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DIPLOMACY ДИПЛОМАЦИЯ

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RESPONSIBILITY TO

RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: THE CONTINUING POST-COLONIAL WESTERN... Lack of morality The NATO head when intervened to Kosovo, said “we must stop the violence and bring an end to the humanitarian catastrophe now taking place in Kosovo. We have a moral duty to do so”. 28 Cassese too, states: “my answer is that from an ethical viewpoint resort to armed force was justified” 29 It can get hard arguing for the inaction of SC in such circumstances. When there is a distinction between law and morality, or better said, when there are unfortunate circumstances in which terrible dilemmas must be faced and imperative political and moral considerations appear to leave no choice but to act outside the law, people will start losing faith in the legitimacy of the law. The authorization would no longer be legitimate. That is exactly what has been happening since Kosovo and also Iraq invasion by US and UK in 2003. The arguments made by international lawyers mentioned earlier 30 in support of intervention, share a certainty about the moral, ethical and humanitarian imperatives that justify the military action. The legality of the action, however, is missing in most of them. R2P takes the first step in legitimizing other states’ military assistance when needed – but it does not make it legal. The gap between legitimacy and legality is not bridged and nor is morality added to the laws of the use of force. R2P in practice Putting the scholarly debates and literature aside, it is crucial to examine the state practice since 2005, and how R2P helped the International Community in times of conflicts. Libya is considered to be the first case in which R2P was used and cited in the SC’s resolution 1973, 31 authorizing a military intervention. Muammar Gaddafi, the president of Libya at the time, was committing “gross and systematic violation of human rights” 32 against its civilian population. Resolution 1970 on 26 February was unanimously adopted and demanded an immediate ceasefire in Libya and imposed a ban on all flights in the country’s airspace. 33 This resulted in a change of regime in Libya. Actions taken by NATO made things complicated in the battlefield. Targeting fleeing troops that posed no immediate threat to civilians; targeting of civilian locations; and openly supporting the opposition were facts that made the line between the objective of protecting Libyan civilians living in Benghazi and the objective of overthrowing the regime blurred. 34 Some States now allege that R2P was a ‘smokescreen’ for regime change, and voiced discomfort with the SC’s selective application of this concept when it was used in a ‘politically expedient’ manner by powerful States, undermining its force in international law. 35 That being said, it is submitted that R2P in Libya was not a complete failure. Whether the International Community’s intervention led to a regime change or not, lives were saved in Libya. In 2011, Syria’s conflict was brought up to the SC, invoking R2P for the purpose of an 28 Supra note 16. Pg 160. 29 Supra note 29. Pg. 25. 30 Supra note 23. 31 Security Council Resolution 1973, Libya, (17 March 2011), available from http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/ pdf/pdf_2011_03/20110927_110311-UNSCR-1973.pdf 32 Ibid. pg. 1. 33 “Mission Statement”. United Nations: Office of the special adviser on the prevention of genocide. Retrieved 2015- 11-07 34 Nasser-Eddine, Minerva. "How R2P failed Syria." Flinders Journal of History and Politics 28 (2012): 16. 35 Alex J. Bellamy, The Responsibility to Protect and the Problem of Regime Change. EInternational Relations. 27 September 2011. Retrieved at: http://www.e-ir.info/2011/09/27/the-responsibility-to-protect-and-the-problemofregime-change/ DIPLOMACY 18/2016 207

RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: THE CONTINUING POST-COLONIAL WESTERN... authorization to intervene militarily. 36 It led to China’s and Russia’s veto, stating that: “R2P has been abused by the US as a pretext for "regime change", more particularly in the case of Libya. In short, “the failure to reach a consensus to respond to the situation in Syria, in which crimes against humanity have been widely documented, is a failure of the Security Council’s responsibility to protect the Syrian population”. 37 Moreover, there was strong evidence of war crimes and possible crimes against humanity committed by Israel against Palestinian territories in 2014. Studies were done by human rights NGO’s like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, suggesting the breach of international law by Israel. 38 Along with the UN fact finding mission, the Goldstone report, which later on retracted its claim (arguably due to the political pressure) accused Israel of targeting the civilian population and committing war crimes in violation of international law. None of these were followed by the International Community’s military actions or the invocation of R2P in any manner. Conclusion Ultimately, after discussing the concept of humanitarian intervention followed by the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) Doctrine in 2005, this paper has questioned the legal basis of R2P coming to the conclusion that the language used in this document is rather vague and uncertain as to whom has the right to protect a nation and when. Then the lack of political will, and the issue of Security Council’s deadlock was criticized, and it was argued that R2P too, fails to resolve the SC’s deadlock in times of need and hence does not guarantee international action on behalf of States in times of need. The lack of morality sensed in the R2P doctrine was briefly discussed and finally, R2P was shortly assessed through the case studies of Libya, Syria and Israel. The gap between legitimacy and the legality of such an action is still not bridged. R2P can help the International Community increase the security and stability of the world, but it can also be used by the hegemons to justify their own political actions. International community should keep cooperating and looking for ways to ensure that there is universal respect for human rights all over the world. There are already mechanisms in place to react to violations of human rights done by States to their populations. The international community should keep relying on United Nations Charter for collective self-defense and/or the UN deployed troops to stabilize regions, instead of trying to legitimize unilateral actions for R2P. Bibliography 1. Alex J. Bellamy, The Responsibility to Protect and the Problem of Regime Change. EInternational Relations. 27 September 2011. Retrieved at: http://www.e-ir.info/2011/09/27/the-responsibility-to-protect-and-the-problemofregime-change/ 2. Arbour, Louise. "The responsibility to protect as a duty of care in international law and practice." Review of International Studies 34.03 (2008): 447-448. 3. Cassese, Antonio. "Ex iniuria ius oritur: are we moving towards international legitimation of forcible humanitarian countermeasures in the world community?." European Journal of International Law 10.1 (1999): 23-30. 208 36 “Security Council Fails to Adopt Draft Resolution Condemning Syria’s Crackdown on Anti-Government Protestors, Owing to Veto by Russian Federation, China”. United Nations Meeting Covering and Press Releases. 4 October 2011. Retrieved at: http://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10403.doc.htm 37 “UN Security Council Fails to Uphold its Responsibility to Protect in Syria”. ICRtoP. 7 October 2011. Retrieved at: http://icrtopblog.org/2011/10/07/un-security-council-fails-to-uphold-its-responsibility-to-protect-in-syria/ 38 “Gaza 'Black Friday': Cutting edge investigation points to Israeli war crimes in Rafah”. Amnesty International. 29 July 2015, retrieved at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/07/gaza-cutting-edge-investigation-rafah/ “Israel: In-Depth Look at Gaza School Attacks”. Human Rights Watch. 11 September 2014, retrieved at: https:// www.hrw.org/news/2014/09/11/israel-depth-look-gaza-school-attacks ДИПЛОМАЦИЯ 18/2016

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    18/2016 Октомври-Декем

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    CONTENTS Contents INTERVIEW The Eur

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    ЕВРОПЕЙСКИЯТ СЪЮЗ

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    СТРАТЕГИИ ЗА СЪЗДА

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    СЛОВАШКОТО ПРЕДСЕД

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    РОЛЯТА НА МЕЖДУНАР

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    РОЛЯТА НА МЕЖДУНАР

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    РОЛЯТА НА МЕЖДУНАР

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    САЩ КАТО ВЪЗХОДЯЩА

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    18/2016 October/December DOCENDO DI

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    THE EUROPEAN UNION IS A WEALTH THAT

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    STRATEGIC EQUILIBRIUM IN THE BLACK

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