Marco_Senatore_A_Market_for_Values_and_Metavalues

Philosophy for Business – Issue 79 – 28th December 2016
http://www.isfp.co.uk/businesspathways/
A Market for Values and Metavalues
by Marco Senatore
The present article is aimed at defining some dimensions of autonomy, as well as
proposing an instrument which could promote them in our societies. In particular, I will
describe the institution of a market for inner motivations (values and metavalues), which
could complement the daily economic interactions among individuals, nowadays mainly
confined to the exchange of goods and services.
I already expressed such ideas in my book “Exchanging Autonomy. Inner Motivations
as Resources for Tackling the Crises of Our Times” 1 .
Kinds of autonomy
Traditionally, starting from Kant, autonomy has been conceived as the condition
whereby will gives itself its own law. Kant defined autonomy as the “ground of the dignity of
human nature and of every rational nature” 2 . Recently, some important philosophers, such as
Thomas Hill and Christine Korsgaard, followed a Kantian perspective to autonomy.
On the other hand, I think that in a complex society, where the social role of
individuals has gained great prominence in the definition of their identities, it is essential to
focus on other ambits which shape the autonomy of an individual, beyond the principle of his
moral laws. In a nutshell, these ambits represent the answer to three questions: “what should I
do?”, “what should I believe?” and “how should I believe?”.
The first question implies the choice of a role, conceived as the set of actions through
which we relate to reality (in professional, social, moral and cultural terms) and the effect that
these actions have on it. Through actions, we can change reality or keep it unchanged.
The second question leads to the definition of values, as criteria employed by the
individual to judge reality, and which can be moral, organizational and cultural.
The third question relates to the motivations behind values and, in some way, the
approach to them, employed by an individual to perceive his own dignity.
Consequently, it is possible to define three kinds of autonomy:
1 The book has been published by Xlibris in 2014.
2 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, ed. by Mary Gregor, Cambridge Texts in the
History of Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge Universiry Press, 1988), 4: 436.
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Philosophy for Business – Issue 79 – 28th December 2016
http://www.isfp.co.uk/businesspathways/
1. relational autonomy is the condition whereby the role assumed by the
individual (e. g. buyer of a certain product or voter for a certain party) is the cause and not the
consequence of the particular relations with other individuals. In this condition, the individual
can claim that some particular persons are his friends and colleagues because he decided to
assume a certain role, while, where there is no relational autonomy, the individual decides to
assume a certain role due to the influence of his friends, relatives and colleagues.
2. Functional autonomy is the condition whereby the judgement on reality, and
the acceptance of it, is the cause and not the consequence of the role assumed in reality.
Therefore, in a condition of functional autonomy, the individual decides to assume a given
role because of his (moral, organizational and cultural) values, whereas, in absence of such
autonomy, a certain judgement on reality is instrumental to the role assumed by the
individual. Ideally, functional autonomy allows an individual to choose his work, the
products he purchases and the party he votes for on the basis of his own principles, thereby
eliminating the common sense of alienation of our time.
3. Existential autonomy is a condition whereby reality is accepted because one is
aware of the dignity of one’s existence. Such kind of autonomy implies the choice of
metavalues, allowing the perception of one’s dignity and guiding the choice of values.
According to my theory, in order to perceive his own dignity, an individual must satisfy at
least some of the following fundamental human needs: a. the need for immortality, of
surviving beyond the temporal confines of one’s life, and of producing a meaning beyond the
historical context to which one belongs; b. the need for uniqueness, meaning that each one of
us is a unique combination of experiences, feelings, and ideas; c. the need for belonging, of
seeing mirrored in oneself a much broader reality in which to participate, sharing it with other
individuals; d. the need for remembering and perceiving one’s faithfulness to oneself through
memory of the past; and e. the need to influence reality, conferring a specific weight and role
on one’s existence. Metavalues satisfying such needs can include the quality of one’s
relations and the abandonment of one’s egoism.
