war<br />
d<strong>on</strong>e to <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ory and practice of m<strong>in</strong>ority rights <strong>in</strong> Sri Lanka? It has significantly altered<br />
<strong>the</strong> form and c<strong>on</strong>tent of m<strong>in</strong>ority rights. It has <strong>in</strong>deed brought <strong>in</strong>to a collisi<strong>on</strong> course <strong>the</strong><br />
liberal and nati<strong>on</strong>alist perspectives <strong>on</strong> m<strong>in</strong>ority rights. The liberal c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>alist<br />
approach believes <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> efficacy of legal reforms and <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> build<strong>in</strong>g to ensure<br />
m<strong>in</strong>ority rights. ‘M<strong>in</strong>ority nati<strong>on</strong>alists’ <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, seek ei<strong>the</strong>r secessi<strong>on</strong> or <strong>the</strong><br />
radical re-structur<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> state <strong>in</strong> a federalist framework. The fram<strong>in</strong>g of m<strong>in</strong>ority<br />
rights can no l<strong>on</strong>ger be made <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> plane of <strong>in</strong>dividual rights or <strong>in</strong> relati<strong>on</strong> to civil and<br />
political rights and language al<strong>on</strong>e. It calls for a group rights discourse. However, <strong>the</strong><br />
ethnic m<strong>in</strong>ority’s advocacy of prioritis<strong>in</strong>g group rights has posed a radical challenge to<br />
<strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>stream liberal c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>alist discourse <strong>in</strong> Sri Lanka. This challenge revolves<br />
around <strong>the</strong> positi<strong>on</strong> that <strong>the</strong> entrenchment of group rights through regi<strong>on</strong>al aut<strong>on</strong>omy<br />
would place at great risk <strong>in</strong>dividual civil and political rights with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> community. The<br />
war has re<strong>in</strong>forced <strong>the</strong> argument that <strong>the</strong> group rights approach to m<strong>in</strong>ority rights might<br />
lead to illiberal c<strong>on</strong>sequences. At <strong>the</strong> same time, advocates of group rights argue that<br />
giv<strong>in</strong>g priority to <strong>in</strong>dividual rights over <strong>the</strong> self-determ<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> claims of m<strong>in</strong>ority<br />
communities is a c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>uati<strong>on</strong> of ethnic majoritarian politics by o<strong>the</strong>r means, that is,<br />
beh<strong>in</strong>d <strong>the</strong> veil of human rights. vii<br />
102
The civil war has also brought to <strong>the</strong> political agenda <strong>the</strong> nature of Sri Lanka’s postc<strong>on</strong>flict<br />
state and its capacity to accommodate m<strong>in</strong>ority aspirati<strong>on</strong>s for political equality.<br />
The Tamil nati<strong>on</strong>alists, particularly those who share <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>sis that Tamils c<strong>on</strong>stitute a<br />
nati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> Sri Lanka, envisage re-c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> exist<strong>in</strong>g state enabl<strong>in</strong>g Tamils to<br />
enjoy an extensive measure of territorial aut<strong>on</strong>omy. Paralleled with <strong>the</strong> Tamil nati<strong>on</strong>alist<br />
visi<strong>on</strong> for a post-civil war state is <strong>the</strong> Muslim visi<strong>on</strong>. The political leaders of <strong>the</strong> Muslim<br />
m<strong>in</strong>ority have articulated <strong>the</strong> idea that a post-civil war state should be c<strong>on</strong>ceptualized to<br />
accommodate regi<strong>on</strong>al aut<strong>on</strong>omy to <strong>the</strong> Muslim community <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Eastern prov<strong>in</strong>ce.<br />
What is noteworthy is that dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> attempts at a negotiated settlement to <strong>the</strong> civil war,<br />
an argument for extensive state reforms has emerged from <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>ority communities.<br />
However, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> S<strong>in</strong>halese society, <strong>the</strong> idea of state reform to accompany a civil war<br />
settlement process c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to rema<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>tensely c<strong>on</strong>tested. There seems to be three<br />
clusters of approaches <strong>on</strong> this issue <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> S<strong>in</strong>halese society – no state reform at all, state<br />
reform through expanded devoluti<strong>on</strong> and limited, pragmatic reforms.<br />
Tamils and <strong>the</strong> claim to ‘Nati<strong>on</strong>hood’<br />
The most dramatic shift <strong>in</strong> Sri Lanka’s m<strong>in</strong>ority rights discourse is l<strong>in</strong>ked to <strong>the</strong> rise of<br />
Tamil ethnic nati<strong>on</strong>alism that claimed that <strong>the</strong> Tamil community was not a ‘m<strong>in</strong>ority’, but<br />
a ‘nati<strong>on</strong>’ with <strong>the</strong> right to self-determ<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>. S<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> Tamil nati<strong>on</strong>alists have always<br />
def<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>the</strong> rights of <strong>the</strong> Tamils <strong>in</strong> a framework of self-determ<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>, <strong>the</strong> liberal<br />
c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>alist discourse of m<strong>in</strong>ority rights could not for many years engage with this<br />
particular c<strong>on</strong>ceptualisati<strong>on</strong> of rights. But it had recognised <strong>the</strong> ‘collective rights’ of<br />
m<strong>in</strong>orities <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> form of <strong>the</strong> right to n<strong>on</strong>-discrim<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>. viii The Soulbury c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> of<br />
1947, drafted ma<strong>in</strong>ly by <strong>the</strong> advisors of <strong>the</strong> outgo<strong>in</strong>g British col<strong>on</strong>ial state, c<strong>on</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed a<br />
crucial provisi<strong>on</strong> that prohibited <strong>the</strong> Sri Lankan parliament from enact<strong>in</strong>g discrim<strong>in</strong>atory<br />
legislati<strong>on</strong>. ix However, <strong>the</strong> socialist-nati<strong>on</strong>alist c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>alism that came to prom<strong>in</strong>ence<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1960s and 1970s radically disagreed with <strong>the</strong> liberal c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>alist perspective of<br />
m<strong>in</strong>ority rights as collective rights. Thus <strong>the</strong> 1972 C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> removed <strong>the</strong> collective<br />
rights clauses of <strong>the</strong> Soulbury C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> and subjected m<strong>in</strong>ority rights entirely to <strong>the</strong><br />
will of <strong>the</strong> legislature, <strong>the</strong> majority of which were under all circumstances, members of<br />
<strong>the</strong> ethnic majority.<br />
Meanwhile, <strong>the</strong> noti<strong>on</strong> of self-determ<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>, as politically c<strong>on</strong>structed <strong>in</strong> Tamil<br />
nati<strong>on</strong>alism, has had both ‘<strong>in</strong>ternal’ and ‘external’ claims. The political goal of ‘<strong>in</strong>ternal<br />
self-determ<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>’ has been posited as regi<strong>on</strong>al aut<strong>on</strong>omy. The Federal Party’s federalist<br />
idea, articulated as far back as <strong>the</strong> early 1950s, was based <strong>on</strong> this noti<strong>on</strong> of ‘<strong>in</strong>ternal selfdeterm<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>’,<br />
although <strong>the</strong> literature of <strong>the</strong> Federal Party did not exactly carry <strong>the</strong><br />
formulati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>se terms. The formulati<strong>on</strong> used was <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> right to ‘nati<strong>on</strong>hood.’<br />
Interest<strong>in</strong>gly, secessi<strong>on</strong> had not entered <strong>the</strong> political imag<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> of Tamil nati<strong>on</strong>alists <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> early phases of post-col<strong>on</strong>ial state formati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> Sri Lanka.<br />
The re-fram<strong>in</strong>g of self-determ<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> ‘external’, or secessi<strong>on</strong>ist terms occurred <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
late 1970s. And <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> early 1980s, it entered <strong>the</strong> political practice of Tamil nati<strong>on</strong>alism<br />
<strong>in</strong> a serious way <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> form of an armed <strong>in</strong>surgency. The argument of secessi<strong>on</strong>ist Tamil<br />
103
nati<strong>on</strong>alism was that <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>hood goal of <strong>the</strong> Tamil ‘nati<strong>on</strong>’, which has been reduced<br />
to <strong>the</strong> status of a ‘m<strong>in</strong>ority’ <strong>in</strong> Sri Lanka’s post-col<strong>on</strong>ial political order, could be achieved<br />
<strong>on</strong>ly through a project of separate ‘statehood.’ This was quite different from <strong>the</strong> presecessi<strong>on</strong>ist<br />
Tamil nati<strong>on</strong>alist project of ‘nati<strong>on</strong>hood.’ The latter was based <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> idea<br />
that <strong>the</strong> ‘nati<strong>on</strong>hood’ goal of <strong>the</strong> Tamil m<strong>in</strong>ority could best be achieved with<strong>in</strong> a reformed<br />
and federalized state of Sri Lanka. While <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>hood goal envisi<strong>on</strong>ed a future of ‘two<br />
nati<strong>on</strong>s –<strong>on</strong>e state’, <strong>the</strong> statehood goal posited a visi<strong>on</strong> of ‘two nati<strong>on</strong>s-two states.’<br />
Indeed, <strong>the</strong> Tamil nati<strong>on</strong>alist struggle for separate statehood through secessi<strong>on</strong><br />
c<strong>on</strong>stituted a qualitatively new dimensi<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> political practice of a m<strong>in</strong>ority to secure<br />
group rights. But, <strong>the</strong> politics of secessi<strong>on</strong>, particularly of armed struggle, <strong>on</strong>ly fur<strong>the</strong>r<br />
complicated <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>ority rights campaign of <strong>the</strong> Sri Lankan Tamils. The protracted civil<br />
war that began <strong>in</strong> 1983 brought forward some new dynamics that even put <strong>in</strong>to doubt <strong>the</strong><br />
validity of secessi<strong>on</strong> as a credible path to group rights with democracy. The emergence of<br />
militarized and thoroughly authoritarian rebel movements and <strong>the</strong>ir eventual dom<strong>in</strong>ance<br />
weakened <strong>the</strong> Tamil nati<strong>on</strong>alist project for democratic rights. S<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> armed struggle,<br />
understood <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> language of ‘nati<strong>on</strong>al liberati<strong>on</strong>’, gave primacy to self-determ<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong><br />
rights over civil and political rights, <strong>the</strong> protracted ‘liberati<strong>on</strong> struggle’ has turned itself<br />
<strong>in</strong>to an <strong>in</strong>tensely militarised phase of state formati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> Tamil polity. One of its key<br />
features is <strong>the</strong> excepti<strong>on</strong>ally high level of <strong>in</strong>ternal militarizati<strong>on</strong> of political and social<br />
relati<strong>on</strong>s that has allowed virtually no space for democratic struggles with<strong>in</strong>.<br />
The problematic c<strong>on</strong>sequences of accord<strong>in</strong>g primacy to self-determ<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> rights became<br />
manifest when <strong>the</strong> LTTE, <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong> Tamil nati<strong>on</strong>alist <strong>in</strong>surgent movement, began to<br />
c<strong>on</strong>trol territory and adm<strong>in</strong>ister civilian populati<strong>on</strong>s. From <strong>the</strong> mid-1990s, <strong>the</strong> LTTE set<br />
up <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>s and structures of a ‘parallel state’ <strong>in</strong> areas under its c<strong>on</strong>trol <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Nor<strong>the</strong>rn<br />
and Eastern prov<strong>in</strong>ces. These <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>the</strong> police, <strong>the</strong> judiciary, social<br />
services, educati<strong>on</strong>, civil adm<strong>in</strong>istrati<strong>on</strong>, management of humanitarian assistance, and <strong>the</strong><br />
LTTE’s military <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>s. While sett<strong>in</strong>g up <strong>the</strong>se <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>s, <strong>the</strong> LTTE also engaged<br />
<strong>in</strong> war with <strong>the</strong> Sri Lankan state. The process has produced a highly militarised system of<br />
a sub-nati<strong>on</strong>al state <strong>in</strong> a part of Sri Lanka. Comb<strong>in</strong>ed with <strong>the</strong> LTTE’s authoritarian<br />
politics, this militarised sub-nati<strong>on</strong>al state precluded <strong>in</strong>ternal democracy with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Tamil<br />
polity. It did not provided space for representati<strong>on</strong>, political pluralism, dissent, or civil<br />
and political rights. This situati<strong>on</strong> enabled <strong>the</strong> Sri Lankan state, run by <strong>the</strong> S<strong>in</strong>halese<br />
political class, to claim that democratic and m<strong>in</strong>ority rights are better guaranteed and<br />
practiced by <strong>the</strong> Sri Lankan state from which <strong>the</strong> LTTE is seek<strong>in</strong>g secessi<strong>on</strong>. It has<br />
re<strong>in</strong>forced <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al liberal c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>alist argument that self-determ<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong><br />
claims by m<strong>in</strong>orities are not necessarily emancipatory projects.<br />
The LTTE is not <strong>the</strong> <strong>on</strong>ly Tamil nati<strong>on</strong>alist entity that has brought <strong>in</strong>to sharp focus <strong>the</strong><br />
limits of <strong>the</strong> self-determ<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> project of Tamil nati<strong>on</strong>alism <strong>in</strong> terms of democratic<br />
rights. In <strong>the</strong> course of <strong>the</strong>ir armed struggle, all Tamil militant groups have been us<strong>in</strong>g<br />
excessive violence aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> civilians, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g Tamil civilians whom <strong>the</strong>y claimed to<br />
be liberat<strong>in</strong>g from <strong>the</strong> Sri Lankan state. The primacy accorded to <strong>the</strong> armed struggle has<br />
to a great extent prevented any broaden<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> debate <strong>on</strong> political emancipati<strong>on</strong> with<strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> Tamil polity. As <strong>the</strong> experience of <strong>the</strong> EPRLF-run prov<strong>in</strong>cial council adm<strong>in</strong>istrati<strong>on</strong><br />
104
<strong>in</strong> 1989-1990 dem<strong>on</strong>strated, even <strong>the</strong> n<strong>on</strong>-LTTE Tamil nati<strong>on</strong>alist groups had not thought<br />
of <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g democratic rights <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir govern<strong>in</strong>g practices. While, n<strong>on</strong>-LTTE Tamil<br />
groups have been sharply questi<strong>on</strong><strong>in</strong>g and oppos<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> LTTE’s authoritarian politics as<br />
‘fascistic’, <strong>the</strong>y have failed to provide a democratic alternative to <strong>the</strong> LTTE’s<br />
authoritarianism. They have <strong>in</strong>itiated no discussi<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Tamil polity for a critical reexam<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong><br />
of <strong>the</strong> possibilities as well as <strong>the</strong> limits of <strong>the</strong> secessi<strong>on</strong>ist armed struggle to<br />
ensure democratic rights of <strong>the</strong> Tamil people. Those ex-militant groups who have given<br />
up armed struggle and jo<strong>in</strong>ed parliamentary politics are not known for be<strong>in</strong>g standard<br />
bearers of human rights and democracy <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Tamil polity.<br />
Moreover, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>ternal war with <strong>the</strong> LTTE <strong>the</strong>y have often allied<br />
<strong>the</strong>mselves with <strong>the</strong> state armed forces and <strong>in</strong>telligence agencies to hunt down even<br />
Tamil civilians l<strong>in</strong>ked to <strong>the</strong> LTTE. The record of violence of <strong>the</strong> Karuna group, which<br />
emerged <strong>in</strong> 2004 as a breakaway facti<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> LTTE, illustrates this fundamental<br />
paradox <strong>in</strong> Tamil politics <strong>in</strong> Sri Lanka. Karuna and his followers <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Eastern prov<strong>in</strong>ce<br />
have jo<strong>in</strong>ed hands with <strong>the</strong> state armed forces <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> latter’s low-<strong>in</strong>tensity war with <strong>the</strong><br />
LTTE. The Karuna group has been direct<strong>in</strong>g its violence and brutality almost exclusively<br />
aga<strong>in</strong>st Tamils. The Tamil nati<strong>on</strong>alist practice of militarised violence and<br />
authoritarianism with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Tamil polity gives credence to <strong>the</strong> ‘deficiency <strong>the</strong>sis’ of<br />
liberal c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>alism c<strong>on</strong>cern<strong>in</strong>g m<strong>in</strong>ority rights, which posits that “ethnic groups are<br />
deficient as rightholders.” x<br />
The extreme polarizati<strong>on</strong> of Tamil politico-military groups <strong>in</strong>to two camps – LTTE and<br />
anti-LTTE – and <strong>the</strong>ir fratricidal <strong>in</strong>ternal war has been detrimental to <strong>the</strong> realizati<strong>on</strong> of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Tamil community’s democratic rights. This has led to an unusual paradox: <strong>the</strong><br />
democratic rights of <strong>the</strong> Tamil people as a ‘m<strong>in</strong>ority’ needs to be protected not <strong>on</strong>ly from<br />
<strong>the</strong> majoritarian S<strong>in</strong>halese state, but also from <strong>the</strong> Tamil politico-military groups who<br />
us<strong>in</strong>g violence, c<strong>on</strong>trol <strong>the</strong> everyday life of Tamil citizens. This c<strong>on</strong>tradicti<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> Tamil<br />
‘nati<strong>on</strong>al liberati<strong>on</strong> politics’ was highlighted <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> aftermath of <strong>the</strong> 2002 Cease-Fire<br />
Agreement, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> war between <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>stream LTTE and <strong>the</strong> breakaway Karuna group.<br />
It was possible for <strong>the</strong> state and <strong>the</strong> Tamil polity to de-escalate war and violence through<br />
mutual agreement; but <strong>the</strong> moment that happened, <strong>the</strong> Tamil polity turned <strong>the</strong> violence<br />
aga<strong>in</strong>st itself.<br />
What does all this tell us about <strong>the</strong> political project of m<strong>in</strong>ority rights? It tells us that<br />
those who wage an armed struggle to secure m<strong>in</strong>ority rights are not <strong>the</strong> best guarantors of<br />
democratic rights. Protracted armed struggle has not been a path paved with democracy<br />
or human rights. In wag<strong>in</strong>g war for nati<strong>on</strong>al rights, its practiti<strong>on</strong>ers have begun to<br />
<strong>in</strong>strumentalise <strong>the</strong> entire rights discourse. Claims like, “it is too early to practice<br />
democracy with<strong>in</strong> ourselves; we must first w<strong>in</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>al <strong>in</strong>dependence,” however<br />
outrageous <strong>the</strong>y may appear to <strong>the</strong> politically c<strong>on</strong>scious citizen, are <strong>in</strong>formed by an<br />
essentially nati<strong>on</strong>alist as well as an <strong>in</strong>strumentalist reas<strong>on</strong><strong>in</strong>g c<strong>on</strong>cern<strong>in</strong>g rights.<br />
105
Rights Claims <strong>in</strong> Muslim Politics<br />
Muslims are Sri Lanka’s sec<strong>on</strong>d largest m<strong>in</strong>ority community with a little over 8 percent<br />
of <strong>the</strong> total populati<strong>on</strong>. They are c<strong>on</strong>centrated <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Eastern prov<strong>in</strong>ce and dispersed<br />
throughout <strong>the</strong> country. Dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> first three decades after <strong>in</strong>dependence, <strong>the</strong> rights<br />
claims of <strong>the</strong> Muslim community were not as assertive or radicalised as those of <strong>the</strong><br />
Tamil community. Till <strong>the</strong> mid-1980s, Sri Lankan Muslims did not have a political party<br />
of <strong>the</strong>ir own. In this early period, <strong>the</strong> Muslim political leadership came primarily from <strong>the</strong><br />
bus<strong>in</strong>ess and professi<strong>on</strong>al elite <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Western prov<strong>in</strong>ce and worked with <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong><br />
S<strong>in</strong>halese political parties. This S<strong>in</strong>halese-Muslim ‘alliance’ ensured parliamentary<br />
representati<strong>on</strong> and cab<strong>in</strong>et positi<strong>on</strong>s for elite Muslim politicians who were members of<br />
ei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> United Nati<strong>on</strong>al Party or <strong>the</strong> Sri Lanka Freedom Party. Meanwhile, Muslim<br />
communities <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Nor<strong>the</strong>rn and Eastern prov<strong>in</strong>ces voted for Tamil parties <strong>in</strong> a c<strong>on</strong>text<br />
where ethnic identity politics had not polarized Tamil-Muslim social formati<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> early phase of mobilizati<strong>on</strong>, Tamil nati<strong>on</strong>alists took for granted that <strong>the</strong> Tamil<br />
movement represented Muslim <strong>in</strong>terests as well. The formulati<strong>on</strong>, ‘Tamil-speak<strong>in</strong>g<br />
people <strong>in</strong> Sri Lanka’ had been deployed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Tamil nati<strong>on</strong>alist discourse to <strong>in</strong>clude both<br />
Tamil and Muslim communities <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> premise that both communities shared <strong>the</strong> same<br />
language, Tamil. In <strong>the</strong> absence of a separate Muslim political party, <strong>the</strong> Muslim<br />
community advanced <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>in</strong>terests through S<strong>in</strong>halese and Tamil political parties. In <strong>the</strong><br />
Nor<strong>the</strong>rn and Eastern prov<strong>in</strong>ces, where <strong>the</strong> Muslim community lived side by side with <strong>the</strong><br />
regi<strong>on</strong>al majority of <strong>the</strong> Tamil community, <strong>the</strong> Federal Party, which later became <strong>the</strong><br />
TULF, attracted Muslim voters as well as Muslim political activists. The ethnic war<br />
radically altered this political co-existence between <strong>the</strong> two communities.<br />
Three factors seem to have c<strong>on</strong>tributed to <strong>the</strong> Tamil-Muslim competiti<strong>on</strong> and c<strong>on</strong>flict <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> mid and late 1980s. The first was <strong>the</strong> use of violence by Tamil armed groups aga<strong>in</strong>st<br />
Muslim civilians, particularly <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Eastern prov<strong>in</strong>ce, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> early phase of <strong>the</strong> armed<br />
struggle. The sec<strong>on</strong>d was <strong>the</strong> deliberate policy of S<strong>in</strong>halese political leaders to create<br />
deep divisi<strong>on</strong>s between <strong>the</strong> Tamil and Muslim communities <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir strategy of ‘divide<br />
and rule’ <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Eastern prov<strong>in</strong>ce. xi The third was <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>tense competiti<strong>on</strong> for land and<br />
ec<strong>on</strong>omic opportunities between <strong>the</strong> two communities <strong>in</strong> c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s of war, particularly<br />
<strong>in</strong> situati<strong>on</strong>s where populati<strong>on</strong> displacement had occurred due to violence. Aga<strong>in</strong>st this<br />
backdrop, a new generati<strong>on</strong> of politicised Muslim youth activists emerged <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Eastern<br />
prov<strong>in</strong>ce, which challenged both <strong>the</strong> traditi<strong>on</strong>al Muslim political leadership as well as <strong>the</strong><br />
Tamil nati<strong>on</strong>alist positi<strong>on</strong> that Tamil parties represented Muslim <strong>in</strong>terests as well.<br />
The formati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> Sri Lanka Muslim C<strong>on</strong>gress (SLMC) <strong>in</strong> 1986 was <strong>the</strong> outcome of<br />
this emergence of Muslim identity politics based <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> claim that <strong>the</strong> political <strong>in</strong>terests<br />
of <strong>the</strong> Sri Lankan Muslim community were fundamentally different from those of <strong>the</strong><br />
Tamils. xii Muslim political leaders argued that an alliance with <strong>the</strong> Tamil secessi<strong>on</strong>ist<br />
<strong>in</strong>surgency would be utterly detrimental to Muslim <strong>in</strong>terests. Instead, Muslims should<br />
establish <strong>the</strong>ir own political party <strong>in</strong>dependent of Tamil politics and serve <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>in</strong>terests<br />
through negotiati<strong>on</strong> and cooperati<strong>on</strong> with <strong>the</strong> S<strong>in</strong>halese political leadership.<br />
106
The <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g hostility between <strong>the</strong> Tamil and Muslim communities <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> North and<br />
East dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> war was marked by civilian massacres <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Eastern prov<strong>in</strong>ce, populati<strong>on</strong><br />
displacement, and ‘ethnic cleans<strong>in</strong>g’ <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> North by <strong>the</strong> LTTE. This relati<strong>on</strong>ship of<br />
hostility shaped <strong>the</strong> nature of a possible political soluti<strong>on</strong> to <strong>the</strong> ethnic c<strong>on</strong>flict,<br />
particularly <strong>in</strong> relati<strong>on</strong> to <strong>the</strong> power-shar<strong>in</strong>g arrangements <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Eastern prov<strong>in</strong>ce. The<br />
proposals for <strong>the</strong> resoluti<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> ethnic c<strong>on</strong>flict, from <strong>the</strong> late 1980s had to grapple with<br />
<strong>the</strong> Muslim demand that Muslim regi<strong>on</strong>al aut<strong>on</strong>omy should be an essential outcome of a<br />
negotiated political settlement. The salience of <strong>the</strong> Muslim aut<strong>on</strong>omy claim made itself<br />
felt <strong>on</strong> two occasi<strong>on</strong>s. The first was <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> early 1990s when a Parliamentary select<br />
Committee was set up to f<strong>in</strong>d a framework of settlement to <strong>the</strong> ethnic c<strong>on</strong>flict. The<br />
sec<strong>on</strong>d occasi<strong>on</strong> was dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> 2002 peace process.<br />
In 1991, under President Ranas<strong>in</strong>ghe Premadasa, Sri Lanka’s parliament appo<strong>in</strong>ted a<br />
Select Committee, headed by an Oppositi<strong>on</strong> MP, Mangala Mo<strong>on</strong>es<strong>in</strong>ghe, to explore a<br />
settlement framework acceptable to all <strong>the</strong> stakeholders to <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>flict. By this time, <strong>the</strong><br />
Indian peace keep<strong>in</strong>g forces had left Sri Lanka and hostilities aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> LTTE had<br />
resumed. The c<strong>on</strong>sultati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong>itiated by <strong>the</strong> Mo<strong>on</strong>es<strong>in</strong>ghe Select Committee regenerated<br />
<strong>the</strong> debate <strong>on</strong> a political soluti<strong>on</strong> that had rema<strong>in</strong>ed dormant s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> 1987 Indo-Lanka<br />
Accord. The debate <strong>on</strong> devoluti<strong>on</strong> centred <strong>on</strong> two questi<strong>on</strong>s - <strong>the</strong> ‘extent of devoluti<strong>on</strong>’<br />
and <strong>the</strong> ‘unit of devoluti<strong>on</strong>.’ The questi<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> ‘extent of devoluti<strong>on</strong>’ was about <strong>the</strong><br />
quantum of regi<strong>on</strong>al aut<strong>on</strong>omy adequate to meet Tamil demands. The broad c<strong>on</strong>sensus at<br />
that time was that any new settlement framework should expand <strong>the</strong> powers of <strong>the</strong><br />
prov<strong>in</strong>cial units bey<strong>on</strong>d those granted to <strong>the</strong> Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Councils under <strong>the</strong> 13 th<br />
Amendment to Sri Lanka’s 1978 C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>. But <strong>the</strong> questi<strong>on</strong> of ‘unit of devoluti<strong>on</strong>’<br />
turned out to be <strong>the</strong> most <strong>in</strong>tractable issue <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> devoluti<strong>on</strong> debate <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> early 1990s.<br />
The complexity c<strong>on</strong>cern<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> ‘unit of devoluti<strong>on</strong>’ arose from <strong>the</strong> compet<strong>in</strong>g positi<strong>on</strong>s<br />
held by S<strong>in</strong>halese, Tamil and Muslim political parties <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> nature of <strong>the</strong> aut<strong>on</strong>omy unit<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Nor<strong>the</strong>rn and Eastern prov<strong>in</strong>ces. Already, it had been complicated by <strong>the</strong> Indian<br />
government <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Indo-Lanka Accord of July 1987, which had recognized <strong>the</strong> Nor<strong>the</strong>rn<br />
and Eastern prov<strong>in</strong>ces as “areas of historical habitati<strong>on</strong> of Sri Lankan Tamil speak<strong>in</strong>g<br />
peoples, who [had] at all times hi<strong>the</strong>rto lived toge<strong>the</strong>r <strong>in</strong> this territory with o<strong>the</strong>r ethnic<br />
groups.” It even provided for <strong>the</strong> merger of <strong>the</strong> two prov<strong>in</strong>ces so that “<strong>on</strong>e adm<strong>in</strong>istrative<br />
unit, hav<strong>in</strong>g <strong>on</strong>e elected Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Council” could be established. xiii Thus, with <strong>the</strong> Indo-<br />
Lanka Accord of July 1987, <strong>the</strong> ‘merger’ of Nor<strong>the</strong>rn and Eastern prov<strong>in</strong>ces became a<br />
firm and ‘n<strong>on</strong>-negotiable’ positi<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> Tamil nati<strong>on</strong>alist politics.<br />
But <strong>the</strong> Muslim and S<strong>in</strong>halese parties resisted <strong>the</strong> ‘merger’ claim. The Muslim argument<br />
was that <strong>the</strong> merger would create Tamil dom<strong>in</strong>ance <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> regi<strong>on</strong>al adm<strong>in</strong>istrati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong><br />
North and East and reduce <strong>the</strong> Muslims to a positi<strong>on</strong> of a disempowered m<strong>in</strong>ority while<br />
endanger<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ir security. xiv In order to safeguard Muslim <strong>in</strong>terests and <strong>the</strong>ir security,<br />
<strong>the</strong> SLMC formulated <strong>the</strong> demand for a separate Muslim unit, comb<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g adm<strong>in</strong>istrative<br />
divisi<strong>on</strong>s with Muslim majority populati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong> Amparai and Batticaloa districts. A ‘n<strong>on</strong>c<strong>on</strong>tiguous<br />
Muslim aut<strong>on</strong>omy unit’ <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Eastern Prov<strong>in</strong>ce was <strong>the</strong> formulati<strong>on</strong> that<br />
eventually emerged <strong>in</strong> this debate. But all <strong>the</strong> Tamil parties <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Select Committee<br />
process were adamant <strong>the</strong> North-East merger’ was ‘n<strong>on</strong>-negotiable.’ The Select<br />
Committee’ Report proposed a compromise - an Apex Council and two prov<strong>in</strong>cial<br />
107
councils for <strong>the</strong> two prov<strong>in</strong>ces. Both <strong>the</strong> Tamil and Muslim parties rejected this proposal<br />
as a move designed to weaken <strong>the</strong> Tamil claim to a unified aut<strong>on</strong>omy unit. The questi<strong>on</strong><br />
of <strong>the</strong> unit of devoluti<strong>on</strong> was left unresolved and still rema<strong>in</strong>s unresolved with little<br />
possibility of a compromise between <strong>the</strong> Tamil and Muslim positi<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> 2002 peace process, <strong>the</strong> Muslim questi<strong>on</strong> re-emerged <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> form of Muslim parties<br />
demand<strong>in</strong>g a direct role <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> negotiati<strong>on</strong> process. The framework with<strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong> 2002<br />
peace process had been c<strong>on</strong>ceptualised was that <strong>the</strong> two pr<strong>in</strong>cipal parties – <strong>the</strong> UNF<br />
government and <strong>the</strong> LTTE – al<strong>on</strong>e should negotiate <strong>the</strong> cease-fire agreement and <strong>the</strong><br />
eventual peace agreement. As <strong>the</strong> SLMC, was a member of <strong>the</strong> govern<strong>in</strong>g UNF coaliti<strong>on</strong>,<br />
its leader took part <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> negotiati<strong>on</strong>s but <strong>on</strong>ly as a member of <strong>the</strong> government<br />
delegati<strong>on</strong>. Muslim parties resisted this framework fear<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>the</strong> S<strong>in</strong>halese and <strong>the</strong><br />
Tamil leaders would ignore Muslim <strong>in</strong>terests and claims. Moreover, follow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> split <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> SLMC and <strong>the</strong> fragmentati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> Muslim polity, Muslim anxieties were fur<strong>the</strong>r<br />
heightened. The Muslim parties made two major demands. First, <strong>the</strong>re should be separate<br />
Muslim representati<strong>on</strong> at <strong>the</strong> peace talks with negotiati<strong>on</strong>s becom<strong>in</strong>g a tripartite process.<br />
Sec<strong>on</strong>d, <strong>the</strong> negotiated soluti<strong>on</strong> should be a tripartite soluti<strong>on</strong> jo<strong>in</strong>tly arrived at by <strong>the</strong><br />
S<strong>in</strong>halese, Tamil and Muslim leaders.<br />
The LTTE’s approach to <strong>the</strong> Muslim issue <strong>in</strong> 2002-2003 reflects <strong>the</strong> particular political<br />
complexity that came to characterize Muslim-Tamil relati<strong>on</strong>s dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> civil war. The<br />
LTTE did not recognize <strong>the</strong> Muslim claim for separate representati<strong>on</strong> at <strong>the</strong> peace talks.<br />
The war had been between <strong>the</strong> Sri Lankan state and <strong>the</strong> Tamil community, <strong>the</strong>refore <strong>the</strong><br />
settlement agreement should be between <strong>the</strong> two pr<strong>in</strong>cipal parties to <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>flict. The<br />
LTTE also claimed that <strong>on</strong>ce a peace agreement was reached with <strong>the</strong> state, <strong>the</strong> LTTE,<br />
would sign a separate peace agreement with Muslim representatives of <strong>the</strong> Nor<strong>the</strong>rn and<br />
Eastern prov<strong>in</strong>ces. Given <strong>the</strong> recent history of extreme violence <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> LTTE-Muslim<br />
relati<strong>on</strong>s, <strong>the</strong> LTTE positi<strong>on</strong> did not have much credibility <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Muslim polity. Dur<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>the</strong> 2002 peace process, <strong>the</strong>re <strong>in</strong> fact emerged a new wave of radicalisati<strong>on</strong> of Muslim<br />
youth, who felt excluded and marg<strong>in</strong>alized from <strong>the</strong> government-LTTE negotiati<strong>on</strong>s<br />
Meanwhile, add<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> complexity of <strong>the</strong> rights questi<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> Muslim m<strong>in</strong>ority,<br />
dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> 2002 peace process, a diversity of perspective and divisi<strong>on</strong> arose am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
community. Some political activists am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Muslims <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Nor<strong>the</strong>rn Prov<strong>in</strong>ce,<br />
particularly those liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> displaced c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s, began to argue that <strong>the</strong>ir needs and<br />
<strong>in</strong>terests were substantially different from those of <strong>the</strong> Muslims <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Eastern prov<strong>in</strong>ce.<br />
Form<strong>in</strong>g a new political party <strong>in</strong> 2008, <strong>the</strong> All Ceyl<strong>on</strong> Muslim C<strong>on</strong>gress claimed that<br />
regi<strong>on</strong>al aut<strong>on</strong>omy for Muslims is not a soluti<strong>on</strong> to <strong>the</strong>ir problems, but <strong>the</strong> right to return<br />
to areas where <strong>the</strong>y had earlier lived <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Nor<strong>the</strong>rn Prov<strong>in</strong>ce.<br />
What are <strong>the</strong> political c<strong>on</strong>sequences of <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g fragmentati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> Sri Lankan<br />
Muslim polity? One answer is that it has weakened <strong>the</strong> political barga<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g capacity of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Muslim m<strong>in</strong>ority dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> peace processes and state reform <strong>in</strong>itiatives. In oppos<strong>in</strong>g<br />
Muslim representati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 2002 peace talks, <strong>the</strong> LTTE emphasised that <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> absence<br />
of a unified voice, Muslim parties could not be accommodated at <strong>the</strong> negotiati<strong>on</strong> table.<br />
Deep divisi<strong>on</strong>s am<strong>on</strong>g Muslim political groups have also enabled <strong>the</strong> S<strong>in</strong>halese political<br />
108
leadership to exploit this disunity, pitt<strong>in</strong>g <strong>on</strong>e group aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r. The o<strong>the</strong>r side of<br />
<strong>the</strong> co<strong>in</strong> is that divisi<strong>on</strong>s have immensely benefited <strong>the</strong> Muslim political class. With no<br />
unified Muslim leadership and voice, <strong>the</strong>y have found it relatively easy to leave <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong><br />
Muslim political party, <strong>the</strong> SLMC, and jo<strong>in</strong> S<strong>in</strong>halese led coaliti<strong>on</strong> governments and be<br />
pers<strong>on</strong>ally rewarded with m<strong>in</strong>isterial positi<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
Plantati<strong>on</strong> Tamils and Power-Shar<strong>in</strong>g Claims<br />
The rights violati<strong>on</strong>s of <strong>the</strong> Plantati<strong>on</strong> Tamil community are legendary. With acutely low<br />
wages, liv<strong>in</strong>g and employment c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s of semi-slavery, exceed<strong>in</strong>gly low social<br />
development <strong>in</strong>dicators, and deliberate discrim<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> by <strong>the</strong> post-col<strong>on</strong>ial Sri Lankan<br />
state, <strong>the</strong>y are a community subjected to gross denial of human rights as well as m<strong>in</strong>ority<br />
rights. Their grievances have been a part of <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>ority rights discourse <strong>in</strong> Sri Lanka<br />
s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>cepti<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> post-col<strong>on</strong>ial nati<strong>on</strong> state <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> late 1940s. In fact, nearly <strong>on</strong>e<br />
milli<strong>on</strong> Tamil plantati<strong>on</strong> workers and <strong>the</strong>ir families lost citizenship rights <strong>in</strong> <strong>on</strong>e of <strong>the</strong><br />
earliest pieces of legislati<strong>on</strong> passed by Sri Lanka’s <strong>in</strong>dependent legislature, namely, <strong>the</strong><br />
Citizenship Act of 1948. In <strong>the</strong> franchise law passed a year later, those who had lost<br />
citizenship rights also lost <strong>the</strong>ir franchise rights. Sri Lanka’s judiciary saw noth<strong>in</strong>g wr<strong>on</strong>g<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>se two laws, although Tamil political parties viewed <strong>the</strong>m as discrim<strong>in</strong>atory and<br />
argued that <strong>the</strong>y were ultra vires of Sri Lanka’s <strong>in</strong>dependent c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>. The plantati<strong>on</strong><br />
Tamil community were <strong>the</strong> first and most celebrated victims of ethnic-discrim<strong>in</strong>atory<br />
public policy that has characterised S<strong>in</strong>halese majoritarian asserti<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> post-col<strong>on</strong>ial<br />
political order <strong>in</strong> Sri Lanka. In a way, <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>itial impetus for ma<strong>in</strong>stream Tamil<br />
nati<strong>on</strong>alism came from <strong>the</strong> group discrim<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> Plantati<strong>on</strong> Tamil community.<br />
As a social formati<strong>on</strong>, <strong>the</strong> Plantati<strong>on</strong> Tamil community is dist<strong>in</strong>ct from <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>stream,<br />
‘Sri Lankan Tamil’ community who c<strong>on</strong>sider <strong>the</strong> island’s Nor<strong>the</strong>rn-Eastern prov<strong>in</strong>ces as<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir ‘traditi<strong>on</strong>al homeland.’ To drive home this dist<strong>in</strong>cti<strong>on</strong>, <strong>the</strong> Plantati<strong>on</strong> Tamils are<br />
sometimes called ‘Tamils of recent Indian orig<strong>in</strong>.’ The descriptive label ‘recent orig<strong>in</strong>’<br />
derives from <strong>the</strong>ir associati<strong>on</strong> with <strong>the</strong> establishment of <strong>the</strong> col<strong>on</strong>ial plantati<strong>on</strong> ec<strong>on</strong>omy<br />
by <strong>the</strong> British col<strong>on</strong>ial rulers <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> sec<strong>on</strong>d half of <strong>the</strong> 19 th Century. The plantati<strong>on</strong><br />
workers were brought from sou<strong>the</strong>rn India and are mostly c<strong>on</strong>centrated <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> tea<br />
plantati<strong>on</strong>s of <strong>the</strong> Central and Uva prov<strong>in</strong>ces. Relatively small populati<strong>on</strong>s of <strong>the</strong>m<br />
c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to be employed <strong>in</strong> rubber and tea plantati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Sabaragamuwa, Western and<br />
Sou<strong>the</strong>rn prov<strong>in</strong>ces as a dispersed m<strong>in</strong>ority.<br />
Till <strong>the</strong> late 1970s, two issues dom<strong>in</strong>ated <strong>the</strong> group rights politics of <strong>the</strong> Plantati<strong>on</strong> Tamil<br />
community - <strong>the</strong> first, citizenship rights and <strong>the</strong> sec<strong>on</strong>d, <strong>the</strong>ir ec<strong>on</strong>omic and social rights.<br />
The 1948 Citizenship law had denied citizen rights to nearly <strong>on</strong>e milli<strong>on</strong> Tamil plantati<strong>on</strong><br />
workers and <strong>the</strong>ir descendents. The Sri Lankan government’s positi<strong>on</strong> was that s<strong>in</strong>ce<br />
<strong>the</strong>se workers had ‘recently’ migrated to Sri Lanka from south India, <strong>the</strong> Indian<br />
government should offer <strong>the</strong>m Indian citizenship. The Indian government rejected this<br />
positi<strong>on</strong>. The issue of some 975,000 stateless pers<strong>on</strong>s was partially resolved <strong>in</strong> October<br />
1964 when <strong>the</strong> prime M<strong>in</strong>isters of Sri Lanka and India signed <strong>the</strong> Sirima-Shastri<br />
agreement whereby Sri Lanka would give citizenship to 300,000, while <strong>the</strong> Indian<br />
government would accept repatriati<strong>on</strong> of 525,000. Even <strong>the</strong>n, 150,000 people rema<strong>in</strong>ed<br />
<strong>in</strong> Sri Lanka as stateless. xv<br />
109
A subsequent agreement signed between <strong>the</strong> two governments <strong>in</strong> 1974 stipulated that <strong>the</strong><br />
two countries would share <strong>the</strong>se ‘stateless’ people equally. This was an arrangement<br />
made between <strong>the</strong> two governments, <strong>the</strong>re was no c<strong>on</strong>sultati<strong>on</strong> with <strong>the</strong> affected people<br />
or <strong>the</strong>ir political leaders. It prompted S.Th<strong>on</strong>daman, <strong>the</strong> leader of <strong>the</strong> Ceyl<strong>on</strong> Workers’<br />
C<strong>on</strong>gress, <strong>the</strong> lead<strong>in</strong>g plantati<strong>on</strong> workers’ trade uni<strong>on</strong>, to remark that <strong>the</strong> Indian Tamils as<br />
a “community of human be<strong>in</strong>gs, with soul, m<strong>in</strong>d and body with pers<strong>on</strong>ality” should not<br />
be “apporti<strong>on</strong>ed between countries like beasts of burden…<strong>on</strong>ly to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> good<br />
neighbourly relati<strong>on</strong>s.” xvi<br />
The ma<strong>in</strong>stream Tamil nati<strong>on</strong>alist movement took up <strong>the</strong> citizenship rights issue of <strong>the</strong><br />
‘stateless Tamils’ as a major <strong>the</strong>me <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir campaign for ‘Tamil rights.’ For example, <strong>the</strong><br />
1985 Thimpu Pr<strong>in</strong>ciples, put forward by all <strong>the</strong> Tamil groups <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir negotiati<strong>on</strong>s with<br />
<strong>the</strong> Sri Lankan government, demanded <strong>the</strong> “recogniti<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> right to full citizenship and<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r fundamental democratic rights of all Tamils, who look up<strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> Island as <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
country.” xvii In 1986, <strong>the</strong> government of President J. R. Jayewardene c<strong>on</strong>ferred<br />
citizenship to 94,000 ‘stateless’ Tamils <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> plantati<strong>on</strong> sector, br<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> citizenship<br />
issue to an end. The closure of <strong>the</strong> citizenship problem co<strong>in</strong>cided with <strong>the</strong> CWC jo<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>the</strong> rul<strong>in</strong>g UNP <strong>in</strong> a coaliti<strong>on</strong> government. Evidently, President Jayewardene had an<br />
electoral objective <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d.<br />
After <strong>the</strong> citizenship issue was resolved, <strong>the</strong> questi<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> rights of <strong>the</strong> ‘Up Country<br />
Tamil’ community shifted to two o<strong>the</strong>r ma<strong>in</strong> areas. Moreover, <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>me of <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
ec<strong>on</strong>omic and social rights has taken a new turn after <strong>the</strong> privatisati<strong>on</strong> of plantati<strong>on</strong><br />
management <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> mid-1980s. Am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong> politically active secti<strong>on</strong>s of <strong>the</strong> Up Country<br />
Tamil community, <strong>the</strong> demand has emerged for aut<strong>on</strong>omy and self-determ<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> rights.<br />
The c<strong>on</strong>text for this shift is <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>al debate <strong>on</strong> power-shar<strong>in</strong>g and regi<strong>on</strong>al aut<strong>on</strong>omy<br />
for North-eastern Tamil and <strong>the</strong> Muslim communities.<br />
The way <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong> leadership of <strong>the</strong> Up-Country Tamil community has negotiated its<br />
political relati<strong>on</strong>ship with <strong>the</strong> state, mov<strong>in</strong>g away from <strong>the</strong> militants politics of <strong>the</strong> Tamils<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> North-East, c<strong>on</strong>stitutes an <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g model. The Ceyl<strong>on</strong> Workers’ C<strong>on</strong>gress<br />
(CWC) was <strong>in</strong>itially a member of <strong>the</strong> Tamil United Fr<strong>on</strong>t (TUF), formed <strong>in</strong> 1975, to<br />
advance m<strong>in</strong>ority Tamil grievances. In 1976, <strong>the</strong> TUF adopted a militant programme of<br />
acti<strong>on</strong> to mobilize <strong>the</strong> Tamils for nati<strong>on</strong>al self-determ<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> and <strong>the</strong> establishment,<br />
through peaceful means, of a separate Tamil state. With this change <strong>in</strong> Tamil nati<strong>on</strong>alist<br />
politics, <strong>the</strong> CWC left <strong>the</strong> TUF and so<strong>on</strong> jo<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>the</strong> government of <strong>the</strong> United Nati<strong>on</strong>al<br />
Party government which came to power <strong>in</strong> 1977. What is noteworthy is that <strong>the</strong> CWC<br />
chose <strong>the</strong> strategy of coaliti<strong>on</strong> build<strong>in</strong>g with <strong>the</strong> S<strong>in</strong>halese political establishment at a<br />
time when <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>stream Tamil politics was <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> process of shift<strong>in</strong>g towards <strong>the</strong> path<br />
of armed struggle. The CWC has c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued this policy throughout <strong>the</strong> subsequent years,<br />
jo<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g UNP and PA led governments, without ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g strict partisanship with ei<strong>the</strong>r.<br />
For example, <strong>the</strong> CWC c<strong>on</strong>tested <strong>the</strong> 1994 parliamentary electi<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong> a coaliti<strong>on</strong> with <strong>the</strong><br />
UNP, but after <strong>the</strong> electi<strong>on</strong>s jo<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>the</strong> PA to form a coaliti<strong>on</strong> regime. Aga<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> 2004, <strong>the</strong><br />
CWC c<strong>on</strong>tested <strong>the</strong> parliamentary electi<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> alliance with <strong>the</strong> UNP, but after <strong>the</strong><br />
electi<strong>on</strong>s jo<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>the</strong> UPFA government. This flexibility <strong>in</strong> enter<strong>in</strong>g coaliti<strong>on</strong> alliances<br />
110
dur<strong>in</strong>g and after parliamentary electi<strong>on</strong>s is a part of <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>novative model of pragmatism<br />
evolved by a small m<strong>in</strong>ority community <strong>in</strong> a c<strong>on</strong>text where <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>ority community<br />
has opted for <strong>the</strong> path of armed struggle aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> state to w<strong>in</strong> its self-determ<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong><br />
rights. Similarly, <strong>the</strong> political leadership of <strong>the</strong> Muslim community has adopted a<br />
flexible strategy of coaliti<strong>on</strong> politics.<br />
Meanwhile, <strong>the</strong>re has been <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>current debate <strong>in</strong> Sri Lanka <strong>on</strong> regi<strong>on</strong>al aut<strong>on</strong>omy,<br />
devoluti<strong>on</strong> and federalism as possible alternatives to secessi<strong>on</strong>. The proposals for a<br />
political soluti<strong>on</strong> to <strong>the</strong> ethnic c<strong>on</strong>flict and appropriate c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al models have given<br />
rise to a state reform discourse. It is <strong>in</strong> this c<strong>on</strong>text that a new political awaken<strong>in</strong>g has<br />
emerged am<strong>on</strong>g political and social activists am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Up Country Tamil community to<br />
envisi<strong>on</strong> a new framework of aut<strong>on</strong>omy rights. Three perspectives have emerged <strong>in</strong> this<br />
regard. The first seeks regi<strong>on</strong>al aut<strong>on</strong>omy for an area compris<strong>in</strong>g districts with a majority<br />
of Plantati<strong>on</strong> Tamil populati<strong>on</strong>. It is based <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>ciple of regi<strong>on</strong>al aut<strong>on</strong>omy for<br />
regi<strong>on</strong>al majority communities who are nati<strong>on</strong>al m<strong>in</strong>orities. Some advocates propose <strong>the</strong><br />
P<strong>on</strong>dicherry model of India. The sec<strong>on</strong>d is power-shar<strong>in</strong>g rights with<strong>in</strong> a scheme of<br />
devoluti<strong>on</strong> or federalism, for plantati<strong>on</strong> Tamil communities who are ei<strong>the</strong>r dispersed or<br />
who c<strong>on</strong>stitute significant m<strong>in</strong>orities <strong>in</strong> S<strong>in</strong>halese-majority districts. It is <strong>in</strong>spired by <strong>the</strong><br />
pr<strong>in</strong>ciple of n<strong>on</strong>-territorial power shar<strong>in</strong>g. The third perspective is streng<strong>the</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong><br />
exist<strong>in</strong>g local government <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>s with enhanced powers and functi<strong>on</strong>s to ensure that<br />
<strong>the</strong> upcountry Tamil people have greater access to <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>s of governance. This idea<br />
presupposes <strong>the</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>ciple of asymmetrical local governance. xviii<br />
“Localised” M<strong>in</strong>ority communities and C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al Opti<strong>on</strong>s<br />
The issue of m<strong>in</strong>ority rights <strong>in</strong> Sri Lanka is related to <strong>the</strong> broad questi<strong>on</strong> of access to and<br />
<strong>the</strong> shar<strong>in</strong>g of state power. This questi<strong>on</strong> has been framed <strong>in</strong> terms of federalism and<br />
aut<strong>on</strong>omy <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> pre-civil war period, and subsequently <strong>in</strong> a discourse of secessi<strong>on</strong> vs. <strong>the</strong><br />
unity of <strong>the</strong> state. The aut<strong>on</strong>omy/federalism fram<strong>in</strong>g of m<strong>in</strong>ority rights returned to <strong>the</strong><br />
political debate <strong>in</strong> 2002-2003, but it did not last l<strong>on</strong>g. Although <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong> focus of this<br />
debate has been <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> political relati<strong>on</strong>s between <strong>the</strong> S<strong>in</strong>halese and Tamil communities,<br />
it has also given rise to o<strong>the</strong>r proposals for multi-level power shar<strong>in</strong>g arrangements to<br />
accommodate political aspirati<strong>on</strong>s of smaller m<strong>in</strong>ority communities. These have<br />
emanated from <strong>the</strong> perspectives of smaller, regi<strong>on</strong>al or ‘localised’ m<strong>in</strong>ority communities.<br />
The Oslo pr<strong>in</strong>ciples <strong>on</strong> federalism and <strong>in</strong>ternal self-determ<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> reached between <strong>the</strong><br />
government and <strong>the</strong> LTTE <strong>in</strong> December 2000 provided <strong>the</strong> impetus for this new th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>on</strong> power shar<strong>in</strong>g. As Devaraj notes, <strong>the</strong> agreement between <strong>the</strong> Sri Lankan government<br />
and <strong>the</strong> LTTE to ‘explore’ new structures of power shar<strong>in</strong>g had opened <strong>the</strong> way for<br />
“deepen<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> power shar<strong>in</strong>g discourse.” xix<br />
We have already discussed <strong>the</strong> claims made for power shar<strong>in</strong>g rights from <strong>the</strong><br />
perspectives of <strong>the</strong> Muslim and Plantati<strong>on</strong> Tamil communities. Here <strong>the</strong> focus is <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
localised communities which are dispersed <strong>in</strong> relatively small numbers <strong>in</strong> areas,<br />
prov<strong>in</strong>ces as well as districts, where <strong>the</strong> majority of <strong>the</strong> populati<strong>on</strong> bel<strong>on</strong>g to a nati<strong>on</strong>al or<br />
regi<strong>on</strong>al majority. In <strong>the</strong> Tamil-speak<strong>in</strong>g North, <strong>the</strong> S<strong>in</strong>halese, Muslims and various o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
mixed communities are such localised m<strong>in</strong>orities. Similarly, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>South</strong>-eastern coastal<br />
111
areas where <strong>the</strong> local majority populati<strong>on</strong> is Muslim, S<strong>in</strong>halese and Tamils c<strong>on</strong>stitute a<br />
local m<strong>in</strong>ority. In <strong>the</strong> S<strong>in</strong>halese majority prov<strong>in</strong>ces – or <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> so-called ‘<strong>South</strong>’ – <strong>the</strong><br />
Tamils, Muslims and o<strong>the</strong>r ethnic groups are m<strong>in</strong>ority communities. Sri Lanka’s<br />
dom<strong>in</strong>ant debate <strong>on</strong> power shar<strong>in</strong>g and federalism does not account for <strong>the</strong> group rights<br />
of <strong>the</strong>se small m<strong>in</strong>orities. Hav<strong>in</strong>g be<strong>in</strong>g excluded from <strong>the</strong> reck<strong>on</strong><strong>in</strong>gs of regi<strong>on</strong>al<br />
aut<strong>on</strong>omy, <strong>the</strong>y run <strong>the</strong> risk of becom<strong>in</strong>g oppressed m<strong>in</strong>orities under territorialized<br />
devoluti<strong>on</strong> and federalism.<br />
Sri Lanka’s devoluti<strong>on</strong> proposals drafted <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1990s did not take <strong>in</strong>to account <strong>the</strong> rights<br />
of local m<strong>in</strong>orities. One reas<strong>on</strong> for <strong>the</strong>ir exclusi<strong>on</strong> is that <strong>the</strong> devoluti<strong>on</strong> discourse as<br />
evolved <strong>in</strong> Sri Lanka has been shaped by <strong>the</strong> logic of ‘ethnic nati<strong>on</strong>alisms’ of S<strong>in</strong>halese,<br />
Tamil and Muslim communities. It has turned <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>cept of ethnic self-determ<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>to a visi<strong>on</strong> of territorialized ethnic enclaves, or ethnic homelands. xx Also, it is based <strong>on</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al federalist reas<strong>on</strong><strong>in</strong>g that <strong>the</strong> best way to politically empower a nati<strong>on</strong>al<br />
m<strong>in</strong>ority is to make <strong>the</strong>m a regi<strong>on</strong>al majority, with c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>ally guaranteed powers of<br />
regi<strong>on</strong>al, or territorialized, aut<strong>on</strong>omy. In such a framework, would <strong>the</strong> rights of regi<strong>on</strong>al,<br />
local and dispersed m<strong>in</strong>ority communities be protected? Rajas<strong>in</strong>gham-Senanayake quite<br />
rightly expresses <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>cern that <strong>the</strong> territorialized model of devoluti<strong>on</strong>/federalism is<br />
very likely to make official <strong>the</strong> ethnic enclave mentality and streng<strong>the</strong>n fears, suspici<strong>on</strong>s<br />
and cultural differences that have been built <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> course of <strong>the</strong> protracted war and<br />
violence. In this argument, devoluti<strong>on</strong> for multi-culturalism and pluralism should have<br />
arrangements to safeguard <strong>the</strong> rights of local m<strong>in</strong>orities while ensur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ir safety and<br />
security from <strong>the</strong> hegem<strong>on</strong>ic possibilities of <strong>the</strong> local majorities.<br />
They centre <strong>on</strong> five issues xxi - representati<strong>on</strong>al rights, security rights, recogniti<strong>on</strong> rights,<br />
right to development and governance rights. I propose that <strong>the</strong>y require <strong>in</strong>novative<br />
c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al and <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al opti<strong>on</strong>s. A reform agenda may be elaborated as follows.<br />
The first set of rights, representati<strong>on</strong>al rights, calls for c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al guarantees for all<br />
m<strong>in</strong>orities to secure representati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> assemblies of governance, <strong>in</strong> parliament,<br />
prov<strong>in</strong>cial councils and local government bodies. The electoral system will need to be<br />
reformed to translate <strong>the</strong>se c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al guarantees <strong>in</strong>to <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al practice. Smaller<br />
m<strong>in</strong>orities would not stand a chance <strong>in</strong> ‘normal’ first past <strong>the</strong> post electoral systems.<br />
The questi<strong>on</strong> of security guarantees for smaller m<strong>in</strong>orities can be partially addressed by<br />
means of ensur<strong>in</strong>g representati<strong>on</strong>al rights as above. In additi<strong>on</strong>, measures of affirmative<br />
acti<strong>on</strong> should be provided, particularly through n<strong>on</strong>-territorial mechanisms of federalism.<br />
Recogniti<strong>on</strong> rights entail <strong>the</strong>ir recogniti<strong>on</strong> as political communities of equal worth,<br />
followed by <strong>the</strong> recogniti<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong>ir language and cultural rights. Developmental rights<br />
emanate from <strong>the</strong> need to alter <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s of ec<strong>on</strong>omic and social<br />
marg<strong>in</strong>ality of almost all <strong>the</strong>se marg<strong>in</strong>al m<strong>in</strong>orities and l<strong>in</strong>k <strong>the</strong>m with ma<strong>in</strong>stream of <strong>the</strong><br />
developmental process, <strong>the</strong>reby enabl<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>m to benefit from state policies for<br />
development. Access to state power encompasses representati<strong>on</strong>, legislative decisi<strong>on</strong><br />
mak<strong>in</strong>g and participati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> executive process - at <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>al, prov<strong>in</strong>cial and local<br />
levels. In c<strong>on</strong>crete terms, this agenda calls for (i) territorial as well as n<strong>on</strong>-territorial<br />
federalism, (ii) federaliz<strong>in</strong>g nati<strong>on</strong>al, prov<strong>in</strong>cial and local assemblies of governance with<br />
guaranteed participati<strong>on</strong> of m<strong>in</strong>orities, and (iii) mak<strong>in</strong>g new electoral arrangements for<br />
smaller m<strong>in</strong>orities to secure representati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> sub-nati<strong>on</strong>al assemblies.<br />
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Chang<strong>in</strong>g Dynamics of M<strong>in</strong>ority Rights Discourse 2007-2008<br />
As suggested <strong>in</strong> this paper, <strong>the</strong> arguments, discourses and policy opti<strong>on</strong>s c<strong>on</strong>cern<strong>in</strong>g<br />
m<strong>in</strong>ority rights <strong>in</strong> Sri Lanka have been largely shaped by <strong>the</strong> trajectories of <strong>the</strong> civil war.<br />
For two and half decades, <strong>the</strong> military strength of <strong>the</strong> Tamil secessi<strong>on</strong>ist campaign, <strong>the</strong><br />
capacity of <strong>the</strong> Tamil society to endure a protracted civil war and <strong>the</strong> resolve of <strong>the</strong> Sri<br />
Lankan state to defeat <strong>the</strong> Tamil nati<strong>on</strong>alist <strong>in</strong>surgency have c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>ed <strong>the</strong> extent to<br />
which m<strong>in</strong>ority rights should be acknowledged, accommodated or resisted. For example,<br />
<strong>the</strong> arguments for m<strong>in</strong>imal political reforms as well as wider state reforms for federalist<br />
aut<strong>on</strong>omy have been policy opti<strong>on</strong>s that emerged <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> S<strong>in</strong>halese polity <strong>in</strong> resp<strong>on</strong>se to<br />
<strong>the</strong> challenge of <strong>the</strong> Tamil nati<strong>on</strong>alist <strong>in</strong>surgency. When <strong>the</strong> Tamil <strong>in</strong>surgency was<br />
militarily str<strong>on</strong>g, <strong>the</strong> Tamil nati<strong>on</strong>alists could demand extensive regi<strong>on</strong>al aut<strong>on</strong>omy, as<br />
exemplified <strong>in</strong> LTTE’s proposals <strong>in</strong> 2003 for an Interim Self-Govern<strong>in</strong>g Authority<br />
(ISGA). In 2007-2008, as <strong>the</strong> LTTE has been militarily weakened, <strong>the</strong> nature as well as<br />
<strong>the</strong> terms of <strong>the</strong> political soluti<strong>on</strong> to <strong>the</strong> ethnic c<strong>on</strong>flict has been undergo<strong>in</strong>g a major<br />
alterati<strong>on</strong>. Below, I explore <strong>the</strong> chang<strong>in</strong>g dynamics of <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>ority rights discourse <strong>in</strong><br />
resp<strong>on</strong>se to <strong>the</strong> anticipated defeat of <strong>the</strong> Tamil <strong>in</strong>surgency.<br />
