March 2001 - Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis

sive regimen of economic sanctions and weapons
inspections ever imposed on a sovereign state. The
unforeseen consequence of this approach to Iraqi
weapons of mass destruction was that it shifted the
battle to the political realm and evened the odds for
Hussein. Since he was unable to challenge American
supremacy on the battlefield, Baghdad has
parleyed U.N control of Iraqi oil revenues into a
propaganda coup. By depicting the Iraqi citizenry
as the victims of a heartless West – in a crisis of
Saddam Hussein’s own making – Iraqi diplomats
have aroused the humanitarian instincts of many
observers and sapped the will of the international
community. Factor in the parochial economic interests
of countries such as France, Russia, and China,
and collapsing international unity on the sanctions
seems probable.
Colin in Wonderland
Thus turning the tide in the propaganda war is the
chief objective of the new American administration.
But interpreting the Bush administration’s policy
aims on Iraq can be a trying prospect, in large part
because that policy remains a work in progress. Part
of the reason for the confusion is the widespread –
and somewhat cavalier – assumption among American
commentators that Colin Powell, because of his
rock-star popularity, will be the undisputed master
of U.S. national security policy. This could be true:
the influence of each the organs of U.S. foreign
policy tends to wax and wane with the force of character
of the principal office-holders. For instance,
the State Department under Henry Kissinger dominated
policy-making, as did the National Security
Council when Kissinger served as national security
adviser. While the State Department’s budget pales
in comparison to that of the Defense Department,
for instance, having the ear of the president tends
to determine which instrument of policy has the
greatest prestige and influence. Considered the most
admired living American, Colin Powell will be a
force to be reckoned with.
In view of the clout Powell may wield in the
next four years, a look at the secretary of state’s
background could be instructive. A veteran of the
Vietnam War and its painful aftermath, Colin Powell
has dedicated his career in large part to banishing
the so-called “Vietnam Syndrome”, which supposedly
paralyzed the American armed forces during
the 1970s. In tandem with then-Secretary of Defense
Caspar Weinberger, he developed a doctrine for
the use of force that sought to clarify the circumstances
under which the United States should fight
overseas. Among the litmus tests that underpinned
the Weinberger/Powell doctrine were clear political
objectives, deployment of overwhelming force,
assurances of sustained public support, and a welldefined
exit strategy – that is, a clear definition of
what constituted victory and how long a deployment
of forces might last. Clearly, General Powell is a
cautious statesman.
This caution was not in evidence at his confirmation
hearings in January, when secretary of
state-designate Powell, best known as one of the
architects of Desert Storm, vowed to reinvigorate
the sanctions on Iraq. Indeed, he ruled out any
modifications to the embargo until Iraq consented
to readmit international weapons inspectors. Recall
that Saddam Hussein expelled inspectors from the
now-defunct U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM)
in December 1998, leading to Operation Desert Fox.
UNSCOM’s successor, the U.N. Monitoring and Verification
Commission (UNMOVIC), was stillborn
because of Iraqi opposition. There is no sign that Iraq
will relent on international weapons inspections.
Still, General Powell reiterated his tough stance
in February 2001, on the eve of his inaugural trip to
the Middle East as secretary of state. Air raids on
five Iraqi air-defense installations near Baghdad a
few days before his departure provided an exclamation
point to the secretary of state’s militant
rhetoric. But the raids were a metaphor for the
difficulties confronting the United States should
Washington persevere in its current Iraq policy. Official
statements justifying the action claimed that
improvements to the Iraqi air-defense network –
improvements made by Security Council members
Russia and China – had improved the capacity of
Iraqi gunners to menace American and British pilots
patrolling the no-fly zones. Thus, claimed the administration,
the attacks were acts of self-defense and
“routine.” Not coincidentally, they also served notice
that the new American president was not to be
trifled with.
The administration’s explanation of the military
merits of the attacks was undoubtedly true. Iraqi
air defenders have become more adept at the longrunning
game of cat-and-mouse in which they try to
down a Western aircraft, capture its pilot, and try to
extort concessions from the United States. But the
political wisdom of the bombardment was less evident.
The more important – and largely unaddressed
– question was: Why were ostensible proponents of
disarming Iraq (i.e., China) upgrading radars and
installing fiber-optic networks that linked anti-aircraft
radar sites more efficiently Probably because
of some combination of the economic benefits of
dealing with Saddam Hussein and the pleasure at
jabbing an overweening America in the eye.
Whatever the case, the aerial attacks graphically
highlighted the decay of the anti-Iraq coalition. Of
the forty-odd nations that helped oust Iraq from
Iraq
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