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Kelembagaan Transportasi

Pengantar Kelembagaan

Miming Miharja, Ph.D.


Definisi Kelembagaan (1)

• Institution refers to rule of the game or the humanly

devised constraints that shape human interactions in a

society (Clingermayer and Feiock, 2001).

• Institutions serve to guide individual behavior, reduce

uncertainty, and stabilize public choices that would

otherwise be even more turbulent then they are. In this

sense, institutions produce more predictable rules of the

game and therefore tend to reduce decision transaction

cost (Amin and Thrift, 1995).


Definisi Kelembagaan (2)

• Institutions are broadly defined as systems of rules,

either formal or informal (soft or hard), and those rules

define the boundaries and interaction within/across

institutions.

• Institutions are also likely to be organizations; the

physical embodiment of an institution, that is, people

who carry out a particular set of activities.


Definisi Kelembagaan (3)

• The term ‘institution' is also used to refer to many

different types of entities including organizations as well

as the rules, norms, and strategies used to structure

patterns of interaction within and across

organizations.

• “While the buildings in which organized entities

located are quite visible, institutions themselves are

usually invisible.” (Ostrom, 1990, p.822-823)


What makes Institutions?

Roles/

Responsibilitie

s/Functions

Planning,

Regulation, Service

provision,

Monitoring,

Financing, etc.

Drivers/

Enablers

Policy, Plan, Act,

Rule, Program

People/Actors

agency, service

providers,

organizations,

individuals, etc.


Defining Governance (1)

• Governance is a process that brings together actors from the public

and the private sphere to steer (parts of) societies by a variety of

mechanisms that include institutions, but also partnerships,

networks, belief systems, etc. (Biermann et al., 2009)

• Institutions is a part and parcel of the concept of Governance

• 6 dimensions of Governance: Accountability, Transparency,

Productive relationships, Advocacy, Clarity of Purpose,

Responsiveness

Discussion: How are we faring on these dimensions in our present system

of urban transport governance today?


Defining Governance (2)

• Create a policy and vision, framework to ensure

cities adopt a sustainable path of growth

• Provide funds for the cities to implement this

vision by physical infrastructure and capacity

creation, maintenance and constant

improvement


Defining Governance (3)

• Regulate the sector to ensure discipline, order,

efficiency, travel safety, good health and

environment, public spaces and liveability

• Plan for public transport and other ‘clean, green

and high quality’ mobility services and facilities

• Set fares, standards, quality norms, etc.


Tipologi Kelembagaan

• Williamson (2000), an institutional economist,

provides a typology as a framework for analyzing

institutions and the ways in which they may impact

decisions and behavior, both positively and

negatively (Stough, 2004). Williamson views

institutions as taking one of four forms: informal,

formal, governance, and resource allocation/

employment related.


• Informal institutions

Informal institutions are deeply embedded values,

norms, customs, and traditions. These are powerful

conditioners of behavior but change only very slowly.

However, when change does occur in an informal

institution, behavior changes rapidly and profoundly.

One could argue that this change was brought on only

over a long period of 20 – 30 years.


• Formal institutions

Formal institutions are Williamson’s second category.

These rules are codified as laws, regulations, and

administrative orders, and include for example, such

things as property rights, judicial orders, and

administrative statutes. Formal institutions change

more quickly than informal ones, but still over fairly

long periods such as decades unless there are radical

changes in the environment within which the rules or

institutions apply.


• Governance

Governance is Williamson’s third category. In this level,

institutions change occurs relatively fast, often

measured in years as opposed to decades. Governance

institutions are rules minor laws, administrative orders,

regulations, and policy directives that are used to

change how government and organizations that involve

governance such as planning and zoning board conduct

business and transaction with other actors and agents.


• Resources allocation/employment related institutions

These fourth level institutions are the action and behavior pattern of

diversity of actors in the decision environment ranging from

government agencies to firms and to non-profit associations, e.g.

neighborhood organizations. Institutions in this level are about

allocating resources directly related to near-term productivity and

operational outcomes. These institutions are changing continuously

because they have highly distributes and varied consequences.

However, the consequences at the societal level are quite small and

often relatively insignificant in terms of long-run outcomes. They

involve decisions and actions about production, delivery, and resources

acquisition and use, and process and occur in a context measured in

days, weeks, and months.