I define actions, values and metavalues as the components of a nomos, i.e. a
relationship between the individual and reality.
In my book “Exchanging Autonomy” I highlighted that relational autonomy is a
necessary but not sufficient condition for functional autonomy, and the latter is, in turn,
necessary but not sufficient for existential autonomy.
I also demonstrated a theorem, the theorem of the two autonomies, for which the
functional autonomy of individuals is necessary but not sufficient for the existential
autonomy of a society, by which I mean the condition whereby society is not perceived as a
mere tool to protect individuals, but it is also considered a community, with an inherent
dignity. Indeed, in a society where individuals judge reality only on the basis of their social
role, collective values are not the outcome of a process of confrontation and generalization of
individual values (allowed by collective metavalues), but only a mere instrument for the
coordination of individual actions.
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Philosophy for Business – Issue 79 – 28th December 2016
http://www.isfp.co.uk/businesspathways/
Autonomy, in its relational, functional and existential dimensions, has several benefits
for society as a whole. For instance, relational autonomy ensures that social roles are assumed
not only with a view to getting the approval of one’s particular environment.
On the other hand, functional autonomy allows consistency among actions of an
individual, to the extent that they are inspired by the same values, as well as social mobility,
to the extent that a given individual can assume a number of social roles inspired by a given
set of values.
As for existential autonomy, it can promote cooperation also among individuals
inspired by the same metavalues, even though they have chosen different values. Moreover, it
can avoid some form of “absolutization” for which values are seen as ends in themselves.
Exchanges of values and metavalues
German sociologist Niklas Luhmann highlighted how there is no single subsystem in
society that would represent the latter as a whole. Therefore, one could argue that, in a
society where the only common shared principle (or at least the principle which is the ground
for all the others) is represented by economic utility, a change in society can be possible only
creating an economic incentive for it. This idea, together with the need for tools aimed at
promoting individual autonomy in our societies, could motivate the institution of markets for
inner motivations, i.e. values and metavalues. In our societies, economic transactions among
individuals are only limited to the exchange of goods and services. On the other hand, the
latter are the result of a social role which is expressed by being a consumer or a producer and,
therefore, by particular actions, aimed at changing reality or keeping it unchanged. What if
human beings could exchange also different components of their nomos, which are currently
only considered as accidental subjective elements of human nature?
If a person A felt that he lacks some inner motivations in her life (for instance, an
empirical proof of the importance of tolerance), he could interact with a person B who, in the
past, lived several experiences testifying the importance of tolerance. In particular, B could
transmit such experiences to A who could, in turn, transmit to B experiences proving the
importance of another value (for instance, economic wellbeing). In this way, A could acquire
a value which is independent of his particular role in reality (as, in general, A and B would
work in different ambits, have different habits in terms of consumption, and so on), and B
could have the same opportunity.
After some time, A could interpret his role in a different way, through living
experiences connected with tolerance. So A could decide to transfer the document containing
such experiences and the ones previously lived by B and other individuals. If values could be
exchanged not only with other values, but also with goods and services, they would become a
means of exchange like money. Therefore, if every experience connected with a given inner
motivation had an economic value (i.e. if it could be exchanged with goods and services
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Philosophy for Business – Issue 79 – 28th December 2016
http://www.isfp.co.uk/businesspathways/
having a certain monetary value), A would have an incentive to live personal experiences on
the basis of some values, in order to transmit them to other individuals. On one hand, this
would ensure functional autonomy (through the acquisition of values independent of the
social role of the individual) to a person who might have been originally deprived of it; on the
other, such kind of transactions would respect the paradigm of economic utility, which is
dominant in our lives.
A person who desires to transfer a given value might indicate to his counterpart the
following elements: (a) one or more significant experiences, attesting to the usefulness of the
value in certain situations in the context of personal or professional relationships; (b) actions
in which the value has been previously expressed; (c) the number of individuals who have
previously had significant experiences relevant to the value in question; and (d) the values
that had previously been exchanged with the value in question. Information a, b, c, and d
would be updated after each exchange of the value in question.