When hostilities between <strong>the</strong> newly elected Mah<strong>in</strong>da Rajapakse adm<strong>in</strong>istrati<strong>on</strong> and <strong>the</strong><br />
LTTE broke out <strong>in</strong> 2006 and developed <strong>in</strong>to an undeclared was <strong>in</strong> 2007, <strong>the</strong> process to<br />
f<strong>in</strong>d a negotiated settlement to <strong>the</strong> ethnic c<strong>on</strong>flict came to an effective end. For both <strong>the</strong><br />
government and <strong>the</strong> LTTE, <strong>the</strong> resumpti<strong>on</strong> of war seemed to be <strong>the</strong> preferred opti<strong>on</strong>. The<br />
rul<strong>in</strong>g coaliti<strong>on</strong> led by <strong>the</strong> United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA) – is a new political<br />
c<strong>on</strong>figurati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> which two hardcore S<strong>in</strong>halese nati<strong>on</strong>alist parties, <strong>the</strong> Janatha Vimukthi<br />
Peramuna (JVP) and Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU), play a key role <strong>in</strong> def<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
regime’s ideology, policies and approaches to <strong>the</strong> ethnic c<strong>on</strong>flict. The JHU denies <strong>the</strong><br />
existence of an ethnic c<strong>on</strong>flict or m<strong>in</strong>ority grievances. For <strong>the</strong> JHU, <strong>the</strong> LTTE rebelli<strong>on</strong> is<br />
pure terrorism. Terrorism calls for a military soluti<strong>on</strong>. There is no political problem that<br />
requires a political soluti<strong>on</strong>. The JVP’s positi<strong>on</strong> is slightly different. The JVP<br />
acknowledges <strong>the</strong> existence of m<strong>in</strong>ority grievances, but rejects <strong>the</strong> legitimacy of <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>surgency. The JVP wants <strong>the</strong> state to defeat <strong>the</strong> LTTE militarily and <strong>the</strong>n offer<br />
‘decentralizati<strong>on</strong>’, and not devoluti<strong>on</strong>, as a framework of accommodat<strong>in</strong>g m<strong>in</strong>ority<br />
demands. The policies of President Rajapakse to <strong>the</strong> ethnic c<strong>on</strong>flict seem to be a<br />
pragmatic syn<strong>the</strong>sis of <strong>the</strong> positi<strong>on</strong>s of both <strong>the</strong> JVP and JHU.<br />
In 2004-2006 as <strong>the</strong> peace process foundered, it impacted quite negatively <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
prospects of resolv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> ethnic c<strong>on</strong>flict by political means with<strong>in</strong> an aut<strong>on</strong>omy<br />
framework. xxii In December 2002 <strong>the</strong> United Nati<strong>on</strong>al Fr<strong>on</strong>t (UNF) government and <strong>the</strong><br />
LTTE had arrived at an understand<strong>in</strong>g, to ‘explore’ a federal soluti<strong>on</strong> to <strong>the</strong> ethnic<br />
c<strong>on</strong>flict with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> parameters of a ‘united Sri Lanka.’ This understand<strong>in</strong>g reached at <strong>the</strong><br />
Oslo talks <strong>in</strong>itially created <strong>the</strong> impressi<strong>on</strong> of a breakthrough <strong>in</strong> Sri Lanka’s protracted<br />
ethnic c<strong>on</strong>flict that would enable m<strong>in</strong>ority aspirati<strong>on</strong>s to be c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>alized <strong>in</strong> a manner<br />
that would enjoy <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>currence of <strong>the</strong> majority as well. However, it took <strong>on</strong>ly a little<br />
time for <strong>the</strong> Oslo understand<strong>in</strong>g to be subsumed by <strong>the</strong> irrec<strong>on</strong>cilability differences<br />
between <strong>the</strong> government and <strong>the</strong> LTTE <strong>on</strong> how to take <strong>the</strong> peace process forward. The<br />
LTTE’s decisi<strong>on</strong> to suspend its participati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> peace talks until <strong>the</strong> government proposed<br />
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a scheme for an <strong>in</strong>terim adm<strong>in</strong>istrati<strong>on</strong> for <strong>the</strong> North and East brought <strong>the</strong> negotiati<strong>on</strong><br />
process <strong>in</strong>to a stage of crisis. When <strong>the</strong> UNF government made two sets of proposals for<br />
an <strong>in</strong>terim adm<strong>in</strong>istrati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> May 2003, <strong>the</strong> LTTE rejected <strong>the</strong>m as <strong>in</strong>adequate <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
proposed scope of power and authority. In turn <strong>the</strong> LTTE developed and presented its<br />
own proposals for what was called an Interim Self-Govern<strong>in</strong>g Authority (ISGA).<br />
The LTTE proposals envisaged a structure of self-rule, with extensive regi<strong>on</strong>al<br />
aut<strong>on</strong>omy. The <strong>in</strong>terim body would have “plenary powers” for <strong>the</strong> governance of <strong>the</strong> two<br />
prov<strong>in</strong>ces, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g “all powers and functi<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong> relati<strong>on</strong> to regi<strong>on</strong>al adm<strong>in</strong>istrati<strong>on</strong><br />
exercised by <strong>the</strong> GOSL [Government of Sri Lanka] <strong>in</strong> and for <strong>the</strong> North East.”. xxiii The<br />
LTTE, it appeared, expected <strong>the</strong> new <strong>in</strong>terim mechanism to formalise <strong>the</strong> existence of<br />
what <strong>the</strong>y called <strong>the</strong>ir ‘de facto adm<strong>in</strong>istrati<strong>on</strong>’. The oppositi<strong>on</strong> Sri Lanka Freedom Party,<br />
which had by this time mobilized S<strong>in</strong>halese nati<strong>on</strong>alist resistance aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> UNF-LTTE<br />
ceasefire and negotiati<strong>on</strong>s, described <strong>the</strong> LTTE’s proposals for an <strong>in</strong>terim adm<strong>in</strong>istrati<strong>on</strong>,<br />
as a ‘bluepr<strong>in</strong>t for secessi<strong>on</strong>.’ xxiv The ISGA proposals even surprised <strong>the</strong> UNF<br />
government. It led to a new crisis <strong>in</strong> Colombo and <strong>the</strong> collapse of <strong>the</strong> UNF government.<br />
This c<strong>on</strong>troversy dem<strong>on</strong>strated <strong>the</strong> vast gulf that existed between <strong>the</strong> S<strong>in</strong>halese political<br />
establishment and <strong>the</strong> LTTE <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> nature of even an <strong>in</strong>terim political soluti<strong>on</strong> to <strong>the</strong><br />
ethnic c<strong>on</strong>flict. The S<strong>in</strong>halese political establishment saw it <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>imalist terms, whereas<br />
<strong>the</strong> LTTE approached <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terim as a necessary step to formalize <strong>the</strong> regi<strong>on</strong>al<br />
adm<strong>in</strong>istrati<strong>on</strong> – or <strong>the</strong> regi<strong>on</strong>al sub-state – it had established.<br />
Regime changes follow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> parliamentary electi<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> April 2004 and <strong>the</strong> Presidential<br />
electi<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> November 2005 led to fur<strong>the</strong>r polarizati<strong>on</strong> of government-LTTE relati<strong>on</strong>s. If<br />
<strong>the</strong> defeated UNF represented an unstable middle ground between two extreme positi<strong>on</strong>s<br />
<strong>on</strong> m<strong>in</strong>ority rights, <strong>the</strong> new UPFA regime and <strong>the</strong> LTTE c<strong>on</strong>stituted oppos<strong>in</strong>g positi<strong>on</strong>s<br />
that could not be rec<strong>on</strong>ciled through negotiati<strong>on</strong>s. The war <strong>on</strong>ce aga<strong>in</strong> became <strong>the</strong><br />
medium through which <strong>the</strong> outcome of <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>flict was to be determ<strong>in</strong>ed.<br />
The UPFA adm<strong>in</strong>istrati<strong>on</strong> headed by President Rajapakse is <strong>in</strong> a way a multi-ethnic<br />
coaliti<strong>on</strong>, despites its commitment to a military soluti<strong>on</strong> to <strong>the</strong> ethnic c<strong>on</strong>flict. S<strong>in</strong>ce<br />
1994, all governments have been multi-ethnic coaliti<strong>on</strong>s of S<strong>in</strong>halese, Tamil and Muslim<br />
political parties with some measure of a proto-c<strong>on</strong>sociati<strong>on</strong>al character. This multi-ethnic<br />
coaliti<strong>on</strong> dimensi<strong>on</strong> of regimes makes it necessary for <strong>the</strong> governments to explore greater<br />
political accommodati<strong>on</strong> with <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>ority communities. President Rajapakse, <strong>in</strong> May<br />
2006, established an All Party Representative Committee (APRC) to formulate <strong>the</strong><br />
framework of a political soluti<strong>on</strong> to <strong>the</strong> ethnic c<strong>on</strong>flict. The Committee comprised<br />
representatives of most of <strong>the</strong> political parties <strong>in</strong> parliament, <strong>the</strong> excepti<strong>on</strong>s be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
United Nati<strong>on</strong>al Party (UNP), <strong>the</strong> Tamil Nati<strong>on</strong>al Alliance (TNA) and <strong>the</strong> JVP. The UNP,<br />
<strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong> oppositi<strong>on</strong> party <strong>in</strong> Parliament, and <strong>the</strong> JVP, a lead<strong>in</strong>g member of <strong>the</strong> UPFA<br />
coaliti<strong>on</strong> government, boycotted <strong>the</strong> APRC proceed<strong>in</strong>gs.<br />
The APRC process met with many challenges and complexities between 2006 and 2007.<br />
The trouble began when <strong>the</strong> APRC’s Committee of Experts submitted an <strong>in</strong>terim report<br />
<strong>in</strong> December 2006 propos<strong>in</strong>g a political soluti<strong>on</strong> with enhanced prov<strong>in</strong>ce-based<br />
devoluti<strong>on</strong>. It proposed to fur<strong>the</strong>r streng<strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> exist<strong>in</strong>g system of power-shar<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Sri<br />
114
Lanka to address Tamil aspirati<strong>on</strong>s for regi<strong>on</strong>al aut<strong>on</strong>omy. The President and <strong>the</strong> rul<strong>in</strong>g<br />
party immediately dissociated <strong>the</strong>mselves from <strong>the</strong> report of <strong>the</strong> Experts Committee.<br />
S<strong>in</strong>halese nati<strong>on</strong>alist partners of <strong>the</strong> rul<strong>in</strong>g coaliti<strong>on</strong>, <strong>the</strong> JVP and JHU, harshly<br />
denounced <strong>the</strong> proposals. Despite this political setback, <strong>the</strong> APRC proceed<strong>in</strong>gs c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued<br />
through to 2008 but with little progress <strong>in</strong> terms of any c<strong>on</strong>crete proposals. The hardcore<br />
S<strong>in</strong>halese nati<strong>on</strong>alist representatives of <strong>the</strong> APRC appear to believe that nei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong><br />
APRC nor <strong>the</strong> government should make any commitment <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> nature and scope of a<br />
political soluti<strong>on</strong> until <strong>the</strong> war aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> LTTE is successfully c<strong>on</strong>cluded. The<br />
assumpti<strong>on</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>on</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> LTTE is militarily defeated and <strong>the</strong> Tamil community is<br />
disarmed, <strong>the</strong> political soluti<strong>on</strong> would not require any degree of regi<strong>on</strong>al aut<strong>on</strong>omy.<br />
The way <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong> Rajapakse adm<strong>in</strong>istrati<strong>on</strong> has re-def<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>the</strong> debate about a<br />
political soluti<strong>on</strong> warrants acknowledgement. xxv By 2008, it became quite clear that<br />
President Rajapakse has altered <strong>the</strong> basic framework with<strong>in</strong> which a negotiated political<br />
soluti<strong>on</strong> to Sri Lanka’s ethnic c<strong>on</strong>flict has hi<strong>the</strong>rto been c<strong>on</strong>ceptualized. He has changed<br />
four comp<strong>on</strong>ents of that framework and added two new elements. The first, is about <strong>the</strong><br />
c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al scope of <strong>the</strong> envisaged political soluti<strong>on</strong>. President Rajapakse’s formula is<br />
‘maximum devoluti<strong>on</strong> with<strong>in</strong> a unitary state’ as <strong>the</strong> guid<strong>in</strong>g pr<strong>in</strong>ciple of <strong>the</strong> political<br />
soluti<strong>on</strong>. The limited scope of regi<strong>on</strong>al aut<strong>on</strong>omy implied <strong>in</strong> this formula is m<strong>in</strong>imum<br />
devoluti<strong>on</strong> which is a fundamental deviati<strong>on</strong> from <strong>the</strong> positi<strong>on</strong>s held by <strong>the</strong> previous PA<br />
and UNF governments.<br />
The sec<strong>on</strong>d is about <strong>the</strong> basic strategic path to peace <strong>in</strong> Sri Lanka. The government<br />
appears to believe that a political soluti<strong>on</strong> without a military victory over <strong>the</strong> LTTE will<br />
not provide susta<strong>in</strong>able and durable peace <strong>in</strong> Sri Lanka. In <strong>the</strong> government’s th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, as<br />
articulated by <strong>the</strong> President and <strong>the</strong> government’s political <strong>the</strong>orists, a military soluti<strong>on</strong>,<br />
or a political soluti<strong>on</strong> paralleled with a military victory, is more likely to work. This<br />
differs from <strong>the</strong> argument of previous governments that <strong>the</strong> LTTE needed to be militarily<br />
weakened <strong>in</strong> order to persuade its leadership to opt for a political settlement. The<br />
emphasis now is <strong>on</strong> defeat<strong>in</strong>g, ra<strong>the</strong>r than weaken<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong> LTTE.<br />
The third, emanat<strong>in</strong>g from <strong>the</strong> first and <strong>the</strong> sec<strong>on</strong>d, c<strong>on</strong>cerns <strong>the</strong> LTTE’s role <strong>in</strong> a<br />
possible negotiated soluti<strong>on</strong> to <strong>the</strong> ethnic c<strong>on</strong>flict. The government does not seem to<br />
believe, nor does it hope for, any negotiati<strong>on</strong>s with <strong>the</strong> LTTE. The military defeat and <strong>the</strong><br />
elim<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> LTTE from <strong>the</strong> politico-military equati<strong>on</strong> seem to be <strong>the</strong> government’s<br />
strategic objective <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> present phase of <strong>the</strong> war. Those who pursue <strong>the</strong> objective of<br />
peace without <strong>the</strong> LTTE treat <strong>the</strong> LTTE as <strong>the</strong> ‘absolute enemy’ of <strong>the</strong> Sri Lankan state.<br />
The LTTE is seen as <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong> obstacle to peace <strong>in</strong> Sri Lanka, and to be removed through<br />
military c<strong>on</strong>quest.<br />
The fourth, c<strong>on</strong>cerns <strong>the</strong> unit of regi<strong>on</strong>al aut<strong>on</strong>omy. With <strong>the</strong> help of <strong>the</strong> JVP and through<br />
judicial <strong>in</strong>terventi<strong>on</strong>, <strong>the</strong> government has achieved a goal which no o<strong>the</strong>r government<br />
would have dared - <strong>the</strong> de-merger of <strong>the</strong> Nor<strong>the</strong>rn and Eastern prov<strong>in</strong>ces. Tamil<br />
nati<strong>on</strong>alists for l<strong>on</strong>g held that <strong>the</strong> merger of <strong>the</strong> two prov<strong>in</strong>ces was a n<strong>on</strong>-negotiable<br />
pr<strong>in</strong>ciple <strong>in</strong> any political settlement. Acknowledg<strong>in</strong>g this, <strong>the</strong> Indo-Lanka Accord of July<br />
1987 proposed <strong>the</strong> merger of <strong>the</strong> two prov<strong>in</strong>ces. They were temporarily merged a few<br />
115
m<strong>on</strong>ths later. The de-merger occurred <strong>in</strong> 2006 when <strong>the</strong> Supreme Court, <strong>in</strong> a<br />
determ<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> of a petiti<strong>on</strong> filed by <strong>the</strong> JVP, held that that temporary merger was illegal.<br />
Almost all <strong>the</strong> n<strong>on</strong>-LTTE Tamil parties and groups have now rec<strong>on</strong>ciled to this new<br />
political reality and aband<strong>on</strong>ed <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al Tamil nati<strong>on</strong>alist noti<strong>on</strong> of a unified<br />
Tamil homeland encompass<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Nor<strong>the</strong>rn and Eastern prov<strong>in</strong>ces.<br />
The fifth comp<strong>on</strong>ent,entails pragmatic political deals with <strong>the</strong> n<strong>on</strong>-LTTE Tamil militant<br />
groups as <strong>the</strong> military thrust aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> LTTE proceeds.. The first phase of this new<br />
strategy has been successfully implemented <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> de-merged Eastern prov<strong>in</strong>ce, with <strong>the</strong><br />
active participati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> group Thamil Makkal Viduthalai Puligal (TMVP), which broke<br />
away from <strong>the</strong> LTTE a few years ago. In <strong>the</strong> North, <strong>the</strong> Eelam People’s Democratic Party<br />
(EPDP) heads <strong>the</strong> n<strong>on</strong>-LTTE entity with which <strong>the</strong> government has already established a<br />
strategic partnership. These anti-LTTE Tamil parties, which earlier had engaged <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
armed <strong>in</strong>surgency aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> state, share <strong>the</strong> view that <strong>the</strong> LTTE, with its secessi<strong>on</strong>ist<br />
goal and c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g commitment to <strong>the</strong> armed struggle, is <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong> obstacle to secur<strong>in</strong>g<br />
Tamil rights <strong>in</strong> cooperati<strong>on</strong> and collaborati<strong>on</strong> with <strong>the</strong> S<strong>in</strong>halese political establishment.<br />
Their strategic path is to w<strong>in</strong> Tamil demands not by c<strong>on</strong>fr<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> state, but by alliancemak<strong>in</strong>g<br />
with <strong>the</strong> S<strong>in</strong>halese political establishment that manages <strong>the</strong> Sri Lankan state.<br />
The sixth is <strong>the</strong> will<strong>in</strong>gness dem<strong>on</strong>strated by m<strong>in</strong>ority political groups, except <strong>the</strong> LTTE<br />
and TNA, to accept under <strong>the</strong> Rajapakse presidency, a political soluti<strong>on</strong> to <strong>the</strong> ethnic<br />
c<strong>on</strong>flict that ensures a sec<strong>on</strong>dary status to ethnic m<strong>in</strong>orities. Some of <strong>the</strong> major m<strong>in</strong>ority<br />
political parties seem ready to accept <strong>the</strong> status of unequal citizens <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> argument that<br />
c<strong>on</strong>fr<strong>on</strong>tati<strong>on</strong> and war with <strong>the</strong> S<strong>in</strong>halese-led state has d<strong>on</strong>e little for <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>orities.<br />
Cooperati<strong>on</strong> and collaborati<strong>on</strong> is viewed more acceptable and pragmatic than resistance<br />
to <strong>the</strong> state that produces no tangible benefit. The m<strong>in</strong>ority parties <strong>in</strong> Sri Lanka also seem<br />
to recognise that <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> post 9/11 world, <strong>the</strong> best course of acti<strong>on</strong> available for ethnic<br />
m<strong>in</strong>orities is <strong>the</strong> path of least resistance and unilateral compromise. This is re<strong>in</strong>forced by<br />
Rajapakse’s strategy of effectively l<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> war aga<strong>in</strong>st LTTE with <strong>the</strong> global war<br />
aga<strong>in</strong>st terrorism.<br />
Internati<strong>on</strong>alizati<strong>on</strong> of C<strong>on</strong>cern for M<strong>in</strong>ority Rights<br />
Sri Lanka has <strong>the</strong> dist<strong>in</strong>cti<strong>on</strong> am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>South</strong> <strong>Asia</strong>n states of <strong>in</strong>vi<strong>in</strong>g a very high degree of<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al c<strong>on</strong>cerns for m<strong>in</strong>ority rights. Two reas<strong>on</strong>s have c<strong>on</strong>tributed to this c<strong>on</strong>cern.<br />
First, Tamil m<strong>in</strong>ority citizens liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Nor<strong>the</strong>rn and Eastern prov<strong>in</strong>ces have been<br />
direct victims of humanitarian c<strong>on</strong>sequences of <strong>the</strong> protracted civil war. Sec<strong>on</strong>d, is <strong>the</strong><br />
realizati<strong>on</strong> am<strong>on</strong>g key <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al actors that governments <strong>in</strong> Sri Lanka driven by <strong>the</strong><br />
imperatives of S<strong>in</strong>halese nati<strong>on</strong>alist agenda, are unlikely to voluntarily guarantee<br />
m<strong>in</strong>ority rights.<br />
India was <strong>the</strong> first external actor to engage <strong>the</strong> Sri Lankan state <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> rights of <strong>the</strong> Tamil<br />
community <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> early and mid-1980s. xxvi In <strong>the</strong> early phase of <strong>the</strong> civil war, Sri Lankan<br />
government was pursu<strong>in</strong>g a military opti<strong>on</strong> to defeat <strong>the</strong> separatist <strong>in</strong>surgency. The Indian<br />
government while back<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Tamil groups, tried to br<strong>in</strong>g about a negotiated settlement.<br />
The Thimpu Talks of 1985 between representatives of <strong>the</strong> Sri Lankan government and<br />
116
Tamil militant groups were facilitated by <strong>the</strong> Indian government. They failed but <strong>the</strong><br />
Indian government c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued its efforts at a negotiated settlement that would ensure some<br />
measure of regi<strong>on</strong>al self-rule to <strong>the</strong> Tamil community. The entry of <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>cept of<br />
devoluti<strong>on</strong> of power <strong>in</strong> Sri Lanka’s political discourse <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> mid-1980s was specifically<br />
an Indian c<strong>on</strong>tributi<strong>on</strong>. The Indo-Lanka Accord of July 1987 proposed a political package<br />
of devoluti<strong>on</strong> which established through a c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al amendment a system of<br />
Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Councils. India’s role is particularly significant because it succeeded <strong>in</strong><br />
persuad<strong>in</strong>g a reluctant S<strong>in</strong>halese political establishment to acknowledge <strong>the</strong> necessity of<br />
regi<strong>on</strong>al aut<strong>on</strong>omy to accommodate Tamil political aspirati<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
Internati<strong>on</strong>al c<strong>on</strong>cerns about <strong>the</strong> positi<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>orities <strong>in</strong> Sri Lanka’s post-civil war<br />
polity have re-emerged <strong>in</strong> 2008, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>text of government claims about w<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
war aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> LTTE. The US has reiterated that a military victory should be<br />
accompanied by a political soluti<strong>on</strong> to <strong>the</strong> ethnic c<strong>on</strong>flict. India too, is emphasiz<strong>in</strong>g that<br />
<strong>the</strong>re is no ‘military soluti<strong>on</strong>’ to <strong>the</strong> ethnic c<strong>on</strong>flict and <strong>the</strong> government of Sri Lanka<br />
should <strong>in</strong>troduce a political soluti<strong>on</strong> acceptable to all communities, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> ethnic<br />
m<strong>in</strong>orities. Apparently, both <strong>the</strong> US and India are apprehensive that a military victory for<br />
<strong>the</strong> state might not provide an <strong>in</strong>centive to <strong>the</strong> government to share power with <strong>the</strong> ethnic<br />
m<strong>in</strong>orities. Sri Lanka’s dilemma is that <strong>the</strong>re is no str<strong>on</strong>g domestic c<strong>on</strong>stituency, o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
than <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>orities <strong>the</strong>mselves that can make an argument for <strong>the</strong> protecti<strong>on</strong> of m<strong>in</strong>ority<br />
rights <strong>in</strong> a comprehensive manner. But <strong>the</strong> protracted civil war has also made <strong>the</strong><br />
m<strong>in</strong>ority communities <strong>in</strong>effective and powerless <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir capacity to <strong>in</strong>fluence any<br />
significant state reform process.<br />
C<strong>on</strong>clusi<strong>on</strong><br />
Sri Lanka’s m<strong>in</strong>ority rights discourse has been widened and <strong>the</strong>n narrowed down quite<br />
significantly, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>text of <strong>the</strong> ethno-political civil war. While <strong>the</strong> understand<strong>in</strong>g of<br />
<strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>cept of ‘m<strong>in</strong>ority’ has been c<strong>on</strong>tested and transformed, <strong>the</strong> focus of m<strong>in</strong>ority<br />
‘rights’ has shifted decisively from <strong>the</strong> doma<strong>in</strong> of civil and political as well as collective<br />
rights to group rights al<strong>on</strong>g with self-determ<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> claims. The rights claims made by <strong>the</strong><br />
Tamil nati<strong>on</strong>alist groups engaged <strong>in</strong> an armed struggle with <strong>the</strong> Sri Lankan state called<br />
for a radical agenda of state reform <strong>in</strong> Sri Lanka as <strong>the</strong> alternative to a secessi<strong>on</strong>ist<br />
outcome. However, with changes <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> balance of power between <strong>the</strong> state and <strong>the</strong><br />
LTTE <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> course of <strong>the</strong> civil war, <strong>the</strong> state reform agenda has also been subjected to<br />
major alterati<strong>on</strong>s. In re-def<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> political discourse of m<strong>in</strong>ority rights, governments<br />
have c<strong>on</strong>tributed significantly. The UNP government <strong>in</strong>troduced <strong>in</strong> 1987-88 <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>cept<br />
of devoluti<strong>on</strong> and <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> of prov<strong>in</strong>cial councils to c<strong>on</strong>stitute <strong>the</strong> framework of a<br />
political soluti<strong>on</strong> to <strong>the</strong> ethnic c<strong>on</strong>flict. The PA government <strong>in</strong> 1995-96 expanded <strong>the</strong><br />
scope of devoluti<strong>on</strong> by propos<strong>in</strong>g greater aut<strong>on</strong>omy to prov<strong>in</strong>cial councils <strong>in</strong> a semifederal<br />
framework. The UNF government <strong>in</strong>troduced <strong>in</strong> 1993 federalism as <strong>the</strong> suitable<br />
c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al framework for accommodat<strong>in</strong>g m<strong>in</strong>ority political aspirati<strong>on</strong>s. The UPFA<br />
government of 2005 took <strong>the</strong> debate away from federalism and <strong>the</strong> new UPFA<br />
government has taken this positi<strong>on</strong> fur<strong>the</strong>r to re-frame <strong>the</strong> scope of power-shar<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> a<br />
m<strong>in</strong>imalist formula of ‘maximum devoluti<strong>on</strong> with<strong>in</strong> a unitary state.’<br />
117
Meanwhile, <strong>the</strong> strategies of m<strong>in</strong>ority political parties and movements underwent notable<br />
changes. The Tamil community rema<strong>in</strong>s deeply divided over <strong>the</strong> best political path to<br />
achieve its political aspirati<strong>on</strong>s. The LTTE c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to wage an armed struggle to reach<br />
<strong>the</strong> goal of ‘nati<strong>on</strong>al <strong>in</strong>dependence’ which may mean secessi<strong>on</strong> or even c<strong>on</strong>federal<br />
regi<strong>on</strong>al aut<strong>on</strong>omy. Quite a few o<strong>the</strong>r Tamil parties are str<strong>on</strong>gly opposed to <strong>the</strong> goal of<br />
secessi<strong>on</strong> as well as <strong>the</strong> strategy of armed struggle. They have opted for shar<strong>in</strong>g power at<br />
<strong>the</strong> level of central government, with even limited aut<strong>on</strong>omy to <strong>the</strong> periphery. In<br />
achiev<strong>in</strong>g this goal, <strong>the</strong>y have even entered <strong>in</strong>to alliances with hardcore S<strong>in</strong>halese<br />
nati<strong>on</strong>alist parties <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> argument that militarily defeat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> LTTE is a necessary prec<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong><br />
for <strong>the</strong> Tamils to achieve <strong>the</strong>ir rights without challeng<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> state.<br />
Two smaller m<strong>in</strong>orities, Muslims and Up-Country Tamils, have adopted a pragmatic<br />
strategy of alliance build<strong>in</strong>g with <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong> S<strong>in</strong>halese political parties. This strategy has<br />
enabled <strong>the</strong>m to jo<strong>in</strong> coaliti<strong>on</strong> governments, with <strong>the</strong> assurance of receiv<strong>in</strong>g cab<strong>in</strong>et<br />
positi<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> central government and representati<strong>on</strong> as well as shar<strong>in</strong>g of office <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
prov<strong>in</strong>cial councils and local government bodies. The strategy of coaliti<strong>on</strong> politics seems<br />
to have served <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>in</strong>terests quite well.<br />
In what directi<strong>on</strong> would <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>ority rights debate move if <strong>the</strong> government’s military<br />
campaign to defeat <strong>the</strong> LTTE succeeds? While it is hard to predict <strong>the</strong> outcome of <strong>the</strong><br />
war, it is also difficult to see how a str<strong>on</strong>g m<strong>in</strong>ority rights argument can politically<br />
survive <strong>in</strong> a c<strong>on</strong>text of a military victory of majority S<strong>in</strong>halese nati<strong>on</strong>alism over m<strong>in</strong>ority<br />
Tamil nati<strong>on</strong>alism. The argument for m<strong>in</strong>ority rights will come from two sources, <strong>the</strong><br />
weak civil society committed to human rights and m<strong>in</strong>ority rights and a few <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al<br />
actors, notably India and <strong>the</strong> US. The Indian and <strong>the</strong> US governments have been<br />
repeatedly rem<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Rajapakse adm<strong>in</strong>istrati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> Sri Lanka to f<strong>in</strong>d a political<br />
soluti<strong>on</strong>, paralleled with <strong>the</strong> military soluti<strong>on</strong>, <strong>in</strong> which m<strong>in</strong>ority rights are protected and<br />
some measure of regi<strong>on</strong>al self-rule is guaranteed. It needs to be noted that under <strong>the</strong><br />
present government, <strong>the</strong> space for external actors to <strong>in</strong>fluence government policy is quite<br />
limited. After nearly three decades of civil war, Sri Lanka’s prospects for<br />
<strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>alizati<strong>on</strong> if m<strong>in</strong>ority rights <strong>in</strong> a framework of equality and power-shar<strong>in</strong>g seem<br />
weak.<br />
i This noti<strong>on</strong> of ‘privileged m<strong>in</strong>orities’ vs. <strong>the</strong> ‘underprivileged majority’ c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to surface <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
S<strong>in</strong>halese nati<strong>on</strong>alist discourse of victimology. Thus, <strong>the</strong> claims to equality made by ethnic and religious<br />
m<strong>in</strong>orities are <strong>in</strong>terpreted as an attempt to secure or re-ga<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> privileged status that <strong>the</strong>y were supposed to<br />
have enjoyed under <strong>the</strong> col<strong>on</strong>ial rule. One of <strong>the</strong> early articulati<strong>on</strong>s of this positi<strong>on</strong> was by J. L. Kotelawala,<br />
a leader of <strong>the</strong> first <strong>in</strong>dependent government, who became <strong>the</strong> Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister <strong>in</strong> 1952. In a Senate debate<br />
<strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> proposed nati<strong>on</strong>al flag for <strong>in</strong>dependent Sri Lanka, Kotelawala said: “The imperial policy was to<br />
subjugate <strong>the</strong> majority community and extract <strong>the</strong> wealth of <strong>the</strong> country…. The m<strong>in</strong>ority communities were<br />
able to enjoy <strong>the</strong> crumbs that fell from <strong>the</strong> table and what <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>ority communities left went to <strong>the</strong><br />
majority community. That is what happened <strong>in</strong> India, Burma, Malaya, and Ceyl<strong>on</strong>. The m<strong>in</strong>ority<br />
communities were, under <strong>the</strong> British rule, <strong>in</strong> a privileged positi<strong>on</strong> as aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> majority community….<br />
Now <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>orities are worried about <strong>the</strong>ir privileged positi<strong>on</strong>.’ (Senate Debates, January 13, 1948,<br />
Column 431). In 2008, sixty years after Kotelawala made this speech, S<strong>in</strong>halese nati<strong>on</strong>alist parties <strong>in</strong> Sri<br />
Lanka c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to propagate this <strong>the</strong>sis of ‘privileged m<strong>in</strong>orities’ vs. <strong>the</strong> ‘dispossessed majority.’<br />
118
ii<br />
Clause 12 (2) of <strong>the</strong> C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, 1978. The<br />
C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> fur<strong>the</strong>r elaborates discrim<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> as follows: “No pers<strong>on</strong> shall, <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> grounds of race, religi<strong>on</strong>,<br />
language, caste, sex or any such grounds, be subject to any disability, liability, restricti<strong>on</strong> or c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong> with<br />
regard to access to shops, public restaurants, hotels, places of public enterta<strong>in</strong>ment and places of public<br />
worship of his own religi<strong>on</strong>.”- Clause 12 (30) of <strong>the</strong> 1978 C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>. It is important to menti<strong>on</strong> here that<br />
this particular provisi<strong>on</strong> is meant to protect <strong>the</strong> rights of social m<strong>in</strong>orities (<strong>the</strong> marg<strong>in</strong>al caste communities)<br />
from <strong>the</strong> discrim<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> practiced by hegem<strong>on</strong>ic castes with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Tamil ethnic community. It does not<br />
refer to <strong>the</strong> protecti<strong>on</strong> of Tamil rights as an ethnic m<strong>in</strong>ority. In o<strong>the</strong>r words, it seeks to prevent <strong>in</strong>ternal<br />
discrim<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> with<strong>in</strong> Tamil society.<br />
iii<br />
Clauses 18 and 19 respectively.<br />
iv<br />
The <strong>in</strong>acti<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> Sri Lankan state to properly implement even <strong>the</strong> exist<strong>in</strong>g legislati<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> m<strong>in</strong>ority<br />
language rights is quite disturb<strong>in</strong>g. The Official Languages Commissi<strong>on</strong> as well as human rights<br />
organizati<strong>on</strong>s have repeatedly po<strong>in</strong>ted out to successive governments that streng<strong>the</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al<br />
capacity, supported by a clear public commitment of <strong>the</strong> government, is crucial to <strong>the</strong> proper<br />
implementati<strong>on</strong> of c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>ally guaranteed language rights of <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>orities. All successive<br />
governments have not d<strong>on</strong>e much bey<strong>on</strong>d provid<strong>in</strong>g lip service to <strong>the</strong> language rights issue.<br />
v<br />
No government s<strong>in</strong>ce has thought it necessary to hold fresh prov<strong>in</strong>cial council electi<strong>on</strong>s for this Prov<strong>in</strong>ce,<br />
although electi<strong>on</strong>s have been held for o<strong>the</strong>r prov<strong>in</strong>cial councils many times.<br />
vi<br />
This po<strong>in</strong>t is elaborated <strong>in</strong> Uyangoda, Jayadeva, 2007, “Power-Shar<strong>in</strong>g and Aut<strong>on</strong>omy Rights of<br />
‘M<strong>in</strong>ority’ Communities <strong>in</strong> Sri Lanka,” <strong>in</strong> Amal Jayawardane (ed.), Perspectives <strong>on</strong> Nati<strong>on</strong>al Integrati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong><br />
Sri Lanka, Colombo: Nati<strong>on</strong>al Integrati<strong>on</strong> Programme Unit.<br />
vii<br />
This tensi<strong>on</strong> between <strong>the</strong> liberal and nati<strong>on</strong>alist approaches to human rights developed <strong>in</strong>to a m<strong>in</strong>or<br />
c<strong>on</strong>troversy <strong>in</strong> 2003 dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> peace negotiati<strong>on</strong>s between <strong>the</strong> Sri Lankan government and <strong>the</strong> LTTE. The<br />
Sri Lankan government, backed by <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al community and local human rights groups, brought <strong>the</strong><br />
issue of human rights to <strong>the</strong> negotiati<strong>on</strong> agenda, with <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>tenti<strong>on</strong> of persuad<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> LTTE to commit itself<br />
to a regime of civil and political rights <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> areas under its adm<strong>in</strong>istrati<strong>on</strong>. Ian Mart<strong>in</strong>, <strong>the</strong> former head of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Amnesty Internati<strong>on</strong>al was <strong>in</strong>vited to prepare a ‘road map’ to human rights. Although <strong>the</strong> LTTE<br />
accepted this move, <strong>the</strong>y were not enthusiastic about what <strong>the</strong>y called <strong>the</strong> ‘<strong>in</strong>dividual rights’ approach. As<br />
<strong>the</strong> LTTE leaders po<strong>in</strong>ted out <strong>in</strong> pers<strong>on</strong>al c<strong>on</strong>versati<strong>on</strong>s as well as <strong>the</strong>ir propaganda literature, <strong>the</strong> ‘selfdeterm<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong><br />
rights’ of <strong>the</strong> Tamil people should take precedence over <strong>in</strong>dividual rights.<br />
viii<br />
It is necessary to make a dist<strong>in</strong>cti<strong>on</strong> between ‘collective’ rights and ‘group’ rights <strong>in</strong> this discussi<strong>on</strong>.<br />
Collective rights are cultural, language and religious etc. rights that <strong>in</strong>dividual members of any ethnic<br />
community should enjoy by way c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al or legal guarantees. They are <strong>in</strong>dividually enjoyed rights of<br />
a community. The c<strong>on</strong>cept of group rights refers to specific political rights of community enjoyed <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
recogniti<strong>on</strong> that that community is <strong>the</strong> agency and <strong>the</strong> holder of those rights. Collective rights are usually<br />
‘granted’ by <strong>the</strong> state whereas group rights are ‘earned’ through political struggle.<br />
ix<br />
Secti<strong>on</strong> 29 (2) of <strong>the</strong> Soulbury C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> stipulated that no law passed by parliament shall (i) prohibit<br />
or restrict <strong>the</strong> free exercise of any religi<strong>on</strong>, (ii) subject pers<strong>on</strong>s of any community or religi<strong>on</strong> liable to<br />
special disabilities or restricti<strong>on</strong>s, (iii) c<strong>on</strong>fer <strong>on</strong> pers<strong>on</strong>s of any community or religi<strong>on</strong> special privileges or<br />
advantages.<br />
x<br />
For <strong>the</strong> ‘deficiency <strong>the</strong>sis’, see James W. Nickel, 1997, “Group Agency and Group Rights,” <strong>in</strong> Ian<br />
Shapiro and Will Kymlicka, (Eds.), Ethnicity and Group Rights, NOMOS XXXIX, New York and L<strong>on</strong>d<strong>on</strong>:<br />
New York University Press, pp.235-256.<br />
xi<br />
Rajan Hoole records and comments <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong>se aspects <strong>in</strong> his, 2001, Sri Lanka, The Arrogance of Power:<br />
Myths, Decadence and Murder, Colombo: University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna), particularly,<br />
Chapter 20, pp. 308-348.<br />
xii<br />
For background details of <strong>the</strong> emergence of <strong>the</strong> SLMC see, Shari Knoerzer, 1998, “Transformati<strong>on</strong> of<br />
Muslim Political Identity [<strong>in</strong> Sri Lanka], <strong>in</strong> Mithran Tiruchelvam and Dattathreya, C. S. (Eds.), Culture and<br />
Politics of Identity <strong>in</strong> Sri Lanka, Colombo: Internati<strong>on</strong>al Centre for Ethnic Studies.<br />
xiii<br />
Clauses 1.4 and 2.2 respectively of <strong>the</strong> India-Sri Lanka Accord of July 1987.<br />
xiv<br />
For an extensive account of this debate, see Loganathan, K. 1996, Sri Lanka, Lost Opportunities: Past<br />
Attempts at Resolv<strong>in</strong>g Ethnic C<strong>on</strong>flict, Colombo: University of Colombo, pp. 168-183.<br />
xv<br />
R. Sahadevan, 1995, India and Overseas Indians: The Case of Sri Lanka, Delhi: Kal<strong>in</strong>ga Publishers, p.<br />
144.<br />
xvi<br />
Cited <strong>in</strong> Sahadevan, 1995, p. 189.<br />
119
xvii Cited <strong>in</strong> Loganathan, 1996, p. 105.<br />
xviii This account is based <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> author’s dialogues and discussi<strong>on</strong>s with political and social activists <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Up Country plantati<strong>on</strong> Tamil society.<br />
xix P. P. Devaraj, 2004, ‘Introducti<strong>on</strong>,” Rights and Power Shar<strong>in</strong>g Mechanism for N<strong>on</strong>-Territorial M<strong>in</strong>ority<br />
Communities <strong>in</strong> Sri Lanka, Colombo: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. This book c<strong>on</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>s <strong>the</strong> papers presented at a<br />
sem<strong>in</strong>ar held <strong>in</strong> Colombo <strong>in</strong> May 2003 <strong>in</strong> an atmosphere of some optimism generated by <strong>the</strong> government-<br />
LTTE commitment to explore a federal soluti<strong>on</strong> to <strong>the</strong> ethnic c<strong>on</strong>flict. This is also <strong>the</strong> first time that <strong>the</strong><br />
th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>on</strong> power shar<strong>in</strong>g mechanisms for smaller m<strong>in</strong>orities was publicly articulated.<br />
xx Rajas<strong>in</strong>gham - Senanayake, Dar<strong>in</strong>i, 1999, “The Dangers of Devoluti<strong>on</strong>: The Hidden Ec<strong>on</strong>omies of<br />
Armed C<strong>on</strong>flict,” <strong>in</strong> Robert Rotberg (ed.), Creat<strong>in</strong>g Peace <strong>in</strong> Sri Lanka, Civil War and Rec<strong>on</strong>ciliati<strong>on</strong>,<br />
Wash<strong>in</strong>gt<strong>on</strong> DC: Brook<strong>in</strong>gs Instituti<strong>on</strong> Press.<br />
xxi Uyangoda, Jayadeva, 2004, “<strong>M<strong>in</strong>orities</strong>, Federalism and N<strong>on</strong>-Territorial Power Shar<strong>in</strong>g,” <strong>in</strong> P. P.<br />
Devaraj (Ed.), 2004, Rights and Power Shar<strong>in</strong>g Mechanism for N<strong>on</strong>-Territorial M<strong>in</strong>ority Communities <strong>in</strong><br />
Sri Lanka, Colombo: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, pp. 18-29; Uyangoda, Jayadeva, 2007, “Power-Shar<strong>in</strong>g and<br />
Aut<strong>on</strong>omy Rights of ‘M<strong>in</strong>ority’ Communities <strong>in</strong> Sri Lanka,” <strong>in</strong> Amal Jayawardane (ed.), Perspectives <strong>on</strong><br />
Nati<strong>on</strong>al Integrati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> Sri Lanka, Colombo: Nati<strong>on</strong>al Integrati<strong>on</strong> Programme Unit.<br />
xxii For extensive discussi<strong>on</strong>s <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> progress as well as breakdown of <strong>the</strong> 2002 peace process, Uyangoda,<br />
Jayadeva, 2007, Ethnic C<strong>on</strong>flict <strong>in</strong> Sri Lanka: Chang<strong>in</strong>g Dynamics, Wash<strong>in</strong>gt<strong>on</strong> DC: East-West Center;<br />
Uyangoda, Jayadeva and Perera, Mor<strong>in</strong>a, 2004, Sri Lanka’s Peace Process 2002: Critical Perspectives,<br />
Colombo: Social Scientists’ Associati<strong>on</strong>; Liyanage, Sumanasiri, 2008, ‘One Step at a Time,’ Reflecti<strong>on</strong>s <strong>on</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> Peace Process <strong>in</strong> Sri Lanka, Colombo: <strong>South</strong> <strong>Asia</strong> Peace Institute; Goodhand, J<strong>on</strong>athan and Bart Klem,<br />
2005, Aid, C<strong>on</strong>flict and Peacebuild<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Sri Lanka 2000-2005, Colombo: The <strong>Asia</strong> Foundati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
xxiii The ISGA was to establish “separate <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>s for <strong>the</strong> adm<strong>in</strong>istrati<strong>on</strong> of justice” and “powers to<br />
borrow <strong>in</strong>ternally and externally”. Also, <strong>the</strong> ISGA “shall have c<strong>on</strong>trol over <strong>the</strong> mar<strong>in</strong>e and offshore<br />
resources of <strong>the</strong> adjacent seas and <strong>the</strong> power to regulate <strong>the</strong> access” to <strong>the</strong> sea. See also Balas<strong>in</strong>gham,<br />
Ant<strong>on</strong>, 2004, War and Peace <strong>in</strong> Sri Lanka: Armed Struggle and Peace Efforts of Liberati<strong>on</strong> Tigers,<br />
Mitcham, England: Fairmax Publish<strong>in</strong>g Ltd., pp. 503-514.<br />
xxiv A press statement <strong>on</strong> ISGA (Nov 4, 2003), said, “The SLFP views with grave c<strong>on</strong>cern <strong>the</strong> proposals<br />
released by <strong>the</strong> LTTE for <strong>the</strong> establishment of an ISGA which lays <strong>the</strong> legal foundati<strong>on</strong> for a future,<br />
separate, sovereign state. The proposals clearly affect <strong>the</strong> sovereignty of <strong>the</strong> Republic of Sri Lanka and<br />
violates its C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>”.<br />
xxv See Uyangoda, Jayadeva, 2008, The Way We Are: Politics of Sri Lanka 2007-2008, Colombo: Social<br />
Scientists’ Associati<strong>on</strong>, pp. 55-57.<br />
xxvi There is a wide body of literature <strong>on</strong> India’s engagement with Sri Lanka’s ethnic c<strong>on</strong>flict. Some notable<br />
examples are Ganguly, Rajat, 1998, K<strong>in</strong> State Interventi<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> Ethnic C<strong>on</strong>flicts: Less<strong>on</strong>s from <strong>South</strong> <strong>Asia</strong>,<br />
New Delhi: SAGE Publicati<strong>on</strong>s; Jayatilleka, Dayan, 1995, Sri Lanka: The Travails of a Democracy,<br />
Unf<strong>in</strong>ished War, Protracted Crisis, New Delhi: Vikas; Kodikara, Shelt<strong>on</strong> U, 1989, Indo-Sri Lanka Accord<br />
of July 1987, Colombo: University of Colombo; Krishna, Sankaran, 1999, Postcol<strong>on</strong>ial Insecurities: India,<br />
Sri Lanka and <strong>the</strong> Questi<strong>on</strong> of Nati<strong>on</strong>hood, M<strong>in</strong>neapolis: University of M<strong>in</strong>nesota Press; Loganathan,<br />
Keteshwaran 1996, Sri Lanka, Lost Opportunities: Past Attempts at Resolv<strong>in</strong>g Ethnic C<strong>on</strong>flict, Colombo:<br />
University of Colombo; Muni, S. D. 1993, Prangs of Proximity: India and Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Crisis, New<br />
Delhi: SAGE.<br />
120
Inclusi<strong>on</strong> and Accountability <strong>in</strong> a ‘New’ Democratic Nepal<br />
Mahendra Lawoti<br />
The restructur<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> state <strong>in</strong> Nepal has begun after <strong>the</strong> success of <strong>the</strong> sec<strong>on</strong>d people’s<br />
movement <strong>in</strong> April 2006 that forced <strong>the</strong> K<strong>in</strong>g to give up power. S<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong>n major<br />
reforms <strong>in</strong>itiated <strong>in</strong>clude <strong>the</strong> declarati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> state as secular, a commitment to<br />
federalism <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Interim C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>, distributi<strong>on</strong> of citizenship to more than 2.6<br />
milli<strong>on</strong>, i <strong>the</strong> electi<strong>on</strong> to <strong>the</strong> C<strong>on</strong>stituent Assembly with a mixed electoral method and <strong>the</strong><br />
aboliti<strong>on</strong> of m<strong>on</strong>archy. Are <strong>the</strong> reforms go<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> right directi<strong>on</strong>? Are <strong>the</strong>y adequate?<br />
What o<strong>the</strong>r political and structural reforms are necessary for democratic state build<strong>in</strong>g?<br />
How should some of <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>tentious questi<strong>on</strong>s, such as <strong>the</strong> type of federalism to be<br />
adopted, be settled?<br />
One guidel<strong>in</strong>e for assess<strong>in</strong>g and argu<strong>in</strong>g for fur<strong>the</strong>r reforms should be <strong>the</strong> potential for <strong>the</strong><br />
reforms to tackle <strong>the</strong> problems Nepal witnessed <strong>in</strong> its previous democratic practice <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
1990s, namely grow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>equality, <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g or c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>uous exclusi<strong>on</strong> of marg<strong>in</strong>alized<br />
groups like <strong>the</strong> Dalit, <strong>in</strong>digenous nati<strong>on</strong>alities, Madhesi, and women, and <strong>the</strong> culture of<br />
power abuse am<strong>on</strong>g political leaders <strong>in</strong> absence of effective accountability mechanisms. ii<br />
These problems went <strong>on</strong> to create governance crises, fuel <strong>the</strong> Maoist <strong>in</strong>surgency, and<br />
exacerbate ethnic movements and c<strong>on</strong>flicts <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> country.<br />
To address <strong>the</strong>se problems, <strong>the</strong> first step is to identify <strong>the</strong> causes. This chapter beg<strong>in</strong>s by<br />
identify<strong>in</strong>g centralizati<strong>on</strong> as <strong>the</strong> root cause. I show how centralizati<strong>on</strong> c<strong>on</strong>tributed to<br />
<strong>in</strong>equality, exclusi<strong>on</strong> and <strong>the</strong> culture of impunity. In <strong>the</strong> sec<strong>on</strong>d part, I propose political<br />
<strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>s that would promote ethnic and class <strong>in</strong>clusi<strong>on</strong> and facilitate political<br />
accountability. I argue that <strong>the</strong> centralized state has to be restructured to share power<br />
am<strong>on</strong>g different ideological, class and nati<strong>on</strong>al/ethnic and caste groups and am<strong>on</strong>g<br />
different sectors of government, that is, both vertically and horiz<strong>on</strong>tally, to address<br />
exclusi<strong>on</strong> and <strong>the</strong> lack of accountability. I argue that power redistributi<strong>on</strong> could facilitate<br />
<strong>in</strong>clusi<strong>on</strong> of both class and ethnic groups, promote accountability, and c<strong>on</strong>tribute towards<br />
<strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>solidati<strong>on</strong> of democracy.<br />
Power shar<strong>in</strong>g, however, need not weaken <strong>the</strong> central state. In fact, <strong>the</strong> central state will<br />
c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to play a very important role <strong>in</strong> some sectors. It is argued that if <strong>the</strong> center<br />
c<strong>on</strong>f<strong>in</strong>es its functi<strong>on</strong>s to limited necessary arenas, it will be more effective. The state’s<br />
overall effectiveness will, <strong>in</strong> fact, <strong>in</strong>crease when different sectors and levels of<br />
governments are effective <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir respective sphere of jurisdicti<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
Centralizati<strong>on</strong>, Inequality, Exclusi<strong>on</strong> &Violent C<strong>on</strong>flict<br />
Excessive Centralizati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> Nepal<br />
The Nepali polity has been highly centralized - most of <strong>the</strong> state power resides at <strong>the</strong><br />
center. I have discussed <strong>the</strong> various dimensi<strong>on</strong>s of excessive centralizati<strong>on</strong> elsewhere, so<br />
121
I will just briefly summarize it here (Lawoti 2003d, 2007b). The ma<strong>in</strong> mechanism of<br />
centralizati<strong>on</strong> was <strong>the</strong> unitary structure of <strong>the</strong> state because of which even <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>imal<br />
power awarded to local governments through adm<strong>in</strong>istrative decentralizati<strong>on</strong> was at <strong>the</strong><br />
mercy of <strong>the</strong> center. The first past <strong>the</strong> post (FPTP) electoral method facilitated <strong>the</strong> central<br />
power to be c<strong>on</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ed to a party without it necessarily hav<strong>in</strong>g a popular majority by<br />
facilitat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> creati<strong>on</strong> of an artificial majority. Moreover, at <strong>the</strong> center most of <strong>the</strong> state<br />
power was c<strong>on</strong>centrated <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> cab<strong>in</strong>et. The parliament mostly followed <strong>the</strong> executive <strong>in</strong><br />
legislati<strong>on</strong> and o<strong>the</strong>r official bus<strong>in</strong>ess while most central agencies depended up<strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
executive for budget and pers<strong>on</strong>nel, <strong>in</strong> additi<strong>on</strong> to be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>fluenced through <strong>the</strong><br />
nom<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> process.<br />
The centralizati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> polity was facilitated and re<strong>in</strong>forced by <strong>the</strong> centraliz<strong>in</strong>g political<br />
culture. The society <strong>in</strong>gra<strong>in</strong>ed by <strong>the</strong> caste system and patriarchy ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong>egalitarian<br />
values that favored certa<strong>in</strong> caste and gender groups. The political parties and<br />
state agencies were overwhelm<strong>in</strong>gly dom<strong>in</strong>ated by <strong>the</strong> caste hill H<strong>in</strong>du elite males<br />
(CHHEM). Fur<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>the</strong> political parties were run n<strong>on</strong>-democratically, that allowed <strong>the</strong><br />
top political leaders to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> a firm grip <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> parties for l<strong>on</strong>g periods of time.<br />
Centralizati<strong>on</strong> and Inequality<br />
Inequality <strong>in</strong> Nepal <strong>in</strong>creased dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> 1990s as compared to <strong>the</strong> previous decades. The<br />
G<strong>in</strong>i Index was 0.300 <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> eighties <strong>in</strong> Nepal and it <strong>in</strong>creased to 0.426 <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> n<strong>in</strong>eties, to<br />
become <strong>the</strong> highest <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Asia</strong>. Ir<strong>on</strong>ically, <strong>in</strong>equality <strong>in</strong>creased despite <strong>the</strong><br />
improvement <strong>in</strong> overall Human Development Indicators. The “<strong>in</strong>come share of <strong>the</strong> top<br />
10 percent of <strong>the</strong> people <strong>in</strong>creased from 21 percent <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> mid 1980s to 35 percent by <strong>the</strong><br />
mid-1990s, while <strong>the</strong> share of <strong>the</strong> bottom 40 percent shrank from 24 percent to 15 percent<br />
by <strong>the</strong> mid 1990s” (Sharma 2006: 1245). Poverty was significantly higher <strong>in</strong> rural areas<br />
(44 percent) than <strong>in</strong> urban areas (20 percent). The open<strong>in</strong>g up of <strong>the</strong> market s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong><br />
1980s may have fur<strong>the</strong>r <strong>in</strong>creased <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>equality. In <strong>the</strong> period 1988-1996, <strong>the</strong> nom<strong>in</strong>al<br />
<strong>in</strong>come of people liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> urban areas <strong>in</strong>creased by 16 percent per annum (from US $126<br />
to US $285) as aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>on</strong>ly 4 percent for <strong>the</strong> rural populati<strong>on</strong> (from US $95 to US $125).<br />
(Lawoti 2007a; Sharma 2006).<br />
The few development objectives <strong>the</strong> government achieved such as <strong>the</strong> extensi<strong>on</strong> of roads<br />
and <strong>the</strong> expansi<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> service sector like private bank<strong>in</strong>g and airl<strong>in</strong>e services largely<br />
benefited a small secti<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> society. Centralizati<strong>on</strong> re<strong>in</strong>forced <strong>in</strong>equality by deny<strong>in</strong>g<br />
regi<strong>on</strong>s and rural areas with authority and resources to develop <strong>the</strong>ir areas and look after<br />
<strong>the</strong> welfare of <strong>the</strong>ir people while <strong>the</strong> central government focused <strong>on</strong> policies that<br />
benefitted <strong>the</strong> urban areas and capital. The governments were unable to foster ec<strong>on</strong>omic<br />
growth and meet <strong>the</strong> ris<strong>in</strong>g aspirati<strong>on</strong>s of a large number of people. They also failed to<br />
<strong>in</strong>troduce social and political reforms to end <strong>in</strong>equalities and discrim<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
Exclusi<strong>on</strong> of Marg<strong>in</strong>alized Groups iii<br />
The adopti<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> majoritarian <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>s of democracy <strong>in</strong> 1990 allowed <strong>the</strong><br />
c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>uati<strong>on</strong> of centralizati<strong>on</strong>. The policies formulated and implemented by a state<br />
dom<strong>in</strong>ated by <strong>the</strong> CHHEM led to <strong>the</strong> political exclusi<strong>on</strong> of marg<strong>in</strong>alized groups. The<br />
CHHE (caste hill H<strong>in</strong>du elite) comprised <strong>the</strong> largest ethnic group c<strong>on</strong>sist<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong><br />
122
largest two caste groups spread across <strong>the</strong> country, <strong>the</strong> Chhetri and Bahun, and two<br />
smaller castes, Thakuri and Sanyasi. The unitary and centralized state structure<br />
c<strong>on</strong>tributed to <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g dom<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> CHHE by facilitat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> group’s<br />
dom<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> Center. As a result, <strong>the</strong> various nati<strong>on</strong>al/ethnic and caste groups, many<br />
of whom are regi<strong>on</strong>ally c<strong>on</strong>centrated, became disempowered and disadvantaged<br />
m<strong>in</strong>orities at <strong>the</strong> center.<br />
The c<strong>on</strong>trol of <strong>the</strong> center <strong>in</strong> a unitary system allowed <strong>the</strong> CHHE to impose public<br />
policies, which were <strong>in</strong>fluenced by <strong>the</strong>ir values, over all o<strong>the</strong>r groups. The CHHEM<br />
<strong>in</strong>fluenced cultural, educati<strong>on</strong>al, and development policies c<strong>on</strong>tribut<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> political<br />
exclusi<strong>on</strong> of marg<strong>in</strong>alized groups (Lawoti 2005; Bhattachan 2000a; Gurung et al. 2000).<br />
For <strong>in</strong>stance, due to <strong>the</strong> central policy of <strong>in</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> Khas-Nepali language <strong>in</strong> schools,<br />
<strong>the</strong>re was a high dropout rate am<strong>on</strong>g n<strong>on</strong>-native Nepali speakers. (Yadav 1992; Stash<br />
and Hannum 2001; Maddox 2003). The lower literacy rate am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong> marg<strong>in</strong>alized<br />
groups disadvantaged <strong>the</strong>m <strong>in</strong> every day life. It lowered <strong>the</strong>ir abilities for articulat<strong>in</strong>g and<br />
demand<strong>in</strong>g rights, compet<strong>in</strong>g for resources, jobs, and political offices, as well as be<strong>in</strong>g<br />
effective supporters of ethnic movements and parties.<br />
The FPTP electoral method also c<strong>on</strong>tributed to <strong>the</strong> exclusi<strong>on</strong> of marg<strong>in</strong>alized sociocultural<br />
groups. The FPTP system <strong>in</strong> Nepal has been biased towards <strong>the</strong> big political<br />
parties, iv which were overwhelm<strong>in</strong>gly dom<strong>in</strong>ated by <strong>the</strong> CHHEM. For example, <strong>in</strong> 1999,<br />
<strong>the</strong> CHHEM dom<strong>in</strong>ated <strong>the</strong> two largest political parties account<strong>in</strong>g for a presence of over 70<br />
percent <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Nepali C<strong>on</strong>gress and 87 percent <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>stream Communist Party Nepal-UML.<br />
This has led to under or n<strong>on</strong> representati<strong>on</strong> of smaller identity oriented parties <strong>in</strong> elected<br />
offices. A comparis<strong>on</strong> of seats based <strong>on</strong> votes under <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>n FPTP system and <strong>the</strong><br />
proporti<strong>on</strong>al representati<strong>on</strong> method <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> three successive electi<strong>on</strong>s to <strong>the</strong> House of<br />
Representative (HOR) after 1990, shows that <strong>the</strong> marg<strong>in</strong>alized groups got less<br />
representati<strong>on</strong> under <strong>the</strong> FPTP system. For <strong>in</strong>stance, <strong>in</strong> 1999 <strong>the</strong> Nati<strong>on</strong>al People’s<br />
Liberati<strong>on</strong> Party (NPLP) of <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>digenous nati<strong>on</strong>alities with 1.11 percent of <strong>the</strong> vote and<br />
<strong>the</strong> Nepal Goodwill Party (NGP) of Madhesi of Tarai regi<strong>on</strong> with 3.34 percent of popular<br />
votes would have got 3 and 7 seats respectively under a PR method, <strong>in</strong>stead of 0 and 5<br />
seats under FPTP (see table 1). In <strong>the</strong> 1994 hung Parliament, <strong>the</strong> NPLP with 1.18 percent<br />
of popular votes would have elected 3 members.<br />
The 2008 CA electi<strong>on</strong> has fur<strong>the</strong>r dem<strong>on</strong>strated that PR electoral method can c<strong>on</strong>tribute<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g representati<strong>on</strong> of Dalit, <strong>in</strong>digenous nati<strong>on</strong>alities, Madhesi and women. The<br />
C<strong>on</strong>stituent Assembly elected a significant c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>gent of Dalit members (50) for <strong>the</strong> first<br />
time <strong>in</strong> Nepal’s history. There were no Dalit representati<strong>on</strong> dur<strong>in</strong>g 1994 and 1999,<br />
whereas a s<strong>in</strong>gle Dalit had been elected to <strong>the</strong> Lower House <strong>in</strong> 1991. Likewise, <strong>the</strong><br />
representati<strong>on</strong> of women (33.22 percent) (Aryal 2008) as well as that of <strong>in</strong>digenous<br />
nati<strong>on</strong>alities and Madhesi has <strong>in</strong>creased significantly. Most Dalit, <strong>in</strong>digenous<br />
nati<strong>on</strong>alities and women got <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> CA through <strong>the</strong> proporti<strong>on</strong>al representative seats.<br />
123
Table 1: Parliament Seats under FPTP and Proporti<strong>on</strong>al Electoral Systems, 1991, 1994, and 1999<br />
Political 1991 1994 1999<br />
Parties Total vote Vote % FPTP PR Total vote Vote % FPTP PR Total vote Vote % FPTP PR<br />
NC 2742452 41.51 110 85 2545287 37.51 83 77 3214786 38.03 113 78<br />
CPN-<br />
2352601 34.67 88 71 2734568 32.35 68 67<br />
UML 2040102 30.88 69 63<br />
CPN-ML 567987 6.82 14<br />
NDP-C 478604 7.24 3 15 295812 3.55 8<br />
NDP-T 392499 5.94 1 12<br />
NDP - 1367148 20.15 20 41 902328 10.83 12 22<br />
NGP 298610 4.52 6 9 265847 3.92 3 8 278435 3.34 5 7<br />
NWPP 91335 1.38 2 3 75072 1.11 4 2 48685 .58 1 1<br />
UPFN 351904 5.33 9 11 100285 1.48 3 74669 .90 1 2<br />
CPN-D 177323 2.68 2 6<br />
NPF 121426 1.46 5 3<br />
NPLP<br />
Total<br />
34509 .52 1 79996 1.18 3 92567 1.11 3<br />
Source: Lawoti (2008)<br />
Note: NC=Nepali C<strong>on</strong>gress; CPN-UML= Communist Party of Nepal- United Marxist-Len<strong>in</strong>ist; CPN-ML: Communist Party of Nepal- Marxist-Len<strong>in</strong>ist; NDP-T<br />
= Nati<strong>on</strong>al Democratic Party –Thapa; NDP-C: Nati<strong>on</strong>al Democratic Party – Chand; NDP = Nati<strong>on</strong>al Democratic Party; NGP = Nepal Goodwill Party; NWPP =<br />
Nepal Workers Peasant Party; UPFN = United People’s Fr<strong>on</strong>t Nepal; CPN-D= Communist Party of Nepal – Democratic; NPF= Nati<strong>on</strong>al People’s Fr<strong>on</strong>t; NPLP =<br />
Nati<strong>on</strong>al People’s Liberati<strong>on</strong> Party<br />
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Culture of Impunity<br />
Nepal witnessed widespread abuse of power and corrupti<strong>on</strong> after 1990s. In most <strong>in</strong>stances, <strong>the</strong><br />
power abuse went unchecked. It fuelled a vicious cycle of power abuse. Centralizati<strong>on</strong><br />
c<strong>on</strong>tributed to <strong>the</strong> process because it underm<strong>in</strong>ed horiz<strong>on</strong>tal accountability mechanisms.<br />
Excessive power c<strong>on</strong>centrati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> executive <strong>in</strong> Nepal rendered most o<strong>the</strong>r central agencies<br />
like <strong>the</strong> Commissi<strong>on</strong> for Investigati<strong>on</strong> of Abuse of Authority (CIAA) and <strong>the</strong> Electi<strong>on</strong><br />
Commissi<strong>on</strong> weak. The central c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al commissi<strong>on</strong>s were also not <strong>in</strong>dependent because<br />
<strong>the</strong> executive <strong>in</strong>fluenced <strong>the</strong>m through <strong>the</strong> nom<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>, budgetary and pers<strong>on</strong>nel staff<strong>in</strong>g<br />
process. These n<strong>on</strong> executive central agencies could not check <strong>the</strong> abuse of power of <strong>the</strong><br />
executive. (Lawoti 2007b) Electi<strong>on</strong>s were not sufficient to hold leaders accountable <strong>in</strong><br />
