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The National Coordination of EU Policy in Latvia 91 governments, the Ministry of Regional Development and Local Government is involved, as is the Union of Local Governments, but there is no formal representation of the regions. Second, its limited experience and the rather abstract terms in which its strategic ambitions have been defined have the consequence that Latvia is reactive to EU initiatives rather than bringing forward proposed actions of its own. Third, the presence of a group of highly skilled EU specialists has worked to isolate the administration from the political level. Due to frequent changes in government, politicians have not been EU specialists and have relied to a large degree on their officials. Explaining the system Two moments have been decisive in shaping Latvia’s system for coordinating EU policy. The first, in 1997/98, concerned the sorting by the Union of the candidate states into two groups. Latvia’s listing among the states that had made less progress was interpreted as a signal that its coordination system needed to be improved. In response, the government of G. Krasts (1997–1998) acted to transfer direct responsibility for coordination to the PM, in order to enable Latvia to meet the challenges of accession — mainly, implementation of the acquis — and to catch up with the first group. The second critical juncture was accession, which required an overhaul of the coordination system to manage the far more exacting and divergent re - quirements. In its response to each, Latvia learned from the experience of how other member states managed the demands respectively of pre-accession and full membership, but did not go so far as to adopt particular models. Both critical junctures arose from external pressures. Indeed, external factors in the form of functional pressures were important in shaping Latvia’s system for the coordination of EU policy during pre-accession and after 1 May 2004. For example, in the late 1990s, pressure from the EU, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (WB) supplied the main motivation for undertaking reform of the administration. The aim was to create the administrative capacity necessary for the adoption of the acquis of both the EU and WB. 17 So influential was the role of international donors and technical experts, that national ownership was threatened at times. 17 Reinholde I. Policy Transfer in Public Administration: How it Works in Practice. Viešoji Politika Ir Administravimas, no. 16, 2006, pp. 53–65.
92 Ivo Rollis Latvia's System for the National Coordination of EU Policy after accession to the EU (2004 – present) European Council Prime Minister -------------------- Special Adviser in EU Affairs European Affairs Office* Council of Ministers National Positions European Affairs Committe in Parliament Cabinet of Ministers Council of Senior Officials COREPER Instructions Ministry of Foreign Affairs Embassy in EU Working groups of the Council of Ministers Initial positions and instructions, amendments Line ministries Social partners Working groups and Committees of European Commission * The EAO operated from January 2004 and closed in February 2005, following which the MFA undertook its functions.
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The National Coordination of EU Policy in Latvia 91<br />
governments, the Ministry of Regional Development and Local Government<br />
is involved, as is the Union of Local Governments, but there is no formal<br />
representation of the regions. Second, its limited experience and the rather<br />
abstract terms in which its strategic ambitions have been defined have<br />
the consequence that Latvia is reactive to EU initiatives rather than bringing<br />
forward proposed actions of its own. Third, the presence of a group of<br />
highly skilled EU specialists has worked to isolate the administration from<br />
the political level. Due to frequent changes in government, politicians have<br />
not been EU specialists and have relied to a large degree on their officials.<br />
Explaining the system<br />
Two moments have been decisive in shaping Latvia’s system for coordinating<br />
EU policy. The first, in 1997/98, concerned the sorting by the Union<br />
of the candidate states into two groups. Latvia’s listing among the states<br />
that had made less progress was interpreted as a signal that its coordination<br />
system needed to be improved. In response, the government of G. Krasts<br />
(1997–1998) acted to transfer direct responsibility for coordination to the<br />
PM, in order to enable Latvia to meet the challenges of accession — mainly,<br />
implementation of the acquis — and to catch up with the first group. The<br />
second critical juncture was accession, which required an overhaul of the<br />
coordination system to manage the far more exacting and divergent re -<br />
quirements. In its response to each, Latvia learned from the experience of<br />
how other member states managed the demands respectively of pre-accession<br />
and full membership, but did not go so far as to adopt particular models.<br />
Both critical junctures arose from external pressures. Indeed, external<br />
factors in the form of functional pressures were important in shaping Latvia’s<br />
system for the coordination of EU policy during pre-accession and after<br />
1 May 2004. For example, in the late 1990s, pressure from the EU, the<br />
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (WB) supplied the main<br />
motivation for undertaking reform of the administration. The aim was to<br />
create the administrative capacity necessary for the adoption of the acquis of<br />
both the EU and WB. 17 So influential was the role of international donors<br />
and technical experts, that national ownership was threatened at times.<br />
17<br />
Reinholde I. Policy Transfer in Public Administration: How it Works in Practice. Viešoji<br />
Politika Ir Administravimas, no. 16, 2006, pp. 53–65.