In a similar way, significant experiences testifying the importance of a given
metavalue could be received by a person, in exchange for experiences connected with other
metavalues or values. This could ensure existential autonomy to a person originally deprived
of it, or give her the possibility to interpret some values under a new light, represented by
metavalues originally unknown by her. For instance, if someone believed in the importance
of tolerance because this is a way to abandon one’s egoism, this individual could interact with
another person, who believes in the same value but because of a different metavalue, such as
the possibility to contribute to the advancement of society. In this way, both individuals
would keep on perceiving their own dignity
In a nutshell, while nowadays we only exchange what characterizes our identities on
an external level (actions), this kind of transactions would give the possibility to give a public
relevance to the inner nature of our beings.
It is also possible to highlight how a market for values and metavalues could provide
significant benefits with regard to issues such as pollution, financialization of the economy,
the excessive influence of lobbies.
For instance, a business deciding to target new customers, not particularly sensitive to
the importance of protecting the environment, could decide to produce a less polluting
product, while asking his current customers to transfer significant experiences connected with
environmentalism. In this way, the business could transfer the experiences to the new
customers, so that the latter might decide to purchase the new product. In general, to the
extent that every business comes into contact with groups of customers, who have different
values and metavalues, the activity of production and sale could involve also an
intermediation between such groups operated by the business, aimed at promoting the
demand of a given product through the transmission of significant experiences.
Another area in which exchanges of values and metavalues could apply is represented
by the activity of financial institutions. Banks could take into account not only the possible
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Philosophy for Business – Issue 79 – 28th December 2016
http://www.isfp.co.uk/businesspathways/
returns of the investments of their customers, financed by their loans, but also the expected
change in the value of significant experiences possessed by the customers. In this way, the
banks would have no incentive to over-expand their lending and increase leverage because
the credit risk would be assessed by the system to which they belong (for the monetary
component) and by independent agencies (as regards the value and meta-value component).
Moreover, if citizens could assess public policies not only on the basis of their
practical implications but also on the basis of their own values and metavalues, it would be
possible to reduce the excessive influence of a limited number of big lobbies.
I also find that exchanges of good and services could be useful for dealing with an
issue such as income inequality. In particular, the State could distribute to the poorest part of
the population, free of charge, a certain quantity of values and meta-values previously
collected through the contribution of the totality of citizens in order to reestablish a fairer
distribution of the resources.
In our societies, the economic system clearly influences all the others. If the market is
the dominant force which conditions our actions, ideas and the same perception of risks and
opportunities, then a different relation of human beings with themselves is only possible
through the introduction in the market of that inner dimension which is nowadays considered
irrelevant, dangerous or mainly instrumental to the economic targets of other operators.
We live in a mass society, characterized, among other elements, by equalitarianism
and homologation. Conversely, while there is a promotion of individualism, meaning the
possibility to freely choose one’s means to achieve some common objectives (e.g. status,
money, affective security), the promotion of individuality, implying the personal elaboration
of one’s objectives, is quite rare.
Against this backdrop, exchanging values and metavalues could greatly contribute to
greater cooperation among individuals, and to the perception that their inner motivations are
neither merely instrumental to their social role, nor reduced to marginality. Money, the only
universal means of exchange, is also the only element behind work and production. If also
values became a means of exchange, then it would still be possible to trade good and services
for their motivating factor, but in a much broader and more fulfilling sense.
On the other hand, to the extent that the perception of one’s dignity is linked with
satisfying some fundamental human needs, it would be essential to promote spirituality,
meaning the public awareness of the existence of such needs. This would reconcile autonomy
with utility, positive and negative liberties, the public and private spheres, and ethics and
economy.
© Marco Senatore 2016
Email: marco.senatore@tesoro.it
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