Evil Maid Just Got Angrier - Why Full-Disk Encryption ... - CanSecWest

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Windows BitLocker http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee449438(v=ws.10).aspx
BitLocker with Trusted Platform Module Volume Key used to encrypt drive contents is encrypted by the TPM based on measurements of pre-OS firmware If any pre-OS firmware component was tampered with, TPM wouldn’t decrypt the key Ensures malicious BIOS/OROM/MBR doesn’t log the PIN or fake recovery/PIN screen Implementation of a Measured Boot
Page 1: Evil Maid Just Got Angrier Why Full
Page 4 and 5: Outline 1 UEFI BIOS 2 Measured/Trus
Page 12 and 13: Legacy BIOS CPU Reset vector in ROM
Page 14 and 15: Legacy BIOS CPU Reset vector in ROM
Page 16 and 17: Security of Legacy BIOS Huh?
Page 18 and 19: Unified Extensible Firmware Interfa
Page 20 and 21: So is UEFI BIOS secure? UEFI specif
Page 26 and 27: Typical Chain of Measurements
Page 28 and 29: Typical Chain of Measurements ⊗ I
Page 44 and 45: The Problem Startup UEFI BIOS firmw
Page 46 and 47: The Solution is Simple Just let Bit
Page 54 and 55: SPI Flash / BIOS Protections 1 Writ
Page 56 and 57: SPI Protected Range Registers http:
Page 60 and 61: Hey! We’ve Succeeded!
Page 62 and 63: NIST BIOS Protection Guidelines Rec
Page 64 and 65: UEFI Updates Aren’t Exactly Signe
Page 69 and 70: Angry Evil Maid Attack Outline Agai
Page 71 and 72: The Original Boot Block
Page 73 and 74: Writing Payload to Early BIOS in SP
Page 75 and 76:
But That P67 Board Is Just Too Old
Page 77 and 78:
ASUS P8Z77-V PRO Yes! UEFI BIOS upd
Page 79 and 80:
Demo The problem applies to any Ful
Page 81 and 82:
What About Secure Boot? UEFI 2.3.1
Page 83 and 84:
Outline 1 UEFI BIOS 2 Measured/Trus
Page 85 and 86:
BIOS Rootkits BIOS Rootkit [5,6,7,1
Page 87 and 88:
Anything We Can Do? If you care abo
Page 89 and 90:
Further Reading 1 Evil Maid goes af
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Evil Maid Just Got Angrier - Why Full-Disk Encryption ... - CanSecWest

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