Pendekatan dalam Ilmu Kelembagaan

• Historical approach

• Rational approach

• Sociological approach


Historical approach

• Institutions as

– “formal and informal procedures, routines, norms,

and conventions embedded in the organizational

structure of the polity or political economy” or the

state (p. 938)

– Organizations and the rules or conventions

promulgated by formal as well as informal

organizations

– E.g. constitutions, regulations, bureaucratically

standard operating procedures


• Institutions as contextual structure

Historical approach

– Institutions ossify overtime and shape the actors’ behavior in the long run

– Cross-national/regional comparisons

• Institutions are integrated in politics

– Asymmetric power relations: institutions distribute power unevenly across social groups,

– Institutions are selective: it gives disproportionate access to actors in the decisionmaking

process

– Conflicts are important selection mechanism

• Institutions as historical context underlying results of action

– Distinctive outcomes: the same collective action will generate different results in

different places, their effect will be mediated by institutions as the contextual features

of a given situation which are often inherited from the past

– Path dependence: institutions are seen as relatively persistent features of the historical

landscape and one of the central factors pushing historical development along a set of

“paths” (trajectories)

– Unintended consequences: institutions are historically given, affect behavior

inefficiently, often condition actors to behave unintentionally


• Assumptions:

Rational choice approach

– actors have a fixed set of preferences or tastes

– actors as as utillity maximizers: they behave entirely instrumentally so as to maximize the attainment

of these preferences

– actors behave in a highly strategic manner that presumes extensive calculation: canvassing all

possible options to select those conferring maximum benefit

• Institutions minimize the costs of exchange: they reduce the transaction costs of undertaking

the same “making deals” or collective decision-making activity without

– In political realm, institutions are devices created by the relevant actors to resolve a series of

collective action dilemmas: e.g prisoner’s dilemmas, the tragedy of the commons

• Institutions structure actors’ interactions, limiting the range and sequence of alternatives on

the choice-agenda or by providing information and enforcement mechanisms that reduce

uncertainty about the corresponding behavior of others. E.g. zoning regulation

• Institutions are instrumental and created through actors’ strategic calculation: institutions

revolves around voluntary agreement by the relevant actors; institution is subject to a

process of competitive selection; it will survive as long as providing more benefits to the

actors than alternate institutional form. E.g. congressional voting rules, criteria of presidential

candidates


Sociological approach

• Assumptions:

– Individuals as utility satisficers: the choice of a course of action depends on the

interpretation of a situation; Individuals seek to define and express their identity in

socially appropriate ways

– Bounded rationality: individuals’ behavior is not fully strategic but bounded by their own

worldview

• Institutions as culture, including, not just formal rules, procedures or norms, but the symbol

systems, cognitive scripts, and moral templates that provide the “frames of meaning” guiding

human action

• Institutions are taken-for-granted to avoid scrutiny: Institutions are seen as culturally-specific

practices, akin to the myths and ceremonies devised by many societies, and assimilated into

organizations as a result of transmission of cultural practices

– Bureaucratic practices

• Institutions provide the cognitive scripts, categories and models to interpret others’ behavior

• Institutions assign role, meaning, value, image to actors

• Institutions are social construction: there is interactive and mutually-constitutive relationship

between institutions and individual action/ behavior; individual recognizes as well as

responds with institutions

• The logic of appropriateness: institution develops to enhance the social legitimacy of the

actors’ behavior


• In political science: reaction to behavioral approaches

• Institutions play role in collective action through affecting the

behavior of individuals: calculus approach vs cultural approach

• Calculus approach:

– Individuals as utillity maximizers: seek to maximize the attainment of a

set of goals given by a specific preference function

– Individuals as strategic actors: canvassing all possible options to select

those conferring maximum benefit

– Institutions are instrumental and created through this strategic

calculation

– Institutions provide actors with greater/ lesser certainty about the

present and future behavior of other actors

– Institutions provide information relevant to the behavior of other,

enforcing mechanisms for agreements, penalties for defection etc

– Institutions are created to minimize the costs of exchange


• Cultural approach

– Individuals as utility satisficers: the choice of a course of

action depends on the interpretation of a situation rather

than on purely instrumental calculation

– Individuals as rationally bounded actors: their behavior is

not fully strategic but bounded by their own worldview

– Institutions provide moral or cognitive templates for

interpretation and action

– Institutions affect identities, self-images and preferences

of the actors

– Institutions are collectively constructed and taken-forgranted

to avoid scrutiny


• Are institution and organization

interchangeable?

• What does institution mean to planning?


Referensi institusionalis

• Ernest R. Alexander is professor emeritus of urban planning at the University of

• Wisconsin-Milwaukee, and is principal in APD-Alexander Planning & Design,

• Tel-Aviv. His research interests cover planning processes and institutions, focusing on

• rationality and decision-making, organizations and coordination, evaluation and

• implementation. His papers have appeared in numerous journals and he is the author

• of Approaches to Planning: Introducing Current Planning Theories, Concepts and

• Issues (2nd ed., 1992) and How Organizations Act Together: Interorganizational

• Coordination in Theory and Practice (1995). His academic appointments include a

• Fulbright grant to Colombia, a visiting professorship at the Technion-Israel Institute of

• Technology, and a fellowship in the Amsterdam Centre for Metropolitan Studies at the

• University of Amsterdam. He has been consultant to public agencies (including the city

• of Development and the Israel Planning Administration) on policy and organizational

• issues and plan evaluation.


