Battle of Jussy

The Fighting 5th (21-23 March 1918)
Factors affecting Germany’s decision to attack:
After several defeats in 1915, Russia retreated from Galicia and Poland. This was followed by several failed
offensives against the Germans in 1916 resulting in heavy casualties. The hardships suffered by the civilian
population coupled with unrest amongst the Army led to widespread strikes and mutiny.
In February 1917 a revolution occurred in Russia, the Army leadership were unable to use a mutinous Army
to quash it resulting in the abdication of Tsar Nicholas II. A Provisional Government was formed but instead
of ending the war with Germany they chose to continue. There were many strikes and protests, the Army
frequently mutinied until the Bolsheviks overthrew the Provisional Government in October 1917. Keen to
end the war with Germany the Bolsheviks quickly entered into talks with Germany and an armistice was
signed on the 15 th December 1917.
On the 22 nd December peace talks commenced resulting
in the Brest-Litovsk treaty which was signed on the 3 rd
March 1918.
Meanwhile in Germany the population was close to starvation and tired of the war. America’s entry into the
War in April 1917 meant that once its Army had been built up to strength and moved to Europe the Allies
would have superior numbers on the Western front. On the 21 st January 1918 the German High Command
decided that a massive attack on the Western Front was required that spring to break the deadlock before
the Americans started to arrive in May. Knowing that Russia wanted an end to the war, the German High
Command moved 50 Divisions from the Eastern Front to the Western. By March 1918 Germany had 192 of
its 241 Divisions on the Western Front.
In 1917, the British Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, agreed (against military advice) that the BEF (British
Expeditionary Force) would take over more of the front line from the French. During the winter of 1917-
1918 the new British line was established around St. Quentin in an area that had effectively been left by the
French with no defences. There was much work to be done digging trenches and constructing redoubts. By
March 1918 most of the front line had been constructed but virtually none of the second and third lines had
been started.
Believing that the British Expeditionary Force were exhausted after the battles of 1917 the German High
Command massed 81 of its Divisions in the North facing the BEF. Its focus was the weakened British lines at
St. Quentin and its aim was to take the channel ports, cutting off the BEF and driving it into the sea.

British Response:
British Intelligence learnt of a planned large scale attack in late 1917, the exact time and location were
unknown at this stage. By March 1918 air reconnaissance and information obtained from German deserters
led British Intelligence to predict an attack in the Arras (3 rd Army) to St. Quentin (5th Army) area.
The 5 th Army at St. Quentin held a 42-mile front line recently taken over from the French. The front line
defences were being constructed at the fastest possible rate and were near to (but not totally) complete.
Work on the second and third lines had not yet started (except for some strong points at key locations). The
5 th Army was also the only section of the British lines that had no general reserves behind it. This prompted
the commander of the under strength and over stretched 5 th Army (Lt. Gen. Gough) to request
reinforcements. A request that was denied.
History records that the reason behind this decision was that Sir Douglas Haig felt he could not move
reserves from the North (which were protecting the shortest route to the Channel ports) until he knew for
certain that the attack would take place to the South of the British line.
A few days prior to the attack, German deserters spoke of troops, artillery and mortars massing on the
German front line at St. Quentin.
On the night of 19/20 th March 1918 men of the 61 st Division raided the German lines to take prisoners for
the purpose of extracting intelligence information. They learned that the attack would commence on the
21st. By this stage it was too late to reinforce the British line in time for the inevitable attack. The role of
sacrificing itself in order to gain time to move the necessary reinforcements fell to the 5 th Army.
Facing the British 3 rd and 5 th Armies were the German 2 nd , 6 th , 7 th , 17 th & 18 th Armies.

British troop positions March 1918:
The British 5 th Army had the British 3 rd
Army on its left flank in the North and the
French 3 rd Army on its right flank in the
South. The extreme right flank of the 5 th
Army was held by III Corps from the area
South of St. Quentin down to St. Gobain.
III Corps front line area was held by the 14 th Division in
the North (just South of St. Quentin), the 18 th Division in
the centre and the 58 th Division in the South. The 2 nd
Cavalry Division were in reserve immediately to the rear
of the front line at Quesmy (10 miles from Jussy).