between <strong>the</strong> electi<strong>on</strong>s. Increase <strong>in</strong> corrupti<strong>on</strong>, politicizati<strong>on</strong> of adm<strong>in</strong>istrati<strong>on</strong>, and <strong>the</strong> failure<br />
to deliver eroded <strong>the</strong> legitimacy of <strong>the</strong> democratic regime. Thus centralizati<strong>on</strong> c<strong>on</strong>tributed to<br />
<strong>the</strong> crisis of governance <strong>in</strong> Nepal.<br />
Growth of Maoist Insurgency<br />
Some of <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s for violent c<strong>on</strong>flict, such as <strong>in</strong>equality and poverty, had existed <strong>in</strong><br />
Nepal prior to 1990. The difference was that c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g centralizati<strong>on</strong> even <strong>in</strong> a democratic<br />
era, ripened <strong>the</strong> situati<strong>on</strong> for revolt. Freedom allowed people to air <strong>the</strong>ir dissatisfacti<strong>on</strong> and to<br />
mobilize for end<strong>in</strong>g real or perceived neglect and discrim<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>. In a c<strong>on</strong>text of grow<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>in</strong>equality, c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g exclusi<strong>on</strong>, governance crises and <strong>the</strong> erosi<strong>on</strong> of legitimacy of <strong>the</strong><br />
democratic regime, <strong>the</strong> Maoists came forward with a trenchant criticism of <strong>the</strong> parliamentary<br />
democratic system and made radical promises to address <strong>the</strong> problems faced by different<br />
segments of <strong>the</strong> society. The alienati<strong>on</strong> am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong> rural people was such that <strong>the</strong>y were<br />
susceptible to <strong>the</strong> promises of radical transformati<strong>on</strong>. The Maoists <strong>in</strong>itiated acti<strong>on</strong>s aga<strong>in</strong>st<br />
exploitati<strong>on</strong>s and <strong>in</strong>equalities, which <strong>in</strong>itially endeared <strong>the</strong>m to large secti<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong><br />
populati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
The centralized polity <strong>in</strong> Nepal worked to push <strong>the</strong> Maoists toward <strong>in</strong>surgency by not<br />
provid<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>m space to operate even thought <strong>the</strong>y had participated <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> first parliamentary<br />
and local electi<strong>on</strong>s. The majoritarian and centralized polity gave no mean<strong>in</strong>gful space to <strong>the</strong><br />
oppositi<strong>on</strong>, as power was mostly c<strong>on</strong>centrated <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> cab<strong>in</strong>et and whoever c<strong>on</strong>trolled it<br />
enjoyed most state power. The parliament and its committees were powerless and <strong>in</strong>effective<br />
so <strong>the</strong> oppositi<strong>on</strong> parties were practically powerless except to raise issues.<br />
The situati<strong>on</strong> was fur<strong>the</strong>r aggravated by <strong>the</strong> blatant abuse of <strong>the</strong> state’s coercive power by <strong>the</strong><br />
rul<strong>in</strong>g party for partisan purpose. Follow<strong>in</strong>g political differences between <strong>the</strong> Maoist’s<br />
political organizati<strong>on</strong>, <strong>the</strong> United People’s Fr<strong>on</strong>t Nepal (UPFN) and <strong>the</strong> local cadres of <strong>the</strong><br />
rul<strong>in</strong>g Nepali C<strong>on</strong>gress, <strong>the</strong> Center resorted to violent repressi<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> Maoists <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir local<br />
str<strong>on</strong>gholds. Before <strong>the</strong> outbreak of <strong>the</strong> ‘Peoples War’ <strong>in</strong> 1996, <strong>the</strong> Nepali C<strong>on</strong>gress<br />
government jailed and tortured activists and leaders of <strong>the</strong> UPFN <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> districts of Rolpa<br />
and Rukum, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g elected officials of <strong>the</strong> UPFN c<strong>on</strong>trolled district development<br />
committees were targeted . The abuse of power by <strong>the</strong> central authority, which c<strong>on</strong>trolled <strong>the</strong><br />
police and adm<strong>in</strong>istrati<strong>on</strong>, was designed to streng<strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> Nepali C<strong>on</strong>gress, but ended up<br />
push<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Maoists <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>surgency (INSEC 1999; Prachanda 1999).<br />
This blatantly partisan use of force could take place because of <strong>the</strong> unitary and centralized<br />
structure of <strong>the</strong> state. If <strong>the</strong>re had been a federal structure, or if <strong>the</strong> police force had been<br />
125
under <strong>the</strong> district governments, <strong>the</strong> extensive <strong>on</strong>e-way abuse of power by <strong>the</strong> center would not<br />
have been possible because <strong>the</strong> Maoists c<strong>on</strong>trolled <strong>the</strong> district government <strong>in</strong> Rolpa, while <strong>the</strong><br />
Nepali C<strong>on</strong>gress c<strong>on</strong>trolled <strong>the</strong> center at <strong>the</strong> time.<br />
The ir<strong>on</strong>y of Nepali centralizati<strong>on</strong> was that <strong>the</strong> state had a very weak reach bey<strong>on</strong>d <strong>the</strong> district<br />
and sub district centers. This allowed <strong>the</strong> Maoists to establish <strong>the</strong>mselves easily <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> rural<br />
areas because no effective state agencies were present to resist <strong>the</strong>m. When <strong>the</strong> people saw<br />
<strong>the</strong> police and o<strong>the</strong>r agencies like <strong>the</strong> banks and agricultural extensi<strong>on</strong> services leav<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
rural areas due to <strong>the</strong> Maoist threat, <strong>the</strong>y fur<strong>the</strong>r lost faith <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> government. Even <strong>the</strong> people<br />
who opposed <strong>the</strong> Maoist ideology did not dare resist publicly because <strong>the</strong> state could not<br />
protect <strong>the</strong>m.<br />
The growth of Maoist power <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> more neglected regi<strong>on</strong>s also supports <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>sis that<br />
alienati<strong>on</strong> is a factor <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Maoist expansi<strong>on</strong>. The mid west, <strong>the</strong> hot bed of <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>surgency, is<br />
<strong>on</strong>e of <strong>the</strong> most neglected and isolated regi<strong>on</strong>s. Likewise, politically excluded groups like <strong>the</strong><br />
women, <strong>in</strong>digenous nati<strong>on</strong>alities, and Dalit have been found to support <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>surgency <strong>in</strong> large<br />
numbers (Lawoti 2003c). Public op<strong>in</strong>i<strong>on</strong> surveys <strong>in</strong> 1999 and 2001 illustrate <strong>the</strong> alienati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
In 1999 a survey showed that ord<strong>in</strong>ary people did not c<strong>on</strong>sider <strong>the</strong> Maoists to be <strong>on</strong>e of <strong>the</strong><br />
top three problems faced by Nepal (Himal Associati<strong>on</strong> 2001; Sharma and Sen 2056 v.s). This<br />
was at a time when political leaders, <strong>in</strong>telligentsia, and journalists were cry<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>mselves<br />
hoarse aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> rebels. Evidently, <strong>the</strong> people were less critical of <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>surgency that <strong>the</strong><br />
elite labeled as a major problem. v<br />
Restructur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> State<br />
Federalism<br />
The Interim C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> (2007) has made a commitment to establish federalism but it has not<br />
specified <strong>the</strong> type of federalism. Some members bel<strong>on</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> dom<strong>in</strong>ant groups have<br />
advanced arguments for adm<strong>in</strong>istrative federalism while ethnic groups are demand<strong>in</strong>g ethnic<br />
federalism to provide <strong>the</strong>m with aut<strong>on</strong>omy. If <strong>the</strong> aim of federalism <strong>in</strong> Nepal is to promote<br />
equality and justice am<strong>on</strong>g ethnic and caste groups, <strong>the</strong>n ethnic federalism is necessary. The<br />
objective of federalism <strong>in</strong> multiethnic societies is to empower groups that are a m<strong>in</strong>ority <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
center by mak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>m a plurality or a majority <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> regi<strong>on</strong>s. This will empower many<br />
groups <strong>in</strong>stead of <strong>on</strong>ly <strong>on</strong>e that c<strong>on</strong>trols <strong>the</strong> center. Adm<strong>in</strong>istrative federalism will fail to do<br />
that. This is illustrated <strong>in</strong> Pitamber Sharma’s (2007) model for adm<strong>in</strong>istrative federalism.<br />
Despite <strong>the</strong> claim of be<strong>in</strong>g n<strong>on</strong>-ethnic, <strong>the</strong> CHHE, <strong>the</strong> author’s ethnic group, will c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to<br />
dom<strong>in</strong>ate at <strong>the</strong> center as well as <strong>in</strong> all <strong>the</strong> six regi<strong>on</strong>s he has proposed (see table 2). If that or<br />
a similar model were to be adopted, <strong>the</strong> hegem<strong>on</strong>y of <strong>the</strong> CHHE will c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue even <strong>in</strong> “new”<br />
Nepal. This adm<strong>in</strong>istrative model divides groups that could have been grouped toge<strong>the</strong>r <strong>in</strong> a<br />
regi<strong>on</strong>. It prevents groups like <strong>the</strong> Limbu, Rai, Tharu, Maithili speakers, Gurung, Newar,<br />
Tamang and o<strong>the</strong>rs from form<strong>in</strong>g a plural group <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> regi<strong>on</strong>s of <strong>the</strong>ir c<strong>on</strong>centrati<strong>on</strong>. To be<br />
sure, Sharma has proposed districts with<strong>in</strong> regi<strong>on</strong>s where different groups will have plurality<br />
of populati<strong>on</strong>. vi However, it does not guarantee aut<strong>on</strong>omy to ethnic groups, as <strong>the</strong><br />
c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al determ<strong>in</strong>ed power separati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> federalism is between center and regi<strong>on</strong>s and<br />
<strong>the</strong> districts will be largely dependent up<strong>on</strong> power devolved by <strong>the</strong> regi<strong>on</strong>s. S<strong>in</strong>ce all <strong>the</strong><br />
regi<strong>on</strong>s will be dom<strong>in</strong>ated by <strong>the</strong> CHHE, <strong>the</strong>y will <strong>in</strong>fluence regi<strong>on</strong>al policies and effectively<br />
<strong>in</strong>fluence <strong>the</strong> power awarded to <strong>the</strong> districts as well.<br />
126
If ethnic aut<strong>on</strong>omy is denied, Nepal will most probably encounter ethnic c<strong>on</strong>flicts. In<br />
additi<strong>on</strong> to <strong>the</strong> armed Madhesi groups, <strong>in</strong>digenous groups like <strong>the</strong> Rai, Limbu, and Tharus<br />
have established militias and ,armies. In fact, <strong>the</strong> Limbus have begun to effectively practice<br />
ethnic federalism as various Limbu groups have begun to collect taxes, adm<strong>in</strong>ister <strong>the</strong> regi<strong>on</strong><br />
with militias, ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> armies, and ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> communicati<strong>on</strong> outlets like <strong>the</strong> FM and<br />
newspapers Some Madhesi and Limbu groups have declared <strong>in</strong>dependence as well (Pun<br />
2008). vii Ethnic aut<strong>on</strong>omy if granted before <strong>the</strong> aut<strong>on</strong>omy movements rigidify <strong>in</strong>to violent<br />
secessi<strong>on</strong>ist movement can arrest likely c<strong>on</strong>flict.<br />
Table 2: CHHE’s Hegem<strong>on</strong>ic dom<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> Sharma’s Federal Model<br />
Regi<strong>on</strong> / Ethnic Largest Sec<strong>on</strong>d Largest Third Largest Fourth Largest<br />
Group<br />
Group Group<br />
Group<br />
Group<br />
Nepal CHHE Magar<br />
Tharu<br />
Tamang<br />
7,033,220 1,622,421 1,533,879 1,282,304<br />
East CHHE Yadav<br />
Tharu<br />
Muslim<br />
648,097 458,995<br />
261,197 212,410<br />
Mid CHHE Tamang<br />
Yadav<br />
Muslim<br />
1,039,459 849,945<br />
458,995 450,087<br />
West CHHE Magar<br />
Gurung Tharu<br />
1,721,923 770,603<br />
359,234 290,600<br />
Far West CHHE Tharu<br />
Kami<br />
Muslim<br />
2,304,156 776,993<br />
366,065 104,961<br />
Karnali CHHE Sherpa<br />
Kami<br />
Gurung<br />
115,414 9,720<br />
7,819<br />
5,168<br />
Capital CHHE Newar<br />
Tamang Magar<br />
621,284 582,370<br />
147,165 50,556<br />
Note: Ethnic populati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> regi<strong>on</strong>s calculated from Gurung et al. (2006); federal map is<br />
from Sharma (2007).<br />
The Madhesi parties like <strong>the</strong> MPRF (Madehsi People’s Rights Forum), TMDP (Tarai-Madhes<br />
Democratic Party) and NGP have begun to demand <strong>on</strong>e Madhesh regi<strong>on</strong>. This demand is<br />
helpful <strong>in</strong> br<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g a larger group <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Madhesi fold but it is not clear whe<strong>the</strong>r it will allow<br />
<strong>the</strong> Madhesi to become <strong>the</strong> largest group <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> proposed regi<strong>on</strong>. If <strong>the</strong> Tarai districts which<br />
have an overwhelm<strong>in</strong>g number of hill migrants and Tarai <strong>in</strong>digenous groups, such as those <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> far east (Jhapa, Sunsari etc.) and far west (Kanchanpur, Kailai, Bardiya etc.)as well as<br />
some <strong>in</strong> central <strong>in</strong>ner Tarai districts like Chitwan are <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong> a s<strong>in</strong>gle prov<strong>in</strong>ce, <strong>the</strong><br />
Madhesi populati<strong>on</strong> with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> regi<strong>on</strong> will be diluted. As Madhesi votes are divided am<strong>on</strong>g<br />
<strong>the</strong> spl<strong>in</strong>tered Madhesi parties as well as ma<strong>in</strong>stream parties, and hill migrants rarely vote for<br />
<strong>the</strong> Madhesi parties, <strong>the</strong> Madhesi parties could end up los<strong>in</strong>g electi<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong> a regi<strong>on</strong> compris<strong>in</strong>g<br />
all <strong>the</strong> tarai districts. .<br />
Federalism is <strong>the</strong> most important <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al form for <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g various ethnic and caste<br />
groups but no s<strong>in</strong>gle type of federalism will be able to address <strong>the</strong> aspirati<strong>on</strong>s of aut<strong>on</strong>omy of<br />
different ethnic groups of vary<strong>in</strong>g size, territorial distributi<strong>on</strong>, aspirati<strong>on</strong>s, and mobilizati<strong>on</strong>al<br />
evoluti<strong>on</strong>. Territorially c<strong>on</strong>centrated groups like <strong>the</strong> Newar, Limbu, Gurung, Maithali,<br />
Abadhi speak<strong>in</strong>g communities and o<strong>the</strong>rs would benefit from territorial based aut<strong>on</strong>omy.<br />
127
However, <strong>the</strong>re are o<strong>the</strong>r groups which are spread across <strong>the</strong> country and do not form majority<br />
or plurality <strong>in</strong> any territory. Such groups could benefit from n<strong>on</strong>-territorial aut<strong>on</strong>omy. With<br />
regard to smaller groups or ethnic groups which are settled <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> regi<strong>on</strong>s of o<strong>the</strong>r groups, <strong>the</strong>y<br />
could be provided aut<strong>on</strong>omy at local levels.<br />
Devolv<strong>in</strong>g power to <strong>the</strong> regi<strong>on</strong>s, however, is not sufficient. Power should be devolved to<br />
local governments as well. Unlike <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> past, extensive devoluti<strong>on</strong> should be carried out that<br />
devolve not <strong>on</strong>ly adm<strong>in</strong>istrative resp<strong>on</strong>sibilities but political and fiscal powers as well. On<br />
<strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, empowerment of local governments al<strong>on</strong>e may not be sufficient to empower<br />
<strong>the</strong> people. Mechanisms to make <strong>the</strong> local governments accountable to <strong>the</strong> local people<br />
should be devised, bey<strong>on</strong>d <strong>the</strong> electoral method. Promot<strong>in</strong>g transparency could be <strong>on</strong>e route.<br />
Provid<strong>in</strong>g political space to multiple agents like NGOs, local communities, and even <strong>the</strong><br />
central state (if it engages <strong>in</strong> activities to promote accountability and empower local people)<br />
would empower local people and promote accountability as different agents check and<br />
balance each o<strong>the</strong>r at <strong>the</strong> local level (Tendler 1997).<br />
Upper House of Nati<strong>on</strong>alities<br />
A bicameral chamber is an essential part of a federal system. The Upper House br<strong>in</strong>gs<br />
toge<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> regi<strong>on</strong>s and it can effectively become <strong>the</strong> House of Nati<strong>on</strong>alities. However, a<br />
powerful Upper House is necessary to negate <strong>the</strong> potential centrifugal tendencies of <strong>the</strong><br />
regi<strong>on</strong>s. The Upper House should be made nearly as powerful as <strong>the</strong> Lower House. It should<br />
have veto power <strong>on</strong> matters that affect <strong>the</strong> regi<strong>on</strong>s, such as cultural issues and center and<br />
regi<strong>on</strong> relati<strong>on</strong>s. If <strong>the</strong> Upper House does not have sufficient power <strong>the</strong> regi<strong>on</strong>al groups<br />
would have no <strong>in</strong>centives to come to <strong>the</strong> center that does not address <strong>the</strong>ir c<strong>on</strong>cerns.<br />
The Upper House should over represent smaller groups and regi<strong>on</strong>s to counter <strong>the</strong> dom<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong><br />
of <strong>the</strong> larger regi<strong>on</strong>s and groups that have more <strong>in</strong>fluence <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Lower House which is elected<br />
<strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> basis of populati<strong>on</strong>. The Upper House should have power to screen appo<strong>in</strong>tees to <strong>the</strong><br />
various c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al commissi<strong>on</strong>s, judiciary, top security pers<strong>on</strong>nel, and executive<br />
appo<strong>in</strong>tees. It is better suited for such purpose as it is a permanent <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>. The Upper<br />
House should also be given a role <strong>in</strong> supervis<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> army. It will reduce <strong>the</strong> executive’s<br />
m<strong>on</strong>opoly of <strong>the</strong> army. viii It will provide a check to <strong>the</strong> possibilities of <strong>the</strong> abuse of an armed<br />
<strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>, which could lead to <strong>the</strong> breakdown of democracy.<br />
C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al Protecti<strong>on</strong> of <strong>M<strong>in</strong>orities</strong><br />
No country can aspire to be democratic without protect<strong>in</strong>g m<strong>in</strong>ority rights. At best, it could<br />
become an electoral democracy. The protecti<strong>on</strong> of m<strong>in</strong>ority rights is even more important <strong>in</strong><br />
Nepal because all nati<strong>on</strong>al/ethnic and caste groups are m<strong>in</strong>orities. Fur<strong>the</strong>r, despite <strong>the</strong><br />
categorizati<strong>on</strong> of different groups <strong>in</strong>to CHHE, <strong>in</strong>digenous nati<strong>on</strong>alities, Madhesi and Dalit,<br />
<strong>the</strong>re are many subgroups with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>se broad categories.<br />
The largest nati<strong>on</strong>al/ethnic and caste group, CHHE, has been dom<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> country but <strong>in</strong> an<br />
electoral democracy <strong>the</strong> tide could turn if o<strong>the</strong>rs unite aga<strong>in</strong>st it. Thus, it is <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terest of<br />
<strong>the</strong> CHHE to protect m<strong>in</strong>ority rights, lest a coaliti<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> disadvantaged groups (Madhesi,<br />
<strong>in</strong>digenous nati<strong>on</strong>alities, and Dalit), who collectively are more than two thirds of <strong>the</strong><br />
populati<strong>on</strong>, should threaten its rights. In this regard, <strong>the</strong> abolishment of <strong>the</strong> m<strong>on</strong>archy <strong>in</strong> 2008<br />
and <strong>the</strong> declarati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> 2006 House of Representatives (HOR) to make <strong>the</strong> Nepali state<br />
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secular is a progressive step. Some H<strong>in</strong>du organizati<strong>on</strong>s and <strong>in</strong>dividuals have objected to <strong>the</strong><br />
HOR declarati<strong>on</strong>s say<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>the</strong> people should be allowed to follow <strong>the</strong>ir traditi<strong>on</strong>s. Mak<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>the</strong> state secular does not h<strong>in</strong>der citizens from follow<strong>in</strong>g any religi<strong>on</strong> or traditi<strong>on</strong>s. Fur<strong>the</strong>r, as<br />
<strong>the</strong> largest religi<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> country, <strong>the</strong> dom<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> of H<strong>in</strong>du religi<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> everyday life would<br />
c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue. Such societal dom<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> perpetuated through <strong>in</strong>formal <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>s, however,<br />
should be prevented from becom<strong>in</strong>g a threat to o<strong>the</strong>r religious groups.<br />
A three languages policy - a local language, a country wide medium language, and an<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al language - should be adopted to promote equality am<strong>on</strong>g native languages.<br />
Likewise, cultures of various groups should be protected and promoted. This is very salient<br />
for small m<strong>in</strong>ority groups who are los<strong>in</strong>g important aspects of <strong>the</strong>ir cultural heritage due to<br />
modernizati<strong>on</strong> and col<strong>on</strong>izati<strong>on</strong> by larger groups and traditi<strong>on</strong>s. To protect cultures and<br />
promote equality at a symbolic level, steps to celebrate festivals of different groups as public<br />
holidays after 2006 change are positive. Prom<strong>in</strong>ent pers<strong>on</strong>s from different groups should be<br />
declared nati<strong>on</strong>al heroes as well. The ‘nati<strong>on</strong>alism’ promoted by <strong>the</strong> state should be made<br />
<strong>in</strong>clusive and school texts should celebrate multiculturalism and not carry derogatory<br />
stereotypes of m<strong>in</strong>orities.<br />
Mixed Electoral Method<br />
The FPTP method creates disproporti<strong>on</strong>ality whereas a pure PR method facilitates <strong>the</strong><br />
dom<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> of top leaders of <strong>the</strong> parties. Thus an electoral method that employs both <strong>the</strong><br />
FPTP and PR methods, with an aim of reduc<strong>in</strong>g disproporti<strong>on</strong>ality and ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
accountability dimensi<strong>on</strong>, like <strong>in</strong> Germany, would be more desirable. In <strong>the</strong> proposed mixed<br />
method, <strong>the</strong> first half of <strong>the</strong> members should be elected <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> FPTP method. Dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
electi<strong>on</strong>s, <strong>the</strong> voters also have <strong>the</strong> right to vote for a party of <strong>the</strong>ir choice. The sec<strong>on</strong>d half of<br />
<strong>the</strong> seats should be distributed based <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> votes received by <strong>the</strong> political parties, aimed with<br />
reduc<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> dis-proporti<strong>on</strong>ality of <strong>the</strong> FPTP method. For example if a party A gets 40<br />
percent of votes but 60 percents of seats (which is 30 percent of <strong>the</strong> total seats) under <strong>the</strong><br />
FPTP method, <strong>the</strong>n it should be awarded <strong>on</strong>ly 20 percent of seats (10 percent of <strong>the</strong> total<br />
seats) <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> sec<strong>on</strong>d round under <strong>the</strong> PR. Table 3 illustrates <strong>the</strong> method that results <strong>in</strong> a<br />
proporti<strong>on</strong>al distributi<strong>on</strong> of seats.<br />
This proposal is different from <strong>the</strong> mixed method employed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> C<strong>on</strong>stituent Assembly<br />
electi<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong> two ways. First, <strong>the</strong> end result of this method is proporti<strong>on</strong>al whereas <strong>the</strong> CA<br />
produced some disproportioanlity. For <strong>in</strong>stance, with around 29 percent of votes, <strong>the</strong> Maoist<br />
w<strong>on</strong> around 38 percent of seats through <strong>the</strong> FPTP and PR method. Sec<strong>on</strong>d, this model will<br />
follow <strong>the</strong> party list pr<strong>in</strong>ciple strictly to nom<strong>in</strong>ate candidates under PR. Representatives<br />
should be elected based <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir rank<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> party list. If this rule is not followed, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong><br />
party leaders could abuse <strong>the</strong> system to nom<strong>in</strong>ate <strong>the</strong>ir wives, family members and loyalists<br />
who are orig<strong>in</strong>ally put <strong>in</strong> lower rank <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> list, as occurred dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> CA electi<strong>on</strong>.<br />
Table 3: Proporti<strong>on</strong>ality FPTP and PR methods<br />
Parties Vote % FPTP: 100 seats PR: 100 seats Total Seats<br />
A 40 60 20 80 (40%)<br />
B 30 25 35 60 (30%)<br />
C 20 10 30 40 (20%)<br />
D 10 5 15 20 (10%)<br />
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The threshold for PR electi<strong>on</strong> should be m<strong>in</strong>imal as <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> CA to facilitate <strong>the</strong> electi<strong>on</strong><br />
of ethnic members from small ethnic parties. If ethnic oriented parties are not elected, <strong>the</strong>n<br />
ethnic issues may not be adequately articulated <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Parliament because marg<strong>in</strong>alized group<br />
members aligned with ma<strong>in</strong>stream political parties may not raise <strong>the</strong> issues effectively. They<br />
might be c<strong>on</strong>stra<strong>in</strong>ed from rais<strong>in</strong>g group issues by party agenda or an <strong>in</strong>sensitive CHHE<br />
leadership. It was <strong>the</strong> NGP that raised <strong>the</strong> Madhesi issues loudly and clearly <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> house <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> 1990s and not Madhesi representative from <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>stream political parties, who <strong>on</strong>ly<br />
took up <strong>the</strong> cudgels for <strong>the</strong> Madhesi cause later.<br />
Inclusive Mechanisms & Affirmative Policies<br />
A federal system and proporti<strong>on</strong>ate electoral method may not be able to ensure <strong>the</strong><br />
representati<strong>on</strong> of some groups like Dalit, women, and o<strong>the</strong>r marg<strong>in</strong>alized groups. Ma<strong>in</strong>stream<br />
political leaders often excuse <strong>the</strong>mselves for not nom<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g members of <strong>the</strong>se communities<br />
by say<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>the</strong>y do not have capable people. Notwithstand<strong>in</strong>g that such attitudes are racist<br />
<strong>the</strong> salient issue is that such excuses are still used to avoid nom<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g candidates from <strong>the</strong>se<br />
communities. It is a fact that <strong>on</strong>ly <strong>on</strong>e Dalit out of 615 members <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> three parliaments <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> n<strong>in</strong>eties clearly dem<strong>on</strong>strates <strong>the</strong> prejudiced attitude and behavior of <strong>the</strong> CHHE<br />
leadership. Reservati<strong>on</strong>s for <strong>the</strong> marg<strong>in</strong>alized nati<strong>on</strong>al/ethnic and caste groups and quotas for<br />
women should be clearly provided <strong>in</strong> public offices, educati<strong>on</strong>al <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>s, adm<strong>in</strong>istrati<strong>on</strong><br />
(as <strong>in</strong> India), and public c<strong>on</strong>tract<strong>in</strong>g (as <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> US). Reservati<strong>on</strong>s are necessary but not<br />
sufficient. O<strong>the</strong>r <strong>in</strong>clusive <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>s and policies should be also promoted.<br />
In focus<strong>in</strong>g <strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong>equality, al<strong>on</strong>g with social <strong>in</strong>justices, class <strong>in</strong>equality is equally, if not more,<br />
essential to address <strong>in</strong> a “new” Nepal. It was class <strong>in</strong>equality and poverty that fuelled <strong>the</strong><br />
Maoist <strong>in</strong>surgency. I propose power shar<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> ec<strong>on</strong>omic sector policy, and <strong>on</strong>e time resource<br />
redistributi<strong>on</strong> to reduce <strong>in</strong>equality and promote ec<strong>on</strong>omic development.An attractive<br />
framework is “Democratic corporatism” which ensures <strong>the</strong> representati<strong>on</strong> of different classes<br />
<strong>in</strong> ec<strong>on</strong>omic governance and helps <strong>in</strong> reduc<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>equality by extend<strong>in</strong>g social welfare and<br />
promot<strong>in</strong>g social justice. A mechanism is developed whereby representatives of labor,<br />
bus<strong>in</strong>ess and <strong>the</strong> state sit toge<strong>the</strong>r to decide <strong>on</strong> ec<strong>on</strong>omic matters such as <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>imum wage<br />
and benefits. The peak organizati<strong>on</strong>s of labor and bus<strong>in</strong>ess represent <strong>the</strong>ir groups <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
negotiati<strong>on</strong>s. ix Democratic corporatism is comm<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> n<strong>on</strong>-English speak<strong>in</strong>g democracies like<br />
Norway, Sweden, Austria, Denmark, Switzerland, Ne<strong>the</strong>rlands, Belgium and Germany<br />
(Lijphart 1999). New democracies like <strong>South</strong> Africa have also established corporatist<br />
mechanism. Corporatist mechanism should be developed <strong>in</strong> Nepal so that <strong>the</strong> work<strong>in</strong>g class<br />
has a more effective voice <strong>in</strong> matters that affect <strong>the</strong>m. x Also, a corporatist mechanism could<br />
arrest <strong>the</strong> unhealthy radicalizati<strong>on</strong> of labor uni<strong>on</strong>s due to <strong>the</strong> competiti<strong>on</strong> am<strong>on</strong>g partisan<br />
uni<strong>on</strong>s that has forced some <strong>in</strong>dustries to close down. The challenge <strong>in</strong> Nepal, where most<br />
political parties have sister labor organizati<strong>on</strong>s and few if any <strong>in</strong>dependent labor organizati<strong>on</strong>s<br />
exist, would be to organize a peak organizati<strong>on</strong> that is relatively n<strong>on</strong>-party based.<br />
The work<strong>in</strong>g class <strong>in</strong> Nepal, however, is <strong>on</strong>ly a small fracti<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> labor force, more<br />
important, it is not <strong>the</strong> poorest group. It is <strong>the</strong> landless, near landless peasant or small farmers<br />
who make up <strong>the</strong> majority of <strong>the</strong> poor. It is <strong>the</strong> peasants <strong>in</strong> Nepal as elsewhere <strong>in</strong> develop<strong>in</strong>g<br />
countries who are <strong>the</strong> mass base of <strong>in</strong>surgencies and rebelli<strong>on</strong>s. A mechanism to represent<br />
<strong>the</strong> peasants <strong>in</strong> governance should be devised so that <strong>the</strong>ir needs and aspirati<strong>on</strong>s are heard and<br />
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addressed by <strong>the</strong> government. The representatives of <strong>the</strong> peasants’ peak organizati<strong>on</strong> could sit<br />
with <strong>the</strong> government representatives periodically to discuss issues that affect <strong>the</strong> peasants.<br />
Rich peasants would <strong>in</strong> all likelihood dom<strong>in</strong>ate <strong>the</strong>se organizati<strong>on</strong>s, as dem<strong>on</strong>strated <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
compositi<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> peasant sister organizati<strong>on</strong>s of various political parties. To circumvent<br />
this, <strong>the</strong> peasant organizati<strong>on</strong> should be elected by <strong>the</strong> poor farmers. Land hold<strong>in</strong>g size could<br />
be made a criteri<strong>on</strong> for eligibility to vote and stand for electi<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> peasant organizati<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
To ensure representati<strong>on</strong> of different <strong>in</strong>terests with<strong>in</strong> smaller farmers, sub associati<strong>on</strong>s of<br />
different farm<strong>in</strong>g groups could be formed, such as rice growers, wheat farmers, sugar cane<br />
farmers, etc. Alternately, sub-associati<strong>on</strong> could be formed based <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> basis of geographic<br />
divisi<strong>on</strong>s, like <strong>the</strong> mounta<strong>in</strong>, hill and Tarai.<br />
Land Reforms<br />
Land reform could be a policy tool that could make available resources to <strong>the</strong> vast numbers of<br />
landless or smallholder farmers for better<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ir lives. Land reforms could also c<strong>on</strong>tribute<br />
to address<strong>in</strong>g food security and <strong>the</strong> ec<strong>on</strong>omic development of <strong>the</strong> country. Small holder<br />
farmers have been found to be more productive than large farmers <strong>in</strong> develop<strong>in</strong>g countries<br />
(B<strong>in</strong>swanger and Elg<strong>in</strong> 1998). Small landholders have an <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong> rais<strong>in</strong>g productivity<br />
because <strong>the</strong>y directly benefit from it whereas a farm laborer work<strong>in</strong>g <strong>on</strong> a large farm does not<br />
as s/he will not benefit from <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>creased output. Land reforms could also yield o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>in</strong>direct<br />
benefits. It could breakdown <strong>the</strong> extensive c<strong>on</strong>trol of <strong>the</strong> landless and smallholder peasants<br />
by landlords (patr<strong>on</strong>-client) through tenancy, credit etc and liberate <strong>the</strong> poor and oppressed<br />
peasants and transform <strong>the</strong>m <strong>in</strong>to fuller citizens who can practice <strong>the</strong>ir democratic rights with<br />
lesser c<strong>on</strong>stra<strong>in</strong>ts.<br />
Earlier, several land related policies have been implemented <strong>in</strong> Nepal. The aboliti<strong>on</strong> of<br />
jam<strong>in</strong>dari <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> fifties was a positive aspect as it ended very large land hold<strong>in</strong>gs. However, it<br />
also enabled some with jagir land given temporarily as compensati<strong>on</strong> for services to <strong>the</strong> state<br />
but still owned by <strong>the</strong> state, to claim it as pers<strong>on</strong>al property. The land reform dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> three<br />
decade Panchayat period had mixed c<strong>on</strong>sequences. It distributed some land to <strong>the</strong> landless<br />
but took away communal land from <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>digenous peoples and gave land to <strong>the</strong> hill people <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> Tarai. Writ<strong>in</strong>g about <strong>the</strong> ethnic Limbu and <strong>the</strong> elim<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong>ir communal land<br />
ownership system called Kipat, Caplan (2001) po<strong>in</strong>ted out that it not <strong>on</strong>ly c<strong>on</strong>tributed to <strong>the</strong><br />
Limbu’s ec<strong>on</strong>omic marg<strong>in</strong>alizati<strong>on</strong> but c<strong>on</strong>tributed to <strong>the</strong>ir loss of culture and identity as<br />
Limbu identity and lifestyle were closely related to <strong>the</strong>ir ancestral communal landhold<strong>in</strong>gs.<br />
Likewise, Guneratne (2000) has argued that <strong>the</strong> land col<strong>on</strong>izati<strong>on</strong> policy <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Tarai benefited<br />
<strong>the</strong> hill migrants but had severe c<strong>on</strong>sequences for <strong>in</strong>digenous Tharu and o<strong>the</strong>r Madhesi. The<br />
Tharu’s loss of c<strong>on</strong>trol over <strong>the</strong>ir traditi<strong>on</strong>al land turned many <strong>in</strong>to b<strong>on</strong>ded laborers.<br />
The nati<strong>on</strong>alizati<strong>on</strong> of forests <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> late fifties, a form of redistributi<strong>on</strong> of land, had disastrous<br />
c<strong>on</strong>sequences. By nati<strong>on</strong>aliz<strong>in</strong>g private and communally held forests, <strong>the</strong> government<br />
claimed to transfer <strong>the</strong> forests to all citizens but by mak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> forests open access resources<br />
from restricted resources, <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>alizati<strong>on</strong> c<strong>on</strong>tributed to massive deforestati<strong>on</strong>. The large<br />
scale deforestati<strong>on</strong> forced <strong>the</strong> government to transfer <strong>the</strong> resources to forest user communities<br />
from <strong>the</strong> seventies <strong>on</strong>ward. Community forestry has been widely cited as successful <strong>in</strong> regreen<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>the</strong> hills (Agrawal and Ostrom 2001). But it did not result <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> restituti<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong><br />
traditi<strong>on</strong>al communal lands to <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>digenous people. The community forests are often<br />
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c<strong>on</strong>trolled by local elite (Harper and Tarnowski 2003), and <strong>the</strong> comb<strong>in</strong>ed process of<br />
nati<strong>on</strong>alizati<strong>on</strong> and community forestry more likely realigned c<strong>on</strong>trol over resources to <strong>the</strong><br />
CHHEM. Future land reforms policies should enable <strong>the</strong> return of traditi<strong>on</strong>al lands to <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>digenous peoples who had ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>the</strong>m <strong>in</strong> susta<strong>in</strong>able ways.<br />
Ano<strong>the</strong>r form of land reform that could spell disaster is <strong>the</strong> collectivizati<strong>on</strong> of land. In Ch<strong>in</strong>a,<br />
for <strong>in</strong>stance, around 30 milli<strong>on</strong> people died of hunger after collectivizati<strong>on</strong> of land because<br />
producti<strong>on</strong> went down and distributi<strong>on</strong> failed. 10 milli<strong>on</strong> farmers died <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> USSR when<br />
Stal<strong>in</strong> collectivized <strong>the</strong> farms. On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, <strong>in</strong> Vietnam and Ch<strong>in</strong>a producti<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong>creased<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> agricultural sector <strong>on</strong>ly after <strong>the</strong> collectivizati<strong>on</strong> system was reformed (The World Bank<br />
2007). A recent study by Marie Lecomte-Tilou<strong>in</strong>e, titled, “Political Change and Cultural<br />
Revoluti<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> a Maoist Model Village” suggests that <strong>the</strong> Maoist experiments <strong>in</strong><br />
collectivizati<strong>on</strong> were not successful <strong>in</strong> produc<strong>in</strong>g enough food for <strong>the</strong> members of <strong>the</strong> groups<br />
(Lecomte-Tilou<strong>in</strong>e Forthcom<strong>in</strong>g).<br />
In <strong>the</strong> Nepali c<strong>on</strong>text, with regard to land redistributi<strong>on</strong>, critics might argue that <strong>the</strong>re is not<br />
much land to redistribute as most land hold<strong>in</strong>gs are small and <strong>the</strong> government has already<br />
distributed <strong>the</strong> fertile land <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Tarai. Table 3 shows that 18.7 percent of landhold<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong><br />
1991 were larger than 4 hectares and owned by 2.51 percent of households . If <strong>the</strong>se lands<br />
were to be redistributed to <strong>the</strong> landless or those with less than 1 hectare, it could meet <strong>the</strong> food<br />
needs of <strong>the</strong> poor and c<strong>on</strong>tribute <strong>in</strong> promot<strong>in</strong>g ec<strong>on</strong>omic development by <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g<br />
agricultural productivity. Land reforms have occurred successfully where land hold<strong>in</strong>gs were<br />
small as <strong>in</strong> Japan, Taiwan, and <strong>South</strong> Korea (Griff<strong>in</strong>, Khan, and Ickowitz 2002).<br />
Table 4: Distributi<strong>on</strong> of Household (HH) and Area owned (<strong>in</strong> per cent)<br />
Size of hold<strong>in</strong>g 1961 1971 1981 1991<br />
HH Area HH Area HH Area HH Area<br />
Landless 1.43 0 0.80 0 0.37 0 1.17 0<br />
Less than 1.0 hectare 73.89 24.03 76.77 27.20 66.32 17.33 68.63 30.5<br />
1-4 hectare 19.56 35.68 18.39 39.29 28.05 46.13 27.68 50.8<br />
More than 4 hectare 5.13 41.42 4.03 33.74 5.35 36.54 2.51 18.7<br />
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100<br />
Source: Karki (2001)<br />
In Nepal <strong>the</strong> real challenge <strong>in</strong> implement<strong>in</strong>g successful redistributive land reform is likely to<br />
be <strong>the</strong> political will as well as adm<strong>in</strong>istrative capability. Land reforms, have often succeded,<br />
when states employed coerci<strong>on</strong> - under occupati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> Japan or under an authoritarian regime<br />
<strong>in</strong> Taiwan, <strong>South</strong> Korea and Peru. In democratic polities, <strong>the</strong> resource rich large land owners<br />
could deploy a host of strategies to underm<strong>in</strong>e land reforms. They have passed <strong>the</strong> title of<br />
lands to proxy owners -family and friends. Also, large landholders have challenged <strong>the</strong> policy<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> court as violative of property rights, an important tenet of liberal democracy. Even<br />
where governments have mustered political will, <strong>the</strong>y face <strong>the</strong> challenge of adm<strong>in</strong>istrative<br />
capability. A capable and n<strong>on</strong>-corrupt bureaucracy is essential to implement <strong>the</strong> land reforms.<br />
It is questi<strong>on</strong>able whe<strong>the</strong>r Nepali bureaucracy can implement redistributive land reforms, as<br />
many high level bureaucrats and <strong>the</strong>ir families own significant landhold<strong>in</strong>gs. Also <strong>the</strong>re is <strong>the</strong><br />
post c<strong>on</strong>flict experience of land reform policies be<strong>in</strong>g abused by <strong>the</strong> rul<strong>in</strong>g political parties to<br />
distribute land to <strong>the</strong>ir cadres and not to <strong>the</strong> poor as happened <strong>in</strong> Zimbabwe and Nicaragua.<br />
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The o<strong>the</strong>r opti<strong>on</strong> could be market based land reform as promoted <strong>in</strong> some countries s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong><br />
eighties. The pr<strong>in</strong>ciple is to provide <strong>in</strong>centives for big landowners to sell <strong>the</strong>ir land and<br />
provide credit and o<strong>the</strong>r support to <strong>the</strong> poor to enable <strong>the</strong>m to purchase land at market prices.<br />
The buyers are often required to c<strong>on</strong>tribute some amount from <strong>the</strong>ir own pocket. The<br />
governments could levy progressive taxes to larger land hold<strong>in</strong>g so that large landholders are<br />
compelled to sell <strong>the</strong>ir land. The progressive tax could also c<strong>on</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> land value at its<br />
productive price (and check land speculati<strong>on</strong>) The World Bank has provided substantial<br />
funds for such programs <strong>in</strong> various Lat<strong>in</strong> American countries like Brazil, Colombia, Mexico<br />
and <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> Africa.<br />
Market based land reforms have worked <strong>in</strong> some countries and not <strong>in</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rs. In Colombia,<br />
<strong>the</strong> reforms became more effective when implemented <strong>in</strong> a decentralized manner compared to<br />
when implemented centrally. Also, land reform works better (<strong>in</strong> terms of <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g<br />
productivity) if land is given to people who are familiar with farm<strong>in</strong>g. From <strong>the</strong> productivity<br />
angle, mak<strong>in</strong>g land available to <strong>the</strong> tiller first should be <strong>the</strong> preferred opti<strong>on</strong>. In Nepal, <strong>in</strong><br />
additi<strong>on</strong> to progressive tax <strong>on</strong> larger landhold<strong>in</strong>g, tax could be levied <strong>on</strong> even smaller farm<br />
landhold<strong>in</strong>gs that are not tilled by <strong>the</strong> owner itself. It could make more land available <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
market.<br />
The advantage of market based land reform is that it will not produce as much resistance as<br />
redistributive land reforms. In additi<strong>on</strong>, market based land reform could c<strong>on</strong>tribute <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>dustrializati<strong>on</strong> by mak<strong>in</strong>g capital available for <strong>in</strong>vestment from <strong>the</strong> large landholders after<br />
<strong>the</strong>y sell <strong>the</strong>ir land. Some critics have po<strong>in</strong>ted out that <strong>the</strong> poorest of <strong>the</strong> poor would not be<br />
able to purchase land if <strong>the</strong>y have to pay a porti<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> land cost. In that case, an excepti<strong>on</strong><br />
could be made and complete credit made available to <strong>the</strong> poorest, to address this problem..<br />
Promot<strong>in</strong>g Accountability<br />
Horiz<strong>on</strong>tal accountability mechanisms should be made effective to hold political leaders and<br />
<strong>the</strong> powerful accountable <strong>in</strong> between <strong>the</strong> electi<strong>on</strong>s. C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al commissi<strong>on</strong>s and central<br />
agencies as well as n<strong>on</strong>-executive branches of <strong>the</strong> government should be empowered and<br />
made <strong>in</strong>dependent to make <strong>the</strong>m more effective. Parliament can be made more effective by<br />
streng<strong>the</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g its committees and award<strong>in</strong>g more committee chairpers<strong>on</strong>s to <strong>the</strong> oppositi<strong>on</strong>, as<br />
<strong>in</strong> Germany (Schmidt 2003). Distributi<strong>on</strong> of chairpers<strong>on</strong>ship of committees based <strong>on</strong><br />
proporti<strong>on</strong>al representati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Parliament, could give more power to <strong>the</strong> oppositi<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Parliament. Judicial review process can be streng<strong>the</strong>ned to limit authoritarian tendencies of<br />
<strong>the</strong> executive by establish<strong>in</strong>g a c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al court, as discussed below.<br />
Empowerment and <strong>in</strong>dependence of central agencies would not <strong>on</strong>ly facilitate check<strong>in</strong>g power<br />
abuse by <strong>the</strong> executive but <strong>the</strong> various agencies could also check power abuse by each o<strong>the</strong>r.<br />
The first step is to make different agencies powerful <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir respective jurisdicti<strong>on</strong>. For<br />
<strong>in</strong>stance, <strong>the</strong> Commissi<strong>on</strong> of Investigati<strong>on</strong> aga<strong>in</strong>st Abuse of Authority (CIAA) should be<br />
empowered to prosecute any<strong>on</strong>e, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> head of <strong>the</strong> executive. However, empower<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>the</strong> agencies al<strong>on</strong>e may not be enough, especially if <strong>the</strong> agencies are under <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>fluence of <strong>the</strong><br />
executive. To promote <strong>in</strong>dependence, <strong>the</strong> executive al<strong>on</strong>e should not have <strong>the</strong> prerogative to<br />
nom<strong>in</strong>ate commissi<strong>on</strong>ers head<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> central agencies. O<strong>the</strong>r branches of government like <strong>the</strong><br />
Parliament and judiciary should have a role <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> nom<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> and approval process.<br />
133
Likewise, <strong>the</strong> parliament could decide <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> allocati<strong>on</strong> of budget and <strong>the</strong> agencies <strong>the</strong>mselves<br />
could recruit adm<strong>in</strong>istrative pers<strong>on</strong>nel.<br />
In pr<strong>in</strong>ciple <strong>the</strong> presidential system is <strong>the</strong> political structure that separates power<br />
am<strong>on</strong>g different branches of government and hence could promote accountability. In<br />
practice, <strong>the</strong> presidential system <strong>in</strong> many develop<strong>in</strong>g countries has c<strong>on</strong>centrated power <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
pers<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> president <strong>in</strong>stead of separat<strong>in</strong>g power (O'D<strong>on</strong>nell 1996). Except for <strong>the</strong> USA,<br />
practically all presidential systems have faced major crises (L<strong>in</strong>z 1996; Riggs 1992) unlike<br />
parliamentary system, which has mixed record. Presidents have often underm<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>the</strong><br />
authority of <strong>the</strong> parliament and judiciary and ruled <strong>in</strong> semi authoritarian ways. In Nepal, <strong>the</strong><br />
major prop<strong>on</strong>ent of <strong>the</strong> presidential system, <strong>the</strong> Maoists, seemed to view it as a tool to<br />
establish a powerful executive.<br />
C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al Court and Judicial Review<br />
A federal system would <strong>in</strong>vite a lot of c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al debates about various c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al<br />
articles that deal with rights between <strong>the</strong> centre and regi<strong>on</strong>s, articles that protect <strong>the</strong> rights of<br />
m<strong>in</strong>orities, and articles that empower central c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al commissi<strong>on</strong>s. The articles could<br />
come under debate and scrut<strong>in</strong>y requir<strong>in</strong>g to be <strong>in</strong>terpreted. This necessitates a judicial<br />
review process. Nepal’s 1990 C<strong>on</strong>stuituti<strong>on</strong> provided for judicial review or <strong>in</strong>terpretati<strong>on</strong>.and<br />
<strong>the</strong>re were some significant judicial <strong>in</strong>terventi<strong>on</strong>s. However, <strong>the</strong>re were some major problems<br />
as well.<br />
A major problem of <strong>the</strong> judicial system has been criticism regard<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Court’s ideological,<br />
ethnic, and gender biases. In <strong>the</strong> 1990s, <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>n dom<strong>in</strong>ant left political party <strong>in</strong> Parliament,<br />
<strong>the</strong> CPN-UML found itself disadvantaged by <strong>the</strong> rul<strong>in</strong>gs of <strong>the</strong> Supreme Court. When <strong>the</strong><br />
Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister bel<strong>on</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> UML dissolved <strong>the</strong> Parliament, <strong>the</strong> Court ruled aga<strong>in</strong>st it<br />
despite <strong>the</strong>re be<strong>in</strong>g a precedent. Not surpris<strong>in</strong>gly, <strong>the</strong> CPN-UML perceived <strong>the</strong> Court as made<br />
up of social elite that favored <strong>the</strong> centrist Nepali C<strong>on</strong>gress.<br />
Even more marked was <strong>the</strong> bias <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Court rul<strong>in</strong>gs aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> marg<strong>in</strong>alized groups.<br />
Between 1990 and 2002, <strong>the</strong> Supreme Court’s rul<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>on</strong> cultural issues that c<strong>on</strong>flicted with<br />
<strong>the</strong> values and <strong>in</strong>terests of <strong>the</strong> CHHEM, went aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terests of <strong>the</strong> marg<strong>in</strong>alized groups.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> Public Service Commissi<strong>on</strong> c<strong>on</strong>troversy, <strong>the</strong> Supreme Court ruled that Khas-Nepali<br />
language ought to be language of <strong>the</strong> public service exam<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>. N<strong>on</strong>-native Nepali speakers<br />
(<strong>in</strong>digenous peoples and <strong>the</strong> ‘madhesi’ peoples) were disadvantaged <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> competiti<strong>on</strong> with<br />
<strong>the</strong> native speakers. As a c<strong>on</strong>sequence, <strong>the</strong> gap between <strong>the</strong> native speakers and o<strong>the</strong>rs<br />
c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued to rise <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> adm<strong>in</strong>istrati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1990s (Lawoti 2008). Likewise, <strong>the</strong> Supreme<br />
Court ruled that local governments could not <strong>in</strong>troduce local native languages as <strong>the</strong> sec<strong>on</strong>d<br />
language of governance even though <strong>the</strong> Local Self Governance Act, 1999 permitted it. Also,<br />
<strong>the</strong> Court’s rul<strong>in</strong>g prohibited distributi<strong>on</strong> of citizenship certificates to Madhesi and o<strong>the</strong>rs who<br />
did not posses <strong>the</strong>m. F<strong>in</strong>ally, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> case of women, <strong>the</strong> Court’s rul<strong>in</strong>gs, though <strong>in</strong> some<br />
<strong>in</strong>stances progressive, generally, did not promote equal rights between men and women.<br />
While some of <strong>the</strong>se decisi<strong>on</strong>s were based <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> discrim<strong>in</strong>atory articles of <strong>the</strong> 1990<br />
C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>, o<strong>the</strong>rs were <strong>in</strong>fluenced by <strong>the</strong> values of <strong>the</strong> justices, who were overwhelm<strong>in</strong>gly<br />
male Bahun (hill Brahm<strong>in</strong>). As <strong>the</strong> American experience shows, c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al articles may<br />
be <strong>in</strong>terpreted differently by people with different values <strong>in</strong> different periods. The same<br />
134
C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al articles <strong>in</strong>terpreted to discrim<strong>in</strong>ate aga<strong>in</strong>st blacks prior to <strong>the</strong> civil rights<br />
movement <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1960s, were subsequently <strong>in</strong>terpreted differently to extend political rights<br />
and civil liberties.<br />
C<strong>on</strong>sequently, even after <strong>the</strong> C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> is made <strong>in</strong>clusive and progressive, <strong>the</strong> CHHEM<br />
would c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to dom<strong>in</strong>ate <strong>the</strong> Supreme Court and <strong>in</strong>terpret <strong>the</strong> C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al articles based<br />
<strong>on</strong> values that favor <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>du religi<strong>on</strong>, Khas-Nepali language, and hill nati<strong>on</strong>alism. These<br />
problems can be addressed by <strong>the</strong> establishment of a C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al Court, whose sole job is<br />
to <strong>in</strong>terpret <strong>the</strong> C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>. It will additi<strong>on</strong>ally free <strong>the</strong> judicial system to look at regular<br />
litigati<strong>on</strong>s. As it will be newly c<strong>on</strong>stituted, it can be made <strong>in</strong>clusive <strong>in</strong> terms of ideology,<br />
ethnicity and gender. A proporti<strong>on</strong>ately c<strong>on</strong>stituted C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al Court has less chance of<br />
favor<strong>in</strong>g <strong>on</strong>e group c<strong>on</strong>sistently. Proporti<strong>on</strong>ality of <strong>the</strong> C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al Court could be<br />
facilitated by nom<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> of justices from <strong>the</strong> regi<strong>on</strong>s. The East European countries have had<br />
successful experience with <strong>the</strong> C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al Court system. It has c<strong>on</strong>tributed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
c<strong>on</strong>solidati<strong>on</strong> of democracies <strong>in</strong> some of <strong>the</strong> countries by restrict<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> abuse of power by <strong>the</strong><br />
executive (Schwartz 1999)..<br />
Towards Democratic Inclusi<strong>on</strong> and Accountability<br />
For <strong>the</strong> poor and marg<strong>in</strong>alized groups <strong>in</strong> Nepal, a functi<strong>on</strong><strong>in</strong>g democracy may give <strong>the</strong>m more<br />
space to be heard, and to make <strong>the</strong> most of mobiliz<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> numbers <strong>the</strong>y have. The politicians<br />
will not be able to ignore <strong>the</strong> poor, if <strong>the</strong>y vote <strong>in</strong> higher number as <strong>in</strong> India, because <strong>the</strong><br />
politicians need votes to w<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> free and fair electi<strong>on</strong>s. However, for electoral politics to work<br />
for <strong>the</strong> poor, democracy should functi<strong>on</strong> properly. Any type of democracy will not functi<strong>on</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong> multicultural societies.<br />
Majoritarian democracy failed <strong>in</strong> Nepal because it not <strong>on</strong>ly excluded different groups<br />
but also fostered power abuse. In this chapter I have argued that power should be distributed<br />
am<strong>on</strong>g different agencies, <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>s, groups, actors and sectors to promote equality,<br />
<strong>in</strong>clusi<strong>on</strong> and accountability.. In additi<strong>on</strong> to manag<strong>in</strong>g c<strong>on</strong>flict and promot<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>clusi<strong>on</strong> and<br />
accountability, power distributi<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> historically centralized polity will c<strong>on</strong>tribute <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
c<strong>on</strong>solidati<strong>on</strong> of democracy as well.<br />
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i In four m<strong>on</strong>ths from January 15 to May 14, 2007, 561 mobile teams distributed 2,615,615 citizenship<br />
certificates. Data obta<strong>in</strong>ed from Citizenship Secti<strong>on</strong>, M<strong>in</strong>istry of Home Affairs, Government of Nepal.<br />
ii The Dalit and <strong>in</strong>digenous nati<strong>on</strong>alities are around 15 and 37 percent of <strong>the</strong> populati<strong>on</strong> respectively, <strong>the</strong><br />
Madhesi 18 to 32 percent if you add <strong>the</strong> Tarai’s Dalit, <strong>in</strong>digenous nati<strong>on</strong>alities and. Muslims to <strong>the</strong> category of<br />
Madhes. Collectively <strong>the</strong> marg<strong>in</strong>alized groups are more than two-third of <strong>the</strong> populati<strong>on</strong> (Bhattachan 2003a).<br />
iii This secti<strong>on</strong> draws <strong>on</strong> Lawoti (2007b).<br />
iv Table 1 shows <strong>the</strong> two largest political parties would have received lesser seats under PR <strong>in</strong> all three<br />
parliamentary electi<strong>on</strong>s after 1990. The rest of <strong>the</strong> parties would have received more seats <strong>in</strong> 90 percent of cases<br />
under a PR system.<br />
v Later op<strong>in</strong>i<strong>on</strong> polls (Nepali Times 2002) have shown that <strong>the</strong> people began to blame <strong>the</strong> Maoists for <strong>the</strong> crises<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> country. The attitude change came after <strong>the</strong> Maoists began destructi<strong>on</strong> of development <strong>in</strong>frastructures,<br />
such as schools, health posts, teleph<strong>on</strong>e transmissi<strong>on</strong> towers, and VDC offices. On October, 2003 Prachanda,<br />
<strong>the</strong> supreme Maoist leader, issued a statement say<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>the</strong> politburo meet<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> party decided to stop <strong>the</strong><br />
destructi<strong>on</strong> of development <strong>in</strong>frastructures. The destructi<strong>on</strong>, however, did not completely stop.<br />
vi For reas<strong>on</strong>s not clear to <strong>the</strong> author, Sharma does not provide calculati<strong>on</strong> of distributi<strong>on</strong> of ethnic groups <strong>in</strong><br />
regi<strong>on</strong>s. In a model for federalism, that should have been <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong> task.<br />
vii Interviews with activists and journalists <strong>in</strong> summer 2008 and documents provided by <strong>the</strong>m.<br />
viii In a parliamentary system, <strong>the</strong> executive will represent <strong>the</strong> Lower House’s <strong>in</strong>terest as it is elected from it.<br />
ix Follow<strong>in</strong>g Schmitter (1982), Lijphart identifies (1999, 172) democratic corporatism with an <strong>in</strong>terest group<br />
system where “(1) <strong>in</strong>terest groups are relatively large <strong>in</strong> size and relatively small <strong>in</strong> numbers, and (2) <strong>the</strong>y are<br />
fur<strong>the</strong>r c<strong>on</strong>solidated <strong>in</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>al peak organizati<strong>on</strong>s…(3) regular c<strong>on</strong>sultati<strong>on</strong> by <strong>the</strong> leaders of <strong>the</strong>se peak<br />
organizati<strong>on</strong>s, especially those represent<strong>in</strong>g labor and management, both with each o<strong>the</strong>r and with government<br />
representatives to (4) arrive at comprehensive agreements that are b<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g <strong>on</strong> all three partners <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
negotiati<strong>on</strong>s.”<br />
x Corporatist mechanisms have been employed by n<strong>on</strong>-democratic regime to broaden support and legitimize <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
rule, for example <strong>in</strong> Lat<strong>in</strong> America. In Nepal <strong>the</strong> Panchayat system also mobilized workers, peasants, women,<br />
and youth etc. to broaden support base. This history might make democrats a bit wary of corporatism. However,<br />
as <strong>the</strong> n<strong>on</strong>-English speak<strong>in</strong>g European democracies have dem<strong>on</strong>strated, corporatism can become an effective<br />
mechanism <strong>in</strong> reduc<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>equality and extend<strong>in</strong>g welfare and social justice <strong>in</strong> democracies. Corporatism <strong>in</strong><br />
autocracy could be problematic as it leng<strong>the</strong>ned <strong>the</strong> regime’s rule while it is desirable <strong>in</strong> democracies because it<br />
facilitates representati<strong>on</strong> of lower classes <strong>in</strong> governance.<br />
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The Challenge of Nati<strong>on</strong>al M<strong>in</strong>ority Questi<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> Pakistan<br />
Shahid Fiaz<br />
Introducti<strong>on</strong><br />
Pakistan, as a state, has survived for over sixty years but <strong>the</strong> aspirati<strong>on</strong>s of <strong>the</strong> people of<br />
Pakistan to live <strong>in</strong> a free, democratic and peaceful society with a degree of material<br />
security have rema<strong>in</strong>ed unfulfilled. The people of Pakistan have been haunted by a<br />
peculiar <strong>in</strong>security, result<strong>in</strong>g from <strong>the</strong> l<strong>in</strong>ger<strong>in</strong>g uncerta<strong>in</strong>ty about whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>ir country<br />
will survive as a state or not 1 . The secessi<strong>on</strong> of its eastern w<strong>in</strong>g and with 56 percent of<br />
<strong>the</strong> populati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> 1971 has left scars <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> psyche of <strong>the</strong> first generati<strong>on</strong> Pakistanis. But<br />
no less<strong>on</strong>s seemed to have been learnt from <strong>the</strong> break up of <strong>the</strong> country. Successive<br />
governments, politicians, <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>stream press and orthodox academics tend to treat <strong>the</strong><br />
questi<strong>on</strong>s of ‘centrifugalism’ as a problem of regi<strong>on</strong>alism.<br />
The official ideology of <strong>the</strong> state has never accepted <strong>the</strong> diversity of languages and<br />
cultures <strong>in</strong> Pakistani society and has pushed a policy of assimilati<strong>on</strong> ra<strong>the</strong>r than<br />
<strong>in</strong>tegrati<strong>on</strong>. The state has persistently refused to recognize <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> federat<strong>in</strong>g<br />
regi<strong>on</strong>s are not mere chunks of territories but areas <strong>in</strong>hibited by people who have<br />
different languages, cultures, history and even states of <strong>the</strong>ir own till <strong>the</strong> middle of <strong>the</strong><br />
twentieth century. The official denial of <strong>the</strong> identities of diverse groups has c<strong>on</strong>tributed to<br />