• John Forester is professor and past chair of the Department of City and Regional

• Planning at Cornell University. His most recent books are The Deliberative Practitioner

• (MIT Press, 1999) and Israeli Planners and Designers: Profiles of Community-Builders

• (SUNY Press, 2001, co-edited with Raphaël Fischler and Deborah Shmueli). His bestknown

• publications are Planning in the Face of Power (University of California, 1989) and

• (with Norman Krumholz) Making Equity Planning Work: Leadership in the Public Sector

• (Temple University Press, 1990). Forester studied at the University of California at

• Berkeley where he received his B.S and M.S in mechanical engineering and his MCP and

• PhD in city and regional planning. He has taught at the University of California, Santa

• Cruz and, since 1978, at Cornell University. In 1993–1994, he was a Lady Davis visiting

• professor at the Faculty of Town Planning at the Technion in Haifa, Israel. He has directed

• the undergraduate Program in Urban and Regional Studies, served briefly as associate

• dean of the College of Architecture, Art, and Planning, and served as the chairperson of

• the executive committee of Cornell’s Program in Ethics and Public Life.


• Patsy Healey is professor Emerita of Town and Country Planning and director of the

• Centre for Research in European Urban Environments at the University of Newcastle. Her

• research career began with a study of the introduction of ideas about urban planning into

• the dynamic development conditions of Venezuela and Colombia in the 1960s and 1970s.

• Since then, she has examined the role of development plans in spatial planning systems,

• the interaction between planning regulation and property development systems, the various

• dimensions of urban regeneration processes, and most recently, new approaches to

• spatial strategy emerging across Europe. She has published extensively. Her most recent

• books are Collaborative Planning (1997, London, Macmillan), Making Strategic Spatial

• Plans: Innovation in Europe (1997, London, UCL Press, with Khakee, Motte and

• Needham), Planning, Governance and Spatial Strategy in Britain (2000, London,

• Macmillan, with Vigar, Hull and Healey), and Urban Complexity and Spatial Strategies

• (2006, London, Rouledge) Urban Governance, Institutional Capacity and Social Milieux

• (2001, Ashgate, with Cars, Madanipour and de Magalhaes).


• Seymour J. Mandelbaum is professor emeritus of city planning in the Department of City

• and Regional Planning at the University of Pennsylvania. He received his BA from Columbia

• and his PhD at Princeton. He is primarily interested in the formation and development of

• human communities, the moral orders which shape these communities and the flows of

individuals

• and information through them. Dr. Mandelbaum is editor of the Gordon and Breach

• international series of case studies under the title Cities and Regions: Planning, Policy and

• Management. He is the editor of Explorations in Planning Theory and serves on the editorial

• boards of the Journal of Planning Education, Journal of Architectural and Planning

• Research, The Responsive Community, Journal of Planning Literature, and Town Planning

• Review. For several years Professor Mandelbaum served as Chair of the ACSP Conference

• Committee. His latest book is Open Moral Communities, published by MIT Press in 2000.


• Niraj Verma is Professor and Chair of the Department of Urban and Regional Planning at

• the University at Buffalo (State University of New York). He is also Senior Research

• Fellow at the Center for Religion and Civic Culture at the University of Southern

• California (USC) where, before coming to Buffalo, he was on the faculty in the School of

• Policy, Planning, and Development and directed the School’s doctoral programs. Verma

• holds a Bachelor’s degree in civil engineering from India, a Master’s degree in

• Infrastructure Planning from Stuttgart (Germany), and a PhD from the University of

• California, Berkeley. He is the author of several scholarly papers in leading journals and

• of Similarities, Connections, and Systems (Lexington 1998). A theorist of planning and

• management, Niraj Verma serves on the editorial board of the journal, Planning Theory.

• Nationally, he has chaired the doctoral committee of the American Collegiate Schools of

• Planning and is currently a member of the doctoral committee of the National Association

• of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration. Professor Verma has been an invited

• speaker at many universities, including MIT, University of California (Berkeley), Rome

• (Italy), the Italian Civil Service Training Academy in Caserta (Italy), Seoul National

• University (Korea), University of Stuttgart, and Arizona State University among others.

• His work has been supported by several organizations, including the DAAD (German

• Academic Exchange Service), Rotary Foundation, Alexander von Humboldt Foundation,

• U.S. Department of Transportation, Pew Charitable Trust, and the Zumberge Research and

• Innovation Fund (USC). Some of his work has been translated into German, Italian, and

• Korean. Verma’s current research is focused around a study of similarities between recent

• public policy concerns, such as zero tolerance against drugs in schools, three strikes law,

• and term limits. This study aims to further our understanding of how public agendas are

• formed and how they get resolved.

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