Defence Primer

Defence Primer: India at 75
The following scenario can be envisaged in this context. As India’s economic
and strategic interests increase in traditional theaters of peacekeeping—for
instance, in Africa—in the next few years as the Republic of India completes
75 years, could Indian presence in the peacekeeping missions in these places
become more targeted to fulfill, as secondary objectives, security of its political
and economic assets?
Some could decry such a change as antithetical to the image India has
developed as a benign, responsible international actor. And this may very
well be the conclusion of the re-evaluation—in which case, at the very least,
India’s contribution to peacekeeping still needs to be publicly managed to
dispel, for instance, the notion of mercenary motives that entice Indian
soldiers. While this may indeed be part of the reason that few Indian soldier
say no to a UN assignment, it is not as simple a matter of “meal tickets” being
provided at no cost to the Indian government 8 : Indian payments on UN
deputations are effectively bigger than the allowances being paid by the UN. 9
This is because India now subsidises its own troops from its own government
budget, 10 and consequently, the UN owes India $85 million as back-payments
for its deployments. 11 A more stringent vetting process of soldiers and police
personnel will also go a long way in successfully carrying out a zero-tolerance
policy towards cases of sexual exploitation and abuse.
Peacekeeping efforts
must be conscious,
and not the humdrum
exercise of ritual.
There are other means by which India can redefine its peacekeeping
engagement. For instance, it is accepted that India will continue pursing
peacekeeping missions under the UN umbrella—no regional peacekeeping à
la Africa Union mission in Somalia is likely or envisaged, and grouping like
the BRICS are not politically coherent to support peacekeeping-like ventures
in third countries (neither is this a desired agenda item). The credibility and
legitimacy that the UN provides is an ideal space to build and advance an
Indian narrative of peacekeeping. Again, this is the corollary that follows post
a critical reassessment of India’s engagement in UN peacekeeping operations.
Based on its varied and long experience, an Indian narrative could tackle the
thorny issues of the use of force, advance the notion of ‘responsibility while
protecting,’ offer training guidelines. India can also help in ideating newer
peacekeeping avenues—such as naval/maritime peacekeeping, something that
may be of particular interest to New Delhi as India moves more concertedly
into the Indian Ocean and beyond. The end goal remains one of mooring
India’s peacekeeping ventures to India’s national interests instead of solely to
bureaucratic ones, as seemingly the case at present. This, effectively, may be
more visibly a case of Indian leadership.
While the above will allow New Delhi to move beyond proforma iterations at
UN gatherings on the need for peacekeeping reform, the other circumstance
that could change the nature of India’s contribution is if there is forward
momentum on UN Security Council reform. Were India to get a seat at the
UN High Table, it would be able to become an equal rule-maker as the other
parties present in the council, all within the safe environment of the world’s
multilateral body.
When it comes to peacekeeping, India has the advantage that the issue
is not an internally political divisive matter; this can help it chart a more
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