General situation in III Corps area:
During Germany’s planned withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line in February/March 1917, all of the area
around St. Quentin had been laid to waste in a ‘scorched earth’ policy. Villages were destroyed, water
supplies poisoned and booby traps laid.
This March 1917 photograph shows the village
of Jussy occupied by French troops after the
Germans destroyed it.
The failure of the French Army to construct an effective, in depth defensive line around St. Quentin meant
that the British Fifth Army had a massive task ahead of itself when it arrived late 1917.
Work commenced immediately. Infantry and dismounted cavalry were formed into work parties employed
on various tasks which were made very difficult by the freezing conditions. The war diary of a dismounted
Company of the Royal Scots Greys (2 nd Dragoons) records their nightly work parties constructing barbed wire
entanglements on the front line in rain, snow, strong winds and “frozen land”.
The withdrawing German Army destroyed the canal and river
bridges as they went. Those that could not be repaired were
replaced and numerous new bridges were built to allow troops
and equipment to move forward to the new front line.
Royal Engineers constructing a pontoon bridge
Royal Engineers repairing a bridge.

This January 1918 trench map shows the British (in blue) and German (in red) front lines
with the Oise Canal and extensive Oise River water system (paler blue) between them.
Although shown on this trench map, it is
unclear from the war diaries whether the
original bridge at Jussy was repaired or even
replaced. There are a number of trenches in
the Jussy area (not all connected) creating a
strong point to the rear of the front line.
There are no other trench systems shown
along the St. Quentin (Crozat) canal,
presumably, given the time, a second line of
defence would have been constructed along
this natural barrier.
The only known operational bridge in the Jussy area on the morning of the 21 st March was 2000 metres
South East along the canal at the La Montagne locks.

The 2 nd Cavalry Division:
In March 1918 the 2 nd Cavalry Division were being held in reserve at Quesmy. Most of the Divisional Infantry
were dismounted and being used as working parties either on the front line or constructing strong points at
key locations for the proposed second line.
On the 18 th March 1918 a cavalry working party consisting of 3 Officers and 153 other ranks were sent to
Jussy.
The Divisional Engineers (2 nd Field Squadron, Royal Engineers) were also dismounted and working on front
line redoubt’s and preparing bridges on the Oise (river and canal) for demolition.

Operation Michael (German attack):
Having captured German soldiers on the night of the 19/20 th March and learning of the impending attack the
following day, the order “prepare for attack” was issued to the BEF at 1500hrs on the 20th.
21 st March 1918
The attack began at 0435hrs with the largest barrage of the first world war. Over 3.5 million shells were
fired in five hours along the 40 mile St. Quentin front. The front line was badly damaged and
communications to the rear were cut. At 0940hrs the German infantry assaulted the incomplete front line,
in some places white tape marked trenches that were yet to be dug.
By 1200hrs the Essigny redoubt on the St. Quentin road had fallen with the entire garrison of the 12 th Irish
Rifles being wiped out. 180 men from the 3 rd Rifle Brigade held ‘Cookers Quarry’ until 2000hrs with only 11
wounded survivors withdrawing to safety. By the end of the first day all troops were either engaged or
covering the withdrawing Divisions.
In III Corps area a new line was hastily being formed along the St. Quentin (Crozat) canal. The 11 th (Service)
Battalion, Royal Fusiliers took up position between Jussy and the still intact La Montagne bridge. The 7 th
(Service) Battalion, Bedfordshire Regiment between the bridge and Mennessis. The 8 th (Service) Battalion,
Northamptonshire Regiment were held in reserve and sheltered as best they could in woods to the West of
the canal.
The 2 nd Cavalry Division being dismounted were bused up to the canal during the afternoon of the 21 st and
took up defensive positions around Jussy. The Division consisted of the 3 rd , 4 th and 5 th Cavalry Brigades each
of which had one troop from the 2 nd Field Squadron, Royal Engineers attached to it. HQ Troop went to the
Oise canal to destroy bridges.
Number One Troop under command of Lt. Kezar MC R.E. were at Jussy with the Royal Scots Greys (2 nd
Dragoons) manning their post in the newly formed defensive line.
22/23rd March 1918
By 7am on the 22 nd the Division was in position having spent the night digging in. Despite the desperate
need to blow the La Montagne bridge a lack of explosives made this impossible. The Bedford’s even
exploded trench mortar shells but were unable to bring the bridge down. Heavy fog reduced visibility to
between twenty and fifty yards.
The Germans attempted to cross the bridge on numerous occasions throughout the day but were pushed
back with heavy losses; finally after a heavy German attack they took the bridge at 1745hrs. Two hours later
the British counter attacked and re-took the bridge. Further South, British units were forced from the canal
and a gap in the line developed. Every available unit not already engaged was thrown into the gap to halt
the German advance. No man was spared from the fighting. Cooks, saddlers, transport drivers and all
available non-combatants went forward to hold the line.