<strong>the</strong> deteriorati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>in</strong>ter-groups relati<strong>on</strong>s, weakened social cohesiveness and underm<strong>in</strong>ed<br />
<strong>the</strong> state’s capacity to forge security and susta<strong>in</strong> development. The resurgent forces of<br />
ethno nati<strong>on</strong>alism are questi<strong>on</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> basis of <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>-state and <strong>the</strong> myth of nati<strong>on</strong>al<br />
homogeneity is be<strong>in</strong>g exploded by <strong>the</strong> diversity of c<strong>on</strong>stituent nati<strong>on</strong>al m<strong>in</strong>orities.<br />
The demands of ethnic nati<strong>on</strong>alism <strong>in</strong> Pakistan range from sovereignty, prov<strong>in</strong>cial rights,<br />
and regi<strong>on</strong>al aut<strong>on</strong>omy to self-determ<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong> compet<strong>in</strong>g elites of smaller<br />
ethnic groups have raised c<strong>on</strong>cerns aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> dom<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> rul<strong>in</strong>g class of Punjab.<br />
The current revival of ethno nati<strong>on</strong>alism and <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>al m<strong>in</strong>ority questi<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> three<br />
prov<strong>in</strong>ces of Pakistan is deeply rooted <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> history of <strong>the</strong> country and is directly<br />
c<strong>on</strong>nected with <strong>the</strong> post col<strong>on</strong>ial demands of ethnic groups which struggled aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong><br />
oppressi<strong>on</strong> of rul<strong>in</strong>g class <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1960’s and 70’s. Prov<strong>in</strong>cial grievances largely orig<strong>in</strong>ate<br />
from discrim<strong>in</strong>atory arrangements for allocati<strong>on</strong> of f<strong>in</strong>ancial resources, shar<strong>in</strong>g of<br />
irrigati<strong>on</strong> water, quota <strong>in</strong> government jobs, <strong>in</strong>ter-prov<strong>in</strong>cial migrati<strong>on</strong> and language and<br />
cultural oppressi<strong>on</strong> by <strong>the</strong> center <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> name of nati<strong>on</strong>al cultural and nati<strong>on</strong>al language. 2<br />
The protecti<strong>on</strong> and promoti<strong>on</strong> of regi<strong>on</strong>al languages was first demanded by Bengalis of<br />
East Pakistan and s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong>n it has been a c<strong>on</strong>stant issue <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>alist discourse.<br />
Ethno-nati<strong>on</strong>alist groups have resisted <strong>the</strong> impositi<strong>on</strong> of Urdu as <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>al language,<br />
which at <strong>the</strong> time was spoken by <strong>on</strong>ly 5.7% of <strong>the</strong> total populati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> country. The<br />
neglect of <strong>the</strong> cultural heritage of <strong>the</strong> smaller nati<strong>on</strong>alities <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> of what is<br />
seen as a ‘nati<strong>on</strong>al’ Pakistani culture is an issue still c<strong>on</strong>tested by <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>al m<strong>in</strong>orities.<br />
139
The <strong>in</strong>-migrati<strong>on</strong> of labor force from N.W.F.P and Punjab as well as <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>flux of<br />
refugees <strong>in</strong> S<strong>in</strong>dh and Baluchistan, rema<strong>in</strong> sources of resentment am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong> local<br />
populati<strong>on</strong>s of <strong>the</strong> two prov<strong>in</strong>ces who fear changes <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> demographic balance and<br />
<strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g pressure <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> meager resources of <strong>the</strong> prov<strong>in</strong>ces.<br />
Ethnic diversity and <strong>the</strong> policy of assimilati<strong>on</strong><br />
The 1973 C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> affirmed <strong>the</strong> federal character of <strong>the</strong> Pakistani state with four<br />
federat<strong>in</strong>g units, namely Punjab, S<strong>in</strong>dh, North West Fr<strong>on</strong>tier Prov<strong>in</strong>ce (N.W.F.P) and<br />
Baluchistan al<strong>on</strong>g with some Federally Adm<strong>in</strong>istered Tribal Areas. Urdu is <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>al<br />
language. Punjabi, S<strong>in</strong>dhi, Pashto, Balochi and a few o<strong>the</strong>r languages are spoken <strong>in</strong><br />
different parts of Pakistan but <strong>the</strong> medium of <strong>in</strong>structi<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong> government schools is Urdu<br />
with <strong>the</strong> excepti<strong>on</strong> of S<strong>in</strong>dhi. The difficulty <strong>in</strong> statistically determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> l<strong>in</strong>guistic<br />
profile of <strong>the</strong> populati<strong>on</strong> is complicated by <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1981 census, no direct<br />
questi<strong>on</strong> was asked about <strong>the</strong> mo<strong>the</strong>r t<strong>on</strong>gue of <strong>in</strong>dividuals. However, a questi<strong>on</strong> was<br />
asked about languages spoken <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> household.<br />
Table 1 - Percentage of populati<strong>on</strong> by mo<strong>the</strong>r t<strong>on</strong>gue<br />
Census<br />
year<br />
Urdu Punjabi S<strong>in</strong>dhi Pashto Balochi Saraiki O<strong>the</strong>rs<br />
1981 7.60 48.17 11.77 13.15 4.22 9.84 5.24<br />
1998 7.57 44.15 14.10 15.42 3.57 10.53 4.66<br />
Source: 1998 Census Report of Pakistan, Populati<strong>on</strong> Census Organizati<strong>on</strong>, Government of Pakistan<br />
The federat<strong>in</strong>g units or prov<strong>in</strong>ces are <strong>in</strong>habited by several major and m<strong>in</strong>or ethno-nati<strong>on</strong>al<br />
and cultural groups, mak<strong>in</strong>g Pakistan an excepti<strong>on</strong>ally heterogeneous society. Accord<strong>in</strong>g<br />
to <strong>the</strong> 1998 Census Report, <strong>the</strong> present state of Pakistan is <strong>in</strong>hibited by Punjabis,<br />
Pashtuns, S<strong>in</strong>dhis, Balochi, Saraikis, Gilgitis, Baltistanis, and Mohajirs. It should be<br />
noted that <strong>the</strong>se ethnic groups are spread across prov<strong>in</strong>cial geographical boundaries.<br />
Moreover, <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>-migrati<strong>on</strong> of Pashtuns and Punjabis to Baluchistan and S<strong>in</strong>dh has<br />
somewhat altered <strong>the</strong> demographic balance of <strong>the</strong> two prov<strong>in</strong>ces. The Afghan refugees,<br />
settled <strong>in</strong> Baluchistan and S<strong>in</strong>dh, with <strong>the</strong> tacit support of <strong>the</strong> government, are deeply<br />
resented by <strong>the</strong> local populati<strong>on</strong>s of <strong>the</strong> two prov<strong>in</strong>ces.<br />
Pakistan: Ideological Orig<strong>in</strong>s and Political Disc<strong>on</strong>tent<br />
The orig<strong>in</strong> of identity politics was rooted <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> basic idea of a separate homeland for <strong>the</strong><br />
Indian Muslims that resulted <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> partiti<strong>on</strong> of India <strong>in</strong> August 1947, and <strong>the</strong> creati<strong>on</strong> of<br />
two states. The c<strong>on</strong>cept was based <strong>on</strong> a c<strong>on</strong>structed comm<strong>on</strong> identity of all Muslims<br />
transcend<strong>in</strong>g o<strong>the</strong>r identities. The well-known Pakistani historian, Ishtiaq Hussa<strong>in</strong><br />
Qureshi while quot<strong>in</strong>g J<strong>in</strong>nah <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> identity questi<strong>on</strong> remarked: “The Quaid-e-Azam<br />
could have argued that <strong>the</strong> areas which were to c<strong>on</strong>stitute Pakistan had a different history<br />
dur<strong>in</strong>g significantly l<strong>on</strong>g period of time and had characteristics which dist<strong>in</strong>guished <strong>the</strong>m<br />
from <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r people of <strong>the</strong> sub-c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ent. But <strong>the</strong>se arguments never occurred to his<br />
m<strong>in</strong>d. The <strong>on</strong>ly argument that he advanced was that Muslims were different because <strong>the</strong>y<br />
were Muslims, not because <strong>the</strong>y were Bengalis, or S<strong>in</strong>dhis, or Punjabis and or Pathans,<br />
140
ut simply because <strong>the</strong>y were Muslims. And what <strong>in</strong> his view made <strong>the</strong> Muslim<br />
different? The basis of <strong>the</strong> difference was <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong>ir entire way of life is founded<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> truth, <strong>the</strong> doctr<strong>in</strong>e and <strong>the</strong> teach<strong>in</strong>gs of Islam 3 ”. J<strong>in</strong>nah and <strong>the</strong> Muslim League,<br />
def<strong>in</strong>itely had a geography for separate homeland <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d 4 , but found it difficult to argue<br />
for its creati<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> a dist<strong>in</strong>ct geographic basis as it was impossible to create a geographical<br />
and cultural c<strong>on</strong>necti<strong>on</strong> between <strong>the</strong> western and <strong>the</strong> eastern parts of <strong>the</strong> imag<strong>in</strong>ed<br />
country and <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>. C<strong>on</strong>sequently, <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> of an ideology, which emphasized<br />
<strong>the</strong> two-nati<strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong>ory – Muslims and H<strong>in</strong>dus are two separate nati<strong>on</strong>s and cannot live<br />
toge<strong>the</strong>r. The ideology served to dist<strong>in</strong>guish <strong>the</strong>m from <strong>the</strong> majority ‘o<strong>the</strong>rs’ and created<br />
a unity between <strong>the</strong> two parts where <strong>the</strong> Muslims were <strong>in</strong> majority. .<br />
The c<strong>on</strong>cept was vague and complicated by <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> majority of <strong>the</strong> Muslims who<br />
lived <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> areas that eventually c<strong>on</strong>stituted <strong>the</strong> state of Pakistan had <strong>the</strong>ir own dist<strong>in</strong>ct<br />
l<strong>in</strong>guistic, cultural and ethnic identity. Also, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> early twentieth century, religious and<br />
ethnic identities were already highly politicized <strong>in</strong> Nor<strong>the</strong>rn India. The anti-col<strong>on</strong>ial<br />
movement <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1930’s and 40’s witnessed <strong>the</strong> emergence of compet<strong>in</strong>g nati<strong>on</strong>alist,<br />
religious and ethnic <strong>in</strong>terests. These compet<strong>in</strong>g ‘nati<strong>on</strong>alists movements’ dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
col<strong>on</strong>ial period worked at two levels – <strong>on</strong>e, to wage a freedom struggle aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong><br />
foreign rule, and two, to build a cohesive ‘nati<strong>on</strong>al identity’ 5 . However, <strong>the</strong> All India<br />
Muslim League, that popularized <strong>the</strong> idea of a separate homeland for Muslims of India, at<br />
<strong>on</strong>e po<strong>in</strong>t, was able to shape a comm<strong>on</strong> identity of all Muslims transcend<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ir o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
identities i.e., ethnic, l<strong>in</strong>guistic, cultural and territorial.<br />
In political terms <strong>on</strong>e would hold that “identities are chosen; that is, out of an <strong>in</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ite<br />
range of possible cultural identities that <strong>on</strong>e is selected as <strong>the</strong> political identity which it is<br />
believed offers <strong>the</strong> greatest scope of political success”. 6 (David Taylor and Malcolm<br />
Yapp “Political identity <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Asia</strong>”:1979:x) At <strong>the</strong> same time, it is important to<br />
recognize that while certa<strong>in</strong> parameters may objectively create a social group – or an<br />
ethnic group – this does not automatically translate <strong>in</strong>to a politically active identity 7 .<br />
While Muslims of India largely had accepted an identity transcend<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ir o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
identities <strong>the</strong>re were vast c<strong>on</strong>cerns raised by <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>n c<strong>on</strong>tent<strong>in</strong>g regi<strong>on</strong>al elites of <strong>the</strong><br />
prov<strong>in</strong>ces. Bengalis, Punjabis, Pathans, S<strong>in</strong>dhis and Balochi. The feared that <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> future<br />
state <strong>the</strong>ir primary identities might get culturally assimilated and political underm<strong>in</strong>ed.<br />
Therefore, <strong>the</strong> Lahore Resoluti<strong>on</strong> of All India Muslim League of March 23, 1940 had<br />
unequivocally recognized that “<strong>the</strong> proposed country would be a multiethnic and<br />
multil<strong>in</strong>gual c<strong>on</strong>federati<strong>on</strong> with safeguards for <strong>the</strong> protecti<strong>on</strong> of m<strong>in</strong>orities” 8 . The<br />
resoluti<strong>on</strong> declared, “No c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al plan would be workable or acceptable to <strong>the</strong><br />
Muslims unless geographical c<strong>on</strong>tiguous units are demarcated <strong>in</strong>to regi<strong>on</strong>s which should<br />
be so c<strong>on</strong>stituted with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary. That <strong>the</strong> areas<br />
<strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong> Muslims are numerically <strong>in</strong> majority as <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> North-Western and Eastern<br />
z<strong>on</strong>es of India should be grouped to c<strong>on</strong>stitute <strong>in</strong>dependent states <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>stituent<br />
units shall be aut<strong>on</strong>omous and sovereign…. " 9 . The Lahore Resoluti<strong>on</strong> encouraged<br />
o<strong>the</strong>rwise hostile Punjabi, S<strong>in</strong>dhi and Pashtun elites to c<strong>on</strong>sider jo<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> All India<br />
Muslim League and support<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> idea of Pakistan.<br />
141
India was divided <strong>in</strong>to two sovereign states <strong>in</strong> August 1947. The Muslims of India had<br />
achieved a separate homeland. The leader of <strong>the</strong> new country Mohammad Ali J<strong>in</strong>nah<br />
address<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> C<strong>on</strong>stituent Assembly underl<strong>in</strong>ed that Pakistan would be a federal state,<br />
however <strong>in</strong> successive public meet<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> Dacca, Peshawar, Quetta and Sibi (August<br />
1947 to August 1948) his t<strong>on</strong>e and tenor changed entirely. He stressed that “<strong>the</strong> people of<br />
Pakistan are Muslims and <strong>the</strong>y should get rid of prov<strong>in</strong>cialism” 10 . Whereas J<strong>in</strong>nah’s<br />
historic address before <strong>the</strong> C<strong>on</strong>stituent Assembly had asserted a secular basis for <strong>the</strong><br />
relati<strong>on</strong>ship of <strong>the</strong> citizen and state, yet, six m<strong>on</strong>ths later, J<strong>in</strong>nah would str<strong>on</strong>gly advise<br />
<strong>the</strong> S<strong>in</strong>dh Bar Associati<strong>on</strong> to prepare <strong>the</strong>mselves to "sacrifice and die <strong>in</strong> order to make<br />
Pakistan [a] truly great Islamic State" 11 .<br />
People particularly <strong>in</strong> East Pakistan and Baluchistan were not enthusiastic about J<strong>in</strong>nah’s<br />
visi<strong>on</strong> of <strong>on</strong>e country - <strong>on</strong>e nati<strong>on</strong> and <strong>on</strong>e language. The elite that assumed power <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
new country, was dom<strong>in</strong>ated by two groups -mohajirs 12 and Punjabis. Their dom<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong><br />
came to be seen by o<strong>the</strong>r regi<strong>on</strong>al groups <strong>in</strong> ethno-nati<strong>on</strong>al terms. Regi<strong>on</strong>al ethnic<br />
balances were also put under huge stra<strong>in</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> massive migrati<strong>on</strong> of populati<strong>on</strong><br />
from India to Pakistan. In particular, <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>centrati<strong>on</strong> of refugees <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> urban center of<br />
S<strong>in</strong>dh sent negative signals, especially as <strong>the</strong> East Punjab migrants who preferred to settle<br />
<strong>in</strong> Punjab, were scattered all over <strong>the</strong> prov<strong>in</strong>ce but, those who migrated from UP, Bihar<br />
and Maharashtra were c<strong>on</strong>centrated <strong>in</strong> Karachi, Hyderabad and o<strong>the</strong>r urban towns of<br />
S<strong>in</strong>dh. The S<strong>in</strong>dhi speak<strong>in</strong>g local populati<strong>on</strong> saw <strong>the</strong> massive <strong>in</strong>flux as threaten<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
culture and language.<br />
Table 2 - S<strong>in</strong>dh: Increase <strong>in</strong> Urban Populati<strong>on</strong><br />
S<strong>in</strong>dh Prov<strong>in</strong>ce 1951 1961 1972 1981 1998<br />
Total 6,047,748 8,367,065 14,155,909 19,028,666 30,439,893<br />
Rural 4,279,621 5,200,047 8,430,133 10,785,630 15,600,031<br />
Urban 1,768,127 3,167,018 5,725,776 8,243,036 14,839,862<br />
Source: Census Reports of Pakistan<br />
The policy of c<strong>on</strong>centrat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> migrant populati<strong>on</strong> was c<strong>on</strong>strued as a political strategy<br />
devised to create political c<strong>on</strong>stituencies for <strong>the</strong> Urdu speak<strong>in</strong>g elite of <strong>the</strong> country who<br />
had spearheaded <strong>the</strong> movement for a separate country but had no political c<strong>on</strong>stituency to<br />
c<strong>on</strong>test electi<strong>on</strong>s. Most historians argue that despite <strong>the</strong> opportunism of elite and<br />
regardless of <strong>the</strong> ethnic imbalances, it should still have been possible for <strong>the</strong> rul<strong>in</strong>g elite<br />
to follow less exclusive and more encompass<strong>in</strong>g policies at <strong>the</strong> level of culture, language,<br />
ec<strong>on</strong>omic development and <strong>the</strong> exercise of political powers <strong>in</strong> order to favor an <strong>in</strong>tegrated<br />
polity 13 .<br />
With<strong>in</strong> a fortnight of Pakistan’s creati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> August 1947, <strong>the</strong> central government, under<br />
M.A. J<strong>in</strong>nah had toppled <strong>the</strong> prov<strong>in</strong>cial government of North West Fr<strong>on</strong>tier Prov<strong>in</strong>ce<br />
follow<strong>in</strong>g a c<strong>on</strong>fr<strong>on</strong>tati<strong>on</strong> with <strong>the</strong> Prov<strong>in</strong>cial M<strong>in</strong>istry over <strong>the</strong> status of <strong>the</strong> Prov<strong>in</strong>ce<br />
follow<strong>in</strong>g a referendum (July 1947) to determ<strong>in</strong>e whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> prov<strong>in</strong>ce would rema<strong>in</strong> a<br />
part of India or become a part of Pakistan. In ano<strong>the</strong>r show of force by <strong>the</strong> center, seven<br />
m<strong>on</strong>ths later, <strong>the</strong> Chief M<strong>in</strong>ister of S<strong>in</strong>dh, M.H. Khuhro was dismissed. He had opposed<br />
<strong>the</strong> Governor General <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> separati<strong>on</strong> of Karachi from <strong>the</strong> prov<strong>in</strong>ce. 14 In 1949, <strong>the</strong><br />
Punjab Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Legislative Assembly was dissolved and <strong>the</strong> Governor took over <strong>the</strong><br />
142
adm<strong>in</strong>istrati<strong>on</strong> 15 . Such measures were forerunners of <strong>the</strong> authoritarian and centraliz<strong>in</strong>g<br />
tendencies of <strong>the</strong> powerful central elite that enjoyed very little credibility particularly<br />
am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong> less privileged ethnic groups.<br />
It sowed <strong>the</strong> seeds for unrest and ethnic resurgence that c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to haunt Pakistan to<br />
date. In <strong>the</strong> case of <strong>the</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>cely state of Kalat, <strong>the</strong> Khan of Kalat declared <strong>in</strong>dependence<br />
<strong>on</strong> August 15, 1947 but offered to negotiate a special relati<strong>on</strong>ship with Pakistan <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
spheres of defense, foreign affairs, and communicati<strong>on</strong>s. Pakistan’s leaders rejected <strong>the</strong><br />
declarati<strong>on</strong> and after n<strong>in</strong>e m<strong>on</strong>ths of heightened tensi<strong>on</strong>s annexed <strong>the</strong> Kalat forcibly. Its<br />
forcible annexati<strong>on</strong> was followed by military misadventures <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> prov<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>in</strong> 1947,<br />
1958, 1974 and <strong>the</strong> current <strong>on</strong> go<strong>in</strong>g military operati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Prov<strong>in</strong>ce.<br />
However, it was <strong>the</strong> oppositi<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> Bengalis <strong>in</strong> East Pakistan to <strong>the</strong> central elite’s<br />
refusal to <strong>in</strong>tegrate <strong>the</strong> regi<strong>on</strong>al elites <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> structure of power, that posed <strong>the</strong> most<br />
serious blow to <strong>the</strong> survival of <strong>the</strong> Pakistan state East Pakistan was ethnically a uniform<br />
prov<strong>in</strong>ce which c<strong>on</strong>stituted 56.75% of <strong>the</strong> country’s total populati<strong>on</strong> but <strong>in</strong> terms of its<br />
allocati<strong>on</strong> of quota <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> central government it was not given its due share. The first<br />
quota system <strong>in</strong>troduced <strong>in</strong> 1948 provided for a regi<strong>on</strong>al model of recruitment and East-<br />
Pakistan which accounted for more that half <strong>the</strong> populati<strong>on</strong> got a share 42 % which was<br />
well below its demographic strength 16 . Karachi with a populati<strong>on</strong> of around <strong>on</strong>e milli<strong>on</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong> 1951 got a share which was 50% more than its share <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>al populati<strong>on</strong>. In<br />
additi<strong>on</strong>, <strong>the</strong> city was given 15% share for potential migrants al<strong>on</strong>g with a substantial<br />
porti<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> federal bureaucracy located <strong>in</strong> Karachi. The central government, dom<strong>in</strong>ated<br />
by migrants, <strong>in</strong>sisted that Urdu would be <strong>the</strong> <strong>on</strong>ly official language of <strong>the</strong> country. It was<br />
rejected by <strong>the</strong> East Pakistan and became a major hurdle <strong>in</strong> fram<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>.<br />
The three c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>s promulgated <strong>in</strong> 1956, 1962 and 1973 c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued to practice <strong>the</strong><br />
c<strong>on</strong>centrati<strong>on</strong> of power <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> unitary central governments. The first two documents did<br />
not even recognize <strong>the</strong> existence of multi-cultural reality of <strong>the</strong> country and treated West<br />
Pakistan as <strong>on</strong>e entity <strong>in</strong> order to compete demographically with <strong>the</strong> eastern w<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong><br />
country. The effect of this lack of accommodati<strong>on</strong> and directi<strong>on</strong> was clearly shown when<br />
<strong>the</strong> Muslim League was routed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1954 electi<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> East Pakistan by <strong>the</strong> United Fr<strong>on</strong>t<br />
– ma<strong>in</strong>ly a coaliti<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> Awami League, and <strong>the</strong> Krishak Sramik Party, led by two <strong>on</strong>etime<br />
leaders of Muslim League, Hussa<strong>in</strong> Shaheed Suhrawardy and Fazlul Haq. The<br />
coaliti<strong>on</strong> ran <strong>on</strong> an aut<strong>on</strong>omist platform. Nati<strong>on</strong>al Awami Party <strong>in</strong> West Pakistan also<br />
emerged <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1950’s, which too supported prov<strong>in</strong>cial aut<strong>on</strong>omy. The scheduled nati<strong>on</strong>al<br />
electi<strong>on</strong>s were superseded by <strong>the</strong> Ayub Khan’s martial law <strong>in</strong> 1958. F<strong>in</strong>ally, <strong>in</strong> 1970<br />
when nati<strong>on</strong>al electi<strong>on</strong>s did take place, it unleashed a reacti<strong>on</strong> that led to <strong>the</strong><br />
dismemberment of <strong>the</strong> country.<br />
After <strong>the</strong> break up of Pakistan and <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependence of Bangladesh <strong>in</strong> 1971, it may be<br />
<strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g to note, that academics began to forward geographical and cultural arguments<br />
that emphasised (West) Pakistan as a ‘true’ nati<strong>on</strong>-state. The noted jurist and Pakistan<br />
People’s Party parliamentarian, Aitzaz Ehsan <strong>in</strong> his book The Indus Saga stated, "The<br />
Indus regi<strong>on</strong>, compris<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> northwestern part of <strong>the</strong> Indian subc<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ent (now<br />
Pakistan), has always had its dist<strong>in</strong>ct identity-racially, ethnically, l<strong>in</strong>guistically and<br />
143
culturally. In <strong>the</strong> last five thousand years this regi<strong>on</strong> has been a part of India politically<br />
for <strong>on</strong>ly five hundred years. Pakistan, <strong>the</strong>n, is no 'artificial' state c<strong>on</strong>jured up by <strong>the</strong><br />
disaffected Muslim elite of British India 17 ”. To del<strong>in</strong>k <strong>the</strong> rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g Pakistan from <strong>the</strong><br />
Indian subc<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ent a new <strong>the</strong>ory was formulated which propounded that West Pakistan<br />
had always been a separate geographical regi<strong>on</strong> and <strong>the</strong> present geography of <strong>the</strong> country<br />
justifies not its creati<strong>on</strong> but also its <strong>in</strong>dependence.<br />
Bhutto Government and Nati<strong>on</strong>al resurgence<br />
Three years, 1969-71, will rema<strong>in</strong> enormously significant <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> political history of<br />
Pakistan. In those years a country-wide upris<strong>in</strong>g forced General Ayub Khan to step down,<br />
approximately 500,000 people died <strong>in</strong> cycl<strong>on</strong>e hit East Pakistan, and <strong>the</strong> general<br />
electi<strong>on</strong>s, <strong>the</strong> first s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> creati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> country, were held <strong>on</strong> a highly polarized<br />
political agenda. The electi<strong>on</strong>s held <strong>in</strong> 1970 gave a split mandate. East Pakistan gave a<br />
thump<strong>in</strong>g majority to Awami League of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Punjab and S<strong>in</strong>dh had<br />
overwhelm<strong>in</strong>g voted for Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party whereas N.W.F.P and<br />
Baluchistan opted for Pashtun and Baluch nati<strong>on</strong>alist parties. The electi<strong>on</strong>s results were<br />
not h<strong>on</strong>ored by West Pakistani leaders, push<strong>in</strong>g Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s led Awami<br />
League to civil disobedience, precipitat<strong>in</strong>g ruthless military repressi<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> East-Pakistan<br />
<strong>in</strong> which three milli<strong>on</strong> 18 were killed, and its f<strong>in</strong>al denouement, <strong>the</strong> partiti<strong>on</strong> of Pakistan<br />
<strong>in</strong>to two <strong>in</strong>dependent sovereign states of Bangladesh (East Pakistan) and Pakistan (West<br />
Pakistan).<br />
The popular expectati<strong>on</strong> was that after <strong>the</strong> debacle <strong>in</strong> East-Pakistan <strong>the</strong> leaders would<br />
have learnt some less<strong>on</strong>s. Unfortunately, <strong>the</strong> post 1971 Pakistani state structure was <strong>on</strong>ly<br />
marg<strong>in</strong>ally different from <strong>the</strong> <strong>on</strong>e preced<strong>in</strong>g it 19 . The <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al imbalance with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
state rema<strong>in</strong>ed substantially unchanged despite <strong>the</strong> assumpti<strong>on</strong> of presidential office by<br />
an elected leader backed by a party with bases of support <strong>in</strong> two of <strong>the</strong> four rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />
prov<strong>in</strong>ces. The civilian government had a perfect opportunity to tilt <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al<br />
balance away from <strong>the</strong> n<strong>on</strong>-elected <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>s of <strong>the</strong> state as <strong>the</strong>re was a popular antibureaucratic<br />
sentiment. Moreover, <strong>the</strong> defeat <strong>in</strong> East-Pakistan had demoralized <strong>the</strong> army<br />
and it would have been impossible for <strong>the</strong> army to <strong>in</strong>terfere at that po<strong>in</strong>t <strong>in</strong> any attempt to<br />
restructure <strong>the</strong> state <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
The Nati<strong>on</strong>al Assembly had approved <strong>the</strong> state’s Third C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> April 10, 1973,<br />
declar<strong>in</strong>g Pakistan to be a Federati<strong>on</strong>, sett<strong>in</strong>g up a bicameral legislature at <strong>the</strong> center<br />
c<strong>on</strong>sist<strong>in</strong>g of two houses, <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>al assembly and <strong>the</strong> senate with four prov<strong>in</strong>cial<br />
assemblies. Despite <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> exist<strong>in</strong>g state structure rema<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>ed towards a<br />
c<strong>on</strong>centrati<strong>on</strong> of power <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> center, its significance lay <strong>in</strong> it be<strong>in</strong>g a c<strong>on</strong>sensus document<br />
endorsed by all major political parties <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g pro-prov<strong>in</strong>cials, centrists, and <strong>the</strong><br />
religious lobby.<br />
The Bhutto’s years saw a refusal to accommodate <strong>the</strong> oppositi<strong>on</strong> or ethno-l<strong>in</strong>guistic<br />
political parties; <strong>the</strong> lack of respect for <strong>the</strong> democratic rights of nati<strong>on</strong>alities c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued to<br />
haunt <strong>the</strong> dream of Pakistani nati<strong>on</strong> even <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> democratic era. Bhutto’s c<strong>on</strong>fidence,<br />
populist rhetoric and political opportunism <strong>on</strong>ce aga<strong>in</strong> pushed <strong>the</strong> country <strong>in</strong> deeper<br />
144
crisis. The brief <strong>in</strong>terlude with democracy did not augur well for <strong>the</strong> rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g half of <strong>the</strong><br />
country 20 .<br />
Also, Bhutto’s political agenda was difficult to digest for <strong>the</strong> traditi<strong>on</strong>al stakeholders <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> power politics. Inter-group tensi<strong>on</strong>s grew as members of <strong>the</strong> lower and middle classes<br />
became disillusi<strong>on</strong>ed, <strong>in</strong>dustrialists were alienated by <strong>the</strong> government's nati<strong>on</strong>alizati<strong>on</strong><br />
policies and wealthy landlords were threatened by <strong>the</strong> land reform program. In 1973, <strong>in</strong> a<br />
move which was to give a str<strong>on</strong>g prov<strong>in</strong>cial dimensi<strong>on</strong> to <strong>the</strong> widen<strong>in</strong>g oppositi<strong>on</strong> to his<br />
regime, Bhutto dissolved two n<strong>on</strong> Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) prov<strong>in</strong>cial governments<br />
<strong>in</strong> Baluchistan and N.W.F.P. The leadership of <strong>the</strong> two governments was charged with<br />
anti state activities <strong>in</strong> collaborati<strong>on</strong> with Kabul and New Delhi. Also, he charged with<br />
c<strong>on</strong>spiracy aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> state Khan Abdul Wali Khan, <strong>the</strong> leader of <strong>the</strong> Nati<strong>on</strong>al Awami<br />
Party (NAP) which had been <strong>on</strong>e of <strong>the</strong> coaliti<strong>on</strong> partners <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> dismissed prov<strong>in</strong>cial<br />
assemblies of Baluchistan and N.W.F.P. Subsequently, Bhutto called <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> army to crush<br />
a tribal upris<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Baluchistan.<br />
The Baluchistan prov<strong>in</strong>cial government was headed by Sardar Attaullah Khan, chief of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Mengal tribe and a Baluch nati<strong>on</strong>alist. Anayat Allah Baluch, a respected historian <strong>on</strong><br />
Baluchistan, argues that central government was unhappy with <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>alist’s<br />
government <strong>in</strong> Baluchistan because it had <strong>in</strong>troduced a comprehensive programme of<br />
socio-cultural and ec<strong>on</strong>omic reforms <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> prov<strong>in</strong>ce. The nati<strong>on</strong>alists were also close to<br />
<strong>the</strong> USSR and wanted <strong>the</strong> Soviet leaders to play more decisive role <strong>in</strong> regi<strong>on</strong> 21 . The<br />
<strong>in</strong>telligence agencies discovered Soviet-made arms <strong>in</strong> Iraqi embassy <strong>in</strong> Islamabad <strong>in</strong><br />
1973. The central government alleged that <strong>the</strong> arms were for a secessi<strong>on</strong>ist movement <strong>in</strong><br />
Baluchistan. Bhutto dismissed <strong>the</strong> prov<strong>in</strong>cial government and arrested <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong> leaders<br />
<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g Sardar Attaullah Megnal, Sardar Khair Buksh Marri, and Mir Gaus Baksh<br />
Bizanjo. In 1973 Baluch students and political cadre of NAP reorganized <strong>the</strong> Baluch<br />
Liberati<strong>on</strong> Fr<strong>on</strong>t (BLP) to strive for an <strong>in</strong>dependent socialist Baluchistan. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
<strong>on</strong>e estimate, at <strong>the</strong> height of liberati<strong>on</strong> struggle, <strong>the</strong> Pakistan state was spend<strong>in</strong>g nearly<br />
<strong>on</strong>e milli<strong>on</strong> rupees a day 22 . The <strong>in</strong>surgency lasted four years before it was brutally put<br />
down. The army used Huey-Cobra gunship helicopters provided by Iran and flown by<br />
Iranian pilots.<br />
Bhutto was able to mobilize domestic support, especially from Punjab and <strong>the</strong> Punjabi<br />
dom<strong>in</strong>ated army. The Baluch had resented <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>flux of Punjabi settlers, c<strong>on</strong>troll<strong>in</strong>g<br />
m<strong>in</strong>es, trade and bus<strong>in</strong>esses. The centre was able to generate <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al support aga<strong>in</strong>st<br />
<strong>the</strong> Baluch struggle due to its broad Marxist-Len<strong>in</strong>ist political outlook. The western<br />
powers feared that an <strong>in</strong>dependent or aut<strong>on</strong>omous Baluchistan might pave <strong>the</strong> way for <strong>the</strong><br />
Soviet Uni<strong>on</strong> to step <strong>in</strong> to c<strong>on</strong>trol <strong>the</strong> coastal waters of <strong>the</strong> prov<strong>in</strong>ce. There was no<br />
noticeable outside open support to <strong>the</strong> movement by Pakistan’s neighbors. Afghanistan<br />
had its own <strong>in</strong>ternal problems and was seem<strong>in</strong>gly anxious to normalize relati<strong>on</strong>s with<br />
Pakistan; India was fearful of fur<strong>the</strong>r balkanizati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> subc<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ent after <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>dependence of Bangladesh, and <strong>the</strong> Soviet Uni<strong>on</strong> did not wish to jeopardize <strong>the</strong><br />
leverage it was ga<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g with Pakistan’s rulers. The Baluch <strong>in</strong>surgency was protracted and<br />
resulted <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Pakistan army suffer<strong>in</strong>g 8,000 to 10,000 casualties, and an untold number<br />
of civilian and guerrilla casualties.<br />
145
Meanwhile, <strong>the</strong> n<strong>on</strong>-Muslim m<strong>in</strong>orities were gett<strong>in</strong>g anxious about <strong>the</strong> state's<br />
<strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly formal identificati<strong>on</strong> with Islam. Bhutto was a secular pers<strong>on</strong> but adopted<br />
policies to appease religious elements and declared Ahmadiyas 23 n<strong>on</strong>-Muslims. The<br />
civilian <strong>in</strong>terlude failed to make headway <strong>in</strong> actualiz<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> democratic political<br />
expressi<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> any mean<strong>in</strong>gful way, lead<strong>in</strong>g back to a military takeover. Militarism and<br />
Islam were to be <strong>the</strong> tw<strong>in</strong> pillars of <strong>the</strong> Zia regime, a formidable blend <strong>in</strong> a politically<br />
polarized and <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly pulverized society 24 . On assum<strong>in</strong>g power, General Zia-ul-Haq<br />
<strong>in</strong>herited armed secessi<strong>on</strong>ist upris<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> largest prov<strong>in</strong>ce, Baluchistan. The unrest<br />
coupled with Afghan war was mov<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> prov<strong>in</strong>ce towards a precarious positi<strong>on</strong>. He<br />
offered amnesty to appease <strong>the</strong> powerful tribal chiefs, withdrew troops from large parts of<br />
<strong>the</strong> prov<strong>in</strong>ce and released <strong>the</strong> jailed leaders of <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>alist parties. The core objective<br />
of <strong>the</strong> military junta was to ga<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> favor all anti Bhutto forces. Zia ul Haq w<strong>on</strong> over <strong>the</strong><br />
Pashtun leadership such as Khan Abdul Wali Khan but Baluch leaders rema<strong>in</strong>ed hostile<br />
to <strong>the</strong> military government. Several meet<strong>in</strong>gs were held <strong>in</strong> Islamabad between military<br />
regime and Baluch leaders <strong>in</strong> 1977 and 1978 that ended <strong>in</strong> some k<strong>in</strong>d of temporary<br />
compromise. Sardar Khair Buksh Marri and Sardar Attaullah Megnal went <strong>in</strong>to exile. Mir<br />
Ghaus Baksh Baz<strong>in</strong>jo who rema<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> country later blamed <strong>the</strong> military regime of<br />
not h<strong>on</strong>or<strong>in</strong>g its promises most notably <strong>the</strong> rehabilitati<strong>on</strong> of families victimized dur<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>the</strong> military operati<strong>on</strong>s and judicial enquiries of <strong>the</strong> military acti<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> Baluchistan.<br />
By w<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> partial support of Baluch and Pashtun leaders, Baluchistan and <strong>the</strong> NWFP<br />
were momentarily c<strong>on</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed, but it was <strong>in</strong> S<strong>in</strong>dh that disc<strong>on</strong>tent was brimm<strong>in</strong>g over,<br />
aggravated by <strong>the</strong> role of <strong>the</strong> military regime <strong>in</strong> encourag<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> formati<strong>on</strong> of a new<br />
political party, Mohajir Quami Movement (MQM) <strong>in</strong> 1984. The move was aimed at<br />
counter<strong>in</strong>g Bhutto’s popularity <strong>in</strong> his home prov<strong>in</strong>ce. Bhutto had alienated <strong>the</strong> Urdu<br />
speak<strong>in</strong>g elite through his policy of affirmative acti<strong>on</strong> and mak<strong>in</strong>g S<strong>in</strong>dhi language<br />
compulsory <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> prov<strong>in</strong>ce. The Urdu speak<strong>in</strong>g populati<strong>on</strong> had always been <strong>in</strong> upper<br />
echel<strong>on</strong> of power, now it so<strong>on</strong> dom<strong>in</strong>ated urban S<strong>in</strong>dh both <strong>in</strong> terms of street power as<br />
well as by virtue of its str<strong>on</strong>g presence <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Assembly, <strong>the</strong> Metropolitan<br />
Corporati<strong>on</strong>, <strong>the</strong> judiciary and educati<strong>on</strong>al <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>s. The Zia-Bhutto tensi<strong>on</strong>s trickled<br />
down to ord<strong>in</strong>ary people <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> form ethnic c<strong>on</strong>flict <strong>in</strong> S<strong>in</strong>dh. Bhutto represented rural<br />
S<strong>in</strong>dhis whereas Zia be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> mentor of MQM represented <strong>the</strong> urban centers of power.<br />
Zia built his political agenda <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> foundati<strong>on</strong>s laid by Bhutto. Islam became an<br />
<strong>in</strong>strument of coerci<strong>on</strong> and oppressi<strong>on</strong> aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> powerless and political opp<strong>on</strong>ents of<br />
<strong>the</strong> military junta. The use of Islam compounded <strong>the</strong> problems of center-prov<strong>in</strong>ce<br />
relati<strong>on</strong>s, pitt<strong>in</strong>g prov<strong>in</strong>cial secularists aga<strong>in</strong>st Islamic fundamentalists dom<strong>in</strong>ant at <strong>the</strong><br />
center 25 . The problem was fur<strong>the</strong>r compounded by <strong>the</strong> widespread percepti<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
smaller prov<strong>in</strong>ces that Islamizati<strong>on</strong> process was a crude and veiled attempt to impose<br />
Punjabi culture and values <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> rest of <strong>the</strong> country.<br />
The current resurgence of nati<strong>on</strong>alist forces as well as religious extremism is <strong>the</strong> outcome<br />
of Zia’s Islamisati<strong>on</strong> those policies. However, <strong>the</strong> unrest <strong>in</strong> tribal regi<strong>on</strong> of NWFP has a<br />
different res<strong>on</strong>ance. It will be premature to l<strong>in</strong>k <strong>the</strong> tribal unrest <strong>the</strong> North and <strong>South</strong><br />
Waziristan with Pushto<strong>on</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>alism, s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> vanguards of Pushto<strong>on</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>alism are<br />
146
support<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> military acti<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> area. Indeed, <strong>the</strong> rise of Pushto<strong>on</strong> middle class has<br />
transformed <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>alist movement <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Pashto speak<strong>in</strong>g belt of Pakistan which now<br />
has a sizeable share <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> armed forces as well as <strong>the</strong> civil bureaucracy. The grow<strong>in</strong>g<br />
trade and <strong>in</strong>dustrial relati<strong>on</strong>s between Punjab and NWFP also is a factor <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> emerg<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>in</strong>ter prov<strong>in</strong>cial political alliances. N<strong>on</strong>e<strong>the</strong>less, <strong>the</strong> view that <strong>the</strong> country is ‘Punjabized’<br />
has credibility given <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> two major <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>s, <strong>the</strong> armed forces and<br />
bureaucracy are still overwhelm<strong>in</strong>gly dom<strong>in</strong>ated by <strong>the</strong> Punjabis but Punjabi-Pushto<strong>on</strong><br />
and Punjabi-Mohajir political alliances seems to be shape of th<strong>in</strong>gs to come.<br />
Table 3 - Pakistan: Ethnic Representati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> Federal Bureaucracy, 1973-2006<br />
Prov<strong>in</strong>ce 1973 1983 1986 2005-6<br />
All Senior All Senior All Senior All Senior<br />
Punjab 49.3 53.5 54.9 55.8 55.3 57.7 49.65 56.37<br />
NWFP 10.5 7.0 13.4 11.6 12.6 12.1 23.24 13.33<br />
S<strong>in</strong>dh Rural 3.1 2.7 5.4 5.1 7.2 6.7 16.22 15.56<br />
S<strong>in</strong>dh Urban 30.1 33.5 17.4 20.2 18.2 18.3<br />
Baluchistan 3.09 3.08<br />
Nor<strong>the</strong>rn 2.6 1.3 3.6 3.4 1.4 1.5 6.02 8.67<br />
Areas<br />
FATA 0.5 1.70<br />
AJK 1.8 0.5 1.9 0.9 1.7 0.7 1.23 1.25<br />
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00<br />
Source: Annual Statistical Bullet<strong>in</strong> of Federal Government Employees, 2006 & Mohammad Waseem,<br />
Affirmative Acti<strong>on</strong> Policies <strong>in</strong> Pakistan, Ethnic Studies Report, ICES, Vol. XV. No 2, July 1997<br />
In <strong>the</strong> 1980’s, political resistance to <strong>the</strong> center became c<strong>on</strong>centrated <strong>in</strong> S<strong>in</strong>dh. The<br />
prov<strong>in</strong>ce became a hotbed of separatist feel<strong>in</strong>g after <strong>the</strong> overthrow of Bhutto by <strong>the</strong><br />
predom<strong>in</strong>antly Punjabi army and his subsequent executi<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> 1979. S<strong>in</strong>dhi activism kept<br />
<strong>the</strong> issue of prov<strong>in</strong>cial aut<strong>on</strong>omy and power shar<strong>in</strong>g from be<strong>in</strong>g submerged by <strong>the</strong> Islamic<br />
rhetoric emanat<strong>in</strong>g from Islamabad 26 . Rasul Baksh Palejo, leader of <strong>the</strong> Awami Tehrik,<br />
played a major role <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1983 rural upris<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> S<strong>in</strong>dh and had followers am<strong>on</strong>g students,<br />
and rural women and peasants. The Movement for <strong>the</strong> Restorati<strong>on</strong> of Democracy (MRD)<br />
drew its ma<strong>in</strong> strength from S<strong>in</strong>dh. Thousands of activists were arrested, tortured and<br />
many of <strong>the</strong>m were killed dur<strong>in</strong>g this period. G.M. Syed was ano<strong>the</strong>r unc<strong>on</strong>tested leader<br />
of S<strong>in</strong>dhi nati<strong>on</strong>alism who often publicly stated his preference for <strong>the</strong> break up of<br />
Pakistan. However, it should be noted that <strong>the</strong> great majority of S<strong>in</strong>dhis can not be<br />
categorized as separatists. In rural S<strong>in</strong>dh, <strong>the</strong> popularity of <strong>the</strong> PPP which has a nati<strong>on</strong>al<br />
ra<strong>the</strong>r than nati<strong>on</strong>alist character rema<strong>in</strong>s a key factor <strong>in</strong> mitigat<strong>in</strong>g and challeng<strong>in</strong>g ethnic<br />
c<strong>on</strong>sciousness. The results of <strong>the</strong> last six general electi<strong>on</strong>s show that S<strong>in</strong>dh is still a PPP<br />
str<strong>on</strong>ghold.<br />
The decade l<strong>on</strong>g return of civilian rule under Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto did nt see<br />
any major <strong>in</strong>cidents of armed upris<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>on</strong>ly sporadic blasts and rocket attacks <strong>on</strong><br />
government properties <strong>in</strong> Baluchistan. Significantly, though, <strong>the</strong> period was plagued with<br />
sectarian menace and <strong>the</strong> mushroom<strong>in</strong>g growth of religious extremist organizati<strong>on</strong>s, and<br />
<strong>the</strong> kill<strong>in</strong>g of hundreds of people across Pakistan.<br />
147
The Current Nati<strong>on</strong>alist Movement <strong>in</strong> Pakistan<br />
The resurgence <strong>in</strong> tensi<strong>on</strong> between <strong>the</strong> central government and prov<strong>in</strong>ces can be located<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> failure of <strong>the</strong> center to fulfill <strong>the</strong> promises it had made <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1973 C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>.<br />
There are c<strong>on</strong>spiracy <strong>the</strong>ories of <strong>in</strong>volvement of <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al powers <strong>in</strong> support<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
rebels <strong>in</strong> Baluchistan and orthodox academics believe that <strong>the</strong> United States, India, and<br />
Ch<strong>in</strong>a have role <strong>in</strong> susta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> rebelli<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> Baluchistan. Our focus here rema<strong>in</strong>s <strong>the</strong><br />
structural roots of <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>flict.<br />
The Baluch, S<strong>in</strong>dhis, Pashtuns and s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> 1980’s <strong>the</strong> Mohajirs, have l<strong>on</strong>g demanded a<br />
restructured relati<strong>on</strong>ship with <strong>the</strong> center that would transfer powers from what is seen as an<br />
exploitative central government to <strong>the</strong> prov<strong>in</strong>ces. In additi<strong>on</strong> to <strong>the</strong> traditi<strong>on</strong>al ethn<strong>on</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>alities,<br />
several smaller ethnic groups have also come up to c<strong>on</strong>tend for recogniti<strong>on</strong><br />
and share <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> power structure i.e., Saraiki, Makranis, Barohis, Chitralis, Gilgitis and<br />
Hazarawals 27 . Interest<strong>in</strong>gly, <strong>the</strong> grievances of <strong>the</strong> smaller groups are not limited to <strong>the</strong><br />
center but <strong>in</strong>volve <strong>the</strong> majority ethnic groups with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir prov<strong>in</strong>ces.<br />
The 1973 c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> was framed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> backdrop of <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependence of (East Pakistan)<br />
Bangladesh <strong>in</strong> 1971 and was federal <strong>in</strong> nature, with a bicameral parliament. And for <strong>the</strong><br />
first time, it recognized <strong>the</strong> existence of three o<strong>the</strong>r nati<strong>on</strong>alities but it guaranteed a<br />
limited decentralizati<strong>on</strong> of political and fiscal powers to <strong>the</strong> federat<strong>in</strong>g units and <strong>the</strong><br />
regi<strong>on</strong>s. The c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> failed to safeguard <strong>the</strong> rights of smaller prov<strong>in</strong>ces due <strong>the</strong><br />
overwhelm<strong>in</strong>g majority of <strong>the</strong> Punjab <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> parliament. All three prov<strong>in</strong>ces even put<br />
toge<strong>the</strong>r make less representati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>al assembly than <strong>the</strong> Punjab al<strong>on</strong>e. The<br />
str<strong>on</strong>g alliance of Punjabis, Mohajirs and Pashtuns has fur<strong>the</strong>r marg<strong>in</strong>alized <strong>the</strong> Baluch,<br />
S<strong>in</strong>dhis and o<strong>the</strong>r smaller ethnic groups <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> political structure. Though <strong>the</strong> upper house<br />
of <strong>the</strong> parliament has an equal representati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> prov<strong>in</strong>ces it lacks <strong>the</strong> power to<br />
undertake issues related to budget allocati<strong>on</strong> and o<strong>the</strong>r fiscal matters.<br />
Table 4 - Representati<strong>on</strong> of Prov<strong>in</strong>ces <strong>in</strong> Nati<strong>on</strong>al Assembly of Pakistan 2002-2007<br />
General Seats Women Total<br />
Baluchistan 14 3 17<br />
Federally Adm<strong>in</strong>istered Tribal Areas 12 - 12<br />
Federal Capital 2 - 2<br />
North West Fr<strong>on</strong>tier Prov<strong>in</strong>ce 35 8 43<br />
Punjab 148 35 183<br />
S<strong>in</strong>dh 61 14 75<br />
Total 272 60 332<br />
The 1973 C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> provided two critical <strong>in</strong>struments for resource distributi<strong>on</strong>. The<br />
Council of Comm<strong>on</strong> Interest (CCI) was c<strong>on</strong>ceived as a critical <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> federal<br />
structure of <strong>the</strong> C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> to safeguard <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terests of federat<strong>in</strong>g units and meant to<br />
serve as an advisory body to <strong>the</strong> federal as well as prov<strong>in</strong>cial governments. The Nati<strong>on</strong>al<br />
F<strong>in</strong>ance Commissi<strong>on</strong> (NFC) is <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al <strong>in</strong>strument to recommend a<br />
formula for shar<strong>in</strong>g of revenue am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong> prov<strong>in</strong>ces. These two <strong>in</strong>struments CCI and <strong>the</strong><br />
NFC were made n<strong>on</strong> functi<strong>on</strong>al and <strong>the</strong> first meet<strong>in</strong>gs of <strong>the</strong> CCI and NFC was called <strong>in</strong><br />
1991, eighteen years after <strong>the</strong> promulgati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>.<br />
Shar<strong>in</strong>g of resources from <strong>the</strong> centralized resource pool is determ<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> basis of<br />
populati<strong>on</strong>. That means Punjab will get <strong>the</strong> approximately 57% of <strong>the</strong> revenue and<br />
148
Baluchistan, which holds 47% of <strong>the</strong> total territory of <strong>the</strong> country, will get a meager 5.7%<br />
It is <strong>on</strong>e of <strong>the</strong> reas<strong>on</strong>s for <strong>the</strong> underdevelopment of <strong>the</strong> smaller prov<strong>in</strong>ces. In 2003<br />
Pakistan human development <strong>in</strong>dices were estimated, for 91 districts and four prov<strong>in</strong>ces<br />
and federally adm<strong>in</strong>istered areas. The variati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> Human Development Indices between<br />
prov<strong>in</strong>ces and districts shows stark regi<strong>on</strong>al disparities <strong>in</strong> both <strong>the</strong> level of ec<strong>on</strong>omic<br />
growth as well as <strong>in</strong> terms of health, educati<strong>on</strong> and <strong>the</strong> quality of life.<br />
Table 5 - Prov<strong>in</strong>ce-wise comparis<strong>on</strong> of HDI<br />
Prov<strong>in</strong>ce-wise share <strong>in</strong> Terms of HDI<br />
Prov<strong>in</strong>ce Top Districts % Middle Districts % Bottom Districts %<br />
Punjab 59% 32% 0%<br />
S<strong>in</strong>dh 13% 29% 19%<br />
NWFP 19% 21% 34%<br />
Baluchistan 9% 18% 47%<br />
Source: Pakistan Nati<strong>on</strong>al Human Development Report 2003<br />
C<strong>on</strong>siderable disparities and variati<strong>on</strong> also exist across prov<strong>in</strong>ces with respect to literacy<br />
rates which vary from 51 % <strong>in</strong> S<strong>in</strong>dh to 36% <strong>in</strong> Baluchistan. Similarly <strong>the</strong> primary<br />
enrolment rate varies from 75 % <strong>in</strong> Punjab to 64 % <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Baluchistan prov<strong>in</strong>ce. The<br />
human development <strong>in</strong>dex as a whole also varies from <strong>the</strong> highest <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Punjab to <strong>the</strong><br />
lowest <strong>in</strong> Baluchistan. The HDI disaggregated by rural and urban areas show that S<strong>in</strong>dh<br />
urban (n<strong>on</strong>-s<strong>in</strong>dhi speak<strong>in</strong>g) has <strong>the</strong> highest rank and S<strong>in</strong>dh rural has <strong>the</strong> lowest of HDI <strong>in</strong><br />
Pakistan.<br />
Table 6 - Rank<strong>in</strong>g of Prov<strong>in</strong>ces by Urban/ Rural and Overall Human Development Index<br />
Name HDI HDI Rank<br />
S<strong>in</strong>dh (urban) 0.659 1<br />
Punjab (urban) 0.657 2<br />
NWFP (urban) 0.627 3<br />
Baluchistan (urban) 0.591 4<br />
Punjab (rural) 0.517 5<br />
NWFP (rural) 0.489 6<br />
Baluchistan (rural) 0.486 7<br />
S<strong>in</strong>dh (rural) 0.456 8<br />
Overall Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Rank<strong>in</strong>g<br />
Punjab 0.557 1<br />
S<strong>in</strong>dh 0.540 2<br />
NWFP 0.510 3<br />
Baluchistan 0.499 4<br />
The <strong>in</strong>dicators above show a l<strong>in</strong>k between <strong>the</strong> demands of nati<strong>on</strong>alist political forces for<br />
aut<strong>on</strong>omy and <strong>the</strong> patterns of uneven development <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> country. Baluchistan and S<strong>in</strong>dh<br />
be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> epicenter of nati<strong>on</strong>alist cause are ranked <strong>the</strong> lowest <strong>on</strong> human development<br />
<strong>in</strong>dex of Pakistan. Interest<strong>in</strong>gly, urban areas of S<strong>in</strong>dh top <strong>the</strong> overall human development<br />
<strong>in</strong>dicators whereas S<strong>in</strong>dh rural falls at <strong>the</strong> bottom of <strong>the</strong> rank<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>dex. The simmer<strong>in</strong>g<br />
anger of <strong>the</strong> S<strong>in</strong>dhi speak<strong>in</strong>g populati<strong>on</strong> is directed not <strong>on</strong>ly towards <strong>the</strong> Punjab but also<br />
at <strong>the</strong> urban mohajirs populati<strong>on</strong> which shares a large chunk of quota of <strong>the</strong> prov<strong>in</strong>ce. Inmigrati<strong>on</strong><br />
to <strong>the</strong> prov<strong>in</strong>ce has reduced <strong>the</strong> number of S<strong>in</strong>dhis from 73.8% <strong>in</strong> 1951 to<br />
59.73% <strong>in</strong> 1998. Dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> years 1981-1995 escalat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>ter group tensi<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong> S<strong>in</strong>dh<br />
forced a large number of migrants <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g Punjabi, Pashtuns and well off mohajirs to<br />
149
leave Karachi. Outward migrati<strong>on</strong> resulted <strong>in</strong> a 7.73 % <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> number of S<strong>in</strong>dhi<br />
speak<strong>in</strong>g populati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> prov<strong>in</strong>ce.<br />
Table 7 - Percentage of populati<strong>on</strong> by mo<strong>the</strong>r t<strong>on</strong>gue <strong>in</strong> S<strong>in</strong>dh<br />
1941 1951 1981 1998<br />
S<strong>in</strong>dhi 82% 73.8% 52% 59.73%<br />
Urdu -- 9.7% 22.64% 21.05%<br />
O<strong>the</strong>rs (Punjabi, Pashto, Balochi and<br />
o<strong>the</strong>rs)<br />
18% 16.5% 24.96% 19.3%<br />
In Pakistan policies of positive discrim<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> favor of underdeveloped communities<br />
and regi<strong>on</strong>s have been <strong>in</strong> place with regard to educati<strong>on</strong>, health facilities and<br />
representati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> public services. In <strong>the</strong> 1980’s Urdu speak<strong>in</strong>g Mohajir demand for<br />
elim<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> quota system peaked <strong>in</strong> urban S<strong>in</strong>dh. In c<strong>on</strong>trast, <strong>the</strong> S<strong>in</strong>dhi speak<strong>in</strong>g<br />
populati<strong>on</strong> demanded quotas not <strong>on</strong>ly <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> basis of <strong>the</strong>ir populati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> Pakistan but <strong>on</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> ratio of S<strong>in</strong>dhi speak<strong>in</strong>g populati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> prov<strong>in</strong>ce. In S<strong>in</strong>dh, Mohajir were <strong>on</strong>ly 3%<br />
of <strong>the</strong> populati<strong>on</strong> and held 21% of <strong>the</strong> jobs <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> civil bureaucracy. In <strong>the</strong> fifteen years of<br />
quota system after 1973, Mohajir representati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> senior positi<strong>on</strong>s decl<strong>in</strong>ed from 33.5%<br />
to 18.3%. The emergence of MQM can be partially attributed to <strong>the</strong> quota system.<br />
Significantly, <strong>the</strong> policy of recruitment to armed services was not allowed to be affected<br />
by <strong>the</strong> quota system. The pr<strong>in</strong>ciple of merit ra<strong>the</strong>r than quota applied to <strong>the</strong> armed forces.<br />
As a result, <strong>the</strong> col<strong>on</strong>ial pattern of dom<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> of Punjab, al<strong>on</strong>g with NWFP as a junior<br />
partner, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> army c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues unabated 28 . This has produced anti-Punjab feel<strong>in</strong>gs am<strong>on</strong>g<br />
n<strong>on</strong>-Punjabis all around.<br />
Table 8 - Pakistan: Representati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> Aut<strong>on</strong>omous Bodies/ Public Corporati<strong>on</strong>s by prov<strong>in</strong>ces: 1993<br />
Prov<strong>in</strong>ce percentage Prescribed Quota<br />
Punjab 49.54 50.0<br />
S<strong>in</strong>dh (Urban) 26.77 7.6<br />
S<strong>in</strong>dh (Rural) 8.16 11.4<br />
NWFP 10.17 11.5<br />
Baluchistan 2.43 3.5<br />
FATA 1.24 4.0<br />
AJK 1.29 2.0<br />
Source: Establishment Divisi<strong>on</strong>, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad<br />
The present ethnic compositi<strong>on</strong> of S<strong>in</strong>dh is such that S<strong>in</strong>dhis have already been reduced<br />
to a m<strong>in</strong>ority <strong>in</strong> many parts of <strong>the</strong> prov<strong>in</strong>ce. Punjabis c<strong>on</strong>stitutes 10.6%, Pashtun 3.6%<br />
and Balochi speak<strong>in</strong>g 6% of <strong>the</strong> populati<strong>on</strong> and are primarily settled <strong>in</strong> highly developed<br />
urban centers. Quota <strong>in</strong> jobs are determ<strong>in</strong>ed by domicile and not by mo<strong>the</strong>r t<strong>on</strong>gue hence<br />
Punjabis, Mohajirs, Pashtuns because of <strong>the</strong>ir access to better educati<strong>on</strong> get preference<br />
when compet<strong>in</strong>g for jobs <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> public and private sectors. It is noteworthy, that <strong>the</strong><br />
majority of <strong>the</strong> S<strong>in</strong>dhi speak<strong>in</strong>g populati<strong>on</strong> still favors <strong>the</strong> centrist Pakistan People’s Party<br />
(PPP) ra<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>alist forces.<br />
The North West Fr<strong>on</strong>tier Prov<strong>in</strong>ce (NWFP) had a str<strong>on</strong>g ethnic c<strong>on</strong>sciousness till <strong>the</strong> 70’s<br />
but it too has changed with <strong>the</strong> progressive <strong>in</strong>tegrati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> Pashtun populati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
150
state structure and <strong>the</strong> market ec<strong>on</strong>omy. Ethnic Pashtuns are c<strong>on</strong>sidered to be <strong>the</strong> junior<br />
partners of Punjab <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> establishment and have a significant presence <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> armed<br />
forces (approximately 25%), civil bureaucracy and public sector corporati<strong>on</strong>s. The war <strong>in</strong><br />
Afghanistan and <strong>the</strong> arrival of nearly 2 milli<strong>on</strong> refugees <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> prov<strong>in</strong>ce also helped <strong>in</strong><br />
dilut<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> demand for separate homeland for Pashtuns. However, <strong>the</strong> politics <strong>in</strong> NWFP<br />
has taken a dangerous turn with nati<strong>on</strong>alist Awaji Nati<strong>on</strong>al Party los<strong>in</strong>g ground to <strong>the</strong><br />
Islamist Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam and Jamaat-e-Islami <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> last general electi<strong>on</strong>s. The<br />
prov<strong>in</strong>ce also is fac<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>tra prov<strong>in</strong>ce tensi<strong>on</strong>s particularly <strong>in</strong> Gilgit-Baltistan and<br />
aut<strong>on</strong>omous Federally Adm<strong>in</strong>istered Tribal Areas (FATA) where Islamist Jehadis and<br />
sectarian forces have camped s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> Soviet <strong>in</strong>vasi<strong>on</strong> of Afghanistan <strong>in</strong> 1979. The<br />
Islamist jehadis who <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> past were loyal to <strong>the</strong> Pakistani state have parted <strong>the</strong>ir ways<br />
and have turned hostile to Pakistan <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> wake of 9/11 and subsequent ‘war <strong>on</strong> terror’ by<br />
<strong>the</strong> United States. Islamist militants have attacked army check posts, government<br />
facilities, and anti Taliban elements <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> areas under <strong>the</strong>ir c<strong>on</strong>trol. The security situati<strong>on</strong><br />
was so grim that Pakistan had to withdraw its troops from its eastern border with India<br />
and deploy <strong>the</strong>m <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> western borders and <strong>in</strong> areas under <strong>the</strong> militant’s c<strong>on</strong>trol <strong>in</strong> North<br />
and <strong>South</strong> Waziristan <strong>in</strong> NWFP. Tribal elders and clergymen, mostly loyal to Maulana<br />
Fazlur Rehman’s party, also support <strong>the</strong> militants and have announced punishments for<br />
local tribesmen help<strong>in</strong>g Pakistani forces <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> tribal areas 29 . Political analysts believe<br />
that <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>flict between tribal populati<strong>on</strong> of FATA and Pakistan army is still more of<br />
Jehadi <strong>in</strong> nature than <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>alistic.<br />
The situati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> Baluchistan has been troubled s<strong>in</strong>ce 1947 when Pakistan came <strong>in</strong>to<br />
existence. It is <strong>the</strong> largest prov<strong>in</strong>ce with 47% of <strong>the</strong> total geography of <strong>the</strong> country and<br />
shares <strong>on</strong>ly 4.96% of <strong>the</strong> total populati<strong>on</strong> of Pakistan. That too is fur<strong>the</strong>r divided <strong>in</strong>to two<br />
ma<strong>in</strong> ethnic groups i.e., Baluch and Pashtuns al<strong>on</strong>g with Punjabi, Urdu speak<strong>in</strong>g and<br />
Siraikis. The n<strong>on</strong> Baluch populati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> prov<strong>in</strong>ce c<strong>on</strong>stitutes approximately 45% of <strong>the</strong><br />
