possession in the common law - HiddenMysteries Information Central
possession in the common law - HiddenMysteries Information Central
possession in the common law - HiddenMysteries Information Central
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orig<strong>in</strong>al Act 3 required that <strong>the</strong> bankrupt should by <strong>the</strong> consent and permission of <strong>the</strong> true owner and<br />
proprietary have <strong>in</strong> his <strong>possession</strong>, order and disposition goods whereof he should be reputed owner. The last<br />
Act, that of 1883, 4 requires that <strong>the</strong> goods shall be <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>possession</strong>, order or disposition of <strong>the</strong> bankrupt, <strong>in</strong><br />
his trade or bus<strong>in</strong>ess, by <strong>the</strong> consent and permission of <strong>the</strong> true owner, under such circumstances that <strong>the</strong><br />
bankrupt is <strong>the</strong> reputed owner <strong>the</strong>reof.<br />
Hence decisions 5 upon. <strong>the</strong>se clauses have given rise to phrases which seem to imply that an owner may<br />
obta<strong>in</strong> <strong>possession</strong> of goods by merely do<strong>in</strong>g all he can to obta<strong>in</strong> <strong>possession</strong>. Now it is perfectly true that if B.'s<br />
goods are <strong>in</strong> C.'s <strong>possession</strong>, B. can prevent <strong>the</strong>ir becom<strong>in</strong>g assets <strong>in</strong> C.'s bankruptcy by do<strong>in</strong>g all he can to<br />
obta<strong>in</strong> <strong>possession</strong>, or <strong>in</strong>deed by do<strong>in</strong>g very much less. They will not be assets <strong>in</strong> C.'s bankruptcy unless <strong>the</strong>y<br />
are <strong>in</strong> C.'s <strong>possession</strong> by B.'s consent and permission, and B. can prevent <strong>the</strong>ir becom<strong>in</strong>g assets by show<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong><br />
any unequivocal way that he no longer consents to C.'s possess<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>m. 6 But apart from this it cannot be [70]<br />
said that one ga<strong>in</strong>s <strong>possession</strong> by do<strong>in</strong>g all one can to ga<strong>in</strong> it. Certa<strong>in</strong>ly an unsuccessful effort made by <strong>the</strong><br />
grantee of a bill of sale will not prevent <strong>the</strong> goods from be<strong>in</strong>g still <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> grantor’s <strong>possession</strong> and liable to be<br />
treated as assets <strong>in</strong> his bankruptcy under <strong>the</strong> Bills of Sale Acts, for those Acts do not, like <strong>the</strong> Bankruptcy Act,<br />
say anyth<strong>in</strong>g about <strong>the</strong> consent of <strong>the</strong> true owner. 1 The true pr<strong>in</strong>ciple is not that a man is deemed to be <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>possession</strong> as a reward of diligence <strong>in</strong> endeavour<strong>in</strong>g to get <strong>possession</strong>, but that, where <strong>possession</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>law</strong> is<br />
founded on de facto <strong>possession</strong>, <strong>the</strong> necessary and sufficient de facto <strong>possession</strong> is that which <strong>the</strong> nature of <strong>the</strong><br />
th<strong>in</strong>g dealt with admits of.<br />
As concern<strong>in</strong>g delivery of part <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> name of <strong>the</strong> whole, it may take place and have effect as a delivery of<br />
<strong>the</strong> whole if such is <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d of <strong>the</strong> parties. There is not any rule or presumption of <strong>law</strong> that a partial delivery<br />
shall have such an effect. ‘It is now held that <strong>the</strong> delivery of part operates as a constructive delivery of <strong>the</strong><br />
whole only where <strong>the</strong> delivery of part takes place <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> course of <strong>the</strong> delivery of <strong>the</strong> whole, and <strong>the</strong> tak<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>possession</strong> by <strong>the</strong> buyer of that part is <strong>the</strong> acceptance of constructive <strong>possession</strong> of <strong>the</strong> whole,’ 2 i. e.<br />
