A Realist Theory of Science Roy Bhaskar

Actualism and the Concept of a Closure 98
counterpose the investigation of complex preformed things to the
search for the complete atomistic statedescriptions that it is supposed
would enable us to predict their behaviour.) The only sense in which
science presupposes ‘determinism’ is the sense in which it
presupposes the ubiquity of causes1 and hence the possibility of
explanations. And the only sense in which it presupposes ‘regularity
determinism’ is the sense in which it presupposes the ubiquity of
causes1 for differences and hence the possibility of their explanation.
But it is probably better not to use ‘determinism’ in this way (nb.
cause1≠cause2). Now any refutation of regularity determinism as an
ontological thesis must depend upon establishing the autonomy of
things, in the sense of the impossibility of carrying out the reductions
implicit in the vital conditions B1 and Cl of Table 2.1 on page 76
(their being a clear asymmetry, for the realist, between the subjects
and the condition of action, and the constancy alternative being
recessive). It is here that I will pitch my attack. Thus I am not going
to argue that if the critical conditions were satisfied the constant
conjunction formula would not be vindicated. Rather, I am going to
argue that the critical conditions could not be satisfied in any world
containing science. The question of whether or not history would
repeat itself is one that need not detain us here. A nagging doubt may
remain: surely, it might be felt, in the (very) last instance regularity
determinism must be true. But this is not so. For once we have
established an ontology of structures there is no earthly reason why
events should [have to] be constantly conjoined. There are indeed
principles of indifference (as we shall see in Chapter 3). But they do
not apply, nor is there any reason why they should, to events, statesof-affairs
and the like.
In establishing the autonomy of things I will follow the normal
procedure of transcendental realism; that is, I will first analyse some
more or less underanalysed feature of science and then ask what the
world must be like for this feature to be possible. The feature I am
concerned with are two aspects of scientific laws, viz:-
(i) their normic and non-empirical character; and
(ii) their consistency with situations of dual (and multiple) control.
I will argue that for these features to be possible the world must be
composed of agents. Agents are particulars which are the centres of