total <strong>in</strong> additi<strong>on</strong> to 3 milli<strong>on</strong> Afghan refugees, who if get <strong>the</strong> citizens of Pakistan will<br />
outnumber <strong>the</strong> Baluch. The Political compositi<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> prov<strong>in</strong>ce is such that <strong>the</strong> Pashtun<br />
areas traditi<strong>on</strong>ally have been under <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>fluence of Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam, a staunch<br />
supporter of Taliban while <strong>the</strong> Baluch areas are under strict tribal c<strong>on</strong>trol but<br />
ideologically secular with <strong>the</strong> excepti<strong>on</strong> of women’s rights.<br />
Baluchistan ranks lowest <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> human development <strong>in</strong>dicators of Pakistan. Successive<br />
regimes <strong>in</strong> Islamabad blame <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>alist leaders for <strong>the</strong> under-development of <strong>the</strong><br />
prov<strong>in</strong>ce and <strong>the</strong> Baluch leaders <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand accuse <strong>the</strong> policies of central<br />
government for underdevelopment of <strong>the</strong> Baluch areas. Both <strong>the</strong> arguments have merit.<br />
The data shows that successive central governments treated <strong>the</strong> prov<strong>in</strong>ce as <strong>the</strong>ir col<strong>on</strong>y<br />
where <strong>the</strong>y could exploit local natural resources with <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>nivance of local elite groups,<br />
and largely for <strong>the</strong> benefit of Punjab and urban S<strong>in</strong>dh. However, it should be added that<br />
today’s Baluch antag<strong>on</strong>ists who have held <strong>the</strong> highest civilian portfolios <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> prov<strong>in</strong>ce<br />
<strong>on</strong> several occasi<strong>on</strong>s, did little for <strong>the</strong> development of <strong>the</strong> prov<strong>in</strong>ce. The questi<strong>on</strong> of<br />
underdevelopment becomes complicated <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> case of Baluchistan.<br />
The popular percepti<strong>on</strong> regard<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> current <strong>in</strong>surgency <strong>in</strong> Baluchistan is that it is l<strong>in</strong>ked<br />
with mega development projects launched by central government <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> prov<strong>in</strong>ce. There<br />
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are for and aga<strong>in</strong>st lobbies <strong>in</strong> Islamabad and <strong>in</strong> Baluchistan as well as <strong>in</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r parts of <strong>the</strong><br />
country. The prop<strong>on</strong>ents of <strong>the</strong> development projects worth billi<strong>on</strong>s of rupees argue that<br />
without <strong>the</strong>se projects <strong>the</strong> prov<strong>in</strong>ce will rema<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> dark ages. They accuse <strong>the</strong><br />
traditi<strong>on</strong>al tribal elite, some of whom oppose <strong>the</strong> projects and allegedly are lead<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
militancy, for all evils <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> prov<strong>in</strong>ce – lack of <strong>in</strong>frastructure, illiteracy, unemployment<br />
and underdevelopment of <strong>the</strong> people. They claim that tribal chiefs (Sardars) have always<br />
been <strong>in</strong> power - no matter who governs <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> center and have siph<strong>on</strong>ed loads of m<strong>on</strong>ey<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> name of people, cit<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> particular <strong>the</strong> deals between Nawab Akbar Khan Bughti<br />
and Pakistan Petroleum Limited. The governments <strong>in</strong> Islamabad have found it easier to<br />
make secret deals with <strong>in</strong>dividual tribal chiefs ra<strong>the</strong>r than negotiate with <strong>the</strong> people of <strong>the</strong><br />
prov<strong>in</strong>ce. These mega projects, <strong>the</strong> development prop<strong>on</strong>ents argue, will set <strong>the</strong>m free of<br />
centuries old clutches of authoritarian tribal system.<br />
The ‘nati<strong>on</strong>alist’ forces who are resist<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> <strong>on</strong>slaught of development projects and <strong>the</strong><br />
accompany<strong>in</strong>g establishment of military garris<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong> Baluchistan claim that <strong>the</strong>se projects<br />
are aimed at robb<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> prov<strong>in</strong>ce of its natural resources and to establish hegem<strong>on</strong>y of<br />
Punjab. These projects will not benefit <strong>the</strong> people of Baluchistan because <strong>the</strong> people of<br />
<strong>the</strong> prov<strong>in</strong>ce are not <strong>in</strong> a positi<strong>on</strong> to compete with people of o<strong>the</strong>r prov<strong>in</strong>ces <strong>in</strong> terms of<br />
educati<strong>on</strong>, skills and technology. The people from Punjab and S<strong>in</strong>d will occupy <strong>the</strong> most<br />
lucrative positi<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong> all sectors leav<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Balochi far beh<strong>in</strong>d <strong>in</strong> unattractive low paid<br />
manual work. Moreover, n<strong>on</strong>-Baluch will flood <strong>the</strong> prov<strong>in</strong>ce and reduce <strong>the</strong> already<br />
negligible majority <strong>in</strong>to an ethnic m<strong>in</strong>ority <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir own homeland.<br />
Development Projects and <strong>the</strong> issue of Aut<strong>on</strong>omy<br />
The government of Pakistan has launched multiple multi-milli<strong>on</strong> dollar projects <strong>in</strong><br />
Baluchistan beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g with <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> of a deep seaport <strong>in</strong> Gwadar, a t<strong>in</strong>y town at<br />
<strong>the</strong> Makran coast. The Gwadar port project was started <strong>in</strong> 1992 but was held up due to<br />
political <strong>in</strong>stability <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> country. Ch<strong>in</strong>a, an old and trusted friend of Pakistan, became<br />
<strong>the</strong> ideal candidate to develop <strong>the</strong> port with an <strong>in</strong>vestment of $ 198 milli<strong>on</strong> and a promise<br />
to fund o<strong>the</strong>r related projects <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> regi<strong>on</strong>. Allied to Gwadar, a 700-km coastal highway<br />
was completed l<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g Karachi <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> east with Jiwani to <strong>the</strong> west, close to <strong>the</strong> Iranian<br />
border. Establishment of railway l<strong>in</strong>k with Gwadar to Taftan <strong>in</strong> Iran via Sa<strong>in</strong>dak has been<br />
planned. Sa<strong>in</strong>dak, <strong>the</strong> first metallurgical project aims at producti<strong>on</strong> of gold and blister<br />
copper, was ly<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>active s<strong>in</strong>ce 1995 which has been revived with <strong>the</strong> Ch<strong>in</strong>ese help at<br />
<strong>the</strong> cost of $30 milli<strong>on</strong>. A parallel road from Gwadar to Sa<strong>in</strong>dak, runn<strong>in</strong>g parallel to <strong>the</strong><br />
Iran-Pakistan border will make it <strong>the</strong> shortest route to reach Central <strong>Asia</strong> from <strong>the</strong> warm<br />
waters of Arabian Sea. To attract <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al <strong>in</strong>vestment Free Trade Ec<strong>on</strong>omic Z<strong>on</strong>e has<br />
been set up. The sec<strong>on</strong>d phase — Gwadar Deep Water Port Project — is expected to be<br />
completed by 2010. The Gwadar Port Authority (GPA) has signed an agreement with<br />
S<strong>in</strong>gapore Port Authority (SPA) for <strong>the</strong> development and operati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> country’s taxfree<br />
port and duty-free trade z<strong>on</strong>e.<br />
The actualizati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong>se projects is expected to transform <strong>the</strong> regi<strong>on</strong>’s ec<strong>on</strong>omic<br />
relati<strong>on</strong>s, political outlook and demography. The nati<strong>on</strong>alist political parties po<strong>in</strong>t out that<br />
all decisi<strong>on</strong>s regard<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> development projects are taken by <strong>the</strong> center without<br />
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c<strong>on</strong>sultati<strong>on</strong> with <strong>the</strong> prov<strong>in</strong>cial authorities and without <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>sent of <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>alist<br />
forces, who claim to be <strong>the</strong> true representatives of <strong>the</strong> people of Baluchistan. The leader<br />
of <strong>the</strong> Pakistan Nati<strong>on</strong>al Party, Dr. Abdul Haye Baluch told <strong>the</strong> author that “we are not<br />
anti-development, but our c<strong>on</strong>cern is that development should take place for <strong>the</strong> sake of<br />
people and not for outsiders. The pattern of development projects is such that it will<br />
benefit people from o<strong>the</strong>r prov<strong>in</strong>ces and local populati<strong>on</strong> will end up be<strong>in</strong>g watchmen,<br />
and pe<strong>on</strong>s. All we demand is that when government embarked <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong>se projects it should<br />
have started parallel project to develop local human resource so that local people are able<br />
to participate <strong>in</strong> developments of prov<strong>in</strong>ce”.<br />
Some Baluch leaders view <strong>the</strong> development projects as a blatant <strong>in</strong>vasi<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong>ir land<br />
and resource. Nawab Khair Baksh Marri, and Sardar Atta Ullah Mengal, <strong>the</strong> most<br />
prom<strong>in</strong>ent and respected am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>alists, demand an entirely new political<br />
arrangement between <strong>the</strong> center and <strong>the</strong> prov<strong>in</strong>ces. The demand has ga<strong>in</strong>ed a certa<strong>in</strong><br />
degree of popularity and support am<strong>on</strong>g nati<strong>on</strong>alists <strong>in</strong> S<strong>in</strong>dh, NWFP, and Punjab and<br />
has resulted <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> formati<strong>on</strong> of an alliance of all nati<strong>on</strong>alist parties and groups under <strong>the</strong><br />
banner of Pakistan Oppressed Nati<strong>on</strong>s Movement (PONM). The alliance supports <strong>the</strong><br />
Baluch cause but so far has not able to significantly mobilize people <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
prov<strong>in</strong>ces <strong>in</strong> a mean<strong>in</strong>gful manner except <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> issue of Kalabagh Dam.<br />
In particular, <strong>the</strong> establishment of military garris<strong>on</strong>s and cant<strong>on</strong>ment <strong>in</strong> Baluch areas has<br />
provoked str<strong>on</strong>g oppositi<strong>on</strong> from <strong>the</strong> tribal leaders and nati<strong>on</strong>alists. Traditi<strong>on</strong>ally, land<br />
has been under strict c<strong>on</strong>trol of <strong>the</strong> tribal chiefs (Sardars). A prom<strong>in</strong>ent nati<strong>on</strong>alist and<br />
spokespers<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> Baluchistan Nati<strong>on</strong>al Movement, Senator Sana Baloch argues that<br />
Pakistan army has 69 para-military cant<strong>on</strong>ments, 6 heavy weap<strong>on</strong> cant<strong>on</strong>ments, 6 naval<br />
bases and three nuclear weap<strong>on</strong>s test<strong>in</strong>g facilities <strong>in</strong> Baluchistan al<strong>on</strong>g with<br />
approximately 700 checkpo<strong>in</strong>ts <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> regi<strong>on</strong>. He estimates <strong>the</strong> current army presence is<br />
<strong>the</strong> prov<strong>in</strong>ce about 150,000 engaged <strong>in</strong> operati<strong>on</strong> aga<strong>in</strong>st Baluch people 30 .<br />
Also at issue, is <strong>the</strong> decisi<strong>on</strong> to upgrade <strong>the</strong> status of <strong>the</strong> tribal areas from B to A areas 31 ,<br />
thus br<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> areas under <strong>the</strong> direct c<strong>on</strong>trol of <strong>the</strong> regular prov<strong>in</strong>cial police. The areas<br />
presently are adm<strong>in</strong>istered by <strong>the</strong> tribal chiefs with <strong>the</strong> help of levies and fr<strong>on</strong>tier<br />
c<strong>on</strong>stabulary. Nawab Akbar Bughti, who was killed by armed forces <strong>in</strong> 2006, did not<br />
accept <strong>the</strong> decisi<strong>on</strong> and resisted <strong>the</strong> move. The central government <strong>in</strong> spite of<br />
recommendati<strong>on</strong>s to <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>trary by a parliamentary committee, is mov<strong>in</strong>g ahead with its<br />
plans of up gradati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
The most c<strong>on</strong>tentious issue <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> development discourse is <strong>the</strong> expected demographic<br />
change <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> prov<strong>in</strong>ce. It is estimated that approximately 5 milli<strong>on</strong> people will be<br />
com<strong>in</strong>g to Baluchistan <strong>in</strong> order to complete and execute <strong>the</strong>se projects. This will create<br />
change <strong>the</strong> local traditi<strong>on</strong>al culture and local values. Although <strong>the</strong> government has<br />
proposed safeguards such as n<strong>on</strong> Baluch will not have right to vote <strong>in</strong> local, prov<strong>in</strong>cial<br />
and nati<strong>on</strong>al electi<strong>on</strong>s, <strong>the</strong> proposal has largely been rejected by <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>alists as eye<br />
wash.<br />
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It is questi<strong>on</strong>able whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>alist forces <strong>in</strong> Pakistan have a popular support base<br />
am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong> masses <strong>in</strong> any of <strong>the</strong> prov<strong>in</strong>ces. In S<strong>in</strong>dh, PPP and MQM are <strong>the</strong> two ma<strong>in</strong><br />
political players hav<strong>in</strong>g absolute support <strong>in</strong> rural and urban areas respectively and both<br />
favor a str<strong>on</strong>g center with<strong>in</strong> a democratic federal framework. The Punjab prov<strong>in</strong>ce has a<br />
similar political landscape with some meager voices for regi<strong>on</strong>al aut<strong>on</strong>omy emerg<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> sou<strong>the</strong>rn districts but with very limited popular support as <strong>the</strong> regi<strong>on</strong> is under strict<br />
feudal c<strong>on</strong>trol of landed aristocracy. The situati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> NWFP and Pashto speak<strong>in</strong>g belt of<br />
Baluchistan is not that different from <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r prov<strong>in</strong>ces for two reas<strong>on</strong>s: One, Pashtuns<br />
now share <strong>the</strong> fruits of ec<strong>on</strong>omic and political power with Punjabi rul<strong>in</strong>g elite and str<strong>on</strong>g<br />
middle class that has emerged <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> last two decades will resistance any attempt for<br />
sessi<strong>on</strong>, and two, <strong>the</strong> grow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>fluence of religious parties <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Pashtun belt has helped<br />
<strong>in</strong> mitigat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>alist sentiments am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Pashto speak<strong>in</strong>g populati<strong>on</strong>. The<br />
current phase of Baluch nati<strong>on</strong>alist movement has got very little support from Pashtuns<br />
that shows <strong>the</strong> chang<strong>in</strong>g political landscape <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Pakistan. It will be pert<strong>in</strong>ent to note<br />
that <strong>the</strong> armed struggle of <strong>the</strong> 70’s was openly supported by Pashtuns.<br />
F<strong>in</strong>ally <strong>the</strong> real stakeholders <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> present resurgence of <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>alist agenda are <strong>the</strong><br />
Baluch people. The movement is weakened by a lack of political unity and a firm future<br />
agenda. Also, it is argued that <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>alists will f<strong>in</strong>d it difficult to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
momentum of resistance when <strong>the</strong>se projects are actualized and <strong>the</strong> ‘trickle down effect’<br />
offers local people <strong>the</strong> choice of hav<strong>in</strong>g a job <strong>in</strong> a factory, ra<strong>the</strong>r than be<strong>in</strong>g a nomad<br />
without any security of livelihood.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> 70’s and 80’s civil society organizati<strong>on</strong> like lawyers, students uni<strong>on</strong>s, teachers, and<br />
<strong>in</strong>tellectual and writes not <strong>on</strong>ly provided <strong>in</strong>tellectual impetus to <strong>the</strong> people’s movements<br />
but also stood by <strong>the</strong>m <strong>in</strong> streets fight<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> authoritarianism and autocratic rule of Z.A.<br />
Bhutto and Zia ul Haq. That vibrant civil society has been weakened and that public<br />
space largely has been taken over by foreign funded apolitical NGO.<br />
Human Right Commissi<strong>on</strong> of Pakistan and some o<strong>the</strong>rs have been organiz<strong>in</strong>g some<br />
protests meet<strong>in</strong>gs and sem<strong>in</strong>ars <strong>in</strong> order to c<strong>on</strong>demn <strong>the</strong> human rights violati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong><br />
Baluchistan and o<strong>the</strong>r parts of <strong>the</strong> country but with no effect <strong>on</strong> those who call <strong>the</strong><br />
shots 32 . The nati<strong>on</strong>al level ma<strong>in</strong>stream political parties till date rema<strong>in</strong> opportunistic<br />
look<strong>in</strong>g for an opportunity to make a deal with <strong>the</strong> military regime. Musharraf’s<br />
c<strong>on</strong>fidence is evident from attitude his towards <strong>the</strong> recommendati<strong>on</strong>s of a parliamentary<br />
committee <strong>on</strong> Baluchistan that proposed wide rage of measures to address <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>surgency<br />
<strong>in</strong> Baluchistan. The report was shelved.<br />
C<strong>on</strong>clusi<strong>on</strong><br />
The current resurgence of nati<strong>on</strong>al m<strong>in</strong>ority questi<strong>on</strong>, ethnic identity, and sectarian<br />
rivalries is closely l<strong>in</strong>ked to <strong>the</strong> nature of <strong>the</strong> Pakistani state. The leadership of <strong>the</strong><br />
country is haunted by a ‘siege mentality’. The state apparatus, right from <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>cepti<strong>on</strong>,<br />
has been heavily weighted <strong>in</strong> favor of n<strong>on</strong>-elected <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>s and particular ethnic<br />
groups. Governments <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> center, elected and unelected, have overridden prov<strong>in</strong>cial<br />
rights and demands for regi<strong>on</strong>al aut<strong>on</strong>omy that has left <strong>the</strong> smaller nati<strong>on</strong>alities with little<br />
choice but to rise aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> state. The success of Bengalis <strong>in</strong> 1971, encouraged <strong>the</strong><br />
154
Baluch people. Their efforts could not succeed, not least because of <strong>the</strong> small populati<strong>on</strong><br />
of Baluchistan, and <strong>the</strong> lack of tangible <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al support.<br />
Also, most regi<strong>on</strong>al and nati<strong>on</strong>alist political parties still seek prov<strong>in</strong>cial aut<strong>on</strong>omy with<strong>in</strong> a<br />
federal parliamentary democratic framework. There is little support for secessi<strong>on</strong>. N<strong>on</strong>e of<br />
<strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>alist forces have a charismatic and credible leadership like Sheikh Mujeebur<br />
Rehman, G.M Syed, Khan Abdul Ghafar Khan and Mir Ghaus Baksh Bizenju. Moreover, a<br />
new middle class is emerg<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> almost <strong>in</strong> all four prov<strong>in</strong>ces of <strong>the</strong> country which is<br />
resist<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> hegem<strong>on</strong>y of traditi<strong>on</strong>al leadership. The devoluti<strong>on</strong> plan <strong>in</strong>troduced <strong>in</strong> 2000 by<br />
<strong>the</strong> military led government had brought <strong>in</strong> thousand of middle class people <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong><br />
political ma<strong>in</strong>stream <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g over 43,000 women. This new class of relatively young<br />
politician has already started challeng<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> traditi<strong>on</strong>al feudal and tribal elites.<br />
Never<strong>the</strong>less, militant sentiments could grow <strong>in</strong> rural S<strong>in</strong>dh, Baluchistan and FATA if<br />
Islamabad does not reverse ill-advised policies pushed by <strong>the</strong> military-civilian clique.<br />
Ir<strong>on</strong>ically, <strong>the</strong> Musharraf government openly negotiates with so-called ‘extremists<br />
terrorists’ <strong>in</strong> North and <strong>South</strong> Waziristan <strong>in</strong> NWFP but refuses to talk to secular<br />
nati<strong>on</strong>alist <strong>in</strong> Baluchistan. In <strong>the</strong> f<strong>in</strong>al analyses, <strong>the</strong> military will not be able to crush <strong>the</strong><br />
grow<strong>in</strong>g resentment of secti<strong>on</strong>s of Baluch people with force. The disadvantages which<br />
nati<strong>on</strong>alist’s forces have can be turned <strong>in</strong>to guerilla advantages – <strong>the</strong> vast mass of<br />
h<strong>in</strong>terland which for any military will be impossible to c<strong>on</strong>trol unless <strong>the</strong>re is some<br />
agreement between <strong>the</strong> warr<strong>in</strong>g parties.<br />
1 Ahmed Feroz, Ethnicity and Politics <strong>in</strong> Pakistan, Oxford University Press, Pakistan 1998<br />
2 Ibid<br />
3 Mubarak Ali, Pakistan’ s Search for Identity, <strong>in</strong> Compet<strong>in</strong>g Nati<strong>on</strong>alisms <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Asia</strong>, Orient L<strong>on</strong>gman<br />
2002<br />
4 All India Muslim League demanded <strong>the</strong> divisi<strong>on</strong> of Bengal <strong>on</strong> communal l<strong>in</strong>es but opposed <strong>the</strong> divisi<strong>on</strong> of<br />
Punjab <strong>on</strong> similar l<strong>in</strong>es.<br />
5 Tapan K. Bose, SAFHR Paper series 16, SAFHR, Katmandu 2003<br />
6 David Taylor and Malcolm Yapp (eds), Political Identity <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Asia</strong>, Curz<strong>on</strong> Press, L<strong>on</strong>d<strong>on</strong> 1979, p.x.<br />
7 Farida Shaheed & Abbas Rashid, Pakistan: Ethnic Identities and C<strong>on</strong>tend<strong>in</strong>g Elites, Discussi<strong>on</strong> Paper No<br />
45, 1993, UNRISD<br />
8 See The Lahore Resoluti<strong>on</strong> 1940.<br />
9 Ibid<br />
10 J<strong>in</strong>nah, Speeches and Statements 1947-1948, Oxford University Press 2000<br />
11 On this Aysha Jalal comments " One can ei<strong>the</strong>r c<strong>on</strong>clude that <strong>the</strong> def<strong>in</strong>iti<strong>on</strong> of an 'Islamic State' <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Quaid-e-Azam's pers<strong>on</strong>al lexic<strong>on</strong> was wholly unique or that <strong>the</strong> travails of office as Pakistan's first<br />
Governor-General had weakened his resolve never to take <strong>the</strong> path of least resistance <strong>on</strong> matters to do with<br />
religi<strong>on</strong>." Jalal, The State of Martial Rule.<br />
12 Mohajirs were <strong>the</strong> people who migrated from nor<strong>the</strong>rn India after <strong>the</strong> partiti<strong>on</strong> of India and were most<br />
educated am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Muslims – that offered <strong>the</strong>m relatively more opportunities <strong>in</strong> jobs and bus<strong>in</strong>esses after<br />
<strong>the</strong> partiti<strong>on</strong>.<br />
13 Farida Shaheed & Abbas Rashid, Pakistan: Ethnic Identities and C<strong>on</strong>tend<strong>in</strong>g Elites, Discussi<strong>on</strong> Paper No<br />
45, 1993, UNRISD<br />
14 M.H. Panhwar, Rem<strong>in</strong>iscences of G.M. Sayed http://www.panhwar.com<br />
15 When J<strong>in</strong>nah was governor general, a secti<strong>on</strong> 92a was <strong>in</strong>troduced to <strong>the</strong> Government of India Act 1935<br />
as a means of facilitat<strong>in</strong>g direct rule by <strong>the</strong> center. Pakistan was governed by this act –as amended by <strong>the</strong><br />
India Independence Act 1947 – until 1956 when <strong>the</strong> C<strong>on</strong>stituent Assembly framed <strong>the</strong> first c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>.<br />
16 Mohammad Waseem, Affirmative Acti<strong>on</strong> Policies <strong>in</strong> Pakistan, Ethnic Studies Report, ICES, Vol. XV.<br />
No 2, July 1997<br />
155
17<br />
Aitizaz Ahsan, The Indus Saga, Aitzaz Ahsan, a noted jurist and parliamentarian, surveys <strong>the</strong> history<br />
18<br />
The number of kill<strong>in</strong>gs is c<strong>on</strong>tested – some quote it 1.5 to 2 milli<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
19<br />
Aeysha Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Asia</strong>, Cambridge University Press 1995 pp. 77<br />
20<br />
Ijaz Khan, Peace and Democracy <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Asia</strong>, Volume 2, Numbers 1&2, 2006<br />
21<br />
Anayat Allah Baloch, The Baluch Questi<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> Pakistan and The Right to Self-Determ<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
22<br />
Ibid<br />
23<br />
The sec<strong>on</strong>d amendment <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> of 1973 declared Ahmadiyas n<strong>on</strong>-Muslims. The amendment<br />
was <strong>in</strong>troduced <strong>in</strong> 1974.<br />
24<br />
Ayesha Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Asia</strong>, Cambridge University Press 1995<br />
25<br />
G.G.P Rakisits, Center-Prov<strong>in</strong>ce relati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong> Pakistan under President Zia: The Government’s and <strong>the</strong><br />
Oppositi<strong>on</strong> Approaches. Pacific Affairs, Vol.61, No 1 (Spr<strong>in</strong>g 1988), University of British Columbia.<br />
26<br />
Mohammad Ayoob, Datel<strong>in</strong>e Pakistan: A Passage to Anarchy?<br />
27<br />
Aijaz Khan, Peace and Democracy <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Asia</strong>, Volume 2, Number 1&2, 2006<br />
28<br />
Stephen P. Cohen <strong>in</strong> his book The Pakistan Army writes that ‘ after <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependence, it was determ<strong>in</strong>ed<br />
that over 77 percent of <strong>the</strong> wartime recruitment had been from Punjab, 19.5% from NWFP, 2.2% from<br />
S<strong>in</strong>dh and just over 0.06 percent from Baluchistan (and of <strong>the</strong>se total numbers 90.7% had served <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
army) Today, <strong>the</strong> percentages have not changed dramatically: 75% of all ex-servicemen come from <strong>on</strong>ly<br />
three districts of <strong>the</strong> Punjab (Rawalp<strong>in</strong>di, jhelum and Campbellpur) and two adjacent district of NWFP<br />
(Kohat and Mardan) – Stephen P. Cohen, The Pakistan Army, Oxford University Press, Karachi 1998.<br />
29<br />
Rahimullah Yousafzai, M<strong>on</strong>thly Newl<strong>in</strong>e, June 2002, Karachi<br />
30 th<br />
June 27 , committee room 16, house of comm<strong>on</strong>s, UK<br />
31<br />
The present government is try<strong>in</strong>g to br<strong>in</strong>g more districts under direct c<strong>on</strong>trol of regular police which so<br />
far were be<strong>in</strong>g adm<strong>in</strong>istered under <strong>the</strong> col<strong>on</strong>ial adm<strong>in</strong>istrative arrangements by <strong>the</strong> levies and he local tribal<br />
chiefs have greater role <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> adm<strong>in</strong>istrati<strong>on</strong>. The areas are divided <strong>in</strong>to ‘A’ and ‘B’ categories. ‘B’ areas<br />
are where no police rule exists and most of <strong>the</strong> Baluchistan c<strong>on</strong>sisted of ‘B’ areas till date.<br />
32<br />
Human Rights Commissi<strong>on</strong> of Pakistan, a n<strong>on</strong> governmental organizati<strong>on</strong>, sent fact f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g missi<strong>on</strong>s to<br />
Baluchistan which reported massive violati<strong>on</strong>s of human rights. Hundreds of political activists have<br />
disappeared and livelihood of <strong>the</strong> people <strong>in</strong> c<strong>on</strong>flict areas has been totally destroyed.<br />
156
The Indigenous Peoples: Victims of <strong>the</strong> Politics of Denial<br />
Tapan Kumar Bose<br />
Col<strong>on</strong>ial Encounter and Racist Epistemologies<br />
The c<strong>on</strong>cept or <strong>the</strong> term ‘<strong>in</strong>digenous people’ is relatively new <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> lexic<strong>on</strong> of social<br />
sciences. Until recently <strong>the</strong> more familiar terms were ‘savages’, ‘primitive people’,<br />
‘aborig<strong>in</strong>es’, ‘natives’ and ‘tribes’. These terms were current am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong> European<br />
anthropologists, geneticists and cultural historians dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> halcy<strong>on</strong> days of<br />
col<strong>on</strong>ialism. These referred to <strong>the</strong> ‘backwardness’ and ‘supposed primitivism’ of <strong>the</strong> n<strong>on</strong>-<br />
Western people. This provided <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>oretical foundati<strong>on</strong>s of <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ory of ‘white mans<br />
burden’ – <strong>the</strong> col<strong>on</strong>iser’s missi<strong>on</strong> of civilis<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> natives and <strong>the</strong> savages <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> col<strong>on</strong>ies.<br />
Anthropologists and o<strong>the</strong>r social scientists def<strong>in</strong>ed people <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> basis of physical<br />
features, race, gene and o<strong>the</strong>r esoteric criteria like absence of social hierarchy,<br />
undeveloped language, use of dialects, animism, hunt<strong>in</strong>g and ga<strong>the</strong>r<strong>in</strong>g, meat eat<strong>in</strong>g,<br />
f<strong>on</strong>dness for alcohol, danc<strong>in</strong>g and naked or semi-naked people. The fact that about 90 per<br />
cent of <strong>the</strong> people classified as tribes and dismissed as ‘ignorant and simple people’ had<br />
well organised social structures, systems of justice, languages, religi<strong>on</strong>s and <strong>the</strong>ir own<br />
histories were ignored or c<strong>on</strong>sidered not worth study<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
Christian Missi<strong>on</strong>aries who often accompanied <strong>the</strong> col<strong>on</strong>ial expediti<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
despatches to <strong>the</strong> Vatican often described <strong>the</strong> ‘tribes’ <strong>the</strong>y encountered <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> jungles and<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> ‘up-lands’ as essentially a simple and ignorant populati<strong>on</strong> – a k<strong>in</strong>d of a gentle<br />
savage. H. H. Risely, a Revenue Collector of <strong>the</strong> East India Company work<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Jungle<br />
Mahals (present Midnapore district of West Bengal), dismissed <strong>the</strong> entire Santhal<br />
community, say<strong>in</strong>g, “A people whose <strong>on</strong>ly means of record<strong>in</strong>g facts c<strong>on</strong>sists of ty<strong>in</strong>g<br />
knots <strong>in</strong> str<strong>in</strong>gs, and who have no bards to hand down a nati<strong>on</strong>al epic by oral traditi<strong>on</strong>,<br />
can hardly be expected to preserve <strong>the</strong> memory of <strong>the</strong>ir past l<strong>on</strong>g enough or accurately<br />
enough for <strong>the</strong>ir accounts of it to possess any historical value”. (Tribes and Castes of<br />
Bengal, vol.2, P. 225, Calcutta 1891).<br />
The 19th century British col<strong>on</strong>ial adm<strong>in</strong>istrators of India were hostile towards <strong>the</strong><br />
Christian missi<strong>on</strong>aries as <strong>the</strong>y believed that <strong>the</strong> missi<strong>on</strong>aries were encourag<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> tribes<br />
to agitate for <strong>the</strong> restituti<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong>ir land. Some missi<strong>on</strong>aries were asked to leave <strong>the</strong> tribal<br />
areas. Dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> later part of <strong>the</strong> 18 th century <strong>the</strong> East India Company extended <strong>the</strong><br />
Zam<strong>in</strong>dari system <strong>in</strong>to tribal homelands - S<strong>in</strong>ghbhum, Manbhum, Birbhum, Chotanagpur<br />
and Jungle Mahals. Ijardars and Jam<strong>in</strong>dars were appo<strong>in</strong>ted for <strong>the</strong>ir capacity to collect<br />
land revenue from <strong>the</strong> local peasants. The tribal communities of this regi<strong>on</strong> - Mundas,<br />
Paharias, Hos, Santhals, Ora<strong>on</strong>s, Birhors, Lodhas, Kurmis, Bhumijs saw <strong>the</strong>ir traditi<strong>on</strong>al<br />
leaders – <strong>the</strong> Sardars, Majhis and Rajas be<strong>in</strong>g replaced by outsiders. They became rent<br />
pay<strong>in</strong>g serf <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir own homeland. As <strong>the</strong> tribes people revolted aga<strong>in</strong>st this <strong>in</strong>trusi<strong>on</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong>ir lives, it created tensi<strong>on</strong> between <strong>the</strong>m and <strong>the</strong> n<strong>on</strong>-tribal H<strong>in</strong>dus and Muslim<br />
landlords as well as <strong>the</strong> British col<strong>on</strong>isers. The 18 th and 19 th centuries witnessed several<br />
157
wars between <strong>the</strong> tribes and <strong>the</strong> British col<strong>on</strong>ial adm<strong>in</strong>istrati<strong>on</strong> and <strong>the</strong>ir H<strong>in</strong>du- Muslim<br />
partners. Of <strong>the</strong>se rebelli<strong>on</strong>s of <strong>the</strong> tribes some of <strong>the</strong> more known <strong>on</strong>es are <strong>the</strong> Paharia<br />
revolt (1783), <strong>the</strong> Santhal revolt (1855-56), <strong>the</strong> Munda revolt (1884-1890) , <strong>the</strong> Kol revolt<br />
<strong>in</strong> Eastern India and <strong>the</strong> war with <strong>the</strong> Nagas <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> nor<strong>the</strong>ast.<br />
Shaken by <strong>the</strong> experience of <strong>the</strong> Santhal revolt, <strong>the</strong> Board of <strong>the</strong> East India Company had<br />
appo<strong>in</strong>ted W.W. Hunter to look <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> causes of <strong>the</strong> revolt. His 1886 report, popularly<br />
known as <strong>the</strong> Annals of Rural Bengal f<strong>in</strong>ally resulted <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> recogniti<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> differences<br />
between <strong>the</strong> tribal and n<strong>on</strong>-tribal societies and <strong>the</strong> adopti<strong>on</strong> of a protecti<strong>on</strong>ist policy. But<br />
<strong>the</strong>se so-called protecti<strong>on</strong>ist measures did not stop <strong>the</strong> alienati<strong>on</strong> of tribal land, which was<br />
<strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong> cause of <strong>the</strong> Santhal rebelli<strong>on</strong>. Thousands of men and women bel<strong>on</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong><br />
tribal communities, Santhals, Ora<strong>on</strong>s, Hos and Mundas were forcibly taken away to work<br />
<strong>in</strong> tea gardens which were be<strong>in</strong>g established <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> land of <strong>the</strong> Angami Nagas <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Naga<br />
Hills. Not much is known about <strong>the</strong> process of forcible uproot<strong>in</strong>g, transportati<strong>on</strong> and<br />
relocati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> Santhal, Munda and Ho men women, children from <strong>the</strong>ir orig<strong>in</strong>al habitat<br />
to Assam, Darjeel<strong>in</strong>g and even to <strong>the</strong> West Indies and Fiji as <strong>in</strong>dentured labourers. A later<br />
day Indian author, Mulk Raj Anand tried to recreate <strong>the</strong> plight of <strong>the</strong>se people <strong>in</strong> two of<br />
his novels – ‘Two Leaves and a Bud’ and ‘Coolie’. Clearly <strong>the</strong> need for profit<br />
overshadowed <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>cern of <strong>the</strong> Christian missi<strong>on</strong>aries <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> British Indian Empire.<br />
Dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> later part of <strong>the</strong> n<strong>in</strong>eteenth century, when col<strong>on</strong>ial powers were scrambl<strong>in</strong>g for<br />
Africa, c<strong>on</strong>cern for <strong>the</strong> tribal/ aborig<strong>in</strong>al populati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong> Africa and <strong>Asia</strong> was voiced by<br />
some European Christian missi<strong>on</strong>aries and a few humanists. A weak effort was made <strong>in</strong><br />
Europe to establish an <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al resp<strong>on</strong>sibility for <strong>the</strong> tribes of <strong>the</strong> C<strong>on</strong>go bas<strong>in</strong>. The<br />
effort was aband<strong>on</strong>ed after Belgium's c<strong>on</strong>quest of C<strong>on</strong>go (now Zaire) and <strong>the</strong><br />
establishment <strong>the</strong>re of <strong>on</strong>e of <strong>the</strong> worst col<strong>on</strong>ial adm<strong>in</strong>istrati<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
Humanist c<strong>on</strong>cern for <strong>the</strong> oppressed is also a feature of <strong>the</strong> history of col<strong>on</strong>ialism. In <strong>the</strong><br />
19 th century voices were raised by ‘humanists’ and ‘good Christians’ <strong>in</strong> Europe aga<strong>in</strong>st<br />
<strong>the</strong> slave trade and <strong>the</strong> ruthless oppressi<strong>on</strong> and genocide of <strong>the</strong> ‘aborig<strong>in</strong>es’ or <strong>the</strong> ‘tribes’<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> distant col<strong>on</strong>ies. Without attempt<strong>in</strong>g to devalue <strong>the</strong> seriousness of <strong>the</strong> humanist<br />
c<strong>on</strong>cern of that period, I would like to add that <strong>the</strong>se pi<strong>on</strong>eers were limited <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
perspective. They did not questi<strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> primitiveness or <strong>the</strong> backwardness of <strong>the</strong>se people.<br />
They campaigned for ‘protecti<strong>on</strong>’ of <strong>the</strong>se ‘primitive people’ <strong>on</strong> humanitarian grounds.<br />
For example, <strong>the</strong> Aborig<strong>in</strong>es Protecti<strong>on</strong> Society, formed <strong>in</strong> L<strong>on</strong>d<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> early n<strong>in</strong>eteenth<br />
century, lobbied for protecti<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> aborig<strong>in</strong>e populati<strong>on</strong>s of <strong>the</strong> new col<strong>on</strong>ies <strong>on</strong><br />
humanitarian grounds. As a result of <strong>the</strong>se campaigns, certa<strong>in</strong> protecti<strong>on</strong>ist measures<br />
were <strong>in</strong>troduced <strong>in</strong> British North America. Later, <strong>the</strong>se measures formed <strong>the</strong> basis for <strong>the</strong><br />
centralised jurisdicti<strong>on</strong> over 'Indian Lands and Indian Reserves' <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> Act of<br />
USA.<br />
‘Indigenous peoples’ enter <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al lexic<strong>on</strong><br />
After <strong>the</strong> First World War, m<strong>in</strong>ority rights figured <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> agenda of <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al c<strong>on</strong>cern,<br />
primarily because of <strong>the</strong> ill treatment of some of <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>orities <strong>in</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>land Europe and <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> col<strong>on</strong>ies dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> war. Some standards for <strong>the</strong> treatment of col<strong>on</strong>ised people were<br />
158
provided <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Covenant of <strong>the</strong> League of Nati<strong>on</strong>s. In <strong>the</strong> work of <strong>the</strong> League of Nati<strong>on</strong>s<br />
we f<strong>in</strong>d <strong>the</strong> recogniti<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>cept of ‘<strong>in</strong>digenous peoples’ for <strong>the</strong> first time. It<br />
emerged as a part of a League of Nati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong>itiative for <strong>the</strong> protecti<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> ‘native<br />
populati<strong>on</strong>’ of Liberia who were be<strong>in</strong>g evicted out of <strong>the</strong>ir traditi<strong>on</strong>al home land by <strong>the</strong><br />
African-Americans, <strong>the</strong> descendents of slaves who had returned from <strong>the</strong> United States,<br />
to set up <strong>the</strong>ir own homeland <strong>in</strong> Africa.<br />
However <strong>on</strong> a later date, when <strong>the</strong> partiti<strong>on</strong> of Palest<strong>in</strong>e was imposed <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> Palest<strong>in</strong>ian<br />
people by <strong>the</strong> blatantly unfair Balfour Agreement, <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al community and <strong>the</strong><br />
newly formed United Nati<strong>on</strong>s was curiously silent abut <strong>the</strong> rights of <strong>the</strong> ‘<strong>in</strong>digenous<br />
populati<strong>on</strong>s’ of Palest<strong>in</strong>e. As we know, all <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>ally blessed peace<br />
agreements/settlement proposals <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> Israel – Palest<strong>in</strong>e dispute have endorsed <strong>the</strong><br />
Israeli positi<strong>on</strong> that <strong>the</strong> Palest<strong>in</strong>ians evicted from <strong>the</strong> homelands for <strong>the</strong> creati<strong>on</strong> of Israel,<br />
will not be allowed to go back <strong>the</strong>ir homes<br />
The wider use of <strong>the</strong> term ‘<strong>in</strong>digenous’ came much later. The Internati<strong>on</strong>al Labour<br />
Organisati<strong>on</strong> (ILO), set up at <strong>the</strong> time of <strong>the</strong> League of Nati<strong>on</strong>s, was also <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong><br />
develop<strong>in</strong>g standards for <strong>the</strong> protecti<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> tribal populati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1920s. The ILO,<br />
however, was not able to make any significant impact <strong>in</strong> this area until <strong>the</strong> end of <strong>the</strong><br />
Sec<strong>on</strong>d World War. Between 1950 and 1970, <strong>the</strong> ILO worked as <strong>the</strong> lead agency <strong>in</strong> an<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>ally funded multi-dimensi<strong>on</strong>al development programme for ‘<strong>in</strong>digenous<br />
populati<strong>on</strong>s’ of <strong>the</strong> Andean regi<strong>on</strong> of <strong>South</strong> America. It was this <strong>in</strong>volvement of <strong>the</strong> ILO<br />
which led to <strong>the</strong> acceptance of <strong>the</strong> term ‘<strong>in</strong>digenous’ and <strong>the</strong> adopti<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> Indigenous<br />
and Tribal Peoples C<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>' <strong>in</strong> 1957. It is popularly known as ILO C<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong> No.<br />
107.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> meantime, between 1920 and 1950, several <strong>in</strong>digenous groups of North America,<br />
who were <strong>in</strong> general clubbed under <strong>the</strong> misc<strong>on</strong>ceived term ‘Red Indians’, sent <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
representatives to <strong>the</strong> League of Nati<strong>on</strong>s and later to <strong>the</strong> United Nati<strong>on</strong>s. They submitted<br />
several memoranda to <strong>the</strong> UN Human Rights Commissi<strong>on</strong> demand<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> recogniti<strong>on</strong> of<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir right to self-determ<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> as <strong>the</strong> ‘<strong>in</strong>digenous’ peoples who were col<strong>on</strong>ised by<br />
outsiders from Europe. The called <strong>the</strong>mselves <strong>the</strong> ‘First nati<strong>on</strong>’. These delegati<strong>on</strong>s,<br />
however, were not enterta<strong>in</strong>ed. Nor were <strong>the</strong>ir memoranda accepted.<br />
Also, <strong>the</strong> manner <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong> decol<strong>on</strong>isati<strong>on</strong> discourse was articulated, foreclosed <strong>the</strong><br />
possibility of any recogniti<strong>on</strong> of <strong>in</strong>digenous peoples rights. Decol<strong>on</strong>izati<strong>on</strong> as a pr<strong>in</strong>ciple<br />
of 'self-determ<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>' was accepted after lengthy debates <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> General Assembly of <strong>the</strong><br />
United Nati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1960s. Even <strong>the</strong>n it was made clear that self-determ<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> as<br />
decol<strong>on</strong>isati<strong>on</strong> did not apply to '<strong>in</strong>ternal' collectivities. The so-called Blue waters and Salt<br />
waters m<strong>in</strong>dset limited decol<strong>on</strong>isati<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong>ly to overseas territories. Because of this limited<br />
def<strong>in</strong>iti<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> ‘right of self-determ<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>’, <strong>the</strong> ‘<strong>in</strong>digenous’ issue could not be put <strong>on</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> UN agenda through <strong>the</strong> route of decol<strong>on</strong>isati<strong>on</strong>/self-determ<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>. The <strong>on</strong>ly open<strong>in</strong>g<br />
left was through <strong>the</strong> route of m<strong>in</strong>ority rights and discrim<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> 1960s <strong>in</strong> Europe, <strong>the</strong> Internati<strong>on</strong>al Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA)<br />
and Survival Internati<strong>on</strong>al were formed. They took up <strong>the</strong> campaign aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> genocide<br />
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and ethnocide of <strong>in</strong>digenous populati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> America. In 1975, some of <strong>the</strong> pi<strong>on</strong>eer<br />
<strong>in</strong>digenous organisati<strong>on</strong>s such as <strong>the</strong> World Council of Indigenous Peoples <strong>in</strong> Canada and<br />
<strong>the</strong> Internati<strong>on</strong>al Indian Treaty Organisati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> US were formed. They started<br />
lobby<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> UN and <strong>the</strong> Western European governments. The Government of Norway<br />
was <strong>the</strong> first to be c<strong>on</strong>v<strong>in</strong>ced. After <strong>the</strong> fourth Russell Tribunal hear<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong>digenous<br />
peoples <strong>in</strong> Rotterdam, <strong>the</strong> Ne<strong>the</strong>rlands also became a str<strong>on</strong>g supporter. O<strong>the</strong>r Nor<strong>the</strong>rn<br />
European countries jo<strong>in</strong>ed later.<br />
Topsy-turvy era of <strong>the</strong> Sixties<br />
The sixties was a period of great upheaval <strong>in</strong> Europe, America and <strong>Asia</strong>. It was a revolt<br />
aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>equities <strong>in</strong>herent <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> social and ec<strong>on</strong>omic order of <strong>the</strong> so-called free<br />
world. Dissatisfied with <strong>the</strong> quality of life, <strong>the</strong> nuclear arms stockpile, <strong>the</strong> grow<strong>in</strong>g power<br />
of <strong>the</strong> mult<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>al corporati<strong>on</strong>s secti<strong>on</strong>s of young <strong>in</strong>tellectuals, students and writers<br />
made comm<strong>on</strong> cause with <strong>the</strong> workers <strong>in</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>land Europe and <strong>the</strong> struggl<strong>in</strong>g masses <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> former col<strong>on</strong>ies <strong>in</strong> <strong>Asia</strong>, Africa and Lat<strong>in</strong> America. The Viet Nam War became <strong>the</strong><br />
focus of anti-imperialist movement. Works of <strong>in</strong>tellectuals like Jean Paul Sartre, Herbert<br />
Marcus and Franz Fan<strong>on</strong> stimulated <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>ds of <strong>the</strong> youth. Secti<strong>on</strong>s of social scientists<br />
felt encouraged to <strong>in</strong>terrogate <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>oretical basis for view<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> history of civilisati<strong>on</strong><br />
as a l<strong>in</strong>ear process -like a ladder.<br />
Informed by <strong>the</strong> new emerg<strong>in</strong>g perspectives of fem<strong>in</strong>ism, <strong>the</strong> grow<strong>in</strong>g c<strong>on</strong>sciousness of<br />
ecology and <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ory of ‘symbiosis’, (i.e. <strong>the</strong> culture of liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> harm<strong>on</strong>y with nature,<br />
propounded by <strong>the</strong> ecologists), secti<strong>on</strong>s of social scientists challenged <strong>the</strong> l<strong>in</strong>ear <strong>the</strong>ory of<br />
civilisati<strong>on</strong>. The classificati<strong>on</strong> of communities as aborig<strong>in</strong>es, primitive peoples and<br />
view<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ir social, ec<strong>on</strong>omic and political systems and <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>s as ‘lower’ or<br />
‘underdeveloped’ was no l<strong>on</strong>ger acceptable. The uni-l<strong>in</strong>ear <strong>the</strong>ory of civilisati<strong>on</strong> gave<br />
way to <strong>the</strong> multi-l<strong>in</strong>ear view of cultural history. Social and cultural practices of <strong>the</strong> socalled<br />
primitive peoples or <strong>the</strong> tribes and <strong>the</strong>ir knowledge systems became attractive sites<br />
of research.<br />
The academic-activist <strong>in</strong>teracti<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> sixties and <strong>the</strong> seventies touched <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>ds and<br />
<strong>the</strong> hearts of <strong>the</strong> young people all over <strong>the</strong> world. The young <strong>in</strong>tellectuals <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> newly<br />
<strong>in</strong>dependent countries <strong>in</strong> Africa, <strong>Asia</strong> and Lat<strong>in</strong> Americas, too began to <strong>in</strong>terrogate <strong>the</strong><br />
liberal <strong>the</strong>ories of political democracy and <strong>the</strong> capitalist system of ec<strong>on</strong>omy. The debate<br />
<strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> right to self-determ<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> was reopened. The rights discourse was enriched with<br />
<strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>clusi<strong>on</strong> of social, ec<strong>on</strong>omic and cultural rights. The c<strong>on</strong>tentious issues of collective<br />
rights entered <strong>the</strong> discourse.<br />
In <strong>South</strong> <strong>Asia</strong>, large numbers of young university students left <strong>the</strong>ir homes to jo<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
struggle of <strong>the</strong> workers and peasants. In India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka armed struggles<br />
were launched by <strong>the</strong> peasantry. The armed struggle <strong>in</strong> India was largely based <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
tribal areas. It began from Naxalbari, <strong>in</strong> nor<strong>the</strong>rn part of West Bengal <strong>in</strong>habited by<br />
Santhal Tribes. Though <strong>the</strong> armed struggle of <strong>the</strong> peasantry <strong>in</strong> India was crushed, <strong>the</strong><br />
sixties generati<strong>on</strong> of India’s radical left re-emerged as <strong>the</strong> supporters of <strong>the</strong> rights of <strong>the</strong><br />
tribal (Adivasi) peoples over ‘water-forest and land’. They took up cudgels for <strong>the</strong><br />
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‘oppressed nati<strong>on</strong>alities’ and jo<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>the</strong> movement of <strong>the</strong> tribal peoples for <strong>the</strong><br />
establishment of <strong>the</strong>ir homelands where <strong>the</strong>y would be able to preserve <strong>the</strong>ir culture, life<br />
systems and ec<strong>on</strong>omy <strong>in</strong> (Jharkhand, Chattishgarh) <strong>in</strong> central and eastern India. In <strong>the</strong><br />
tribal majority area of North East India, <strong>the</strong> Mizo, Naga, Khasi and Adi peoples, too<br />
became str<strong>on</strong>g. The new Forest policy of <strong>the</strong> Indian government which proposed<br />
‘nati<strong>on</strong>alisati<strong>on</strong>’ of all forests and c<strong>on</strong>versi<strong>on</strong> of all forest villages of <strong>the</strong> tribes <strong>in</strong>to<br />
‘virtual labour camps’ had to be aband<strong>on</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> face of <strong>the</strong> str<strong>on</strong>g oppositi<strong>on</strong> put up by<br />
a comb<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> new ‘ecologists’ , young radicals and <strong>the</strong> tribal peoples.<br />
Indigenous peoples enter <strong>the</strong> UN<br />
In <strong>the</strong> 1970s, Willemsen Diaz, who worked <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> UN Human Rights Centre <strong>in</strong> Geneva,<br />
<strong>in</strong>itiated efforts to <strong>in</strong>corporate <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>digenous issue <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> UN agenda. As a result of his<br />
works, <strong>the</strong> Sub-commissi<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> Preventi<strong>on</strong> of Discrim<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> and Protecti<strong>on</strong> of M<strong>in</strong>ority<br />
Rights accepted a recommendati<strong>on</strong> to set up a separate study <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> problems of<br />
discrim<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>in</strong>digenous populati<strong>on</strong>s. The study was authorised <strong>in</strong> 1972 with<br />
José Mart<strong>in</strong>ez Cobo as <strong>the</strong> Special Rapporteur. Inadequate staff<strong>in</strong>g and lack of funds<br />
hampered <strong>the</strong> work of <strong>the</strong> Special Rapporteur. Cobo was able to make <strong>on</strong>ly a couple of<br />
field trips, and <strong>the</strong> study was f<strong>in</strong>ally completed <strong>in</strong> 1983.<br />
In 1982, at <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>itiative of Mr. Theo Van Boven of <strong>the</strong> Ne<strong>the</strong>rlands, who was <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong><br />
head of <strong>the</strong> UN Human Rights Centre, and with <strong>the</strong> support of some of <strong>the</strong> European<br />
states, a UN Work<strong>in</strong>g Group <strong>on</strong> Indigenous Populati<strong>on</strong>s was set up as a pre-sessi<strong>on</strong><br />
work<strong>in</strong>g group of <strong>the</strong> Sub-commissi<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> Preventi<strong>on</strong> of Discrim<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> and Protecti<strong>on</strong> of<br />
<strong>M<strong>in</strong>orities</strong>. It should be noted that <strong>the</strong> credit for gett<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> UN to accept <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>digenous<br />
issue <strong>on</strong> its agenda goes to <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>digenous groups of North America and some of <strong>the</strong><br />
pi<strong>on</strong>eer European NG0s which were c<strong>on</strong>cerned with <strong>the</strong> genocide of <strong>in</strong>digenous<br />
populati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> America. At this stage no <strong>Asia</strong>n or African NGO or <strong>in</strong>digenous<br />
peoples' organisati<strong>on</strong> was <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> this effort. Even <strong>the</strong> Australian <strong>in</strong>digenous peoples<br />
did not jo<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> effort until <strong>the</strong> early 1980s. It is natural that as <strong>the</strong>se peoples were ma<strong>in</strong>ly<br />
exposed to <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>digenous peoples of America, <strong>the</strong>ir understand<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>digenous<br />
issue at <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>ceptual level was str<strong>on</strong>gly <strong>in</strong>fluenced by <strong>the</strong> American situati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
However, this does not mean that <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>digenous or tribal peoples of <strong>Asia</strong> were silent or<br />
that NG0s of <strong>the</strong> <strong>Asia</strong>n countries did not take up <strong>the</strong> cause of <strong>the</strong> tribal peoples <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
countries. As a matter of fact, <strong>in</strong> <strong>Asia</strong> <strong>the</strong> tribal peoples of Burma (Myanmar),<br />
Bangladesh, India, Japan and Pakistan have been engaged <strong>in</strong> a l<strong>on</strong>g and protracted<br />
struggle aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> states for establish<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ir rights over land and o<strong>the</strong>r resources. They<br />
have also been fight<strong>in</strong>g for <strong>the</strong> protecti<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong>ir culture, language, livelihood, religi<strong>on</strong><br />
and social and political <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>s. C<strong>on</strong>siderable work has been d<strong>on</strong>e <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>se countries<br />
by humanist scholars, political organisati<strong>on</strong>s, social reformers and NG0s for <strong>the</strong><br />
protecti<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> rights of <strong>the</strong> tribal peoples, as well as <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> questi<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong>ir right of<br />
self-rule, self-government and self-determ<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
As a result, <strong>in</strong> some of <strong>the</strong>se countries c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al and legal reforms were <strong>in</strong>troduced<br />
which provided protecti<strong>on</strong> to <strong>the</strong> tribal populati<strong>on</strong>s. Unfortunately, as most <strong>Asia</strong>n<br />
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governments did not allow <strong>the</strong>ir NG0s to participate <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> UN fora, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Asia</strong>n tribal<br />
peoples and <strong>the</strong>ir organisati<strong>on</strong>s were unable to participate <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> process that led to <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>corporati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>digenous issue <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> UN agenda.<br />
The UN Work<strong>in</strong>g Group <strong>on</strong> Indigenous Populati<strong>on</strong>s started its work <strong>in</strong> 1982. It was given<br />
a dual task: First, to develop a criteri<strong>on</strong> for determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>cept of ‘<strong>in</strong>digenous’ and,<br />
sec<strong>on</strong>d, to develop standards to guide member states of <strong>the</strong> UN <strong>in</strong> relati<strong>on</strong> to <strong>the</strong> rights of<br />
<strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>digenous m<strong>in</strong>orities <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir jurisdicti<strong>on</strong>s. The Work<strong>in</strong>g Groups, which are a part of<br />
a sub-commissi<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> UN Human Rights Commissi<strong>on</strong>, have no juridical or legislative<br />
functi<strong>on</strong>. These bodies are to discuss human rights issues and draft proposals. They may<br />
<strong>in</strong>dicate <strong>the</strong> norms of <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al law as established by member states <strong>in</strong> practice, but<br />
<strong>the</strong>y do not have <strong>the</strong> power to establish new norms. Even <strong>the</strong> norms or pr<strong>in</strong>ciples<br />
established <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> declarati<strong>on</strong>s of <strong>the</strong> UN General Assembly do not become <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al<br />
law until <strong>the</strong>se are subsequently ratified by <strong>the</strong> state <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> form of covenants and o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al <strong>in</strong>struments.<br />
UN Work<strong>in</strong>g Group and <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>ceptual debate<br />
As <strong>the</strong> Work<strong>in</strong>g Group was set up without def<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>digenous peoples, <strong>the</strong> def<strong>in</strong>iti<strong>on</strong><br />
developed by . José Mart<strong>in</strong>ez Cobo, Special Rapporteur <strong>on</strong> Discrim<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> aga<strong>in</strong>st<br />
Indigenous Populati<strong>on</strong>s, was accepted by <strong>the</strong> Work<strong>in</strong>g Group (Sanders 1989):<br />
"Indigenous populati<strong>on</strong>s are composed of <strong>the</strong> exist<strong>in</strong>g descendants of <strong>the</strong> peoples who <strong>in</strong>habited <strong>the</strong><br />
present territory of a country wholly or partially at <strong>the</strong> time when pers<strong>on</strong>s of a different culture or ethnic<br />
orig<strong>in</strong> arrived <strong>the</strong>re from o<strong>the</strong>r parts of '<strong>the</strong> world, overcame <strong>the</strong>m, by c<strong>on</strong>quest, settlement or o<strong>the</strong>r means,<br />
reduced <strong>the</strong>m to a n<strong>on</strong>-dom<strong>in</strong>ant or col<strong>on</strong>ial c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>; who today live more <strong>in</strong> c<strong>on</strong>formity with <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
particular social, ec<strong>on</strong>omic and cultural customs and traditi<strong>on</strong>s than with <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>s of <strong>the</strong> country of<br />
which <strong>the</strong>y now form part, under a state structure which <strong>in</strong>corporates ma<strong>in</strong>ly nati<strong>on</strong>al, social and cultural<br />
characteristics of o<strong>the</strong>r segments of <strong>the</strong> populati<strong>on</strong> which are predom<strong>in</strong>ant." (Mart<strong>in</strong>ez Cobo, 1972).<br />
In his f<strong>in</strong>al report published almost twelve years later, Mart<strong>in</strong>ez Cobo did not add<br />
anyth<strong>in</strong>g new to <strong>the</strong> def<strong>in</strong>iti<strong>on</strong> at <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>ceptual level. However, while def<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g an<br />
<strong>in</strong>digenous pers<strong>on</strong> he added that any <strong>in</strong>dividual who identified himself or herself as<br />
<strong>in</strong>digenous and was accepted by <strong>the</strong> group or <strong>the</strong> community as <strong>on</strong>e of its members was<br />
to be regarded as an <strong>in</strong>digenous pers<strong>on</strong> (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7/Add.4. para.381).<br />
The Draft Universal Declarati<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> Rights of Indigenous Peoples (1995date?)<br />
prepared by <strong>the</strong> Work<strong>in</strong>g Group does not <strong>in</strong>clude a def<strong>in</strong>iti<strong>on</strong> of <strong>in</strong>digenous peoples or<br />
populati<strong>on</strong>s. The Chairpers<strong>on</strong> – <strong>the</strong> Rapporteur of <strong>the</strong> Work<strong>in</strong>g Group, Ms. Erica Irene<br />
Daes – has justified this omissi<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> ground that “historically, <strong>in</strong>digenous peoples<br />
have suffered, from def<strong>in</strong>iti<strong>on</strong>s imposed by o<strong>the</strong>rs” and as a result, <strong>in</strong> certa<strong>in</strong> countries<br />
many <strong>in</strong>digenous peoples have been declassified. She ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed that because of this<br />
reas<strong>on</strong>, <strong>the</strong> members of <strong>the</strong> Work<strong>in</strong>g Group <strong>in</strong>sisted that no <strong>in</strong>digenous community,<br />
organisati<strong>on</strong>, nati<strong>on</strong> or even <strong>in</strong>digenous pers<strong>on</strong> from whatever regi<strong>on</strong> should be denied<br />
<strong>the</strong> right to express peacefully and without abuse an op<strong>in</strong>i<strong>on</strong> or a viewpo<strong>in</strong>t <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
sessi<strong>on</strong>s of <strong>the</strong> Work<strong>in</strong>g Group. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to her, through this participatory process <strong>the</strong><br />
Work<strong>in</strong>g Group was able to develop <strong>the</strong> widely accepted comprehensive Draft<br />
162
Declarati<strong>on</strong> of Rights of <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>digenous Peoples ‘without feel<strong>in</strong>g a need for elaborat<strong>in</strong>g a<br />
def<strong>in</strong>iti<strong>on</strong> of <strong>in</strong>digenous peoples’. (E/ CN.4/Stib.2/AC.4/1995/3, page 3).<br />
The Work<strong>in</strong>g def<strong>in</strong>iti<strong>on</strong> suffers from several flaws. The first flaw is that it def<strong>in</strong>es<br />
<strong>in</strong>digenous peoples primarily from a chr<strong>on</strong>ological perspective. By identify<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>in</strong>digenous peoples with those who <strong>in</strong>habited' an area before it was c<strong>on</strong>quered or<br />
col<strong>on</strong>ised by 'people from o<strong>the</strong>r parts of <strong>the</strong> world' <strong>the</strong> work<strong>in</strong>g def<strong>in</strong>iti<strong>on</strong> has limited <strong>the</strong><br />
applicability of this def<strong>in</strong>iti<strong>on</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>ly to pre-col<strong>on</strong>ial populati<strong>on</strong>s. In any case, to decide<br />
<strong>the</strong> issue with reference to <strong>on</strong>ly 500 years of European col<strong>on</strong>ialism is to ignore <strong>the</strong> history<br />
of n<strong>on</strong>-European civilisati<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