In Jussy, Lt. Kezar and his Troop of Sappers were pushed back from their defensive strong point and cut off
from the Infantry. They fought their way back to the edge of a wood where he collected 100 Infantry
(possibly from the 8 th Northamptonshire Regiment held in reserve in the woods to the West of Jussy) and
counter attacked. The Infantry Officers were cut down and their attack did not succeed. Lt. Kezar MM R.E.,
however, reached his post and held it until he only had two men left. He was awarded a Bar to his Military
Cross for his actions that day.
The unit war diary records “No 1. Troop gallantly defended post at Jussy under lieut. KEZAR MC RE No 1 lost
10 O.R. killed, wounded & missing”. No casualties from other Troops are specifically mention in the 2 nd Field
Squadron R.E. war diary therefore it is assumed that the 4 casualties buried at Grand Seraucourt British
Cemetery are those from 1 Troop. They are:
Sapper William Albert Cooper
Sapper Charles Howell
Sapper Harold Clifft
Sapper George Field

By the morning of the 23 rd , the 2nd Division was being pushed backwards and badly mauled by the German
Army. Jussy was now held by a large German force and the 14 th Division to their left had withdrawn (after
heavy losses) leaving the 54 th Brigade left flank exposed. At about 1100hrs on the 23 rd , the Bedfordshire’s
reported the enemy had crossed the canal in strength to their South meaning the right flank was also
exposed. The 54 th Brigade HQ ordered a withdrawal to the ridge East of Faillouel. The Bedford’s covered the
Northampton’s withdrawal but were unable to extricate themselves from the line without being badly
mauled by the Germans crossing the bridge to their rear. Similarly, the Fusiliers between Jussy and the La
Montagne bridge did not receive the order to withdraw. By the time they eventually took the decision
themselves it was too late. Forced to cover 800m of open ground they were cut down in swathes by
machine gun fire from both their flanks. By nightfall the Bedford’s and Northampton’s could only muster
200 men each. The Fusiliers however had been virtually wiped out with only 2 Officers and 26 other ranks
left.
Aftermath:
Official figures published in 1935 state that the Allies lost 255,000 men who were killed, wounded or missing
during the German Spring Offensive. Of those 177,739 were British and 90,882 from the 5 th Army.
Two German Armies were launched at the British 5 th Army at a time when they were under strength, over
stretched and (through no fault of their own) un-prepared. General Ludendorff knew this which is why he
chose to concentrate his main effort at St. Quentin.
Immediately cut off from high command the battle came down to individual Regiments, Platoons and men.
Although faced with an overwhelming force the 5 th Army fought stubbornly to hold its position, only
relinquishing it once it became clear that their left flank was exposed (due to the withdrawal of the 3 rd
British Army) and their right flank was exposed (due to the withdrawal of the French 3 rd Army).
Executing a fighting withdrawal and rear guard they took up position and faced the enemy time and time
again only withdrawing when their flanks were once again exposed. It wasn’t until the 5 th of April that the
German advance was finally halted.
Had Ludendorff been successful, Germany would have won the war which in turn means that had the 5 th
Army not held its ground, Germany would have won the war.