Defence Primer

Defence Primer: India at 75
integration in higher defence management. India’s Ministry of Defence is
almost exclusively civilian and its interaction with the almost exclusive military
headquarters has been problematic. As a result there has been considerable
tension between the Ministry of Defence and the Service Headquarters
leading to an ‘us and them’ sentiment. This has been exacerbated by a lack
of expertise in the civilian bureaucracy—a by-product of the generalist I.A.S.
system of administration. For some within the military the solution to this
is to ‘integrate’ the two—preferably with the civilian bureaucracy serving
under the military. However this would be antithetical to civilian control
and moreover would remove an important source of ‘checks and balances.’
Instead, a better alternative would be to cross-post officers, develop and
reward expertise within civilian bureaucrats and create conditions for a more
harmonious interaction between the two bureaucracies. Such an approach
would study the ‘best practices in defence management’ in different
democracies and recommend one suited to India.
Following from this discussion the outlines of India’s desired higher
defence organisation in 2022 should be clear—there should be a C.D.S.-
type post with a mandate to enforce jointness. As a result the service chiefs
would lose their commander-in-chief function and would be chiefs of staff
advising the Defence Minister. There should be geographically delineated
joint commands perhaps under a 4 star rank to be assisted by a joint staff.
This would enable operational integration among the three services in the
field and push jointness to lower formations. The boundaries of the joint
commands and its composition can be debated but the emphasis must be on
military effectiveness and not on parochial service interests. In addition, there
would be a permanent cadre of civilian bureaucrats to man positions related
to national security. This would fill the expertise gap in the Defence Ministry.
Finally, there should be an emphasis on a civil-military partnership including
by cross-posting officers and finding other ways to diminish, if not demolish,
the ‘us and them’ narrative.
There should be
geographically
delineated joint
commands perhaps
under a 4 star rank
to be assisted by a
joint staff. This would
enable operational
integration between
the three services in
the field and push
jointness to lower
formations.
With all this wishful thinking, sceptics have a right to question of how
do we get here and how do we achieve this ideal desired state? There are
three possible drivers for such changes. The first, perhaps most desired
driver, is forceful political intervention. For years generations of defence
reformers have been decrying the ‘lack of political will.’ The assumption is
that resistance to change is natural and to be expected from the military
and civilian bureaucracies but forceful, well-intentioned and well-informed
political intervention would overcome this resistance. Indeed, this has been
the experience in other democracies that have transitioned from a single
service approach to a more joint approach. Many therefore pin their hopes
on the current government. However, if no significant reforms are enacted
within the next couple of years, then one would have to admit that ‘talking’
and ‘doing’ are two entirely different activities.
Another possible driver is for the system to change from within. This would
place hope in India’s senior military and civilian leaders overruling their
parochial, institutional interests to accept a roadmap towards organisational
change which emphasizes military effectiveness over other considerations.
While this is possible in theory but, based on the available evidence, it is
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