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The National Coordination of EU Policy in Latvia 95 Latvia’s priorities for EU membership were defined in 2006 for the 2007–2013 period. 21 The existing priority document was based on conclusions drawn from consultations with society and was supposed to initiate full use of opportunities provided by EU membership. Nevertheless, the document contains a very wide scope of priorities and at the same time does not settle success indicators that would allow for the evaluation of Latvia’s performance in achieving settled goals. Similarly, results of implementation of settled priorities for the 2007–2013 period have not been formally evaluated. Priorities and interests for national EU policy for the 2014–2020 period have not yet been defined (except for the EU multiannual budget 2014–2020), but interrelation with other national priority documents, such as the National Development Plan 2014–2020, is not predetermined. However, despite possible first impressions of the country’s overall passivity in EU decision making, Latvia has been active, and in many cases successful, in making sure the final outcome takes into account the country’s demands. This has especially been the case in the areas of budget and Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), as well as energy and environment. For instance, Latvia’s active position on the EU budget review was deter mined by the fact that Latvia is one of the poorest EU member states and thus sees EU funds as a means for achieving EU average income levels. Latvia’s active position on the CAP was defined by the strong farmers’ lobby. Latvia’s active position on energy and environment issues was determined by Latvia’s specific interests in this field: the country is dependent on Russia’s energy, the Baltic electricity market is isolated from the rest of Europe, and the country wants to secure emission quotas that do not limit economic growth. Among other priority issues for Latvia have been support for EU enlargement, EU relations with eastern neighbours, and the Services Directive. 22 If countries were to be classified on each of the EU policy issues as “policy takers”, “policy killers” or “policy drivers”, depending on their particular position and level of activity 23 , one would recognize that Latvia has been a policy taker (in some cases also policy maker) in areas such as the Internal Market, Freedom, Security and Justice and Lisbon Strategy, policy 21 Latvia‘s EU membership — basic principles, goals, priorities and action 2007–2013. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Report, Cabinet of Ministers, 2006. 22 Akule D. The EU New Member States as Agenda Setters in the Enlarged European Union. Latvia. EuPI — European Policies Initiative, Open Society Institute — Sofia, Country Report, 2009. 23 Ibid.
96 Ivo Rollis taker in minority integration and citizenship issues, policy driver in energy and climate issues, policy driver (and in certain cases also policy killer) in the Budget review and the CAP, and policy driver and policy taker in EU foreign policy, enlargement and institutional issues. Assessing the system and challenges The performance of Latvia’s national EU coordination system was most effective during pre-accession, where its implementation record was exceptional. In the face of intense external pressure, which called for EU matters to be prioritized, the system was very effective. The coordination system ensured regular, timely, precise and effective work in conditions of intensity and pressure. A direct vertical link between the Cabinet and expert groups affected by the CSO, and monthly meetings of the EIC, was key to its success. 24 Institutional changes and a loss of key personnel to EU institutions, as well as the private sector, at accession, had a negative effect at a time when demands on Latvia increased. Despite its experience during pre-accession, where it was effective at preparing and negotiating positions, and its management of communication between national officials and EU institutions, the MFA has found it difficult as a line ministry to play a central national EU policy coordinating role. This has given rise to the concern that the positions advanced by the Latvian representative in Brussels are not sufficiently well prepared or robust. Some observers have also argued that the CSO has become less well informed since Latvia’s accession, due to the weakness of the MFA’s coordinating capacity. 25 Other weaknesses have become evident at the system level since accession. Transparency and accountability have been a problem — the government’s responsibilities to Parliament notwithstanding. At the political level, meanwhile, there is limited interest in the day-to-day work of the EU. In addition, there is little evidence, crucial for a small state with limited EU experience, of established relations with other member states or EU institutions. One should also mention a number of issues disturbing the 24 The Practical Aspects for involvement of Latvia in the EU Institutional System. Eirokonsultants Ltd, Riga, 2002. 25 EU-8 Public Sector Capacity in the EU 8. Report On Strategic Planning and Policy Management in Lithuania and Latvia. Background Paper. Poverty Reduction and Economic Management unit. Europe and Central Asia, World Bank, September 2006.
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96<br />
Ivo Rollis<br />
taker in minority integration and citizenship issues, policy driver in energy<br />
and climate issues, policy driver (and in certain cases also policy killer) in<br />
the Budget review and the CAP, and policy driver and policy taker in EU<br />
foreign policy, enlargement and institutional issues.<br />
Assessing the system and challenges<br />
The performance of Latvia’s national EU coordination system was most<br />
effective during pre-accession, where its implementation record was exceptional.<br />
In the face of intense external pressure, which called for EU matters<br />
to be prioritized, the system was very effective. The coordination system<br />
ensured regular, timely, precise and effective work in conditions of intensity<br />
and pressure. A direct vertical link between the Cabinet and expert<br />
groups affected by the CSO, and monthly meetings of the EIC, was key to its<br />
success. 24 Institutional changes and a loss of key personnel to EU institutions,<br />
as well as the private sector, at accession, had a negative effect at a time when<br />
demands on Latvia increased. Despite its experience during pre-accession,<br />
where it was effective at preparing and negotiating positions, and its management<br />
of communication between national officials and EU institutions,<br />
the MFA has found it difficult as a line ministry to play a central national<br />
EU policy coordinating role. This has given rise to the concern that the positions<br />
advanced by the Latvian representative in Brussels are not sufficiently<br />
well prepared or robust. Some observers have also argued that the CSO has<br />
become less well informed since Latvia’s accession, due to the weakness of<br />
the MFA’s coordinating capacity. 25<br />
Other weaknesses have become evident at the system level since<br />
accession. Transparency and accountability have been a problem — the<br />
government’s responsibilities to Parliament notwithstanding. At the political<br />
level, meanwhile, there is limited interest in the day-to-day work of the<br />
EU. In addition, there is little evidence, crucial for a small state with limited<br />
EU experience, of established relations with other member states or EU<br />
institutions. One should also mention a number of issues disturbing the<br />
24<br />
The Practical Aspects for involvement of Latvia in the EU Institutional System. Eirokonsultants<br />
Ltd, Riga, 2002.<br />
25<br />
EU-8 Public Sector Capacity in the EU 8. Report On Strategic Planning and Policy Management<br />
in Lithuania and Latvia. Background Paper. Poverty Reduction and Economic Management<br />
unit. Europe and Central Asia, World Bank, September 2006.
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