Hav<strong>in</strong>g frozen <strong>the</strong> identity of <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>digenous peoples <strong>in</strong> a historical-chr<strong>on</strong>ological axis, it<br />
treats <strong>the</strong> category of <strong>in</strong>digenous as a priori. And from it follows <strong>the</strong> def<strong>in</strong>iti<strong>on</strong> of<br />
<strong>in</strong>digenous culture, customs, religi<strong>on</strong>, society and history. The survival of <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>digenous<br />
identity is expla<strong>in</strong>ed by its isolati<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>on</strong>e hand and its marg<strong>in</strong>alisati<strong>on</strong> and<br />
discrim<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r. This approach is simplistic as it treats <strong>in</strong>digenous peoples <strong>in</strong><br />
terms of an ‘ethnographic present', as if <strong>the</strong> thousands of years of human history and<br />
<strong>in</strong>teracti<strong>on</strong>s have not substantially altered <strong>the</strong> cultures of different peoples.<br />
Am<strong>on</strong>g o<strong>the</strong>r th<strong>in</strong>gs, this approach also fails to expla<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> phenomena of <strong>the</strong> survival of<br />
<strong>the</strong> '<strong>in</strong>digenous' identity <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> face of adversity. Moreover, ethnic identities have also<br />
survived. But not all ethnic communities have lived <strong>in</strong> isolati<strong>on</strong>. Many ethnic<br />
communities have completely lost c<strong>on</strong>trol over <strong>the</strong>ir 'homeland' or <strong>the</strong> territory which<br />
was <strong>the</strong> cradle of <strong>the</strong>ir culture. Yet <strong>the</strong>ir identities have survived. What <strong>the</strong>n are <strong>the</strong><br />
differences between ethnic groups and <strong>in</strong>digenous peoples?<br />
It does raise a ra<strong>the</strong>r ticklish issue. It is a fact that <strong>the</strong> white Afrikaners from <strong>South</strong><br />
Africa, after <strong>the</strong> aboliti<strong>on</strong> of apar<strong>the</strong>id, went to <strong>the</strong> Work<strong>in</strong>g Group as an <strong>in</strong>digenous<br />
people. Likewise, <strong>the</strong> Kashmiri Pundits community of India has been attend<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
sessi<strong>on</strong>s of <strong>the</strong> Work<strong>in</strong>g Group with <strong>the</strong> bless<strong>in</strong>gs of <strong>the</strong> Indian Government. Both <strong>the</strong>se<br />
ethnic communities did not suffer from isolati<strong>on</strong> or discrim<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>. On <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>trary, until<br />
recently <strong>the</strong>y were <strong>in</strong> power and were practis<strong>in</strong>g discrim<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> aga<strong>in</strong>st o<strong>the</strong>rs.<br />
In 1983, realis<strong>in</strong>g that Cobo's orig<strong>in</strong>al def<strong>in</strong>iti<strong>on</strong> was not adequate to cover <strong>the</strong> isolated<br />
and marg<strong>in</strong>al tribal populati<strong>on</strong>s of <strong>the</strong> <strong>Asia</strong>n c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ent, <strong>the</strong> scope and <strong>the</strong> ambit of <strong>the</strong><br />
'work<strong>in</strong>g def<strong>in</strong>iti<strong>on</strong>' was enlarged. It was decided that all those marg<strong>in</strong>al and isolated<br />
groups exist<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> many countries who may not have suffered c<strong>on</strong>quest or direct<br />
col<strong>on</strong>isati<strong>on</strong> might be c<strong>on</strong>sidered as <strong>in</strong>digenous peoples if <strong>the</strong>y fulfilled <strong>the</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g<br />
criteria:<br />
"(a) <strong>the</strong>y are <strong>the</strong> descendants of groups, which were <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
territory at <strong>the</strong> time when o<strong>the</strong>r groups of different cultures or ethnic orig<strong>in</strong> arrived <strong>the</strong>re<br />
(b) precisely because of <strong>the</strong>ir isolati<strong>on</strong> from o<strong>the</strong>r segments of <strong>the</strong> country's populati<strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong>y have almost<br />
preserved <strong>in</strong>tact <strong>the</strong> customs and traditi<strong>on</strong>s of <strong>the</strong>ir ancestors which are similar to those characterised as<br />
<strong>in</strong>digenous,<br />
(c) <strong>the</strong>y are, even if <strong>on</strong>ly formally, placed under a state structure which <strong>in</strong>corporates nati<strong>on</strong>al, social and<br />
cultural characteristics alien to <strong>the</strong>ir own" (FICN. 41Sub.211983121 Adds. Para. 379).<br />
163
But even <strong>the</strong>se additi<strong>on</strong>al criteria did not remove <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>fusi<strong>on</strong> that is <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> def<strong>in</strong>iti<strong>on</strong>.<br />
This c<strong>on</strong>fusi<strong>on</strong> exists not <strong>on</strong>ly am<strong>on</strong>g governments and experts, but also am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
isolated, marg<strong>in</strong>alised and tribal peoples of Africa, <strong>Asia</strong> and <strong>Asia</strong> Pacific.<br />
Dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> 12th Sessi<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> UN Work<strong>in</strong>g Group <strong>on</strong> Indigenous Populati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong> June<br />
1994, some of <strong>the</strong> representatives of <strong>in</strong>digenous or tribal peoples of <strong>Asia</strong>n countries<br />
addressed <strong>the</strong> need to redef<strong>in</strong>e <strong>the</strong> criteria for determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>cept of <strong>in</strong>digenous<br />
peoples.<br />
The c<strong>on</strong>fusi<strong>on</strong> basically emanates from <strong>the</strong> use of <strong>the</strong> term '<strong>in</strong>digenous'. In social<br />
sciences, term<strong>in</strong>ologies carry a multiplicity of mean<strong>in</strong>gs. Social scientists selectively<br />
choose <strong>on</strong>e or a few of <strong>the</strong> several mean<strong>in</strong>gs possible while us<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>se term<strong>in</strong>ologies.<br />
But it should be remembered that a c<strong>on</strong>cept or a term has no <strong>in</strong>dependent existence. It<br />
derives its mean<strong>in</strong>g not <strong>on</strong>ly from <strong>the</strong>ory, but is shaped by <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>temporary power<br />
structure of which it is a part. There is also ano<strong>the</strong>r c<strong>on</strong>tribut<strong>in</strong>g factor, and that is <strong>the</strong><br />
dialogue between <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>orists and <strong>the</strong> activists. And that dialogue is mediated by <strong>the</strong><br />
dom<strong>in</strong>ant power structures. To what extent <strong>the</strong> activist percepti<strong>on</strong> gets <strong>in</strong>tegrated <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong><br />
c<strong>on</strong>cepti<strong>on</strong> depends <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>fluence exerted by that power structure.<br />
The current c<strong>on</strong>cept or <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ory of '<strong>in</strong>digenous' has been shaped by <strong>the</strong> dialogue<br />
between academics and activists of Western Europe and North America, as well as <strong>the</strong><br />
power structures of Western Europe which lent <strong>the</strong>ir support <strong>in</strong> and outside <strong>the</strong> UN. The<br />
c<strong>on</strong>cept, <strong>the</strong>refore, has its orig<strong>in</strong>s <strong>in</strong> a col<strong>on</strong>ial historical perspective. When it is applied<br />
to <strong>the</strong> people of <strong>the</strong> Americas, Australia and New Zealand it creates no c<strong>on</strong>fusi<strong>on</strong>, but<br />
when <strong>the</strong> same c<strong>on</strong>cept is applied to <strong>the</strong> peoples of <strong>Asia</strong> and Africa, it creates c<strong>on</strong>fusi<strong>on</strong>.<br />
The <strong>Asia</strong>n situati<strong>on</strong><br />
It has been said by several <strong>Asia</strong>n governments and many scholars, with some amount of<br />
justificati<strong>on</strong>, that this def<strong>in</strong>iti<strong>on</strong> applies <strong>on</strong>ly to <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>quered peoples of <strong>the</strong> Americas,<br />
Australia, New Zealand and <strong>the</strong> Pacific areas and leaves out <strong>the</strong> tribal peoples of <strong>Asia</strong> and<br />
Africa, <strong>in</strong> particular, and some ethnic communities <strong>in</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>land Europe. In <strong>the</strong> countries<br />
of <strong>Asia</strong> and Africa where migrati<strong>on</strong> has c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued for thousands of years, it is impossible<br />
to identify any group as <strong>in</strong>digenous <strong>on</strong> a chr<strong>on</strong>ological basis. The t<strong>on</strong>gue <strong>in</strong> cheek<br />
statement of <strong>the</strong> representative of <strong>the</strong> Government of India that after <strong>the</strong> departure of <strong>the</strong><br />
British - <strong>the</strong> 'foreigners' who ruled over India for 200 years - <strong>on</strong>ly '<strong>in</strong>digenous' peoples<br />
were left <strong>in</strong> India and hence, all Indians are <strong>in</strong>digenous, shows <strong>the</strong> weakness of this<br />
method of identify<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>digenous peoples <strong>in</strong> <strong>Asia</strong> and Africa.<br />
Governments of <strong>the</strong> <strong>Asia</strong>n regi<strong>on</strong> have taken advantage of <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>fusi<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> UN<br />
def<strong>in</strong>iti<strong>on</strong> to exclude milli<strong>on</strong>s of tribal peoples of <strong>Asia</strong> and Africa from <strong>the</strong> designati<strong>on</strong><br />
of <strong>in</strong>digenous peoples. These peoples who are called 'scheduled tribes' <strong>in</strong> India, 'tribes' <strong>in</strong><br />
Bangladesh, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan and Thailand, and 'nati<strong>on</strong>alities' <strong>in</strong> Burma<br />
(Myanmar) and Ch<strong>in</strong>a are treated as m<strong>in</strong>orities with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>-state systems. The<br />
ground for exclusi<strong>on</strong> is that <strong>the</strong> tribal peoples of <strong>the</strong>se countries are no l<strong>on</strong>ger col<strong>on</strong>ised<br />
by overseas powers. Such an approach is a historical, a structural and partisan. Moreover,<br />
164
it ignores <strong>the</strong> phenomen<strong>on</strong> of <strong>in</strong>ternal col<strong>on</strong>ialism by <strong>the</strong> n<strong>on</strong>-tribal dom<strong>in</strong>ant groups<br />
with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> state structures, both <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> past and at present.<br />
We have already seen that <strong>the</strong> term 'tribe' is closely c<strong>on</strong>nected with <strong>the</strong> rise of European<br />
col<strong>on</strong>ialism and its racist hegem<strong>on</strong>ic ideology. Despite its ideological c<strong>on</strong>notati<strong>on</strong>, <strong>the</strong><br />
term has survived, especially <strong>in</strong> those post-col<strong>on</strong>ial countries where a small fracti<strong>on</strong> of<br />
<strong>the</strong> populati<strong>on</strong> has been classified as 'tribes'. Though its usage varies from country to<br />
country, it has always carried a negative c<strong>on</strong>notati<strong>on</strong>. Ir<strong>on</strong>ically. <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> academic circles<br />
of <strong>the</strong>se post col<strong>on</strong>ial societies this term is still def<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> much <strong>the</strong> same way as was<br />
d<strong>on</strong>e <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> mid-n<strong>in</strong>eteenth century by European academics like Morgan. It is important<br />
to understand this, lest we become c<strong>on</strong>fused by <strong>the</strong> varied new term<strong>in</strong>ologies used by<br />
different governments.<br />
In Ch<strong>in</strong>a or Burma, <strong>the</strong> term used is 'nati<strong>on</strong>ality'. But it does not mean recogniti<strong>on</strong> of an<br />
equal partner <strong>in</strong> an assembly of nati<strong>on</strong>alities. It is used to def<strong>in</strong>e a m<strong>in</strong>ority, which needs<br />
to be 'developed and <strong>in</strong>tegrated' <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>stream of Ch<strong>in</strong>ese or Burmese society. In<br />
Burma, at <strong>the</strong> time of <strong>in</strong>dependence , all <strong>the</strong> political leaders had signed <strong>the</strong> Pangl<strong>on</strong>g<br />
Agreement, which provided for <strong>the</strong> establishment of a federati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> which all <strong>the</strong><br />
federat<strong>in</strong>g ‘nati<strong>on</strong>alities’ – Kach<strong>in</strong>, Ch<strong>in</strong>, Arakanese, Shan, M<strong>on</strong>g and Karens - would<br />
enjoy equal status with <strong>the</strong> Burmans. However, immediately after <strong>in</strong>dependence, <strong>the</strong><br />
‘ma<strong>in</strong>stream’ Burmese leaders broke <strong>the</strong> agreement, imposed Burmese language as <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>on</strong>ly official language <strong>on</strong> all <strong>the</strong> people and declared Buddhism as <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>al religi<strong>on</strong>.<br />
In East Pakistan, <strong>the</strong> Regulati<strong>on</strong> of 1900, which offered limited protecti<strong>on</strong> to <strong>the</strong> lands of<br />
<strong>the</strong> hill tribes – Chakma, Marma, Tipera, Bam - was withdrawn, when Pakistan<br />
government decided to build <strong>the</strong> Kaptai Dam that <strong>in</strong>undated vast areas of tribal homeland<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Chittag<strong>on</strong>g Hill tracts. Virtually no compensati<strong>on</strong> was paid. More than 200,000<br />
displaced tribal people had to seek refuge <strong>in</strong> Burma and India.<br />
Let us now exam<strong>in</strong>e <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>di term 'Adivasi' which is comm<strong>on</strong>ly used <strong>in</strong> India to<br />
describe tribal people. The word orig<strong>in</strong>ates from H<strong>in</strong>du religious texts. Literally<br />
translated, it means 'orig<strong>in</strong>al <strong>in</strong>habitants'. But that is not <strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> which it was<br />
customarily used. It was used <strong>in</strong> a cultural and a social c<strong>on</strong>text to refer to people who<br />
were outside <strong>the</strong> folds of <strong>the</strong> H<strong>in</strong>du social system. It referred to people who had a<br />
different culture, religi<strong>on</strong>, language and social system. But this recogniti<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong><br />
'o<strong>the</strong>rness' did not mean that <strong>the</strong>y were accepted as equals. The H<strong>in</strong>dus and Adivasi did<br />
not <strong>in</strong>ter-marry nei<strong>the</strong>r did <strong>the</strong>y relate to each o<strong>the</strong>r socially. The term 'Adivasi' was used<br />
<strong>in</strong> a derogatory sense to mean 'junglee', i.e. uncultured forest dwellers. As <strong>the</strong> forest<br />
dwell<strong>in</strong>g Adivasis were hunter ga<strong>the</strong>rs, <strong>the</strong>y were seen as ‘unclean people’ because <strong>the</strong>y<br />
ate almost every animal <strong>the</strong>y killed for food.<br />
Six decades after India’s <strong>in</strong>dependence <strong>the</strong> ground realities have not changed much. It is<br />
true that <strong>the</strong> pro ‘Scheduled Tribe’ Reservati<strong>on</strong> Policy of <strong>the</strong> Indian state enabled a small<br />
number of Adivasis to enter <strong>the</strong> parliament as elected members through ‘reserved<br />
c<strong>on</strong>stituencies’ and a handful of <strong>the</strong>m have jo<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>the</strong> elite Indian adm<strong>in</strong>istrative,<br />
diplomatic and police services through ‘reserve quota’, however, it has d<strong>on</strong>e little to<br />
enhance <strong>the</strong> social and political status of <strong>the</strong> Adivasi <strong>in</strong> Indian society. They still rema<strong>in</strong><br />
165
<strong>the</strong> ‘outsiders’ who have strange social practices and unclean food habits. The arrogance<br />
and <strong>the</strong> attitudes towards <strong>the</strong>se people and <strong>the</strong>ir histories, which <strong>the</strong> rul<strong>in</strong>g classes, ‘<strong>the</strong><br />
brown sahibs’- Macaulay’s archetypes, imbibed from <strong>the</strong>ir ‘assimilati<strong>on</strong>’ with <strong>the</strong><br />
col<strong>on</strong>ial masters c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to block <strong>the</strong> Adivasi people’s progress to social equality even<br />
today as <strong>the</strong> ‘Brown Sahib’ mentality and culture c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to dom<strong>in</strong>ate social and cultural<br />
aspects <strong>in</strong> post <strong>in</strong>dependent India.<br />
A political debate<br />
Throughout human history, people have moved from place to place, c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ent to<br />
c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ent. Intercultural <strong>in</strong>fluences and <strong>in</strong>ternal dynamics are near universal processes of<br />
history. Before <strong>the</strong> advent of col<strong>on</strong>ialism and world capitalism, communities apparently<br />
lived <strong>in</strong> peaceful coexistence and <strong>the</strong>re was syncretism am<strong>on</strong>g culturally diverse<br />
societies. Anthropologists say that with <strong>the</strong> advent of settled agriculture based <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> use<br />
of <strong>the</strong> field furrow and domesticated tracti<strong>on</strong> animal came private property. As <strong>the</strong>se<br />
communities became ec<strong>on</strong>omically and militarily more powerful <strong>the</strong>y pushed <strong>the</strong><br />
communities who practiced hunt<strong>in</strong>g and ga<strong>the</strong>r<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to areas where settled agriculture<br />
was not feasible – like hilly areas, arid and desert regi<strong>on</strong>s and forests.<br />
Some of <strong>the</strong> early l<strong>in</strong>guists of <strong>the</strong> col<strong>on</strong>ial days classified <strong>the</strong> language of <strong>the</strong> Munda and<br />
Ho people of Jharkhand as a member of <strong>the</strong> Austroasiatic language family which<br />
comprises languages spoken <strong>in</strong> Ind<strong>on</strong>esia, Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos and Burma. These<br />
studies have given support to <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ories of Austroasian family of people <strong>on</strong>ce<br />
<strong>in</strong>habit<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> central uplands of Indian (G<strong>on</strong>dwana) and over centuries migrat<strong>in</strong>g to parts<br />
of <strong>South</strong> East <strong>Asia</strong> and Polynesia.<br />
N<strong>in</strong>eteenth century European scholars of early Indian literature (Vedic and Sanskrit)<br />
claimed that <strong>the</strong> Arian/Brahmanical culture slowly spread from <strong>the</strong> north west of India<br />
across <strong>the</strong> Gangetic pla<strong>in</strong>s <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> east and south. These scholars viewed <strong>the</strong> epic<br />
Mahabharat as an account of <strong>in</strong>ternal c<strong>on</strong>flict am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong> ‘Aryan c<strong>on</strong>quers’ and <strong>the</strong> epic<br />
Ramayana, as <strong>the</strong> story of <strong>the</strong> fur<strong>the</strong>r spread of ‘Brahmanism’ towards <strong>the</strong> south.<br />
Twentieth century scholars like G. N. Hiralal, T. Paramasiva Iyer and H. D. Sankalia held<br />
that <strong>the</strong> war <strong>in</strong> Ramayana represented <strong>the</strong> struggle between <strong>the</strong> communities <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
embry<strong>on</strong>ic stage of settled agriculture and <strong>the</strong> communities who were <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> culture of<br />
hunt<strong>in</strong>g and ga<strong>the</strong>r<strong>in</strong>g. In <strong>the</strong> s<strong>on</strong>gs of ‘Rigveda’ and <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> ‘Grihya’ rituals, Sita is<br />
described as <strong>the</strong> field furrow <strong>in</strong> which ‘seeds’ are planted. There are elaborate Vedic<br />
rituals for pay<strong>in</strong>g div<strong>in</strong>e tributes to <strong>the</strong> field furrow. In o<strong>the</strong>r words ‘Sita’ represented <strong>the</strong><br />
Aryan (Vedic) society’s transiti<strong>on</strong> from culture of ‘hunt<strong>in</strong>g-ga<strong>the</strong>r<strong>in</strong>g’ to settled<br />
agriculture and animal husbandry.<br />
The characters of Ramayana – Rama and Sita were allegorical figures – pers<strong>on</strong>ificati<strong>on</strong><br />
of certa<strong>in</strong> occurrences and situati<strong>on</strong>s and that <strong>the</strong> central scheme of <strong>the</strong> epic was <strong>the</strong><br />
abducti<strong>on</strong> of ‘Sita’ by a giant dem<strong>on</strong> and her subsequent recovery by Rama. In this war<br />
aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> dem<strong>on</strong>s, those natives who were well disposed towards Aryan civilisati<strong>on</strong><br />
were described as m<strong>on</strong>keys – a ra<strong>the</strong>r unflatter<strong>in</strong>g descripti<strong>on</strong>. G. Ramdass has argued<br />
that Ravana was <strong>the</strong> k<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> G<strong>on</strong>d tribes/<strong>in</strong>digenous community of Central India<br />
166
while M. V. Kive’s research <strong>in</strong> central Indian had led him to c<strong>on</strong>clude that Lanka was<br />
located <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Amarkantak plateau of present day Indian state of Chattishgarh.<br />
Many Indian scholars believe that <strong>the</strong> Aryans who came to India around 1800-1500 B.C.<br />
had subjugated secti<strong>on</strong>s of <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>digenous people of <strong>the</strong> subc<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ent. Later, depend<strong>in</strong>g of<br />
<strong>the</strong> skills of <strong>the</strong>se people and <strong>the</strong> services <strong>the</strong>y provided, <strong>the</strong>y were <strong>in</strong>tegrated <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong><br />
society’s lower echel<strong>on</strong>s as ‘polluted’ people or ‘untouchable castes’. O<strong>the</strong>r people who<br />
probably did not possess suitable skills or could not be enslaved, were pushed <strong>in</strong>to<br />
uplands and forests where <strong>the</strong>y enjoyed relative aut<strong>on</strong>omy. These accounts of history<br />
may or may not be true. However <strong>the</strong>se provide plausible explanati<strong>on</strong>s of <strong>the</strong> survival of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Adivasi <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> forest tracts, all across India, from <strong>the</strong> west to <strong>the</strong> east coast, through<br />
central India and c<strong>on</strong>nect<strong>in</strong>g up to <strong>the</strong> nor<strong>the</strong>ast.<br />
Victims of <strong>in</strong>ternal col<strong>on</strong>ialism<br />
The so-called c<strong>on</strong>ceptual debate <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> def<strong>in</strong>iti<strong>on</strong> of ‘Indigenous’ and whe<strong>the</strong>r it is<br />
applicable to post col<strong>on</strong>ial <strong>Asia</strong>n states will rema<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>c<strong>on</strong>clusive. No c<strong>on</strong>cept can fully<br />
def<strong>in</strong>e a reality. But what is important to note is that <strong>the</strong> real reas<strong>on</strong> for exclud<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
tribal peoples of <strong>Asia</strong> is not lack of c<strong>on</strong>ceptual clarity, but a political <strong>on</strong>e. And <strong>the</strong>refore,<br />
it is a political debate, which needs to focus <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> reality of powerlessness of <strong>the</strong> tribal<br />
peoples and <strong>the</strong>ir struggle for justice and <strong>the</strong> removal of <strong>the</strong> imbalance <strong>in</strong>herent <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
present nati<strong>on</strong>al and <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al power structures. It is time to look at <strong>the</strong> mechanisms<br />
perpetuat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ir subjugati<strong>on</strong> and subord<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> countries <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong>y live,<br />
as well as today's global ec<strong>on</strong>omic system. Almost all tribal peoples and <strong>in</strong>digenous<br />
peoples of <strong>Asia</strong> live <strong>in</strong> relatively remote areas with meagre resources.<br />
Dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> col<strong>on</strong>ial days, particularly as <strong>the</strong> British brought <strong>the</strong> railways to India and<br />
started lay<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> rail tracks l<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g far away places cutt<strong>in</strong>g across forests, bridg<strong>in</strong>g rivers<br />
and digg<strong>in</strong>g tunnels through hills, most of <strong>the</strong> forests <strong>in</strong> accessible areas <strong>on</strong> tribal lands<br />
were taken away. The post-col<strong>on</strong>ial governments of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh have<br />
followed <strong>the</strong> same policies. In Bangladesh, <strong>the</strong> Chakma and <strong>the</strong> Haj<strong>on</strong>g tribes have been<br />
uprooted from <strong>the</strong>ir homelands and majority Bengali people were settled <strong>in</strong> those areas.I<br />
Sri Lanka, <strong>the</strong> state’s land acquisiti<strong>on</strong> policy has reduced <strong>the</strong> Vedda <strong>in</strong>digenous people to<br />
a few hundred. In Thailand, <strong>the</strong> Royal Forest Department is <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> process of remov<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>the</strong> tribal peoples from <strong>the</strong> traditi<strong>on</strong>al forest habitat <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> name of preserv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
envir<strong>on</strong>ment.<br />
In Nepal, where <strong>the</strong> Indigenous/tribal people c<strong>on</strong>stitute a significant proporti<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong><br />
state’s populati<strong>on</strong>, <strong>the</strong>y have been denied any say <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> governance of <strong>the</strong> country. In<br />
Myanmar (Burma), at <strong>the</strong> time of <strong>in</strong>dependence <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> late forties, <strong>the</strong> federal government<br />
agreed to provide full '<strong>in</strong>ternal sovereignty' to all <strong>the</strong> ethnic communities. Yet with<strong>in</strong> 15<br />
years of <strong>in</strong>dependence, <strong>the</strong> government had decided to impose Buddhism as <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>al<br />
religi<strong>on</strong> and <strong>the</strong> Burmese language <strong>on</strong> all people. It <strong>in</strong>itiated a programme of forced<br />
<strong>in</strong>tegrati<strong>on</strong> of all ethnic people <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> so-called ma<strong>in</strong>stream Burmese culture by deny<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>the</strong>m even <strong>the</strong> right to pr<strong>in</strong>t books <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir own languages. This policy has c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued to<br />
167
date.<br />
In India, despite <strong>the</strong> protecti<strong>on</strong> provided by <strong>the</strong> Fifth and <strong>the</strong> Sixth Schedules of <strong>the</strong><br />
C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>, <strong>the</strong> tribes have lost most of <strong>the</strong>ir land. Their rights to forests and forest<br />
produce were c<strong>on</strong>verted <strong>in</strong>to c<strong>on</strong>cessi<strong>on</strong>s by law. Gigantic factories, m<strong>in</strong>es, mega power<br />
projects and dams have been set up <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir habitats. Milli<strong>on</strong>s of tribal people have been<br />
uprooted without adequate compensati<strong>on</strong>. This has been d<strong>on</strong>e by <strong>the</strong> government <strong>in</strong> spite<br />
of hav<strong>in</strong>g ratified ILO c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong> No. 107. Government of India has not signed ILO<br />
c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong> 169 which provided greater protecti<strong>on</strong> to <strong>the</strong> tribes and <strong>in</strong>digenous peoples. In<br />
nor<strong>the</strong>astern India, <strong>the</strong> army has been let loose to crush <strong>the</strong> movements of <strong>the</strong> tribal<br />
peoples for self determ<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>. In <strong>the</strong> central Indian tribal belt, when <strong>the</strong> tribal people rose<br />
<strong>in</strong> armed revolt dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> seventies to reclaim <strong>the</strong>ir rights to land, water resources and<br />
forests, <strong>the</strong>y were brutally crushed. After about seven and a half decades of struggle, <strong>the</strong><br />
Adivasi peoples of <strong>the</strong> regi<strong>on</strong> known as, Jharkhand f<strong>in</strong>ally got a separate state. But it was<br />
<strong>on</strong>ly a part of <strong>the</strong> area of <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>al homeland, <strong>the</strong> Adivasi <strong>in</strong>habited c<strong>on</strong>tiguous areas<br />
under <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>trol of <strong>the</strong> states of Orissa and West Bengal was not <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> new<br />
state of Jharkhand. As a result <strong>the</strong> Adivasis became a m<strong>in</strong>ority <strong>in</strong> Jharkhand state.<br />
India has signed <strong>the</strong> UN C<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> Elim<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> of All Forms of Racial<br />
Discrim<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> (CERD) <strong>in</strong> December 1968. However, <strong>the</strong> Indian government claims that<br />
as <strong>the</strong>re is no racial discrim<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> India. The Scheduled Castes and <strong>the</strong> Scheduled<br />
Tribes do not come under <strong>the</strong> purview of CERD M<strong>on</strong>itor<strong>in</strong>g Committee. The government<br />
of India claims that it submits <strong>the</strong> report to CERD Committee as a matter of ‘courtesy’.<br />
Dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> meet<strong>in</strong>g of he CERD Committee <strong>on</strong> February 26, 2007 <strong>the</strong> Indian delegati<strong>on</strong><br />
even refused to recognise <strong>the</strong> ‘scheduled tribes’ as a ‘dist<strong>in</strong>ct group’.<br />
India’s Tenth Five Year Plan 2002-2007 document notes, ‘Tribal communities c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue<br />
to be vulnerable even today, not because <strong>the</strong>y are poor, asset-less and illiterate compared<br />
to <strong>the</strong> general populati<strong>on</strong>; but often <strong>the</strong>ir dist<strong>in</strong>ct vulnerability arises from <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>in</strong>ability<br />
to negotiate and cope with <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>sequences of <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>in</strong>tegrati<strong>on</strong> with <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>stream<br />
ec<strong>on</strong>omy, society, culture and political systems, from all of which <strong>the</strong>y were historically<br />
protected by <strong>the</strong>ir relative isolati<strong>on</strong>’ (Tenth Five-Year Plan 2002-2007. Plann<strong>in</strong>g<br />
Commissi<strong>on</strong>, GOI, New Delhi, 2002 P.457)<br />
This is bureaucratic double speak. While <strong>the</strong> Indian Plann<strong>in</strong>g Commissi<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> its<br />
document recognises <strong>the</strong> tribal people as a dist<strong>in</strong>ct group and po<strong>in</strong>ts out that poverty,<br />
malnutriti<strong>on</strong>, mortality, illiteracy and unemployment are markedly higher am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
tribal peoples than am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong> rest of <strong>the</strong> populati<strong>on</strong>s of <strong>the</strong>se states, <strong>the</strong> Indian<br />
bureaucrats and <strong>the</strong> academic experts who represent India <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> UN bodies deny <strong>the</strong><br />
same truth. The technocratic paradigm of development and modernisati<strong>on</strong> sp<strong>on</strong>sored by<br />
<strong>the</strong> government and supported by <strong>the</strong> IMF and World Bank policies of ec<strong>on</strong>omic<br />
liberalisati<strong>on</strong> and globalisati<strong>on</strong>, is pos<strong>in</strong>g a major challenge to <strong>the</strong> traditi<strong>on</strong>al holistic<br />
percepti<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> tribal peoples of <strong>the</strong>ir natural envir<strong>on</strong>ment. The open<strong>in</strong>g up of tribal<br />
areas to mult<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>al corporati<strong>on</strong>s, and <strong>the</strong> build<strong>in</strong>g of dams, m<strong>in</strong>es, <strong>in</strong>dustries and roads<br />
has already displaced more than 2.12 milli<strong>on</strong> tribal people <strong>in</strong> India. The so-called planned<br />
development paved <strong>the</strong> entry of market forces and <strong>the</strong> formal state <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
168
tribal homelands. This has led to erosi<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> authority of <strong>the</strong>ir tribal <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>s and<br />
practices and put at risk <strong>the</strong>ir community oriented values, collective identities, cognitive<br />
heritage, dist<strong>in</strong>guish<strong>in</strong>g socio-cultural and l<strong>in</strong>guistic frameworks and c<strong>on</strong>sensual decisi<strong>on</strong><br />
mak<strong>in</strong>g processes. The state policies of assimilati<strong>on</strong> and nati<strong>on</strong>al <strong>in</strong>tegrati<strong>on</strong>, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g<br />
nati<strong>on</strong>al educati<strong>on</strong> and l<strong>in</strong>guistic policies, are all c<strong>on</strong>tribut<strong>in</strong>g to a k<strong>in</strong>d of steady<br />
ethnocide.<br />
To c<strong>on</strong>clude, we may state that <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>fusi<strong>on</strong> over whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> tribes, scheduled tribes or<br />
nati<strong>on</strong>alities of <strong>the</strong> <strong>Asia</strong>n countries can be termed <strong>in</strong>digenous or not has little to do with<br />
c<strong>on</strong>ceptual clarity. It has to do with <strong>the</strong> politics of <strong>the</strong> dom<strong>in</strong>ant rul<strong>in</strong>g classes. As <strong>the</strong><br />
struggles of <strong>the</strong> tribal peoples of <strong>Asia</strong> and <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>digenous peoples of North and <strong>South</strong><br />
America, Australia and New Zealand are similar, and as <strong>the</strong> current efforts of <strong>the</strong> United<br />
Nati<strong>on</strong>s is to <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>alise better provisi<strong>on</strong>s for <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>digenous peoples, <strong>the</strong> tribal<br />
peoples of <strong>the</strong> <strong>Asia</strong>n regi<strong>on</strong>, (variously known as Adivasis, Janajatis, aborig<strong>in</strong>es,<br />
nati<strong>on</strong>alities and tribes) should be regarded as <strong>in</strong>digenous <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>text of <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al<br />
<strong>in</strong>struments. It is true that a declarati<strong>on</strong> is a very weak <strong>in</strong>strument and is not enforceable,<br />
yet it has a moral force and does exert some amount of restra<strong>in</strong>t <strong>on</strong> states.<br />
Selected Bibliography<br />
A.Webber, History of Indian Literature, Kegan Trench & Trubner Press, L<strong>on</strong>d<strong>on</strong>, 1914<br />
W.W. Hunter, Annals of Rural Bengal (1886), Repr<strong>in</strong>ted by Cosmo Publicati<strong>on</strong>s, New<br />
Delhi 1975<br />
Ramayana Myth or Reality, H. D. Sankalia, PPH, New Delhi 1973<br />
Mart<strong>in</strong>ez Cobo, José 1972. Prelim<strong>in</strong>ary report. E/CN.4/Sub.2/L.566,<br />
June 1972. The f<strong>in</strong>al report was completed <strong>in</strong> 1983.<br />
Sanders, Douglas 1989. Human Rights Quarterly, Vol.11, pp 406-433, Johns Hopk<strong>in</strong>s<br />
University Press.<br />
Frances St<strong>on</strong>er Saunders, The Cultural Cold War, The New Press, New York 2000<br />
Ranjit Gupta, Subaltern Studies IV, Oxford University Press, New Delhi 1990<br />
Department of Informati<strong>on</strong> & Culture, Government of West Bengal, India’s Struggle for<br />
Freedom – An Album, Govt of West Bengal, Calcutta, 1987<br />
169
Tribal Land Alienati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> Maharashtra:<br />
Legality, Illegality and Praxis<br />
Pradip Prabhu<br />
The Tribal People of Maharashtra<br />
Maharashtra has <strong>the</strong> sec<strong>on</strong>d largest tribal populati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> country next <strong>on</strong>ly to that of<br />
Madhya Pradesh. The tribal people, who number 8.58 mili<strong>on</strong>s, c<strong>on</strong>stitute 8.9% of <strong>the</strong><br />
state’s populati<strong>on</strong>. The major tribal communities are <strong>the</strong> Bhils, G<strong>on</strong>ds, Mahadev<br />
Kolis, Warlis, Koknas and Thakars, while <strong>the</strong> Katkaris, Kolam and Madia G<strong>on</strong>ds are<br />
classified as primitive tribes. 19 o <strong>the</strong> 47 ST communities have a m<strong>in</strong>iscule populati<strong>on</strong><br />
of less than 1,000. The geographical distributi<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> major tribal communities is<br />
presented <strong>in</strong> Table below<br />
Table 1<br />
Name of tribe Total populati<strong>on</strong> % of tribal Geographical locati<strong>on</strong><br />
(<strong>in</strong> lakhs)<br />
populati<strong>on</strong><br />
Bhil 18.18 21.2 Nandurbar, Dhule, Nashik<br />
G<strong>on</strong>d 15.54 18.1 Gadchiroli, Chandrapur, Wardha, Nagpur,<br />
Bhandara, G<strong>on</strong>dia, Yavatmal<br />
Mahadev Koli 12.28 14.3 Ahmednagar, Thane, Nashik, Buldhana<br />
Warli 6.27 7.3 Thane, Nashik, Mumbai<br />
Kokna 5.72 6.7 Thane, Nashik<br />
Thakar 4.88 5.7 Raigad, Thane, Nashik<br />
Source: Collated from Census of India 2001<br />
Though present <strong>in</strong> every district, six districts account for 54% of <strong>the</strong> tribal populati<strong>on</strong>,<br />
officially called Scheduled Tribes. 1 The hilly tracts of <strong>the</strong> western Sahayadri range<br />
(Nandurbar, Dhule, Nashik, Thane and Raigad districts); and <strong>the</strong> Satpuda and<br />
Mahadeo hill ranges <strong>in</strong> central G<strong>on</strong>dwana (Gadchiroli, Chandrapur, Bhandara,<br />
Nagpur, Amravati and Yavatmal districts) are c<strong>on</strong>sidered <strong>the</strong> traditi<strong>on</strong>al homelands of<br />
<strong>the</strong> tribal people. Nandurabar has <strong>the</strong> highest c<strong>on</strong>centrati<strong>on</strong> of tribal people, while<br />
Thane district has <strong>the</strong> highest populati<strong>on</strong>. The district-wise distributi<strong>on</strong> is given <strong>in</strong><br />
Table 2.<br />
Table 2<br />
District ST populati<strong>on</strong> of total<br />
district (lakhs)<br />
ST as %age of total<br />
district populati<strong>on</strong><br />
1 Nandurbar 8.59 65.53 5<br />
2 Gadchiroli 3.72 38.31 8<br />
3 Dhule 4.44 25.97 3<br />
4 Nashik 11.94 23.92 7<br />
5 Yavatmal 4.73 19.26 4<br />
6 Chandrapur 3.75 18.12 1<br />
7 G<strong>on</strong>dia 1.96 16.36 Nil<br />
8 Thane 11.99 14.75 10<br />
9 Amravati 3.56 13.68 2<br />
10 Wardha 1.54 12.49 Nil<br />
No. of Blocks<br />
scheduled<br />
170
11 Raigad 2.69 12.19 Nil<br />
12 Jalga<strong>on</strong> 4.35 11.84 3<br />
13 Nagpur 4.44 10.93 Nil<br />
Source: Collated from Census of India 2001<br />
The overwhelm<strong>in</strong>g majority, 96% of <strong>the</strong> tribal people, live <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> rural areas and<br />
c<strong>on</strong>stitute <strong>the</strong> poorest secti<strong>on</strong>s of society. High <strong>in</strong>fant mortality, pervasive<br />
malnutriti<strong>on</strong> of women and children, hunger <strong>in</strong>duced <strong>in</strong>fant mortality, <strong>in</strong>dicators of<br />
high poverty levels, have been visible for generati<strong>on</strong>s, though <strong>the</strong> enormity of <strong>the</strong><br />
human catastrophe has found place <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> media <strong>on</strong>ly <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> recent past. What is of<br />
c<strong>on</strong>cern is, <strong>the</strong> prevalence of malnutriti<strong>on</strong> deaths <strong>in</strong> Thane district, next door to <strong>the</strong><br />
political, f<strong>in</strong>ancial and <strong>in</strong>dustrial capital of Mumbai. The vast chasm, divid<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
tribal people from <strong>the</strong> rest of <strong>the</strong> populati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> advanced <strong>in</strong>dustrialized state of<br />
Maharashtra, is <strong>the</strong> cumulative result of land alienati<strong>on</strong>, loss of forest habitat and<br />
displacement, which <strong>in</strong>dividually and c<strong>on</strong>jo<strong>in</strong>tly result <strong>in</strong> impoverishment and<br />
c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to pose questi<strong>on</strong>s about <strong>the</strong> impact of land reforms <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> tribal areas of <strong>the</strong><br />
state. 2<br />
Tribal Land Today– A Overview<br />
The tribal people are basically cultivators, over 90 % of male and 94% of female tribal<br />
workers are engaged <strong>in</strong> cultivati<strong>on</strong> and land related activities 3 . Out of <strong>the</strong> 94.7 lakh<br />
operati<strong>on</strong>al land hold<strong>in</strong>gs extend<strong>in</strong>g over 209.24 hectares all over <strong>the</strong> state, 6.34 lakh<br />
operati<strong>on</strong>al hold<strong>in</strong>gs are those of <strong>the</strong> tribals admeasur<strong>in</strong>g 15.32 lakh hectares, tribal land<br />
hold<strong>in</strong>gs be<strong>in</strong>g 6.7% of <strong>the</strong> total hold<strong>in</strong>gs and account<strong>in</strong>g for 7.3% of <strong>the</strong> land. 5.77 lakh<br />
hold<strong>in</strong>gs cover<strong>in</strong>g 15.37 lakh hectares are <strong>in</strong>dividual hold<strong>in</strong>gs while 0.57 lakh cover<strong>in</strong>g<br />
1.75 lakh hectares are collective hold<strong>in</strong>gs. 4 The overall landlessness of tribals <strong>in</strong><br />
Maharashtra is placed at a high 43%, with wide regi<strong>on</strong>al disparities as observable <strong>in</strong><br />
Table 3 below.<br />
Table 3 : Land hold<strong>in</strong>g pattern (<strong>in</strong> %age)<br />
ITDP area Landless Less than 1-2 ha. 2-3 3-5 5-10 ha. Greater<br />
1ha.<br />
ha. ha.<br />
than 10 ha<br />
Pen 68 7.36 14.4 4.48 3.84 1.6 0.32<br />
Yawal 66 11.9 11.9 4.42 4.42 1.36 0.0<br />
Shahapur 63 14.8 15.17 4.07 2.22 0.74 0.0<br />
Pandharkawda 62 2.6 18.24 5.7 6.84 3.8 0.76<br />
Taloda 56 12.76 18.92 5.72 3.96 1.76 0.0<br />
Akola 51 10.78 22.54 7.35 5.88 1.96 0.49<br />
Nagpur 51 10.29 22.54 7.84 5.88 1.96 0.49<br />
Chimur 50 20 19 5.0 4.5 1.5 0.0<br />
Nandurbar 47 13.25 23.85 8.48 5.83 2.12 0.0<br />
K<strong>in</strong>wat 45 10.45 27.5 7.7 6.6 2.2 0.0<br />
Jawhar 44 14.0 24.08 9.52 5.6 2.24 0.0<br />
Chandrapur 43 13.11 25.65 7.98 6.84 2.85 0.57<br />
Dharni 43 7.41 23.94 8.55 10.83 5.7 0.57<br />
Aheri 38 17.98 26.04 8.68 6.82 1.86 0.0<br />
Nashik 38 18.6 22.32 9.92 7.44 3.1 0.62<br />
Dahanu 36 30.72 24.96 6.4 1.92 0 0.0<br />
Kalwan 32 20.4 25.84 10.88 7.48 2.72 0.68<br />
Deori 32 26.52 26.52 8.16 5.44 1.36 0.0<br />
Gadchiroli 28 20.88 30.24 10.08 7.92 2.16 0.72<br />
171
Bhamragad 18 14.76 35.26 13.94 13.12 4.1 0.82<br />
Ghodega<strong>on</strong> 15 18.7 30.6 16.15 11.9 5.95 0.85<br />
Rajur 12 17.6 33.44 17.6 13.2 5.28 0.88<br />
Source: Bench Mark Survey Data, Tribal Research and Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g Institute, Government of Maharashtra, Pune 2003<br />
Over 60% of <strong>the</strong> tribals <strong>in</strong> Pen block of Raigad dt, Yawal block of Jalga<strong>on</strong> dt.,<br />
Shahapur block of Thane dt. and Pandharkawda block of Yavatmal dt., are landless.<br />
Landlessness is lower at 30% <strong>in</strong> Gadchiroli and Bhamragad blocks of Gadchiroli dt),<br />
Ghodega<strong>on</strong> block of Ahmednagar dt and Rajura block of Chandrapur dt. Proximity to<br />
urban hubs, coupled with high vulnerability, has c<strong>on</strong>tributed to severe landlessness,<br />
while <strong>the</strong> relative <strong>in</strong>accessibility of Gadchiroli has relative “protecti<strong>on</strong>” to tribal lands.<br />
Landlessness is highest am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Particularly Vulnerable Tribal Groups (PVTG) of<br />
Katkaris at 83% and Kolams at 63%, though <strong>on</strong>ly 17% of <strong>the</strong> Madia G<strong>on</strong>ds, also<br />
PVTG are landless. Landlessness is <strong>in</strong>timately l<strong>in</strong>ked to malnutriti<strong>on</strong> related deaths,<br />
Nandurbar district be<strong>in</strong>g a case <strong>in</strong> po<strong>in</strong>t, as “72% of families, <strong>in</strong> which malnutriti<strong>on</strong><br />
related deaths had occurred owned less than 3 acres, of which 40% were landless or<br />
owned less than <strong>on</strong>e acre”. 5 88% of families who suffered malnutriti<strong>on</strong> related deaths<br />
<strong>in</strong> Thane occurred were landless.<br />
Majority of <strong>the</strong> tribals own poor quality land and cultivate coarse gra<strong>in</strong>s, particularly<br />
millets with low yields. As lands are left fallow <strong>in</strong> rotati<strong>on</strong> cycles, <strong>the</strong> size of<br />
landhold<strong>in</strong>gs is not <strong>in</strong>dicative of <strong>the</strong> actual cultivated area. 85.8% of <strong>the</strong> tribal land is<br />
unirrigated, 6 a strik<strong>in</strong>g example be<strong>in</strong>g advanced Thane district report<strong>in</strong>g 1% irrigati<strong>on</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong> Dahanu block, 1.4% <strong>in</strong> Jawhar block, 1.44% <strong>in</strong> Shahapur block and 2% <strong>in</strong> Pen of<br />
<strong>the</strong> adjacent Raigad district. 7<br />
Like o<strong>the</strong>r tribal areas, land and forests <strong>in</strong> Maharashtra bel<strong>on</strong>ged to <strong>the</strong> tribal<br />
communities till <strong>the</strong> beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> n<strong>in</strong>eteenth century.8 Col<strong>on</strong>ial government<br />
records refer to community ownership of land and adm<strong>in</strong>istrati<strong>on</strong> by village elders<br />
with usufructory rights for families.9 In <strong>the</strong> traditi<strong>on</strong>al system, rights of enjoyment of<br />
land were enmeshed <strong>in</strong> communitarian systems of resource management, ownership<br />
was c<strong>on</strong>strued as ‘security of access to land for sustenance needs’ and provided for<br />
'particularities of requirements' with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 'generality of <strong>the</strong> community resources'.<br />
‘Exclusive Title' as <strong>the</strong> adversarial doma<strong>in</strong> of ownership was n<strong>on</strong>existent. In popular<br />
tribal c<strong>on</strong>sciousness, land was not a commodity to be bought or sold, but a pers<strong>on</strong><br />
bel<strong>on</strong>ged to land as habitat, history, geography and territory, by virtue of his ancestors<br />
be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> given territory.10 Land had ec<strong>on</strong>omic significance as a survival resource<br />
and social value as <strong>the</strong> basis of bel<strong>on</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g, a cultural importance as <strong>the</strong> l<strong>in</strong>k to<br />
traditi<strong>on</strong>s, ethos and way of life.11 C<strong>on</strong>sequently, land alienati<strong>on</strong> also had systemic<br />
implicati<strong>on</strong>s - <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividual or community be<strong>in</strong>g uprooted from <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>crete<br />
articulati<strong>on</strong> of its c<strong>on</strong>sciousness and progressively decl<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong>to role diss<strong>on</strong>ance <strong>in</strong><br />
ec<strong>on</strong>omic, socio-political and cultural milieu and eventually to anomie.12 Hence <strong>the</strong><br />
angst of alienati<strong>on</strong> cannot not be under-estimated as land is <strong>the</strong> vital 'permanent' l<strong>in</strong>k<br />
between <strong>the</strong> generati<strong>on</strong>s and an embodiment of c<strong>on</strong>sciousness.<br />
Most tribal land is <strong>in</strong>dividually owned, a result of 10 decades of col<strong>on</strong>ial rule, which<br />
suppressed community ownership. Community owned land is found <strong>in</strong> 383 sacred<br />
groves <strong>in</strong> Vidarbha and <strong>the</strong> mounta<strong>in</strong>ous passes from <strong>the</strong> sea coast to <strong>the</strong> Sahyadris.<br />
49% of <strong>the</strong> sacred groves are <strong>on</strong> revenue land, 12% <strong>on</strong> forest land, 32% <strong>on</strong> private<br />
lands and 7% <strong>on</strong> temple lands and vary <strong>in</strong> size from a clump of trees to over 60<br />
hectares, with an average size of 1.5 hectares. The burial ground groves or masutias<br />
(eg. Bhairoba sacred grove) found <strong>in</strong> Mahadeo Koli and Kunbi villages, are owned by<br />
<strong>the</strong> village, hamlet, clans, castes or <strong>in</strong>dividuals. 13<br />
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Land Alienati<strong>on</strong>: Col<strong>on</strong>ial and Early Independence<br />
The col<strong>on</strong>ial period triggered epochal changes <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> land-man matrix and although<br />
<strong>the</strong> freedom struggle envisaged emancipati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> toil<strong>in</strong>g peasants as an important<br />
task post <strong>in</strong>dendence, <strong>the</strong> process of land reform of <strong>the</strong> early <strong>in</strong>dependence years,<br />
c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued to have <strong>the</strong> col<strong>on</strong>ial matrix at its core and resulted <strong>in</strong> widespread<br />
landlessness am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong> tribal people. The tribal –land matrix was turned <strong>on</strong> its head<br />
by<br />
• Land, from be<strong>in</strong>g a survival resource be<strong>in</strong>g made a saleable commodity;<br />
• Legal status of land changed from community to privately owned;<br />
• Subord<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> of woman; from be<strong>in</strong>g co-cultivator to worker with <strong>the</strong> male<br />
be<strong>in</strong>g ‘owner’;<br />
• Destructi<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> protective umbrella of community management of land;<br />
• Open<strong>in</strong>g up of <strong>the</strong> area to outsiders enjoy<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> protecti<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> law;<br />
• Legal space created for transfer or alienati<strong>on</strong> of title;<br />
• Drastic shift <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> relevance of evidence from oral to documentary;<br />
• Shift <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> legal frame from harm<strong>on</strong>y to adversarial jurisprudence;<br />
• Court bias <strong>in</strong> assess<strong>in</strong>g material evidence over seek<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> truth;<br />
• Emergence of a land own<strong>in</strong>g class and a labour<strong>in</strong>g class who toiled <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
land.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> vortex of change brought <strong>on</strong> by col<strong>on</strong>ial expansi<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong>to tribal homelands, <strong>the</strong><br />
people were alienated from <strong>the</strong>ir lands and forests and transformed <strong>in</strong>to rack rented<br />
tenants, serfs and slaves of multiple descripti<strong>on</strong>s. Four pattern of land alienati<strong>on</strong> are<br />
identifiable, two related to <strong>the</strong> col<strong>on</strong>ial period and two to <strong>the</strong> early post <strong>in</strong>dependence<br />
period characterized by <strong>in</strong>ternal col<strong>on</strong>ialism <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> wake of elite led nati<strong>on</strong> build<strong>in</strong>g<br />
and development. The first patter was marked by ‘coerced’ land alienati<strong>on</strong>, backed by<br />
<strong>the</strong> law and <strong>the</strong> might of <strong>the</strong> col<strong>on</strong>ial state as it appropriated tribal homelands<br />
suppress<strong>in</strong>g ‘traditi<strong>on</strong>al shift<strong>in</strong>g cultivati<strong>on</strong>’, appropriat<strong>in</strong>g community forests,<br />
creat<strong>in</strong>g reserved forests, and transferr<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>m to <strong>the</strong> timber trade for commercial<br />
exploitati<strong>on</strong>. This brutal land alienati<strong>on</strong> ignited tribal upris<strong>in</strong>gs across <strong>the</strong> country and<br />
<strong>the</strong> col<strong>on</strong>ial adm<strong>in</strong>istrati<strong>on</strong> was forced to step back a little. The sec<strong>on</strong>d pattern was<br />
‘assented’ land alienati<strong>on</strong> as <strong>the</strong> state focused <strong>on</strong> rent collecti<strong>on</strong> and turned a bl<strong>in</strong>d eye<br />
to transfer of tribal land to m<strong>on</strong>ey-lenders, traders and c<strong>on</strong>tractors, abetted by revenue<br />
functi<strong>on</strong>aries through <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>strumentality of <strong>the</strong> courts. So extreme was <strong>the</strong><br />
exploitati<strong>on</strong> that <strong>the</strong> Sym<strong>in</strong>gt<strong>on</strong> Commissi<strong>on</strong> (1938) appo<strong>in</strong>ted to exam<strong>in</strong>e <strong>the</strong> causes<br />
for <strong>the</strong> widespread distress <strong>in</strong> Thane, Nashik and Dhule districts characterized <strong>the</strong><br />
c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s of <strong>the</strong> tribals as a 'blot <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> adm<strong>in</strong>istrati<strong>on</strong>' (14)<br />
The third pattern, described as ‘state acquiesced’ alienati<strong>on</strong> of tribal land, took place<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> period follow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>dependence. Ra<strong>the</strong>r than correct<strong>in</strong>g feudal distorti<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong> land<br />
relati<strong>on</strong>s which had <strong>in</strong>tensified dur<strong>in</strong>g British rule, <strong>the</strong> post col<strong>on</strong>ial state accepted<br />
<strong>the</strong>se crucial elements as an 'a priori' c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong> of land reform and <strong>the</strong> legal<br />
framework for implementati<strong>on</strong> of policies and programs <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> tribal areas. It should<br />
be noted that alienati<strong>on</strong> of tribal land to <strong>the</strong> n<strong>on</strong>-tribal took place with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> legal<br />
framework and this ‘abuse’ of law was with <strong>the</strong> collusi<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> lower echel<strong>on</strong>s and<br />
<strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>sent of <strong>the</strong> higher revenue bureaucracy. This situati<strong>on</strong> c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued,<br />
notwithstand<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> str<strong>on</strong>g remarks of <strong>the</strong> C<strong>on</strong>stituent Sub Committee <strong>in</strong> 1949, about<br />
'<strong>the</strong> anxiety of <strong>the</strong> hill people about <strong>the</strong>ir land and <strong>the</strong>ir fear of exploitati<strong>on</strong>’. (15) The<br />
fourth pattern can be termed ‘<strong>in</strong>ternal col<strong>on</strong>izati<strong>on</strong>’, acquisiti<strong>on</strong> of tribal land <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
173
name of projects us<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> col<strong>on</strong>ial Land Acquisiti<strong>on</strong> Act. The 28 th and 29 th Report of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Commissi<strong>on</strong>er for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes termed this form of<br />
alienati<strong>on</strong> as <strong>in</strong>ternal col<strong>on</strong>izati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> tribal homelands (16). Carried out <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> name<br />
of development, it pushed <strong>the</strong> tribal people to <strong>the</strong> br<strong>in</strong>k of survival, ruthlessly<br />
destroy<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> forest people through an all out attack <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir basic right to live and<br />
work <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> forest. (17).<br />
Freedom Struggle and Land Reform<br />
Land reforms were not an important agenda <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> early years of <strong>the</strong> freedom<br />
movement but ga<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> importance as <strong>the</strong> movement <strong>in</strong>tensified and Mahatma<br />
Gandhi felt <strong>the</strong> need for active support of <strong>the</strong> peasantry. Mobilizati<strong>on</strong> by <strong>the</strong> CPI<br />
forged <strong>the</strong> peasantry it <strong>in</strong>to a major pressure block. For <strong>the</strong> tribal people, freedom was<br />
co-term<strong>in</strong>us with liberati<strong>on</strong> from <strong>the</strong> m<strong>on</strong>ey lender, zam<strong>in</strong>dar and khot and restorati<strong>on</strong><br />
of <strong>the</strong> comm<strong>on</strong>s, which rema<strong>in</strong>ed at <strong>the</strong> core of <strong>the</strong>ir upris<strong>in</strong>gs throughout <strong>the</strong> century.<br />
The issue of land reform tentatively taken up at <strong>the</strong> Karachi C<strong>on</strong>ference of <strong>the</strong> Indian<br />
Nati<strong>on</strong>al C<strong>on</strong>gress and expanded <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Faizapur Sessi<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> C<strong>on</strong>gress <strong>in</strong> 1936,<br />
became an important slogan dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Home Rule Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Electi<strong>on</strong>s, expressed <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> slogan ‘land to <strong>the</strong> tiller’. In <strong>the</strong> adivasi belt it was “jyachya hathala mehnaticha<br />
ghatta, tyachya nave jam<strong>in</strong>icha patta”. (‘ <strong>the</strong> evidence for <strong>the</strong> tenant to become <strong>the</strong><br />
owner of his land are <strong>the</strong> corns <strong>on</strong> his palms from his work <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> fields’). The J.C.<br />
Kumarappa Agrarian Reforms Committee looked at a wide range of land reform<br />
measures and its recommendati<strong>on</strong>s became <strong>the</strong> basis of agricultural policy post<br />
<strong>in</strong>dependence (18). Laws like <strong>the</strong> Bombay M<strong>on</strong>ey Lenders Licens<strong>in</strong>g Act (1946), <strong>the</strong><br />
Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act (1947), <strong>the</strong> Bombay Preventi<strong>on</strong> of<br />
Fragmentati<strong>on</strong> and C<strong>on</strong>solidati<strong>on</strong> of Hold<strong>in</strong>gs Act (1947) were passed dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
period of Home Rule, <strong>the</strong> Zam<strong>in</strong>dari Aboliti<strong>on</strong> Act (1948) and <strong>the</strong> Bombay Tenancy<br />
and Agricultural Lands Act (1948) followed <strong>in</strong> free India.<br />
Tenancy Reform and Alienati<strong>on</strong><br />
Notwithstand<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> lofty goals of <strong>the</strong>se agrarian legal reforms, <strong>the</strong> law still had to be<br />
<strong>in</strong>terpreted by <strong>the</strong> courts and implemented through <strong>the</strong> revenue bureaucracy. There is<br />
where <strong>the</strong> difficulties began, because with very few excepti<strong>on</strong>s, both <strong>the</strong> courts and<br />
<strong>the</strong> adm<strong>in</strong>istrators knew little or noth<strong>in</strong>g about <strong>the</strong> tribals. They did not know <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
languages, had little understand<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong>ir m<strong>in</strong>dset and had little sympathy for <strong>the</strong><br />
‘uncultured’ and ‘half naked’ denizens of <strong>the</strong> forest. They felt greater k<strong>in</strong>ship with <strong>the</strong><br />
better off and ‘cultured’ land own<strong>in</strong>g class.<br />
There could be no real reform if <strong>the</strong> laws were to be mechanically <strong>in</strong>terpreted and<br />
implements. The new land laws c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued replicate <strong>in</strong>equality and <strong>in</strong>equity as <strong>the</strong>y<br />
placed <strong>the</strong> tribal landless and <strong>the</strong> landlord <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> same legal foot<strong>in</strong>g. Legal<br />
presumpti<strong>on</strong>s and procedures of col<strong>on</strong>ial orig<strong>in</strong> were reta<strong>in</strong>ed, <strong>the</strong>reby negat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>tenti<strong>on</strong> of land reforms. Courts bound by adversary jurisprudence pitched <strong>the</strong> ‘oral<br />
evidence’ of <strong>the</strong> tribal aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> documentary evidence of <strong>the</strong> landlord, which<br />
naturally prevailed. Aga<strong>in</strong> with some excepti<strong>on</strong>s, <strong>the</strong> lower revenue adm<strong>in</strong>istrati<strong>on</strong><br />
actively colluded or c<strong>on</strong>nived with <strong>the</strong> landlords <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir efforts to protect <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
<strong>in</strong>terests <strong>in</strong> land. As a result, a secti<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> tribal tenants were evicted from <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
lands under <strong>the</strong> very provisi<strong>on</strong>s of <strong>the</strong> Tenancy Act (1948), which was designed to<br />
protect <strong>the</strong>m. Lands were 'resumed' by <strong>the</strong> landlords for ‘pers<strong>on</strong>al cultivati<strong>on</strong>’, tenants<br />
were forced to 'surrender' <strong>the</strong>ir lands <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> grounds of a sudden ‘<strong>in</strong>ability to cultivate'<br />
174
or tenants’ names were deleted for ‘n<strong>on</strong>-payment of rent’ to landlords who gave no<br />
receipts. Tenants applied to <strong>the</strong> authorities say<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>the</strong>ir names were wr<strong>on</strong>gly<br />
entered <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> records or that <strong>the</strong>y were not <strong>in</strong> possessi<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> land of <strong>the</strong> landlords.<br />
However, <strong>the</strong> higher adm<strong>in</strong>istrati<strong>on</strong> found little time to verify <strong>the</strong> ground realities or<br />
communicate with <strong>the</strong> tribals and take effective steps to ensure not just effective but<br />
efficacious implementati<strong>on</strong> of tenancy reform.<br />
Revenue records underwent a metamorphosis with <strong>the</strong> active c<strong>on</strong>nivance of <strong>the</strong><br />
talathis (village land officers), largely from peasant castes who chose to align with <strong>the</strong><br />
landed elites. Tenancy went underground, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> records and <strong>in</strong> fact, as tribal tenant<br />
farmers became labourers with <strong>the</strong> landlords resum<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ir titles.(19) A detailed study<br />
undertaken by <strong>the</strong> IAS Probati<strong>on</strong>ers <strong>in</strong> 1994 c<strong>on</strong>firms that <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>cidence of tenancy<br />
was very low or n<strong>on</strong>-existent <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> hilly areas. (20) Landlords, while liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> very<br />
distant towns and had o<strong>the</strong>r major trade or occupati<strong>on</strong>s, claimed that <strong>the</strong>y lands were<br />
'pers<strong>on</strong>ally cultivated' <strong>in</strong> remote villages to deny tenancy rights to <strong>the</strong> tribals.<br />
The 1971 census revealed <strong>in</strong> grim statistical detail <strong>the</strong> negative effects and relative<br />
failure of tenancy reform. Dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> decade 1961-1971, when implementati<strong>on</strong> of<br />
tenancy legislati<strong>on</strong> was at its peak, <strong>the</strong> number of tribal cultivators <strong>in</strong> Maharashtra<br />
actually fell from 7.25 lakhs to 5.61 lakhs. The study of <strong>the</strong> IAS probati<strong>on</strong>ers<br />
<strong>in</strong>dicates that <strong>in</strong> Vidharbha <strong>on</strong>ly 17% of <strong>the</strong> land ownership went to <strong>the</strong> tenant, <strong>in</strong><br />
western Maharashtra <strong>on</strong>ly 33%. Their f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs tell us that <strong>the</strong> bulk of <strong>the</strong> leased land<br />
reverted back to <strong>the</strong> landlord as tenants ‘voluntarily’ surrendered lands ei<strong>the</strong>r because<br />
<strong>the</strong>y were not <strong>in</strong> possessi<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong>ir land <strong>on</strong> ‘tillers day’, <strong>the</strong> landlords had resumed<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir land for pers<strong>on</strong>al cultivati<strong>on</strong> or that tenancy could not be proved because tenants<br />
had no lease deeds or rent receipts as most were poor and illiterate.(21)<br />
C<strong>on</strong>sequently, for a large secti<strong>on</strong> of expectant tribals, post <strong>in</strong>dependence land reform<br />
laws were still born, as <strong>the</strong>ir premise, <strong>in</strong>terpretati<strong>on</strong> and implementati<strong>on</strong> rema<strong>in</strong>ed<br />
impris<strong>on</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> ir<strong>on</strong> clad frame of <strong>the</strong> relati<strong>on</strong>ship between <strong>the</strong> landlord and <strong>the</strong><br />
tribal cultivator evolved dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> col<strong>on</strong>ial period. Instead of <strong>the</strong> tenant becom<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
owner of <strong>the</strong> land <strong>on</strong> ‘tillers day’, it resulted <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> alienati<strong>on</strong> of a good proporti<strong>on</strong> of<br />
<strong>the</strong> lands of <strong>the</strong> tribal tenants to four land own<strong>in</strong>g elite groups. This form of alienati<strong>on</strong><br />
of tribal land us<strong>in</strong>g tenancy legislati<strong>on</strong> was comm<strong>on</strong> for <strong>the</strong> whole state with m<strong>in</strong>or<br />
variati<strong>on</strong>s. The first type of alienati<strong>on</strong> of tribal land us<strong>in</strong>g tenancy reform was<br />
widespread <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> ryotwari areas and lands of tribal tenants were lost to <strong>the</strong> local land<br />
