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of casualties from the pens. It was not until 3.12pm that chief Superintendent Nesbit arrived on the pitch and organised a chain of officers to simplify and expedite the evacuation of casualties from the pitch. Though it was not clear when the Major Disaster Plan was initiated, it was certainly not initiated until 3.06pm (subsequent evidence suggests that the existence of a major disaster was not communicated to the ambulance services for some time). Ambulances from the South Yorkshire Metropolitan Area began to arrive at Leppings Lane at 3.13pm and at the Peniston Road entrance at 3.17pm. No request for the fire-brigade or for cutting gear was made until 3.13pm (it would obviously have helped to evacuate the injured from behind the wiring had the fire- brigade and cutting equipment been available sooner). No request for help was broadcast to doctors and nurses in the grounds until 3.29pm when, according to Lord Justice
Taylor’s findings, "it was too late". (8) It is plain then that, on the basis of the evidence heard by Lord Justice Taylor (which to a large extent was reheard by the Coroner and his jury at the inquest) there was clear evidence that police blunders and negligence was responsible for the fatal crush which caused the deaths of the deceased. If then the jury were, as a matter of law, entitled to reflect that negligence in a verdict (whether of "lack of care" or some other verbal formula falling short of the gross negligence or recklessness necessary to constitute unlawful killing by manslaughter), such a verdict should have been left to them on the facts. (9) Secondly, it is plain that Lord Justice Taylor found some serious deficiencies in the police response to the plight of the injured once they had sustained their injuries at some time between 2.52pm and 3.05pm, or even later. It is true that he had concluded that many of the injuries and deaths were probably inevitable once the fatal crush had built up. But he recognised that a quicker response to the emergency by the police to ensure the early attendance of the emergency services might have saved at least some lives. These findings did at least raise the further question of whether the cause of death (i.e. crush injuries) had not in some cases been aggravated by "lack of care" in the sense of a failure to respond swiftly enough to the plight of the injured and provide them with the necessary medical care to avert death. -9-
Page 1 and 2: M. J. QREQQ, LL.B. J. J. M. HAWTHOR
Page 3 and 4: IN THE MATTER OF THE CORONERS* ACT
Page 5 and 6: Your Memorialists hereby seek your
Page 7 and 8: As is recorded in Lord Keith’s Ju
Page 9: 3.04pm a further surge caused by th
Page 13 and 14: So, despite his reservations about
Page 15 and 16: "There seemed to be a few St. John
Page 17 and 18: Mr. Eccleston Mr. Eccleston is a qu
Page 19 and 20: would have made in saving life. I d
Page 21 and 22: decreased was, when he died, as far
Page 23 and 24: At each of them the evidence of eye
Page 25 and 26: himself up by holding onto Mr. Holl
Page 27 and 28: y a qualified person. The fact that
Page 29 and 30: whether he could have been resuscit
Page 31 and 32: injuries within seconds and irrecov
Page 33 and 34: suitable medical intervention at an
Page 35 and 36: of this evidence had been heard bec
Page 37 and 38: (iii) Moreover it meant that there
Page 39 and 40: who had been admitted to hospital w
Page 41 and 42: in their individual statements. Thi

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