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<strong>The</strong> <strong>global</strong> <strong>context</strong> <strong>and</strong> its<br />

implications for emerging<br />

economies<br />

Dani Rodrik<br />

June 3, 2010


<strong>The</strong> setting<br />

Financial stability is being restored in the advanced<br />

countries eventually<br />

Recovery is taking place, but economic growth in the<br />

advanced economies is likely to fall short from pre-crisis<br />

levels<br />

– sizable wealth destruction + burden of public debt => slow<br />

consumption growth<br />

– European crisis will exert continuing drag at best<br />

Political constituency for “economic openness” will<br />

remain weak at best in the advanced countries<br />

– Significant strains on world trade regime is likely<br />

So the pace of economic <strong>global</strong>ization is likely to slow<br />

down<br />

– Domestic markets <strong>and</strong> domestic growth strategies will become<br />

more important for the health of tradable industries


Incomplete economic recovery<br />

Real GDP, advanced economies (2000=100)<br />

120<br />

115<br />

110<br />

105<br />

100<br />

95<br />

90<br />

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010


Global trade unlikely to recover its<br />

previous buoyancy<br />

Global trade volume (2000=100)<br />

170<br />

160<br />

150<br />

140<br />

130<br />

120<br />

110<br />

100<br />

90<br />

80<br />

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010


Protectionist clouds on the horizon<br />

China’s surpluses <strong>and</strong> <strong>global</strong> macro imbalances<br />

– Even some distinguished free traders now favor<br />

punitive tariffs on China<br />

Excess capacity in many sectors<br />

– Steel: 19% <strong>global</strong> overcapacity in 2008 (MGI)<br />

Renewed emphasis of the role of government in<br />

the economy<br />

– Market fundamentalism is dead<br />

WTO <strong>and</strong> the multilateral trade regime in trouble<br />

for some time<br />

– Problems of over-reach reach <strong>and</strong> legitimacy


<strong>The</strong> good, the bad, <strong>and</strong> the ugly<br />

1. Managed <strong>global</strong>ization<br />

– Better balance between the prerogative of nation<br />

states <strong>and</strong> international rules<br />

2. Business as usual<br />

– Continued reliance on (necessarily inadequate)<br />

improvements in <strong>global</strong> governance <strong>and</strong><br />

coordination<br />

3. Return to the 1930s<br />

– Protectionist free-for<br />

for-all<br />

<br />

<strong>The</strong> first option is the only practical <strong>and</strong><br />

sustainable remedy for the world economy


A slower pace of <strong>global</strong>ization is<br />

not necessarily bad news<br />

Growth comes from convergence with the productivity<br />

level (the “technology”) that prevails in the rich countries<br />

– <strong>The</strong> stock of ideas <strong>and</strong> knowledge that constitutes<br />

“technology” does not disappear or dissipate when rich<br />

countries grow more slowly or when world trade is less buoyant.<br />

Countries of the Latin American region grew more<br />

rapidly prior to the 1980s than they have since<br />

For countries with large domestic/regional markets<br />

domestic market growth can sustain rapid increase in<br />

output in tradables


Comparative economic performance<br />

of Latin America by periods<br />

8<br />

7<br />

6<br />

Annual average growth rate of GDP per capita<br />

5<br />

4<br />

3<br />

2<br />

1<br />

East Asia<br />

Advanced economies<br />

Latin America<br />

0<br />

1960-1980 1980-1990 1990-2008<br />

-1<br />

-2


Comparative economic performance<br />

of Colombia<br />

8<br />

7<br />

6<br />

Annual average growth rate of GDP per capita<br />

5<br />

4<br />

3<br />

2<br />

1<br />

East Asia<br />

Advanced economies<br />

Latin America<br />

Colombia<br />

0<br />

1960-1980 1980-1990 1990-2008<br />

-1<br />

-2


<strong>The</strong> long view on economic growth:<br />

what’s <strong>global</strong>ization’s contribution?<br />

Historical experience with growth<br />

9<br />

8<br />

GDP per capita growth rate of fastest growing<br />

country/region (annual average, %)<br />

World GDP per capita growth rate (annual<br />

average, %)<br />

7<br />

6<br />

5<br />

4<br />

3<br />

2<br />

1<br />

0<br />

1000-1500 1500-1820 1820-1870 1870-1913 1913-1950 1950-73 1973-90 1990-2005<br />