own<strong>in</strong>g peasant castes, like <strong>the</strong> Agris or Kunbis <strong>in</strong> Thane and Raigarh and <strong>the</strong> Gujjars<br />
<strong>in</strong> Dhule, who moved dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> col<strong>on</strong>ial dispensati<strong>on</strong> and c<strong>on</strong>solidated land hold<strong>in</strong>gs<br />
dur<strong>in</strong>g successive land settlements as tribals burdened by debts aris<strong>in</strong>g out of<br />
starvati<strong>on</strong>... surrendered or aband<strong>on</strong>ed lands and fled to distant villages.(22) In Dhule,<br />
Thane, Nashik and Raigarh district, <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>al owner cultivators hav<strong>in</strong>g lost <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
lands, were absorbed as b<strong>on</strong>ded labour <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir own lands. (23) The sec<strong>on</strong>d type of<br />
land alienati<strong>on</strong> through tenancy reform was transfer of land to <strong>the</strong> n<strong>on</strong>-cultivat<strong>in</strong>g<br />
landed gentry, like <strong>the</strong> Maldharis <strong>in</strong> Chandrapur and Ghadchiroli districts and <strong>the</strong><br />
Khots <strong>in</strong> Raigarh and Ratnagiri districts. Hereto <strong>the</strong> tribals were forced to surrender<br />
lands <strong>in</strong> lieu of c<strong>on</strong>sumpti<strong>on</strong> loans or land cess. While <strong>the</strong> owners reta<strong>in</strong>ed title as<br />
absentee landlords, a few of <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>al cultivators were recorded as tenants but many<br />
rema<strong>in</strong>ed unrecorded. (24). The third type of land loss through tenancy reform was to<br />
n<strong>on</strong> cultivat<strong>in</strong>g n<strong>on</strong> peasant castes, largely traders, merchants and c<strong>on</strong>tractors, who<br />
entered <strong>the</strong> areas as shop-keepers, traders, timber c<strong>on</strong>tractors and alcohol vendors and<br />
became large landlords with <strong>the</strong> of <strong>the</strong> col<strong>on</strong>ial adm<strong>in</strong>istrati<strong>on</strong>. Tribals surrendered<br />
lands <strong>in</strong> lieu of petty loans or land cess and avoid harassment by <strong>the</strong> m<strong>on</strong>eylenders.<br />
Some were recorded as tenants <strong>on</strong> poorer lands while fertile lands rema<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
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hands of landlords. (25) The fourth type of land alienati<strong>on</strong> took place to members of<br />
<strong>the</strong> lower nobility, officials <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> army, and grantees of <strong>the</strong> political largesse were <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>amdars, izzafatdars, zem<strong>in</strong>dars and faznadeiros who took payment of ti<strong>the</strong> for <strong>the</strong><br />
use of <strong>the</strong> lands and paid no cess to <strong>the</strong> state. The col<strong>on</strong>ial adm<strong>in</strong>istrati<strong>on</strong> c<strong>on</strong>verted<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir political rights <strong>in</strong>to feudal proprietary rights while <strong>the</strong> tribal cultivators were<br />
reduced to rack rented tenant serfs. (26)<br />
The absence of land lease records or written evidence of tenancy rights was a serious<br />
handicap for <strong>the</strong> tribal cultivators. A good secti<strong>on</strong> of landlords never issued lease<br />
deeds or receipts <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> tribal areas. Notwithstand<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> far reach<strong>in</strong>g implicati<strong>on</strong>s of a<br />
judgment of <strong>the</strong> Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal that "... <strong>the</strong> lease of a land may be <strong>in</strong><br />
writ<strong>in</strong>g or oral; an oral agreemental lease can also create tenancy rights <strong>in</strong> favour of a<br />
pers<strong>on</strong> who cultivates <strong>the</strong> land” (27), virtually all unrecorded tenants lost <strong>the</strong>ir land.<br />
Tenancy legislati<strong>on</strong> was a relative failure <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> case of <strong>the</strong> first category of landlords<br />
menti<strong>on</strong>ed above, as ownership rema<strong>in</strong>ed with <strong>the</strong> n<strong>on</strong>-tribals and tenants were<br />
recorded to 'hired labour' <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> revenue records. They were excluded from <strong>the</strong> ga<strong>in</strong>s<br />
of <strong>the</strong> law and evicted. In <strong>the</strong> case of <strong>the</strong> sec<strong>on</strong>d group of landlords which had<br />
'resumed <strong>the</strong> lands for pers<strong>on</strong>al cultivati<strong>on</strong>' (28) with tenants deemed as hav<strong>in</strong>g<br />
‘voluntarily surrendered lands’, tenants names hav<strong>in</strong>g been ‘voluntarily withdrawn’ or<br />
hav<strong>in</strong>g ‘ failed to appear for tenancy hear<strong>in</strong>gs’(29) - <strong>in</strong> almost all <strong>the</strong> cases <strong>the</strong><br />
term<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> tribal- land nexus was d<strong>on</strong>e even without recourse to <strong>the</strong> legal<br />
process. (30) In <strong>the</strong> case of <strong>the</strong> third and fourth group of landlords, land reform met<br />
with failure because of <strong>the</strong> extensive practice of 'partially recorded tenancies' <strong>on</strong> poor<br />
highlands and 'unrecorded tenancies' <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> low ly<strong>in</strong>g paddy lands which was ensured<br />
by a co-operative adm<strong>in</strong>istrati<strong>on</strong>. All highlands even those under cultivati<strong>on</strong> were<br />
shown as varkad lands, with naturally grow<strong>in</strong>g grass, to which <strong>the</strong> tenant had no right<br />
of tenancy.(31) Therefore, it is no surprise that <strong>the</strong> actual land that went to <strong>the</strong> tenants<br />
c<strong>on</strong>stituted <strong>on</strong>ly 8% of <strong>the</strong> gross cropped area, although several estimates <strong>in</strong>dicate that<br />
<strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>cidence of tenancy <strong>in</strong> western Maharashtra, for example, covered 50% <strong>the</strong> total<br />
cultivated area.(32)<br />
Ceil<strong>in</strong>g Surplus Lands<br />
The failure of tenancy reform to advantage <strong>the</strong> tribal people and give <strong>the</strong>m livelihood<br />
and food security began to show up <strong>in</strong> grow<strong>in</strong>g tribal dissatisfacti<strong>on</strong>, particularly <strong>in</strong><br />
Thane, Nashik and <strong>the</strong> erstwhile Dhule districts. A way out of <strong>the</strong> cul de sac result<strong>in</strong>g<br />
from <strong>the</strong> subversi<strong>on</strong> of land reform and <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g c<strong>on</strong>centrati<strong>on</strong> of lands with <strong>the</strong><br />
rural elite was <strong>the</strong> Maharashtra Agricultural Land (Ceil<strong>in</strong>g <strong>on</strong> Hold<strong>in</strong>gs) Act 1961. Its<br />
effective operati<strong>on</strong> was underm<strong>in</strong>ed by <strong>the</strong> large holders divid<strong>in</strong>g up <strong>the</strong>ir lands<br />
am<strong>on</strong>g heirs and relatives, which ranged from unborn children to pet dogs and cats.<br />
Meanwhile, <strong>the</strong> prescribed ceil<strong>in</strong>gs were revised <strong>in</strong> 1972 and came <strong>in</strong>to force <strong>in</strong><br />
October 1975.<br />
Accord<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> state government, 93,000 tribal families were granted 1.24 lakh<br />
hectares of surplus land under <strong>the</strong> land ceil<strong>in</strong>g law. But <strong>the</strong> study of <strong>the</strong> IAS<br />
probati<strong>on</strong>ers says o<strong>the</strong>rwise. The study <strong>in</strong>dicated that 76% of <strong>the</strong> ceil<strong>in</strong>g surplus lands<br />
were located <strong>in</strong> distant villages and <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> case of <strong>the</strong> hilly tribal regi<strong>on</strong>s, as high as<br />
86.6%. Absentee landlords' who resided <strong>in</strong> towns with n<strong>on</strong>-agricultural avocati<strong>on</strong>s<br />
never visited <strong>the</strong> lands for years, but <strong>the</strong>y were recorded ‘under pers<strong>on</strong>al cultivati<strong>on</strong>’.<br />
Accord<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> study’s f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs - <strong>the</strong> distributi<strong>on</strong> of ceil<strong>in</strong>g surplus land was largely<br />
<strong>on</strong> paper, a large number of tribals had records but no land, while <strong>the</strong> surplus lands<br />
were <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> possessi<strong>on</strong> of unrecorded tenants, who stood to be dispossessed; a good<br />
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percentage of <strong>the</strong> lands were wastelands and unfit for cultivati<strong>on</strong> and also tribals were<br />
assigned lands <strong>in</strong> distant villages ensur<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>the</strong> land rema<strong>in</strong>ed with <strong>the</strong> landlord.<br />
(32)<br />
It can be reas<strong>on</strong>ably c<strong>on</strong>cluded that <strong>the</strong> weakest feature of <strong>the</strong> ceil<strong>in</strong>g programme was<br />
its very marg<strong>in</strong>al impact <strong>in</strong> improv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> ec<strong>on</strong>omic c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> beneficiaries. (33)<br />
The operati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> land ceil<strong>in</strong>g law also c<strong>on</strong>firms <strong>the</strong> fact that little land of <strong>the</strong><br />
absentee landlords actually went to <strong>the</strong> tenants under tenancy reform (34) and<br />
c<strong>on</strong>siderable amount of land <strong>in</strong> every village rema<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> possessi<strong>on</strong> of unrecorded<br />
tenants.<br />
Restorati<strong>on</strong> Laws and Remedial Interventi<strong>on</strong><br />
Though a secti<strong>on</strong> of tribals did get lands under <strong>the</strong> Tenancy legislati<strong>on</strong> (35), alienati<strong>on</strong><br />
c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued apace through illegal entries <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> mutati<strong>on</strong> registers or permissi<strong>on</strong> for land<br />
transfers of land to n<strong>on</strong> tribal be<strong>in</strong>g granted freely by Collectors. (36) Restricti<strong>on</strong>s were<br />
imposed <strong>in</strong> 1966 <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> transfer of tribal lands by <strong>the</strong> Maharashtra Land Revenue<br />
Code to curb this malpractice and came <strong>in</strong>to effect <strong>in</strong> August 1967. Notwithstand<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>the</strong> prohibiti<strong>on</strong>s, <strong>the</strong> Collector/ Deputy Commissi<strong>on</strong>er rout<strong>in</strong>ely granted permissi<strong>on</strong>.<br />
Grow<strong>in</strong>g disaffecti<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> tribal areas prompted <strong>the</strong> Government of Maharashtra to<br />
appo<strong>in</strong>t a Committee under <strong>the</strong> Chairmanship of <strong>the</strong> state Revenue M<strong>in</strong>ister <strong>in</strong> 1971.<br />
The Committee to “Exam<strong>in</strong>e Difficulties Experienced by Scheduled Tribe Land<br />
Holders/Cultivators <strong>in</strong> Respect of Their Lands <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Work<strong>in</strong>g of Certa<strong>in</strong> Acts”<br />
observed <strong>in</strong> its 1972 Report, that <strong>the</strong> ban <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> permissi<strong>on</strong>s for transfer of lands was<br />
be<strong>in</strong>g flouted by Collectors, freely and now <strong>the</strong>y were be<strong>in</strong>g required to declare <strong>the</strong><br />
earlier orders of <strong>the</strong>se officials illegal, at best a travesty of justice. (37)<br />
Accord<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> Committee’s recommendati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>the</strong> state enacted - Maharashtra Land<br />
Revenue Code and <strong>the</strong> Tenancy Laws (Amendment) Act, (1974) and Maharashtra<br />
Restorati<strong>on</strong> of Land to <strong>the</strong> Scheduled Tribes Act (1975). The objectives of <strong>the</strong><br />
legislati<strong>on</strong>s were commendable, <strong>the</strong>ir implementati<strong>on</strong> doubtful. Both measures act<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>in</strong> tandem were <strong>in</strong>tended to provide an ir<strong>on</strong>clad protecti<strong>on</strong> to tribal land. The first<br />
enactment amend<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Land Revenue Code was rout<strong>in</strong>e and perta<strong>in</strong>ed to <strong>the</strong><br />
restorati<strong>on</strong> of lands alienated to n<strong>on</strong> tribals <strong>in</strong> c<strong>on</strong>traventi<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> law but it raised <strong>the</strong><br />
questi<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> necessity of a law to remedy illegalities. The sec<strong>on</strong>d legislati<strong>on</strong> was<br />
more revoluti<strong>on</strong>ary as it was premised <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> restorati<strong>on</strong> of land to <strong>the</strong> STs <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
pr<strong>in</strong>ciple of equity and went bey<strong>on</strong>d <strong>the</strong> narrow c<strong>on</strong>f<strong>in</strong>es of legality and provided for<br />
restorati<strong>on</strong> of even validly transferred tribal lands.<br />
The Act was challenged but its validity was upheld by a three judges bench of <strong>the</strong><br />
Supreme Court <strong>in</strong> 1984. Justices O.Ch<strong>in</strong>appa Reddy, A.P.Sen and E.S. Venkatramiah<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir judgment noted that “<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>, <strong>the</strong> Scheduled Tribes, as a class<br />
require special protecti<strong>on</strong> aga<strong>in</strong>st exploitati<strong>on</strong>," however, "<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> past 40 years, most<br />
of <strong>the</strong> tribal societies have come under attack by ec<strong>on</strong>omically more advanced and<br />
politically more powerful ethnic groups.... <strong>the</strong> greedy land grabber and exploiter ...<br />
who <strong>in</strong>filtrated <strong>in</strong>to tribal regi<strong>on</strong>s." This "triggered a struggle for land <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong><br />
aborig<strong>in</strong>al tribesmen were usually losers, and deprived of <strong>the</strong>ir ancestral lands, turned<br />
<strong>in</strong>to impoverished landless laborers." The judgment fur<strong>the</strong>r advanced <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>cept of<br />
distributive justice as <strong>the</strong> "removal of ec<strong>on</strong>omic <strong>in</strong>equalities and <strong>the</strong> rectify<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>justice result<strong>in</strong>g from deal<strong>in</strong>gs or transacti<strong>on</strong>s between <strong>the</strong> unequal <strong>in</strong> society.... It<br />
177
means that those who have been deprived of <strong>the</strong>ir properties by unc<strong>on</strong>sci<strong>on</strong>able<br />
barga<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g would be restored <strong>the</strong>ir property...The impugned act is <strong>in</strong>tended and meant<br />
as an <strong>in</strong>strument for alleviat<strong>in</strong>g oppressi<strong>on</strong>, redress<strong>in</strong>g barga<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g imbalance,<br />
cancel<strong>in</strong>g unfair advantage and generally oversee<strong>in</strong>g and ensur<strong>in</strong>g probity and fair<br />
deal<strong>in</strong>g." Unfortunately, <strong>the</strong> greater <strong>the</strong> radicalism of a law, <strong>the</strong> weaker <strong>the</strong><br />
implementati<strong>on</strong> – is a truism that was amply borne out by <strong>the</strong> Tenancy, Ceil<strong>in</strong>g,<br />
Prohibitory and Restorati<strong>on</strong> laws.<br />
The government claims that of <strong>the</strong> 45,501 cases decided, 23,748 were <strong>in</strong> favour of <strong>the</strong><br />
tribals, where<strong>in</strong> 22,556 tribals, i.e. roughly 50%, were been given possessi<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong><br />
lands, till December 1993. The statistics however are silent <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> total number of<br />
tribal claimants, who were prima facie entitled to restorati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong>ir lands which it is<br />
estimated were likely to have been over 1.5 lakhs. The efficacy of <strong>the</strong> Restorati<strong>on</strong> acts<br />
can be gauged from field-based studies of <strong>the</strong> implementati<strong>on</strong> of both <strong>the</strong> laws <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Thane district of Maharashtra.<br />
Thane district has several features which make it a good locati<strong>on</strong> for field research <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> area of land transfers and by extensi<strong>on</strong> alienati<strong>on</strong>; its proximity to <strong>the</strong> f<strong>in</strong>ance<br />
capital of <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong> and <strong>the</strong> opportunities to <strong>in</strong>vest undeclared wealth <strong>in</strong> land, its<br />
proximity to <strong>on</strong>e of <strong>the</strong> oldest centers of modern educati<strong>on</strong> and its attractiveness to<br />
students to undertake research nearby, its proximity to <strong>the</strong> center of state power and<br />
<strong>the</strong> political party enthusiasm to mobilize people to take advantage of grievances.<br />
Notwithstand<strong>in</strong>g all <strong>the</strong>se propensities and potentialities, <strong>the</strong> picture <strong>in</strong> Thane district<br />
is discomfit<strong>in</strong>g to say <strong>the</strong> least. C<strong>on</strong>clusi<strong>on</strong>s about land reform <strong>in</strong> far flung districts,<br />
away from <strong>the</strong> public eye, is left to <strong>the</strong> reader. The data for Thane district as a whole<br />
and <strong>the</strong> four tribal majority blocks or talukas of <strong>the</strong> district is presented <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> tables 2,<br />
3 and 4.<br />
Till 1992, 6087 cases were reported to have been filed of which 3,671 i.e. 54% of <strong>the</strong><br />
cases were dropped for unverifiable reas<strong>on</strong>s, 1428 cases, i.e. approx 22% were<br />
pend<strong>in</strong>g for 30 years <strong>on</strong> unstated grounds, <strong>in</strong>vestigati<strong>on</strong>s were c<strong>on</strong>ducted and were<br />
decided <strong>in</strong> favour of <strong>the</strong> tribals <strong>in</strong> 1647 cases, i.e. approx 24% of <strong>the</strong> cases but all<br />
<strong>the</strong>se cases were challenged <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> MRT, <strong>the</strong> High Court of Judicature at Mumbai and<br />
f<strong>in</strong>ally <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Supreme Court. The authorities claim that possessi<strong>on</strong> was handed over<br />
to 1566 pers<strong>on</strong>s <strong>on</strong> Court orders, but no verificati<strong>on</strong> of actual physical possessi<strong>on</strong> is<br />
available. Ano<strong>the</strong>r report says that at <strong>the</strong> end of a lengthy legal process 350 tribals,<br />
i.e.5.77%, were to be restored <strong>the</strong>ir lands. Even <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>se cases whe<strong>the</strong>r physical<br />
possessi<strong>on</strong> has actually been given rema<strong>in</strong>s to be c<strong>on</strong>firmed.<br />
Table 2 Restorati<strong>on</strong> Cases Thane District XIV/75 & XXXV/74<br />
No. Cases filed 3,325 2,762<br />
Cases dropped 1,905 ( 37%) 1,766 (65%)<br />
Cases pend<strong>in</strong>g 1,396 ( (41%) 32<br />
Cases decided <strong>in</strong> Adivasis favour 689 (21%) 958 (34%)<br />
Cases decisi<strong>on</strong> stayed 689 (21%) 958 (34%)<br />
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Cases possessi<strong>on</strong> to be handed over 618 948<br />
Area of land restored (ha.) 1,127.19 1,268.96<br />
There is no explanati<strong>on</strong> why 54% of <strong>the</strong> cases were dropped although <strong>the</strong>y were filed,<br />
suo moto by senior revenue officials after establish<strong>in</strong>g <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> basis of records and<br />
documents that prima facie <strong>the</strong>re was a case. There is also no explanati<strong>on</strong> why cases<br />
have been kept pend<strong>in</strong>g for 30 l<strong>on</strong>g years. While <strong>the</strong>re are no reported cases of actual<br />
restorati<strong>on</strong> of physical possessi<strong>on</strong> hav<strong>in</strong>g been d<strong>on</strong>e by government officials, tribals<br />
have taken possessi<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> land when <strong>the</strong> orders were <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir favour <strong>in</strong> areas where<br />
<strong>the</strong>y are mobilized. These four tribal dom<strong>in</strong>ated blocks of Thane district have been <strong>the</strong><br />
sites of political mobilizati<strong>on</strong> from pre-<strong>in</strong>dependence days <strong>in</strong> what is popularly called<br />
<strong>the</strong> Warli Upris<strong>in</strong>g. (38)<br />
Table 3 Restorati<strong>on</strong> Cases <strong>in</strong> Tribal Dom<strong>in</strong>ated Blocks of Thane District.<br />
Cases Under Act XIV/75 Dahanu Talasari Jawahar Mokhada<br />
Cases filed 166 254 238 145<br />
Cases dropped 72(43%) 137(54%) 152(63%) 25(17%)<br />
Cases pend<strong>in</strong>g 18(11%) 36(14%) 6(3%) -<br />
Cases untraceable 29(17%) 36(14%) - 69(47%)<br />
Favour of adivasis 47(30%) 45(18%) 80(34%) 51(35%)<br />
Possessi<strong>on</strong> handed over 47 42 73 51<br />
Area restored (Ha) 33.15 25.72 05.60 138.47<br />
Table 3 draws our attenti<strong>on</strong> to <strong>the</strong> most strik<strong>in</strong>g public secret that from a total of 703<br />
registered cases, an overwhelm<strong>in</strong>g majority of <strong>the</strong> cases, i.e. 578 (80%) were dropped<br />
or are pend<strong>in</strong>g or are untraceable. Under Act XIV/75, <strong>the</strong> figure is 37% + 41% = 78%<br />
while for Act XXXV/74 <strong>the</strong> figure is 65%+1% = 66%. Surpris<strong>in</strong>gly, <strong>the</strong> figure are<br />
54%+ 14%+ 14% = 82%; and 87% +4%=91% for <strong>the</strong> two acts respectively with<br />
respect to Talasari taluka, <strong>the</strong> heart of <strong>the</strong> Warli upris<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
The implicati<strong>on</strong>s of a dropped case are of serious c<strong>on</strong>cern. In law, a dropped case<br />
implies that it has been legally exam<strong>in</strong>ed and has no merit. It is important at this stage<br />
to recognize that an opportunity was created through <strong>the</strong> Restorati<strong>on</strong> law for <strong>the</strong> tribal<br />
who was legally wr<strong>on</strong>ged <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> implementati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> Tenancy, Ceil<strong>in</strong>g and<br />
Prohibitory laws. A suo moto case was filed after prima facie legal grounds were<br />
made out <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> records. The tribal was not even aware of <strong>the</strong> proceed<strong>in</strong>gs be<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>in</strong>itiated or be<strong>in</strong>g dropped. Hence <strong>the</strong> act of clos<strong>in</strong>g a case is a judicial act and will<br />
operate as res judicata, mean<strong>in</strong>g ‘already adjudged’ <strong>the</strong>reby effectively foreclos<strong>in</strong>g<br />
any effort to re-exam<strong>in</strong>e <strong>the</strong> matter. In so do<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong> tribal tenants have been doubly<br />
wr<strong>on</strong>ged through <strong>the</strong> fraudulent implementati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> Restorati<strong>on</strong> act. The needle of<br />
resp<strong>on</strong>sibility necessarily po<strong>in</strong>ts to <strong>the</strong> revenue officials and functi<strong>on</strong>aries.<br />
179
Exam<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> case records shows that cases were closed <strong>on</strong> flimsy grounds. In a<br />
large number of cases, <strong>the</strong> ALT (Trial Court for Restorati<strong>on</strong>) did not refer to <strong>the</strong> 32G<br />
proceed<strong>in</strong>gs at all to establish ownership. In o<strong>the</strong>rs <strong>the</strong> validity/legitimacy of <strong>the</strong><br />
proceed<strong>in</strong>gs were not enquired <strong>in</strong>to and accepted at face value. ALTs failed to enquire<br />
or exam<strong>in</strong>e <strong>the</strong> validity of proceed<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong>to cases of "voluntary surrenders", misuse of<br />
<strong>the</strong> term ‘servant’ to denote ‘tenant’ to deny tenancy rights to tenants, or where<br />
purchase prices fixed for an area was less than <strong>the</strong> tenants orig<strong>in</strong>al hold<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
A closer look at <strong>the</strong> record and proceed<strong>in</strong>gs also show disregard for <strong>the</strong> statements of<br />
<strong>the</strong> tribals. The judgement of <strong>the</strong> Sub Divisi<strong>on</strong>al Officer of Dahanu <strong>on</strong> 31 st December<br />
1981 <strong>in</strong> an appeal before him states <strong>in</strong> unambiguous language "The Assistant<br />
Tahsildar has c<strong>on</strong>ducted <strong>the</strong> enquiry <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> most callous manner. No permissi<strong>on</strong> under<br />
relevant provisi<strong>on</strong> of law was obta<strong>in</strong>ed before <strong>the</strong> transfer." Ano<strong>the</strong>r quote from <strong>the</strong><br />
Revenue Tribunal (39) "The ALT had passed orders without mak<strong>in</strong>g any <strong>in</strong>quiry and<br />
without record<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> statements of <strong>the</strong> parties c<strong>on</strong>cerned.... <strong>the</strong> appellant was not<br />
given any opportunity to be heard <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> matter." Fur<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>the</strong> ALT did not serve<br />
notices to all <strong>in</strong>terested pers<strong>on</strong>s to show cause.(40) The Tahsildar had dropped <strong>the</strong> case<br />
as "<strong>the</strong> tribal was not available for statement." Proceed<strong>in</strong>gs were lodged under wr<strong>on</strong>g<br />
acts under XIV/75 or XXXV/74 and vice versa, <strong>on</strong> some occasi<strong>on</strong>s <strong>the</strong> enquiries were<br />
made aga<strong>in</strong>st null and void.(41) In fact, <strong>the</strong>re are cases where case papers are not<br />
available or where <strong>the</strong>y have been washed away <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> floods.(42) The Restorati<strong>on</strong><br />
proceed<strong>in</strong>gs c<strong>on</strong>ducted by a large number of ALTs were totally to <strong>the</strong> detriment of <strong>the</strong><br />
rights of <strong>the</strong> tribal people despite <strong>the</strong> clear <strong>in</strong>tenti<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> law to redress <strong>the</strong> wr<strong>on</strong>gs<br />
committed dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> previous reforms proceed<strong>in</strong>gs and give <strong>the</strong> tribal people <strong>on</strong>e<br />
more opportunity to experience justice. However, <strong>the</strong> unholy alliance between <strong>the</strong><br />
landed <strong>in</strong>terests and <strong>the</strong> revenue authorities ensured that <strong>the</strong> Restorati<strong>on</strong> Acts were<br />
effectively scuttled and worse still, that all avenues for legal redress for <strong>the</strong> aggrieved<br />
tribals were closed.<br />
Expectedly, n<strong>on</strong>-tribals appealed to <strong>the</strong> MRT <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> few cases where <strong>the</strong> lands were<br />
restored to <strong>the</strong> tribals by <strong>the</strong> ALT. The higher authorities managed to f<strong>in</strong>d m<strong>in</strong>or<br />
discrepancies <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> procedures at <strong>the</strong> lower level to repeal restorati<strong>on</strong> orders. Some of<br />
<strong>the</strong> grounds were frivolous, for example “The ALT had not enquired <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong><br />
'resp<strong>on</strong>dent's caste' whe<strong>the</strong>r he is a tribal (43). This was a m<strong>in</strong>or procedural error,<br />
capitalised <strong>on</strong> by Revenue Tribunal to dismiss <strong>the</strong> restorati<strong>on</strong> order. (44) O<strong>the</strong>r reas<strong>on</strong>s<br />
were like “The ALT did not get <strong>the</strong> tribals’ undertak<strong>in</strong>g that he will cultivate <strong>the</strong><br />
restored land pers<strong>on</strong>ally, hence Sec. 3(3) of <strong>the</strong> Act was c<strong>on</strong>travened. Once aga<strong>in</strong> a<br />
procedural error was used to dismiss <strong>the</strong> restorati<strong>on</strong> order.<br />
Table 4 based <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>formati<strong>on</strong> provided by <strong>the</strong> Asst. Commissi<strong>on</strong>er Tribal Welfare<br />
(Thane) to <strong>the</strong> ST Commissi<strong>on</strong> dur<strong>in</strong>g a visit to <strong>the</strong> district <strong>in</strong> 2005 is reveal<strong>in</strong>g. While<br />
<strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>accuracies apparent <strong>in</strong> Table 2 and 3 are attributable to <strong>the</strong> degree of disregard<br />
of <strong>the</strong> officials to <strong>the</strong> necessity of land reform and restorati<strong>on</strong> of tribal lands, <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
<strong>in</strong>ability to even dist<strong>in</strong>guish cases registered under different enactments, namely<br />
XXXV/74 and XIV/75, is evident <strong>in</strong> Table 4.<br />
180
Table 4 Details of Restorati<strong>on</strong> Cases <strong>in</strong> Thane District<br />
Name of Taluka J V<br />
a i<br />
w k<br />
a r<br />
h a<br />
a m<br />
r g<br />
a<br />
d<br />
W<br />
a<br />
d<br />
a<br />
Cases filled 312 364 179 411 373 281 1921<br />
M<br />
o<br />
k<br />
h<br />
a<br />
d<br />
a<br />
Area 317.69 261.86 505.24 185.61 116.32 29.15 1415.87<br />
Pro tribal Orders 116 172 110 145 112 47 702<br />
Area 310.14 218.63 505.24 185.61 109.53 26.68 1355.83<br />
Cases rejected 196 192 69 266 261 234 1218<br />
Area --- --- 242.04 --- --- -- 242.04<br />
Cases disposed 116 172 110 145 112 47 702<br />
Area 310.14 218.63 263.80 185.61 109.53 26.68 1114.39<br />
Cases pend<strong>in</strong>g 1 10 --- --- 3 17<br />
Area 7.55 43.23 --- --- 6/78 2.46 60.02<br />
Cases land restored 1 10 --- ---- 3 3 17<br />
Area 7.55 43.23 --- --- 6.78 2.46 60.02<br />
Pend<strong>in</strong>g Cases 1 10 --- --- 3 3 17<br />
Area 7.55 43.23 --- --- 6.78 2.46 60.02<br />
N<strong>on</strong> restorati<strong>on</strong><br />
reas<strong>on</strong><br />
Court<br />
Stay<br />
P<br />
a<br />
l<br />
g<br />
h<br />
a<br />
r<br />
D<br />
a<br />
h<br />
a<br />
n<br />
u<br />
Court<br />
Stay<br />
T<br />
a<br />
l<br />
a<br />
s<br />
a<br />
r<br />
i<br />
T<br />
o<br />
t<br />
a<br />
l<br />
181
While <strong>the</strong> table appears to be recent, perta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g to 2005, <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>accuracies are glar<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
Table 2 <strong>in</strong>dicates that 6087 restorati<strong>on</strong> cases were filed while Table 4 reduces <strong>the</strong>m to<br />
1920 cases. The balance of 68% of <strong>the</strong> cases have vanished without trace.<br />
Notwithstand<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>accuracies, <strong>the</strong> data shows that <strong>on</strong>ly 36% of <strong>the</strong> cases were<br />
decided <strong>in</strong> favour of <strong>the</strong> tribal. What is more startl<strong>in</strong>g is <strong>the</strong> fact that of <strong>the</strong> 702 cases<br />
supposedly decided <strong>in</strong> favour of <strong>the</strong> tribals, land was reported to be restored <strong>in</strong> <strong>on</strong>ly<br />
2.4% i.e. 17 cases. What has happened to <strong>the</strong> 97.6% of <strong>the</strong> cases? The biggest blow is<br />
that even <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 17 cases, i.e. 0.89 percent of <strong>the</strong> 1920 cases filed, restorati<strong>on</strong> of<br />
possessi<strong>on</strong> has been stayed by <strong>the</strong> Court.<br />
Revenue Bureaucracy Subvert<strong>in</strong>g Land Reform<br />
Studies undertaken by <strong>the</strong> Kashtakari Sanghatna, a tribal peoples organizati<strong>on</strong> active<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> tribal tracts of <strong>the</strong> district, have revealed that by and large adivasis were<br />
unaware of <strong>the</strong>se acts or <strong>the</strong> procedures. Even <strong>the</strong> judicial member of <strong>the</strong> Tribunal,<br />
S.G. Borde, was unaware of <strong>the</strong> Acts, and passed an order (which was subsequently<br />
changed) <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> basis of <strong>the</strong> previous Land Revenue Code. Cases were filed suo-moto<br />
by officials, with <strong>the</strong> adivasi kept unaware and bereft of legal assistance. Ex-parte<br />
orders were passed when <strong>the</strong> tribal missed a date though he o<strong>the</strong>rwise faithfully<br />
attended <strong>the</strong> court. In <strong>on</strong>e case (45) <strong>the</strong> authority observed that, "<strong>the</strong> tribal had no proof<br />
that <strong>the</strong> order was not served <strong>on</strong> him", c<strong>on</strong>sequently an appeal aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> ex-parte<br />
orders was not upheld. N<strong>on</strong>-tribals engaged lawyers, <strong>in</strong> c<strong>on</strong>traventi<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> Acts, but<br />
records were removed to suppress this fact. Dates of <strong>the</strong> decisi<strong>on</strong>s were not<br />
communicated to <strong>the</strong> tribals while n<strong>on</strong> tribals were <strong>in</strong>timated <strong>in</strong> advance. N<strong>on</strong>-tribal<br />
traders like Hari Gulabdas Wani produced tribal certificates (46) and tenancy orders<br />
were modified to allow land be<strong>in</strong>g shown as transferred under <strong>the</strong> Ceil<strong>in</strong>g Act,<br />
render<strong>in</strong>g restorati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong>effective. (47) In <strong>on</strong>e case, a n<strong>on</strong>-tribal transferred land to a<br />
tribal mistress to make restorati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong>applicable. Defective c<strong>on</strong>solidati<strong>on</strong> resulted <strong>in</strong><br />
alienati<strong>on</strong> of tribal lands that were excluded from <strong>the</strong> purview of <strong>the</strong> act. Restorati<strong>on</strong><br />
was denied as <strong>the</strong> tribal was ignorant of <strong>the</strong> land survey number notwithstand<strong>in</strong>g a<br />
Court judgment that unequivocally stated that, "<strong>the</strong> fact of cultivati<strong>on</strong> cannot be<br />
denied by <strong>the</strong>ir failure to give exact area and survey numbers of lands." (48)<br />
The discussi<strong>on</strong>s made about make it clear that <strong>the</strong> failure of tribal land reform can be<br />
laid squarely at <strong>the</strong> feet of <strong>the</strong> Revenue bureaucracy? The legislature, under pressure<br />
from <strong>the</strong> electorate, sought to remedy land alienati<strong>on</strong>, but <strong>the</strong> revenue bureaucracy<br />
effectively circumvented <strong>the</strong> law. When c<strong>on</strong>fr<strong>on</strong>ted with <strong>the</strong> empt<strong>in</strong>ess of its laws, <strong>the</strong><br />
legislature falls <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> trap of col<strong>on</strong>ial governance, it cannot not trust democracy or<br />
<strong>the</strong> citizens it swears by and transfers <strong>the</strong> task of rectify<strong>in</strong>g a legal wr<strong>on</strong>g precisely to<br />
<strong>the</strong> functi<strong>on</strong>aries who were guilty of <strong>the</strong> wr<strong>on</strong>g. Is this by default or by design? Only<br />
history will tell.<br />
One of <strong>the</strong> major causes for <strong>the</strong> failure of land reform has been <strong>the</strong> co-optati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong><br />
lower revenue bureaucracy by <strong>the</strong> rural elites. In every case of progressive land<br />
legislati<strong>on</strong>, <strong>the</strong>ir complicity is evident, as <strong>the</strong>y spare no efforts to circumvent <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
own acts of commissi<strong>on</strong> or omissi<strong>on</strong>. Also, <strong>the</strong> legislature has been slow to rectify<br />
anomalies <strong>in</strong> both enactments, effect<strong>in</strong>g remedies five years later. It is like lock<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
stable after <strong>the</strong> horse has bolted. The tribals are compromised fur<strong>the</strong>r as <strong>the</strong> legislators<br />
182
<strong>in</strong>troduce loopholes <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> law under <strong>the</strong> pressure of <strong>the</strong> landed elites. Land reform<br />
laws become like o<strong>the</strong>r pro poor statutes, devoid of mean<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
By way of Clos<strong>in</strong>g a Pa<strong>in</strong>ful Chapter of Tribal History<br />
It would be <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> order of th<strong>in</strong>gs to c<strong>on</strong>clude with a quotati<strong>on</strong> from <strong>the</strong> Plann<strong>in</strong>g<br />
Commissi<strong>on</strong> appo<strong>in</strong>ted ‘Study Group <strong>on</strong> Land Hold<strong>in</strong>g Systems <strong>in</strong> Tribal Areas - "<br />
The basic threat to <strong>the</strong> tribal existence emanates from land alienati<strong>on</strong>. For <strong>the</strong> tribals,<br />
traditi<strong>on</strong>al land hold<strong>in</strong>g system was <strong>the</strong> basis of <strong>the</strong>ir polity, ec<strong>on</strong>omy and culture...<br />
Traditi<strong>on</strong>ally <strong>in</strong> most tribal areas <strong>in</strong>dividual rights of enjoyment of land and land<br />
based resources are embedded <strong>in</strong> communal systems of access to and management of<br />
resources which were systematically suppressed dur<strong>in</strong>g col<strong>on</strong>ial rule. But <strong>the</strong> very<br />
distorti<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong>troduced by <strong>the</strong> col<strong>on</strong>ial government were accepted as <strong>the</strong> crucial<br />
elements of <strong>the</strong> legal framework for implementati<strong>on</strong> of policies and programs <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
tribal areas. Paper laws of <strong>the</strong> col<strong>on</strong>ial dispensati<strong>on</strong> were given <strong>the</strong> place of pride over<br />
<strong>the</strong> laws <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> ground by which people lived. The significance of tribal upsurges <strong>in</strong><br />
diverse forms which have taken place from time to time dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> last <strong>on</strong>e century,<br />
for protecti<strong>on</strong> of resource based survival systems, not <strong>on</strong>ly as biological entities but<br />
also as social entity, <strong>in</strong> specific historico-ecological niche, has not been adequately<br />
appreciated. On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, paper laws of <strong>the</strong> past have been used as an alibi to<br />
deny <strong>the</strong> customary rights of <strong>the</strong> people and <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> process accommodative<br />
compromises have been made with <strong>the</strong> feudal pretensi<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong> some areas and facti<strong>on</strong>al<br />
elites have been promoted <strong>in</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rs... The study team has lighted ano<strong>the</strong>r <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g<br />
fact. It has brought out that <strong>the</strong> land reform (without first remov<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> col<strong>on</strong>ial<br />
distorti<strong>on</strong>s) has promoted a neo-feudalisati<strong>on</strong> process where <strong>the</strong> tribals are less<br />
assertive and democratic mobilizati<strong>on</strong> where <strong>the</strong>y are c<strong>on</strong>scious of <strong>the</strong>ir historical<br />
rights”. (49)<br />
We have come full circle. Every s<strong>in</strong>gle Commissi<strong>on</strong>, whe<strong>the</strong>r of <strong>the</strong> state or <strong>the</strong> center<br />
and legislatures of <strong>the</strong> states and <strong>the</strong> center, without excepti<strong>on</strong> harp <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> same<br />
<strong>the</strong>me. Land alienati<strong>on</strong> r<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>the</strong> death knell for <strong>the</strong> tribal people. Protect<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> tribals<br />
from ethnocide is <strong>the</strong> primary objective of every s<strong>in</strong>gle piece of land reform law s<strong>in</strong>ce<br />
<strong>in</strong>dependence. Yet every recommendati<strong>on</strong> appears to have been made to be forgotten,<br />
every law made to be subverted, by design or by default. No w<strong>on</strong>der that <strong>the</strong> call of<br />
<strong>the</strong> ultra left Maoist party res<strong>on</strong>ates <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> hearts of <strong>the</strong> tribals and large tracts of <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
homelands are <strong>the</strong> stag<strong>in</strong>g grounds for <strong>the</strong> party guerillas who wage a war aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong><br />
state. I end with a quote from <strong>the</strong> Chairpers<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> Plann<strong>in</strong>g Commissi<strong>on</strong>, Expert<br />
Group <strong>on</strong> Development Issues, deal<strong>in</strong>g with Disc<strong>on</strong>tent, Unrest and Extremism -<br />
“Unmet just demands may provoke <strong>the</strong> sufferers to use force, whe<strong>the</strong>r for <strong>the</strong><br />
occupati<strong>on</strong> of land or for exercis<strong>in</strong>g rights …The rul<strong>in</strong>g establishment cannot avoid<br />
tak<strong>in</strong>g resp<strong>on</strong>sibility for its failure to read <strong>the</strong> writ<strong>in</strong>g <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> wall”. (50) Will <strong>the</strong> rul<strong>in</strong>g<br />
elites sit up and listen ?<br />
1. Census of India 2001, Government Press, New Delhi<br />
2. Prabhu Pradip, Legally Looted and Cheated – Land Reforms & Tribals <strong>in</strong> Maharashtra,<br />
M<strong>on</strong>ograph, NIRD, Hyderabad.<br />
3. Census of India 2001.<br />
4. Pradip Prabhu, op cit<br />
183
5. Tribal Research and Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g Institute, Malnutriti<strong>on</strong> Related Deaths of Tribal Children <strong>in</strong><br />
Nandurbar District, M<strong>on</strong>ograph, Government of Maharashtra, Pune 2002<br />
6. Report of <strong>the</strong> Agricultural Census, Department of Agriculture and Co-Operati<strong>on</strong>, Government of<br />
India, New Delhi, 1990-91<br />
7. Tribal Research and Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g Institute-Pune, Benchmark Survey, 2003<br />
8. Evidence of <strong>the</strong> same is found <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> different survey and settlement reports of <strong>the</strong> various<br />
districts. e.g. Report by Capta<strong>in</strong> W<strong>in</strong>gate, Revenue Survey Commissi<strong>on</strong>er, <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> plan of Survey and<br />
Assessment most suitable to <strong>the</strong> prov<strong>in</strong>ce of Khandesh and also Instructi<strong>on</strong>s issued <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> subject by<br />
Government, Selecti<strong>on</strong>s from Government Records, No. 1, Old Series, Bombay, 1851<br />
9. The earliest records perta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> pattern of land ownership am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong> tribal peoples, like <strong>the</strong><br />
Gazetteers prepared by <strong>the</strong> British, refer to <strong>the</strong> communal ownership of land <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> tribal communities,<br />
for example Gazetteer of Bombay Presidency Vol XIII, Thane (Gazetteer), Central Government Press,<br />
Bombay, 1882.<br />
10. This is particularly visible <strong>in</strong> Bihar, where <strong>the</strong> Sasandhris, large st<strong>on</strong>es placed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> memory of<br />
<strong>the</strong> ancestors were not <strong>on</strong>ly <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>dicati<strong>on</strong>s of a tribal habitati<strong>on</strong> but also <strong>the</strong> 'title deeds' of <strong>the</strong><br />
community.<br />
11. Report of <strong>the</strong> Study Group <strong>on</strong> Land Hold<strong>in</strong>g Systems <strong>in</strong> Tribal Areas, Chairman B. K. Roy<br />
Burman, Government of India, New Delhi, 1987<br />
12. The anomie that follows <strong>the</strong> loss of land was reflected immediately <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> very high <strong>in</strong>cidence of<br />
'suicides' am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong> displaced tribals <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Dapcheri Milk Project <strong>in</strong> Thane. The explanati<strong>on</strong> that was<br />
forwarded by most of <strong>the</strong> tribal people without excepti<strong>on</strong> was - 'what happens to a tree when you cut its<br />
roots? It dies. The same is happen<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> older people of <strong>the</strong> village. They prefer death to <strong>the</strong><br />
debilitat<strong>in</strong>g anomie." This c<strong>on</strong>cept has been explored at some length <strong>in</strong> Prabhu P. and Suresh V<br />
Transience and Transiti<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> Tribal Societies, ISISD, Madras, 1986.<br />
13. Roy Burman JJ, Sacred Groves Am<strong>on</strong>g Communities, Mittal Publicati<strong>on</strong>s, New Delhi 2003<br />
14. D. Sym<strong>in</strong>gt<strong>on</strong>, Report of <strong>the</strong> Aborig<strong>in</strong>al and Hill Tribes of <strong>the</strong> partially excluded areas <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Bombay Presidency, Central Government Press, Bombay, 1938.<br />
15. Report of <strong>the</strong> Committee <strong>on</strong> Special Multipurpose Tribal Blocks, Chairman Verrier Elw<strong>in</strong>, New<br />
Delhi 1960<br />
16. 28th.Report of <strong>the</strong> Commissi<strong>on</strong>er for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, Government of<br />
India, New Delhi, and 29th. Report of <strong>the</strong> Commissi<strong>on</strong>er for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes,<br />
Government of India, New Delhi<br />
17. Fernandes W and Ganguly T, (eds) Questi<strong>on</strong>s <strong>on</strong> Development, Displacement and<br />
Rehabilitati<strong>on</strong>, Indian Social Institute, New Delhi, 1989, pg.6<br />
18. Nati<strong>on</strong>al Commissi<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> Agriculture, 1951, Government of India Press, New Delhi 1951, Vol.<br />
15, para 65.2.14<br />
19. Advocate Brian Lobo has made a careful analysis of <strong>the</strong> judgments and orders of <strong>the</strong> Sub<br />
Divisi<strong>on</strong>al Officer’s Court, <strong>the</strong> Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal and <strong>the</strong> High Court. His study is<br />
published <strong>in</strong> ‘Land Reforms <strong>in</strong> Maharashtra’ <strong>in</strong> Shah G. & Shah D. C. (eds) Land Reforms <strong>in</strong> India,<br />
Volume VIII: , Sage Publicati<strong>on</strong>s, New Delhi, 2002, pp 247-294<br />
20. Land Reforms <strong>in</strong> Maharashtra, An Empirical Study, Lal Bahadhur Shastri Academy of<br />
Adm<strong>in</strong>istrati<strong>on</strong>, Mussoorie, 1994,pg. 18<br />
21. Land Reforms <strong>in</strong> Maharashtra, An Empirical Study, op cit pg.6<br />
22. When trac<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ir ancestry, a number of tribal villagers <strong>in</strong> Thane District have menti<strong>on</strong>ed <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
ancestral villages to be <strong>in</strong> distant talukas. On prob<strong>in</strong>g fur<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>the</strong>se families menti<strong>on</strong> that <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
forefa<strong>the</strong>rs, not so far ago had fled <strong>the</strong> village due to <strong>the</strong> tyranny of <strong>the</strong> local landlord and aband<strong>on</strong>ed<br />
<strong>the</strong> land because of <strong>in</strong>ability to pay loans taken to stave off starvati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
23. Report of <strong>the</strong> Depressed Classes and Aborig<strong>in</strong>al Tribes Committee, Chairman, O.H.B. Starte,<br />
Bombay, 1930 also see Papers relat<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> Revisi<strong>on</strong> Survey Settlement of <strong>the</strong> Taloda taluka of <strong>the</strong><br />
Khandesh Collectorate, Selecti<strong>on</strong>s from Government Records, No. 387, New Series, Bombay official,<br />
1899, p.9.<br />
24. B. H. Powell, The Land System <strong>in</strong> British India, Vol. II pg. 456 and Vol. III pg. 28<br />
25. Parulekar G, Jeva Manoos Zaga Hoto,(Marathi) Peoples Publish<strong>in</strong>g House 1960 and Parulekar<br />
S, Revolt of <strong>the</strong> Warlis, Peoples Publish<strong>in</strong>g House, Bombay 1947<br />
26. B. H. Powell, The Land System <strong>in</strong> British India, Vols. 1 & II<br />
27. Case No. 237/84 heard and disposed of by <strong>the</strong> Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Bombay, Court<br />
Records.<br />
28. In Maharashtra al<strong>on</strong>e 73,546 landlords resumed <strong>the</strong>ir lands for pers<strong>on</strong>al cultivati<strong>on</strong>. See Land<br />
Reforms <strong>in</strong> Maharashtra, An Empirical Study, op cit p.23. There is however no explanati<strong>on</strong> for <strong>the</strong><br />
landlords sudden love for agriculture, particularly when <strong>the</strong>se lands were with <strong>the</strong> tenants for<br />
184
generati<strong>on</strong>s, except perhaps that <strong>the</strong>y saw <strong>the</strong> imm<strong>in</strong>ent likelihood of <strong>the</strong> land be<strong>in</strong>g transferred to <strong>the</strong><br />
tenants.<br />
29. The Report of <strong>the</strong> Nati<strong>on</strong>al Commissi<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> Agriculture 1976, Part XV, refers to 1 milli<strong>on</strong><br />
tenants who lost land rights due to voluntary surrender, n<strong>on</strong>-appearance, failure to pay <strong>in</strong>stallments <strong>in</strong><br />
time. The Reports also menti<strong>on</strong>s of 0.85 lakh cases of tenants whose lands were resumed by <strong>the</strong><br />
landlords and 1.21 lakh cases of voluntary surrender of lands by tenants to landlords. If <strong>the</strong> unofficial<br />
data collected with respect to <strong>the</strong> tribal tenants <strong>in</strong> Dahanu taluka of Thane is any <strong>in</strong>dicati<strong>on</strong>, <strong>the</strong>n this 1<br />
milli<strong>on</strong> tenants would <strong>in</strong>clude a very large proporti<strong>on</strong> of tribals.<br />
30. For extensive <strong>in</strong>formati<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> effects of <strong>the</strong> Tenancy Legislati<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> tenants, see, Report of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Committee appo<strong>in</strong>ted by <strong>the</strong> Government of Maharashtra, for Evaluati<strong>on</strong> of Land Reforms, Central<br />
Government Press, Bombay, official, 1974.<br />
31. ibid<br />
32. Land Reforms <strong>in</strong> Maharashtra, An Empirical Study, op cit p.6<br />
33. ibid pg. 10<br />
34. Chhatrapati S<strong>in</strong>gh <strong>in</strong> his article 'Rehabilitati<strong>on</strong> and <strong>the</strong> Right to Property' pp. 97-98 <strong>in</strong> Fernandes<br />
W and Thukral E. G., (eds) op cit makes an <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g observati<strong>on</strong>. He speaks of two types of citizens<br />
<strong>in</strong> this country. The first category gets rights to land if <strong>the</strong>y lived <strong>on</strong> it for a certa<strong>in</strong> period of time or<br />
have tilled it or cultivated it, <strong>the</strong>y come under <strong>the</strong> Tenancy laws. On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r side are a very large<br />
number of tribals and forest dwellers who come under <strong>the</strong> forest laws that do not give any right of<br />
ownership to <strong>the</strong> cultivator even after several generati<strong>on</strong>s of occupancy and cultivati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
35. The overall progress <strong>in</strong>dicates that <strong>in</strong> <strong>on</strong>ly 33% of <strong>the</strong> recorded tenancy cases, did <strong>the</strong> tenants<br />
become owners of <strong>the</strong>ir land. In <strong>the</strong> Central Prov<strong>in</strong>ces <strong>the</strong> percentage was still lower at 11.8%. While<br />
<strong>the</strong>se percentages refer to <strong>the</strong> general tenant populati<strong>on</strong>, <strong>the</strong> percentage <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> case of <strong>the</strong> tribals would<br />
be a fracti<strong>on</strong> of even <strong>the</strong>se percentages, See Land Reforms <strong>in</strong> Maharasntra, An Empirical Study, op cit<br />
p.24<br />
36. See Report of Committee to Exam<strong>in</strong>e Difficulties Experienced by Scheduled Tribe Land<br />
Holders/Cultivators <strong>in</strong> respect of <strong>the</strong>ir lands <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Work<strong>in</strong>g of Certa<strong>in</strong> Acts, Chairman H. G. Vartak,<br />
Government Press, , Bombay, 1972<br />
37. In fact <strong>the</strong>re are two important Reports that present <strong>the</strong> situati<strong>on</strong> of land reforms with respect to<br />
<strong>the</strong> tribals namely The Report of Committee to Exam<strong>in</strong>e Difficulties Experienced by Scheduled Tribe<br />
Land Holders/ Cultivators <strong>in</strong> respect of <strong>the</strong>ir lands <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Work<strong>in</strong>g of Certa<strong>in</strong> Acts 1972 and Report of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Committee appo<strong>in</strong>ted by <strong>the</strong> Government of Maharashtra, for Evaluati<strong>on</strong> of Land Reforms 1974.<br />
38. Parulekar G, op cit<br />
39. Case No. 102/80 heard and disposed of by <strong>the</strong> Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Bombay, Court<br />
Records.<br />
40. Case No. 235/77 heard and disposed of by <strong>the</strong> Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Bombay, Court<br />
Records.<br />
41. Case No 109/79 and Case No. 110/79) heard and disposed of by <strong>the</strong> Maharashtra Revenue<br />
Tribunal, Bombay, Court Records.<br />
42. Case heard and disposed by <strong>the</strong> Addl. Commissi<strong>on</strong>er at Appeal Desk/ WTN/4495.<br />
43. Case No. 177/79, heard and disposed off by <strong>the</strong> Sub Divisi<strong>on</strong>al Officer, Dahanu, Court Records.<br />
44. Case Nos. 131/80, 125/80, 114/80, 119/80, 130/80, 91/80, 71/80, 66/80, 80/80 heard and<br />
disposed of by <strong>the</strong> Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Bombay, Court Records.<br />
45. Case No. 56/77 heard and disposed of by <strong>the</strong> Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Bombay, Court<br />
Records.<br />
46. Case No. 121/77 heard and disposed of by <strong>the</strong> Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Bombay, Court<br />
Records.<br />
47. Case No. 157/77 heard and disposed of by <strong>the</strong> Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Bombay, Court<br />
Records.<br />
48. Case No. 237/84 heard and disposed of by <strong>the</strong> Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Bombay, Court<br />
Records<br />
49. Report of <strong>the</strong> Study Group <strong>on</strong> Land Hold<strong>in</strong>g Systems <strong>in</strong> Tribal Areas, op cit pp 1-3<br />
50. Bandhopadhya D, Rural Unrest, Yojana, New Delhi, February 2007<br />
185
Legality and Pragmatism<br />
Usha Ramanathan<br />
A re-<strong>in</strong>vent<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> has been underway for some time now. The<br />
Emergency (1975-77) may be seen to c<strong>on</strong>stitute a breakaway moment <strong>in</strong> c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al<br />
history when <strong>the</strong> wr<strong>on</strong>gs of <strong>the</strong> state raised questi<strong>on</strong>s about <strong>the</strong> state’s treatment of <strong>the</strong><br />
rights of <strong>the</strong> people. The image of <strong>the</strong> judiciary had suffered an erosi<strong>on</strong> dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
Emergency, especially after its <strong>in</strong>famous verdict <strong>in</strong> ADM Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla, 1<br />
where <strong>the</strong> Supreme Court had endorsed unfettered powers over <strong>the</strong> lives and liberties of<br />
<strong>the</strong> citizenry when c<strong>on</strong>fr<strong>on</strong>ted with mass arrests of political dissidents and opp<strong>on</strong>ents of<br />
<strong>the</strong> regime. Perhaps, <strong>in</strong> part out of penitence and partly out of recogniti<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong><br />
irrelevance of rights <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> lives of large masses of <strong>the</strong> populati<strong>on</strong>, and f<strong>in</strong>ally, <strong>in</strong> an effort<br />
that helped to shore up <strong>the</strong> decl<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g reputati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> judiciary, public <strong>in</strong>terest litigati<strong>on</strong><br />
(PIL) was devised by judges <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Supreme Court. In its early years, PIL gave life and<br />
texture to <strong>the</strong> rights found <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> text of <strong>the</strong> C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>. The legitimacy that this<br />
jurisdicti<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong>vested <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> courts, <strong>in</strong>evitably altered <strong>the</strong> nature of judicial power, and<br />
expanded <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> power to pr<strong>on</strong>ounce <strong>on</strong> rights, and wr<strong>on</strong>gs. Legality and pragmatism<br />
are two noti<strong>on</strong>s through which <strong>the</strong> treatment of rights, wr<strong>on</strong>gs, remedies and sancti<strong>on</strong>s<br />
have been mediated, and <strong>the</strong>y will be explored to attempt an understand<strong>in</strong>g of that which<br />
has happened to c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al rights and wr<strong>on</strong>gs.<br />
Legality<br />
Legality is a flexible noti<strong>on</strong>.<br />
It is possible that legality is derived from enacted law which may shift an event from<br />
legality to illegality, and back. So, for many years after <strong>the</strong> Plantati<strong>on</strong>s Labour Act was<br />
enacted <strong>in</strong> 1951, to c<strong>on</strong>form with <strong>the</strong> law, a plantati<strong>on</strong> owner would have had to ensure<br />
that <strong>the</strong>re were no children below 12 years employed <strong>on</strong> his plantati<strong>on</strong>. In 1966, <strong>the</strong><br />
Nati<strong>on</strong>al Commissi<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> Labour found that plantati<strong>on</strong>s where migrant labour abound, do<br />
<strong>in</strong> fact employ children of less than <strong>the</strong> age that <strong>the</strong> law permitted. In 1986, as part of <strong>the</strong><br />
process of rati<strong>on</strong>alis<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> law <strong>on</strong> child labour <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> matter of age and hazardous<br />
occupati<strong>on</strong>s, <strong>the</strong> prohibiti<strong>on</strong> for employment of child labour <strong>in</strong> plantati<strong>on</strong>s was removed<br />
from <strong>the</strong> law. 2<br />
Legality may depend <strong>on</strong> an exercise of state power. It may be power exercised under a<br />
statute, as, when land is 'acquired' under <strong>the</strong> Land Acquisiti<strong>on</strong> Act 1894, <strong>the</strong> rights and<br />
<strong>in</strong>terests of any 'pers<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong>terested' <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> land is reduced to a 'claim', and ownership, and<br />
often possessi<strong>on</strong>, are passed <strong>on</strong> to <strong>the</strong> acquir<strong>in</strong>g agency, who may ei<strong>the</strong>r receive or pass<br />
<strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> rights over <strong>the</strong> land.<br />
1 Supreme Court Cases 1976 vol II p 521<br />
2 Secti<strong>on</strong> 24, Child Labour Act 1986. For a discussi<strong>on</strong>, see Usha Ramanathan, “<strong>on</strong> Engag<strong>in</strong>g with <strong>the</strong> Law:<br />
Revisit<strong>in</strong>g Child Labour” <strong>in</strong> (1998) vol 40 Journal of <strong>the</strong> Indian Law Institute, pp.263-283 at 271.<br />
186
It may be by executive practice, possibly entrenched <strong>in</strong> rules or guidel<strong>in</strong>es, possibly<br />
sanctified by a judicial decisi<strong>on</strong>. There are c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s that <strong>the</strong> police may impose while<br />
permitt<strong>in</strong>g a processi<strong>on</strong> or a dem<strong>on</strong>strati<strong>on</strong>, or permissi<strong>on</strong> may be refused by <strong>the</strong> police.<br />
This is an exercise of executive power which would determ<strong>in</strong>e <strong>the</strong> legality of various<br />
forms of protest.<br />
Courts may work, and re-work, <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>tours of legality. In 1987, <strong>the</strong> Supreme Court held<br />
that <strong>the</strong> “State government also stands prohibited to transfer by way of lease or any o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
form known to law, government land <strong>in</strong> Scheduled Areas to n<strong>on</strong>-tribal pers<strong>on</strong>, be it<br />
natural or juristic pers<strong>on</strong> except to its <strong>in</strong>strumentality or a co-operative society comprised<br />
solely of tribes...”. 3 This was because, “if <strong>the</strong> Cab<strong>in</strong>et form of government would transfer<br />
<strong>the</strong> land of <strong>the</strong> government to n<strong>on</strong>-tribals peace would get disturbed, good governance <strong>in</strong><br />
Scheduled Areas would pass <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> hands of n<strong>on</strong>-tribals who would drive out <strong>the</strong> tribals<br />
from Scheduled Areas...and slowly and imperceptibly, but surely, <strong>the</strong> land <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Scheduled Area would pass <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> hands of <strong>the</strong> n<strong>on</strong>-tribals. The letter of law would be<br />
an empty c<strong>on</strong>tent”, and <strong>the</strong> course of justice would be deflected, “denud<strong>in</strong>g, (<strong>the</strong> tribals)<br />
of <strong>the</strong> socio-ec<strong>on</strong>omic empowerment and dignity of <strong>the</strong>ir pers<strong>on</strong>”. 4 In 2001, ano<strong>the</strong>r<br />
bench of <strong>the</strong> Supreme Court thought differently and expressed str<strong>on</strong>g reservati<strong>on</strong>s about<br />
<strong>the</strong> Samatha op<strong>in</strong>i<strong>on</strong> while permitt<strong>in</strong>g dis<strong>in</strong>vestment of <strong>the</strong> Bharat Alum<strong>in</strong>ium Company<br />
Ltd. <strong>in</strong> Chattisgarh aga<strong>in</strong>st a challenge that this would amount to hand<strong>in</strong>g over tribal land,<br />
which had been taken over about two decades prior to <strong>the</strong> dis<strong>in</strong>vestment, to a private<br />
<strong>in</strong>vestor.<br />
These are some shades of legality.<br />
Pragmatism<br />
The practice of pragmatism has exerted a significant <strong>in</strong>fluence <strong>on</strong> legality. Pragmatism<br />
may be about <strong>in</strong>duct<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> art of <strong>the</strong> possible <strong>in</strong>to law-mak<strong>in</strong>g and justic<strong>in</strong>g. This would<br />
<strong>in</strong>volve identify<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> problem and seek<strong>in</strong>g not a soluti<strong>on</strong> but an improvement over <strong>the</strong><br />
situati<strong>on</strong> as it exists.<br />
In 1981, <strong>the</strong> Special Bearer B<strong>on</strong>ds (Immunities and Exempti<strong>on</strong>s) Act was legislated by<br />
Parliament. This Act c<strong>on</strong>ferred immunities and exempti<strong>on</strong>s <strong>on</strong> holders of black m<strong>on</strong>ey,<br />
with <strong>the</strong> stated <strong>in</strong>tenti<strong>on</strong> of <strong>in</strong>duc<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>m to re-<strong>in</strong>troduce <strong>the</strong> m<strong>on</strong>ey from <strong>the</strong> parallel<br />
ec<strong>on</strong>omy to <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>trol of <strong>the</strong> Reserve Bank and <strong>the</strong> taxati<strong>on</strong> laws. However, “regrettable<br />
or unfortunate it may be,” as <strong>the</strong> Supreme Court commented while uphold<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al validity of <strong>the</strong> provisi<strong>on</strong>s of <strong>the</strong> 1981 Act, “ <strong>the</strong>y had to be enacted by <strong>the</strong><br />
legislature <strong>in</strong> order to br<strong>in</strong>g out black m<strong>on</strong>ey <strong>in</strong> to <strong>the</strong> open and canalise it for productive<br />
purposes.” 5 “The problem of black m<strong>on</strong>ey,” <strong>the</strong> court said, “was an obst<strong>in</strong>ate ec<strong>on</strong>omic<br />
problem which had been defy<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> government for quite some time and it was <strong>in</strong> order<br />
3 Samatha v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1997) 8 SCC 191 at 259. Tribal land, c<strong>on</strong>stituted <strong>in</strong>to `scheduled<br />
areas’ or `agency areas’, is governed by excepti<strong>on</strong>al rules relat<strong>in</strong>g to transfer of land; and transfer of land <strong>in</strong><br />
a tribal area to a n<strong>on</strong>-tribal is, as a rule, prohibited, or at least restricted, by law. This case was a reasserti<strong>on</strong><br />
of this pr<strong>in</strong>ciple, and prohibited <strong>the</strong> state from tak<strong>in</strong>g over land to hand over to a n<strong>on</strong>-tribal for<br />
m<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g or any o<strong>the</strong>r purpose.<br />
4 Id. at p.259, para 94.<br />
5 R.K.Garg v. Uni<strong>on</strong> of India (1981) 4 SCC 675 at p.704, para 18.<br />
187
to resolve this problem that, o<strong>the</strong>r efforts hav<strong>in</strong>g failed, <strong>the</strong> legislature decided to enact<br />
<strong>the</strong> Act, even though <strong>the</strong> effect of its provisi<strong>on</strong>s might be to c<strong>on</strong>fer certa<strong>in</strong> undeserved<br />
advantages <strong>on</strong> tax evaders <strong>in</strong> possessi<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> black m<strong>on</strong>ey.” 6<br />
In ano<strong>the</strong>r c<strong>on</strong>text, pragmatism may be a purposive exercise, where, hav<strong>in</strong>g identified <strong>the</strong><br />
end sought to be achieved, ways may be devised to reach that end. This may <strong>in</strong>volve <strong>the</strong><br />
prioritis<strong>in</strong>g of rights, <strong>in</strong>terests and claims. It may <strong>the</strong>n <strong>in</strong>volve a decisi<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> how <strong>the</strong> law<br />
will be used, <strong>in</strong>terpreted, marg<strong>in</strong>alised or stepped past. Pragmatism may have an effect <strong>on</strong><br />
legality, ei<strong>the</strong>r by <strong>the</strong> way legality is addressed, or ignored.<br />
Public Interest Llitigati<strong>on</strong><br />
Public <strong>in</strong>terest litigati<strong>on</strong> (PIL) has impacted <strong>on</strong> legality and pragmatism <strong>in</strong> at least two<br />
ways. The first is <strong>the</strong> focus that PIL <strong>in</strong>troduced <strong>on</strong> c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al rights and those that <strong>the</strong><br />
C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> had not reached, for reas<strong>on</strong>s of <strong>in</strong>digence, illiteracy, ignorance of rights and<br />
<strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>capacity fostered by powerlessness. In <strong>the</strong> early years of PIL, classes of pers<strong>on</strong>s<br />
