No. 01-1757 Stogner v. California - FindLaw: Supreme Court Center

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32 II. A RETROACTIVE CHANGE IN THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS THAT REVIVES A PREVI- OUSLY-EXPIRED CAUSE OF ACTION IN A CRIMINAL CASE DOES NOT, ON ITS FACE, VIOLATE THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE A. The Ex Post Facto Clause, Not the More Generalized Notion of Substantive Due Process, Governs the Constitutional Inquiry The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment contains a substantive component, sometimes referred to as “substantive due process,” which bars certain arbitrary government actions regardless of the procedures used to implement them. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 337 (1986). Petitioner, referencing a “fundamental right of liberty” (Pet. Br. 33) and “the substantive nature of the right” (Pet. Br. 40), asks this Court to find that a retroactive change in the statute of limitations in a criminal case violates substantive due process. This contention fails at the threshold because the Due Process Clause cannot be read to provide greater protections against ex post facto laws than the Ex Post Facto Clause itself. When a particular constitutional amendment “provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection” against a particular sort of government behavior, “that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of ‘substantive due process,’ must be the guide for analyzing these claims.” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)). The Court recently reiterated this principle in Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. ___ (2003), in which it stated that “[a]t bottom, petitioner’s due-process claim is nothing more than his double-jeopardy claim in different clothing,”
33 and it declined his “invitation to hold that the Due Process Clause provides greater double-jeopardy protection than does the Double Jeopardy Clause,” id. at ___ (slip op. at 14-15). This principle is applicable in the instant case. The Framers of the Constitution considered the matter of retroactive changes in the law, and they drafted the Ex Post Facto Clause of Article I, section 10, to address it. That clause speaks to the circumstances under which penal laws, “whatever their form,” may be “altered by legislative enactment, after the fact, to the disadvantage of the accused.” Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. at 170. It provides an “explicit textual source of constitutional protection” against retroactive legislative changes in criminal law, and so it is not to be supplemented through the device of “substantive due process.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. at 395. There is no reason for this Court to turn away from this prior jurisprudence, and to create a new due process right that duplicates a right that is readily identifiable in the Constitution’s text and overlaid with case law governing its scope. B. A Change in the Statute of Limitations Does Not Deny a Defendant Substantive Due Process Petitioner’s due process claim fares no better when analyzed in light of this Court’s substantive due process precedents. The substantive content of the Due Process Clause “forbids the government to infringe . . . ‘fundamental’ liberty interests at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,
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Page 3 and 4: ii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page QUESTIONS
Page 5 and 6: iv TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued Pa
Page 7 and 8: vi TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued
Page 9 and 10: viii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continu
Page 11 and 12: 1 STATEMENT OF THE CASE A. Statutor
Page 13 and 14: 3 process guarantees. 1 This Court
Page 15 and 16: 5 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT Californi
Page 17 and 18: 7 regulates the time at which a cri
Page 19 and 20: 9 of limitations, he may challenge
Page 21 and 22: 11 and it has repeatedly been endor
Page 23 and 24: 13 is right, and prohibit what is w
Page 25 and 26: 15 concerned.” People v. Frazer,
Page 27 and 28: 17 crimes than are facts bearing on
Page 29 and 30: 19 retroactive state law falls with
Page 31 and 32: 21 limitations “defense” does n
Page 33 and 34: 23 cases). But if a statute of limi
Page 35 and 36: 25 of limitations, standing alone,
Page 37 and 38: 27 not make a timely outcry), a def
Page 39 and 40: 29 their effect so that individuals
Page 41: 31 Petitioner also fails to recogni
Page 45 and 46: 35 litigate,” has “never been r
Page 47 and 48: 37 in the history of statutes of li
Page 49 and 50: 39 a. Beginning in the late 1980’
Page 51 and 52: 41 Adult survivors are more anxious
Page 53 and 54: 43 because she was scared. (RT 45.)
Page 55 and 56: 45 does not include the opinions of
Page 57: 47 sanction the most indefensible f

No. 01-1757 Stogner v. California - FindLaw: Supreme Court Center

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