<strong>possession</strong> by <strong>the</strong> hands of some one who now beg<strong>in</strong>s to hold as his agent. ‘The delivery of a part may be a<br />
delivery of <strong>the</strong> whole if it is so <strong>in</strong>tended.,’ but not o<strong>the</strong>rwise, and it seems that <strong>the</strong> burden of proof is on <strong>the</strong><br />
party assert<strong>in</strong>g such an <strong>in</strong>tention. 3<br />
When part of a bulk of goods is delivered <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> name of <strong>the</strong> whole, this is, as to <strong>the</strong> rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g bulk, a<br />
particular case of <strong>the</strong> change of <strong>possession</strong> by a change of <strong>the</strong> character <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong>y are held by <strong>the</strong> actual<br />
custodian. This branch of <strong>the</strong> subject is of such importance as to demand a separate section for its treatment.<br />
[71]§ 7. Delivery of goods by attornment.<br />
The transfer of <strong>possession</strong> <strong>in</strong> goods, as dist<strong>in</strong>guished from property, is an <strong>in</strong>cident <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> performance of <strong>the</strong><br />
contract of sale which is of special importance <strong>in</strong> two ways; by reason of <strong>the</strong> Statute of Frauds, as regards <strong>the</strong><br />
proof of <strong>the</strong> contract <strong>in</strong> certa<strong>in</strong> cases; and under <strong>the</strong> rules of <strong>the</strong> <strong>common</strong> <strong>law</strong> derived from <strong>the</strong> <strong>law</strong> merchant<br />
as regards an unpaid vendor’s rights. By <strong>the</strong> Statute of Frauds one of <strong>the</strong> alternative conditions on which a<br />
contract for <strong>the</strong> sale of more than 10l. worth of goods is ‘allowed to be good’ is <strong>the</strong> acceptance and actual<br />
receipt of some part of <strong>the</strong> goods. As Lord Blackburn has said, ‘<strong>the</strong> receipt of part of <strong>the</strong> goods is <strong>the</strong> tak<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>possession</strong> of <strong>the</strong>m. When <strong>the</strong> seller gives to <strong>the</strong> buyer <strong>the</strong> actual controul of <strong>the</strong> goods, and <strong>the</strong> buyer accepts<br />
such controul, he has actually received ,<strong>the</strong>m.’ 1 The modern decisions have settled that <strong>the</strong>re is acceptance as<br />
well as receipt when <strong>the</strong> buyer beg<strong>in</strong>s to possess <strong>the</strong> part of <strong>the</strong> goods <strong>in</strong> question with reference to <strong>the</strong><br />
contract of sale and as part of <strong>the</strong> goods designated by or appropriated to it, whe<strong>the</strong>r he <strong>in</strong>tends to accept <strong>the</strong>m<br />
absolutely or to reserve whatever rights <strong>the</strong> contract may give him of reject<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>m as not accord<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
sample, or <strong>the</strong> like. 2 It is also held that <strong>the</strong>re may be actual receipt by delivery to a <strong>common</strong> carrier for<br />
conveyance to <strong>the</strong> buyer, or to a warehouseman to hold subject to his direction; <strong>the</strong> carrier is said to be <strong>the</strong><br />
buyer’s agent to receive though not to accept. This is at first sight anomalous. The Courts have looked more to<br />
3 21 Jac. I. c. 19. s. 10, 11.<br />
4 46 & 47 Vic. c. 52. s. 44.<br />
5 West v. Skip, I Ves. Sen. 239, is an early <strong>in</strong>stance; see p. 244.<br />
6 See e. g. Ex parte Harris, 8 Ch. 48; Ex parte Ward, 8 Ch. 144.<br />
[70] 1 See e. g. Ex parte Jay, 9 Ch. 697,705; Ancona v. Rogers, 1 Ex. Div. 285, 293<br />
2 Willes J., Bolton v. L. & Y. R. Co., 1866, L.R. 1 C.P. 431, 440.<br />
3 Lord Blackburn, Kemp v. Falk, 1882, 7 App. Ca. 573, 586.<br />
[71] 1 Blackhurn on Sale, Part I, ch. 2, <strong>in</strong>it.<br />
2 Page v. Morgan (1885), 15 Q.B. Div. 228.