whom c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al rights had not reached, and who could not reach <strong>the</strong>m, were<br />
identified; such, for <strong>in</strong>stance, were b<strong>on</strong>ded labour, pavement dwellers, child labour,<br />
exploited migrant and c<strong>on</strong>tract labour, children of women <strong>in</strong> prostituti<strong>on</strong>; under-trial<br />
pris<strong>on</strong>ers and c<strong>on</strong>victs <strong>in</strong> un<strong>in</strong>habitable jails; <strong>the</strong> mentally ill <strong>in</strong> jails and o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
<strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>s; children <strong>in</strong> custodial <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>s; women <strong>in</strong> protective and corrective<br />
<strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>s and victims of excesses of <strong>the</strong> state as were those who died <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Arwal<br />
fir<strong>in</strong>g, those displaced (largely tribals), to make way for power plants and o<strong>the</strong>r projects,<br />
and tribals <strong>in</strong>jured or killed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Balliapal army fir<strong>in</strong>g range. Throughout this phase, a<br />
significance was imparted to c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al rights, and <strong>the</strong>ir relevance to all pers<strong>on</strong>s was<br />
asserted. The law and executive acti<strong>on</strong>, <strong>in</strong>dolence and abuse were c<strong>on</strong>sidered with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
terms set by <strong>the</strong> C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>; and <strong>the</strong> rights <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> were expansively<br />
understood. This is <strong>the</strong> period when rights to livelihood, dignity, health, and aga<strong>in</strong>st<br />
hunger, were read <strong>in</strong>to Article 21, which guarantees <strong>the</strong> right to “life” and pers<strong>on</strong>al<br />
liberty. In later years, <strong>the</strong> right to educati<strong>on</strong>, for <strong>in</strong>stance, was read <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> right to life. 7<br />
The relati<strong>on</strong>ship between morality, c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>alism and <strong>the</strong> court's expanded<br />
understand<strong>in</strong>g of its role led <strong>in</strong>exorably to a broaden<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> power of <strong>the</strong> court; and<br />
this is <strong>the</strong> sec<strong>on</strong>d way <strong>in</strong> which PIL has left its impressi<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> legality and pragmatism.<br />
There are c<strong>on</strong>tradicti<strong>on</strong>s that have emerged between c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al rights and <strong>the</strong><br />
imperatives imposed by pragmatism and <strong>the</strong> varied mean<strong>in</strong>gs given to legality. The rest<br />
of this essay sets out <strong>the</strong> scheme of rights and obligati<strong>on</strong>s that are <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>,<br />
explores <strong>the</strong> ways <strong>in</strong> which legality is worked, and illustrates how pragmatism could have<br />
<strong>the</strong> effect of render<strong>in</strong>g legality redundant. In this renditi<strong>on</strong>, PIL forms <strong>the</strong> backdrop, and<br />
<strong>the</strong> court is <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> through which <strong>the</strong> variati<strong>on</strong>s of legality and pragmatism are<br />
played out.<br />
6<br />
Id. at pp.704-705, para 18. For ano<strong>the</strong>r illustrati<strong>on</strong> of this aspect of pragmatism, see supra note 2.<br />
7<br />
In 2002, <strong>the</strong> C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> was amended to <strong>in</strong>clude Article 21-A, which enunciates a fundamental right to<br />
educati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
188
An <strong>in</strong>clusive agenda<br />
It is possible to read <strong>the</strong> C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> of India as an <strong>in</strong>clusive document. It speaks <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
name of `We, <strong>the</strong> people of India’. The right to equality, life and pers<strong>on</strong>al liberty, aga<strong>in</strong>st<br />
arbitrary arrest and aga<strong>in</strong>st exploitati<strong>on</strong> are c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>ally recognised <strong>in</strong> every pers<strong>on</strong>,<br />
citizen and n<strong>on</strong>-citizen alike. No citizen is to be discrim<strong>in</strong>ated aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> basis of <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
religi<strong>on</strong>, race, caste, sex, place of birth, nor shall <strong>the</strong>y be denied access to public spaces<br />
as are shops, restaurants, nor to wells, tanks, bath<strong>in</strong>g ghats and places of public resort,<br />
which are wholly or partially ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed by state funds or which are dedicated to <strong>the</strong> use<br />
of <strong>the</strong> general public. 8 This prohibiti<strong>on</strong> would not extend to special provisi<strong>on</strong>s be<strong>in</strong>g<br />
made for women and children, or provisi<strong>on</strong> made for <strong>the</strong> advancement of any socially<br />
and educati<strong>on</strong>ally backward classes of citizens or for <strong>the</strong> Scheduled Castes and Scheduled<br />
Tribes. 9 There is to be equality of opportunity <strong>in</strong> matters of public employment for all<br />
citizens, while excepti<strong>on</strong>s may be permissible, when <strong>the</strong>y are based <strong>on</strong> domicile, or are <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> nature of affirmative acti<strong>on</strong>; and an excepti<strong>on</strong> covers religious or denom<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>al<br />
<strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>s which may c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>ally c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue with <strong>the</strong> criteri<strong>on</strong> of profess<strong>in</strong>g a<br />
particular religi<strong>on</strong> or bel<strong>on</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g to a particular denom<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> to be eligible for be<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>in</strong>ducted. 10<br />
Untouchability is outlawed. 11 All citizens have <strong>the</strong> right to freedom of speech and<br />
expressi<strong>on</strong>; to assemble peaceably and without arms; to form associati<strong>on</strong>s and uni<strong>on</strong>s; to<br />
move freely throughout <strong>the</strong> territory of India; to reside and settle <strong>in</strong> any part of Indian<br />
territory and to practise any professi<strong>on</strong>, or to carry <strong>on</strong> any occupati<strong>on</strong>, trade or bus<strong>in</strong>ess.<br />
These rights are hemmed <strong>in</strong> by `reas<strong>on</strong>able restricti<strong>on</strong>s’ but, as <strong>the</strong>re is a need to<br />
c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ually assert, it is <strong>the</strong> rights that are fundamental; <strong>the</strong> restricti<strong>on</strong>s c<strong>on</strong>stitute <strong>the</strong><br />
excepti<strong>on</strong>. 12 The right of all pers<strong>on</strong>s to freedom of c<strong>on</strong>science, free professi<strong>on</strong>, practice<br />
and propagati<strong>on</strong> of religi<strong>on</strong> and <strong>the</strong> freedom to manage religious affairs is guaranteed.<br />
The right of any secti<strong>on</strong> of citizens to c<strong>on</strong>serve <strong>the</strong>ir dist<strong>in</strong>ct language, script or culture is<br />
assured, and <strong>the</strong> right of l<strong>in</strong>guistic or religious m<strong>in</strong>orities to establish and adm<strong>in</strong>ister<br />
educati<strong>on</strong>al <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>s of <strong>the</strong>ir choice is asserted.<br />
There are fundamental rights, and <strong>the</strong>y are justiciable, that is, <strong>the</strong> courts are tasked with<br />
ensur<strong>in</strong>g that any violati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong>se rights is swiftly redressed. The C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> also sets<br />
out an <strong>in</strong>clusive agenda for <strong>the</strong> state to pursue <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> `Directive Pr<strong>in</strong>ciples of State Policy’<br />
which were not <strong>in</strong>tended to be enforced through <strong>the</strong> courts, but which were “never<strong>the</strong>less<br />
fundamental <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> governance of <strong>the</strong> country and it shall be <strong>the</strong> duty of <strong>the</strong> state to apply<br />
<strong>the</strong>se pr<strong>in</strong>ciples <strong>in</strong> mak<strong>in</strong>g laws”. 13 So, <strong>the</strong> state is to promote “a social order <strong>in</strong> which<br />
justice, social, ec<strong>on</strong>omic and political, shall <strong>in</strong>form all <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>s of <strong>the</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>al<br />
life”. 14 All “citizens, men and women equally, (are to) have <strong>the</strong> right to an adequate<br />
8 Article 15<br />
9 Article 15(3) and (4)<br />
10 Article 16<br />
11 Article 17<br />
12 K.G.Kannabiran, The Wages of Impunity, 2004, Orient L<strong>on</strong>gman, Delhi, p.38.<br />
13 Article 37<br />
14 Article 38<br />
189
means of livelihood”. 15 The “ownership and c<strong>on</strong>trol of <strong>the</strong> material resources of <strong>the</strong><br />
community are (to be) so distributed as best to subserve <strong>the</strong> comm<strong>on</strong> good”. 16 The state is<br />
to ensure that “<strong>the</strong> operati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> ec<strong>on</strong>omic system does not result <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>centrati<strong>on</strong><br />
of wealth and means of producti<strong>on</strong> to <strong>the</strong> comm<strong>on</strong> detriment”. 17 The “health and strength<br />
of workers, men and women, and <strong>the</strong> tender age of children are not (to be) abused and …<br />
citizens … not forced by ec<strong>on</strong>omic necessity to enter avocati<strong>on</strong>s unsuited to <strong>the</strong>ir age or<br />
strength.” 18 Am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r directives issued to <strong>the</strong> state is found <strong>the</strong> mandate to<br />
“secur(e) <strong>the</strong> right to work, to educati<strong>on</strong> and to public assistance <strong>in</strong> cases of<br />
unemployment, old age, sickness and disablement, and <strong>in</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r cases of undeserved<br />
want”. 19 A liv<strong>in</strong>g wage, and humane c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s of work 20 are state resp<strong>on</strong>sibilities even<br />
as <strong>the</strong> “state shall regard <strong>the</strong> rais<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> level of nutriti<strong>on</strong> and <strong>the</strong> standard of liv<strong>in</strong>g of<br />
its people and <strong>the</strong> improvement of public health as am<strong>on</strong>gst its primary duties”. 21 In<br />
1978, <strong>the</strong> post-Emergency Parliament <strong>in</strong>troduced an express imperative that <strong>the</strong> “state<br />
shall, <strong>in</strong> particular, strive to m<strong>in</strong>imize <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>equalities <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>come, and endeavour to<br />
elim<strong>in</strong>ate <strong>in</strong>equalities <strong>in</strong> status, facilities and opportunities, not <strong>on</strong>ly am<strong>on</strong>gst <strong>in</strong>dividuals<br />
but also am<strong>on</strong>gst groups of people resid<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> different areas or engaged <strong>in</strong> different<br />
vocati<strong>on</strong>s”. 22<br />
`Scheduled areas’ and `tribal areas’ are marked out for a dist<strong>in</strong>ct status <strong>in</strong> law and <strong>the</strong><br />
C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>; 23 and restricti<strong>on</strong>s <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> sale or transfer of tribal land to n<strong>on</strong>-tribals, and <strong>the</strong><br />
Panchayat (Extensi<strong>on</strong> to Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996, are illustrative of laws that are<br />
aimed at protect<strong>in</strong>g tribal <strong>in</strong>terests.<br />
Those exploited, those excluded from <strong>the</strong> ec<strong>on</strong>omy, those discrim<strong>in</strong>ated aga<strong>in</strong>st, and<br />
those with less than equal capacity to partake <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> polity are deliberately drawn <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong><br />
c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al scheme. The C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> of India is an accessible document, and<br />
reproduc<strong>in</strong>g its provisi<strong>on</strong>s could seem an extravagance. Yet, recent experience <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
work<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> suggests that collective amnesia has clouded <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>text – of<br />
<strong>in</strong>equality, oppressi<strong>on</strong> and <strong>in</strong>clusiveness – that <strong>the</strong> C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> sought to address. If it is<br />
not amnesia, may be it is that <strong>the</strong> C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> is be<strong>in</strong>g re<strong>in</strong>vented to become c<strong>on</strong>s<strong>on</strong>ant<br />
with current priority, and preference, and even prejudice.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> early decades of <strong>the</strong> C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>, <strong>the</strong> welfare state was charged with account<strong>in</strong>g<br />
for those marg<strong>in</strong>alised by <strong>the</strong> processes of development, and those that development did<br />
not reach. It was <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> late seventies and early eighties that <strong>the</strong> Supreme Court devised<br />
public <strong>in</strong>terest litigati<strong>on</strong> (PIL), which was <strong>in</strong> express recogniti<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> chasm that had<br />
come to exist between masses of people and <strong>the</strong>ir rights. So, b<strong>on</strong>ded labour, c<strong>on</strong>tract<br />
15<br />
Article 39(a)<br />
16<br />
Article 39(b)<br />
17<br />
Article 39(c)<br />
18<br />
Article 39(f)<br />
19<br />
Article 41<br />
20<br />
Article 43<br />
21<br />
Article 47<br />
22<br />
Article 38(2). For an exhaustive list of fundamental rights and directive pr<strong>in</strong>ciples, see Parts III and IV of<br />
<strong>the</strong> C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>.<br />
23<br />
Articles 244 and 244-A, and <strong>the</strong> Fifth and Sixth Schedules to <strong>the</strong> C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>.<br />
190
labour, undertrial pris<strong>on</strong>ers, child labour, women <strong>in</strong> custodial <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>s, <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>alised mentally ill, <strong>in</strong>terstate migrant workers, <strong>the</strong> starv<strong>in</strong>g…. became <strong>the</strong><br />
c<strong>on</strong>stituency of <strong>the</strong> court, and <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al text as expanded by <strong>in</strong>terpretati<strong>on</strong><br />
became <strong>the</strong> basis of judicial acti<strong>on</strong>. As executive <strong>in</strong>efficiency and apathy stood revealed,<br />
and as `public <strong>in</strong>terest’ spread itself to reach corrupti<strong>on</strong> and abuse of power <strong>in</strong> high<br />
places, any challenge that <strong>the</strong>re was to <strong>the</strong> court, of hav<strong>in</strong>g departed from its traditi<strong>on</strong>al,<br />
adversarial territory, was marg<strong>in</strong>alised. An irreproachability settled <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> court, with<br />
`social activists’, n<strong>on</strong>-governmental organisati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g envir<strong>on</strong>mental groups,<br />
journalists, lawyers and academics becom<strong>in</strong>g participants <strong>in</strong> this new found space, where<br />
any b<strong>on</strong>a fide pers<strong>on</strong> could take matters of public <strong>in</strong>terest to court, while sidestepp<strong>in</strong>g<br />
complex court procedure.<br />
The expansive understand<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> court’s power to <strong>in</strong>tervene <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> lives of people not<br />
directly before it was essential to re-<strong>in</strong>troduc<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> idea of <strong>the</strong> C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> as an<br />
<strong>in</strong>clusive document <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>text of <strong>the</strong> many who had been forgotten and excluded. The<br />
fluidity of <strong>the</strong> nature of judicial power, however, meant that <strong>the</strong> power grew with<br />
restra<strong>in</strong>ts <strong>on</strong> it that could <strong>on</strong>ly be self-imposed by <strong>the</strong> courts. The `public <strong>in</strong>terest’ was<br />
also a matter for judicial determ<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
In this c<strong>on</strong>text of `public <strong>in</strong>terest’, judicial power and executive n<strong>on</strong>-performance,<br />
noti<strong>on</strong>s of illegality and pragmatism have acquired a range of mean<strong>in</strong>gs. Demoliti<strong>on</strong> of<br />
<strong>the</strong> dwell<strong>in</strong>gs of <strong>the</strong> urban poor, and project displacement have been grist to <strong>the</strong> judicial<br />
mill, and two strands from <strong>the</strong> experience <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>se two areas will serve to expla<strong>in</strong> how<br />
<strong>the</strong>se noti<strong>on</strong>s f<strong>in</strong>d <strong>the</strong>ir place <strong>in</strong> legal and judicial practice.<br />
Illegality<br />
The demoliti<strong>on</strong> of jhuggis <strong>in</strong> Delhi s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> turn of this century illustrates graphically <strong>the</strong><br />
c<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> of illegality and <strong>the</strong> result<strong>in</strong>g exclusi<strong>on</strong>. An abbreviated chr<strong>on</strong>ology of <strong>the</strong><br />
relati<strong>on</strong>ship between law and shelter would <strong>in</strong>clude 1956, when <strong>the</strong> Slum Areas<br />
(Clearance and Improvement) Act was enacted. This law was c<strong>on</strong>ceived as a resp<strong>on</strong>se to<br />
<strong>the</strong> unsanitary and unsafe c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s of hous<strong>in</strong>g, and placed a resp<strong>on</strong>sibility <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> state<br />
to `clear’ or `improve’ such hous<strong>in</strong>g. In 1957, to enable <strong>the</strong> planned development of <strong>the</strong><br />
city, <strong>the</strong> Delhi Development Act was passed. In 1962, <strong>the</strong> Master Plan of Delhi was<br />
devised as required by <strong>the</strong> 1957 statute, which <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong>tegrated hous<strong>in</strong>g schemes for<br />
<strong>the</strong> `ec<strong>on</strong>omically weaker secti<strong>on</strong>s’. In 1990, <strong>the</strong> Master Plan was overhauled. The mass<br />
demoliti<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong> Delhi <strong>in</strong> 1976, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>famous Turkman Gate bulldoz<strong>in</strong>g, are part<br />
of <strong>the</strong> record and <strong>the</strong> lore surround<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Emergency. 24 In 1990, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> brief period that<br />
<strong>the</strong> V.P.S<strong>in</strong>gh government was <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> seat of government, <strong>the</strong>re was an attempt to <strong>in</strong>vest<br />
jhuggi dwellers with a mark of <strong>the</strong>ir residence, <strong>in</strong> recogniti<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong>ir right to be<br />
accounted for by <strong>the</strong> state <strong>in</strong> any hous<strong>in</strong>g or resettlement plan. In 1993, an order of <strong>the</strong><br />
Delhi High Court directed that jhuggi dwellers be<strong>in</strong>g resettled should not be given<br />
24<br />
“Shah Commissi<strong>on</strong>’s F<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs – V: The Wreck<strong>in</strong>g of Delhi” <strong>in</strong> Ec<strong>on</strong>omic and Political Weekly, June 24,<br />
1978, pp.1019-21.<br />
191
leasehold rights but <strong>on</strong>ly a licence, 25 to prevent any transacti<strong>on</strong> of sale or transfer by <strong>the</strong><br />
resettled pers<strong>on</strong>s. Demoliti<strong>on</strong>s occurred sporadically <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1990s, and, with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> limited<br />
commitment that <strong>the</strong> government undertook, resettlement was d<strong>on</strong>e.<br />
It was <strong>in</strong> 2000, while hear<strong>in</strong>g a PIL <strong>on</strong> solid waste disposal <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> metropolises, that <strong>the</strong><br />
Supreme Court struck a lethal blow <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> lives of <strong>the</strong> urban poor. “Large areas of public<br />
land,” <strong>the</strong> court exclaimed, were be<strong>in</strong>g “usurped for private use free of cost” by slum<br />
dwellers. It seemed that it was “slum creati<strong>on</strong>” and not “slum clearance” that was<br />
happen<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Delhi. The “promise of free land, at <strong>the</strong> taxpayers’ cost, <strong>in</strong> place of a<br />
jhuggi” was attract<strong>in</strong>g “land grabbers”. And, <strong>in</strong> words that have acquired <strong>in</strong>famy,<br />
reward<strong>in</strong>g an encroacher <strong>on</strong> public land with an alternative free site was like giv<strong>in</strong>g a<br />
reward to a pickpocket. 26<br />
It was a short hop to <strong>the</strong> November 29, 2002 words of <strong>the</strong> Delhi High Court when it dealt<br />
a body blow to “encroachers” and those who “squatted and trespassed” <strong>on</strong> public land.<br />
“Encroachers and squatters <strong>on</strong> public land should be removed expeditiously without prerequisite<br />
requirement of provid<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>m alternative sites before such encroachment is<br />
removed or cleared,” <strong>the</strong> court decreed. The state had, doubtless, failed <strong>in</strong> its assumed<br />
task of creat<strong>in</strong>g hous<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>the</strong> Ec<strong>on</strong>omically Weaker Secti<strong>on</strong>s (`EWS’) could access,<br />
but that was no reas<strong>on</strong> to “encourage dish<strong>on</strong>esty and violati<strong>on</strong> of law”.<br />
The language of encroachment, trespass and squatt<strong>in</strong>g have replaced altoge<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong><br />
acknowledgment <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Pavement Dwellers case that where <strong>the</strong> urban poor lives is l<strong>in</strong>ked<br />
to <strong>the</strong> capacity to earn and survive. In 1984, even when <strong>the</strong> court did not direct an<br />
embargo <strong>on</strong> forced evicti<strong>on</strong>s, it was moved to observe that, empirically it was possible to<br />
establish, people live <strong>in</strong> slums or pavements because <strong>the</strong>y have work that <strong>the</strong> city offers<br />
<strong>the</strong>m and “<strong>the</strong>re is nowhere else to live”. That <strong>the</strong>y choose a pavement or a slum <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
vic<strong>in</strong>ity of <strong>the</strong>ir work, is determ<strong>in</strong>ed by <strong>the</strong> costs of m<strong>on</strong>ey or time. That “to lose <strong>the</strong><br />
pavement or <strong>the</strong> slum, is to lose <strong>the</strong> job”.<br />
In 1990, when <strong>the</strong> government was not mak<strong>in</strong>g villa<strong>in</strong>s of <strong>the</strong> urban poor, <strong>the</strong> Law<br />
Commissi<strong>on</strong> thought to work out some legislative protecti<strong>on</strong> “to ensure that <strong>the</strong>y are not<br />
evicted without offer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>m an alternative facility unless it is virtually impossible to do<br />
so”. The 138 th Report of <strong>the</strong> Law Commissi<strong>on</strong> recommended enact<strong>in</strong>g a law that would<br />
put <strong>the</strong> brakes <strong>on</strong> forced evicti<strong>on</strong>, while mak<strong>in</strong>g it <strong>in</strong>cumbent <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> “local authority to<br />
provide alternative site, accommodati<strong>on</strong> or facility” to those evicted. But this <strong>in</strong>tent<br />
vanished without a trace when <strong>the</strong> V.P.S<strong>in</strong>gh government fell from electoral grace.<br />
So, <strong>the</strong>re is no law assist<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> urban poor towards legality of any sort. That is not all.<br />
There are many deeds that are d<strong>on</strong>e while evict<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> slum dweller which are not illegal<br />
because <strong>the</strong>re is no law that declares it so, and because of <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>fluence of <strong>the</strong> percepti<strong>on</strong><br />
of illegality of <strong>the</strong> dwell<strong>in</strong>gs and dwellers be<strong>in</strong>g evicted.<br />
25 Civil Writ No. 267 and CM No. 464 of 1993 <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Delhi High Court, cited <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Draft Annual Plan<br />
2000-01 of <strong>the</strong> Municipal Corporati<strong>on</strong> of Delhi, JJ Department, p.8.<br />
26 Almitra H. Patel v. Uni<strong>on</strong> of India (2000) vol 2 Supreme Court Cases p.679 at 685.<br />
192
• Bulldozers and short notices or n<strong>on</strong>e at all, are syn<strong>on</strong>ymous with urban evicti<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
Forced evicti<strong>on</strong>s defy <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al law. Yet, because <strong>the</strong>re is no domestic law<br />
outlaw<strong>in</strong>g bulldoz<strong>in</strong>g and raz<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> ground, and <strong>the</strong>re is no law that prescribes<br />
a process (except where <strong>the</strong> Public Premises Act is <strong>in</strong>voked, where <strong>the</strong>re is at least<br />
a procedure), <strong>the</strong> slum dwellers could wake up any day to demoliti<strong>on</strong>.<br />
• There is no law that imposes a resp<strong>on</strong>sibility <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> demolish<strong>in</strong>g agency to protect<br />
<strong>the</strong> pers<strong>on</strong> and property of <strong>the</strong> slum dweller. This means that loss or damage to<br />
property or pers<strong>on</strong> is hardly ever challenged, when <strong>the</strong>re is any recompense for<br />
<strong>the</strong> loss. 27<br />
• Slum demoliti<strong>on</strong> is a law and order exercise, where <strong>the</strong> `blue berets’ may cord<strong>on</strong><br />
off <strong>the</strong> area and no <strong>on</strong>e, but no <strong>on</strong>e, may be allowed <strong>in</strong>gress to watch <strong>the</strong> way <strong>the</strong><br />
demoliti<strong>on</strong> squad works. A court may even be moved to endorse <strong>the</strong> services of a<br />
retired member of <strong>the</strong> armed forces <strong>in</strong> effect<strong>in</strong>g efficient demoliti<strong>on</strong>. 28<br />
• Demoliti<strong>on</strong> may be carried out as exam<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>s impend, whe<strong>the</strong>r or not <strong>the</strong><br />
resettlement site has <strong>the</strong> basic <strong>in</strong>frastructure <strong>in</strong> place, and whe<strong>the</strong>r or not even a<br />
census of those who stand to lose <strong>the</strong>ir dwell<strong>in</strong>gs has been taken. That is, <strong>the</strong>re is<br />
no law dictat<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>the</strong> state knows <strong>the</strong> costs, losses, numbers and c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s of<br />
<strong>the</strong> affected. And <strong>the</strong>re is no illegality attach<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> derogati<strong>on</strong> from state<br />
obligati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
• It has been noticed, <strong>in</strong> cities around <strong>the</strong> world, that <strong>the</strong> poor settle <strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong>hospitable<br />
sites because <strong>the</strong>y do not attract those who can afford better. 29 They <strong>the</strong>n develop<br />
<strong>the</strong> land <strong>on</strong> which <strong>the</strong>y dwell. When demoliti<strong>on</strong> br<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>the</strong>ir dwell<strong>in</strong>gs down, <strong>the</strong>re<br />
is no law to recognise <strong>the</strong> work <strong>the</strong>y have d<strong>on</strong>e to develop <strong>the</strong> land.<br />
Sometimes it is not <strong>the</strong> n<strong>on</strong>-existence of a law but <strong>the</strong> way it is viewed, <strong>in</strong> fits and starts<br />
with bl<strong>in</strong>d spots <strong>in</strong> between, which dictates what is illegal and what is not. The<br />
Development Act 1957 authorised <strong>the</strong> purchase of land by <strong>the</strong> DDA. That was d<strong>on</strong>e and,<br />
recognis<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> soar<strong>in</strong>g prices of developed land, and “also as a matter of major policy,<br />
<strong>the</strong> Government of India…. Notified for acquisiti<strong>on</strong> about 35,000 acres of land all around<br />
<strong>the</strong> present built up area… The ownership of land by government makes plann<strong>in</strong>g and <strong>the</strong><br />
implementati<strong>on</strong> of plans easier and is imperative for slum clearance, redevelopment and<br />
provisi<strong>on</strong> of community facilities accord<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> accepted standards…” 30 So a plan was<br />
drawn up <strong>in</strong> 1962, overhauled <strong>in</strong> 1990, which, am<strong>on</strong>g o<strong>the</strong>r th<strong>in</strong>gs, promised <strong>in</strong>tegrated<br />
development of z<strong>on</strong>es so that all classes of people f<strong>in</strong>d <strong>the</strong>ir places <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> z<strong>on</strong>es be<strong>in</strong>g<br />
developed. But <strong>the</strong>re was a neglect of hous<strong>in</strong>g for <strong>the</strong> ec<strong>on</strong>omically weak and over<br />
delivery <strong>on</strong> hous<strong>in</strong>g for <strong>the</strong> higher <strong>in</strong>come clients of <strong>the</strong> DDA. 31 Yet, when <strong>the</strong> matter of<br />
27 Meera Bapat, “Bombay’s Pavement Dwellers: C<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g Torment” <strong>in</strong> 1992 Ec<strong>on</strong>omic and Political<br />
Weekly p. 2217.<br />
28 Bombay Envir<strong>on</strong>mental Acti<strong>on</strong> Group v. A.R.Bharati, Writ Petiti<strong>on</strong> No. 305 of 1995 <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Bombay High<br />
Court.<br />
29 Mike Davis, Planet of Slums, 2006, Verso, L<strong>on</strong>d<strong>on</strong> and New York, chapter <strong>on</strong> `Slum Ecology’ at<br />
pp.121-150.<br />
30 Master Plan of Delhi (1962) prepared by <strong>the</strong> Delhi Development Authority and approved by <strong>the</strong> Central<br />
Government, para 6.<br />
31 Jagdish v. DDA Writ Petiti<strong>on</strong> (Civil) No. 5007 of 2002, judgment of S<strong>in</strong>gle Judge of High Court of Delhi<br />
dated July 14, 2006, at paras 45-54.<br />
193
public lands was be<strong>in</strong>g addressed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> courts, it was <strong>on</strong>ly <strong>the</strong> wr<strong>on</strong>gs of <strong>the</strong> slum<br />
dweller that was raised, while <strong>the</strong> failure to follow up <strong>on</strong> appropriati<strong>on</strong> through creat<strong>in</strong>g<br />
hous<strong>in</strong>g stock for <strong>the</strong> ec<strong>on</strong>omically weak was addressed <strong>in</strong> <strong>on</strong>ly <strong>on</strong>e <strong>in</strong>stance. 32<br />
Demoliti<strong>on</strong>, which is premised <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> illegality of <strong>the</strong> slum and its residents, has an<br />
<strong>in</strong>discrim<strong>in</strong>ateness that attends it. When it occurs, <strong>the</strong>refore, it makes no dist<strong>in</strong>cti<strong>on</strong> based<br />
<strong>on</strong> caste or ethnic orig<strong>in</strong>, and, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> irrelevance that is <strong>in</strong>vested <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>se traits of <strong>the</strong> slum<br />
dwellers, it may happen that those who <strong>the</strong> C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> recognises as need<strong>in</strong>g protecti<strong>on</strong><br />
and assistance may fall as victims to <strong>the</strong> bulldozer. Studies and statistics suggest that<br />
those bel<strong>on</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> Scheduled Castes and <strong>the</strong> Scheduled Tribes may, <strong>in</strong> fact, be targets<br />
of demoliti<strong>on</strong> exercises.<br />
A study based <strong>on</strong> a stratified-and-random sample, c<strong>on</strong>ducted by an urban demographer <strong>in</strong><br />
1995, made <strong>the</strong>se f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> five areas <strong>in</strong> Delhi:<br />
Table 1 - Percentage of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe Households <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Study Area<br />
Area Type of settlement Percentage of Sample size<br />
SC/ST households<br />
Nehru Stadium Slum 38.9 490<br />
Govt Flat 6.6 167<br />
Badli-Roh<strong>in</strong>i Slum 36 132<br />
Industrial Area Urban village 31.3 342<br />
Planned sector 10.4 346<br />
Tigri Slum 64.1 413<br />
Resettlement col<strong>on</strong>y 31.7 321<br />
Unauthorised col<strong>on</strong>y<br />
+DDA flats 25.2 127<br />
NOIDA Slum 39.2 372<br />
Urban village 17.5 919<br />
Planned sector 1.8 684<br />
Mayur Vihar Slum 12.1 99<br />
Resettlement col<strong>on</strong>y 37.2 720<br />
Urban village 40.7 253<br />
Unauthorised col<strong>on</strong>y<br />
+DDA flats 3.6 225<br />
Co-op Group Hous<strong>in</strong>g<br />
Societies 0.6 179<br />
Source: Ver<strong>on</strong>ique Dup<strong>on</strong>t, ORSTOM-IEG Household Survey <strong>on</strong> Populati<strong>on</strong> Mobility <strong>in</strong> Delhi<br />
Metropolitan Area, 1995<br />
The Tenth Plan Document of <strong>the</strong> Plann<strong>in</strong>g Commissi<strong>on</strong> admits, at para 1.80, to this be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> general<br />
positi<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> country, and over <strong>the</strong> years: referred to <strong>in</strong> Usha Ramanathan, “Demoliti<strong>on</strong> Drive” <strong>in</strong><br />
Ec<strong>on</strong>omic and Political Weekly, July 2, 2005, p.3607, footnote 15.<br />
32 Jagdish, referred to at FN 31, is a well rounded order, deal<strong>in</strong>g with obligati<strong>on</strong>s, entitlements and equity.<br />
194
In 2001, <strong>the</strong> Census “Data Highlights” <strong>on</strong> slum populati<strong>on</strong>s reck<strong>on</strong>ed that 42.6 milli<strong>on</strong><br />
people dwell <strong>in</strong> slums <strong>in</strong> 640 cities and towns, of whom 7.4 milli<strong>on</strong>, or 17.4 per cent,<br />
reportedly bel<strong>on</strong>ged to <strong>the</strong> Scheduled Castes, and <strong>on</strong>e milli<strong>on</strong>, or 2.4 per cent, bel<strong>on</strong>ged<br />
to <strong>the</strong> Scheduled Tribes. 33<br />
When demoliti<strong>on</strong> is proposed, ordered or carried out, and <strong>the</strong>re is a neuter<strong>in</strong>g of this<br />
<strong>in</strong>formati<strong>on</strong>, <strong>the</strong> effect it has <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe populati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> slum is lost <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> immediacy and opacity that demoliti<strong>on</strong>s br<strong>in</strong>g with it. The<br />
significance of a figure of 0.6% scheduled caste and scheduled tribe households <strong>in</strong> cooperative<br />
group hous<strong>in</strong>g societies, and 3.6% <strong>in</strong> DDA flats is not even <strong>in</strong>vestigated.<br />
Located amidst <strong>the</strong> immiserati<strong>on</strong> and impoverishment that pursues those whose dwell<strong>in</strong>gs<br />
have been demolished, <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al obligati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> state to <strong>the</strong> urban poor, and to<br />
<strong>the</strong> Scheduled Castes and <strong>the</strong> Scheduled Tribes, lies <strong>in</strong> neglect, while <strong>on</strong>e versi<strong>on</strong> of<br />
legality paves <strong>the</strong> path to demoliti<strong>on</strong>.<br />
Pragmatism<br />
Mass displacement to pave <strong>the</strong> way for projects has also encountered legality, and <strong>the</strong><br />
Narmada experience dem<strong>on</strong>strates <strong>the</strong> flexibility that percepti<strong>on</strong>s of priority, and<br />
pragmatism, gives to <strong>the</strong> noti<strong>on</strong> of legality.<br />
Despite <strong>the</strong> large scale of displacement that projects demanded from <strong>the</strong> early decades of<br />
<strong>in</strong>dependence, <strong>the</strong>re was no plan sett<strong>in</strong>g out how <strong>the</strong> displaced would be treated; not until<br />
<strong>the</strong> Nati<strong>on</strong>al Rehabilitati<strong>on</strong> Policy 2003, anyway, which was notified <strong>in</strong> February 2004.<br />
Project authorities acted as <strong>the</strong>y deemed wise, and possible. When <strong>the</strong> stirr<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Narmada valley forced <strong>the</strong> dispossessi<strong>on</strong>, impoverishment and neglect out <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> open,<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>s such as <strong>the</strong> World Bank <strong>in</strong>troduced a requirement that<br />
rehabilitati<strong>on</strong> policies be set <strong>in</strong> place <strong>in</strong> relati<strong>on</strong> to projects that <strong>the</strong>y funded. Policies,<br />
however, do not have <strong>the</strong> b<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g quality that law can be made to possess, and, at best,<br />
<strong>the</strong>y may persuade. However, <strong>the</strong> policy of rehabilitat<strong>in</strong>g those displaced by <strong>the</strong> Sardar<br />
Sarovar Project (SSP) across <strong>the</strong> Narmada was different. The rehabilitati<strong>on</strong> policy was<br />
part of an award made <strong>in</strong> 1979 by a statutory tribunal. Three states that were compet<strong>in</strong>g<br />
for maximiz<strong>in</strong>g benefits and m<strong>in</strong>imiz<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> costs to <strong>the</strong>mselves took <strong>the</strong> issue before an<br />
<strong>in</strong>ter-state water disputes tribunal, which <strong>the</strong>n carved out an award that would b<strong>in</strong>d <strong>the</strong><br />
states of Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat and Maharashtra, leav<strong>in</strong>g someth<strong>in</strong>g over for<br />
Rajasthan. Voices speak<strong>in</strong>g for those to be displaced were <strong>on</strong>ly marg<strong>in</strong>al, and <strong>the</strong>re<br />
would have been little reas<strong>on</strong> to expect, or fear that <strong>the</strong> promises held <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> award would<br />
have to materialise for <strong>the</strong> oustees. The dispute, and its resoluti<strong>on</strong>, was a matter that was<br />
between states, and about which state would pay <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r for <strong>the</strong> privilege of displac<strong>in</strong>g<br />
its people or submerg<strong>in</strong>g its land to get water or electricity.<br />
That calculus changed with <strong>the</strong> entry of n<strong>on</strong>-governmental and research organisati<strong>on</strong>s<br />
<strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> valley, <strong>in</strong>vestigat<strong>in</strong>g and <strong>in</strong>terrogat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> effect of <strong>the</strong> project <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> displaced.<br />
The movement aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> dam, and <strong>the</strong> red-faced stepp<strong>in</strong>g away of <strong>the</strong> World Bank,<br />
added impetus to <strong>the</strong> resistance aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> large scale submergence <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> valley. This<br />
33 Census of India 2001, Metabase and Brief Highlights <strong>on</strong> Slum Populati<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
195
was <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> eighties and <strong>the</strong> early n<strong>in</strong>eties. It wasn’t l<strong>on</strong>g before <strong>the</strong> impossibility of<br />
performance <strong>in</strong> implement<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> rehabilitati<strong>on</strong> clauses <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> tribunal’s award became<br />
obvious. It is <strong>in</strong>structive to see how this problem of impossibility was overcome. The<br />
diluti<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> requirement that <strong>the</strong> oustees should be displaced ahead of submergence<br />
illustrates <strong>the</strong> elasticity of legality.<br />
• The tribunal award had required that rehabilitati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> oustees should be<br />
completed at least 18 m<strong>on</strong>ths before submergence of <strong>the</strong> area where <strong>the</strong>y live and<br />
farm. This would have put <strong>the</strong> <strong>on</strong>us <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> project authorities to ensure that <strong>the</strong><br />
oustees were rehabilitated as a prerequisite to c<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> n=and submergence.<br />
In August 1991, when approached by B.D.Sharma, <strong>in</strong> his capacity as Commissi<strong>on</strong>er of<br />
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes about <strong>the</strong> n<strong>on</strong>-implementati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> tribunal’s<br />
award, a three judge bench of <strong>the</strong> Supreme Court watered down this requirement. “Sardar<br />
Sarovar is an <strong>in</strong>terstate project … f<strong>in</strong>anced by <strong>the</strong> World Bank and assistance … from<br />
some of <strong>the</strong> foreign countries,” <strong>the</strong> court said. “As it is, completi<strong>on</strong> is beh<strong>in</strong>d schedule. It<br />
is, <strong>the</strong>refore, difficult to look for enforcement of what had been c<strong>on</strong>templated wi<strong>the</strong>r <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> agreement or <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> award. While we agree that <strong>the</strong> rehabilitati<strong>on</strong> should be d<strong>on</strong>e as<br />
far as possible <strong>in</strong> a methodical and meticulous way, to enforce terms and c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s<br />
stipulated <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> agreement … may be difficult and may not be beneficial for <strong>the</strong> ultimate<br />
purpose”. So it was directed that “rehabilitati<strong>on</strong> should be so d<strong>on</strong>e that at least six m<strong>on</strong>ths<br />
before (an) area is likely to be submerged, rehabilitati<strong>on</strong> should be complete.” And<br />
clarified that “it is not our <strong>in</strong>tenti<strong>on</strong> to hold up <strong>the</strong> progress of <strong>the</strong> work. On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
hand we would like it to be completed expeditiously so that <strong>the</strong> time lag may not affect<br />
<strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> project. 34 Between 1994, when <strong>the</strong> Narmada Bachao Andolan<br />
went to court, and October 2000 <strong>the</strong>re was an effective, though unstated, stay <strong>on</strong><br />
c<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong>. In <strong>the</strong> court’s order of 18 October, 2000, where it lifted <strong>the</strong> questi<strong>on</strong> mark<br />
that had been hover<strong>in</strong>g over executi<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> project, <strong>the</strong>se two irrec<strong>on</strong>cilable statements<br />
appear:<br />
“There seems to be no hurry <strong>in</strong> tak<strong>in</strong>g steps to effectively rehabilitate <strong>the</strong> Madhya<br />
Pradesh PAFs (Project Affected Families) <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir home state. It is <strong>in</strong>deed surpris<strong>in</strong>g that<br />
even awards to determ<strong>in</strong>e rehabilitati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> respect of six villages out of 33 villages likely<br />
to be affected at 90m dam height, have not been passed.”<br />
And a directi<strong>on</strong> that:<br />
“As <strong>the</strong> Relief and Rehabilitati<strong>on</strong> Subgroup has cleared <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> up to 90m, <strong>the</strong><br />
same can be undertaken immediately. Fur<strong>the</strong>r rais<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> height will be <strong>on</strong>ly pari<br />
passu with <strong>the</strong> implementati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> relief and rehabilitati<strong>on</strong> measures and <strong>on</strong> clearance<br />
by <strong>the</strong> Relief and Rehabilitati<strong>on</strong> Subgroup.” 35<br />
This was after cit<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> government of Gujarat as estimat<strong>in</strong>g that 97% and 100% of <strong>the</strong><br />
dam affected <strong>in</strong> Gujarat and Maharashtra, respectively, were tribals, while <strong>in</strong> Madhya<br />
Pradesh, <strong>the</strong> figure was 30%; and after record<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>tenti<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> government of<br />
34 B.D.Sharma v. Uni<strong>on</strong> of India 1992 Supp SCC 93 at 94 and 95.<br />
35 Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Uni<strong>on</strong> of India (2000) 10 SCC 664 at 769.<br />
196
Gujarat that <strong>the</strong> “tribals <strong>in</strong> large number have resp<strong>on</strong>ded positively to <strong>the</strong> resettlement<br />
package offered by <strong>the</strong> state”. 36<br />
On March 8, 2006, <strong>the</strong> Narmada C<strong>on</strong>trol Authority cleared <strong>the</strong> decks for fur<strong>the</strong>r<br />
c<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> dam to 121m. This permissi<strong>on</strong> to proceed was c<strong>on</strong>tested by <strong>the</strong> NBA<br />
and its c<strong>on</strong>stituents from <strong>the</strong> valley. A group of three M<strong>in</strong>isters, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> M<strong>in</strong>isters<br />
for Water Resources and for Social Welfare found, dur<strong>in</strong>g a brief visit to <strong>the</strong> valley that<br />
rehabilitati<strong>on</strong> seemed far from complete. On March 15, 2005, <strong>the</strong> Supreme Court had<br />
held that <strong>the</strong> dist<strong>in</strong>cti<strong>on</strong> that was be<strong>in</strong>g made between temporary and permanent<br />
submergence was unsusta<strong>in</strong>able both <strong>in</strong> law, be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>c<strong>on</strong>s<strong>on</strong>ant with <strong>the</strong> tribunal award,<br />
and <strong>in</strong> fact, given <strong>the</strong> way water will travel and settle <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> valley, shaped as it is “like an<br />
<strong>in</strong>verted c<strong>on</strong>e”. 37 So those fac<strong>in</strong>g ei<strong>the</strong>r temporary or permanent submergence would<br />
have to be rehabilitated as a prelude to rais<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> height of <strong>the</strong> dam. And <strong>the</strong> directi<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> tribunal award that major s<strong>on</strong>s would be rehabilitated as a separate unit was<br />
reiterated, and <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>trary positi<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> state rejected. In March 2006, <strong>the</strong>re was no<br />
<strong>in</strong>dicati<strong>on</strong> about <strong>the</strong> altered numbers that this 2005 order would <strong>in</strong>evitably have brought<br />
with it.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> midst of an <strong>in</strong>def<strong>in</strong>ite fast <strong>in</strong> Delhi which raised <strong>the</strong> pitch of protest; <strong>the</strong> Modi<br />
government’s aggressive espousal of c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued c<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> and its brand<strong>in</strong>g of those<br />
speak<strong>in</strong>g for rehabilitati<strong>on</strong> before c<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> and those oppos<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> dam altoge<strong>the</strong>r as<br />
enemies; and nati<strong>on</strong>al dailies, especially <strong>the</strong> ‘Indian Express’, remorselessly pursu<strong>in</strong>g an<br />
agenda <strong>the</strong>y had set for <strong>the</strong>mselves, <strong>the</strong> Supreme Court deferred <strong>the</strong> hear<strong>in</strong>g which was to<br />
have occurred <strong>on</strong> 3 April, 2006 to 17 April, 2006. F<strong>in</strong>ally, <strong>on</strong> 8 May, 2006, just before<br />
<strong>the</strong> start of <strong>the</strong> court vacati<strong>on</strong>s, <strong>the</strong> court accepted <strong>the</strong> formula of an Oversight Committee<br />
set up by <strong>the</strong> Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister, which was to report to <strong>the</strong> Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister through <strong>the</strong><br />
M<strong>in</strong>ister of Water Resources. Significantly, <strong>the</strong> report of <strong>the</strong> Group of three M<strong>in</strong>isters, of<br />
which <strong>the</strong> M<strong>in</strong>ister of Water Resources was a part, f<strong>in</strong>ds no menti<strong>on</strong>. And, while <strong>the</strong><br />
Oversight Group would do its “sample checks”: “As at present, we are not <strong>in</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>ed to<br />
restra<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g work of rais<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> height of <strong>the</strong> dam, ” <strong>the</strong> Oversight Group said.<br />
(???Court said ???)<br />
On July 10, 2006, when <strong>the</strong> court had rec<strong>on</strong>vened after <strong>the</strong> vacati<strong>on</strong>, <strong>the</strong> Prime M<strong>in</strong>ster’s<br />
decisi<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> Report of <strong>the</strong> Oversight Group was with <strong>the</strong> court. C<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
dam was suspended anyway because of <strong>the</strong> <strong>on</strong>set of <strong>the</strong> m<strong>on</strong>so<strong>on</strong>s and “<strong>the</strong> shortcom<strong>in</strong>gs<br />
<strong>in</strong> relief and rehabilitati<strong>on</strong> work brought out <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> report can be remedied by accelerated<br />
pace of implementati<strong>on</strong>. It would not be appropriate (<strong>the</strong>refore) to pass any directi<strong>on</strong> or<br />
order at this stage stopp<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> dam which is designed to serve <strong>the</strong><br />
larger public <strong>in</strong>terest.” Hav<strong>in</strong>g thus paraphrased <strong>the</strong> Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister’s decisi<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
report, <strong>the</strong> court adjourned <strong>the</strong> matters to an unspecified date <strong>in</strong> September 2006.<br />
The erosi<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> right to be rehabilitated before c<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> can proceed was, <strong>in</strong> this<br />
episode, accompanied by <strong>the</strong> impunity <strong>in</strong>vested <strong>in</strong> project authorities and states that make<br />
promises that cannot be kept, or that are <strong>in</strong>efficient, or are unm<strong>in</strong>dful that certa<strong>in</strong><br />
36 Id at p.735, para 149.<br />
37 Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Uni<strong>on</strong> of India (2005) 4 SCC 34 at 49.<br />
197
obligati<strong>on</strong>s have devolved up<strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong>m through <strong>the</strong> law. In <strong>the</strong> Narmada episode, <strong>the</strong><br />
escalat<strong>in</strong>g acceptance by <strong>the</strong> court of <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>evitability of n<strong>on</strong>-performance is matched by<br />
its endorsement of dam c<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> as a priority to be assisted over <strong>the</strong> barriers and<br />
roadblocks.<br />
Pragmatism required a retreat from a positi<strong>on</strong> where rehabilitati<strong>on</strong> was a necessary<br />
c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong> for c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued c<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> dam. Sanjay Sangvai’s book, The River and<br />
Life: People’s Struggle <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Narmada Valley, 38 documents <strong>the</strong> game of numbers that <strong>the</strong><br />
state was engaged <strong>in</strong>, <strong>in</strong> count<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> oustees. 39 This was compounded by <strong>the</strong> sleight of<br />
hand by which <strong>the</strong> state <strong>in</strong>troduced a `Special Rehabilitati<strong>on</strong> Package’ (SRP), which was<br />
a mere euphemism for a cash settlement that would replace <strong>the</strong> entitlement to be<br />
rehabilitated. This was c<strong>on</strong>trary to <strong>the</strong> Tribunal award, and allegati<strong>on</strong>s that <strong>the</strong> SRP was<br />
be<strong>in</strong>g foisted <strong>on</strong> an unwill<strong>in</strong>g but choice-less people were fly<strong>in</strong>g fast and furious, but<br />
which <strong>the</strong> state was not even called up<strong>on</strong> to counter.<br />
C<strong>on</strong>trast this with an order of <strong>the</strong> Supreme Court <strong>in</strong> 1986. The court had stayed <strong>the</strong> hand<br />
of <strong>the</strong> government of Gujarat <strong>in</strong> tak<strong>in</strong>g possessi<strong>on</strong> of land that it had acquired <strong>in</strong> an area<br />
that would be submerged by a dam across <strong>the</strong> Karjan river. The government of Gujarat<br />
approached <strong>the</strong> court, ask<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>the</strong>y be allowed to proceed with tak<strong>in</strong>g possessi<strong>on</strong> of<br />
<strong>the</strong> land. “We appreciate <strong>the</strong> anxiety of <strong>the</strong> state government to take possessi<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong><br />
acquired land. We are also aware that <strong>the</strong> land has been acquired for an important public<br />
purpose. But at <strong>the</strong> same time we cannot overlook <strong>the</strong> human problem aris<strong>in</strong>g out of<br />
displacement of large number of tribals and o<strong>the</strong>r pers<strong>on</strong>s bel<strong>on</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g to weaker secti<strong>on</strong>s<br />
<strong>on</strong> account of acquisiti<strong>on</strong> of land.” 40 The court, <strong>the</strong>refore, set out c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s that would<br />
have to be met before <strong>the</strong> state could take over <strong>the</strong> land, which <strong>in</strong>cluded: “alternative land<br />
of equal quality but not exceed<strong>in</strong>g three acres <strong>in</strong> area and if it not possible, <strong>the</strong>n<br />
alternative employment where he should be assured a m<strong>in</strong>imum wage” and “which is not<br />
temporary <strong>in</strong> character”. If, for any reas<strong>on</strong>, <strong>the</strong> state government encounters difficulty <strong>in</strong><br />
meet<strong>in</strong>g this c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>, it was to “pay to <strong>the</strong> head of <strong>the</strong> family at <strong>the</strong> latter’s place of<br />
residence compensati<strong>on</strong> equivalent to m<strong>in</strong>imum wage every fortnight dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> period<br />
alternative land or employment is not provided.” 41 If a dwell<strong>in</strong>g is lost as a c<strong>on</strong>sequence<br />
of be<strong>in</strong>g part of <strong>the</strong> land acquired, “<strong>the</strong> state government will, simultaneously with tak<strong>in</strong>g<br />
possessi<strong>on</strong> of such land, provide alternative dwell<strong>in</strong>g…. So that <strong>the</strong> pers<strong>on</strong> dispossessed<br />
should not be without roof over his head even for a s<strong>in</strong>gle day.” 42 And a social activist<br />
was to be a witness to <strong>the</strong> entire exercise.<br />
The shift away from plac<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> <strong>on</strong>us <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> state and <strong>the</strong> project authorities <strong>in</strong> reck<strong>on</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />
with <strong>the</strong> project affected, and <strong>the</strong> shroud of dispensability cast up<strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> displaced, is a<br />
calculus that pragmatism has brought with it. There is, too, more than a t<strong>in</strong>ge of cynicism,<br />
38 nd<br />
2002:2 editi<strong>on</strong>, Earthcare Books, Mumbai and Calcutta<br />
39<br />
See also, Usha Ramanathan, “Em<strong>in</strong>ent Doma<strong>in</strong>, Protest and <strong>the</strong> Discourse <strong>on</strong> Rehabilitati<strong>on</strong>” <strong>in</strong> MM<br />
Cernea and HM Mathur (eds.), Can Compensati<strong>on</strong> Prevent Impoverishment?, forthcom<strong>in</strong>g, OUP.<br />
40<br />
Karjan Jalasay Yojana Assargrasth Sahkar Ane Sangarsh Samiti v. State of Gujarat 1986 Supp SCC<br />
350.<br />
41<br />
Id at p.352.<br />
42<br />
Ibid.<br />
198
where a n<strong>on</strong>-perform<strong>in</strong>g state is accepted as fact, and <strong>the</strong> project of development as<br />
necessarily claim<strong>in</strong>g its victims.<br />
C<strong>on</strong>clusi<strong>on</strong><br />
This read<strong>in</strong>g of legality and exercise <strong>in</strong> pragmatism is difficult to rec<strong>on</strong>cile with <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>clusive agenda which <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al scheme seems to hold. In <strong>the</strong> development of<br />
Indian c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al law, justiciability – that is, <strong>the</strong> capacity of a court to exercise<br />
jurisdicti<strong>on</strong> – is believed to be <strong>the</strong> divid<strong>in</strong>g l<strong>in</strong>e between enforcement of rights and<br />
rightlessness, and, <strong>the</strong>refore, between an <strong>in</strong>clusive c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al order and <strong>on</strong>e <strong>in</strong> which<br />
many get left out, or left beh<strong>in</strong>d. This is what made PIL more than a judicial adventure.<br />
PIL <strong>in</strong>volved dust<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> cobwebs off many rights; such, for <strong>in</strong>stance, was <strong>the</strong> right<br />
aga<strong>in</strong>st exploitati<strong>on</strong>, where c<strong>on</strong>tract labour, <strong>in</strong>terstate migrant labour and child labour<br />
were drawn <strong>in</strong>to a discourse that brought to life some hardly noticed, even less used,<br />
articles <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>. 43 PIL was devised to prod he executive <strong>in</strong>to activat<strong>in</strong>g laws,<br />
such as <strong>the</strong> B<strong>on</strong>ded Labour (Aboliti<strong>on</strong>) Act 1976 to reach c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al objectives.<br />
Where <strong>the</strong> law fell short, <strong>the</strong> court could rely <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> mandate drawn from <strong>the</strong> C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong><br />
to structure legality to meet <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al imperative. So, before <strong>the</strong> Child Labour<br />
(Prohibiti<strong>on</strong> and Regulati<strong>on</strong>) Act 1986, children as c<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> labour was not<br />
recognised <strong>in</strong> law as be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> hazardous employment; but <strong>the</strong> court read <strong>the</strong> protecti<strong>on</strong> for<br />
children as demanded by <strong>the</strong> C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>, and outlawed <strong>the</strong> employment of children as<br />
child labour. PIL helped <strong>the</strong> court identify c<strong>on</strong>stituencies that had fallen off <strong>the</strong> table<br />
through <strong>the</strong> years and give <strong>the</strong>m c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al recogniti<strong>on</strong>. It is this that gave <strong>the</strong> court<br />
renewed legitimacy, and made it difficult for even <strong>the</strong> detractors of <strong>the</strong> court’s activism to<br />
reproach it.<br />
PIL was a purpose-driven jurisdicti<strong>on</strong>. The relati<strong>on</strong>ship that court acti<strong>on</strong>s had with<br />
legality was often mediated through <strong>the</strong> C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>. Inevitably, <strong>the</strong> relaxed rules of<br />
access, <strong>the</strong> expanded jurisdicti<strong>on</strong>, and <strong>the</strong> procedures unfettered by orthodoxy altered <strong>the</strong><br />
extent of <strong>the</strong> court’s power. The popularity, and <strong>the</strong> press it received, did little to dim this<br />
power. With<strong>in</strong> a decade, this power had seem<strong>in</strong>gly become unassailable. The frequency<br />
with which <strong>the</strong> Article 142 power to do “complete justice” 44 has been <strong>in</strong>voked <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> past<br />
decade and a half, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g while do<strong>in</strong>g that which is not c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>ally provided, 45<br />
and <strong>the</strong> blanket powers that <strong>the</strong> court has assumed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> matter of c<strong>on</strong>tempt 46 are<br />
<strong>in</strong>dicati<strong>on</strong>s of <strong>the</strong> enhanced state of judicial power.<br />
43<br />
Articles 23 and 24<br />
44<br />
Article 142: “(1) The Supreme Court <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> exercise of its jurisdicti<strong>on</strong> may pass such decree or make<br />
such order as is necessary for do<strong>in</strong>g complete justice…”<br />
45<br />
Uni<strong>on</strong> Carbide Corporati<strong>on</strong> v. Uni<strong>on</strong> of India (1991) vol 4 Supreme Court Cases p.584 at 626-627. The<br />
c<strong>on</strong>tenti<strong>on</strong> that <strong>the</strong> Supreme Court cannot override <strong>the</strong> statute and express provisi<strong>on</strong>s of <strong>the</strong> C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> to<br />
quash all crim<strong>in</strong>al cases <strong>in</strong> c<strong>on</strong>necti<strong>on</strong> with <strong>the</strong> Bhopal Gas Disaster was brushed aside as be<strong>in</strong>g a<br />
“hypertechnical” objecti<strong>on</strong>. “The purported c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al plenitude of powers of <strong>the</strong> apex court to ensure<br />
due and proper adm<strong>in</strong>istrati<strong>on</strong> of justice is <strong>in</strong>tended to be co-extensive <strong>in</strong> each case with <strong>the</strong> needs of<br />
justice,” <strong>the</strong> court expla<strong>in</strong>ed, while rely<strong>in</strong>g <strong>on</strong> its Article 142 power to do `complete justice’.<br />
Hav<strong>in</strong>g spoken thus, however, <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> premise that justice should not <strong>on</strong>ly be d<strong>on</strong>e, but should also be seen<br />
to be d<strong>on</strong>e, <strong>the</strong> court did order <strong>the</strong> reopen<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> crim<strong>in</strong>al cases. But <strong>the</strong>re<strong>in</strong> lies a different tale.<br />
46<br />
Zahira Habibullah Sheikh (5) v. State of Gujarat (2006) vol. 3 Supreme Court Cases p.374 is <strong>the</strong> most<br />
recent, and strik<strong>in</strong>g, example.<br />
199
There is a direct relati<strong>on</strong>ship between <strong>the</strong> expansi<strong>on</strong> of judicial power and <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>texts of<br />
legality and pragmatism to which we have adverted. There has been a shift away from <strong>the</strong><br />
courts, with social acti<strong>on</strong> groups and movements turn<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ir attenti<strong>on</strong> to Parliament and<br />
<strong>the</strong> executive <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> enactment, and enforcement, of <strong>the</strong> Right to Informati<strong>on</strong> Act 2005<br />
and <strong>the</strong> Rural Employment Guarantee Act. This could be <strong>in</strong>terpreted as a recogniti<strong>on</strong> of<br />
<strong>the</strong> limits, 47 and limitati<strong>on</strong>s, of judicial acti<strong>on</strong>. It could also be an acknowledgement of<br />
<strong>the</strong> chang<strong>in</strong>g c<strong>on</strong>stituency of <strong>the</strong> court, and <strong>the</strong> fad<strong>in</strong>g focus <strong>on</strong> fur<strong>the</strong>r<strong>in</strong>g an <strong>in</strong>clusive<br />
agenda. As social acti<strong>on</strong> moves <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> political and executive terra<strong>in</strong>, it would be<br />
reas<strong>on</strong>able to expect that <strong>the</strong> relevance of <strong>the</strong> court <strong>in</strong> achiev<strong>in</strong>g social justice will lessen.<br />
Yet, if <strong>the</strong> power to determ<strong>in</strong>e <strong>the</strong> legal and def<strong>in</strong>e <strong>the</strong> pragmatic is not re<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong>, <strong>the</strong><br />
capacity to <strong>in</strong>voke or ignore <strong>the</strong> C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> may c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue its c<strong>on</strong>tentious career. The<br />
next phase of justiciability and rights may have to re-work <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>necti<strong>on</strong>s between<br />
c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al <strong>in</strong>clusiveness and judicial power.<br />
47 See also, <strong>in</strong>terview with Jean Dreze, “Legal Acti<strong>on</strong> has its Limits” <strong>in</strong> Infochange Agenda, October 2006,<br />
which can be found at http://www.<strong>in</strong>fochange<strong>in</strong>dia.org/agenda6_14.jsp<br />
200
C<strong>on</strong>tributors’ Bio-note<br />
Prof. Javeed Alam, Chairman, Indian Council for Social Science Research<br />
Afsan Chowdhury: Currently has <strong>the</strong> Human Rights Chair Colby College, em<strong>in</strong>ent<br />
journalist and scholar {editor Daily Star; Director Panos <strong>South</strong> <strong>Asia</strong>}<br />
Dr. Mahendra Lawoti, Assist Professor, Dept of Political Science, Western Michigan<br />
University, author of Towards a Democratic Nepal (2005)<br />
Dr. Rub<strong>in</strong>a Saigol, lead<strong>in</strong>g sociologist, researcher and writer<br />
Usha Ramanathan, em<strong>in</strong>ent legal researcher<br />
Prof. Pradip Prabhu, Nati<strong>on</strong>al Law School University, Hyderabad, India and a lead<strong>in</strong>g<br />
advocate of <strong>the</strong> rights of <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>digenous peoples.<br />
Tapan Bose, Secretary General SAFHR<br />
Prof. Jayadeva Uyangoda, Dept. of Political Science, Colombo University & Director,<br />
Social Sciences Associati<strong>on</strong>, Sri Lanka<br />
Fara Hannifa, Member Muslim Peace Secretariat, Sri Lanka<br />
Irshad Hussa<strong>in</strong>, Historian, writer and a m<strong>in</strong>ority rights activist, Pakistan<br />
Shahid Fiaz, <strong>Asia</strong> Foundati<strong>on</strong>, Islamabad, Pakistan , a peace activist and human rights<br />
defender<br />
Rita Manchanda, scholar, author and Director Research, SAFHR.<br />
201