Chapter 11 The Tort of Negligence - OED-update - Oxford University ...

Rescuers
Chapter 11 The Tort of Negligence 359
Prior to 1999 it was understood that, in law, rescuers were automatically to be treated as
primary victims and a duty of care was owed to a rescuer who suffered mental trauma as
a result of helping out in an accident.
Chadwick v British Rail (1967)
Facts: The claimant was a volunteer rescuer at the scene of a rail disaster where 90 people
died. He later suffered from a psychiatric illness as a result of the horrific nature of what he had
experienced.
Decision: A duty of care was owed to the claimant as it was reasonably foreseeable that
volunteers would assist at the scene and suffer mental illness as a result.
However, in White v Chief Constable South Yorkshire (1999) the House of Lords made it clear
that a rescuer could only be classed as a primary victim if the rescuer was, or reasonably
believed himself to be, in danger of physical injury. The court recognised that Chadwick,
above, was correctly decided because the rescuer in that case was in physical danger from
the collapse of the wreckage, but the rescuers in White were not at risk and could not claim
as primary victims.
White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire (1999)
Facts: As a result of the negligent failure of the police to control admission to the Hillsborough
football stadium in Sheffield, numerous fans were crushed against railings and barricades. Ninetyfive
people were killed and hundreds injured. The claimants were police officers who took part in
the rescue operation and suffered post-traumatic stress disorder (a psychiatric illness) as a result
of the horrific scenes they encountered. They sued the Chief Constable of Yorkshire Police.
Decision: No duty of care was owed by the Chief Constable to the claimants because
the claimants were not actually at risk themselves. They had not been exposed to danger or fear
of danger.
Secondary victims
A secondary victim is a person who suffers a psychiatric illness as a result of witnessing an
accident or its ‘immediate aftermath’. The person himself is in no danger but suffers shock
as a result of either seeing another person injured, reasonably believing that another person
is injured, or coming to the scene immediately afterwards. In addition, the secondary
victim must have a close tie of love and affection for the victim of the accident.