Western Europe United States Other Western<br />

offshoots<br />

Mexico Norway Japan South Korea China


What drives growth in developing<br />

Three models of growth:<br />

countries?<br />

1. Foreign borrowing-led growth<br />

• countries in the periphery of EU in 1990s, LA in 1970s, …<br />

2. Commodity booms<br />

• 19th century, many African countries in the last decade<br />

3. Structural transformation-led growth<br />

• From low-productivity traditional products to modern, mostly<br />

manufacturing activities (<strong>and</strong> lately increasingly into tradable<br />

services)<br />

• Based not on (static) comparative advantage, but on producing<br />

what richer countries produce<br />

Only the last has been a sustained source of convergence<br />

(Japan, S. Korea, China)


Countries that rely less on external<br />

resources grow faster in the longer term<br />

Source: Prasad, Rajan, <strong>and</strong> Subramanian (2006).


Can Latin America return to rapid<br />

growth? Pluses<br />

Growth potential, as measured by “convergence<br />

gap” with advanced countries, larger than ever<br />

since the early 1970s<br />

Significant capacity to absorb (<strong>and</strong> generate)<br />

new technologies<br />

Much greater integration in international trade<br />

<strong>and</strong> production networks<br />

Better macroeconomic management<br />

Improved governance <strong>and</strong> institutions


Can Latin America return to rapid<br />

growth? Minuses<br />

Endemic tendency for high real interest rates<br />

– A consequence of history of fiscal imprudence <strong>and</strong><br />

macroeconomic instability<br />

Much greater integration in <strong>global</strong> finance<br />

– Sudden stops <strong>and</strong> financial whiplash<br />

– Currency overvaluation as soon as optimism sets in<br />

Much greater conflict between “productivist” <strong>and</strong><br />

finance-centered centered policies<br />

– Should monetary policy target purely inflation or take into<br />

account competitiveness <strong>and</strong> employment too?<br />

– Should capital inflows be allowed to lead to currency<br />

appreciation or result in sterilization <strong>and</strong> capital controls?<br />

– Is there a role for industrial policies?


What has worked in East Asia:<br />

“productivist” policies<br />

Sound “fundamentals”<br />

– Market-friendly policies<br />

– Macro stability<br />

But also:<br />

– Industrial policies in support of new economic<br />

activities<br />

– Undervalued currencies to promote tradables<br />

– (<strong>The</strong> more a country relies on industrial policies, the<br />

less the need for currency undervaluation, <strong>and</strong> vice<br />

versa)<br />

– A certain degree of repression of finance, to enable:<br />

Development banking<br />

Subsidized credit<br />

Undervaluation


… combined with an enabling<br />

external environment<br />

Permissive with regard to industrial policies<br />

– At least under GATT <strong>and</strong><br />

– Until recently<br />

Willing to absorb excess supply of tradables<br />

– U.S. attitude of benign neglect towards current<br />

account deficits<br />

Bretton Woods I <strong>and</strong> II<br />

– Unconcerned with undervaluation in developing<br />

countries<br />

Again, until recently


Latin America cannot duplicate Asia<br />

History of macroeconomic instability<br />

Financial <strong>global</strong>ization<br />

Global trade rules


But it can internalize the main<br />

lessons<br />

Economic transformation requires strategic<br />

collaboration between the private sector <strong>and</strong> the<br />

government<br />

– Instead of a h<strong>and</strong>s-off approach<br />

– Important role for “industrial policies”<br />

Currency volatility <strong>and</strong> overvaluation is very<br />

harmful to economic development<br />

– Role of capital controls<br />

Only high levels of domestic saving can reduce<br />

the economy’s reliance on capital inflows without<br />

hurting investment <strong>and</strong> growth<br />

– Role of strong fiscal policy

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