TACKLING DRUG-RESISTANT INFECTIONS GLOBALLY FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

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data’ that will be generated as diagnostic tools are modernised
and cloud computing is embraced. These new tools are just
around the corner, and even less developed countries may be
able to ‘leapfrog’ into using them. So questions about how data
are owned, used and shared need to be answered now if the
full potential of this information revolution is to be harnessed
in our battle against AMR. Additionally, governments need to
examine regulations and incentives for private players such as
private laboratories, hospitals and pharmaceutical companies to
encourage them to enter the field of surveillance and share the
data that they collect, both on consumption and resistance rates.
This presents a rich potential source of information that would
generate more representative data.
enhancements to emergency response capabilities64. We support
the recommendations of the report and believe that a global
commitment to investing on this scale is crucial to enable health
systems to better respond to the threat of infectious diseases
as a whole.
The work of the WHO in setting up the GLASS, the work of the
Fleming Fund in the UK, and the surveillance-focused strands
of the GHSA, will play important roles in providing financial
and technical support for building laboratory and surveillance
capabilities in low and middle-income countries.
How much would it cost?
It is exceptionally challenging to establish a firm estimate of
the costs of implementing a comprehensive, global surveillance
system tracking antibiotic use and rising drug resistance across
both the human and animal populations, and in the environment.
First, there is a lack of data on current surveillance capabilities
across the world, which are extremely variable with some
countries and regions having advanced systems in place,
some with insufficient laboratory capability for participating
in surveillance, and some regions where there is simply no
infrastructure or routine testing being carried out.
Second, there is very little information to set out what type
of system we would need to provide good quality data for
surveillance that would also benefit the patient.
Third, in the regions where resistance testing is conducted, it is
often part of larger surveillance systems that are intrinsic parts
of the wider healthcare infrastructure.
Fourth, AMR is not limited to a single pathogen or case definition,
unlike diseases such as polio, gonorrhoea or influenza, for which
surveillance systems have existed for a while. It is therefore
challenging to extrapolate the costs of AMR surveillance from
the cost of already existing surveillance networks.
However, we believe that improving the surveillance of AMR is
vital. The recent GHRF report, recommended a total investment
of 4.5 billion USD per year to improve national pandemic
preparedness capabilities, including significant improvements
to global disease surveillance capabilities as part of wider
64 GHRF Commission (Commission on a Global Health Risk Framework for the Future).
The neglected dimension of global security: A framework to counter infectious disease crises,
2016.